OR CHIU FAT v. THE QUEEN
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG
(APPELLATE JURISDICTION)
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 534 OF 1972
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| BETWEEN | ||
| OR CHIU FAT | Appellant | |
| and | ||
| THE QUEEN | Respondent |
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Coram: Huggins, McMullin and Pickering, JJ.
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JUDGMENT
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Huggins, J.:
1. This Appellant was indicted with two others. He was charged on two counts, one of rape and one of unlawful detention of females. He was convicted of rape and acquitted on the second count. He now asks this court for leave to appeal against his conviction, his application having been dismissed by the single judge.
2. The Notice of Application states the ground for appeal to be “that certain evidence was improperly admitted or rejected upon the hearing of the proceedings”. The Appellant has not been able to indicate to us what evidence he says was wrongly admitted or rejected. He has not referred to the cautioned statement which he made and which was in fact admitted. We see no reason to think that it was wrongly admitted and, as the learned judge pointed out at the trial, it was of no consequence because, although the statement was a confession of intercourse with the girl, intercourse was admitted at the trial.
3. Before us the Appellant has asserted his innocence, saying that the intercourse was with the girl’s consent. In effect he seeks leave to call further evidence, because he now says that the intercourse was in consideration of a payment of $100. He concedes that he never mentioned the $100 in the court below and that there he said the intercourse was a reward for his having released the girl from forcible detention by another, and his story now is that he was afraid to tell his wife of the payment of $100 because she would have been angry at his wasting money. We see no reason to believe that this evidence is any more credible than the evidence which he gave at the trial.
4. Like the single judge we see nothing in this appeal. We see no reason to believe that any evidence was wrongly admitted or rejected. There was evidence upon which a jury could convict and it was a matter for the jury to decide whether they believed that evidence or not. We see no reason to question any direction on law in the summing-up of the learned judge and this application is dismissed.
28th March, 1973