PANG YUN SUN v. THE QUEEN

CACC000660/1968

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 660 OF 1968

 

BETWEEN
	PANG YUN SUN	Appellant
	AND
	THE QUEEN	Respondent

Coram: Huggins, J.

Date of Judgment: 26 November 1968

 

-----------------

JUDGMENT

-----------------

 

Huggins, J:

1. The appellant was originally charged, with others, with robbery with aggravation, there being one charge against him. A re-trial was ordered and when the case came before the learned magistrate for the second trial the magistrate directed that the charge be reframed: three persons were alleged to have been robbed and he directed that each be separated into a separate charge.

2. The evidence was that three persons entered into some business premises and that property was taken by force from the three persons named in the charges. None of the victims was able to identify any of the robbers. Subsequently, as a result of information received, the police went to the appellant's premises. There certain property was recovered. So far as this appellant is concerned what was found was first a bunch of keys: this was not part of the stolen property but one of the keys opened a receptacle in which a pair of compasses was found. This pair of compasses was part of the stolen property. The only other evidence against the appellant and, indeed, the substantial evidence against him in the case, was an alleged confession to the police. In the alleged confession the appellant admitted his participation in the robbery. The admissibility of his confession was challenged and the learned magistrate heard lengthy evidence upon its admissibility. He came to the conclusion that the statement was written voluntarily by the appellant himself. The appellant continues to maintain in this court that the statement was not written voluntarily but I see no reason to disagree with the decision of the learned magistrate.

3. Thereafter the appellant sought to set up an alibi. As the learned magistrate says in a very careful judgment, this was to some extent corroborated. In particular the learned magistrate thought that one witness (Chau Sun) called by the appellant was impressive but he ended up by saying he was not satisfied that Chau Sun was a witness of truth and he rejected his evidence. It is perhaps unfortunate that he worded it in quite that way because, of course, the burden was not on the defence to satisfy the magistrate of anything. Nevertheless, reading the judgment as a whole. I think it is clear that the learned magistrate was left in no doubt that the confession of the appellant was voluntary and was true and that he was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the appellant. I cannot dissent from that conclusion.

4. The appeal must be dismissed.

 

26th November, 1968.

 

Representation:

Appellant in person

Mr. Alexander for the Respondent