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1985

TANG LAU WAI CHUN v. TANG FUNG FAT

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  • CACV161/1985TANG LAU WAI CHUN v. TANG FUNG FAT

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8887-EN-1986-03-27

TANG LAU WAI CHUN v. TANG FUNG FAT

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CACV000142A/1985

 

1985, No. 142

(Civil)

 

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Headnote

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                This decision contains comments on the desirability of hearing the evidence of parents concerned in contested custody cares and with regard to calling as witnesses Welfare Officers who have made reports to the Court.

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

 

1985, No. 142

(Civil)

BETWEEN

 

TANG LAU WAI CHUN

Petitioner

and

TANG FUNG FAT

Respondent

 

Coram: Cons, V. -P., Penlington & Jones, JJ.

Date of hearing: 27th March, 1986.

Date of judgment: 27th March, 1986.

 

___________

JUDGMENT

___________

 

Cons, V. -P.:

 

1. This is an appeal, with his leave, against the decision of His Honour Judge Wane to grant custody of a 41/2 year old girl to her father. In view of the conclusion to which we have come, a conclusion which is agreed to be correct by counsel who appear for both sides today, we do not think it right to go into the facts of the matter at all. We need only mention two of the grounds of appeal.

 

2. Firstly, although custody was contested the Judge did not hear evidence by either parent or by their mothers, one of whom would, whichever way the case went, be entrusted with a great deal of responsibility in bringing up the child. There is ample English authority, so well known that we need not refer to it, that where custody is contested, it is highly desirable, and at times essential, that the Court should hear such evidence.

 

3. Secondly, when the application was called before him, the Judge had to hand an affidavit from the child's mother and a report from a Welfare Officer. The solicitor for the mother immediately requested an adjournment so that the Welfare Officer and the child's father's mother could be called for cross-examination. The request was refused. Adjournments are of course, matters very much within the discretion of the Judge. We only wish to comment on one of the reasons he later gave for his refusal. He said that an adjournment would have caused at least two months' delay. Now we appreciate that the District Court is a busy court, but it is the basic court for matrimonial affairs and it seems to us an unsatisfactory situation if its listing procedures are so inflexible that a few hours cannot be sooner found on an urgent matter of child custody.

 

4. In the result there was no effective hearing of the application and for this reason we order a retrial before another judge, to be heard as soon as possible because the matter has already dragged on far too long. We also make an order requesting the Director of Social Welfare to prepare another report to bring the position up to date.

 

5. Before leaving this case, Mr. Payne who appears for the mother today, has drawn our attention to what he suggests are difficulties found by the profession with regard to the calling of Welfare Officers who make reports of the usual kind. He points out a distinction between two very closely related situations. The first arises under the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance, which by Section 17 makes special provision for the calling of the officer where objection is taken to anything contained in the report. The second situation arises under Rule 95 of the Matrimonial Causes Rules, which provides for similar reports, but not for calling the officer. In the latter case it is clear from comments made in Cadman v. Cadman(1) to which we were referred by way of Edwards v. Edwards(2) that it is then a matter entirely for the discretion of the judge. Mr. Payne tells us however that there are certain judges who do not regard it as such, but as a matter of course, refuse all applications. If that be so, then for my part, I would say it is quite wrong. A judge may not ignore a discretion which is given to him. He must consciously exercise it, and according to the circumstances of the individual case.

 

6. Again, speaking for myself I would hesitate long before saying anything which might be thought to fetter this particular discretion, save to suggest that, in order to avoid if possible a subsequent sense of grievance in the one I might call "the losing parent", it would generally be desirable to call for cross-examination an officer who has expressed an opinion upon facts which are substantially in dispute.

 

7. In the circumstances we are not asked to make any decision on this aspect of the present appeal. I only add these words in the hope that they may perhaps alleviate some difficulties which appear to beset the profession.

 

 

 

 

(D. Cons)

Vice-President

 

 

 

 

Penlington, J.:

        

8. I entirely agree.

 

 

 

 

(R.G. Penlington)

Judge of the High Court

 

 

Jones, J.:

        

9. I agree.

 

 

 

 

(B.L. Jones)

Judge of the High Court

 

 

(1)    (1982) 3 F.L.R. 275

(2)    unreported, Wood J. 10 June 1985

Representation:

Ian Payne (D.L.A.) for Petitioner/Appellant

Kumar Ramanathan (M/s Leonard K.L. Heung & Co.) for Respondent/Respondent

39009-EN-1985-11-05

TANG LAU WAI CHUN v. TANG FUNG FAT

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CACV000142/1985

1N THE COURT OF APPEAL

1985, Nos. 142 & 161

(Civil)

BETWEEN:

TANG LAU WAI CHUNPetitioner

and

 

TANG FUNG FATRespondent

_____________

Coram: Sir Alan Huggins, V.-P., Cons & Fuad, JJ.A.

Date of Hearing: 5th November 1985

Date of Judgment: 5th November 1985

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JUDGMENT

___________

Sir Alan Huggins, V.-P.:

1. This is an appeal against an order of H. H. Judge Wane upon an application to define the "reasonable access" granted pursuant to an order made on 27th September 1985. We are told that the judge declined jurisdiction to make an order defining access on the ground that an appeal had been lodged against the order granting custody to the Respondent. With respect to the learned judge I do not think that the fact that an appeal had been lodged deprived him of jurisdiction. It is alleged that reasonable access has not been given pursuant to the order. That order must necessarily remain in force until the hearing of the appeal against the custody order unless it is varied before that, and it is essential now that difficulties have arisen that the parties should know what reasonable access means. They have not previously been able to agree, but it would be wrong that the mother should, in effect, be deprived of access until the hearing of the custody appeal. Therefore I think the judge had jurisdiction and that this appeal must be allowed.

2. Mr. Payne, for the Petitioner, has asked us not to remit the case to the trial judge for him to consider the application and has asked us to define the periods of access. Happily the parties are now able to agree and I think it is appropriate hat we should define the access. I would therefore make an order in these terms:

By consent pending the hearing of the appeal against the custody order or until further order of this court the Petitioner to have staying access from 12 noon on Saturday 9th November to 4 p.m. on Saturday 10th November and thereafter on alternate Saturdays and Sundays between those times and access on Saturday 16th November, and thereafter on alternate Saturdays, from 12 noon to 6 p.m.

Cons, J. A.:

3. I agree entirely with my Lord and would only suggest subject to Mr. Payne's comments that there be no order as to costs on this appeal save one for Legal Aid taxation.

Fuad, J. A.:

4. I also agree.

5th November 1985

Representation:

Payne for Petitioner.

Respondent in person.