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Civil Action1978

TAI HING COTTON MILL LTD v. LIU CHONG HING BANK LTD AND OTHERS

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30191-EN-1983-07-12

TAI HING COTTON MILL LTD v. LIU CHONG HING BANK LTD AND OTHERS

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HCA001488C/1978

Action No. 1488 of 1978

Banking - Forged cheques - Wrongful debiting of a customer's current account - Whether the customer is vicariously liable to the bank for the forgeries of its servant - Whether the customer owed the bank a duty of care - Whether the banks' rules were contractual - Construction of the banks' rules - Account stated - Conclusive evidence clause - Verification agreement-Estoppel Evidence - Standard of proof in civil proceedings when allegations of criminal conduct are made.

                A textile mill employed a dishonest accounts clerk who stole HK$ 7,000,000 from its bank accounts over a period of 5 years by obtaining the Managing Director's signatures to cheques by deception and by forging the Managing Director's signature. The mill's internal accounting system was inadequate to prevent or discover the frauds, chiefly because the task of reconciling the monthly bank statements was left to the dishonest clerk and there was no independent check of the reconciliations until at the end in May 1978 the frauds were revealed. At no time ever the 5-year period did the mill ever protest or question any of the monthly bank statements and in the case of one of its bank accounts sent regular confirmations of the monthly statements. In an action by the mill against the clerk for damages and against the three paying banks for declarations that they were not entitled to debit its accounts with them with the amounts of the forged cheques, it was held that:-

1. Proof of criminal conduct in civil proceedings need not be to the standard necessary in criminal proceedings. The civil standard of proof as defined in Reg. v. Home Secretary Ex-parte khawaja[1983] 2 W.L.R. 321 is sufficient. Applying that standard, the plaintiff had proved that all except one of the themes alleged but not admitted to be forged were forged.

2. Prima facie, the defendant banks were not entitled to debit the plaintiff's current accounts with the amounts of the forged cheques.

3. The plaintiff was not vicariously liable to the defendant banks for the fraud or its servant, the 4th defendant.

4. The plaintiff owed the defendant banks no duty either in contract or in tort

(a) to take reasonable care to prevent cheques drawn on its account but not representing its orders being presented for payment, or

(b) to take reasonable care to check its monthly bank statements and to notify the banks of any unauthorized debits.

5. On the facts, the plaintiff would have been in breach of both duties had they been found to exist.

6. The defendant banks' rules did impose contractual obligations upon the parties insofar as they are capable of being given contractual effect.

7. In no case, on the true construction of the defendant banks' rules, did the monthly bank statements become conclusive of the account between the parties in the event of their being confirmed or not objected to.

8. The plaintiff was not estopped from contesting the authority of the defendant banks to debit its accounts by reason of any breach of duty but was estopped by reason of representations made to the banks that the monthly bank statement did not contain unauthorized debits and/or that the bank could assume that they did not contain any unauthorized debits.

9. The estoppel did not operate in the case of the 1st defendant in relation to any forged cheques which passed through its account prior to the plaintiff's failure to object to the first monthly bank statement containing unauthorized debits.

10.The plaintiff was entitled to a declaration in the terms sought against the 1st defendant in relation to unauthorized debits in the monthly bank statement received in January 1978 and to judgment against the 4th defendant in a sum equal to the total amount obtained from the bank accounts save for those sums covered by the declaration. The 2nd and 3rd defendants were entitled to judgment on the claim.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

Action No. 1488 of 1978

BETWEEN

TAI HING COTTON MILL LIMITEDPlaintiff

 

AND

 

LIU CHONG HING BANK LIMITED1st Defendant
THE BANK OF TOKYO LIMITED2nd Defendant
CHEKIANG FIRST BANK LIMITED3rd Defendant
LEUNG WING LING4th Defendant
WANCE CHENG5th Defendant

_______

Coram: Hon. Mantell, J.

Date: 12 July 1983

__________

JUDGMENT

__________

 

1. The plaintiff is a textile manufacturer. The first three defendants are banks. The 4th defendant was employed by the plaintiff as an accounts clerk, and the 5th defendant is the 4th defendant's wife. It is alleged that the 4th defendant stole large sums of money from the plaintiff's bank accounts with the Dah Sing Bank and with each of the first three defendants by fraud or forgery and that the 5th defendants has received some of the proceeds. The plaintiff's claim against the 5th defendant has been compromised. The claim against the 4th defendant is for damages for fraud and conversion. The claims against the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants are for declarations that they are not  entitled to debit the plaintiff's accounts with the amcounts of the forged cheques.

2. Since there are allegations of criminal conduct Mr. Diamond submits that the plaintiff must prove them to the same standard as would be necessary in a criminal court. He relies upon a decision of the Privy Council, (1) not on appeal from Hong Kong, which is certainly authority for the proposition and which was recently followed by the High Court in Hong Kong, (2) but in the latter case the learned judge was not referred to the decision in Reg. v. Home Secretary Ex-parte Khawaja.(3) In khawaja, the House of Lords approved the approach of the English Court of Appeal in Hornal, v. Newberger Products limited(4) and Bater v. Bater(5) which favoured a flexible application of the civil standard. Lord Scarman said :

''I have come to the conclusion that the choice between the two standards is not one of any great moment. It is largely a matter of words. There is no need to import into this branch of the civil law the formula used for the guidance of juries in criminal cases. The civil standard as interpreted and applied by the civil courts will meet the ends of justice".

He quoted the words of Morris L.J. in Hornal's case.

"No real mischief results from an acceptance of the fact that there is some difference of approach in civil actions......the very elements of gravity become a part of the whole range of circumstances which have to be weighed in the scale when deciding as to the balance of probabilities."

I have sought to apply the civil standard as defined in khawaja's case bearing in mind at all times the aphorism of Lord Denning in Blyth v. Blyth. (6)

"In proportion as the offence is grave, so ought the proof to be clear."

Applying that standard I find as follows.

3. The plaintiff is a medium sized, reasonably successful textile company which has been in business in Hong Kong since 1957. It comprises a number of divisions each of which is autonomous to a degree. The Managing Director is Mr. Chen. He started the company in Hong Kong and before 1957, controlled a similar business in Shanghai. At different times, the plaintiff has held a number of bank accounts. In November 1962, the plaintiff opened a bank account with the 1st defendant. That account was allocated to the Spinning and Weaving Division. The request to open a current account is dated 8th November 1962 and was signed by Mr. Chen. The request begins with these words:

"We request you to open a current account for and in the name of Tai Hing Cotton Mill Limited, a company incorporated in Hong Kong, having its registered office at 908/909 Yu To Sang Building, Hong Kong, subject to your Rules and Regulations for the conduct of such account."

4. Mr. Chen admits having seen a copy of the Rules and Regulations at the time of making the request to open a current account. Some alterations were made later but rule 13 of the rules seen by Mr. Chen reads:

"A statement of the customer's account will be rendered once a month. Customers are desires:

 

(1) to examine all entries in the statement of account and to report at once to the Bank any error found therein,

 

(2)to return the confirmation slip duly signed. In the absence of any objection to the statement within seven days after its receipt by the customer, the account shall be deemed to have been confirmed."

No confirmation of any material bank statement was ever sent by the plaintiff to the 1st defendant. The 1st defendant was authorised to pay cheques drawn on behalf of the company if singed by Mr. Chen or by any two of four nominated signatories. An account was opened with the 2nd defendant in November 1961. By letter of 17th November 1961, Mr. Chen agreed on behalf of the plaintiff to observe the provisions of an agreement which is to be found on the reverse of the proforma letter and to conform to the bank's notice in the cheque book. By that letter Mr. Chen further undertook to hold the bank free from any loss resulting from the plaintiff's failure to abide by such provisions or notice. Clause 10 of the "agreement" provides:

"The Bank's statement of my/our current account will be confirmed by me/us without delay. In the case of absence of such confirmation within a fortnight, the Bank may take the said statement as approved by me/us."

Again no material bank statement ever was confirmed. Again cheques could be signed by Mr. Chen alone or by two authorised signatories. The plaintiff's account with the 3rd defendant was opened in September 1957. The request for the account to be opened was signed, as in the other cases, by Mr. Chen and there was the same arrangement for signing cheques as with the 1st and 2nd defendants. By the request, the plaintiff agreed "to comply with your bank's Rules and procedures in force from time to time governing the conduct of such account". There is an issue as to whether or not Mr. Chen had sight of the 3rd defendant's then current. Rules at the time of making the request. He says he did not. Impressive witness though Mr. Chen was, I take his evidence to mean that after this interval of time, he does not remember seeing a copy of the Rules. Mr. Lee, an official of the Chekiang First Bank at the material time, whose evidence was in some respects less than satisfactory, told me that it was the invariable practice for the bank to send or hand a copy or its Rules for current accounts to every customer at the time that the proforma request was sent or handed over. Mr. Chen is meticulous. I do not think that he would have signed the reouest without seeing the Rules to which it referred. I find that he did have a sight of the Rules at the time when he opened the account. I recite rule 7:

"A monthly statement for each account will be sent by the Bank to the depositor by post or messenger and the balance shown therein may be deemed to be correct by the Bank if the depositor does not notify the Bank in writing of any error therein within ten days after the sending of such statement. Except for the month of June and December, no monthly statement for an account will be sent if there is no entry passed through it in the month.'

 

5. From the account being opened in 1957 to March 1978 the plaintiff did confirm the accuracy of each monthly statement by returning the confirmation slip signed by two authorised cheque signatories. I so find even though one such confirmation slip for January 1978 has not been produced. In addition each year before audit the plaintiff asked the bank to confirm its current account balance. Mr. Lee told me that from time to time he had compared suspect signatures with signatures on cheques in an earlier month which had been confirmed. There is no evidence that any of those suspect signatures are to be found amongst, the forgeries and in any event I did not believe him. The allegation that the 3rd defendant relied upon the confirmation in that way is not pleaded. The evidence only came out in cross-examination, and I simply do not accept that given the suspicion the bank would have gone through that procedure rather than telephone the plaintiff.

6. At one time, there were five manufacturing divisions in the plaintiff company. Except for the Knitting Division it was Mr. Chen's practice to allocate to each of then the use of one or more than one of its current banking accounts. Thus, the Garment Division used the bank accounts with the Dah Sing Bank and the 3rd defendant. The Texturizing Division used the accounts at the Bank of Tokyo and at the 2nd defendant. Along with other accounts, the Spinning and Weaving Division and the Dyeing and Finishing Division had the use of the current account at the 1st defendant's bank.

7. I have mentioned that the plaintiff company was reasonably successful. In fact, it made a trading profit in all but one year between 1957 and 1978. In those years, it has been shown to have had a considerable turn over. The profits would have been greater but for the fact that towards the and of 1972, it took into employment the 4th defendant, a young accounts clerk named Leung. He was, as I find, and as he has admitted to the police quite dishonest. He was given responsibility for the books of account of the Garment Division and the Texturizing Division. Before long, he was stealing. He opened bank accounts in names similar to those of real suppliers. Leung persuaded Mr. Chen to sign cheques by showing him forged documents which appeared to support the transaction. Sometimes, Mr. Chen would sign cheques on which the words "or bearer" had not been cancelled. Then, Leung would simply endorse the cheque in his own name and receive payment. In this way, Leung stole HK$317,068.04 from the plaintiff's Dah Sing Bank account between 4th December 1972 and 31st January 1974. He used the same method to steal from the plaintiff's 'current account with the 2nd and 3rd defendants. The extent to which I find he did so will depend upon other findings of fact not yet reached. The method worked well enough, but Leung did not rely upon it entirely. Perhaps because he dared not come too often to Mr. Chen with cheques drawn in favour of the same supplier, he decided of forge Mr. Chen's signature and so by-pass Mr Chen altogether. Leung was an adept forger. He passed forged cheques through the plaintiff's account with the Bank of Tokyo and the Chekiang First Bank and, when his superior retired through ill-health at the beginning of November 1977 and he became responsible for the plaintiff's account with the Liu Chong Hing Bank, he drew forged cheques on that account for substantial sums of money. He was eventually exposed in May 1978 when the new chief accountant carried out a reconciliation of the plaintiff's March monthly statement for its account with the 1st defendant.

8. As I find, there is no question but that Leung obtained the total amount pleaded in the Statement of Claim by one such dishonest means or the other. But the plaintiff's claim against the banks does not get off the ground unless in relation to any particular cheque it can be shown to have been forged. It is important, thereforre, for the plaintiff to be able to distinguish between cheques bearing signatures which were obtained by deception and cheques bearing forged signatures. So, in the first place, I have to ask myself whether or not the plaintiff has proved against each of the first three defendants that all or some of the cheques alleged to have been forged were forged. There is no difficulty with regard to the 1st defendant. Forgery was an issue on the pleadings but after cross-examination of Mr. Chen, Mr Morritt for the 1st defendant conceded that all 54 cheques, material to the case against him, had been forged by Leung. Those cheques are set out in Schedule A of the Particulars under paragraph 4 of the Statement of Claim and were drawn on the plaintiff's account with the Liu Chong Hing Bank between 5th November 1977 and 31st March 1978. They have a face value of HK$3,082.214.30. The 2nd defendant put forgery in issue in respect of all 110 cheques set out in Schedules B and G to the Particulars under paragraph 4 of the Statement of Claim. The plaintiff does not pursue its claim in relation to 6 cheques but alleges that each of the remaining 104 was forged; that they covered the period 30th January 1975 to 1st February 1978 and that between them, they have a face value of HK$790,842.89. So far as the 3rd defendant is concerned, the plaintiff's allegation is that between 30th November 1974 and 28th January 1978, a total of 145 cheques with a total face value of HK$1,772,822.93 were drawn on its account and that each cheque had been forged by Leung. The claim has not been pursued it relation to 8 cheques, others are admitted by the 3rd defendant to have been forged and the upshot is that I have to decide whether or not some 53 cheques were forgeries.

9. The evidence is that all 104 of the Bank of Tokyo cheques were forged. It is not contradicted. It comes in the first place from Mr. Chen who says that the signatures on the cheques are not his. It comes also from Mr. Welch, a handwriting expert, who agrees with Mr. Chen and comes independently to the same conclusion. His report is there to be seen and his evidence was not challenged. Leading counsel for the Bank of Tokyo set Mr. Chen an examination in the witness box. It was testing but perfectly fair. Mr. Chen passed with flying colours. I am satisfied that all 104 cheques were forged and moreover, I am satisfied that they were forged by Leung. With the exceptions of numbers 1 to 5 inclusive and number 7 on Schedule B to the Statement of Claim the are set out in that Schedule and Schedule G. They represent a very substantial proportion of the transactions passing through the account both numerically and in terms of value, and this was at a time when the Texturizing Division had all but closed down.

10. The 53 cheques in issue between the plaintiff and the 3rd defendant are all from Schedule C to the Statement of Claim. They are numbered 73, 74, 80 to 106 inclusive, 108 to 113 inclusive, 115 to 127 inclusive, 129 to 131 inclusive, 133 and 134. There is a conflict of evidence about these cheques. Mr. Chen says that none bears his signature. In his report Mr. Welch appeared to agree, with the reservation that he considered it possible that Mr. Chen might have deliberately altered his own signatures so as to make them appear to be forgeries. I dismiss that theory. When called to give evidence for the plaintiff, Mr. Welch was less sure. After telling me about his qualifications, experience and method, he first of all confirmed the contents of his report but later said that he was unable to exclude the possibility that the cheques were genuine. Mr. Diamond, in his submission, has it that Mr. Welch said he could not say one way or another whether the cheques were forged. That may be right but the effect of his evidence, as a whole, on my mind, was that the 53 cheques probably were forged. There was another expert witness, Mr. Davies who said that the cheques were genuine though he had "some small doubt" about it. In cross-examination of Mr. Chen:, Mr. Diamond adopted the method used on behalf of the 2nd defendant. He showed the witness 20 cheques on which only the signature was visible. The witness was invited to go through them saying whether the signature was his or not. This he did at some speed and got 4 of them wrong or, at least, what he said was inconsistent with his earlier evidence. Once again, I comment that it was a severe test but not unfair. Now, I will not say that I was unimpressed by the evidence of Mr. Welch and Mr. Davies. Within the limits of what is known not to be an exact science, they have given me considerable help. For one thing, they ware both able to confirm Mr. Chen's evidence unreservedly as to 77 of the cheques in Schedule C and 3 cheques in Schedule H. Mr. Welch, was not as emphatic in its favour as the plaintiff might have wished, but certainly did not contradict Mr. Chen on the 53 cheques. Mr Davies was not able to assert positively that any single one of the cheques was not a forgery. They might have helped me even more had they been content to leave the role of advocate to the eminent leading counsel who appeared for the protagonists Of the three witnesses on the issue, I found Mr. Chen the most impressive. I think he is better able than anyone else to recognise his own signature and I am quite sure that, if in doubt, he is fair-minded enough to say so. His evidence as to one of the 53 cheques, No. 532686, has been inconsistent and I am not satisfied as to that. With regard to the remaining 52, I am.

11. Where in any instance, the plaintiff has not persisted in his allegation of forgery or I have not been satisfied that a particular cheque was forged, I do find that Leung obtained the signatures by fraud. That resulted in the plaintiff's bank account being debited and the plaintiff suffering loss to an equivalent amount. Those cheques, therefore, which are to be subtracted from the schedule of forged cheques must be added to the claim against the 4th defendant, for the amount of which, I find the plaintiff is entitled to judgment in any event. I do not propose to make a calculation now. Suffice it to say, for the time being, that the sum is in excess of HK$1,300,000.

12. So, as I find, the defalcations remained undetected for over five years. They involved approximately 500 cheques of which about 300 were forged. The total face value of the cheques was approximately HK$ 7,000,000. The question cannot be avoided. How was Leung able to get away with it for so long?

13. The short answer is that Leung was trusted. He was in a position to manipulate the accounts for which he was responsible, and the plaintiff's system of internal control was ill adapted to either prevent fraud taking place or to find out about it afterwards. Mr. Yorke did not dissent in his speech from the assessment that the system was adequate to guard against error but had not been designed to deal with dishonesty. Provided the office staff were honest, little could go wrong and, indeed, apart from the 4th defendant's activities, little did go wrong over the relevant period. But put a clever and resourceful thief in the position of accounts clerk and there was every chance for fraud to succeed.

14. The plaintiff's system of internal control had been devised by their first thief accountant, a Mr. So. Its operation has been shown on a chart. I do not think that it is necessary to analyse the system further than to say that an accounts clerk with responsibility for a particular division had almost total control of the receipts and payments side of the accounts including the handling of incoming cheques, the recording of receipts and, subject to being able to produce supporting -vouchers, the making and recording of payments. Leung was always able to produce vouchers if needed by forging them. He forged them in advance if he was presenting a chen to me Chen for signature and at sometime before the annual audit in every other case. When the plaintiff's external auditor, Mr. Tam, had pointed out to him in cross-examination the lack of any proper division of function, he agreed that such a division was elementary to a proper system of internal control. And although, as I find, he as dealing with the question of preventing fraud he had previously told me that the prevention of fraud ought to be one object of any commercial accounting system. It seems strange, therefore, that even if the frauds themselves were not shown up on annual audit that the auditors dial not recommend any changes to the system even though, as Mr. Tam said, they might be achieved without the employment of a single additional member of staff. So, taking full advantage of this defect in the system, Leung was able to teem and lade, adjusting the record of receipts so as to disguise the reduced monthly balance. Subsequently, in the case or forged cheques, it seems that by writing up the transaction and raising documents which appeared to support it, he was able to escape detection by the auditors: But as to how that was achieved, the evidence is not entirely clear.

15. Given the shortcomings of the system, it was essential that there should be a high degree of supervision. There was not. Indeed it appears that there was none. Cheque books were left in a unlocked steel cabinet. Cheque counterfoils were not completed as a matter of course. It was not necessary for cheques to be used sequentially or even to be taken from one cheque book at a time. In the case of Mr. Chen, a second signature was not necessary. But most important, I find, was the failure to check what Leung was doing and in particuatar, the failure to check or supervise his reconciliations of the monthly bank statements. Until he retired, Mr. Wang was supposed to do it. He was the chief accountant and office manager and was, no doubt, very busy, but Mr. Chen had given him the job of supervising the accounts clerks and one of the checks he ought to have made was of the monthly reconciliations. Perhaps, he did check from time to time but he cannot have done it properly because if he had, the frauds would have shown up immediately. Mr. Clutterbuck told me that a proper bank reconciliation is carried out line by line and a proper check of a bank reconciliation must be done in the same way. Mr. Clutterbuck, who is an experienced chartered accountant and was called by the plaintiff, also said that the system which the plaintiff employed was not reasonably sound and that it was inadequate for any company. From the point of view of preventing or detecting fraud, I agree.

16. A forged cheque is no mandate to pay and, prima facie, the plaintiff is entitled to be relieved. The onus is cast upon the defendant banks to establish affirmatively that all or some of the debits relating to forged cheques should remain. None of the banks persist in the allegations of ratification and adoption which were pleaded, nor do those who made it continue the allegation that the plaintiff has failed to mitigate its loss. Each of the banks does rely upon the following grounds:-

(a) The plaintiff is vicariously liable for the 4th defendant's fraud.

(b) The plaintiff is in breach of its duty in contract and in tort to take reasonable care to prevent cheques drawn on its account but not representing its orders being presented for payment. The duty referred to has been called "the wider duty".

(c) The plaintiff was in breach of its duty in contract and in tort to take reasonable care to check its monthly bank statements and to notify the bank of any unauthorized debits. This duty has been called "the narrower duty".

(d) On a true reading of the contract between each bank and the plaintiff and on the monthly bank statements being confirmed or not objected to, the monthly bank statements became conclusive of the account between the parties.

(e)By reason of its breach of contract and/or negligence and/or express or implied representations made by it to the banks, the plaintiff is estopped from contending that the debits were unauthorized.

I propose to consider each ground in turn having regard to the facts found as they separately affect the defendants.

(a)     vicarious Liability

17. If right, the proposition must constitute a complete defence for all three banks. It would either afford them a cause of action for a sum equal to the value of the forged cheques or give rise to an estoppel. Other Leading Counsel adopted in advance the submission of Mr. Diamond for the 3rd defendant which ran like this. The plaintiff owed a contractual duty to exercise reasonable care in executing its written orders so as not to mislead the bank or to facilitate forgery. (7) That duty was delegated to the 4th defendant who filled in the blank cheques for Mr. Chen to sign, performed bank reconciliations and controlled the relevant accounting procedures. It does not matter that tile frauds were for the benefit of the 4th defendant and not the plaintiff or that they involved forgery. (8) The plaintiff must answer for its servant's negligence or fraud in performing that duty. Mr. Diamond relies upon words of Lord Denning in Morris v. C.W. Martin & Sons Ltd. (9) which was a case concerning the theft of a fur coat by the servant of a sub-bailee. Lord Denning said:

"From all these instances we may deduce the general proposition that when a principal has in his charge the goods or belongings of another in such circumstances that he is under a duty to take all reasonable precautions to protect them from theft or depredation, then if he entrusts that duty to a servant or agent, he is answerable for the mariner in which that servant or agent carries out his duty. If the servant or agent is careless so that they are stolen by a stranger, the master is liable. So also if the servant or agent himself steals them or makes away with them."

That proposition as expressed by Lord Donning has been applied by the Privy Council (10) and approved by the House of Lords (11) and, of course, it is accepted by me. But I cannot do as Mr. Diamond asks and apply it to the facts of this case.

18. Mr. Diamond has not attempted to argue that Leung had been clothed with cstensible authority within the principle in Lloyd v. Grace, Smith, (12) nor would it have been possible to do so. The argument proceeds upon the premiss that the plaintiff had delegated to Leung its duty of care in the execution of its written order, in other words, the drawing of its cheques. The premiss is false. The cheque is drawn by the person signing it and the authority to sign was given only to the approved signatories. The words of Lord Denning may have been apt had one of them been guilty of fraud. But that is not this case. The submission fails.

(b)     The so called wider duty

19. If the duty exists then I accept chat the standard of care is as propounded by Mr. Morritt:

"The plaintiff was required to take such precautions as a reasonable customer in his position would take to prevent such cheques being presented to his bank for payment".

Again assuming the duty, I would find on the facts that the plaintiff was in breach in relation to all three banks. In the circumstances, the failure to take the steps which I have enumerated to prevent the forgeries and thereafter to uncover them would amount in my judgment to a failure on the part of the plaintiff to take such precautions as would be reasonable for a customer in its position. I do not distinguish between the defendants. The 2nd and 3rd defendants can show that the fraudulent course of conduct continued over a long period of time thus emphasising the breach of duty, if duty there was. The 1st defendant is able to say that the continued employment of Leung at a time when the plaintiff ought to have known of his dishonesty was a breach of the duty of care owed to it.

20. Strictly, I do not think that the breach of the assured duty leads, as submitted, to an estoppel, but to a claim which in each case would be sufficient to extinguish the plaintiff's cause of action. But it is all one, perhaps, since as authorities suggest the banks' claim may be treated as if it were an estoppel to "avoid ci cuity of action''.(13)

21. It is the existence of the duty which is in question. The defendants contend that it exists in contract and independently in tort. I consider first the position in contract. This is the main thrust of the 1st defendant's case trough adopted by the others. Undismayed by the weight of authority against him. Mr. Morritt, if I may say so, has constructed a subtle and seductive argument. I hope that in attempting a summary, I am able to do it justice.

22. The starting point is the well known passage in the judgment of Atkin L. J. in Joachimson's case (7):

"I think that there is only one contract made between the bank and its customer. The terms of that contract involve obligations on both sides and require careful statement. They appear upon consideration to include the following provisions. The bank undertakes to receive money and to collect bills for its customer's account. The proceeds so received are not to be held in trust for the customer, but the bank borrows the proceeds and undertakes to repay them. The promise to repay is to repay at the branch of the bank where the account is kept, and during banking hours. It includes a promise to repay any part of the amount due against the written order of the customer addressed to the bank at the branch, and as such written orders may be outstanding in the ordinary course of business for two or three days, it is a term of the contract that the bank will not cease to do business with the customer except upon reasonable notice. The customer on his part undertakes to exercise reasonable care in executing his written orders so as not to mislead the bank or to facilitate forgery. I think it is necessarily a term of such contract that the bank is not liable to pay the customer the full amount of his balance until he demands payment from the bank at the branch at which the current account is kept."

I am incited to observe that the statement is not intended to be exhaustive of the contractual obligations of the parties to the contract and that it is possible to read into the passage, some notion of reciprocity which had earlier found expression in the speech of Lord Haldane in London Joint Stock Bank v. Macmillan(13) :

"But the customer of a bank is under a yet more specific duty. The banker contracts to act as his mandatory and is bound to honour his cheques without any delay to the extent of the balance standing to his credit. The customer contracts reciprocally that in drawing his cheques on the banker he will draw them in such a form as will enable the banker to fulfil his obligation, and therefore in a form that is clear and free from ambiguity. The correlative obligation is thus complementary to the obligation of the mandatory to apply the balance in paying without delay the cheques as and when presented to him."

So, it is said, the obligations of the customer are reciprocal to or correlative of those of the bank. In 1968, in Selangor's case, (14) it was decided for the first time that a bank owed its customer a duty of care beyond the strict observance of the customers mandate. Ungoed-Thomas J. stated the enlarged duty thus:

"So this case likewise, in my view, goes to indicate that the bank has a duty of care to its customer in respect of thc conduct of its customer's business as Bankes L.J. said and not morely in interpreting its customer's instructions: that that duty may in the circumstances require that the bank should make inquiries before acting and for that purpose to postpone honouring the customer's cheque: and that the test of care required in the performance of the bank's duty is an objective test of reasonableness."

That wider duty of care on the paving bank has been reasserted in Karak Rubber Co. v. Burden. (15) It is argued that the reciprocal or correlative duty which must by implication rest upon the customer is the one for which the defence contends. Fairness and justice requires, it is said, that the customer should be under an implied duty to exercise reasonable care in carrying out its part with regard to operations within its contract with the bank, that being the correlative of tire bank's duty "under its contract with its customer to exercise reasonable care and skill in carry out its part with regard to the operations within its contract with its customer."(14)

23. Mr. Morritt goes on to refer me to decisions in Canada and the United States which, he says, support his proposition and ought to be regarded by me as strong persuasive authority. Morgan v. U.S. Mortgage & Trust Company was decided by the Supreme Court of New York in 1913. (16) That was really a case which turned on the duty of a customer to report discrepancies in his passbook after it had been returned to him with the paid cheques and is more pertinent to the submission yet to be considered with regard to the narrower duty. Yet there can be extracted from it some support for the general proposition. This passage appears in the opinion of Hiscock J. when speaking of the duty of the customer:

"Negligence in this case means the neglect to do those things dictated by ordinary business customs and prudence and fair dealing towards the bank which if done would have prevented the wrong doing which resulted from their omission."

In the headnote, there is this statement of principle:

"It is however permitted for a bank to escape liability for repayment of amounts paid out on forged cheques by establishing that the depositor has been guilty of negligence which contributed to such payments and that it has been free from any negligence."

Stronger and more recent support comes from the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal, upholding a decision of Montgomery J. at first instance, in Canadian Pacific Hotels Limited v. Bank of Montreal.(17) The facts of the Canadian case do bear some comparison to those of the instant one. The learned judge was critical of the plaintiff's internal control system and in particular of the practice of delegating to the fraudulent servant without proper supervision, the task of reconciling bank statements. The decision at first instance turned upon a breach of both the wider and the narrower duty but the Court of Appeal seems to have considered that only breach of the narrower duty was involved. Montgomery J. anticipates Mr. Morritt's submission, and I make no apology for setting out a substantial portion of his judgment.

"I cannot see that a large sophisticated bank customer who receives daily statements of account from its bank whose daily bank transactions amount to many thousands of dollars, can be absolved of responsibility for checking the accuracy of those statements in respect of cheques bearing forged signatures. If the bank is to be held liable to its customer for honouring cheques bearing forged signatures surely it must be considered a part of commercial custom that the customer take steps to identify forgeries and prevent their recurrence as part o normal business practice. The Price Waterhouse report indicated unequivocally that had CP Hotels followed proper accounting practices and procedures, Sigulim would not have been able to succeed in his scheme. Such practices and procedures necessarily include proper bank reconciliations.

As indicated previously, the principles of loss allocation in the various aspects of cheque forgery are somewhat imperfect and arbitrary. In enacting s. 49(1) of the Bills of Exchange Act, the Legislature clearly did not intend that strict liability be imposed upon the hank. A statutory defence is available if the bank can lead evidence to show that the customer is precluded from setting up the forgeries. One such established ground of preclusion is evidence that the customer was so negligent in the conduct of his business affiars as to permit a fraudulent clerk to raise the amount payable on cheque. The customer thus has a positive duty to employ business procedures that minimize this one aspect of cheque forgery. But can it be said that the duty stops there? Surely the customer is also concerned with minimizing forgeries involving fictitious and non-existent payees since s.21(5) of the Act casts these losses upon the customer. Having established business procedures to minimize its risk of loss can the customer then sit back and say it has no concern with guarding against forged signatures since the loss will fall upon the bank?

In a commercial context an efficient internal control system is designed to prevent frauds against the corporation without regard to specific provisions of the Bills of Exchange Act. In my opinion a bank dealing with a sophisticated commercial customer has a right to expect that the customer will have such internal controls in place. The customer owes a duty to the bank to operate an acceptable internal control system so that both the bank and its customer are jointly engaged in prevention and of  minimization losses occurring through forgeries."

One of the Judges of Appeal thought that the decision went beyond what was open to either the court of first instance or the Court of Appeal to find, having regard to previous authority, and in due course, I understand, the decision is to be considered by the Supreme Court of Canada. Nevertheless, the approach of Montgomery J. is commended to me, and I am invited to take the bold cause of departing from principles laid down by Mr. Justice Bray in 1909 and followed ever since in England, Australia, New Zealand and Hong Kong. It is said that there is no previous authority which binds me and no reason of policy or good sense which should persuade me to adhere to the hitherto accepted approach. It is not suggested that there is any custom or business practice to support the implication of such a term but I suppose that it is contended that it may be implied from the presumed intention of the parties or that it is necessary to give business efficacy to the contract.

24. I cannot accede to the submission. Leaving authority on one side, I think that the argument that the term should be implied because it reciprocates the duty on the bank lacks force for the reason Mr. Yorke put forward, namely that whilst the bank transacts its customers business, the customer does not transact any part of the business of the bank. There is no fundamental or compelling reason why justice, fairness or common sense should lead to the implication of a term for which the bank could have expressly stipulated and which is not necessary, as I find, to give business efficacy to the contract. Nor do I thin it could ever be said to be the presumed intention of the parties in the known state of English Law at the dates when these accounts were opened to include a term which would cast a previously unrecognised duty upon the customer. I would respectfully adopt the approach of Mr. Justice Bray who considered an almost identical submission. (18)

"It amounts to a contention on the part of the bank that its customers impliedly agreed to take precautions in the general course of carrying on their business to prevent forgeries on the part of their servants. Upon what is that based? It cannot be said to be necessary to made the contract effective. It cannot be said to have really been in the mind of the customer, or, indeed, of the bank, when the relationship of banker and customer was created. What is to be the standard of the extent or number of the precautions to be taken? Applying it to this case, can it be said to have been in the minds of the directors of the company that they were promising to have the passbook and the cash-book examined at every board meeting, and to have a sufficient number of board meetings to prevent forgeries, or that the secretary should be supervised or watched the chairman? If the bank desire that their customers should make these promises they must expressly stipulate that they shall. I am inclined to think that a banker who required such a stipulation would soon lose a number of his customers. The truth is that the number of cases where bankers sustain losses of this kind are infinitesimal in comparison with the large business they do, and the profits of banking are sufficient to compensate them for this very small risk. To the individual customer the loss would often be very serious; to the banker it is negligible."

I do not think that the views expressed have lost any of their force in the intervening years and I am encouraged in so thinking by the robust judgment in 1981 of Murphy J. as a member of the High Court of Australia.(19)

25. But whatever view I might take on grounds of policy, and I am far from being satisfied that it is ever right for a judge of first instance to allow such considerations to persuade him to depart from a settled approach whether bound by previous decisions or not, there is a weight of authority which compels me to reject the defence submission. The statement of the limits of a customer's duty as appears from Kepitigalla (18) has been expressly approved by the House of Lords in Macmillan's case, (13) Viscount Haldane remarking that Bray J. had stated the principle "with conspicuous lucidity". Though Atkin L.J. may not have been attempting to give an exhaustive statement of a customer's obligations, he cannot have been ignorant of the decision in Kepitigalla (18) or of the observations in the speeches in Macmillan. (13) More recently the passage which I have cited from the judgment of Bray J. was referred to with approval by McNeill J. in Wealden Woodlands (Kent) Limited v. National Westminister Bank. (20)

"These passages I find wholly consistent with the other authorities to which I have referred and I note that, not merely was it not the subject of appeal, but that it stood uncriticised for over 70 years.''

 

The learned judge was concerned with the narrower duty, it is true, but his observation is apt in the present context. In 1975, the New Zealand Court of Appeal rejected the concept of a wider and a narrower duty of care on the customer.(21) Richmond J. delivered a judgment with which the other members of the Court agreed. In the course of it, he said:

 

"The Kepitigalla case was cited with approval by Lord Finlay L.C. in the Macmillan case, and also by Viscount Haldane in the passage which have already cited. I know of no sufficient reason why we should not retain in New Zealand, the principle so clearly laid down by the House of Lords that the only type of negligence on the part of a customer which will remove from the banker the risk of paying on a forged cheque is negligence in or immediately connected with the drawing ,f the cheque itself."

In Hong Kong, Mr. Justice Leonard in Asien Pazifik Merchant Finance Limited v.Shanghai Commercial Bank Limited(22) rejected similar submissions to those confronting me. And more recently still, Mr. Justice Fuad indicated what his attitude was likely to he if called upon to decide the point. (23)

He said:-

"As the pleadings stood, part of the defence gave promise of interesting submissions that the Court should disassociate itself from a line of decisions of high authority in a number of Commonwealth jurisdictions to hold that in the circumstances of this case the bank was entitled to succeed upon a defence based on Wah Shing's negligence in not exercising reasonable care over the custody of the cheque books and in failing to examine the bark statements over a period of 14 months. In the eves Mr. Martin Lee for the bank did not urge such contentions upon me. If I may say so, with respect, I think this was a responsible decision and I am bound to say that as a Court of first instance I would not have been inclined to presume to disturb precedents followed and acted upon for some 90 years on the basis of which banks and the business community have no doubt for long conducted their affairs."

I respectfully agree.

26. Another branch of Mr. Morritt's argument is that Kepitigalla followed upon a line of authority in which the customer's duty was said to depend upon it being the proximate, immediate or direct cause of the loss. That says Mr. Morritt is no longer the test in the light of more recent authority culminating in the decision of the House of Lords in Junior Books Limited v. Veitchi Co. Limited.(24) Now he submits the test is one of reasonable foreseeability and, therefore, to the extent that Kepitigalla (18) depended upon the earlier authorities, it is no longer good law. With respect to that argument it seems to me that what was being considered in kepitigalla was the customers' contractual duty towards the bank and not some alternative or additional duty in tort. Also the earlier authorities to which I was referred running from Bank of Ireland v.Trustees of Evans Charities(25) down to Lewes v. Sanitary Steam Laundry Limited, (26) which I shall have cause to look at more closely in another connection, were concerned not with such negligence as might give rise to a cause of action but with negligence operating as an estoppel. The distinction is, I think, an important one and will call for some consideration at a later stage in this judgment. Nevertheless, the submission proceeds on the basis that the wider duty did exist in tort, that the plaintiff was in breach of that duty and that the banks have consequentially suffered loss. If I had found the duty to exist in contract, I think that I may well have been persuaded to find a coterminous duty in tort. Put if I am right in holding that the plaintiff owed no such duty in contract, is it, nevertheless, possible for the same duty to arise in tort even though it relates directly to the performance of the contract between the parties? That would seem surprising. Midland Bank 'Trust Co. Limited v. Hett, Stubbs and Kemp (a firm)(27) and Ross v. Caunters(28) are authorities for the proposition that these may be independent but coextensive duties in contact and tort, but no authority suggesting a wider or larger duty in tort has been cited to me and I hold there to be none.

(c)    The so called narrower duty

27. Again, making the assumption that there is such a duty, I accept that the standard of care would be as suggested by Mr. Morritt:

"The plaintiff was required to take such steps to check his monthly bank statements as a reasonable customer in his position would take to enable him to notify the bank of any items debited therefrom which were not or may not have been authordsed by him."

Making the same assumption as to the existence of the duty, on the facts found and particularly with regard to the failure to check bank statement reconciliations, I would hold that there had been a breach of that duty on the part of the plaintiff in relation to all three defendant banks. As in the case of the wider duty, I do not think that breach of the narrower duty would give rise to an estoppel but to a claim for damages sufficient to extinguish or defeat the plaintiff's cause of action.

28. Except that it is less ambitious, Mr. Morritt's contention that the narrower duty results from an implied term of the contract is the same as his contention in support of the wider duty. It is true that he is able to offer more North American authorities in which the existence of the duty has been upheld. Indeed, one of them Leather Manufacturers' Bank v. Morgan(29) was cited to Mr. Justice Bray in Kepitigalla. And I think that I am right in saying that in the United States, the proposition now has the force of statute. But the authorities to the contrary to which I have previously referred are just as strong in denying the existence of this implied term as they were of the other and the same reasons which persuaded me to reject the wider proposition lead me to the same conclusion in respect to the narrower one. It also follows from my earlier reasoning that in the absence of any contractual duty upon the customer to check his monthly statements, there can be no equivalent duty arising in tort.

29. I should not leave this ground of defence without making some reference to the interesting submission put foulard by Mr. Chang on behalf o the 2nd defendant. He referred me to clause 10 of the agreement between the 2nd defendant and the plaintiff. I have set out its terms elsewhere. He did not, as I understood, invite me to construe that term as expressly imposing a duty upon the plaintiff to check his monthly bank statements and notify any unauthorised debits but he did ask me to view it as a circumstance making the existence of an implied term to that effect more probable. The submission went in this way. There is a continuing duty on both the bank and the customer to act with reasonable care to ensure the proper working of the account. (30) The continuing duty in turn involves, at least in the case where the contract between them expressly requires the customer to confirm to the bank without delay periodic statements of the customer's account rendered by the bank, a duty on the part of the customer to check and verify the entries in the statements with reasonable care and to inform the bank within a reasonable time of any discrepancies. That formulation produces an attractive hybrid but I cannot accept it. It seems to me that the existence of the express provision, if that is what it is, goes to negative rather than to support the implication of any additional duty.

(d)    The monthly bank statements

30. Common to the defences of all three banks is the contention that the bank statements have become conclusive of the state of account between them and the plaintiff and cannot now be re-opened. This is a separate ground of defence from estoppel and depends upon an express or implied agreement between the parties. Whether the effect of such an agreement, sometimes called a verification agreement, sometimes a conclusive evidence clause and by Mr. Diamond an exceptions clause, is to produce a true account stated seem to me to he doubtful. For one thing, an account stated is bind binding on both parties, a conclusive evidence clause need not be. What is clear, however, is that the basis for this defence lies contract. There is no doubt that the parties may reach an express agreement which will have the result of preventing one or both contradicting the entries in the bank statement. There has been doubt in the past as to whether to failure to object to an error in the passbook or bank Statement would have the same effect. (31) I accept Mr. Diamond's submission, again adopted by other counsel, that the effect of the earlier authorities and in particular of Devaynes v. Noble, (32)Blackburn. Building Society v. Cunliffe, Brooks & Co.(33) and Spencer v. Wakefield(34) was that where passbooks were sent periodically by a banker to his customer and were hot contested by the customer on the figures entered, an expression of consent was implied to toth the figures and an account stated. I do make the observation, however, that the Master's Report in Devaynes's case speaks of silence being regarded as an admission and no other adjustment, statement or allowance thereafter usually taking place. (My emphasis) Also I o observe that in Blackburn Building Society v. Cunliffe, Brooks & Co.,(33) Lord Selbourne L.C. spoke of the passing to and fro of the passbook as being "evidence of a stated and settled. account" and in Spencer v. Wakefield(34)the customer waited ten year's before seeking to question the bank's interest charges and it could be said that the decision rested upon another ground. Nevertheless, I do think that Mr. Diamond is right, as I do also with retard to his second submission or concession that the weight of later English authority is against the preposition. (35) I think that the present position is correctly summarized in this passage from the judgment of Bankes L.J. in Vagliano v. Bank of England(36) which formed no part of the Court of Appeal decision reversed by the House of Lords.

"The plaintiff form time to time received from the bank his pass-book, with entries debiting the payments made, for which the bank sent the bills as vouchers, which were retained by the plaintiff when he returned without objection the pass-books. It was contended that this was a settlement of account between aim and the bank, and that he had been guilty of such negligence with respect to tire examination of the vouchers as would have prevented him from being relieved from this settlement of account. But there was no evidence to shew what, as between a customer and his banker, is the implied contract as to the settlement of account by such a dealing with the pass-book, or that, having regard to the ordinary course of dealing between a banker and his customers, the plaintiff had done anything which can be considered a neglect of his duty to the bank or negligence on his part."

Of course, the effect of a failure to object to entries on the bank statement will vary according to the circumstances of the case. But where, as here, the bank retains the paid vouchers, it is difficult to see how a failure to object could do more than raise a rebuttable presumption that the settlement correct.

31. But in this case, the defendants do riot rely wholly, or perhaps at all, upon any implied agreement because each of them contends that upon a true construction of their respective bank contracts, it will be found that the plaintiff is expressly precluded from re-opening the account. And in particular, each of them contends that it is the term, rule or regulation, which I set cut in my findings of fact,  which gives to each of them this defence. This judgment has become so long, and no doubt wearisome, that it may have been forgotten that the plaintiff asked to open an account subject to the 1st defendant's rules and regulations for the conduct of such account; with the 2nd defendant, the plaintiff undertook to observe the provisions of an agreement on the reverse of the letter of request; on asking to open an account with the 3rd defendant, the plaintiff agreed to comply with the bank's rules and procedures in force from time to governing the conduct of the account. Now provided that the terms of agreement or the rules and regulations referred to are capable of being given contractual effect, I do not see how it can be argued that the plaintiff is not bound by them. Certainly, it may be said that some of the rules are precatory, advisory or instructional but others are hot and in my view, it is a question of construction in any particular case as to whether or not a rule does impose an obligation upon the plaintiff or seeks to declare a legal consequence on the happening of a given event. Fuad J., as he then was, took a different view in Lam Yin-fei's case (23) but the words which he had to construe were less clear in their meaning and it appears that that the learned judge was much impressed by the fact that the rules in his case could be changed at any time without notice to the customer. If it be the case that my view and that of Mr. Justice Fund cannot be reconciled, then I must respectfully beg to differ. It was said by Mr. Yorke that the rules were like those of a member's club and not intended to create contractual relations. I do not agree. They are not like the rules of a club. Thay are intended to govern a commercial relationship and, in any event, I doubt the correctness of the premiss. (37)

32. I have set out elsewhere in my judgment the rules upon which reliance is placed. To paraphrase the relevant portion of each:-

        Rule 13 of the 1st defendant's rules and regulations provides that in the absence of any objection within 7 days, the amount shall be deemed to have been confirmed.

        Clause 10 of the 2nd defendants agreement provides that in the absence of confirmation, the bank may take the bank statement as approved. ("Approved" must bear the same meaning as "confirmed" and actual confirmation must for present purposes lead to the same result.)

        Rule 7 of the 3rd defendant's rules provides that if the customer does not notify the bank of any error within 10 days, the balance may be deemed to be correct.

In each case, it is contended that the rule or clause it the circumstances of the present case precludes the plaintiff from challenging the correctness of the bank statements which have been sent to them on a regular basis over the material period. In the case of the 1st and 2nd defendants, it is said that the result has been achieved because either there was no objection in the one case or an absence of confirmation in the other, and in the case of the 3rd defendant, it is said that the actual confirmations which I have found there were must be at least as efficacious to shut the plaintiff out.

33. There have been a number of decisions in Canada where verification agreements or conclusive evidence clauses have been held to be an effective bar to a customer's claim in relation to the debiting of his account with the, amount of a forged cheque. Those cases have held, I think rightly, that it is no answer to a conclusive evidence clause or verification agreement to say that it seeks to protect the bank from liability for fundamental breach. But in each of the Canadian decisions to which I have been referred, the clause or agreement to be construed has peen expressed in the clearest possible language. I shall give two examples. In Arrow Transfer Co. Ltd. v. Royal Bank of Canada,(38) the "Verification of Account Agreement" read as follows:-

"In consideration of The Royal Bank of Canada (hereinafter caller the 'Bank') opening or continuing an account with the undersigned, the undersigned hereby agrees with the Bank in respect of each account with the under-signed now or hereafter kept by the Bank at any of its branches or agencies to verify the correctness of each statement of account received from the Bank and if a statement of account and relative vouchers are not received by the 10th day after the end of each month or, if statements are not to be prepared monthly by the 10th day after the end of the term agreed on for their preparation to obtain them from the Bank and within 30 days after the time when they should have been received to notify the Bank in writing at the branch or agency where the account is kept of any alleged omissions from or debits wrongly made to or inaccurate entries in the account as to states and that at the end of the said 30 days the account as kept by the Bank shall be conclusive evidence without any further proof that except as to any alleged errors so notified and any payments made on forged or unauthorized endorsements the account contains all credits that should he contained therein and no debits that should not be contained therein and all the entries therein are correct and subject to the above exception the Bank shall be free from all claims in respect of the account."

In Syndicat des Comionneurs Artisans du Quebec Metro Metropolitan v. Banque Provincale des Canada,(39) the relevant portion of the verification agreement was:-

"2. The customer shall examine the said cheques and other relevant documents and all the debit and credit items on the said statement, and shall notify the bank, in writing, within thirty (30) days of the date of each delivery or that of dispatch by mail, of all errors, irregularities or omissions shown by the said statement. The customer expressly agrees that the production by the Bunk of the record of dispatch and delivery of the said documents and statements, duly initialled by the officials designated for this purpose shall constitute prima facie and indisputable evidence of such delivery, dispatch and receipt to and by the customer of the said documents and statements.

3. On the expiry of this period of thirty days (excepting errors, irregularities or emissions previously notified to the Bank, as aforesaid, and excepting payments made on counterfeit or unauthorized endorsements) the customer agrees once and for all with the Bank that the balance shown in this statement of account is correct, that the said cheques and other relevant documents are authentic duly chargeable and debited to his account and that he has no right to be credited with any sum which is not shown on this statement."

In the Arrow Transfer case, the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the decision of the court of the first instance that the verification agreement in question was not ambiguous and made the bank statements conclusive evidence against the customer. Whilst agreeing with the decision on another ground, Laskin J. took a different view on the construction of the agreement. It is not for his view or the particular clause that I now cite a substantial portion of his judgment, but for his approach to questions of construction of this kind which I respectfully propose to adopt. (38)

"Forgery and unauthorized debits to a customer's account owing to the forgery or fraud of third persons or of employees do not exhaust a bank's liability. There is the quite ordinary case of arithmetic error, of failure to credit sums to an account, of wrongful albeit innocent attribution of debits to an account. These are possible, even if infrequent; perhaps as infrequent as forgery and fraud. These instances of breach of obligation to a customer relate directly to what the bank has sought to achieve through the verification agreement. In my opinion, the principal question is not whether the bank has sought to protect itself against its breach of a fundamental term of its relationship with its customer, but rather what is the scope of protection which it has achieved under a document which is more a contract of adhesion than a bargained arrangement.

 

Neither forgery nor fraud are expressed as risks of the customer. The key words are "verify the correctness" of statements of account received from the bank; "notify the bank in writing ..... of any alleged omissions from or debits wrongly made to or inaccurate entries in the account". It is in respect of these, unless there is timely notice, that "the account as kept by the bank shall be conclusive evidence" that it is correct, and that, subject to what is excepted (this includes "payments made on forged or unauthorized endorsements")the bank is to be free "from all claims in respect of the account".

I find it strange that a bank which seeks by contract to throw the risk of all forged drawer signatures upon its customer should be so reticent about referring expressly to such an eventuality. It is not as if its verification form subject-matter without it. The verification form, as a matter of words, encompasses the situation which arose in Union Bank of Canada v. Wood. Beyond this or related situations, it surely is, to say "the least, "ambiguous"(to use the term applied by Duff, J., in the Steward case) in any suggested application to forgery on fraud. There is every reason to construe it contra proferentem, and I would therefore conclude that its words do not provide protection against the forgery of the drawer's signature.

The construction that I would put on the verification agreement is consistent with the approach to contractual limitations of liability in other kinds of relationships, such as bailee and carrier and consignor, retailer and purchaser. Risks that are by contract to be passed by a party, upon whom they would otherwise rest, to the other party to the relationship must be brought home expressly if they are to be effective; at least this is so when the limitation would still have subject-matter if unexpressed risks be found to be outside its general language."

I do not overlook tae point that by its contract with the 2nd defendant, the plaintiff undertook to hold the bank free from loss resulting from any failure to observe its provisions. Even so, in none of the terms or rules which I have to consider are forgery or fraud expressed to be risks of the plaintiff. Each of the rules or terns has subject-matter without reference to fraud or forgery. Not one of the rules or terms refers to the account becoming "conclusive evidence". No reference is made in any of the rules or terms to the items which are to be included in the account. In my judgment, there is, in each case, every reason to construe the rule or term contra poferentem and so doing in each case, I conclude that it provides no defence to the plaintiff's claim is this action.

(e)    Estoppel

34. This ground is put in two ways (a) that the plaintiff is estopped from asserting that its account has been wrongly debited by reason of its own negligence and (b) that the plaintiff is estopped as under (a) by reason of its representations that the bank statements were correct. In considering the first of those two propositions, perhaps some of us, and certainly 1 include myself, have been guilty of an imprecise use of language and possibly some confusion of thought. It is well, therefore, to go back to first principles. Estoppel is a rule of evidence which comes into operation if a statement of the existence of a fact has been made by one party or his agent to another with the intention that the other should act upon the faith of the statement and the other party does act upon the faith of the statement. (40) The essentials of the doctrine were clearly set out by Lord Tomlin in Greenwood v. Martins Bank Limited.(41) They are:-

(1) A representation or conduct amounting to a representation intended to induce a course of conduct on the part of the person to whom the representation is made.

(2) An act or omission resulting from the representation, whether actual or by conduct, by the person to whom the representation is made.

(3) Detriment to such person as a consequence of the act or omission.

(4)Mere silence cannot amount to a representation, but when there is a duty to disclose deliberate silence may become significant and amount to a representation.

Negligence as such can never operate as an estoppel. If I may quote from a distinguished writer on the topic:(42)

"The neglect of a legal duty gives a cause of actions; it cannot as such operate as an estoppel. If there is one thing clearer than another in the lair of this subject, it is that an estoppel arises only in favour of a party who has been misled into altering his position for the worse as against the party who has so misled him, and that such misleading can be effected only by a representation:. The representation may be made by (inter alia) abstention from speech or action, if such abstention constitutes a breach of a duty to spear or act, and not otherwise, as has already been explained; but such breach of duty has not the slightest effect as an estoppel unless it induces in the mind of the person to whom the duty is owed a belief in the existence or non-existence of some state of things, in which belief he adopts a course of action to his detriment, which he would not otherwise have adopted. In other words, it is not the negligence per se which estops, but only the representation implied from it. The estoppel to which this false label has been attached is merely one of the many species or illustrations of, and not a class by itself cenerically distinguishable from, a class of estoppel by representation,"

I believe that upon close examination, all the authorities which speak of negligence giving rise to an estoppel are in fact concerned with a representation to be implied from the neglect of a duty. So it was in Bank of Ireland v. Evans Trustees(43) where Baron Parke observed:

"It is clear, we think, that the negligence in the case, if there be any, is much too remote to affect the transfer itself, and to cause the Trustees to he parties to misleading the bank in making the transfer on the forged power of attorney."

In Swan v. North British Australasian Co.,(44) this passage occurred in the judgment of Blackburn J.:

"What I consider the ,fallacy of my brother Wilde's judgment is this: He lays down the rule in general terms 'that if one has led others into the belief of a certain state of facts by conduct of culpable neglect calculated to have that result and they have` acted on that belief to their prejudice, he should not be heard afterwards as against such person to shew that state of facts did not exist.' This is very nearly right, but in my opinion not quite, as he omits to qualify it by saying that the neglect must be in the transaction itself, and be the proximate cause of leading the party into that mistake; and also, as I think, that it must be the neglect of some duty that is owing to the person led into that belief or what comas to the same thing, to the general public of whom this person is one."

And in Lewes Sanitary Laundry Co. v. Barclay & Co.,(45) Mr. Justice Kennedy cave his reason for rejecting the bank's defence of estoppel by negligence in this way:

"I am unable to hold that Mr. William Gates Sr. on chat occasion is proved to have done or said anything which could properly be treated by the bank as a representation and assurance, on behalf of the plaintiff company, that the company's account, as it stood in the bank's ledger at that time contained only proper and authorised items of debit, and so prejudiced the bank's position.''

 

It may very well happen that the neglect of duty which amounts to an implied representation will itself give rise to a cause of action. So it is that the negligent drawer of a cheque may not only be estopped from contesting its genuineness but as in Kepitigalla may also be in breach of an implied term of his contract with the bank.

 

35. It follows in this case that its failure to operate an efficient internal control system even if stigmatized as negligent could never raise an estoppel against the plaintiff; but if I had found that the plaintiff owed a duty to the banks to check its monthly statements, the negligent performance of that duty or failure to perform is at all might well have raised an estoppel. However, I did not and insofar as the three banks rely upon "estoppel by negligence", they fail.

36. The second limb of the proposition is stronger. The plaintiff returned confirmation slips every month after receiving its bank statements from the 3rd defendant. The slip included these words "I/we acknowledge receipt of your monthly statement of my/our current account with you shorting the following balance which has been examined and found correct" and bore two authorised signatures. There is no doubt, to my mind, that there is a clear representation of fact. But I do not find the other two defendants to be in a worse position. The 1st defendant's rules and regulations, which I have found to be contractual, provide that "in the absence of any objection to the statement within 7 days after its receipt by the customer, the account shall be deemed to have been confirmed." The 2nd defendant's agreement provides that "in tie case of absence of such confirmation within a fortnight, the bank may take the statement as approved by me/us." The contractual effect of those two rules is to turn failure to respond into a representation. In such a case, the defendants need not show the breach of any duty or indeed the existence of one. They may rely simply upon the fact of the representations.

37. I think that it would be right to say that neither the 1st nor the 2nd defendants put estoppel by representation on this basis in the forefront of its defence, but I take the view that the pleadings are adequate to cover the point.

38. I have held that the particular clauses contained in the respective banking contracts of these defendants fall short of producing a true account stated. I have held also that they are not to be regarded as conclusive evidence clauses, that is an express agreement by each party to be estopped, as was found to be the case in Burrouqhs Adding Machines Ltd. v. Aspinall.(45) Up to now, the largest construction that I have been prepared to place upon any one of these clauses is one which produces that kind of account stated which raises a rebuttable presumption as to its correctness. But that is not to exclude the possibility of a representation on either side as to the correctness or otherwise of the accounts giving rise to an estoppel if the other essential characteristics of estoppel are present, and in holding, as I do, that the representations which I have found to have been made are of such a kind, I believe that I do not say anything which is inconsistent with my earlier findings.

39. I was at one time much exercised with the thought that the plaintiff's representation in each case might be cancelled out by the representations made by the bank. I had in mind the following passage from Sir Alexander Turner's excellent edition of Spencer Bower and Turner: (47)

"A good affirmative answer to a prima facie case of estoppel is established by proof that the representation relied upon an giving rise to the estoppel was founded upon, or the outcome of, a previous representation made by the representee to the representor. In any such case, the mine of the one party is exploded by the countermine of the other, and nothing remains as the subject of the decision, except the facts. The representee is estopped by   his own representation from setting up that the representor is estopped by his. This is what is meant by the old formula that 'estoppel against estoppel doth put the matter as large'."

After all, by sending out a bank statement, the bank does represent that the statement records genuine transactions passing through the account in the previous month. In Lloyds' Bank v. the Hon. Cecily K.Brooks, (48) the bank was estopped from claim claiming back credits wrongly placed to the depositor's account because the depositor had altered her position on the strength of them. But the point has not been taken before me and upon reflection I lave come to the conclusion that the plaintiff's representations do not spring solely those of the defendants'. If the banks represent as I have put it, the plaintiff in turn does not merely represent that the accounts contain only genuine transactions but in assuming as much that the banks are right.

40. Before any one of these representations on the part of the plaintiff could give rise to an estoppel, it would have to be shown in each case by the party making the contention:

(a) that the plaintff intended the bank to rely upon it,

(b) that the bank did rely upon it,

(c) that the bank was induced to act to its detriment, and

(d)that it did so act.

No positive evidence has been led save that of the official from the 3rd defendant which I rejected, and as to the continued. operation of the bank account. And, of course, I know that none of the banks was able to pursue its remedy against Leung until after 2nd May 1978. But on the evidence before me and on making such interence from the proven or admitted facts as I think it right to make, I am satisfied that in each case the elements necessary to an estoppel have been made out. I find, in each case, that the detriment to the bank or prejudice suffered has been its willingness to continue to operate the account and to expose itself to the risk of paying cut on forged cheques. In the case of the 2nd and 3rd defendants, I find that there has been an additional prejudice to the bank in that through the passage of time, they have lost their best opportunity for recovering from Leung. I do no find that same prejudice in the case of the 1st defendant which only became exposed to the fraud in November 1977 and I am satisfied that the chances of recovering from Leung have not been substantially diminished in the period November 1977 to May1978. If follows that in the case of the 1st defendant, there eras no operative estoppel arising from the first representation which I find to be that made following the month of December 1977.

41. Therefore, there will be judgment for the plaintiff against the 1st defendant in the terms of the declaration sought, in respect of the forged cheques debited to the plaintiffs account for November and December 1977. There will be judgment for the 2nd and 3rd defendants on the claim. There will be judgment for the plaintiff against the 4th defendant in all sums claimed save in respect of that sum for which I have given a declaration in favour of the plaintiff against the 1st defendant.

42. I shall require the assistance of counsel in calculating the appropriate figures for inclusion in the orders and I should welcome submissions as to the appropriate rate of interest to be awarded and which I propose to award not only in relation to the judgment against the 4th defendant but also on the amount covered by the declaration. I reject the argument that because the sum wrongly debited was in a non-interest bearing account, interest is not recoverable. The plaintiff has lost the opportunity of placing the money at interest which, in my judgment, is all that it is necessary for the plaintiff to show.

(C.B.K. Mantell)
Judge of the High Court

(1)The People of the State of New York v. Heirs of Phillips (deceased)  [1939] 3 All E.R. 952

(2)Lloyd's Bank International Ltd. and C. B. I. Finance (H.K.) Ltd. v. Vernet 18th nay 1983 (unreported)

(3)[1923] 2 W.L.R. 321

(4)   [1957] 1 Q.B. 247

(5)    [1951] P35

(6)    [1966] A.C. 463 at p.669

(7)    Joachimson v. Swiss Bank Corp. [1921] 3 K.B. 110 per Atkin L.J. at p.127

(8)    Uxbridge Permanent Benefit Buildings Society v. Pickard[1939] 2 K.B. 248

(9)   [1966] 1 Q.B. 716 at p.728

(10)    Port Swettenham Authority v. T.W. Wu & Co. [1979] A.C. 580

(11)    Photo Production Ltd. v. Securicor Transport Ltd. [1980] A.C. 827

(12)    [1912] A.C. 716

(13)per Lord Finlay in London Joint Stock Bank Ltd. v. Macmillan & Others[1918] A.C. 777 at p. 799

(13)    [1918] A.C. 777 at p.814

(14)    Selanger United Rubber Estates v. Craddock[1968] 1 W.L.R. 1555 at p.1599

(14)Selanger United Rubber Estates v. Craddock.[1968] 1 W.L.R. 1555 per Ungoed-Thomas J. at p. 1608

(15)    [1972] 1 W.L.R. 602

(16)    208 N.Y. 218

(17)     122 D.L.R. (3d) 519 and 139 D.L.R. (3d) 578

(18)Kepitigalla Rubber Estates Limited v. National Bank of India Limited[1909] 2 K.B. 1010 at. p. 1025

(19)Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia v. Sydney Wide Stores Pty. Limited  & Another[1981] 55 A.L.J.R. 574

(20)    11th March 1983 (unreported)

(21)    National Bank of New Zealand v. Walpole and Patterson[1975] 2 N.Z.L.R.7

(22)    [1982] H.K.L.R. 273

(23)Lam Yin-fei trading as Wah Shing Garment Manufacturing Co. and Another v. Harg Lung Bank Limited[1982] H.K.L.R. 215 at p. 217

(24)    [1982] 3 W.L.R. 477

(25)    5 H.L.C. 10 E.R. 950

(26)    [1906] 11 Commercial Cases 255

(27)    [1979] Ch. 384

(28)    [1980] Ch. 297

(29)    [1885] 117 U.S. Report 96

(30)    per Lord Justice Scrutton L.J. in Greenwood v. Martins Bank[1932] 1 K B.371 C .A.

(31)    per Lord Wright in Firm Bishun Chand v. Seth Girdhary Lau[1934] 50 T.L.R. 465 at p.468

(32)    [1816] 1 Mer. 529

(33)    [1882] 22 Ch. D. 61

(34)    [1887] 4 T.L.R. 194

(35)    Chatterten v. London County Bank [1890] The Miller

(36)    [1889] 23 Q.B.D. d. 243 C,A

(37)    Clarke v. Dunraven[1897] A.C. 59

(38)    [1971] 27 D.L.R. (3d) 91

(39)    [1969] 11. D.L.R. (3d) 610

(38)    [1971] 27 D.L.R. (3d) 81 at pp 97 & 98

(40) See Nippon Man Kwa Kabushiki Kaisha v. Dawson's Bank Ltd.[1935] 51 L1. L. Rep. 147 J.C. per Lord Russell of Killowen at p. 151

(41)[1933] A.C. 51 at p.57

(42)Sir Alexander Kingcome Turner, Editor of Spencer Bower and Turner "Estoppel by representation" 3rd edition paragraph 75

(43)    5 H.L.C. 389 1 E.R. 950

(44)    2 H & C 175 159 E.K. 73 at p. 76

(45)    [1906] Commercial Cases 255 at p. 269

(46)    [1925] 1 T.L.R. 276 C.A.

(47)    3rd edition paragraph 155

(48)    December 15th, 1950 reported Journal of the Institute of Bankers Vol. 72 114

Representation:

R. Yorke, Q.C., C. Ching Q.C. & R. Tang (Therese P.F. Chow & Co.) for Plaintiff.

A. Morritt, Q.C. & O.V. Cheung, Q.C. & A. Li (Deacons) for 1st Defendant.

D. Chang, Q.C. & R. Faulkner (D.W. Ling & Co.) for 2nd Defendant.

A. Diamond, Q.C., K. Bokhary, Q.C. & M. Delgado (F. Zimmern & Co.) for 3rd Defendant.

4th Defendant - absent

W. Wong & A. Fung (Foo & Li) for 5th Defendant.

Action No. 1488 of 1978

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN

TAI HING COTTON MILL LIMITEDPlaintiff

 

AND

 

LIU CHONG HING BANK LINITED1st Defendant
BANK OF TOKYO LIMITED2nd Defendant
CHEKIANG FIRST BANK LIMITED3rd Defendant
LEUNG WING LING4th Defendant
WANCE CHENG5th Defendant

___________

Not recorded in the written judgment but stated in the open Court and appears in the Clerk's Notes

1. The plaintiff shall have a declaration that the 1st defendant was not entitled to debit the plaintiff's account in the amount of HK$187,195.74 (being the sum of the six cheques listed in Schedule A of the Further Re-Amended Statement of Claim filed herein as Nos.1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 10) and that the plaintiff be entitled to interest on the said sum at the rate of 1½% over the prime rate in force from time to time from 1st January 1978 to judgment.

2. The plaintiff do pay the 1st defendant's costs of the action from 14th April 1983.

3. The plaintiff's claim against the 2nd defendant be dismissed with costs.

4. The plaintiff's claim against the 3rd defendant be dismissed with costs.

5. Judgment be entered for the plaintiff against the 4th defendant in the sum of $6,821,160.54 together with interest thereon at 1½% above the prime rate in force from time to time to be calculated from the 1st January 1978 to the date of payment and costs.

6. The 1st defendant do pay the plaintiff's costs of the action in respect of the proceedings as between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant up to and including 13th April 1983.

7. The third party proceedings by the 1st defendant against the 4th defendant and the third party proceedings by the 2nd defendant against the 4th defendant be adjourned sine die. Liberty to apply.

8. That the sums of $1,100,000.00, $375,000.00 and $400,000.00 paid into court by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants respectively on the 13th, 30th and 25th April, 1983 be forthwith paid out to the respective solicitors for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants together with accrued interest (if any)

9. The sun of $132,738.06 being money paid into court herein pursuant to the Order of Cons. J. dated 30th November 1978 together with any interest thereon be forthwith released to the Plaintiff's solicitors in partial satisfaction of the judgment obtained against the 4th defendant.

10.Liberty to apply.

(Michael Pang)
Clerk to Hon. Mantell J.

30563-EN-1982-06-30

TAI HING COTTON MILL LTD v. LIU CHONG HING BANK LTD AND OTHERS

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HCA001488/1978

H.C.A. 1488/78

Costs - Party and party taxation - Whether expenditure for travelling time, air-fares and hotel accommodation for London counsel allowahle.

 

 

H.C.A. 1488/78

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG

HIGH COURT

____

BETWEEN

TAI HING COTTON MILL LTD.Plaintiff

 

AND

 

LIU CHONG RING BANK. LTD.1st Defendant
BANK OF TOKYO LTD.2nd Defendant
CHEKIANG FIRST BANK LTD.3rd Defendant
LEUNG WING LING4th Defendant
WANCE CHENG5th Defendant

_____

Coram: Hon. Rhind, J.

Date: 30 June 1982

 

___________

JUDGMENT

___________

 

1. In late September and early October 1980, Mr. Rokison, Q.C., of the London Bar represented Liu Chong Hing Bank Limited (L.C.H. Bank) on its successful application to the Hong Kong Court of Appeal for the setting aside of an order made by a judge at first instance to the effect that the Defence filed by L.C.H. Bank in the proceedings brought against it by Tai Hing Cotton Mill Limited (Tai Hing Cotton) should be struck out pursuant to 0.18 r.19 on the ground that its disclosed no reasonable cause of defence. Costs followed the event.

2. The fee marked on the brief for Mr. Rokison to appear on that appeal was the equivalent of HK$60,000 (£5,000 converted at the then rate of £1 = HK$12), plus daily refreshers of the equivalent of HK$4,800.

3. On a party and party taxation before Master McLelland, no challenge was made to Mr. Rokison's brief fee, as marked, nor to the refreshers.

4. However, challenge was made to three heads of disbursements related to the bringing of Mr. Rokison to Hong Kong on this brief.

5. Firstly, a claim was made for the time spent by Mr. Rokison flying to and from Hong Kong. A day each way at the rate of $3,000 per day made a total of $6,000 under this head. Secondly, there was his air-fare, which, first class, came to $25,905. Thirdly, were his accommodation expenses while in Hong Kong: for a suite in a first class hotel the expenses amounted to $12,015.

6. On a review of his taxation, Master McLelland totally disallowed all those three heads of disbursements. The appeal before me is concerned with whether he was correct in so doing.

7. I accept that all of those disbursements are of a type and at a level almost invariably, if not invariably, incurred when a Silk from London is briefed to appear in Hong Kong. The travelling fee for the day flying to and for the day flying from Hong Kong is at the rate of from half to two thirds of the daily refresher.

8. The solicitor instructing Mr. Tang thought she had a vague recollec-tion of a London Silk who had been paid merely for economy air travel and who did not get a whole suite, but neither Mr. Li nor Mr. Tang had over heard of London Silks settling for this more modest scale of comforts on their journies to and from Hong Kong.

9. First class air travel and accommodation in a suite in a first class hotel are both clearly in accordance with the style to which London Silks are accustomed. I regard it as befitting their rank that they should be accorded those particular benefits.

10. Thus then, to sum up, it can be seen that the usual practice is for London Silks to be paid two days travelling time at from half to two thirds of their daily refresher rate, first class air fares, and accommoda-tion in a suite in a first class hotel.

11. L.C.H. Bank will already have paid out those expenses. The question before me is whether it can now require Tai Hing Cotton, the loser in the Court of Appeal, to shoulder them.

                0.62 r.28(2) lays down the principles which the Court is to apply on a party and party taxation:

"Subject to the following provisions of this rule, costs to which this rule applies shal1 be taxed on the party and party basis, and on a taxation on that basis there shall be allowed all such costs as were necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for enforcing or defending the rights of the party whose costs are being taxed."

12. That sub-rule needs to be read in conjunction with paragraph 2(5) of Part II of the First Schedule to 0.62, which is as follows:

"Every fee paid to counsel shall be allowed in full on taxation, unless the taxing master is satisfied that the same is excessive and unreasonable, in which event the taxing master shall exercise his discretion having regard to all the relevant circumstances and in particular to the matters set out in paragraph 1(2)."

13. For a full understanding of diet sub-paragraph, reference needs also be made to a further sub-paragraph of Part II, namely 1(2) which is as follows:

"(2)    In exercising his discretion under this paragraph or under rule 32(2) in relation to any item, the taxing master shall have regard to all relevant circumstances, and in particular to:

(a)

the complexity of the item or of the cause or matter in which it arises and the difficulty or novelty of the questions involved;

 

(b)

the skill, specialised knowledge and responsibility required of, and the time and labour expended by, the solicitor or counsel:

 

(c)

the number and importance of the documents (however brief) prepared or perused;

 

(d)

the place and circumstances in which the business involved is transacted;

 

(e)

the importance of the cause or matter to the client;

 

(f)

where money or property is involved, its amount or value;

 

(g)any other fees and allowances payable to the solicitor or counsel in respect of other items in the same cause or matter, but only where work done in relation to those items has reduced the work which would otherwise have been necessary in relation to the time in question."

14. From the pests of the Rules just cited, it will be seen that, on a taxation, L.C.H. Bank would be entitled to the disputed items for counsel if it could be said they were necessary or proper for the attainment of justice or for defending its rights.

15. Authority for what costs in relation to counsel can be regarded as "necessary or proper" is to be found in Simpsons Motor Sales (London) Ltd. v. Handon Corporation (No. 2).(1) Both counsel before me agreed that case correctly laid down the measure for determining whether the disputed items of expenditure were "necessary or proper". The measure is determined by estimating what a hypothetical counsel capable of conducting the case effectively would be content to take on the brief. This hypothetical counsel does not insist upon the particularly high fees sometimes demanded by fashionable counsel. In making its estimate, the court has to rely on its knowledge and experience.

16. Having arrived at its estimate of what this effective (yet not necessarily fashionable) hypothetical counsel would be content to accept, the court looks at the case in hand to see how much is being asked for the actual counsel who conducted it. If the fees being claimed are within the range of what the court has estimated for its hypothetical counsel, they will be allowed; otherwise, they will be disallowed, pro tanto.

 

17. It becomes necessary to ask what calibre of counsel was required to ensure L.C.H. Bank effective representation in its proceedings before the Court of Appeal. L.C.H. Back was one of three banks being sued in the same action by Tai Hing Cotton for a total of just under HK$5.7 million in respect of allegedly wrongful debits made to Tai Hing Cotton's accounts with those banks which had honoured Tai Hing Cotton cheques forged by one of Tai Hing Cotton's employees.

18. Of that sum of approximately $5.7 million, $3,082,214 represented what L.C.H. Bank had paid out on 54 forged cheques between November 1977 and March 1978, $836,692 represented what the second defendant bank had paid out on 110 forged cheques between January 1975 and February 1978, and the balance of $1,772,822 represented what the third defendant bank had paid out on 145 forged cheques between August 1975 and January 1978.

19. All three banks pleaded the same defence which was to the effect that they were not liable for the allegedly wrongful debits, as Tai Hing Cotton was wholly or in part to blame on account of its negligence in the supervision of its employee.

20. That defence found no favour with the judge at first instance who struck it out on the application made under 0.18 r.19.

21. In reaching the conclusion he did, the learned judge placed reliance on dicta from the House of Lords in London Joint Stock Bank v. Macmillan(2) to the effect that it was only if the customer was negligent in the drawing of the cheque itself that the bank would be justified in debiting the customer's account for a forgery. In that case the customer had been -negligent in the actual drawing of the cheque he had left gaps on the cheque sufficiently large for his fraudulent employee to fill in additional figures. Thus, observations made by the House of Lords to the effect that it is only negligence in relation to the manner of the drawing of the cheque which affords the bank a defence were in the nature of obiter dicta, albeit of very high persuasive authority.

22. Further support for the course adopted by the judge at first instance was afforded by the New Zealand Court of Appeal decision in National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. v. Walpole and Pattorson Ltd.(3) Relying on the dicta in London Joint Stock Bank v. Macmillan, the New Zealand Court of Appeal held that as between banker and customer, the customer is under no duty to exercise reasonable care in the general course of his business to prevent forgeries on the part of his employees.

 

23. Counsel for the bank before the New Zealand Court of Appeal had sought unsuccessfully to argue firstly that changes in the law of negligence wrought by cases such as Donoghue v. Stevenson(4) and Hedley Byrne Co. Ltd. v. Heller and Partners Ltd.(5) and secondly the need for development of judicial policy to suit current conditions justified a departure from the principle laid down in 1918 in London Joint Stock Bank v. Macmillan, with the result that the courts should now recognize a general duty on employers to exercise care in the conduct of their businesses.

24. Without having to go as far afield as New Zealand, the learned judge at first instance could also find direct authority for the course he took in the decision of his learned brother, Leonard, J. (as he then was) in Asien-Pazifik Merchant Finance Ltd. v. Shanghai Commercial Bank Ltd.(6) of 1978.

25. In the course of an argument designed to persuade Leonard, J. that a customer owes a general duty to his banker to prevent forgery of his cheques, basically the same arguments which had failed to find favour with the New Zealand Court of Appeal in the case just referred to were trotted out. In addition to Donoghue v. Stevenson and Hedley Byrne v. Heller, another landmark decision in negligence was cited to Leonard, J. - Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co.(7)

26. Despite the addition of the Dorset Yacht case, Leonard, J. was no more minded to interfere with the law as laid down by the House of Lords in London Joint Stock Sank v. Macmillan than the New Zealand Court of Appeal had been.

27. Bearing in mind the weight of authority supporting the learned judge in the court below, whoever represented L.C.H. Bank before the Court of Appeal obviously had an uphill struggle on his hands. However, it was not a particularly heavy or complex case to have to argue. On a comparatively narrow negligence issue, counsel for L.C.H. Bank had to persuade the Court of Appeal that this was not a clear and obvious case for striking out.

28. What calibre of counsel was called for to ensure the effective carrying out of this task?

 

29. Mr. Li for L.C.H. Bank does not dispute that there are at the Hong Kong Bar Leaders equal to the carrying oat of that task. I would go further and say that nearly all, if not all the Hong Kong Leaders would have been fully competent to give effective representation to L.C.H. Bank on that particular appeal.

30. As explained to me, there was nothing novel in the argument presented £o the Court of Appeal. Mr. Rokison followed the same lines of argument which had been pioneered in the National Bank of New Zealand Ltd. case and the Asien Pazifik Merchant Finance Ltd. case.

31. Certainly, as a specialist in commercial law Mr. Rokison was well qualified to present the appeal. However, highly specialised knowledge of commercial law was not really necessary for this particular appeal. Any competent Common Law Leader need not have felt he was straying out of his depth here, for the problem was essentially one of how far the law of negligence extends.

32. That there are Hong Kong Leaders quite capable of effectively agruing the points raised before the Court of Appeal is vouchsafed by the fact that in the Asien Pazifik Merchant Finance Ltd. case a Hong Kong Leader fore shadowed the arguments that I understand Mr. Rokison was content to use before the Court of Appeal.

33. In the very recent case of Lam Yin Fei etc. v. Hang Lung Bank Ltd.(8), there is not the slighest indication that Hong Kong Leaders have found any difficulty in effectively representing their clients on what is essentially the same issue as arose in the present case.

34. A11 of the above leads me to the conclusion that counsel sharing the essential characteristic of the hypothetical counsel capable of effective representation in this particular case are available in the Hong Kong at the local Bar.

35. Judging from the attractive and lucid way in which both Hong Kong counsel before me explained the issue which had been before the Court of Appeal, I have every confidence that either of them, on his own, could effectively have conducted L.C.H. Bank's case before the Court of Appeal, but I will, nonetheless, presume that this hypothetical effective counsel which I have found to exist in Hong Kong is a Leader.

36. At this point, it becomes necessary to enquire what this hypothetical Hong Kong Leader would be content to accept by way of fees for his representation. It will be recalled that the fee on Mr. Rokison's brief in September 1980 was $60,000, and, in addition, there were the three items of travelling time, air fare and hotel accommodation totalling $43,920.

 

37. Guidance on what this hypothetical Hong Kong Leader might have been contented to accept is furnished by what actually happened at first instance on the Summons to Strike Out. When that Summons was first before the Court, Mr. Oswald Cheung, Q.C. held the brief for L.C.H. Bank. That was in November 1979. His fee on brief was $30,000, plus refreshers of $6,000 per day. Mr. Oswald Cheung conforms admirably with the hypothetical Leader I have been speaking about. On the other side, the Leaders were Mr. John Swaine and Mr. Charles Ching. Both of them hold their own with this hypothetical Leader. My information is that the fees on their briefs were lower than Mr. Oswald Cheung's. I have not been told what their refreshers were.

38. My conclusion is that in this case the hypothetical Hong Kong Leader would have been more than content to accept the $60,000 Mr. Rokison got on his brief. However, there would have been no need to pay the Hong Kong Leader anything for travelling time, air fares or accommodation.

39. To my mind, $60,000 was well up at the top end of or even beyond the range of what the hypothetical Hong Kong Leader would have wanted for his brief fee then. Tai Hing Cotton has not cavilled at paying that sum as the brief fee for its winning opponent's London counsel. I cannot see any conceivable basis on which in this case it could be asked to pay anything in respect of the disputed items, for those disputed items are well outside the range of what it would cost for the hypothetical counsel.

40. This was meant to be a test case to find out whether a successful party in the Hong Kong courts can include in his taxed party and party costs the disputed items of expenditure for bringing a Leader from England. All I can say is that in the particular circumstances of the case before me he cannot. However, had the circumstances been appropriate, I would have been perfectly willing to allow such items of expenditure. If, for example, the case were of a type where no counsel capable of effective representation was available from the Hong Kong Bar, I would have allowed the disputed items. Moreover, if it turned out in a particular case that the combined costs of brief fee, and expenses of travelling time, air fares and accommodation were about the same for London counsel as for the hypothetical Hong Kong counsel's brief fee alone, then I would regard it as proper to allow London counsel's expenses. On the view I take, it is artificial to consider overseas counsel's brief fee in isolation from the other items of expenditure involved in getting him here. The court should look at the global figure of overseas counsel's brief fee and other expenses for the purpose of comparing the price of overseas counsel with the hypothetical counsel.

41. For the reasons set out above, the appeal from the learned Master's taxation is dismissed.

 

 

(J.J. Rhind)
Judge of the High Court

 

(1)    [1965] I W.L.R. 112

(2)    [1918] A.C. 777

(3)    [1975] 2 N. Z.L.R. 7

(4)    [1932] A. C. 562

(5)    [1964] A.C. 465

(6)     [1978] H.C.A. 4403

(7)    [1970] A.C. 1004

(8)    H.C.A. 3037 of 1980

 

 

Representation:

Mr. Robert Tang (Therese Chow & Co.) for plaintiff

Mr. Andrew Li (Deacons) for 1st defendant/appellant

36169-EN-1980-04-16

TAI HING COTTON MILL LTD v. LIU CHONG HING BANK LTD AND OTHERS

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HCA001488B/1978

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG

HIGH COURT

 

ACTION No. 1488 OF 1978

-----------------

 

BETWEEN  
 TAI HING COTTON MILL LIMITEDPlaintiff
 and 
 LIU CHONG HING BANK LIMITED1st Defendant
 BANK OF TOKYO LIMITED2nd Defendant
 CHEKIANG FIRST BANK LIMITED3rd Defendant
 LEUNG WING LING4th Defendant
 WANCE CHENG 

-----------------

Coram: Silke, J. in Court

Date of Judgment: 16th April 1980

 

-----------------

JUDGMENT

-----------------

 

 Headnote: Company signatures forged on cheques: duty of care customer to banker: negligence in a contractual duty: can it exist: contractual contributory negligence: tort 

1. These are three summonses brought by the plaintiff - a substantial business concern - against the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants who are banks.

2. There are also summonses to amend by the 2nd defendant and for discovery by the 1st defendant but of these the first has been adjourned pending the ruling on that which I may call the main summons and the second depends to a large extent upon that ruling. Consideration of the summons to amend is therefore deferred.

3. The plaintiff seeks, as against the 1st defendant Bank, by its amended summons, an order that paragraphs 16 and 16A of the 1st defendant's defence be struck out under the Rules of the Supreme Court O.18 R.19 on the ground that they disclose no reasonable defence.

4. That paragraph 16 reads: -

"Further or alternatively if which is denied the plaintiff has suffered any loss or damage: the same was caused or contributed to by its negligence and/or breaches by the plaintiff of the said contract.

Particulars

 (1)Failing to check sufficiently or at all the monthly statements rendered from time to time by the 1st defendant to the plaintiff in respect of the said current account and/or to object to or inform the 1st defendant of unauthorised entries within a reasonable time or at all. 
 (2)Failing to take any or any adequate business precautions to prevent or detect the repeated forgery over a period of five months of the plaintiff's signature by the 4th defendant on the said 54 cheques. Insofar as may be necessary the 1st defendant will rely on the forgery of the plaintiff's signature of the 4th defendant on the 110 cheques of the 2nd defendant and the 145 cheques of the 3rd defendant pleaded in paragraphs 4(2) and 4(3) of the amended Statement of Claim and conversion by the 4th and/or 5th defendants of the 195 genuine cheques drawn by the plaintiff on the 2nd and 3rd defendants and the Dah Sing Bank Limited as pleaded in paragraph 10 of the amended Statement of Claim as evidence of such failure. Insofar as may be necessary the 1st defendant will rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquities. 
 (3)Failing to exercise any or any adequate supervision over and/or reasonable care in the conduct of the said current account. 
 (4)Failing to exercise any or any reasonable care to ensure that the 1st defendant was not led into making any payments from the said current account which were not authorised by and/or in accordance with the mandate from the plaintiff. 
 (5)Failing to check and/or verify (a) the debit of the said current account with the said 54 cheques and/or (b) the counterfoils or stubs or summary sheets in the cheque books in respect thereof and/or (c) the entries in the plaintiff's books of account in respect thereof and/or the transactions for which such cheques and payments were issued and made and/or (d) the documents relating to such transactions and/or (e) the vouchers and other supporting accounting documents supporting the drawing and issue of such cheques and such entries in the plaintiff's books of account and/or (f) the documents relating to the delivery and receipt of such cheques. 

          The 1st defendant is unable to give further particulars until after discovery and/or interrogatories." And paragraph (16) (A) of that defence reads: -

"Further or alternatively if which is denied the plaintiff had suffered any loss and damage the same was caused or contributed to by the failure to observe the said Rules and Regulations (whether the new or old) and/or failure to observe the duties referred to in paragraphs 6(1), (2) and (3) above on the part of the plaintiff as particularised in paragraph 16 above and under the said contract the plaintiff is liable to indemnify the 1st defendant against its liability to the plaintiff (which is denied) or contribute to it to such extent as to Court thinks fit."

5. The summons as against the 2nd defendant seeks an order that paragraphs 12, 13 and 15 of the 2nd defendant's defence be struck out under O.18 R.19 on the ground that they disclose no reasonable defence.

6. The paragraph 12 reads: -

"Further and/or alternatively the 2nd defendant says that the plaintiff was by reason of the aforesaid matters and/or the matters particularised herein below negligent in failing to detect the said forgery and/or taking steps to prevent the same.

Particulars

(i)Failing to check or adequately check its books and accounts insofar as the same related to the state of the plaintiff's account with the 2nd defendant and the plaintiff repeats the matters pleaded in the preceding paragraphs. 
(ii)Failing to supervise or otherwise check the operation of the said current account." 

7. The paragraphs 13 reads: -

"Further and/or alternatively the 2nd defendant says that the plaintiff is estopped by its aforesaid negligence from seeking a reversal of the relevant debits in the said current account."

8. The paragraph 15 reads: -

"Further and/or alternatively the 2nd defendant says that by reason of the banker customer relationship between the 2nd defendant and the plaintiff there was at all material times a duty in contract or alternatively in tort on the part of the plaintiff to take such care as would reasonably be expected in the circumstances to supervise or check the operation of the said account and/or the books of the plaintiff to prevent or detect any forgery or other unauthorised drawing from the said account. By reason of the matters pleaded in paragraph 11 and/or 10 the plaintiff was in breach of the said duty and has thereby caused or contributed to the 2nd defendants loss and damage. The 2nd defendant is entitled to set off the said loss and damage pleaded in paragraph 14 above against the plaintiff's claim herein insofar as they affect the 2nd defendant or alternatively to such an extent as the Court may assess."

9. The summons as against the 3rd defendant seeks an order that paragraphs 19 and 20 of the 3rd defendant's defence be struck out under O.18 R.19 of the Rules of the Supreme Court on the ground that they disclose no reasonable defence.

10. The paragraph 19 reads: -

"Further or alternatively if which is not admitted the said cheques were forgeries and/or if which is denied the 3rd defendant was or is prima facie under any liability to the plaintiff under the said contract or an alleged in the amended Statement of Claim the Plaintiff is estopped and prevented from asserting such liability by reason of the negligence of the plaintiff particulars of which are set out hereinafter. 
           The 3rd defendant was caused by the said negligence to make the payments on the alleged forged cheques." 

11. The paragraph 20 reads:-

"Further or alternatively if which is not admitted the said cheques were forgeries and/or if which is denied the 3rd defendant was or is prima facie under any liability to the plaintiff under the said contract or as alleged in the amended Statement of Claim the 3rd Defendant says that any loss or damage on the part of the plaintiff (which is not admitted) was caused or contributed to by the negligence of the Plaintiff.

Particulars of negligence

(i)Failing to examine or check the monthly statements issued by the 3rd Defendant (particulars of which are given under paragraph 13 hereof) in respect of the said current account. 
(ii)Failing to maintain proper or adequate accounts of payments made by or on behalf of the plaintiff and/or to check the same and/or to compare the same with the said monthly statements. 
(iii)Failing within a reasonable time after the drawing of each cheque on the forms provided for the purposes of the said current account by the 3rd defendant (including the said cheques) or at all to check the counterfoils thereof against the said monthly statements and/or against other records of payment or expenditure. 
(iv)Failing to supervise the accountancy staff of the plaintiff in the handling of cheques or to have a proper or safe system for each supervision. 
(v)Failing to discover within a reasonable time that the said cheques or any of them were forged as alleged. 
(vi)Failing to notify the 3rd defendant within a reasonable time of the alleged forgeries or any of them or to alert the 3rd defendant to the danger of such forgeries or other forgeries. 
(vii)Entrusting the cheque books from which the said cheques were extracted to an insufficiently reliable and/or responsible and/or honest employee without any or any proper supervision. 
(viii)The 3rd Defendant will rely on each and every acknowledgement referred to in paragraph 13 hereof as an independent act of negligence as aforesaid and/or as evidence of the same." 

12. I have seen fit to set out in extenso the pleadings which it is sought to strike out to show the general trend of the defences of all three defendants and to provide some, at least, of the background to this action as it emerges from those pleadings.

13. For the purposes of this ruling I accept that these were forged cheques - though I note Mr. Litton's bold assertion - he appears, Mr. Bokhary with him, for the 3rd Defendant - that forgery is not admitted on the ground that one cannot forge the signature of a limited company that being a composite signature.

14. Very briefly the history of the matter is the employment by the Plaintiff of a Mr. Leung Wing Ling - the 4th defendant in the action - in its accounts department.

15. There he forged cheques from at least the 30/1/75 to 1978 without detection by the banks involved or, apparently, by the plaintiff.

16. The basic issues are: First is there a contractual duty, in respect of forgeries, as between the plaintiff customer and the defendant Banks so that negligence as a breach of that duty is a good defence to the customers claim against the Banks.

17. Second: can there be such a thing as contractual contributory negligence.

18. I accept Mr. Morritt's submission - he, Mr. Oswald Cheung Q.C. and Mr. Andrew Li with him, appeared for the 1st Defendant - that a striking out under O.18 R.19 is only done in plain and obvious cases, that it is a summary procedure, that a reasonable cause of action means a cause of action with some chance of success, when simply the allegations on the pleadings are considered, and that the answer to a claim will only be struck out if it is clear beyond doubt that it is obviously unsustainable and that the defence is not an arguable one.

19. He makes the point that if I were to think the issues here to be capable of being argued in such an august body as the Privy Council then they should not be struck out.

20. I equally accept Mr. Ching's point - he, Mr. Swaine Q.C. and Mr. Tang with him, appeared for the plaintiff - that the court should not look over its shoulder at a Court of Appeal or the Privy Council - I do not think Mr. Morritt to have been making any such suggestion. As Mr. Ching has said, in respect of O.14 proceedings, however difficult the point may be it is susceptible of a ruling upon in chambers if it is clear and unambiguous.

21. There is generally a relationship of debtor and creditor as between a bank and its customer but a contract: -

"between banker and customer contains special terms and cannot in its entity be expressed in the phrasing of an ordinary indebitatus count." (per Atkin L.J. in Joachimson v. Swiss Bank Corporation(1)).

22. And there must be a valid mandate to demand payment. A forged cheque is not a demand says Mr. Ching though I note another phrase Atkin L.J. in Joachimson where he said at p. 127: -

"The customer on his part undertakes to exercise reasonable care in executing his written orders so as not to mislead the bank or to facilitate forgery."

23. This stems from Young v. Grote(2) - a case which runs through the argument of both himself and Mr. Morritt and which is constantly referred to in the authorisation cited.

24. This was an 1827 case of a bank customer who delivered to his wife printed cheques signed by himself with blanks left for the sums. The wife was to fill up the blanks.

25. She filled one out in the sum of £50.2 shillings, gave it to her husbands clerk to take to the bank, he altered it to three hundred and fifty pounds 2 shillings and the bank paid.

26. The matter went to arbitration and the arbitrator referred the matter to the Court of Common Pleas where Best C.J. said, at p.766: -

"Undoubtedly a banker who pays a forged cheque is in general bound to pay the amount again to his customer because, in the first instance, he pays without authority."

27. And

"But though the rule be perfectly well established, yet if it be the fault of the customer that the banker pays more than he ought he cannot be called upon to pay again."

28. Having set out the precautions he thought an ordinary business person should take, and which he found were not taken there, he went on: -

"It was by the neglect of these ordinary precautions that Grote & Co. were induced to pay."

29. And finally

"We decide here on the ground that the banker has been misled by want of proper caution on the part of his customer."

30. That was a case of a "raised amount" cheque and not a nullity: and is authority for the proposition that a man could not complain of the consequences of his own default against a person who was misled by that default without any default of his own. And the line was continued in London Joint Stock Bank v. McMillan and Arthur(3) - again a "raised amount" case - having gone through first instance and appeal in earlier reports, now reaching the House of Lords. McMillan expressly approved Young v. Grote(2).

31. Leorard J. (as he then was) had this to say of McMillan in Asien-Pazifik Merchant Finance Limited v. Shanghai Commercial Bank Ltd.(4) : -

"I consider it important to remember that in that case a cheque, a valid mandate, was prepared by the customer. The valid mandate was altered. It was not ab initio a nullity but a perfectly valid mandate to pay £2. This was fundamental to every reference to duty in that case."

32. The reference to "ab initio a nullity" stems from section 24 of the Bills of Exchange Ordinance CAP 19 which states, inter alia, that a "forged or unauthorised signature is wholly inoperative."

33. Therefore, when Lord Finlay L.C. says, at p. 789, in McMillan(3) : -

"A cheque drawn by a customer is in point of law a mandate to the banker to pay the amount according to the term of the cheque. It is beyond dispute that the customer is bound to exercise reasonable care in drawing the cheque to prevent the banker being misled"

his judgment must be considered in the "raised amount" light and not as referring to a nullity.

34. At page 801 Lord Finlay makes reference to Kepitigalla Rubber Estates v. National Bank of India(5) a decision upon which Mr. Ching places great reliance.

35. In that decision the headnote reads: -

"It is the duty of a customer of a bank in issuing mandates to the bank to take reasonable care so as not to mislead the bank; but, beyond the care which must be taken in or immediately connected with the transaction itself there is no duty on the part of the customer to take precautions in the general course of carrying on his business to prevent forgeries on the part of his servants."

36. There the Secretary of a company forged the signatures of two of the directors of the company to a number of cheques which purported to have been drawn by the directors on behalf of the company upon the defendants, who were the company's bankers, and the defendants paid the cheques so drawn.

37. The forgeries extended over a period of about two months during which time neither the bank pass book nor the cash book of the company was examined by the directors. In an action by the company against the defendants to recover the amounts so paid it was held that, upon the facts, the company was entitled to recover.

38. Mr. Morritt in a persuasive and attractive argument seeks, basically, to extend Young v. Grote(2) to the forged signature or "non mandate" situation. He would have it that the trend of the old cases, including the Kepitigalla and McMillan, is being overtaken by developments in the law and practice of banking so as to bring negligence as a breach of duty within the defences available to a bank where there is effectively no mandate as the result of the customers negligence.

39. Encapsulated his arguments are: -

          (1) That a customer owes a duty to a banker to exercise reasonable care in his conduct of banking affairs so that the bank is not presented with a forged cheque purporting to be drawn on his account;

          (2) That the duty to take reasonable case arises from the contractual relationship as between customer and banker and also in tort;

          (3) That the reasonableness required to perform the duty is that which a person in the position of a customer would take;

          (4) That the plaintiffs negligence breaches the chain of causation upon which the plaintiffs claim rests.

          (5) That if, in consequence of the breach of duty, the banker pays upon a forged cheque the customer is not entitled to recover the amount from the banker; because the customer is estopped by his own negligence from alleging that the cheque is a forgery: because the Bank has a claim, be it in contract or in tort, for negligence against his customer in the amount of the forged cheque available to him by way of set off as against the claim of the customer against the bank.

          (6) Irrespective of any duty that might be owed by the customer to the Bank, contributory negligence by the customer could provide a complete or, at the very least, an arguable defence to the bank.

40. He accepts that the central question is whether or not there is a "duty situation".

41. He does, with respect to him, attempt on the earlier cases to argue from the opposite. He submits that it can be inferred from such cases as Lewes Sanitary Steam Laundry Co. v. Barclay Bevan & Co.(6), that though they did not refer to such a duty as is alleged here they did not state that no such duty existed. Lewes was a banking case and that particular case, and other analogous cases such as Bank of Ireland v. Trustees of Evans' Charities(7) and Mayor Constables & Company of Merchants of the Staple of England v. Governor of the Bank of England(8), lay down that negligence must be in or immediately connected with the transaction itself. And that is their ratio.

42. He goes on that Kepitigalla should be construed with Selangor United Rubber Estates v. Cradock(9) and with Karak Rubber Co. Ltd. v. Burden(10), which applied Selangor.

43. But Karak was a case where, in the words of Brightman J., at p. 629, the type of problem he had to deal with was: -

"........, whether, despite a primary obligation to pay a cheque on demand, a bank owes to its customer a duty of care which may, in an extreme case, oblige it to question the authority of an authorised signatory."

44. And went on: -

"He (Ungood Thomas J. in Selangor) was not dealing any more than I am dealing with a case where a cheque is presented over the counter or is subject to the exigencies of the town or general clearing timetables nor with anything approaching a normal cheque transaction." (my emphasis)

45. Karak was a case where the authorised signatures were misusing their authority for the purpose of defrauding their principal or otherwise defeating his true intentions.

46. Mr. Morritt is submitting throughout that there is an arguable case so that he should not be struck out in a summary manner - he contends further that the application to strike out is, in reality, an attempt by the plaintiff to avoid discovery.

47. He has cited extensively from Selangor(9) to attempt to show that from 1968 on the duty of a bank was no longer simply to pay on demand and that there was a wider duty of care as between customer and banker which encompasses a situation such as exists here - where there is no valid mandate. He would import into the contractual relationship an obligation to use reasonable skill and care in what might be termed a normal banking transaction. He would say that it is at least arguable that the customer has a similar obligation.

48. But again with respect to him he has been unable to go further than submitting there must be that collateral duty and I do not think the authorities cited to me to carry him that far. If I have not specifically referred to each and every one of those comprehensive authorities it is from no disrespect to his argument.

49. Mr. Mills-Owen, who with Mr. Faulkner appears for the 2nd defendant bank, referred me to Electrical Development Co. of Ontario v. Attorney General for Ontario and Hydro Electric Power Commission of Ontario(11), a Privy Council decision, on the summary setting aside of a writ. The issue in that case being whether or not a provision that no action shall be brought against the Commission without the consent of the Attorney General was ultra vires and the issue in the Privy Council was whether the action could be summarily stopped.

50. Lord Finlay, in the judgment of the Privy Council, said, at page 694: -

"In their Lordships opinion it is impossible to treat the appellant's contentions as to the section in question on this point as merely frivolous. They raise points of importance which ought not to be dealt with in this summary fashion and which demand serious consideration in the ordinary course of law."

51. And again at p. 695: -

"The elaborate argument advanced on behalf of the Attorney General for Ontario has failed to satisfy their Lordships that it is so clear that no declaration can be made against the Attorney General that the action should be summarily stopped as against the Attorney General."

52. Mr. Mills-Owen would rely on the phrase "raise points of importance" and "so clear" so as to illustrate the heavy burden on those who seek to strike out in a summary way.

53. In that case pleadings had still to be delivered, which is not the case here, and the Privy Council felt that, after their delivery, evidence be taken "so far as it may be necessary".

54. Lord Finlay concluded, the merits not having been properly raised before the Privy Council and the court having therefore refused to express any concluded view, at p. 695: -

"........... whatever difficulties there may be in the way the way of the ultimate success of the appellants case, it is not, in the judgment of their Lordships, so clearly bad as to make it right that the appellants should by summary order be prevented from having it tried in ordinary course."

The position here it is submitted is analogous.

55. He would further contend that there are express duties under the contract which are pleaded and are admitted and the trial court will have to consider those express duties and their terms and the consequences to the parties of their non observance. There may now be, he says, duties coexisting in both contract and tort.

56. As to duties generally he cites Greenwood v. March(12) and Brown v. Western and Brown v. Western Bank(13) but, with respect to him, Greenwood(12) was a matter of a joint account in the name of husband and wife where the wife forged, the husband discovered but he did not inform the bank until after her death. The Bank were thus deprived of the right of pursuing an action in respect of the wife's tort - and this is the point upon which Greenwood(12) turned. Brown(13) was again a failure to inform the bank of known forgeries. Neither in my view apply to a case of the nature of the one here.

57. Mr. Litton on behalf of the 3rd defendant in his argument referred me to the pleadings and made the point that, as they stand, they are not in such watertight compartments that excision of the paragraphs of the defence as sought here would effectively deal with Mr. Ching's point.

58. He also criticised the particulars given in the Statement of Claim, the lengthy period over which the forgeries took place and their number and submitted that a large company must keep books and full accounts. In this last he seems to be suggesting that the plaintiffs must have known - but this of course is not pleaded as it is rather a chicken and the egg situation - discovery, can you get it? Plead from that which is discovered.

59. He further submitted that it must be remembered this is a limited company and its mandate is one which involves machinery and, through it, delegation. The real question he would suggest is what is neglect in or about the giving and operation of the mandate and this inevitably encompasses the drawing of a cheque.

60. He draws a distinction between this instant case and Kepitigalla(5) as to the period involved and the number of cheques and seeks to argue that Dorset Yacht(14) extends the concept of tortious negligence beyond that which, at one time, was thought to be a closed concept. Basically that the law has, and is, developing beyond Donoghue v. Stevenson(15). He urges that it is the neglect of the plaintiff that enabled the 4th defendant to pursue his course of forgery.

61. On the contributory negligence issue it is significant, as Leonard J. said in Asien-Pazifik that:-

"There is no reference in Padget on Banking to Donoghue v. Stevenson(15) or Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co.(14)."

Hedley Byrne(16) contains no reference to cheques the signatures of which are forged.

62. Mr. Ching has referred me to the Law Amendment and Reform (Consolidation) Ordinance CAP 23 and it is his submission that this Ordinance, following upon the English Act, simply solidified, in its section 21. that which was the law and did not create any new application of the doctrine of contributory negligence.

63. Mr. Morritt would argue that that the decision in Donoghue v. Stevenson(15) - that is the foreseeability test and, in particular here, that the customer must foresee that his lack of care of his account would lead the bank to pay upon forged cheques - will be applied as of its own force unless there is valid reason for its exclusion. He cites in support the Dorset Yacht(14) - or the "Borstal Boys case".

64. In Midland Bank Trust v. Hett, Stubbs & Kemp(17), where the relationship of solicitor and client was in question, it was held that there was a duty of care imposed upon the solicitors because of that very relationship and that the solicitors were "therefore liable in tort, independently of any liability in contract, for their negligence ........" But this is more on the "neighbour" principle and I am not persuaded, without specific authority, that such tortious liability applies as between customer and banker that being a relationship in contract.

65. I am very conscious that the majority of the authorities cited to me on the central issue here are decisions at trial and contain such references as "in the present case", "on the facts as proved", or, as in the Dorset Yacht(14) :-

"If there is no clear cut precedent the Court may have to reach a decision whether, once the facts and circumstances of a situation are ascertained, it can be said it was a duty situation."

66. I think I should make reference to Lumsden & Co. v. London Trustee Savings Bank(18) which was expressly not followed in Wilton and another v. Commonwealth Trading Bank of Australia; Model Investments Pty. Ltd.(19).

67. In Lumsden, which was a case of an employee fraudulently altering cheques drawn by his employer and paying them into his own account with the Savings Bank, the plaintiff sued the bank in conversion and the Bank asserted the plaintiffs contributory negligence. Counsel for the plaintiff conceded that this was a good defence in law and this concession was accepted by the trial judge.

68. In Wilton(19), Samuels J. said (at p. 653) of the reasoning behind counsels concession:-

"My respectful view they were far from compelling. First it was acknowledged that there was no English authority for the proposition that contributory negligence was a defence at common law; secondly it was indeed recognised that there was a dictum of Lord wright to the contrary in Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. E.B. Saving & Co.(20) at p. 229 which counsel sought to explain on a ground which seems to me implausible but thirdly reliance was placed upon the majority view of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Helson v. McKenzies (Cable Street) Ltd.(21)."

69. He went on to state that, on examination, Helsons(21) case did not support the proposition and gave his reasons for that conclusion.

70. In Quinn v. Burch Bros. (Builders)(22) Paull J., considering the Law Reform (Contributory negligence) Act of 1945 - which our Ordinance follows - was prepared to accept that section (1) (1) of the act - in terms similar to our section 21 - could apply to a contractual situation. But he also said he did not understand the expression "a negligent breach of contract", because at p. 379: "in contract, it matters not whether the breach is brought about deliberately or negligently or per incuriam." At p. 380 he had this to say "in order to apply the Act one has to find that there was some term which imported a duty not to be negligent and a breach of that term."

71. In my judgment a customer owes a duty to the banker to take reasonable care in giving a mandate. In Bank of England v. Vagliano(23) Vagliano failed to exercise that duty in that his own acts - accepting the bills as genuine bills when they were not and by the giving of a letter of advice to the Bank that the bills were coming due when no such bills existed - misled the bank, and there was, in effect, a valid mandate.

72. Lord Halsbury at p. 115 said: -

"My Lords, it seems to me impossible to dispute that this was, in fact, a misleading of the bankers. I pass by for the moment the question whose default it was, for the purpose of considering the proposition which has found favour with one of your Lordships, and which I will not dispute, that the carelessness of the customer, or neglect of the customer to take precautions, unconnected with the act itself, cannot be put forward by the banker as justifying his own default. In order to make the cases of the Bank of Ireland v. Trustees of Evans' Charities(7), and the Mayor, Sc., of Merchants of the Staple of England v. Bank of England(8), authorities in this case, it would be necessary to assume that the plaintiffs in those cases had by some voluntary act of their own given credit and the appearance of genuineness to the particular powers of attorney which were forged in those cases, and if they had, I very much doubt whether the decision would have been what it was; but no such fact appeared; all the parties whose negligence was relied on had done, was to leave their seal carelessly in the custody of the person who abused his trust. These decisions therefore do not seem to me to touch the case."

73. For the pleadings, with one exception to which I shall refer in a moment, to stand the banks must show the negligence of the customer on the mandate itself. The cheque is the mandate. If there be no mandate, and thus no authority to pay, there can be, in my view, no duty upon the customer in that regard a negligent breach of which would give rise to a good defence to the banks.

74. It may be that there can be an estoppel by conduct or by negligence arising from events subsequent to the nonexistent mandate. That is not for me to say. In essence there cannot, in my judgment, be a breach of a nonexistent duty. None of the authorities cited go so far as to say that a company should take reasonable precautions to prevent its servants forging its signature. (Kepitigalla(5) at page 1023).

75. Here we are faced with a contractual not a tortious nexus. Mr. Ching accepts, as indeed he must, that there is a duty, outside the narrow confines of contract upon a customer to tell a bank of forgeries of which he knew or ought to have known. But, as he says, this has not been pleaded.

76. To the question is there a duty other than the taking of care in the drawing of the cheque I would say that on the authorities as they now stand there is none. On the question of contributory negligence in the case of a contractual duty I would say that the authorities as they now stand are against.

77. There is no clear cut precedent that a duty situation arises in the circumstances here as between customer and banker but the basic facts of the forgery, as they emerge from the pleadings, are clear. In the event I do not think the defendant banks on the central issue to have raised an arguable case when there is no mandate from the customer and therefore no representation by him to the bank.

78. The authorities do not in my judgment extent tortious negligence to cover a contractual situation - despite Dorset Yacht(14).

79. I have not gone into detail as to the particulars of negligence as alleged by the 1st defendant some of which, with respect, are clearly bad, as once the central issue is decided then the whole pleading goes. I would strike out paragraphs 16 and 16A of the defence of the 1st defendant.

80. I would strike out paragraph 12 of the defence of the 2nd defendant and I would also strike out paragraph 15.

81. I said there was one piece of pleading to which I would refer "in a moment" and it is paragraph 13 in the defence of the 2nd defendant.

82. The difficulty I find myself in is this: estoppel by neglect of duty - that is the customer being estopped from setting up the invalidity of the cheques - is an arguable defence. But the neglect I have in mind is that which may - or may not - emerge from the evidence as to the customer's conduct subsequent.

83. Paragraph 13 as it stands refers to "its (the plaintiffs) aforesaid negligence" which relate; to "failing to detect the forgery and/or taking steps to prevent the same". It goes back to a negligent breach of a duty I have found not to exist.

84. I am somewhat loath to strike this out in its entity but feel I must as it turns itself in on that nonexistent duty.

85. As to paragraph 19 of the defence of the 3rd defendant: this appears to be an attempt to bring in estoppel by the back door so to speak for it relies on that which is contained in paragraph 20 of that defence as particulars of the alleged negligence - and paragraph 20 specifically pleads contributory negligence setting out particulars of it.

86. I think both those pleadings to be bad and they should go.

DISCOVERY

87. I now turn to the Discovery summon of the 1st defendant.

88. Having struck out the pleadings the situation is that the plaintiff agrees to items (1) to (5) in the schedule to the summons limited to the 54 cheques - that would mean an order in terms of the "alternative" stated in each item.

89. The plaintiff joins issue on items 6(ii) and (iii) but concedes on item 6(i).

90. The plaintiff also resists an order in the terms of paragraph (1) of the summons and wishes to be heard on paragraph (3): costs.

91. I shall deal with paragraph (1) of the summons first.

92. I accept Mr. Li's point that on the face of it certain documents have not been disclosed. Mr. Swaine would say that the reason for this is that the plaintiff had first to await the determination of the summons to strike out, and, in any event, an order in the terms of that paragraph would mean general discovery all over again. He referred me to the White Book at p. 418 side note 24/7/1 to 0.24 - as did Mr. Li who emphasised that which appears on p. 419 commencing "The second (and more important) qualification is .........."

93. Mr. Li also submitted that there is a large number of cheques involved and that the trial on the issue of forgery is not merely a matter of cold evidence. Some may be in doubt. He gives as an example that if there is genuine documentation to back up a cheque it may well be a cogent submission that the managing director signed that cheque: or that some of the payments made even on forged cheques may have gone to discharge the indebtedness of the company.

94. To all this the surrounding documents are highly relevant. And on the necessity of discovery he cites George Ballantine & Sons Ltd. v. F.E.R. Dixon & Son Ltd.(24) - where in it was held that discovery would not be ordered where the application for discovery was directed solely to credit but distinguished the basis there from that existing here. It is his case that the documents sought here are vital for the purpose of disposing fairly of the action.

95. I confess that I have gone on from paragraph (1) itself to cover some of the arguments that relate to items 6(ii) and (iii) in the schedule.

96. Mr. Swaine says as to items 6(ii) and (iii) that item 6(ii) goes exclusively to paragraph 16 and, if it is gone, then so should this item; that item 6(iii) goes exclusively to negligence and contributory negligence and in any event that which each item seeks in the alternative is far too wide.

97. Generally I view discovery as a necessity here. I think the 1st defendant, so that the position is put beyond doubt, to be entitled in the circumstances which exist to an order in terms of the resisted paragraph (1) of the summons.

98. I view some discovery under items 6(ii) and 6(iii) to be desirable and that the 1st defendant be entitled to it. There would be an order in respect of the alternative portions of those items but with the dates restricted to 1st November 1977 to 1st April 1978 period. Despite Mr. Li's plea for a wider period this is the period directly germane to his defence and I do not think, in the interests of the saving of time at the trial and of saving costs he should, in his present position, go outside that period. That sought for that period is of probative value.

99. In the event there will be an order in terms of paragraph (1) and (2) of the summons: an order in terms of items (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) of the schedule limited to the 54 cheques in each case: an order in terms of item 6(i) and in terms of items 6(ii) and 6(iii) limited to the alternative sought and to the period 1st November 1977 to the 1st April 1978 in each case.

100. That is the proposed order. I say "proposed" in that if I have left anything undone I should be grateful if counsel were to draw it to my attention.

101. I shall hear the parties as to costs. And that leaves the adjourned summon of the 2nd defendant to amend generally and, in the particular, paragraphs 11A, 12A and 15A.

102. Having heard counsel:

103. Costs of the striking out summons to the plaintiff as against the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants certificate for two counsel.

104. Mr. Bokhary's point as to costs against the 3rd defendant noted: matter left to the taxing master.

105. Costs on the Discovery Summons adjourned for argument.

106. The proposed order on the Discovery Summons adjourned for argument.

107. The summons of the 2nd defendant to amend adjourned generally with liberty to restore on two days notice.

  

  

 (William Silke)
 Judge of the High Court

  

Representation:

Mr. Charles Ching Q.C. & Mr. Swaine Q.C. & Mr. R. Tang (Therese Chow & Co.) for plaintiff.

Mr. Morritt Q.C. & Mr. Oswald Cheung Q.C. & Mr. A. Li (Deacons) for 1st defendant

Mr. Mills-Owens Q.C. & Mr. Faulkner (D.W. Ling & Co.) for 2nd defendant.

Mr. Litton Q.C. & Mr. Bokhary (F. Zimmern & Co.) for 3rd defendant.

(1) [1921] 3 K.B. 110 at p. 128

(2) 4 Bingham (253) 764

(3) [1918] A.C. 777

(4) H.C. 4403/1978

(5) [1909] 2 K.B. 1010

(6) [1901] 11 Commercial Cases 255

(7) 5 H.L.C. 389

(8) 21 Q.B.D. 160

(9) (No. 3) [1968] 1 W.L.R. 1555

(10) [1972] 1 W.L.R. 602

(11) [1919] A.C. 687

(12) [1933] A.C. 51

(13) [1964] Lloyds Report 187

(14) [1970] A.C. 1004

(15) [1932] A.C. 562

(16) [1964] A.C. 465

(17) [1978] 3 ALL E.R. 571

(18) [1971] 1 LLY. R. 114

(19) [1973] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 644

(20) [1933] A.C. 201 at p. 229

(21) [1950] NZ.L.R. 878

(22) [1966] 2 Q.B. 370

(23) [1891] A.C. 107 (H.L.)

36689-EN-1979-11-22

TAI HING COTTON MILL LTD v. LIU CHONG HING BANK LTD AND OTHERS

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