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Probate Action1982

KUNG WONG SAU HIN v. KUNG KWOK SUN AND ANOTHER

Related cases with same parties

  • CACV128/1983KUNG WONG SAU HIN v. KUNG KWOK SUN AND ANOTHER
  • CACV148/1987C. P. LIN AND CO. v. KUNG WONG SAU HIN

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30767-EN-1985-10-11

KUNG WONG SAU HIN v. KUNG KWOK SUN AND OTHERS

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HCAP000002/1982

HEADNOTE

Charging order - whether it can be registered on land owned by judgement debtor and a stranger to the action as joint tenants - position in England distinguished as no equivalent legislation to Law of Property Act 1925 enacted in Hong Kong whereby joint tenancies give tenants a beneficial interest interest in proceeds of sale rather than an actual interest in land - a joint tenancy is an actual and registrable interest in land in Hong Kong and thus is encompassed within Sec. 20 of Supreme Court Ordinance.

No. 2 of 1982

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG

PROBATE JURISDICTION

______________

In the Estate of Kung Yuek (otherwise spelt as Yeuk, Yerk or York) Man , aliases Kung Kai Yip, Kung Kei, Kung Yeung Kei, Kung King Yip and Kung Yue Shing, deceased

BETWEEN

KUNG WONG SAU HINPlaintiff

 

AND

KUNG KWOK SUN
KUNG KWOK CHIN
KUNG CHI CHIU GARRIEL
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
1st Defendant
2nd Defendant
3rd Defendant
4th Defendant

_________________

Coram: Deputy High Court Judge O'Dea in Chambers

Date of hearing: 5 September 1985

Date of handing down of judgment: 11 October 1985 (file in 1986 HCA file)

___________

JUDGMENT

___________

1. This is an appeal from the decision of a Master who ordered that the registration of an order imposing a charge on certain land be vacated. This Probate Action was originally tried in the High Court in August, 1983 when judgment was given in favour of the Plaintiff together with costs. The defendants appealed and a new trial was ordered on a limited issue and the order for costs made in the Court below and the costs of the appeal were awarded to the Plaintiff. Both the costs of the original trial and the appeal were subsequently taxed and their recovery in the subject of the present proceedings.

2. The 1st defendant owns a flat at Braemar Hill as a joint tenant with his wife, NG She Woon.

3. On 2nd May 1985 a Mester in Chambers ordered that unless sufficient cause to the contrary be shown the 1st defendant's interest in the said property should, and in the meantime it was ordered that it did, stand charged with the payment of the taxed costs payable. The plaintiff took steps to register a sealed copy of the order to show cause in the Land Office against the said property.

4. By an inter-partes summons dated 23rd August 1985 the 1st defendant applied to have the registration of the order vacated and after hearing argument the learned Master made the order as sought. The plaintiff now appeals.

5. The central issue to be decided is whether the Court has power to impose on land owned by the judgment debtor and a stranger to the action as joint tenants a charge securing payment of the judgment debt and, if so, how it should exercise the discretion clearly given to it pursuant to Sec. 20 of the Supreme Court Ordinance This provision reads as follows:-

"The High Court may, for the purpose of enforcing a judgment or order of the High Court for the payment of money to a person, by order impose on such land or interest in land of the debtor as may be specified in the order a charge for securing the payment of any moneys due or to become due under the judgment or order. "

6. Apart from the discretion vested in the Court it is to be noted that the power only exists in relation to "such land or interest in land. " It is this restriction which distinguishes the position in Hong Kong from that existing in England because as a consequence of the passing of the law of Property Act 1925 joint tenancies create statutory trusts giving the tenants a beneficial interest in the proceeds of sale rather than an actual interest in the land.

7. In "Irani Finance Ltd v Singh" [1971] Ch. 59 the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal against a decision of a single judge and held that a charge against an interest in land could not be made unless that interest was registrable and, since a trust for sale of land was not an interest in land but an interest in the proceeds of sale it was not chargeable. That remains the position with respect to joint tenancies in England but the situation in Hong Kong is quite different as no similar legislation to the Law of Property Act has been enacted here.

8. A joint tenancy in Hong Kong is clearly a registrable interest in land and is acknowledged as such in the records of the Land Office. I would, therefore have little difficulty in imposing a charge on the property if the joint tenants were jointly liable on the judgment debt. Indeed, this appears to be one of the principal factors taken into account by Waller J. in: "National Westminster Bank v Allen" [1971] 2 Q.B. 718 where the Court was considering the position where the defendants, a husband and wife, were jointly and severally liable on two joint accounts which were overdrawn. The defendants were joint owners of a house property as joint tenants holding on trust for sale. The plaintiff was seeking a charging order nisi. The Court distinguished the "Irani Finance" case by showing that the defendants, acting together, were perfectly entitled to charge their land and as the plaintiffs were seeking to charge that which the defendants could validly charge, namely, their joint legal interest in the land, it was proper to make a charging order.

9. Counsel for the defendant before me stressed that by its very nature a joint tenancy is an undivided interest and the only way it can be otherwise is for it to be severed and separately valued. It was further argued that as the 1st defendant's wife, as a joint tenant, was a stranger to the action her interest in the land would be encumbered through no fault of her own and she would be prevented from obtaining certain bank finance intended to be secured upon her interest in the property. This is where I am of the view that the fallacy in that argument becomes apparent because it is not her interest in the property that the plaintiff seeks to charge but rather that of the 1st defendant. As the law stands in Hong Kong at the present time each joint tenant must be regarded as having a registrable interest in land. Accordingly it is my ruling that such interest in land is that contemplated by the legislature under Sec. 20 of the Supreme Court ordinance as being capable of having imposed on it a charge for securing the payment of moneys due under a judgment or order.

10. That leaves open the question of whether, in the present circumstances, the Court should, notwithstanding that it has the power, exercise its discretion and refuse to impose a charge on the 1st defendant's interest in the land. Although this is an appeal from the decision of a Master and one would ordinarily be slow to interfere with the manner in which a discretion is exercised in a Court below this appeal is by way of a re-hearing and as the parties are entitled to adduce new evidence and expand or vary the arguments heard by the Master I propose to assess the evidence and Counsel's submissions afresh in deciding in whose favour any discretion which I may have should be exercised. The only factor upon which the 1st defendant can hope to have the charging order declined is the plea that considerable injustice would be caused to his joint tenant if the property were charged. If I have correctly interpreted Sec. 20 of the Supreme Court Ordinance it gives the Court the power to charge either "such land or interest in land of the debtor". I can only repeat that I could not countenance the imposition of a charging order on the land itself but it is open to me to impose a charge on the 1st defendant's interest in the land and it is this distinction that removes any real injustice being caused to the other joint tenant.

11. For the reasons given I do not see any good grounds for the plaintiff's registration of the order to show cause to be vacated and I will allow the appeal and the plaintiff will be entitled to his costs before the master as well as of this appeal.

(P.G. O'Dea)
Deputy High Court Judge

Representation:

Edward Chan instructed by T.L. Ip & Co. for Plaintiff

Rupert Spicer instructed by John Ip & Co. for 2nd Defendant

23742-EN-1985-04-16

KUNG WONG SAU HIN v. KUNG KWOK SUN AND OHTERS

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23728-EN-1985-01-17

KUNG WONG SAU HIN v. KUNG KWOK SUN AND ANOTHER

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HCAP000002A/1982

No. 2/1982

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG

PROBATE JURISDICTION

_____________________

BETWEEN

KUNG WONG SAU HINPlaintiff

 

AND

 

KUNG KWOK SUN1st Defendant
KUNG KWOK CHING2nd Defendant

______________________

Coram: Mantell, J. in Chambers

Date of hearing: 17 January 1985

Date of delivery of decision: 17 January 1985

____________

DECISION

__________

 

1. This is a probate action which has been fixed for hearing on 25th February 1985 with an estimate of five days. The action has had a long and checkered history. There has been a decision on the merits in an action heard by Jones J. There has been an appeal from that decision which was dismissed. There has been a further application to the Court of Appeal on the basis of fresh evidence and in the event the Court of Appeal has ordered a new trial before a different Judge.

2. The sole question arising in that new trial concerns the validity of a document purporting to be a will discovered date of the hearing before Jones J. Quite recently the plaintiff has changed solicitors. That was on 7th January, this year. The reasons for her changing the solicitors are not set out in the affidavit or affirmation but I have heard from Mr. Chan, Counsel who appeared this morning, that difficulties have arisen over questions involving fees. It may well be that the fact that there is now a difficulty, if difficulty there is, is not necessarily her fault, but, as I say, the explanation for the change of solicitors has not been deposed or affirmed to.

3. There is now an application by the plaintiff to vacate the hearing date on the grounds that the new solicitors cannot be ready in time, or at least it is feared that they cannot be ready in time, and also on the ground that leading Counsel who it was hoped to retain at the hearing cannot now be available for those dates although at one time he had been. I say at once that the second ground is not one which could be acceded to. I am troubled, however, about the first basis for the application because on any view it is not the fault of the plaintiff's present solicitors that they are now faced with difficulties. It is said by Mr. Chan in support of his application that if the hearing dates are vacated the defendants would have to be indemnified fully on costs and their convenience would have to be regarded in fixing any new date. That, of course, goes without saying.

4. However, Mr. Cheung for the Defendant draws my attention to the matters contained in the affidavit of Mr. Fung and to the fact that it does appear that during the time that the plaintiff was represented by other solicitors there was some history of delay or even the use of delaying tactics. The plaintiff's convenience has been regarded in the past. There has been sufficient time up to now for the case to be prepared for the plaintiff, and even if there has not, there remains a period of five weeks or so which would be sufficient, albeit that the plaintiff's present solicitors would have to make haste to get the case ready.

5. I have looked at, or more accurately glanced at, the judgment of Jones J. in which it appears to me that at the previous hearing the issues of fact fell within a small compass, and it may be that they will do so again. Mr. Chan tells me from the Bar that perhaps it will be necessary to obtain expert evidence but that does not appear on affirmation or affidavit.

6. In the end after a degree of hesitation, which is marked by the fact that it is now eleven in the morning, I have come to the conclusion that it would not be right to accede to this application. Therefore the application is dismissed. I say that without prejudice to the making of any future application but I do indicate that it is very unlikely that I would allow any further application unless the grounds advanced were very much stronger than those put before me this morning.

(C.B.K. Mantell)
Judge of the High Court

Representation:

Edward Chan instructed by T.L. Ip & Co. for Plaintiff

D1 in person - absent

K. John Cheung instructed by Y.K. Fung & Co. for 2nd Defendant

26815-EN-1983-08-09

KUNG WONG SAU HIN v. KUNG KWOK SUN AND ANOTHER

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HCAP000002C/1982

IN THE HIGH COURT   

No. 2 of 1982

(Probate Jurisdiction)

IN THE ESTATE OF KUNG YUEK (otherwise spelt as YEUK, YERK or YORK) MAN, aliases KUNG KAI.YIP,KUNG KEI, KUNG YEUNG KEI, KUNG KING YIP and KUNG YUE SHING, deceased

BETWEEN

KUNG WONG SAU HINPlaintiff
and
KUNG KWOK SUN1st Defendant
KUNG KWOK CHING2nd Defendant
---------

Coram: Jones J.

Date: 9th August, 1983

 

__________

JUDGMENT

__________

INTRODUCTION

1. The plaintiff is the widow of Kung Yuek Man (the deceased) who died on the 4th October 1981. These are three sons of the marriages Kung Kwok Ching (2nd defendant) who is the eldest, Kung Kwok Sun (1st defendant) and Kung Kwok Wai (David). David the youngest son is not a party to the action. However he lives with the plaintiff and is the sole beneficiary under her latest will dated the 2nd January 1982.  It has been alleged that the plaintiff is to a large extent influenced by David.

2. By this action the plaintiff seeks a decree for probate in solemn form of a will made by the deceased dated the 29th October, 1970. The plaintiff was appointed to be the sole executrix of this will under which she is entitled to the estate as the sole beneficiary.

3. Both defendants dispute the plaintiff's claim and counterclaim for a decree in solemn form of a later will made in Chinese dated the 20th August, 1980. Subject to certain conditions, this will divides the estate of the deceased in the following proportions : 30%   to the plaintiff, 15% to each of the three sons, 15% to charity and 10% to the grandchildren. A plea in the alternative that the deceased died intestate or partially intestate was not pursued by the defendants at the trial. The 1st defendant also counterclaims for a decree in solemn form of a document in Chinese, described as a will or codicil made by the deceased which is dated the 23rd July, 1981. I shall refer to this document as the codicil.

EVIDENCE FOR PLAINTIFF

4. Mr. C.P. Lin a solicitor said that he prepared mutual wills in English on the instructions of the deceased for the deceased, and the plaintiff in October 1970. The wills were executed by the deceased and the plaintiff after the contents had been interpreted and explained to them in the presence of Mr. Lin and his clerk Mr. Leung Wing Kwong who signed their names as attesting witnesses. I am quite satisfied that the deceased had testamentary capacity when he made the will and that the will is valid in accordance with the provisions of Section 5 of the Wills Ordinance Cap. 30.

5. The plaintiff is aged 83. She is in poor health and is confined to a wheel chair suffering from hypertension and heart disease. She gave evidence that she had a very good relationship with the deceased and was not aware of the existence of a later will. During his lifetime the deceased informed the plaintiff on more than one occasion that she was to inherit his entire estate and when he went into hospital before he died he mentioned that Mr. Lin had custody of his will.

6. In cross-examination the plaintiff testified that the deceased did not have a very good opinion of the three sons to whom none of the estate would devolve. However, she also said that the deceased was a loving father. She said that she had not made another will, but this was later found to be incorrect. I found nothing sinister in this error which I am satisfied was due to a lapse of memory. The plaintiff was understandably confused at various times during her evidence. However she made every effort to recall events which happened several years ago. In spite of her age and infirmity she is a lady of much spirit. Inconsistencies in her evidence were attributable to her poor memory her advanced age and state of health. I was impressed with the way she gave her evidence and I found her to be an honest witness.

EVIDENCE FOR 1ST DEFENDANT

7. Mr. Fong Ming testified on behalf of the 1st defendant that in August, 1980 he prepared five draft wills for the deceased in Chinese. He said that the first three drafts were destroyed by the deceased. Copies of the fourth draft dated the 7th August 1980 and the fifth draft dated the 20th August 1980 were produced as exhibits. Neither draft bears the signature of the deceased. The deceased expressed himself to be happy with the fifth draft and asked Mr. Fong to sign the document, but Mr-Fong declined because he was mentioned as a beneficiary. As a result the deceased kept the original draft and later gave a photo copy to Mr. Fong informing him that he could refer to this document if it became necessary to make any further amendments.

8. It is significant that when Mr. Fong asked the deceased why he did not instruct a lawyer to prepare the will the deceased said that as he did not understand English he wanted drafts to be prepared and that he would make a formal one when he considered that the contents were to his satisfaction.

9. Mr. Tam Kam Yuen was called as a witness by the 1st defendant. He claimed that he had seen a will in English signed by the deceased. However, he said that he neither understands English nor was aware of the contents of the document. He was a garrulous and evasive witness who was not concerned with telling the truth. His testimony which I reject was of no evidential, value in this action.

10. Mr. Kung Pui Ying, who prepared the codicil on the deceased's instructions, worked as an accountant at the deceased's firm. The Sam Kwong Weaving Factory from 1952 until the deceased's death. The codicil reads as follows :

 

THE SAM KWONG WEAVING FACTORY

WHOLESALES DEPARTMENT

N0.9 WING KUT STREET, TEL. H-447554

HONG KONG

FACTORY : -
NO. 131 KOFILOON CITY ROAD.
Hong Kong.         23/7/1981    

                     ..........................

Ref.

11. I, Kung Yeuk Man, know that I am aging and may soon pass away. Because my son Kung Kwok Sun is very straight forward and not good at elaborate planning and he has been working for Tin Chong Ho since 1950 and was promoted as the Managing Director of the Sam Kwong (1952) Weaving Factory in 1952. For several tens of years he has been working very hard and keeping his principle. Therefore I have decided that after my death, apart from what he is entitled to from my estate, I also specifically allocate to him deposit Certificate No. 133299 HK$4,353,827.66 of the fixed deposit, whole amount, as a gift to my second son Kung Kwok Sun and hope he uses it for good cause.

12. Your bank Shaukiwan Branch, Manager Mr. Kung Chuan Wah is my village-related nephew and I wish Chuan Wah can carry out his promise to me to put into practice the above various decisions after my death.

To

B.N.P. Executive Manager

Witness : Kung Pui Ying    written by

Kung Yeuk Man

Kung Chuan Wah

The codicil was signed by the deceased and by Mr. Kung Pui Ying as a witness. Mr. Kung was asked by the deceased to keep the codicil and the fixed deposit receipt and not to mention the matter to anyone. It is not in dispute that the signature of the second witness Mr. Kung Chuan Wah who is the son of Mr. Kung Pui Ying was added on the 8th October 1981 four days after the death of the deceased. It was not until that date that Mr. Kung Pui Ying informed the 1st defendant about the codicil.

13. No evidence was called by the 2nd defendant.

14. Mr. Sakhrani who appeared for the 1st defendant concedes that there is no evidence that the deceased executed a later will. However, he submitted that I should draw an inference from the evidence that the deceased executed the fifth amended draft will. This was because the deceased intended to make a will at the time, that the provisions with which he expressed himself to be satisfied are consistent with the character of the deceased and that he had requested Mr. Fong Ming to sign the document. Mr. Sakhrani further argued that David who stands to gain if the plaintiff succeeds in this action has had the opportunity and motive to conceal or destroy the later will. This very serious allegatioin was not supported by a tittle of evidence.

15. I accept that over a period of about three weeks in August 1980 the deceased instructed Mr. Fong Ming to prepare the five draft wills. The further and better particulars of the defence aver that the deceased told Mr. Fong that he was not going to make any more amendments. However, this was not borne out by the evidence of Mr. Fong who said that although the deceased was happy with the draft and asked him to sign as a.witness, he was also given a photo copy of the draft which he was told he could refer to if further amendments became necessary.

16. There is no doubt that the deceased intended to make a will at that time. However, there is no evidence that the fifth amended draft or any other draft was executed. No one saw the deceased execute a will nor has anyone seen a will signed by the deceased. Although Mr. Fong said that he was asked to sign the fifth amended draft I consider that part of his evidence to be unlikely. However, be that as it may I accept his evidence that it was the deceased's intention to have a formal will executed when he was satisfied with the final draft. Having regard to the fact that the deceased had previously instructed a solicitor to prepare his will I see no reason to doubt that he would have done so again. What became of the original fifth amended draft is unknown, but in all probablity it was destroyed by the deceased. The burden is upon the defendants to establish on a balance of probabilities that a later will was made. Upon the evidence I do not accept that the deceased executed the will dated the 20th August, 1980 nor do I draw any inference that the deceased did so. In fact the evidence compels me to draw the inference that the deceased did not execute the will.

17. Section 5(2) of the Wills Ordinance provides :

"Any will of a Chinese testator written wholly or substantially in Chinese and signed by the testator shall be valid and duly executed although not executed in accordance with the rules set out in subsection (1)."

18. The definition of will in section 2 includes a codicil and any other testamentary instrument or act. Accordingly the codicil in this case may be admitted to probate for the deceased was Chinese, the document was written wholly in Chinese, and according to Mr. Kung Pui Ying it was signed by the deceased. As the deceased's signature was not required to be witnessed the addition of Mr. Kung Chuan Wah's signature after the death of the deceased would not invalidate the codicil. However, it is pertinent to refer to the evidence of Mr. Kung Pui Ying. In cross-examination in answer to a question put by Mr. Ching who appeared for the plaintiff that is son signed as a witness, his first reply before he eventually agreed was 'I'm ignorant of the law'. However, it is clear that he believed, although incorrectly as it transpired, that the document in order to be valid required the signature of two witnesses. It was his decision that the document should be signed by his son. He agreed that his son signed with reluctance. Although he did not deceive the Court Mr. Kung Pui Ying's actions were calculated to deceive persons who sawn the document into believing that the deceased had signed in the presence of two witnesses.

19. There were other unsatisfactory features concerning the codicil. In particular Mr. Kung Pui Ying placed a cross in pencil to indicate to the deceased where he should sign when he could as easily have pointed to the place for his signature, the position of the signature does not follow the text but is much lower down, and certain parts of the contents are in different shades of ink.

20. Mr. Kung testified that the deceased had instructed him to renew the fixed deposit with interest every three months yet the codicil refers to a specific sum of $4,353,827.66.

21. The reasons set out in the codicil for making the gift are not convincing, and in my opinion do not reflect the character of the deceased. Exactly why Mr. Kung Chuan Wah as branch manager of Banque Nationale de Paris at Shaukiwan should be entrusted with handling this matter and what duties he was expected to perform was not explained. Apart from the testimony of Mr. Kung Pui Ying there was no evidence to establish that the signature on the codicil is that of the deceased. I did not find Mr. Kung Pui Ying to be a convincing or a reliable witness. He was shifty, devious and at times verbose. I did not accept his evidence.

22. The lst defendant has therefore failed to establish on the balance of probabilities the validity of  the codicil. I find that the will made on the 29th October 1970 was valid and was the last will and testament of the deceased. Accordingly I pronounce in favour of the plaintiff that the will be proved in solemn form. The counterclaims of the defendants are dismissed. Costs to the plaintiff.

(B.L. Jones)

Judge of the high Court

Representation:

Mr. Charles Ching, Q.C. & Mr. Michael Bunting (C.P. Lin & Co.) for plaintiff

Mr. Arjan H. Sakhrani, Q.C. & Mr. 4laven C.H. Chan (Fairbairn & Kwok) for lst defendant

Mr. Kenneth H.W. Kwok (C.Y. Kwan & Co.) for 2nd defendant

Mrs. Catherine Chan (Legal Department) for A.G.

Miss Sze Kin (T.L. Ip & Co.) on watching brief for 3rd son of deceased,

Mr. David Kung