Matrimonial Causes1980

ANN VIRGINIA HOTUNG v. JOSEPH EDWARD HOTUNG

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36372-EN-1980-12-09

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HCMC000053A/1980

1980 No. 53

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG

HIGH COURT

DIVORCE JURISDICTION

-----------------

BETWEEN
	ANN VIRGINIA HOTUNG	Petitioner
	and
	JOSEPH EDWARD HOTUNG	Respondent

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Coram: Hon. Fuad J. in Chambers

Date of Judgment: 9th December 1980.

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ORDER

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1. The application which is before me today arose in this way. The petition filed by the wife on the 27th June this year, contained (as required by rule 68 of the Matrimonial Causes Rules) an application for ancillary relief, including maintenance pending suit, periodical payments, secured provision and a lump sum. Since the wife wished to proceed with the application, notice in the usual form dated the 14th July, was served upon the husband. The notice required the husband to file an affidavit of means. No such affidavit was filed within the 14 days allowed, and the wife duly applied for an Order under rule 73(2) of the Rules. On the 30th September, for the reasons that I gave, I made the Order sought, and on the 7th October the husband filed an affidavit which was in the following terms:-

"	1.	I have net realizable assets of or in excess of US$100 million and a commensurate income.
	2.	I am advised by my lawyers that in the circumstances there is no requirement for me to give any greater detail nor for me to quantify my assets with any greater particularity (which would in any event take me many months to do) since the above assets are more than sufficient to satisfy any order which this Honourable Court might reasonably make."

2. When, in October, I was dealing with other applications arising out of these proceedings, Mr. Swinton Thomas, who appears for the wife, raised the issue of the sufficiency of the affidavit, and when Mr. Robert Johnson, for the husband, said that he had not come prepared to argue that issue, the matter was stood over by consent. In the meantime, a formal application was filed for an Order "that the respondent do file an affidavit of means or alternatively a further affidavit in accordance with the provisions of Rule 73(2) of the Matrimonial Causes Rules," and this is the application upon which I have to reach a decision.

3. Mr. Swinton Thomas supported his application on a number of grounds:-

(i)	that rule 73(2) was clear and was binding on the husband;
(ii)	that the extent of his income and property was hightly relevant to enable the court to make just and proper financial provision for the wife when the time came, in accordance with the matters to which the court is required to have regard under s.7 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance;
(iii)	that an affidavit, giving full particulars of the husband's assets, was vital to enable the wife's case to be properly conducted and for her to be properly advised;
(iv)	that there existed no authority, in Britain or Hong Kong, that could support a contention that any person, whether on account of extreme wealth or any other reason, could be excused from compliance with the Rules; and
(v)	that the court had already made an Order directing an affidavit of means to be filed and, in those circumstances, the husband had three courses open to him, none of which he had pursued, namely-

	(a)	to comply with the Order;
	(b)	to ask for more time; or
	(c)	to appeal against the Order.

4. Mr. Johnson submitted that the Court's Order had been complied with, for an affidavit of means had indeed been filed. If the Court were to hold that such was not the case, then there was a discretion whether to order a new affidavit or further particulars or not, and that discretion should not be exercised in the wife's favour because the information contained in the affidavit of the 7th October was amply sufficient in the particular circumstances of this case to enable the Court to deal with the issues that were relevant to the decision which would ultimately need to be made.

5. It is necessary I think to set out the relevant statutory provisions. Paragraph (2) of Rule 73 of the Matrimonial Causes Rules is in the following terms-

"(2) Where a respondent spouse or a petitioner is served with a notice in Form 8 or 9 in respect of an application for ancillary relief, not being an application to which rule 74 or 75 applies, then, unless the parties are agreed upon the terms of the proposed order, he shall, within 14 days after service of the notice, file an affidavit in answer to the application containing full particulars of his property and income, and if he does not do so, the court may order him to file an affidavit containing such particulars."

Subsection (1) of s. 7 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance is as follows-

"7. (1) It shall be the duty of the court in deciding whether to exercise its powers under section 4 or 6 in relation to a party to the marriage and, if so, in what manner, to have regard to the conduct of the parties and all the circumstances of the case including the following matters, that is to say-

(a)	the income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources which each of the parties to the marriage has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;
(b)	the financial needs, obligations and responsibilities which each of the parties to the marriage had or is likely to have in the foreseeable future;
(c)	the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage;
(d)	the age of each party to the marriage and the duration of the marriage;
(e)	any physical or mental disability of either of the parties to the marriage;
(f)	the contributions made by each of the parties to the welfare of the family, including any contribution made by looking after the home or caring for the family;
(g)	in the case of proceedings for divorce or nullity of marriage, the value to either of the parties to the marriage of any benefit (for example, a pension) which, by reason of the dissolution or annulment of the marriage, that party will lose the chance of acquiring."

6. It is to be noted that while that subsection begins in almost identical terms to subsection (1) of s.25 of the United Kingdom Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, in the Hong Kong statute, the requirement in the United Kingdom Act that the Court should strive "to place the parties, so far as is practicable and, having regard to their conduct, just to do so, in the financial position in which they would have been if the marriage had not broken down and each had properly discharged his or her financial obligations and responsibilities towards the other" is omitted. Of course, this omission can be no accident and the difference will need to be borne in mind at the appropriate time. I need only say here that I do not consider that it has any real bearing on the application before me.

7. In resisting the application, Mr. Johnson submitted that there were in essence two types of case - the "contribution" type of case and the "need" type of case. Here the wife had made no contribution whatever to the building up of the husband's great wealth and so the "contribution" consideration was irrelevant. As to her needs, while it would be right for the wife to be treated justly, and even generously, against the background of the husband's enormous riches, these needs could be assessed, without further details, from the information already before the Court. It would be a protracted and expensive exercise to attempt to go into the sort of detail envisaged by Mr. Swinton Thomas, and such an exercise was wholly unnecessary in all the circumstances. I think it should be said, at this stage, that on the material before me, I feel it would be quite wrong to dismiss out of hand considerations, so far as they may be relevant, of any contributions of the kind referred to in paragraph (f) of subsection (1) of s.7 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, that the wife may have made.

8. Mr. Johnson argues that on the facts of this case it could not be that the Court would need to decide the total value of the family assets, for the Court would not consider it appropriate to award the wife a fixed proportion of these assets, or to divide them by a fraction to reach the right figure. It was essential, in his submission, for the Court to view the present application in the light of the issues involved. The issue here, essentially the legitimate needs of the wife (albeit against the background of huge wealth) could be resolved without the need for further particulars regarding the husband's assets. Mr. Johnson cited a number of authorities on interrogatories and discovery to indicate the approach of the courts to requests for information or material not essential for a fair decision to be reached in civil proceedings. There can be no doubt about the principles applied by the courts in this area of the law of procedure and, if I may say so with respect, the cases cited were merely examples (although it must be said, good examples) of the application of these principles in particular circumstances.

9. Mr. Johnson suggested that the time had come for the Court to step in and stop the wife from pursuing a course of action that found no support in the authorities and was not sanctioned by statute law.

10. While absolving the husband of any possible suggestion that he was being defiant in filing an affidavit in the form which is before me, and accepting without question that neither he nor his advisers seek to advance the proposition that his immense wealth entitles him to any special indulgence, in my judgment it cannot be said, by any stretch of the imagination, that his affidavit complies with the requirements of the law. It does not begin to give "full particulars of his property and income" as stipulated by paragraph (2) of rule 73 of the Rules. The Court, in deciding the form and extent of the financial provision that should be made for the wife (in the unhappy event of no agreement being reached) has, of course, a wide discretion. But the discretion is not at large - it is governed both by statute and, to an extent by authority, and in my view, Mr. Swinton Thomas was right in submitting (particularly in the context of a lump sum order, the form of order that is most likely to suit the circumstances of this case) that the first task of the Court will be to make a realistic estimate of the means of each of the parties; in effect, of the family assets. I also accept that the Court will need to know not only what are the assets but what are their worth. Even where very great capital is possessed the income of the husband (about which nothing has been said) cannot be irrelevant. Indeed this is one of the matters to which the Court is required to have regard under the statute. Unless matters such as these are adequately dealt with in an affidavit of means, I agree that the Court will have no starting point, whatever modifications are made to the guidelines laid down by the authorities, and whatever be the approach ultimately adopted by the Court to reach a just and reasonable conclusion on financial provision, in the special circumstances created by the husband's enormous riches. Such wealth may well make the "one-third rule" inappropriate, and the Court might not arrive at the amount to be awarded by a calculation based on a proportion of the husband's total assets, but it seems to me that it is essential, if the Court is to do its duty in the way the statute enjoins, for as reliable an account, as the circumstances allow, of the assets of each party, and their worth, to be before the Court.

11. There is much force, too, in the submission made on behalf of the wife, that a full and frank disclosure by the husband is essential before she can be properly advised in negotiations that might lead to a compromise, or in the stand she should take if the matter is litigated to a conclusion.

12. It would be wrong not to recognize the very considerable expense and effort that would need to be expended if the husband were to be required to file an affidavit in the form urged by the petitioner. I can understand, too, the reluctance of a man with world-wide interests and a great fortune, to reveal more about his affairs than he need. However, these are not considerations that can have any weight, if my view of the law be correct. At least it can be said that the husband has the means to employ the best professional help (and by this I mean accountants, valuers and the like) that is available.

13. It will have been seen that I have been content to rest my decision on the wording of the relevant statutory provisions. I hold that the affidavit sworn and filed on the 7th October does not contain full particulars of the deponent's property and income and, in my judgment, the affidavit falls so far short of complying with the provisions which founded my Order of the 30th September, as to be, in effect, no affidavit of means at all. I therefore grant the application and order that a further affidavit be filed of the kind contemplated by rule 73(2) of the Rules. I do not think it to be either appropriate or necessary for me to attempt to spell out into what detail the affidavit should go. So long as my Order stands, it will be for the husband's advisers to advise him on this matter, in the light of the views I have expressed above. Of course, the parties are free to agree to any exceptions or limitations to the particulars required if they so chose.

14. I will now hear counsel on costs and the date on or before which the fresh affidavit should be filed.

	(K.T. Fuad)
	Judge of the High Court

Representation:

Mr. Swinton Thomas, Q.C. and Mr. A. Allman-Brown (Hampton, Winter & Glynn) for petitioner

Mr. Robert Johnson, Q.C. and Mr. G. Rodeay (Johnson, Stokes & Master) for respondent

36373-EN-1980-10-13

ANN VIRGINIA HOTUNG v. JOSEPH EDWARD HOTUNG

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HCMC000053/1980

1980 No. 53

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG

HIGH COURT

DIVORCE JURISDICTION

-----------------

BETWEEN
	ANN VIRGINIA HOTUNG	Petitioner
	and
	JOSEPH EDWARD HOTUNG	Respondent

-----------------

Coram: Hon. Fuad J. in Chambers

Date of Judgment: 13th October, 1980

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ORDER

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1. In this painful case, I have been greatly assisted by Mr. Robert Johnson who appears for the husband and by Mr. Swinton Thomas who appears for the wife. Mr. and Mrs. Hotung married on the 3rd August 1970. The husband is about 50 and the wife in her middle forties. Their marriage has been childless but the husband has two sons and two daughters by a previous marriage, and the wife has two sons by her previous marriage.

2. The wife filed a petition for divorce on the 27th June 1980. On the 14th July she applied for maintenance pending suit and the notice of the application required her husband to provide an affidavit as to his means. On the 15th September 1980, Mr. Hotung applied for an injunction ordering his wife to leave the matrimonial home, and on the 23rd September he filed his answer. Since her husband had failed to produce an affidavit regarding his means, two days later, Mrs. Hotung made application for her husband to be directed to do so, an application which was granted on the 30th September. On the 2nd October Mrs. Hotung applied for two injunctions - one that her husband should be restrained from parting with certain chattels in their house, and the other that he should be ordered to vacate the matrimonial home.

3. This bare recital tells its own sad story. We are here concerned with the two applications relating to the vacation of the matrimonial home which is, by all accounts, and by any standards, a beautiful house.

4. Mr. Hotung's grandfather was born in Hong Kong in 1860 and his father was also born here. He himself was born in Shanghai. He spent some time in Hong Kong during his boyhood and was for a year at the University here - in 1948. He continued his education in the U.S.A. and returned to live in Hong Kong permanently in 1960. It is common ground that he is possessed of an immense fortune.

5. Mrs. Hotung, who is American born, came first to Hong Kong in 1962. She lived here on and off since then, until she settled permanently in Hong Kong upon her marriage. Mr. and Mrs. Hotung bear a proud and illustrious name and are a couple of the highest social standing.

6. The marriage relationship has been somewhat stormy. After a few years of marriage they felt that their children by their previous marriages were a source of discord and that it might help if they lived away from them for a time. Despite this arrangement, the friction they had hoped to remove continued and they themselves agreed to live apart - this was for about a year, in 1975. The marriage finally broke down towards the end of 1979.

7. The husband's affidavit in support of his application is to the following effect. The matrimonial home had been bought and reconstructed by him. He had been advised that his wife had no rights in the house beyond those accorded her under the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance and that it was unlikely in the extreme that the Court would transfer the house to her under a final settlement. The marriage had broken down and they were living in an atmosphere of increasing tension. Since it was obviously inevitable that sooner or later his wife would leave the house, he was seeking an order that she should be required to leave within a reasonable time. He had a closer connection with Hong Kong than had his wife. He recognised that he would have to make a proper financial settlement for her in due course, both on an interim and a long term basis, and that he would be responsible for providing suitable alternative accommodation for her. All this he was willing to do.

8. A further matter of particular concern to him were his two daughters. Ann (who is 19½) had been granted a sabbatical year from her university in Massachusetts which she would be utilising to study Mandarin at the University of Hong Kong. (It is my understanding that she has now arrived here). It was his hope that Ann would be able to make her home with him while she pursued her studies, but the present situation in the house was very unhappy for a girl of her age and sensitive personality. Moreover his wife and Ann had never got on well together.

9. As regards his other daughter, Ellen, aged 18½, she had retuerned to the U.S.A. after spending the academic year 1979/1980 in Hong Kong and living in the family home. The affidavit does not reveal specific plans for her, but Mr. Hotung does say that his wife has had a harmful effect on the girl, more particularly by giving her far too much pocket-money, and by encouraging her to flout his authority.

10. Mr. Hotung asks the Court to impose a solution which would enable him to live at home with his children whilst his wife lived elsewhere in accommodation provided and financed by him. The affidavit concludes with a reference to the wounding nature of the allegations in his wife's petition.

11. It might be convenient here to summarise the effect of Mrs. Hotung's affidavit in support of her cross-application. She accepts that there is tension in the home but says that this is largely due of the treatment she has received at her husband's hands. She lives in fear of further violence of the nature particularised in her petition. Tension had also been caused by the very fact of contested divorce proceedings, and also by the fact that her husband was failing to meet his financial obligations. Furthermore, her husband had instructed the domestic staff to be obstructive and hostile and she had been humiliated by his act in forbidding the cook to prepare meals for her guests. He had also locked the main bedroom and the library against her. Since she had virtually been restricted to one bedroom, she had spent most of her time away from home, leaving early in the morning and returning late at night; and she had spent a good deal of time abroad. These absences had been necessitated by her husband's conduct. She made her application with great reluctance. While she had contemplated making such an application earlier, she had been anxious not to make matters worse. She had not wished to initiate proceedings which might have led to her husband having to leave home.

12. However, the affidavit continues, since her husband clearly felt that they should separate sooner rather than later, then he should be the one to leave. Her husband's wealth made it easier for him to find another home. She wanted to remain in her home and was horrified at the very thought of having to leave at his behest at a particularly difficult moment in her life. She had played a considerable part in the building, landscaping and furnishing of the home and was not prepared to accept that a move by her was inevitable. Her connections with Hong Kong were very strong. She agreed an offer had been made to her that she should be provided with alternative accommodation but did not wish to be exposed to the problems and uncertainties of living in a temporary dwelling. Ann, and still less Ellen, should not be allowed to influence the position. In any event, she got on well with Ellen and she denied that she had given her exhorbitent sums of pocket money or had encouraged her to flout her father's authority.

13. The affidavit ends by explaining that while she stayed away from home out of fear of her husband, he, on the other hand, spent a great deal of time abroad on business and on pleasure. He would suffer much less hardship if he were required to remain away.

14. Mr. Johnson began his submission by seeking to emphasise the very great difference between this case and the ordinary sort of case with which the Courts had to deal. He submitted that the husband had taken a very reasonable position. The marriage had undoubtedly broken down. Contrary to his hopes for a quick, sensible divorce, with the minimum of bitterness and heartbreak, the husband had been met by a very lengthy petition containing allegations of such a nature that would result in long drawn-out proceedings. The couple were leading a bizzare life in an atmosphere of increasing tension and unhappiness. She was away for the greater part of the day and used the house for little more than sleeping in. The husband wanted to bring matters to a head and put an end to what had become a charade. He had always been prepared to provide suitable alternative accommodation for her. The presence of Ann in Hong Kong was an important factor in the case.

15. In the forefront of Mr. Johnson's submissions was the fact of the husband's great and unusual wealth. The Court should assess the likelihood of Mrs. Hotung being awarded this very valuable property in a final settlement, for this should have a strong influence on the Court's decision. Recent cases showed that in final awards where very rich men were involved (and he knew of no case where the husband had possessed wealth of the order here) the Courts regarded the one-third rule as inappropriate. While Mrs. Hotung was entitled to fair, even generous treatment, it has highly unlikely, indeed almost inconceivable, that she would be given the house which, in any event, would need a great deal of money to run and maintain. The cases indicated that the wife's needs were paramount and the awards were increased only when the contribution she had made to the marriage was a factor to be taken into account.

16. Thus, in Mr. Johnson's submission, if the Court took the view that the chances of the wife ultimately being awarded the house were remote, it was only fair that she should go. They could not continue to live in the same house together if the realities of the situation were to be faced. There were terrible pressures on both. The inevitable had to be acknowledged. After all she would not be put out in to the street. While putting off the evil day might appear to have some attraction, the situation was getting worse all the time.

17. In resisting the husband's application, Mr. Thomas submitted that an order made at this stage requiring the wife to leave the matrimonial home would have a catastrophic effect upon her. She would be rendered so insecure that she might feel she had to settle at any price. It was most unusual, if not unique, for a husband to apply to a Court for his wife to be removed from the joint home during the pendency of a matrimonial suit. The value of the house was irrelevant - what was relevant was that it was the matrimonial home to which the wife was greatly attached and upon which, in happier times, she had lavished loving care. Far from conceding that it was inevitable that the wife would eventually have to leave the house, it was his submission that there was a strong likelihood that the Court would transfer the house to her as part of the final settlements and this, indeed, would be part of her case at the appropriate time. In view of her husband's enormous wealth, Mrs. Hotung would be asking, in money terms, for much more than the house was worth. A decision which would result in the wife being ordered to leave now would be to gravely prejudice the ultimate result. No offer had been made to the wife about alternative accommodation that she could possibly accept. The house was in every way just as much hers as it was his, save that he had paid for it. She did not enjoy the best of health and the pressure and stresses of these proceedings, which would affect her whole future life, were immense. If the husband really felt that they should separate now, the only chivalrous thing for him to do was to leave the house himself and, with his ample means, find somewhere right for himself and any children he wanted with him.

18. As for the husband's daughters, Ellen was clearly irrelevant and Ann had been living with her mother in America for some years. It would be quite wrong, in Mr. Thomas' submission, to make the wife go on account of her.

19. Mr. Thomas argued that the husband had made out no case at all for his wife to be ordered to leave. She had a right, protected by law, to remain in her home unless cogent and compelling grounds had been shown to require her to vacate it.

20. As regards the cross-application, Mr. Thomas submitted that the evidence revealed incidents of aggressive, hostile and violent behaviour by the husband. Some of the serious incidents were comparitively recent. There was clear evidence of harassment on Mr. Hotung's part. While Counsel would not go so far as to suggest that it was impossible for her to stay, she was living in a very difficult and humiliating situation, and her fear of her husband was well-founded.

21. Counsel cited a number of helpful English cases to me; I do not need to refer to them all. I understand no relevant cases have been reported in Hong Kong. In Hall v. Hall [1971] 1 W.L.R. 404, at page 406, Lord Denning M.R. and Sachs L.J. emphasised that for a Court to turn a party to a matrimonial dispute out of his or her home is a drastic course to take. In Bassett v. Bassett [1975] Fam. 77, Ormrod L.J. pointed out that while this was, of course, true in that such an order was likely to occasion hardship to some degree, varying in gravity from case to case, it had to be borne in mind that to refuse to make such an order might have no less drastic results, if the consequence of refusing to make one would be to inflict severe hardship on the unsuccessful spouse. I will respectfully adopt that approach.

22. It is clear from the authorities usefully drawn together in Walker v. Walker [1978] 1 W.L.R. 533, that in cases of this kind, the Court has to decide (in the words of Geoffrey Lane L.J - as he then was), at page 536 of the report:

"..... what is, in all the circumstances of the case, fair, just and reasonable and, if it is fair; just and reasonable that the husband should be excluded from the matrimonial home, then this must happen. Before one can come to a conclusion, all the circumstances have to be regarded. First of all, the behaviour of the husband; the behaviour of the wife; the effect upon the children if the husband stays there; the effect upon the children if he does not; the husband's own personal circumstances; the likelihood of injury to the wife or to the husband, their health, either physical or mental. All these things have to be taken into account."

23. I will also be guided, in reaching my decision, by the passages from the judgment of Cumming-Bruce J. in Bassett v. Bassett, cited with approval by Ormrod L.J. (who himself had been a member of the Court in that case), at page 538 of the report of Walker v. Walker. It need hardly be said that each case of the kind before me must be dealt with on its own facts.

24. I will say at once that in my judgment it would be dangerous and wrong to base a decision in a case like this upon a prediction of the likely final disposition of the matrimonial home. If a decision were to be founded upon such speculations, however carefully words are chosen to reflect that decision, a spouse ordered to leave would feel, it seems to me with some justification, that the issue had been to an extent prejudged.

25. Nor do I think that the Court should be influenced by the fact that there are ample assets to provide alternative accommodation for one spouse or the other. It seems to me no answer to a spouse who does not want to move, and who should not be required to do so applying ordinary tests, to say that he or she should move because another home can so easily be provided. The matrimonial home is not simply a piece of real estate that can be compared with other property.

26. But here there is Ann to consider. It is perfectly understandable that Mr. Hotung should wish to have his daughter living with him while she spends her year at the University of Hong Kong. Although there is no evidence before me on this point, I may be forgiven for drawing on my own experience and accepting that it might well be that it was convenient, if not essential, in the context of the girl's overall programme of studies at her American university, that she should take the year off now and that it could not have been postponed. She is still under 20 and the present atmosphere in the home may well upset her. Her reunion with her father will not be as happy as it might have been. However I do not think that Ann's presence in Hong Kong can be placed in the scales in weighing what is fair and just between Mr. and Mrs. Hotung. She has not formed part of the household in Hong Kong for some years and in all the circumstances, I have no doubt that it would be absolutely wrong to require Mrs. Hotung to leave on account of Ann's presence in Hong Kong. And on the material before me I am unable to say that Ellen could possibly have any legitimate bearing on the decision that has to be made.

27. The marriage has undoubtedly broken down. There is great friction and unhappiness in the house. However, all the grounds urged upon me on behalf of the husband, taken singly and together, fall for short, in my judgment, of those that would justify the Court ordering the wife to leave the matrimonial home while the divorce proceedings are pending.

28. Now what of Mrs. Hotung's application? I think it can fairly be said that she would not have made it had her husband not moved first. In my view the wording she used at the beginning of para. 8 of her affidavit is important:

"The respondent, however, is clearly of the opinion that there should be a physical separation sooner than later. If that is to be so, then it is my contention that clearly the respondent should be the one to leave, at least on an interim basis."

29. This, of course, does not disentitle her from succeeding in her application if the evidence warrants it. But I have to bear in mind that the allegations in her petition are strongly contested. Whatever complexion may properly be placed at this stage of the proceedings upon incidents that undoubtedly did occur, Mrs. Hotung has not established that as matters stand she is in need of the protection of the Court to the extent that it is necessary to exclude her husband from their house.

30. For the reasons I have attempted to give, I propose to dismiss both applications. The result (unless other arrangements can be agreed) will be to preserve the status quo, but my decision was in no way prompted by a desire that this should be so. After anxious consideration I came to the conclusion that in all the circumstances it was not fair, just or reasonable to exclude either spouse from the matrimonial home.

31. If I may be permitted to say so, Mr. and Mrs. Hotung are cultured and sophisticated people with great talents and wide interests. It is my hope that in the large house they presently share, they will be able to adapt to a sensible way of life to reduce, as far as possible, the anguish and bitterness that is so apparent. I understand that counsel will be seeking the assistance of the Court to have the hearing of the petition set down for trial as soon as is reasonably practicable. In this they can rely upon the Court's support.

	(K.T. Fuad)
	Judge of the High Court

Representation:

Mr. Swinton Thomas, Q.C., Mr. Charles Ching, Q.C. and Mr. Andrew Allman-Brown, instructed by Hampton, Winter & Glynn for Petitioner

Mr. Robert Johnson, Q.C. and Mr. Gilbert Rodway instructed by J.S.M. for respondent