HK CourtDB
HomeDirectoryMCP
Hong Kong CourtDB
Back to directory
Civil Action1980

CHIU MING SUN v. MICHAEL MA WING AND OTHERS

Related cases with same parties

  • HCA3981/1985CHIU MING SUN v. MICHAEL MA WING AND OTHERS

Files (2)

24505-EN-1982-01-19

CHIU MING SUN v. MICHAEL MA WING AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCA007013/1980

Striking out for abuse of process of court - res judicata - issue estoppel.

No. 7013 of 1980

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG

HIGH COURT

___________________________________

BETWEEN

CHIU MING SUNPlaintiff

AND

MICHAEL MA WING1st Defendant
PETER MARK WAI HING2nd Defendant
YAT MING INVESTMENT COMPANY LIMITED3rd Defendant
FOO TAK CHING4th Defendant
CELBERG LIMITED5th Defendant

 

Coram: Mr. Justice Rhind

Date: 19 January 1982

 

___________

JUDGMENT

___________

 

In open Court

1. These are applications by the five defendants to strike out the Statement of Claim on the grounds that it is frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the process of the Court. An additional ground for striking out advanced by the fifth defendant is that the Statement of Claim discloses no reasonable cause of action against the fifth defendant.

2. Under an Agreement (Agreed Bundle F1) made on 3rd May 1978, the plaintiff (hereafter referred to as "Mr. Chiu") bought all of the 5002 issued shares in the 3rd defendant company (hereafter referred to as "Yat Ming") for a price of $15 million.

3. The 2nd defendant (hereafter referred to as "Mr. Mark"), who is a solicitor, acted for Mr. Chiu in drawing up the Agreement just referred to, and also acted for him on related transactions for the financing of the purchase of those shares, as well as for re-selling them.

4. Because there had to be at least two shareholders, one of the shares in Yat Ming was transferred into the name of the 1st defendant (hereafter referred to as "Mr. Ma") to be held in trust for Mr. Chiu who was registered as the holder of the remaining 5001 shares. Mr. Chiu had been looking for a solicitor to act for him in the transactions just referred to, and it was Mr. Ma, then a friend of Mr. Chiu, who introduced Mr. Mark to him for that purpose.

5. Yat Ming's sole asset was a pair of Letters of Entitlement (Agreed Bundle A56), issued in respect of land in the New Territories known as "Leung Yuen".

6. The next step in the series of legal transactions entered into by Mr. Chiu, with Mr. Mark acting as his solicitor, was an Agreement dated 6th May 1978 between Mr. Chiu and Pomulus Company Limited (hereafter referred to as "Romulus").

7. Subject to the fulfilment of terms and conditions as specified in that Agreement, Romulus agreed to buy and Mr. Chiu agreed to sell the whole 5002 issued shares in Yat Ming to which Mr. Chiu was beneficially entitled. If Mr. Chiu could fulfil all the contract obligations imposed on him, such as, within the time allowed, getting the Letters of Entitlement exchanged for the land known as "Leung Yuen" on terms that the land could be used for residential purposes, with a plot ratio of not less than 7.5, coverage of not less than 50% and heights of fifteen storeys, then the formula employed for calculating the purchase price under the Agreement resulted in a total of $83,790,000 in Mr. Chiu's favour.

8. One of the provisions of that Agreement with Romulus was to advance Mr. Chiu $15.4m. by way of deposit. That advance enabled Mr. Chiu to discharge his liability to the persons from whom he bought at the price of $15m. under the Agreement of 3rd May 1978 already referred to.

9. Detailed provisions were also included in the Agreement dated 6th May 1978 between Mr. Chiu and Romulus about what was to happen in the event of Mr. Chiu failing to exchange the Letters of Entitlement for Leung Yuen on the terms specified. In particular, provision was made for the repayment of the deposit of $15.4m. which had been advanced for Mr. Chiu's purposes. I do not think it necessary to refer in detail to those provisions beyond saying that Mr. Chiu could have been personally liable to repay Romulus the $15.4m.

10. Besides obtaining Yat Ming's statutory books, share transfer certificates signed in blank together with the supporting share certificates for the 5001 and the 1 share in the names of Mr. Chiu and Mr. Ma respectively as provided for in the Agreement of 6th May 1978, Romulus also took mortgages over the Letters of Entitlement to secure the $15.4m. advanced to Mr. Chiu as deposit. (See B155).

11. Up to this point, there is no disagreement of any significance as to what happened. Now come the events which have opened the way for so much litigation.

12. In early August 1978, Mr. Chiu called at Mr. Mark's office to sign documents (Exh B240) which are in fact Share Transfer Instruments and Bought and Sold notes. On their face, those documents record that Mr. Chiu sold 5000 Yat Ming shares to Mr. Ma for $500,000 on 8th August 1978. The purport of those documents is to the effect that Mr. Ma has now become the beneficial owner of the shares in Yat Ming.

13. Mr. Chiu does not deny signing those documents in early August 1978, but maintains that they were in blank when he signed them. According to Mr. Chiu, it was represented to him by Mr. Mark or Mr. Mark's staff that Mr. Chiu's signature was required on those documents for the purpose of resisting Romulus which was being difficult about the Agreement of 6th May 1978, but there was no suggestion that he was transferring his shares to Mr. Ma. Mr. Chiu contends that the documents in their present form are a complete sham: he never transferred the shares to Mr. Ma and was never paid any $500,000.

14. As Mr. Chiu would have it, Mr. Ma, with the collusion of Mr. Mark and Mr. Mark's staff, has cheated Mr. Chiu out of his ownership of Yat Ming.

15. On the 21st August 1978, Mr. Mark obtained possession of the Letters of Entitlement (See F45) from the solicitors for Romulus for the purpose of proceeding with the exchange of land.

16. At what stage Mr. Mark ceased to be Mr. Chiu's solicitor is not clear, but, at any rate, by the 29th March 1979 (see Agreed Bundle F56) Mr. Chiu had instructed the 4th defendant (hereafter referred to as "Mr. Foo"), a solicitor with the firm of Messrs Foo & Li, to act for him in relation to the issued shares of Yat Ming, all of which Mr. Chiu claimed to own still.

17. As the result of an exchange of correspondence between Mr. Mark acting for Mr. Ma, and Mr. Foo acting for Mr. Chiu, it became clear that Mr. Ma and Mr. Chiu were each claiming to be beneficially entitled to the whole of the issued shares of Yat Ming.

18. Litigation quickly got under way. On the 20th April 1979 Mr. Chiu issued High Court Writ No. 1600 of 1979 against Mr. Ma, Mr. Mark, and Yat Ming, or, in other words, against the same three persons who are the first three defendants in the present action before me.

19. The only relief that Mr. Chiu sought against Mr. Mark by those proceedings No. 1600 of 1979 was to prevent his disposing of the Letters of Entitlement. On the very day of the issuing of the writ, Mr. Chiu sought an interlocutory injunction against Mr. Mark before Trainor J. to prohibit Mr. Mark from disposing of the Letters of Entitlement, but after giving his personal undertaking to the Court in the terms sought, Mr. Mark was not required to play any further part in the proceedings. According to what Mr. Chiu's counsel, Mr. Charles Ching Q.C., said at the time the action came on for trial (8th July 1980), Mr. Mark was by then no longer a party even, (See transcript, Agreed Bundle B66), and certainly there is no material before me to suggest he was required to take any step in the action after giving the undertaking I have just referred to.

20. As against Mr. Ma and Yat Ming, Mr. Chiu sought a declaration that he was the owner of the issued shares in Yat Ming. He also sought what was in effect a consequential order for the cancellation and delivery up of the Instrument of Share Transfer and the Bought and Sold notes (Agreed Bundle B240) which he alleged to be a sham.

21. At every significant stage of that litigation, Mr. Foo acted on the advice of Counsel, and at the hearing itself, Mr. Chiu was represented by Mr. Charles Ching, Q.C., the Junior being Mr. Anthony Rogers.

22. In his defence, Mr. Ma contended that not only was he beneficially entitled to all the issued shares in Yat Ming, having bought them from Mr. Chiu for $500,000 as evidenced by the Instrument of Share Transfer and the Bought and Sold Notes, but also he went on to counter-claim for $1.5m. he allegedly lent to Mr. Chiu who, according to Mr. Ma, needed the money to settle a claim for an "introduction fee" of $3m. incurred when Mr. Chiu first bought the shares on 3rd May 1978.

23. Things began going none too well for Mr. Chiu once he started answering the questions put to him in cross-examination by Mr. Henry Litton, Q.C., the Counsel for Mr. Ma, at the trial. A perusal of the transcript of the Court proceedings (Agreed Bundle B101 et seq.) reveals Mr. Chiu answering questions in a way which could only serve to undermine his credibility.

24. At the time of the adjournment at the close of the first hearing day, Mr. Chiu had still not yet finished being cross-examined. Mr. Chiu's lawyers communicated to their client that the other side were willing to settle the action on terms which included paying Mr. Chiu $1.5m. in consideration of Mr. Chiu relinquishing his claim to the shares. The counter-claim by Mr. Ma against Mr. Chiu for $1.5m. would be dropped. Mr. Ma would also keep Mr. Chiu indemnified against any claims from Romulus for the return of the deposit of $15.4m. under the Agreement of 6th May 1978, and against any claim for the alleged $3m. "introduction fee" previously referred to. The proposed terms of settlement were explained to Mr. Chiu by Mr. Ching in Cantonese, and Mr. Chiu indicated that he was prepared to accept them. (See Messrs Deacons' letter of 26th November 1980 on behalf of Mr. Ching to Mr. Chiu. Agreed Bundle A24).

25. The terms of settlement were embodied in a document describing itself as a Memorandum of Agreement (Agreed Bundle B14) which was signed by Counsel.

26. For present purposes, it is not necessary for me to elaborate on that Memorandum of Agreement beyond saying that it embodied detailed provisions for the settlement of H.C.A. 1600/79 then before the Court, as well as making provision for the conduct of M.P. Action 305/80 and H.C.A. 3111/80, which were both concerned with the struggle to get control of Yat Ming, and hence the Letters of Entitlement.

27. Part of the Memorandum of Agreement contemplated the Court making a declaration to the effect that Mr. Ma had been the beneficial owner of 5001 shares in Yat Ming since 8th August 1978.

28. When the parties went back to Court on the morning of 11th July 1980, a copy of the Memorandum of Agreement was handed up to Mr. Commissioner Gittins who had been conducting the trial. The learned Commissioner's attention was then drawn to the Vice-Chancellor's judgment in Metzger v. Department of Health and Social Security(1) which is to the effect that courts do not make declarations simply because the parties have chosen to admit something, and that there are no declarations without argument.

29. Mr. Litton then proceeded to submit why he considered it proper for the learned Commissioner to make the declarations sought. Mr. Ching did not resist.

30. The learned Commissioner made the declarations asked for, and formal judgment was entered. The precise terms of the formal judgment are to be found in the Agreed Bundle, A19.

31. As a result of the terms of the Memorandum of Agreement, Mr. Ma could no longer be plagued by M.P. Action 305/80, and on the with September 1980 he settled H.C.A. 3111/80.

32. At that point, he thought the way was clear for Yat Ming to sell the two Letters of Entitlement. Yat Ming sold those Letters of Entitlement to the 5th defendant (hereafter referred to as "Celberg") on the 29th day of September 1980 for a price of $113,165,965. That sum was paid to Yat Ming on the 13th day of October 1980.

33. Since then, Celberg has sold the land granted in exchange for the Letters of Entitlement for $163,165,971. (See A66).

34. Then comes the present action, H.C.A. 7013/80, commenced by a Writ dated the 4th day of December 1980, again seeking a declaration that Mr. Chiu is the beneficial owner of the issued shares in Yat Ming. That is the only relief of any significance he seeks against Mr. Ma and Yat Ming.

35. I do not think anyone who has to read the Statement of Claim will disagree with me when I say it is not an easy document to follow.

36. A perusal of that Statement of Claim discloses that the first string to Mr. Chiu's bow is that he never sold the shares in Yat Ming to Mr. Ma. That is precisely the same assertion which Mr. Chiu made against Mr. Ma and Yat Ming in H.C.A. 1600/79. An alternative line of attack in the event of the first one failing is that, if such a sale were found to have taken place, then it was void or voidable because Mr. Ma stood in a fiduciary relationship to Mr. Chiu, and the sale was not at a fair price, unconscionable and/or procured by the undue influence of Mr. Ma. Precisely what this alleged fiduciary relationship is supposed to be has not been particularised, but I gather it is meant to consist either in Mr. Ma's allegedly performing some sort of legal adviser's role through his having an alleged connection with Mr. Mark's firm, or else in his having been a trustee of one share at the time Mr. Chiu made his purchase of the shares in Yat Ming on 3rd May 1978.

37. The question of Mr. Chiu's entitlement to a declaration in this present action H.C.A. 7013/80 has already come to a head as the result of an application he has made for an Interlocutory Injunction against Mr. Ma and Yat Ming to prevent them from disposing of the proceeds of the sale to Celberg.

38. At the hearing of that application, which was before O'Connor J., Mr. Ma and Yat Ming resisted the making of an interlocutory injunction on the ground that there was no serious issue to be tried. In his judgment dated the 24th December 1980, O'Connor J. agreed with Mr. Ma and Yat Ming on that. He held in effect that, in the present action H.C.A. 7013/80, Mr. Chiu was trying to re-litigate against Mr. Ma and Yat Ming the very issue of the ownership of the shares which had already been litigated against the same pair in H.C.A. 1600/79. It was a classic instance of res judicata. Moreover, the alternative ground of a void or voidable sale on which Mr. Chiu would now seek to put his case if he failed on his prime ground of no purported sale whatever, was one that could have been litigated first time round. Mr. Chiu was not seeking to rely on any material against Mr. Ma and Yat Ming which had been unavailable to him at the time of bringing H.C.A. 1600/79. In a plaintiff when litigating does not bring forward all his claims against his opponent arising from the subject matter of the litigation, he will be estopped from doing so in subsequent proceedings, unless there are some special circumstances such as the plaintiff, despite reasonable diligence, not being aware of material evidence which has come to light since the previous proceedings. O'Connor J. found in effect that none of the allegations made against Mr. Ma and Yat Ming by the present action 7013/80 was based on material unavailable to Mr. Chiu at the time of H.C.A. 1600/79. As O'Connor J.'s opinion was to the effect that Mr. Chiu was bound to fail on the present action against Mr. Ma and Yat Ming in view of what had happened in H.C.A. 1600/79, the learned Judge held there was no scope for granting Mr. Chiu an interlocutory injunction.

39. O'Connor J. also ruled against the possibility of the judgment in H.C.A. 1600/79 being set aside on the ground of mistake. As O'Connor J. pointed out, Mr. Chiu was in no way mistaken as to the facts on which that judgment was based. Mr. Chiu's real complaint is that, now having had more time to reflect, he is not happy with the bargain he has secured for himself. In a popular sense I suppose Mr. Chiu might lament that he made a "mistake" in agreeing to what might now seem to have been a very poor bargain with the benefit of hindsight, but that is not the sort of mistake which the law treats as operative for the purpose of over-turning bargains freely entered into.

40. The case of In re Roberts [1905] 1 Ch. 704, and a passage from Volume 16 of Halsbury, paragraph 1237 cited to me by Mr. Stevenson on Mr. Chiu's behalf, on the topic of setting aside a compromise where there has been a mistake of fact or of law, did not in my opinion assist his client. Firstly, there is no discernible mistake of fact or law on which Mr. Chiu might rely, and secondly, the authorities cited to me appear to be confined to compromises of disputes in relation to family property.

41. Am I bound to hold that Mr. Chiu is sure to fail against Mr. Ma and Yat Ming in the present proceedings because O'Connor J. has formed that opinion in related interlocutory proceedings? The question is academic, for I happen to find myself wholly in agreement with both the conclusions and the reasoning in his admirably lucid judgment. Even had I found myself less fully in agreement with my learned Brother, I tend to doubt whether it would have been proper for me to arrive at a different conclusion from his for reasons of judicial comity. I would have done no more than express reservations about his reasoning, and than left it to the appeals process, if activated, to provide a definitive answer in due course.

42. Because Mr. Chiu is bound to fail in the present proceedings against Mr. Ma and Yat Ming for the reasons I have just indicated, it would be an abuse of the process of the Court to allow the action to proceed against them. They therefore succeed on their applications to have the action struck out against themselves.

43. As against Mr. Mark, Mr. Chiu has put forward the following three heads of claim in the present action:-

(i) A duty to account to Mr. Chiu for the profits from the sale to Celberg on the basis that Mr. Mark was a party to Mr. Ma's breach of fiduciary duty towards Mr. Chiu (paragraph 8 of the Statement of Claim).

(ii) Negligence by drawing up the documents leading to the alleged sale to Mr. Ma and failing to advise Mr. Chiu on them. (paragraph 8 of the Statement of Claim).

(iii)Conversion of Yat Ming's assets in or about August 1978 (paragraph 18 of the Statement of Claim).

44. Dealing firstly with (i), the allegation against Mr. Mark presupposes that Mr. Ma committed a breach of fiduciary duty. However, in view of what transpired at the hearing of H.C.A. 1600/79, Mr. Chiu is estopped from asserting that. During the course of those proceedings, he admitted in the Memorandum of Agreement (see Agreed Bundle A14) that his sale of the shares in Yat Ming to Mr. Ma was valid, and that at all material times from the 8th August 1978 onwards Mr. Ma was the beneficial owner of all the issued Yat Ming shares. Those admissions by Mr. Chiu create an estoppel in favour not only of Mr. Ma but also of Mr. Mark. How the doctrine of issue estoppel operates against a party to previous litigation is explained by Denning M.R. in McIlkenny v. Chief Constable of the West Midlands(2) at page 705.

45. Being no longer entitled to assert that Mr. Ma committed a breach of fiduciary duty, the opportunity simply cannot arise for Mr. Chiu to allege that anyone else could have participated in such a breach.

46. A further ground for ruling against Mr. Chiu's contention that Mr. Mark is liable to account to him is that there is nothing in the Statement of Claim, nor in the material before the Court, to suggest that Mr. Mark has been in any way the beneficiary of the profits from the sale by Yat Ming to Celberg. The remedy of an account against Mr. Mark seems wholly misconceived.

47. For Mr. Chiu to be able to rely on head (ii), namely negligence, he would need to be able to prove (a) a duty of care owed to him by Mr. Mark; (b) a breach of that duty; and (c) damage caused by any such breach of duty (Halsbury Vol. 34, paragraph 54). The damage which Mr. Chiu alleges is the loss of his shares in Yat Ming or their value (paragraph 16 of the Statement of Claim). However, Mr. Lee, for Mr. Mark, has pointed out what I regard as an insuperable obstacle to Mr. Chiu's hopes of proving that Mr. Mark was the cause of his sustaining such loss. Mr. Chiu has pleaded that there was no sale, alternatively, that there was a void sale (which again would mean that there was no sale) or, as a further alternative, that there was a voidable sale. Had Mr. Chiu been correct in any one of those three assertions prior to the settlement of 11th July 1980 in H.C.A. 1600/79, the way would have remained open up till that date for the court to restore to him what he says were his shares or their equivalent value. However, by his agreeing to the settlement of the 11th July 1980, Mr. Chiu was a party to a transaction which divested himself of the shares in favour of Mr. Ma. Any loss sustained by Mr. Chiu from that point on was attributable to that settlement. In lawyers' terminology, there was a novus actus interveniens, namely the settlement, which was the cause of the loss, so that the previous conduct of Mr. Mark became relegated to a matter of mere history after that.

48. In relation to head (iii), reference has already been made to Mr. Mark's having obtained possession of the Letters of Entitlement on the 21st August 1978. Mr. Chiu has no locus standi to complain about that. Those assets belonged to Yat Ming, not to Mr. Chiu, so that Yat Ming alone could sue.

49. Seeing no basis on which any of the claims against Mr. Mark could succeed, I regard it as an abuse of the process of the Court to allow the action to proceed against him. His application to strike out therefore succeeds.

50. Mr. Chiu's claim against Mr. Foo rests on negligence. Mr. Foo is alleged to have been negligent in the following ways -

(i) Failing to advise Mr. Chiu on receipt of Mr. Mark's letter of 20th April 1979 (Agreed Bundle, F48) that even if there had been a sale to Mr. Ma, it was void or voidable (paragraph 8 of the Statement of Claim.)

(ii) Failing to raise in H.C.A. 1600/79 -

(a) either that there was no sale, or, alternatively, if there was such a sale, that it was void or voidable because of a breach of fiduciary duty by Mr. Ma in purchasing the shares (paragraphs 6, 7 and 11 of the Statement of Claim).

(b) that Mr. Mark was liable to account as a party to Mr. Ma's alleged breach of fiduciary duty or was alternatively negligent by drawing up the documents leading to the alleged sale to Mr. Ma and failing to advise Mr. Chiu on them (paragraphs 8 and 11 of the Statement of Claim).

(iii)Advising Mr. Chiu to accept the terms of settlement.

51. All of these allegations of negligence against Mr. Foo are non-starters. At every material stage of the litigation, Mr. Foo was shielded by Counsel's advice (see the type-written sheet submitted by Mr. Sakhrani to show Counsel's involvement at the various stages of the litigation). There is no suggestion either in the Statement of Claim or in any of the other material before the Court that Counsel was at any stage inadequately instructed. In fact, it is clear that the material on which Mr. Ma now seeks to rely was at all relevant times in the possession of the Counsel Mr. Foo instructed in H.C.A. 1600/79.

52. My understanding is that a solicitor who has instructed Counsel properly cannot be liable in negligence when he follows Counsel's advice. See Halsbury, Vol. 3, paragraph 1190. On that basis, I do not see how Mr. Foo can be liable to Mr. Chiu in the way alleged, and accordingly see no point in allowing the proceedings against Mr. Foo to go any further. The action against Mr. Foo is accordingly struck out.

53. It is difficult to gauge what Celberg is supposed to have done wrong. There is no suggestion in the Statement of Claim or in any of the material before the Court that it was other than a purchaser in good faith of the Letters of Entitlement from Yat Ming at a time when Mr. Ma had been declared by the Court to be the owner of Yat Ming's issued shares. No basis having been disclosed for impugning the transaction between Yat Ming and Celberg, it is clear that Celberg should not have been joined in the present proceedings with the result that the action will be struck out against Celberg on the ground of disclosing no reasonable cause of action and as an abuse of the process of the Court.

(J.J. Rhind)
Judge of the High Court

(2) (1980) 2 W.L.R. 689

Representation:

Mr. Stevenson of (Stevenson, Low & Co.) for Plaintiff

Mr. Litton, Q.C. and Mr. K.H. Woo (C.P. Lai & Co.) for 1st and 3rd Defendants

Mr. Martin Lee, Q.C. and Mr. R. Tang (Lo & Lo) for 2nd Defendant

Mr. Sakhrani (R. Young & Co.) for 4th Defendant

Mr. Bokhary (Woo Kwan Lee & Lo) for 5th Defendant

32324-EN-1980-12-24

CHIU MING SUN v. MICHAEL MA WING AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCA007013A/1980

  

Interlocutory injunction - serious question to be tried - action vexatious and an abuse of process - previous action in which the issues could and should have been litigated - previous action settled - whether a court can make declarations without hearing evidence.

  

 1980 No. 7013

  

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG

HIGH COURT

-----------------

  

BETWEEN  
 Chiu Ming SunPlaintiff
 and 
 Michael Ma Wing1st Defendant
 Peter Mark Wai Hing2nd Defendant
 Yat Ming Investment Company Limited3rd Defendant
 Foo Tak Ching4th Defendant
 Delberg Limited5th Defendant

-----------------

Coram: O'Connor, J. in Chambers

Date of Judgment: 24th December 1980

 

-----------------

JUDGMENT

-----------------

 

1. The plaintiff by inter party summons seeks an interlocutory injunction to restrain the first and third defendants from disposing of any of the proceeds of sale of two letters of Entitlement to grants of land in the New Territories. The defendants oppose the application on a number of grounds, the principal one being that the plaintiff's action is vexatious and an abuse of process, as the subject matter of the action has been litigated and decided in a previous action between the parties.

2. The third defendant is a limited company whose assets, in effect, consisted solely of two Letters of Entitlement to land in the New Territories. The plaintiff realised these Letters were very valuable and decided that if he could obtain them he could sell them at a substantial profit. He entered into an arrangement by which he would purchase all the shares in the third defendant and so obtain its assets. This arrangement provided that his purchase of the shares would be financed by Romulus Company Limited to whom he would then sell the shares. The plaintiff would pay $15 million for the shares but would sell them to Romulus for $83 million. On the face of it the transaction would be very profitable for him. The second defendant is a solicitor, whose services were engaged by the first defendant. The plaintiff signed a transfer and a bought and sold note in respect of the shares in the third defendant. The plaintiff says he signed them in blank and that he was given to understand that this was for the purposes of his transaction with Romulus. The defendants say that when he signed them they were already filled in with the name of the first defendant as transferee. The Letters of Entitlement have since been sold by the third defendant for $113 million. That sum became, effectively, the sole asset of the third defendant company. The issue between the parties in essence was, and is, whether the purported transfer of the shares in the third defendant to the first defendant was valid or not. The plaintiff's case was and is that he remains the beneficial owner of the shares and thus of its assets which were the Letters of Entitlement and later the sum of $113 million for which they were sold. The third defendant has since paid a dividend which went to the first defendant. The $113 million is now held between the first and third defendants. On this application the plaintiff seeks to restrain the first and third defendants from disposing of that money.

3. The plaintiff says that the purported transfer of the shares to the first defendant first came to his notice when the first defendant claimed that he owned the shares in the third defendant, and consequently its assets.

4. The plaintiff brought an action no. 1600 of 1979 seeking a declaration that he was entitled to the shares and for ancillary relief. The first defendant counterclaimed for a declaration that he was the beneficial owner of the shares. That action came on for hearing before Mr. Commissioner Gittens in July 1980. The plaintiff and the first defendant were each represented by leading counsel. The plaintiff's counsel opened his case and examined the plaintiff who was then cross-examined. The action was adjourned overnight, before the cross-examination of the plaintiff had concluded. His credit as a witness had already been virtually destroyed. Under cross-examination he made admissions that were seriously in conflict with statements that had been made in his counsel's opening. On the hearing being resumed his counsel requested an adjournment and indicated that it was likely the parties would come to terms. Subsequently a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into, containing terms of settlement of the action. Its terms conceded the validity of the transfer of the shares in the third defendant to the first defendant. Leading counsel for the first defendant directed the learned Commissioner's attention to the words of the Vice Chancellor in Metzger v. Dept of Health and Social Security(1), to the effect that a court does not make declarations just because the parties have chosen to admit something, that there are no declarations without argument. He asked the learned Commissioner to make a declaration that the first defendant was the beneficial owner of the shares. Leading counsel for the plaintiff confirmed the Memorandum of Agreement and stated that he did not resist the terms of a formal judgment handed up. The terms of the formal judgment included the declaration that the first defendant was the beneficial owner. Judgment was given in those terms. The formal judgment does not recite that it was made by consent. The plaintiff has accepted payment of $1.5 million under the terms of settlement.

5. The plaintiff now brings a further action in which he seeks a declaration that he is the beneficial owner of the shares and asks that the judgment in the previous action be set aside. He says he is entitled to bring this further action because he is now alleging matters which he did not allege in the previous action. Firstly he alleges that the judgment is void or voidable as both parties, or at least the plaintiff, made a fundamental mistake in believing that the first defendant could enforce a sale to himself of the shares, whereas having regard to a fiduciary relationship between the parties he could not do so. There is on the evidence before me nothing which could be taken to indicate any mistake on the part of the first defendant. In my opinion Mr Commissioner Gittens, sitting as a judge of the High Court could not make an order that was void. An order made by a High Court judge is good until it is set aside. It may be voidable, but cannot be void.

6. The compromise was not entered into in ignorance of any primary relevant fact. The plaintiff at the time judgment was given in the previous action was aware of all the facts which he says point to the inference that there was a fiduciary relationship. So much is conceded by the plaintiff, and indeed is apparent from his pleadings, the opening of his counsel and his evidence in the previous case, together with the affidavits put in by him in the present action. However he says that he did not draw the inference he ought to have from those primary facts nor did he consider the legal consequences to which that inference would give rise. Any mistake involved in the compromise was therefore not attributable to the first defendant, and would not assist the plaintiff unless the first defendant was under a fiduciary duty to make known to the plaintiff the inference that could or should be drawn from the primary facts and the legal consequences. I do not consider it reasonably arguable, on the view of the facts must favourable to the plaintiff, that any duty that might have been owed by the first defendant, went so far. The first defendant is not alleged to have made any misrepresentation nor kept any relevant fact from the plaintiff. The plaintiff's own case indicates that the first defendant had made full revelation of the facts, which the plaintiff says give rise to a fiduciary relationship. Indeed the plaintiff's claim to a fiduciary relationship is based on facts alleged to have been communicated to him by the first defendant. On the plaintiff's own case he made no mistake as to what he conceded. He conceded that the first defendant was the beneficial owner of the shares, and that is what he intended to concede. He was fully aware of all the facts upon which he could assess his position and with the advice of leading counsel he chose to enter into a bargain to terminate the proceedings. What he is now asserting is, in reality, that he is dissatisfied with the bargain because he misjudged his chance of success if he had proceeded with the action. He is really complaining of a bad bargain. That does not affect the validity of the bargain. He obtained exactly what, in full possession of all the relevant facts and with legal advice, he bargained for. It does not seem relevant that if he had drawn an inference open from primary facts known to him, and adverted to a legal consequence, he might not have entered into that bargain.

7. The defendants, in the present application, relying on Kinch v. Walcott(2), say that the judgment in the previous action was not a consent judgment and that therefore it can only be attacked by way of appeal. In my view it is a consent judgment. It was made by agreement between the parties in order to terminate the proceedings. Accordingly it can be attacked by way of fresh proceedings.

8. For the plaintiff it is said that the judgment of Mr Commissioner Gittens can be attacked because it made declarations by consent. Reliance is placed upon Wallersteiner v. Moir(3) and Metzoer v. Dept of Health and Social Security(1). It is to be observed that the passage from the judgment of Buckley L.J. refers to the practice of not making declarations of right on admissions. It is not suggested that in law, the court has no jurisdiction to make declarations on admissions. The jurisdiction to make declarations is now to be found in Order 15 r.16. The terms of that rule place no limits on the jurisdiction. There does not appear to be any good grounds for not giving the words of the rule their full and fair meaning. The early cases indicated that the courts would be slow to exercise this jurisdiction. The courts as a matter of practice, not because of jurisdictional limitations, often refused to make declarations. In Ibeneweka v. Eobuna(4), Lord Radcliffe said:

 The general theme of judicial observations has been to the effect that declarations are not lightly to be granted. The power should be exercised 'sparingly', with 'great care and jealousy', with 'extreme caution'. These are indeed counsels of moderation, even though as Lord Dunedin once observed, such expressions afford little guidance for particular cases. Nevertheless, anxious warnings of this character appear to their lordships to be not so much enunciations of legal principle as administrative cautions issued by eminent and prudent judges to their possibly more reckless, successors. After all, it is doubtful if there is more of principle involved than the undoubted truth that the power to grant a declaration should be exercised with a proper sense of responsibility and a full realisation that judicial pronouncements ought not to be issued unless there are circumstances that call for their making. Beyond that there is no legal restriction on the award of a declaration.

In Imperial Tobaccu Ltd v. Attorney General(5), Ormorod L.J. at page 605a expressed the view that the discretion ought not be fettered by courts laying down guidelines for its exercise and Browne L.J. expressed similar views at 614b. I do not consider the remarks in Wallersteiner v. Moir(3) and Metzger v. Dept of Health and Social Security(1) were intended to be, or are, in conflict with the passage quoted from Lord Radcliffe. Nevertheless, before making a declaration the court would usually require the conditions set out in Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank v. British Bank for Foreign Trade Ltd(6) to be satisfied, and see also Rediffusion (Hong Kong) Ltd v. A.G. of Hong Kong(7).

9. In the previous action the declaration the learned Commissioner was invited to make, and did make, did not affect a public interest or the interest of third parties. It did not involve a finding of fraud, to the contrary it avoided the possibility of such a finding being made after a full hearing. The plaintiff agreed to his claim being dismissed and in the circumstances that involved a withdrawal of his allegation that the transfer of the shares to the first defendant was invalid. There was therefore no assertion still being put forward that the beneficial ownership of the shares had not passed to the first defendant. Each party was advised by leading counsel. In those circumstances I consider it cannot seriously be disouted that the learned Commissioner was acting properly within the limits of his discretion in making the declaration. Of course it is true that there was no evidence, save the transfer itself, contradicting the evidence of the plaintiff that he had not transferred his interest to the first defendant. However in the light of all the circumstances the learned Commissioner was entitled to act on the basis that the plaintiff's evidence was not fit to be acted upon.

10. However the main issue on this application is whether the plaintiff's action is clearly vexatious and an abuse of process of the court, that there is no serious question to be tried. The matter arises, of course in the light of the previous proceedings. All the relief sought by the plaintiff in the present action is founded on the allegation that he, not the first defendant, is beneficially entitled to the shares. That was the allegation which was litigated and eventually resolved by a consent judgment in the previous action. The plaintiff says he is entitled to bring the present action because the issue was not fought to the bitter end in the previous proceedings, and the issue of the fiduciary relationship was not dealt with in them, the plaintiff being ignorant of it. He says that the fiduciary relationship gives rise to a new cause of action upon which the court has not given a judgment.

11. As I have already pointed out the plaintiff was, at the time of judgment in the previous action, in possession of all the evidence upon which he bases his allegation of a breach of fiduciary duty. His counsel was also aware of those facts. He does not dispute that, but says he did not appreciate its significance. His failure to appreciate any significance attaching to those facts, was not because of any concealment or misrepresentation by the first defendant.

12. The plaintiff is not assisted by the fact that the issue of beneficial ownership in the previous action was resolved by a consent judgment rather than fought out to the end. It is sufficient that the plaintiff's counsel admitted in the face of the court that the beneficial ownership was in the first defendant and that admission was implied in the order made by the court. In Khan v. Goleccha International Ltd(8) Brightman L.J. said at page 266b:

 "The only sensible approach of the law, in my view, is to treat an issue as laid at rest, not only if it is embodied in the terms of the judgment, or implicit in the judgment because it is embodied in the spoken decision, but also if it is embodied in an admission made in the face of the court or implicit in a consent order.

13. Nor is the plaintiff assisted by the fact that the admission was wrongly made. In a passage Brightman L.J. at page 265 cited and approved of the following passage from Hoystead v. Taxation Comr(9) at 165:

 In the opinion of their lordships, it is settled, first, that the admission of a fact fundamental to the decision arrived at cannot be withdrawn and a fresh litigation started with a view to obtaining another judgment upon a different assumption of fact; secondly, the same principle applies not only to an erronous admission of a fundamental fact, but to an erronous assumption as to the legal quality of that fact. Parties are not permitted to begin fresh litigation because of new views they may entertain of the law of the case, or new versions which they present as to what should be a proper apprehension by the Court of the legal result either of the construction of the documents or the weight of certain circumstances. If this were permitted, litigation would have no end, except where legal ingenuity is exhausted."

In Yat Tung Investment Co. Ltd v. Dao Heng Bank Ltd(10) the following passage occurs in the judgment of the Privy Council in reference to res judicata in its wider sense:

"....... it becomes an abuse of process to raise in subsequent proceedings matters which could and therefore should have been litigated in earlier proceedings. The locus classicus of that aspect of res judicata is the judgment of Wioram V.-C. in Henderson v. Henderson (1843) 3 Hare 100, 115, where the judge says

'..... where a given matter becomes the subject of litigation in, and adjudication by, a court of competent jurisdiction, the court requires the parties to that litigation to bring forward their whole case, and will not (except under special circumstances) permit the same parties to open the same subject of litigation in respect of matter which might have been brought forward as part of the subject in contest, but which was not brought forward, only because they have from negligence, inadvertence, or even accident, omitted part of their case. The plea of res judicata applies, except in special cases, not only to points upon which the court was actually required by the parties to form an opinion and pronounce a judgment, but to every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation, and which the parties, exercising reasonable diligence, might have brought forward at the time.'

The shutting out of a 'subject of litigation' - a power which no court should exercise but after a scrupulous examination of all the circumstances - is limited to cases where reasonable diligence would have caused a matter to be earlier raised; moreover, although negligence, inadvertence or even accident will not suffice to excuse, nevertheless 'special circumstances' are reserved in case justice should be found to require the non application of the rule."

14. Their Lordships went on to approve of the expanded meaning given to the phrase "every point which properly belonged to the subject of litigation", in Greenhaight v. Mallard(11) at 257:

"....... res judicata for this purpose is not confined to the issues which the court is actually asked to decide, but .... it covers issues of fact which are so clearly part of the subject matter of the litigation and so clearly could have been raised that it would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow a new proceeding to be started in respect of them."

15. The order sought in the present action arises out of the same issues as were decided in the previous action, that is the validity of the sale of the shares and where the beneficial ownership of them lies. Those issues properly belonged to the previous action and the plaintiff could have brought forward in the previous action, the breach of fiduciary duty which he now alleges in respect of those issues. He was in possession of the facts and his failure to bring them forward was due to his failure to appreciate their significance. That failure was in no way due to any misrepresentation by the first defendant. Not only could he have brought those matters forward in the previous action but he should have done so. He is now seeking to raise on a somewhat different basis, the same issues of validity of the sale and the beneficial ownership, as were previously decided against him on an admission made on his behalf by leading counsel. In the light of sections 16 and 17 of the Supreme Court Ordinance Chapter 4 I consider regard may be had to section 43 of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1925. It is as follows:

"S.43The High Court and the Court of Appeal respectively, in the exercise of the jurisdiction vested in them by this Act, shall in every cause or matter pending before the Court, grant, either absolutely, or on such terms or conditions as the Court thinks just, all such remedies whatsoever as any of the parties thereto may appear to be entitled to in respect of any legal or equitable claim properly brought forward by them in the cause or matter, so that, as for as possible, all matters in controversy between the parties may be completely and finally determined and all multiplicity of legal proceedings concerning any of those matters be avoided."

It is in the public interest that multiplicity of proceedings be avoided and there be an end to litigation. It is vexatious that a plaintiff should be able to try to avoid a sale by bringing forward one set of allegations and, on judgment being given against him, be thereafter permitted to bring forward a different set of allegations, known to him at the time of the first action, in a further attempt to avoid the sale. Of course there may be circumstances where it is convenient that litigation be instituted to resolve only some of the issues in dispute between parties in relation to some particular matter. Such a case may well fall within the category of "special circumstances" referred to in Yat Tung Co. v. Dao Heng Bank(10) and see also Brisbane City Council v. Attorney General(12). I do not consider the present case to fall within that category. I consider the present action to be vexatious.

16. There is another aspect to the matter. The plaintiff by his pleadings in the previous action, tendered as the issue to be litigated the beneficial ownership of the shares, but only in so far as it depended upon whether or not he had agreed to sell to the first defendant. On his own case he was then aware of facts which would, if properly appreciated by him have enabled him to attack that sale on the further ground that it was invalidated by reason of the first defendant's breach of fiduciary duty. He was advised by leading counsel. Courts are slow to grant declarations. The plaintiff by his counsel consented to the court making a declaration which it would not have made if the facts known to the plaintiff had been brought to its attention. The plaintiff, by not bringing to the attention of the court matters which would almost certainly have resulted in the court refusing to make the declaration, thereby induced the court to an erroneous decision. At that time the plaintiff obviously considered it to be in his interests that the court make the declaration as part of a general settlement of the action. I consider it would be an abuse of process of the court if the plaintiff were now permitted, for his own advantage, to now bring forward those allegations in order to, among other matters, have the judgment in the other action set aside.

17. In considering whether there is a serious question to be tried I have considered the questions of law that arise and the differences concerning issues of fact. I have come to the conclusion that there is no reasonably likely combination of the issues of law and fact upon which the plaintiff could succeed, as it appears his claim is both vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court. That being so it is unnecessary for me to decide what decision I would have come to if I had found there was a serious question for trial, however it might be helpful if I indicate briefly my view on the matter. The money which the plaintiff seeks to have frozen is directly connected with the subject matter of the action. There is no suggestion that the third defendant is a trading company or that it has any other assets. It does not appear that the third defendant would use the money for the purpose of carrying on business. The first defendant is the owner of the third defendant company. He appears to be a person of some substance but not to such an extent as to give confidence that a plaintiff judgment creditor would be able to recover the debt. If the money were not frozen the first defendant could easily put it out of the reach of the plaintiff. The amount involved is $113 million. If the first defendant were inclined to take steps to avoid execution of a judgment that might be given against him, it seems he would have no difficulty in doing so, and the plaintiff would be left with an empty judgment. The plaintiff has recently been in prison in respect of a substantial judgment debt. His counsel is not instructed as to his resources. If he were called upon to pay damages to the defendants on foot of his undertaking, those damages would be assessed at the difference between what $113 million earns on deposit, and what profit the defendants could have made by the use of that money between now and judgment in the action. Interest rates are very high at the moment but not likely to remain at the present level till the trial, which would not take place for a considerable time. The percentage of profit that defendants could make, in excess of what the money would earn on deposit, might be small. However having regard to the amount of capital being $113 million, even if the defendants could only use it to make a profit of 1% in excess of deposit rates, the sum would be $1.13 million over even a twelve month period.

18. I would not have granted an injunction unless the plaintiff could have fortified his undertaking by a bond or security in the value of $3 million.

  

  

 (R. O'Connor)
 Judge of the High Court

  

Representation:

Patrick Fung (Johnson, Stokes & Master) for plaintiff

Martin Lee, Q.C., and Samel Lee (C.P. Lai & Co.) for 1st and 3rd defendants

(1) (1977) 3 ALL ER 444 at 451

(2) (1929) A.C. 482

(3) (1974) I.W.L.R. 991 at 1028H-1029D 1030C-G

(4) (1964) I.W.L.R. 219 at 224

(5) (1979) 2 ALL ER 592

(6) (1921) 2 A.C. 438 at 448

(7) (1970) A.C. 1136 at 1158

(8) (1980) 2 ALL ER 259

(9) (1926) A.C. 155

(10) (1975) A.C. 581

(11) (1947) 2 ALL ER 255

(12) (1978) 3 W.L.R. 299 at 307H to 308G