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Criminal Appeal1974

LEUNG CHI-WAH TSE MAN LAI FAN-YIN v. THE QUEEN

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3395-EN-1974-08-16

LEUNG CHI-WAH TSE MAN LAI FAN-YIN v. THE QUEEN

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CACC000352/1974

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG

(APPELLATE JURISDICTION)

 

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 352 OF 1974

-----------------

 

BETWEEN:  
 LEUNG Chi-wah TSE Man LAI Fan-yinAppellants
 and 
 THE QUEENRespondent

Coram: Briggs, C.J., Huggins & Leonard, JJ.

Date of Judgment: 16th August 1974

 

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JUDGMENT

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1. The three appellants in this case were tried together with four other persons. One of the then seven accused was acquitted, the other six were all found guilty of various offences. The first and second appellants were found guilty of the offences of blackmail, unlawful detention of a female and traffic in females. The third appellant was found guilty of the offences of blackmail and unlawful detention of a female. The three appellants appeal against their conviction.

2. There is only one point with which we wish to deal. In his oral judgment the learned district court judge did not warn himself of the necessity or desirability of the corroboration of the evidence of the complainant in the charges of unlawful detention and traffic in females.

3. Paragraph 1429 of the 38th Edition of Archbold reads as follows:-

"Sexual cases: Corroboration is looked for, and the jury should be warned of the danger of acting without it, in all cases of sexual offences, irrespective of the age or sex of the complainant or other party involved, and even if the only issue is that of the identity of the person alleged to have committed the offence."

4. In the present case before us, the victim of the unlawful detention and traffic charges herself gave evidence and there was some corroboration of that evidence given by another witness. However, this was not referred to by the trial judge in his judgment. The question is whether the two offences, which are statutory offences, come within the definition of "sexual cases". We think that although in one sense the offences of unlawful detention of a female and traffic in females could be stated to be "sexual offences" they are not within the phrase as it is used in the paragraph from Archbold which has been quoted above. It is quite clear from the cases quoted in support of the proposition contained in that paragraph that the learned editor of Archbold is there referring only to the offences of rape and indecent assault and kindred offences. He is not referring to cases of unlawful detention of or of traffic in females. These two offences are offences against sections 8 and 3 of the Protection of Women and Juveniles Ordinance. That Ordinance makes corroboration mandatory in certain offences, for example, procuration of females and procuring the defilement of females. However, there is no such stipulation with regard to traffic in females and unlawful detention of females. We do not think that it is necessary to give a direction as to corroboration though it is, of course, obviously desirable in cases of this nature.

5. We therefore think it is unnecessary for the trial judge to have dealt with the matter in his judgment. In the event, therefore, these appeals against conviction are dismissed.

 

Representation:

Appellants in person.

Carolan, C.C., for Crown/Respondent.