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Civil Action1987

THE PRUDENTIAL ENTERPRISE LIMITED AND ANOTHER v. P.H. SHEK LIMITED AND ANOTHER

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  • HCA4911/1986THE PRUDENTIAL ENTERPRISE LIMITED AND ANOTHER v. P.H. SHEK LIMITED AND ANOTHER

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24442-EN-1989-02-28

THE PRUDENTIAL ENTERPRISE LTD. AND ANOTHER v. P.H. SHEK LTD. AND ANOTHER

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HCA004911/1987

1987, No. A4911

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG

HIGH COURT

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BETWEEN
THE PRUDENTIAL ENTERPRISE LIMITED1st Plaintiff
THE PRUDENTIAL MALL LIMITED2nd Plaintiff
AND
P.H. SHEK LIMITED1st Defendant
PIREST LIMITED2nd Defendant

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Coram: Hon. Liu J. in Chambers

Dates of hearing: 23 - 27 January, 9 - 10 February 1989

Date of delivery of judgment: 28 February 1989

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J U D G M E N T

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1. The defendants were the 2nd plaintiff's tenants of Portion R of the 3rd Basement of Prudential Centre in Nathan Road. Rental for Portion B was $169,290 per month. The 2nd plaintiff re-entered these premises by writ on the 14th August 1987. Judgment was given for the 2nd plaintiff against the defendants, inter alia, "that the defendants do pay the 2nd plaintiff damages to be assessed".

2. Mesne profits are thus the only outstanding issue. The agreed period for assessment is from re-entry on the 14th August 1987 to the 12th October 1988. For easy computation, it is also agreed that it should be 14 months less two days.

3. The area of the said premises is 9,400 sq.ft. Interim payment at the rate of the contractual rent has been made for the whole period of assessment. Damages by way of mesne profits are sought to he assessed by a judge.

4. Valuation aside, the main disagreement lies in two areas:

(1) whether mesne profits are to be assessed on the exclusive basis of "open market rental value" or whether assessment should be made with reference to a notional tenant of the same type as the defendants who held over after forfeiture;

(2) whether or not, in any case, the 2nd plaintiff's claim is confined by pleadings and conduct to "open market rental value."

5. A further attack was mounted at the un-particularised mesne profits in the Amended Statement of Claim.

6. That special damage must be specifically pleaded is beyond question. Unless it is, so pleaded, evidence of special damage cannot be led at the trial and consequently no damages can technically be awarded Hayward & Another v. Pullinger & Partners, Ltd., [1950]1 K.A.D. 581; Ilkiw v. Samuels & Others, [1963]1 W.L.R. 991 at p. 1006, per Diplock, L.J.

7. It is not necessary to plead general damage. Whatever damages are claimed, an opponent need, at times, be given fair warning as to what case he has to meet, particularly when the claim is one which cannot with justice be sprung upon a defendant at the trial. In Perestrello E Companhia Limitada v. United Paint Co. Ltd., [1969]1 W.L.R. 570, at page; 579, Letters E-F, the English Court of Appeal in a judgment delivered by Lord Donovan made the following observation:

"Accordingly, if a plaintiff has suffered damage of a kind which is not the necessary and immediate consequences of the wrongful act, he must warn the defendant in the pleadings that the compensation claimed will extend to this damage, thus showing the defendant the case he has to meet and assisting him in computing a payment into Court."

"The limits of this requirement are not dicated by any preconceived notions of what is general or special damage, but by the circumstances of the particular case. 'The question to be decided does not depend on words, but is one of substance.' (per Bowen L.J. in Ratcliffe v. Evan [1892] 2 Q.B. 524, 529)."

8. But mesne profits are not special damage. They flow from a holding over in trespass and are "the necessary and immediate consequences of a wrongful act." Arrears of rent are claimed and adjudged as a liquidated demand. However, not final but only interlocutory judgment may be given for mesne profits to le assessed. See marginal reference 13/4/5 at p.120, 1988 White Book Vol. 1. Indeed, "a claim for rent is therefore liquidated. But the amount to which the plaintiff is entitled for mesne profits must be assessed by the Court." Bullen &Leake And Jacob's, Precedents of Pleadings 12th Edn., p.69. In Precedent Forms Nos. 330 & 331 given at pages 595 & 596 for "Claim for Possession upon a Forfeiture for Non-Payment of Rent and Claim Law Procedure Act, 1852", a prayer for mesne profits is made without quantification from the service of the writ until delivery for possession. A claim for mesne profits is a claim for general damage and assessment of mesne profits is guided by settled principles familiar to all. The rest is evidence.

9. After all, Lord Dunedin said in The Susquehanna [1926] A.C. 655 at p. 661:

"If the damage be general then it must he averred that such damage has been suffered; but the quantification of such damage is a jury question."

10. Evidence to assist assessment of mesne profits may come from experts. The calling of experts and exchange of their reports is governed by set rules of procedure so that the parties may adequately be warned of the material which each will be confronted with at the trial. A litigant will then be in a position to prepare evidence for meeting or testing his opponent's expert opinion for the courts assistance. All this is a far cry from the immutable requirement of pleading of special damage and the adverse consequences in breach that follow.

11. The burden of proving damages lies squarely on the shoulders of a plaintiff. The Court was time and again directed to paragraph 1779 of McGregor on Damages 15th Edn. with a view to piling emphasis on judicial reluctance "to advance into an area of pure speculation" without evidence, in defiance of the known , contractual rent. (per Forbes J. in Tate & Lyle Food And Distribution Ltd. v. Greater London Council. and Another, [1982]1 W.L.R. 149 at p.152 Letter H).

12. Strange enough there is little authority for the proposition that "the normal measure of damages is the market rental value of the property occupied or used for the period of wrongful occupation or use." See para. 1420 at p.879 McGregor on Damages 15th Edn. The same passage continues with the following rationalization :

"But this measure is consonant with general principles and with the name of the action for wrongful occupation as one for mesne profits. If the rental value varies due to market fluctuation during the period of wrongful occupation, these fluctuations should be taken into account."

13. Megaw L.J. proposed that "in the absence of anything special in the particular case, it would be the ordinary letting value of the property that would determine the amount of damages." Swordheath Properties Ltd. v, Tabet, [1979]1 U.L.R. 285 at p.288 Letters E/F. Obviously, the target is "the fair value of the premises; when the rent represents that fair value the assessment is according to the amount of the rent, but if the fair value is higher than the rent the assessment is by reference to that higher value". It is so summed up in paragraph 1-2158 at p.976 Woodfall on Landlord & Tenant, 28th Edn.

14. Measure of mesne profits is, so Mr Mills-Owens suggested on behalf of the defendants, on the open market rental value which merely envisages occupation by an ordinary tenant. Counsel urged the Court not to assess mesne profits with reference to the type of tenant of the same quality as that of the actual sitting tenant holding over in a given case. But it would seem unjust for any landlord to be saddled with a former tenant of a quality which he no longer wishes to entertain even at a chargeable higher rental and yet to be given only the lower open market rental payable by an ordinary tenant. It would be inequitable to allow a tenant who holds over in trespass to profit by his own wrong, paying less in damages than he would pay for renting the premises.

15. The courts are inclined to steer a common sense path. In Swordheath Properties Ltd. v. Tabet, supra. at p. 288 Letters E/F Megaw L.J. came down heavily in favour of the owner and damages were awarded against the over-staying former tenant, even without evidence that the property could or would have been let, on the basis of the value of the property as it would fairly be calculated". Nevertheless, we are still left with no direct authority as to how a fair value is to be calculated. Is it to be the open market rental value in the sense as Mr Mills-Owens suggested or must mesne profits take into account the quality of the former tenant who has remained on as a trespasser?

16. Perhaps I should begin with a definition of mesne profits as given by Bullen & Leake And Jacob's Precedents of Pleadings, 12th Edn. at p.69:

"If a person who has no title enters into possession of land, the rents or profits which he receives or makes or which he might have received or made therefrom during his occupation are called mesne profits."

This passage highlights the actual rental taken or receivable by the trespasser.

17. Mr Swaine referred me to Bracewell v. Appleby [1975]l Ch. 408, where damages were granted in lieu of an injunction restraining trespass over a right of way by reason of the plaintiff's own delay. At p.419 Letters D/E, Graham J. proceeded to assess as damages the fair price which the reluctant owners would have accepted when refused the aid of an injunction:

"It seems to me that the defendant must be liable to pay an amount of damages which insofar as it can be estimated is equivalent to a proper and fair price which would be payable for the acquisition of the right of way in question."

18. Graham J. gauged the quantum with reference to a percentage of the probable profit or notional profit to the trespasser.

19. Mr Swaine also leaned heavily on an observation of Brightman J. in a similar situation in Wrotham Park Estates Co. Ltd. v. Parkside Homes Ltd., [1974]1 W.L.R. 798 at P. 815:

"A just substitute for a mandatory injunction would be such a sum of money as might reasonably have been demanded the plaintiff from Parkside as a quid pro quo for relaxing the covenant."

20. These dicta stem from cases dealing with an outright acquisition of property right at a price fair in the prevailing circumstances, having regard to probable or notional profit. The price of a land right, even on a forced sale to a trespasser, must be affected by what profit he expects to make from its use or wrongful enjoyment. While the price of a property sale is necessarily sensitive to a wide spectrum of element the special gain which a trespasser may make from his wrongful occupation has never been recognised as a proper item for quantifying mesne profits. Insofar as the decided cases purport to suggest that in the assessment of mesne profits, one "may look beyond even market rental value of the land to the benefit which the defendant had extracted from its user, they are moving away from damages to quasi-contractual restitution." See end of para. 1421 at P.881, McGregor on Damages 15th Edn. In my view, Bracewell and Wrotham Park offer no real guidance

21. However, the cases cited do not shut out from a fair value what a landlord would demand in return for the actual wrongful user. That is precisely the answer provided by an analogy in Strand Electric & Engineering Co. Ltd. v. Brisford Entertainments Ltd., [1952] 2 Q.B. 246. That was a case for damages for wrongful detention of certain switchboards. Having aired his sentiments at p.p. 249/250 that the defendants could not "as wrongdoers, have the use of the chattels for less than a fair price for the hire. Otherwise, they would be benefiting by their own wrong", at p. 252, Somervell L.J. had this to say:

"Why is not the plaintiff's loss the value in the market of the user?"

"There are no doubt some cases in which a wrongdoer may, he called on to account for profits, but in considering the measure of damages as raised here, I think the actual benefit which the defendants have obtained is irrelevant. The damages could not, in my view, be increased by showing that the defendant has made by his use of the chattel much more than the market rate of hire. Equally, they cannot be diminished by showing that he had made less."

22. Even for damages in a trespass to goods, expected profits of the wrongdoer are not considered as material. But indeed, why is not the owner's loss the value in the market of the user? Then Lord Justice Somervell continue :

"It is curious, as I have said, that there is no authority on this point. The nearest analogy is a claim for mesne profits. The measure there is a reasonable sum in the nature of rent for the user during the period of defendant's trespass. In other words, the defendant must pay what the plaintiff would have obtained if the defendant has lawfully been in possession."

There, in my view, the measure of mesne profits as damages is correctly stated. Open market rental expected of a tenant comparable with the trespasser in quality and is the proper yardstick for assessing damages.

23. The defendants further contended that the question of quality of tenant such as nuisance tenants as in the defendants, running a fastfood outlet was not an issue open to the 2nd plaintiff. It was argued that by the prayer in the Amended Statement of claim, the reports of the 2nd plaintiff's case in measure of mesne profits had throughout been put on the narrow basis of open market rental value. The 2nd plaintiff should not be allowed, therefore, to shift its claim to include a consideration of the quality of its sitting tenant.

24. As general damage, mesne profits need not be specifically pleaded. An order was made for limiting one expert from each side. Exchange of their reports was not even ordered although reports had, in fact, been exchanged in advance. Mr Swaine referred in the opening, to the user by the sitting tenant as a fastfood outlet and invited the court to take into account all it entailed. He outlined the 2nd Plaintiff's evidence for quality of the tenant. The prayer of the Amended Statement was based on the rate of $515,000 per month as given in the 2nd plaintiff's expert reports, but the prayer also referred to "or such other date (sic) as this court deems just.? The formal judgment simply ordered damages to be assessed.

25. The defendants had at no time sought an adjournment. Indeed, the expert of the defendants Mr Ng was specifically asked as to quality of tenant, and he agreed that a nuisance tenant would bid more for the same premises. The question of quality of tenant was not a matter excluded. The reverse is true. The 2nd plaintiff cannot be said to have confined itself exclusively to open market rental value by pleadings or conduct.

26. Having disposed of these preliminary contentions, it is necessary to cover briefly the geography and the main events. The Prudential Centre stands on 216 - 228A Nathan Road. Its shopping mall completed in December 1982. The upper structures were thereafter added onto the mall, but they do not concern these proceedings. The Prudential Centre Mall is a nine-storeyed commercial complex comprising four podium floors above the ground level, a lower ground level and four levels of basement low. The four basement levels are known as the 1st to the 4th Basements. The 1st floor, the upper ground level, the lower ground level and the 1st to the 3rd Basements are all shopping arcades served by corridors with an atrium at the core. The empty atrium extends from the 3rd Basement right up to the 1st floor level. Therefore only the 3rd Basement has the advantage and use of the Centre Void flooring. All above is empty air space. There are five pairs of escalators on both sides of the atrium. There also three staircases and one service lift serving the mall. The Prudential Centre Mall is  unusual  and unique with its 2nd Basement connected to the Jordon MTR Station Entrance. It was agreed on all hands that lettings within the shopping mall would provide better samples for comparison in any attempted valuation.

27. The lease to the defendants was to run from the 18th December 1982 to the 17th December 1989. After forfeiture on the 14th August 1987, the defendants held over. Units 8 to 12 on the 2nd Basement were let as a shop on the 7th September 1986. Unit 27 on the 2nd Basement was let as a shop on 15th September 1986. Unit 28 on the 2nd Basement was let as a shop on the 9th May 1987.

28. In October 1988, Swire made enquiry for some 4,000 sq.ft. on the 3rd Basement on behalf of Kentucky Fried Chicken, another fastfood outlet. An offer was made for $55 p.s.f. for the first three years with escalating rental thereafter. Average rental for the entire six years term was $60.50. The offer was rejected by the 2nd plaintiff which set its mind on a better quality tenant. In three memoranda from its Letting Agent between November and December 1988, offers ranging between-$40 to $50 p.s.f. were received. These offers did not interest the 2nd plaintiff by reason of the required floor area, the nature of the proposed activity or performance record of the enquirers. In any case, they were tentative offers and information was scanty. On the 21st January 1989, the Friday preceding the week-end before the hearing of these proceedings, Toppy Company (H.K.) Ltd. concluded a four years lease with the 2nd plaintiff to commence from the 1st March 1989 with rental payable as from the 1st April 1989.

29. Mr Hui and Mr Ng were called as valuers. Mr Ng is more highly qualified and enjoys a longer experience than Mr Hui, but Mr Ng adopted the report of one Mr Chiu who is equally less qualified and not as experienced. I accept them both as experts. Mr Hui, expert for the 2nd plaintiff, knew the area well and had been working in that locality for some three years. Certain indices prepared by Jones Lang Wootton mere relied upon. That is permissible. See R. v. Abadom [1983]1 A.E.R 364 at p. 367, Letters c - d.

30. Mr Hui focused on four other letting samples taken within the Prudential Centre. Letting to Toppy Company (H.K.) Ltd is recent. Mr Hui's selected-samples were criticized as unsuitable comparables. They are all on a different level, the 2nd Basement, in different locations, with varying terms, areas and frontages. Except for Shop 28, they were all let at a time well before the assessment period commencing from August 1987. They had no exclusive use of the "Coffee Shop Portion" but were served by common corridors. The letting date of the last sample, shop 28 on the 2nd Basement was closest to August 1987 and accepted by the defendants as the best letting for comparison before the Toppy lease. As these selected samples differed in essentials, factors were suggested for adjustment. The object of the exercise was to eliminate or reduce the disparities bringing the essentials on a par with those of a letting in August 1987 so as to reflect a rental rate at the relevant time.

31. Apart from the factor of time adjustment, Mr Hui's other factors of adjustments were criticized as insignificant and their given percentage allowances as inaccurate. One of such factors of adjustment of Mr Hui, "Visibility in respect to the Central Void but later recategorized as "Coffee Shop Portion", was assailed by the defendants as overlapping with another factor "Frontage" or giving some double-counting effect to it. In the report of Mr Hui, no adjustment was allowed for quality of tenant, and his evidence of a nuisance tenant running a fastfood outlet was condemned by the defendants as an after-thought.

32. Mr Hui, expert for the 2nd plaintiff, initially regarded the Toppy lease as the prime comparable. The 1989 Toppy lease is most recent in time and was accepted by the defendants as having overtaken Mr Hui's other samples. Then Mr Hui experienced some difficulties in explaining the low rental rate in the Toppy lease, said to be not in tune with the others he sampled. And Mr Hui suggested that there must have existed some unknown factors for such low rental rate. Mr Hui attempted to brush aside the low rate in the Toppy lease as being not very reliable and not as good. At one time, he even implored Mr Mills-Owens, Counsel for the defendants, to discontinue discussing it. However, he maintained to the last that the Toppy lease would provide good background information.

33. In his final address, Mr Swaine rallied to Mr Hui's support with a suggestion that his expert could comfortably have explained the low rental rate in the Toppy lease with an adjustment for "quality of tenant? Mr Hui was driven to concede that the ordinary meaning of open market rental value" would make to allowance for any nuisance tenant. Even, with all variables "quality of tenant" re-adjusted, Mr Hui's average rental rate from his four letting samples ($55.82 p.s.f.) is 33% of his original valuation calculated on the Toppy, lease ($41.83 p.s.f.) or 23% of such his original valuation as revised to $45. 35 p.s.f. by a higher time index differential of -41.89%. See Chart B in the annexure to this judgment. Mr Hui could hardly maintain as valid both his assessment of $55,82 p.s.f. (or approx. $525.,000, per month i.e. $55.82 x 9,400 sq. ft.) and his rental valuation derived from figures taken of the Toppy lease: they are $55.82 and $41.83 (or $45.35 after revision). There is a difference of over $10 p.s.f.!

34. I turn, Mr Swaine attacked Mr Ng, expert for the defendants, as lacking in credibility by his blatant refusal to give credit to "Frontage" and "Visibility" for these premises in the Prudential Centre. That was said to have been sufficienly borne out by the answer of Mr Ng to the last question in cross-examination. Mr Ng suggested three sub-factors for the factor of adjustment in area i.e. "Quantum": one of which was "Ease of Letting"; for that the allowed from -9% to -11% in the 4 letting samples used by Mr Hui. Mr Swaine argued that as there would be more tenants than space available in the rising market, the question of "Ease of Letting' should have little bearing on the exercise. Mr Ng's attempt so introduce -9% to -11% was characterised as an example of his propensity to exaggerate.

35. Mr Ng adopted the reports of Mr Chiu, "D4(1)" to "D4 (3)". In "D4(2)", rental for Shop 28 on the 2nd Basement was taken to be $29 p.s.f. for September 1983 as opposed to its actual known rental of $25 p.s.f. Another error, so Mr Swaine was at pains to point out, is the $35 unit rental for Shop 4 on the 2nd Basement in December 1982. As a matter of fact, for the first year, the rental for that shop was only $31.50 p:s.f. and $35 was unit rental for the 2nd and the 3rd years. Further, the correlation attempted by Mr Chiu on the figures from Shops 6 and 28, both on the 2nd Basement was admitted by Mr Mg to be of no value to him.

36. Valuation of this nature must be highly subjective. The selection of factors for adjustment cannot be always justified. The list of factors of adjustment, their order of priority and percentages allowance could well produce some factor duplication or double-counting effect. There is no standard formula for such an exercise. While the percentages given were at trimes hotly contested, the factors as chosen were not seriously debated. It is a very inexact science. The temptation to over-value or under-value may not be easy to resist. I come to the firm conclusion that so long as a property valuer is consistent in his application of a device or formula to any given situation, his expert views should be given proper respect. In complex calculations involving subjective assessment, it is understandable that both experts were taken to task in the defence of their valuations. In the result, I propose to take the best of both worlds as it were, adopting selectively what I would regard as better suited to the circumstances under consideration, as expressed in the opinions of these experts.

37. Both experts seemed to have embraced a "sequential assessment" of factors listed in order of priority of their importance. The selection of factors and the priority accorded to each did not draw much adverse comment. Four lettings within the Prudential Centre were initially taken as samples for comparison in the valuation process. Variables by way of differences in area, frontage to MTR entrance, transaction date and display facilities were adjusted. These samples for comparison are known as the comparables. The variables in the comparables selected, once adjusted, on the basis of the know rental, up or down in sequence of their priority, would hopefully yield a reliable notional letting value similar in most respects to that of the subject property at the relevant date. These adjustments are generally expressed in terms of positive or negative percentages with the result that the known rental value in any comparable used will be either enhanced or diminished in rate. Theoretically, even the rental of the subject property may be so adjusted for use in the valuation process. But for possible avoidance of imponderables, similar lettings closest to the date of valuation would be sampled. The less a comparable requires adjustment the more accurate would be the result. The percentages arising from all the relevant variables may be taken together as a final total percentage to be added to or subtracted from the known rental value of the selected comparable. This is known as adjustment on an aggregate percentage basis or an aggregate adjustment. Again, these percentages, plus or minus, may also be taken account of, one by one, in a series of adjustments to the known rental of the comparable. This is known as adjustment on a sequential basis or a sequential adjustment. In a sequential adjustment, a further decision shall have to be made as to the order in which the pecentages are to be adjusted. This list of priority for the factors of adjustment is normally to be determined by the respective importance of the variables as judged by the valuer. See also Land Compensation and Valuation Law in Hong Hong by H.H Judge Cruden, p. 400. Neither of these methods of adjusting the percentages given to the variables is entirely free from criticism. If a valuer would bear in  mind what difference there is in or could arise from the use of these two bases, experience would lead him to make a further allowance so that on either basis his valuation would suffer from no significant disparity.

38. Mr Mills-Owens endeavoured to illustrate that the prime comparable, the Toppy lease would produce the most reliable result. Counsel pressed upon this Court that the Toppy lease was for the same 3rd Basement premises, also with the use of the "Coffee Shop Portion" in the Centre Void, though admittedly not a "letted area".

39. Mr Ng, tile expert for the defendants, expressed the view that only the time factor need be adjusted for the Toppy lease rental rate. Mr Mills-Owens echoed his opinion that not only was the Toppy lease the prime comparable as a recent letting of virtually the same premises with the same facilities, the only need for an adjustment in time would give it an added advantage of being exposed to a much less subjective assessment. Further, counsel sought to rely on the consistency displayed in the calculations : the valuation based on the Toppy lease at $34.44.p.s.f. as adjusted back to August 1987 is close to (1) Mr Ng's assessment of $38.70 p.s.q. from Mr Chiu's figures for Shop, 28 as given, in his report, Exh. D4(2), (2) the re-calculated assessment of $40.14 for Shop 28 from figures of Shop 4 on the 2nd Basement and also (3) the Kentucky offer of $38.73 as calculated by Mr Hui, expert for the 2nd plaintiff.

40. The expert for the defendants, Mr Ng, explained his colleague's valuation, using Shop 28 as a comparable. Shop 28 let in May 1987 on the 2nd Basement was closest in time to the assessment date, of August 1987. Rental figures from Shop 28 as given in "D4(2)" were applied as follows:

(1)    the unit rental of Shop 28 was taken as $29 p.s.f. in September 1983;

(2)    the Unit rental of Shop 28 as at the end of 1982 was estimated to be $34 p.s.f.;

(3) the average rental paid for the defendants premises was $18 p.s.f. in December 1982;

(4) ($18 × 1.89 = $34) therefore, $34 p.s.f. of Shop 28 was 1.89 times $18 p.s.f. of the defendants premises as at the end of 1982;

(5) unit rental for Shop 20 was known to he $68.40 in May 1987 from the letting information;

(6) ($36.20  × 1.89 = $68.40) therefore, the unit rental of lithe defendants premises ought to be $36.20 in May 1987;

(7) with about 7% increase from May to August 1987, the unit rental of the defendants premises ought to be $38.70 in August 1987.

41. This $38.70 can hardly be said to be accurate. The $29 p.s.f. assumed for September 1983 is an error. It was then only $25 p.s.f.

42. On the information available, Mr Mills-Owens calculated, for illustration, unit rental of Shop 28 as at August 1987 from figures of Shop 4 as follows:

(1)    Average rental of Shop 4 in December 1982 was $33.33 p.s.f. ($31.50 for first year and $35 for second and third years);

(2)    "Visibility" in terms of "how easily you can see the shop" requires a 3% adjustment downwards in relation to Shop 28 and therefore Shop 4, put in the location of Shop 28, ought to be $32.81 p.s.f. as at December 1982;

(3) ($18  × $1.823 = $32.81) therefore, $32.81 is 1.823 times of the average unit rental of $18 for the defendants premises, in December 1982;

(4) Shop 28 was let for $60.40 p.s.f. in May 1987;

(5) ($37.52  × 1.823 = $68.40) therefore, rental for Shop 28 with all the variables adjusted should be $37.52 p.s.f. in 1987;

(6) with about 7% increase from May to August 1987, the unit rental as at August 1987 for Shop 28 with adjusted variables ought to be $40.14;

(7)    Shop 28 as adjusted is the best of the 4 comparables used by Mr Hui and therefore the defendants' premises should also attract $40.14. p. s.f in August 1987.

43. Mr Hui's calculations on the Kentucky offer are as set out in the Chart 4 in the annexure to this judgment giving an adjusted unit rental of $38.73 for August 1987.

44. The thrust of the defendants' valuation is in their Toppy lease calculations with only time adjustment i.e. $34.44 p.s.f. That can be seen from Chart 1 in the annexure to this judgment.

45. Mr Ng disagreed with Mr Hui's valuations made on the four comparables. Mr Ng's calculations are, as set out in Chart 2 in the annexure to this judgment, ranging from $25-$37 p.s.f. Mr Ng offered these calculations at the request of counsel. His preference was the Toppy lease. Mr Mills-Owens also directed the Court's attention to this range of $25-$37 p.s.f. as yet further corroboration of the defendants $34.44 p.s.f.

46. Mr Mills-Owens further pointed out that all his figures were much below (1) the 2nd plaintiff's re-adjusted valuations of, $55,-$58.89 p.s.f as at August 1987 from the figures of the 4 comparables given by its expert, Mr Hui (Chart D in the annxure to this judgment), (2) the offer as recorded in the second of Sindy's memoranda in November 1988 at $45 - $50 p.s.f., and (3) Mr Hui's unit rate of $5.5.82 or $56 p.s.f. for the defendants premises in August 1937.

47. Take the $56 p.s.f. assessed by Mr Hui for the defendants' premises in August 1987 and multiply it by the Jones Lang Wootton Property Index of 141.89 or.41.89% taken from 22 of Exh. P4, it would yield a figure of $79.45 p.s.f. for January 1989. Capital was also sought to be made by Mr Mills-Owens of this $79.45 p.s.f. as being a much inflated value given by Mr Hui when compared with the $40-$50 p.s.f. offers recorded in Sindy's memoranda made just a short time earlier at the end of 1988.

48. Mr Swaine, Counsel for the2nd plaintiff, was less than enthusiastic in pressing for rising market to be taken as a separate factor for adjustment. First of all, Mr Hui, expert for the 2nd plaintiff, did not himself list rising market as a factor. In this case, rising market would appear to be more of a matter of hindsight because there was no evidence led to suggest that anyone in the trade had then formed a firm view of a definite rising market trend. Market conditions, after all, had been taken into account by Hr Hui. He stated in evidence that "we should build in our opinion of the then market rental value in our report".

49. The tentative offers in the Letting Agent's memoranda were taken to consideration by Mr Hui; nor was the Kentucky Fried Chicken offer through Swire. Mr Hui explained that in valuation practice, only concluded agreements were accepted as comparables. He gave us what he regarded as proper factors for adjustments for the Kentucky offer as shown in Chart 4 in annexure to this judgment, yielding a figure of $38.73 p.s.f., having taken it backwards to August 1987.

50. Little can usefully be deduced from the less than precise memoranda of the Letting Agent.

51. Mr Swaine had chosen to take a different approach to the Kentucky offer : the $55 p.s.f. as offered in October 1988 even for a much smaller area of 4,000 sq.ft. should be $41.82 back in August 1987, after deducting the 31.5% increase given in the Jones Lang Wootton Property Index. See Chart A in the annexure to this judgment. In fact, it should be an average unit rental of $60.50 throughout the six years as offered by Swire for Kentucky Fried Chicken and not just $55 p.s.f. Assuming the index differential to be the same at 31.5%, Mr Swaine might have raised it to $46 p.s.f. for August 1987 as a matter of arithmetic.

52. The Kentucky offer of $55 or an average of $60.50 p.s.f. was not made in a concluded agreement. Mr Hui would not use offers as comparables. The figure produced in Mr Swaine's approach cannot be reliable, particularly when Mr Hui himself had adjusted it down to $38.73 p.s.f.

53. Mr Swaine further submitted that the defendants' $34.44 p.s.f. calculated from the Toppy rental rate with only the time factor adjustment was wholly unrealistic for a tenant running a fastfood outlet. The Toppy lease was concluded with the reputable Fang family group, and the business will be cleaner, operating more regular hours, enjoying less control over the "Coffee Shop Portion?and catering for a lower customer density.

54. Simply for time differential, even with the acknowledged acceptability of Jones Lang Wootton Property Index for percentage rental fluctuation, it would seem to be more appropriate working forward from May 1987 to August 1987 on Shop 28 (a time lag of only 3 months) rather than working backward from January 1989 to August 1987 (a difference of r some 16 months). The Property Index does provide hindsight of market fluctuation, but, there is, no evidence that any owner would have knowledge or had had the benefit of the like information. Whilst the Property Index may well back what should have been a past survey with a more accurate, forecast using Shop 28 seems to be more realistic, particularly with a short time span accounting for just a 7% increase.

55. For these reasons, I have re-calculated Shop 28 for my use. I would allow only 10% and 5% for "Frontage" and "Coffee Shop Portion" respectively, in effect reducing these allowances by half for Shop 28. See Final Chart in the annexure to this judgment.

56. It does not mean that the Toppy lease has been replaced as the prime comparable. I accept that it is. What is being suggested is that Shop 28 should not be ignored. Mr. Hui must be correct in suggesting that it would be incautious to rely on only one comparable.

57. For the Toppy lease, I agree with Mr Swaine that allowance must be given to its lack of more effective control over the Centre Void or "Coffee Shop Portion". The area of the Centre Void was originally sought by Toppy on the 3rd January 1989. Toppy has now the use of this Centre Void area but subject to a little more supervision from the 2nd plaintiff as landlord. This "Coffee Shop Portion" is not "a letted area". Unit rental of Toppy must be adjusted upwards for enjoying no better control. Freer use of this Centre Void area would more likely discourage the management from interfering with any temporary installation of seats for queuing up customers, logos or other promotional material. That must clearly be an asset to the tenant, call it what you will, "Visibility" or "Coffee Shop Portion". Frontage to the MTR entrance would also be an advantage. In my view, the quality of the tenant should be, for assessing mesne profits, given credit to and taken as an extra payable by a nuisance tenant to compensate "what the plaintiff would have obtained if the tenant had lawfully been in possession" himself. See Strand Electric & Engineering, Co. Ltd. v. Brisford Entertainments Ltd. supra p. 252 per Somervell L.J.

58. Time for negotiation for the Toppy lease and others must have had some built-in edge advantage if negotiation was conducted with fewer contenders. There was no reason why negotiation could not have been commenced by Toppy at year-end for occupation in March 1989. Mr Hui made no assertion that prospective tenants of the 3rd Basement had probably channelled their undivided attention to preparing and promoting the year-end sales. Although he was unable to offer the real cause for lack of interest at the year-end, I accept his evidence based on his experience that in practice, that would be the case.

59. It was a continuous trespass. Periodical fluctuation cannot be a proper element for consideration. The rental value of the premises must be judged at the time when the 2nd Plaintiff had to determine what fair value it would have received on a usual letting of these premises, the nature of which does not cater for monthly occupation.

60. Mr Hui produced his calculations for the 4 selected comparables as set out in Chart 2. I have put in the 7% increase from May to August 1987. I was not impressed by Mr Ng's evidence in cross-examination on his additional factors : Management, Ease of Letting and Time for Decoration. Mr Ng explained that "Mr Hui's quantum allowance (was) a very general allowance while (his) quantum allowance (was) being very specific. That (was) why (he) further split up the possible quantum allowance used by Mr Hui into three other categories." I am not satisfied that there was any real need for their introduction. Moreover, Mr Ng allotted a negative adjustment of -45% in respect to "Quantum" for all the four comparables, but there was no explanation as to why in comparable (1), he should maintain the same -45% for "Quantum" but allow a lower -9% for "Ease of Letting" which is itself a subsidiary of "Quantum". I have also taken note of Mr Swaine's criticisms against these three extra subsidiary factors of Mr Ng for adjustment.

61. Evidently, for the reasons I have given, there would seem to be little justification for me to reject the basic approach adopted by either of these two experts. I have taken advantage of all the expertise they had to offer in areas which I regard as most or more convincing.

62. Mr Hui's adjustments on the Toppy lease as shown in Chart 1 were brought in line in Chart B with the 41.89% increase as acceded to by him in his cross-examination.

63. Shop 28 is the best of the 4 comparables selected by Mr Hui. For the reasons I have given, Shop 28 should not be overlooked.

64. Mr Swaine endeavoured to provide further information by using the figures available in respect to Shop 28. It is a known fact that Shop 28 attracted a unit rental of $25 p.s.f. in September 1983, and not $29 p.s.f. as suggested by Mr Chiu in his report, Exh."D,4(2)? Mr Swaine made an assumption that $25 p.s..f. in September 1983 represented the continuation of a stable rent as from December 1982. He further postulated that since Mr Chiu's report s"D4(2)''. was $4 off the mark at .$29 p.s.f. from the actual $25 p.s.f for September 1983, he would arbitrarily adjust, the given estimated unit rate of $34 p.s.f. as at the end of 1982 in the said report also by $4 to $30 p.s.f. That is how Chart C was prepared. Contrasting his first assumed rental at $25,p.s.f. and his further assumed rental at. $30 p.s,.f. with the average rental for the defendants' premises at..$18 p..s.f., Mr Swaine obtained 2 rental ratios, of 1.39 and 1.66 respectively. Applying the rental rations so obtained to the known unit rental of Shop 28 for May 1987 together with a 7% increase from May to August 1987, Mr Swaine arrived at $45.20 and $44.11 p.s.f. respectively.

65. I agree with Mr Mills-Owens that on these assumptions Chart C cannot be reliable.

66. Chart D produced by Mr Swaine gives summary of calculations for the 4 comparables, with the adjusted percentage for time.

67. Therefore, in Mr Swaine's various proposed calculations, the relevant unit rental for August 1987 of Prudential Centre Mall ranged from $41.82 p.s.f. in Chart A to $58.39 p.s.f. in Chart D.

68. Bearing in mind all the pros and cons, the suggestions and calculations from the experts, and the calculations suggested for my benefit by counsel, I am persuaded to accept the Toppy lease as the prime comparable. Indeed, as Mr Hui advised, it would be more cautious not to rely on one comparable, I have also take into consideration Shop 28. I have adopted all the suggested percentages of Mr Hui with the exception of those for the "Time", "Time of Letting" and "Coffee Shop Portion". Percentage for "Time" has to be revised form - 35% to - 41.89%. I regard the 5% for "Time of Letting" as being slightly high. I would adopt the reduced figure of 2%. The suggested "Coffee Shop Portion" of 10% would seem likewise too high. I would reduce it by half to 5%. The final calculation is as set out in the Final Chart in the annexure attached to this judgment.

69. I have set out in extenso the views, reasons and calculations of each of the experts as well as submissions and calculations made by Counsel. The object of the exercise is, first to fully understand these materials presented for my consideration and then to take full advantage of all the assistance so rendered me. Even from matters I have disregarded, good lessons are learnt for general application. My own conclusion can therefore be said to be an educated one, bearing in mind everything put before me and after much deliberation.

70. In conclusion, I would prefer a figure somewhere in between $42.06 for the Toppy lease and $46.51 for Shop 28. I would take the middle but slightly below the mean of the two figures, i.e. $44 p.s.f. $44 p.s.f.  × 9,400 sq.ft. × 14 months = $5,790,400. Two days' rental at $44 p.s.f. = $44  × 9,400 ÷ 30 days  × 2 = $27,573.33. Therefore, $5,790,400 - $27,573.33 = $5,762,826.67. That represents the assessment of mesne profits for the relevant period by this Court.

71. For the form of the order, I would prefer to be assisted by counsel for the 2nd plaintiff and the defendants. I also make an order nisi for costs in favour of the 2nd plaintiff against the defendants.

(B. Liu)
Judge of the High Court

Representation:

Mr J. Swine, Q.C. and Mr G. Ma instructed by M/s. Tai, Ho & Chan for the 2nd Plaintiff.

Mr Mills-Owens, Q.C. and Mr R. Wong instructed by M/s. Deacons for the 1st & 2nd Defendants.

"Toppy Chart" Chart 1

TOPPY LEASE AS COMPARABLE

ASSUME AREA LEE

TO TOPPY AI 8184

SQ.FT [p.45]

QUINCY HUI IN-CHUI

CROSS EXAMINAIION OF QUINCY HUI

EXAM. INCHIEF OF NG SAI HEE

CROSS0EXAMINAIION OF NG SAI HEE

ADJUSIMENI

ADJUSIED UNIT RAIE

TROM $48.87 PER SQ.FT. PER MONIH [p.45]

ADJUSTMENI ADJUSTED UNIT RAIE

FROM $48.87 PERSQ.FT. PER MONTH [p.45]

ADJUSTMEN ADJUSTED UNIT RAIE

FROM $48.87 PER SQ.FT. PER MONHI [p.45]

ADJUSIMENIADJUSTED UNIT RAIE FAOM $40.87 PER SQ. FT PER MONIH [p.45]

Area

-5%

[p.48]

$46.43

-5%

$46.43 $46.43Nil$48.87
Time different-

ial [Between

July/Aug. 87 to

Jan. 89]

-35%

[p.46]

430.18 -41.89%

[p.54]

$26.98 $26.98-41.89% $34.44[p.111]

141.89

[R x ------ = 48.87

100

therefore

48.87 x 100

R = -----------

141.89

= $34.441

Time of negotia-tion being Nov.

Or Dec.

+5%

[p.46]

$31.69+5%$28.33 $28.33 Nil

[p.110]

$34.44
Coffee Shop

Portion

+10%

[p.46]

$34.85+10%$31.16 $31.16 Nil

[p.110]

$34.44
Quality of

Tenant

+20%

[p.47]

$41.85+20%$37.39 Accepls you do not make an adjustment for the quality of tenant in assessing market value. [pp.67-68] Nil

[p.110]

$34.44
Amoont on the

Basis of 9405

sq.ft

($393,411)

@$41.88%sq.ft.

($351,671.76)($293,059.80) @$37.39/sq.ft. @$31.16/sq.ft.[With adjustment for Quslity of tenant] [No adjustment for Quality of tenant]$323,908.20

Chart 2

FOOR COMPARABLE ADODIRD BY PEILY

September 1986

COMPARABLE (1)

SHOP 28 - 8 to 12

AREA 2,550 SQ.FT

PETTY AS PER PROOF EVIDENCE

PETTY IN RE-EXAMINATION

JONES LANG IN-CHUI

JONES LANG IN-CHUI

ADJUSTMENT

ADJUSTED UNIT RATE FROM $49.72/SQ.FT.ADJUSTMENTADJUSTED UNIT RATE FROM $49.72/SQ.FTADJUSTMENTADJUSTED UNIT RATE FROM $49.72/SQ.FTADJUSTMENTADJUSTED UNIT RATE FROM $49.72/SQ.FT

AREA

-20%

$39.78

-45%

[p.106]

$27.35

FRONTAGE TO MTR

+10%

$43.75

Ease of

access [p. 107] Nil

$27.35

TIME DIFFERENTIAL

+8%

$47.25

+8%

$29.54

VISIBILITY

+10%

$51.97

Nil

[p.108]

$29.54

MANAGEMENT

-2%

[p.113]

$28.96

[p.165]

EASE OF LETTING

-9%

[p.113]

$26.54

TIME FOR DECORATION

-3%

[p.113]

$25.55

+7%             $55.61 (See Chart D)

    May - Aug.87

September 1986

COMPARABLE (2)

SHOP 28 - 29 & 30

AREA 412 SQ.FT

PETTY AS PER PROOF EVIDENCE

PETTY IN RE-EXAMINATION

JONES LANG IN-CHUI

JONES LANG IN-CHUI

ADJUSTMENTADJUSTED UNIT RATE FROM $49.72/SQ.FT.ADJUSTMENTADJUSTED UNIT RATE FROM $49.72/SQ.FTADJUSTMENTADJUSTED UNIT RATE FROM $49.72/SQ.FTADJUSTMENTADJUSTED UNIT RATE FROM $49.72/SQ.FT

AREA

-40%

$44.12

-45%

$45.45

FRONTAGE TO MTR

+10%

$48.54

Ease of

access [p. 107] Nil

$40.45

TIME DIFFERENTIAL

+8%

$52.42

+8%

$43.69

VISIBILITY

+5%

$55.04

Nil

[p.108]

$43.69

MANAGEMENT

-2%

[p.113]

$42.82

[p.165]

EASE OF LETTING

-11%

[p.113]

$38.1

TIME FOR DECORATION

-3%

[p.113]

$37

+7%                $58.89 (See Chart D)

    May - Aug.87

September 1986

COMPARABLE (3)

SHOP 28 - 27

AREA 210 SQ.FT

PETTY AS PER PROOF EVIDENCE

PETTY IN RE-EXAMINATION

JONES LANG IN-CHUI

JONES LANG IN-CHUI

ADJUSTMENTADJUSTED UNIT RATE FROM $49.72/SQ.FT.ADJUSTMENTADJUSTED UNIT RATE FROM $49.72/SQ.FTADJUSTMENTADJUSTED UNIT RATE FROM $49.72/SQ.FTADJUSTMENTADJUSTED UNIT RATE FROM $49.72/SQ.FT

AREA

-45%

$33.04

-45%

$33.04

-45%

$33.04

FRONTAGE TO MTR

+20%

$39.65

+20%

$39.65

Ease of

access [p. 107] Nil

$33.36

TIME DIFFERENTIAL

+8%

$42.83

+8%

$42.83

+8%

$37.1

VISIBILITY

+10%

$47.11

+20%

$51.4

+10%

$40.8

MANAGEMENT

-2%

[p.108]

$40

[p.165]

EASE OF LETTING

-11%

[p.113]

$35.60

TIME FOR DECORATION

-3%

[p.113]

$54.55

+7%             $50.40 (See Chart D)

    May - Aug.87

September 1986

COMPARABLE (4)

SHOP 28 - 28

AREA 263 SQ.FT

PETTY AS PER PROOF EVIDENCE

PETTY IN RE-EXAMINATION

JONES LANG IN-CHUI

JONES LANG IN-CHUI

ADJUSTMENTADJUSTED UNIT RATE FROM $49.72/SQ.FT.ADJUSTMENTADJUSTED UNIT RATE FROM $49.72/SQ.FTADJUSTMENTADJUSTED UNIT RATE FROM $49.72/SQ.FTADJUSTMENTADJUSTED UNIT RATE FROM $49.72/SQ.FT

AREA

-45%

$37.64

-45%

$37.64

-45%

$37.64

FRONTAGE TO MTR

+20%

$45.17

+20%

$45.17

+2%l

$38.39

[P.152]

TIME DIFFERENTIAL

-

$45.17

-

$45.17

+8%

$41.46

VISIBILITY

+10%

$49.69

+20%

$54.2

+5%

[P.108]

$43.53

MANAGEMENT

-2%

[p.113]

$42.66

[p.165]

EASE OF LETTING

-11%

[p.113]

$39.97

TIME FOR DECORATION

-3%

[p.113]

$36.83

+7%             $53.17 (See Chart D)

                            May - Aug.87

Chart 3

FRONIAGE TO MIR ENIRANCE AND VISIBILITY

COMPARABLE

LOCATION

FRONTAGE TO MTR ENTRANCE

(1)

VISIBILITY

(2)

 

TOAL

(1) & (20

ASSESSMENT AS

PER QUINCY HUI

ADJUSTMFNT

ALLOWED BY

QUINCY HUI

IN PROOF

OF

EVIDENCE

RE-EXAMIN-

ATION

1

Shops

Nos. 2B

8 - 12

Has a much

Larger

frontage

than 2B-2 and

2B-3 [p.72]

+10%

+10%

+10%

20%

2

Shop

2B-Shop

2B - 30

Has a much

Shorter

frontage

towards MTR

[p.71]

Has a larger

frontage than

2B-2 and 2B-3

[p.71]

+10%

+5%

+5%

15%

3

Shop

2B - 27

+20%

+10%

+20%

[P.82]

40%

4

Ship

2B - 28

+20%

+10%

+20%

40%

Chart 4

KENTUCKY FRIED CHICKEN LEASE [p.296]

ASSUME AREA LET

4,000 SQ.FT

QUINCY HUI IN-CHIEF

$55 PER MONTH [p.49]

Area

-10% $49.50
Time

differential

-25% $36.88
Time of

negotiation

+5%$38.73

2nd Plaintiff's Chart A

KENTUCKY CASE

Date

JLW Index

% Increase

From Aug. 87

Rent/S.F.

on 4,000 S.F.

Aug. 87

Oct. 88

140.37

184.64

0.0%

31.5%

$41.82

$55.00

2nd Plaintiff's Revised Chart B

TOPPY LEASE

TOPPY RENTLess 5%

(Quantum)

TIME

(41.89% increase

1987 to January,

1989)

ADD 5%

(Time of letting)

ADD 10%

(Coffee Shop)

ADD 20%

(Quality of

Tenant)

ADD 15.7%

(Average percentage

increase from

August, 1987. to

October, 1988)

$48.87

$46.43

$32.72

$34.55

$37.79

$45.35

$52.50

2nd Plaintiff's chart C

THE ANALYSIS OF JLW APPROACH

A. (Average) MARKET RENT FOR PIZZA HUI

AS AT DECEMBER, 1982

B. MARKET RENT FOR b2 SHOP 2B

AS AT DECEMBER, 1982

C. RATIO (B ÷ A

1.                                    $18.00

2.                                    $18.00

$35.00

$30.00

1.39

1.66

MARKET RENT FOR

B2 SHOP 28 AS AT

MAY, 1987

MARKET RENT FOR

PIZZA HUI AS AT

MAY, 1987

(using ratio

of 1.39)

MARKET RENT FOR

PIZZA HUI AS AT

MAY, 1987

(using ratio

of 1.66)

ADD 7%

(Increase from

May, 1987 to

August, 1987)

ADD 15.78%

(Average percentage

increase from

August, 1987 to

October, 1988)

$68.44$42.44

$41.23

$45.20

(For rental ratio 1.39)

(For rental ratio 1.66)

$52.33

$51.08

2nd Plaintiff's chart D

THE 4 ORIGINAL CHLSIERIOH POTTY COMPARABLES (AS RIVISED

LOCATION

RENT

QUANTUM

IRONTACE TO MIR

THE

VISIBILITY

ADD 10%

(Increase from

May, 1987 to

August, 1987)

ADD 15.78%

(Average percentage

increase from

August 1987 to

October, 1988)

1.2B Shop 8-12

   (September)

    1986)

2. 2B Shops 29 and 30

     (September

      1986)

3. 2B Shop 27

     (September

      1986)

4. 2B Shop 2B

     (May 1987)

$49.72

 

$75.54

 

$60.08

 

$68.44

$39.L78

(Less 20%)

$44.12

(Less 40%)

$33.04

(Less 40%)

$36.64

(Less 45%)

$43.75

(Add 10%)

$48.54

(Add 105)

$39.65

(Add 20%)

$45.17

(Add 20%)

$47.25

(Add 8%)

$52.42

(Add 8%)

$42.83

(Add 8%)

$51.97

(Add 10%

$55.04

(Add 8%)

$51.40

(Add 20%)

$54/20

(Add 20%)

$55.31

 

$58.89

 

$55.00

 

$58.00

R64.38

 

$68.34

 

$63.68

 

$66.14

Final Chart

Shop 2B RENT

LESS 45%

(Quantum)

Shop 2B

ADD 7%

(Increase form

May 87 to Aug. 87)

ADD 10%

(Frontage to

MTR Entrance)

ADD 5%

(Coffee Shop

Portion)

R68.44

$37.64

$41.10

$43.47

$46.51

TOPPY EEASE

TOPPY RENT

LESS 5%

(Quantum)

TIME

(41.89% increase

from August,

1987 to January,

19789)

ADD 2%

(Time of

letting)

ADD 5%

(Coffee Shop

Portion)

ADD 20%

(Quality of

Tenant)

$48.87

$46.43

$32.72

$33.39

$35.05

$42.06

31760-EN-1988-08-19

THE PRUDENTIAL ENTERPRISE LIMITED AND ANOTHER v. P.H. SHEK LIMITED AND ANOTHER

HTML content

HCA004911A/1987

High Court Action No. 4911 of 1987

 

===========

HEADNOTE

===========

 

Landlord and tenant - Covenant by corporate tenant against allowing itself to betaken over - Covenant against parting with possession - Breach of covenant - Waiver - Failure to serve notice under S.58 of Conveyancing and Property Ordinance, Cap. 219 - Notice to quit without prejudice to notice under S.58 - Whether amounted to election to continue the tenancy - Appropriateness of relief against forfeiture where tenant deliberately in breach of covenant for sake of own enrichment.

 

===========

 

                By a tenancy in writing dated 18th December 1982, the landlord let the suit premises from that date for a term of seven years at a monthly rent payable in advance on the first day of each calendar month by the tenant, a limited company operating a "Pizza Hut" franchise. Express covenants were given by the tenant that, on pain of forfeiture and re-entry, it would not alienate the suit premises by parting with possession and, the tenancy being personal to the tenant, the tenant would not without written approval of the landlord allow itself to be taken over. The tenancy agreement also made provision that in the event of the "Pizza Hut" franchise being terminated, the landlord could terminate the tenancy upon giving two months notice in writing to the tenant.

                Despite refusal of prior consent by the landlord, the tenant went ahead and transferred the tenancy and the "Pizza Hut" franchise to a purchaser, Jardine, Matheson & Co Limited ("Jardines"), on 30th April 1987.

                Without first of all serving a notice on the tenant pursuant to section 58 of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance, Cap. 219, the landlord on 8th May 1987 issued a writ for possession of the suit premises against the tenant on the ground of breach of the covenant against alienation, such writ being served on the tenant on 11th clay 1987.

                Because of a mistake on the part of the landlord's staff, the landlord, on 23rd May 1987, sent the tenant a demand for the month's rent falling due on 1st June 1987. Before the tenant made any attempt to pay that rent, the landlord wrote to the tenant on 27th May 1987, pointing out that the June rent had been demanded by mistake and stating that such rent would not be accepted.

                On 4th July 1987, the date on which the shares in the tenant were transferred to Jardines, Jardines took over the tenant.

                At the end of July 1987, the landlord discontinued the proceedings commenced by the writ dated 8th May 1987.

                Then, on 4th August 1987, the landlord served a notice ("the Statutory Notice of 4th August 1987") on the tenant, pursuant to section 58 of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance, stating that the landlord intended to re-enter upon the suit premises and forfeit the tenancy because the tenant had committed irremediable breaches of covenant by parting with possession of the suit premises to Jardines and by allowing itself to be taken over by Jardines.

                On 6th August 1987, that was followed by the service of another notice (the "Contractual Notice") on the tenant, whereby the landlord purported to give the tenant two months notice to quit under the provision in the tenancy agreement dealing with the eventuality of the "Pizza Hut" franchise being terminated. That Contractual Notice embodied a clause that it was to be without prejudice to the Statutory Notice of 4th August 1987.

                A formal "Notice Of Forfeiture" was served by the landlord on the tenant on 13th August 1987, asserting that the tenancy was thereby forfeited because the tenant had failed to remedy the breaches of covenant complained of in the Statutory Notice of 4th August 1987.

                Next day, i.e. 14th August 1987, the landlord issued the writ giving rise to the present trial in which possession of the suit premises was sought against the tenant, on the ground of breach of the covenants against parting with possession, and against suffering a take-over, the tenant counter-claiming for relief against forfeiture.

Held, granting possession to the landlord after trial:-

   

(1) The proceedings commenced by the writ issued on 8th May 1987 were a nullity because the landlord had failed to comply with the condition precedent imposed by law of first of all serving a notice pursuant to s.58(1) of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance.

   

(2)

Because those proceedings were a nullity, the landlord did not enjoy any notional re-entry on the suit premises by virtue of them, and by demanding June's rent on 23rd May 1987 the landlord waived the breach of covenant committed by the tenant on 30th April 1987 in transferring possession to Jardines.

   

(3)

By virtue of the tenant being taken over by Jardines on 4th July 1987, which was the date the shares in the tenant here transferred, the tenant was on that date in breach of the covenant against being taken over. Just because the tenant had parted with possession of the suit premises, did not also inevitably mean that the tenant would suffer a take-over. Hence, the waiver of the breach of covenant against parting with possession did not lead to the conclusion that the covenant against being taken over must also have been waived. (Downie v Turner [1951]2 K.B. 112 distinguished)

   

(4)

Contrary to the tenant's contention, the Contractual Notice did not amount to an election on the landlord's part to affirm the continuation of the tenancy for another two months from 6th August 1987, and did nothing to impair the operation of the Statutory Notice of 4th August. 1987.

   

(5)

This was not a suitable case for granting relief against forfeiture. Equity could not see its way to relieving a corporate tenant whose owners, in the face of opposition from the landlord, had caused it deliberately to break a covenant so as to enrich themselves.

 

1987 No. A4911

 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG

HIGH COURT

 

------------------

BETWEEN

THE PRUDENTIAL ENTERPRISE LIMITED1st Plaintiff
THE PRUDENTIAL MALL LIMITED2nd Plaintiff
and
P.H. SHEK LIMITED1st Defendant
PIREST LIMITED2nd Defendant

-------------------

 

Coram: Hon. Rhind, J. in open court.

Dates of hearing: 18th-22nd July 1988

Date of delivery of judgment: 19th August 1988 at 9:30 a.m.

------------------

JUDGMENT

------------------

 

I.THE FACTS

(A)My Findings Of Fact

1. By a lease dated the 18th December 1982, The Prudential Enterprise Limited (the 1st plaintiff in the present proceedings) let part of the third basement floor of the Prudential Centre at 216-228A Nathan Road, Kowloon to P.H. Shek Limited and Pirest Limited (the 1st and 2nd defendants, respectively; in the present action) for a 7 year term from the 18th December 1982. The rent together with the managment fee and air-conditioning charges was payable monthly in advance on the 1st day of each and every calendar month. The lease made provision that for the first year of the lease the rent was to be HK$112,860 per month, but for the third, fourth and fifth years (with which the present case is concerned) the rent was to rise to HK169,290 per month.

2. From the outset, the premises have been used for the operation of a "Pizza Hut". Under SECTION (XII), which is the INTERPRETATION AND MISCELLANEOUS part of the lease, Clause (17) provides as follows:

"The Landlord understands that P.H. Shek Ltd. and Pirest Ltd. are the operator of a franchise with the Pizza Hut group headquarters. The Landlord also understands that should such franchise agreement be terminated then P.H. Shek Ltd. and Pirest Ltd. will be required under their franchise agreement to discontinue use of the Pizza Hut style color scheme and will be required to remove all identifying architectural superstructure effectively to distinguish the same from the design under the Pizza Hut registered building design service mark. It is also understood, however, should such franchise be terminated, the Landlord shall have the right to terminate the lease of P.H. Shek Ltd. and Pirest Ltd. upon giving two months' notice in writing."

3. SECTION (9l) of the lease, which is entitled "RESTRICTIONS AND PROHIBITIONS" provided that :-

"The Tenant hereby agrees with the Landlord as follows:-

 

……………………………………………………………

 

"(19) Not to assign, underlet, part with the possession of or transfer the said premises or any part thereof or any interest therein, nor permit or suffer any arrangement or transaction whereby any person who is not a party to this Agreement obtains the use, possession, occupation or enjoyment of the said premises or any part therefore irrespective of whether any rental or other consideration is given therefor. The tenancy shall be personal to the Tenant named in this Agreement and without in any way limiting the generality of the foregoing, the following acts and events shall, unless approved in writing by the Landlord, be deemed to be breaches of this clause:-

(a) In the case of a tenant which is a partnership, taking in of one or more new partners whether on the death or retirement of an existing partner or otherwise.

(b) In the case of a tenant who is an individual (including a sole surviving partner of a partnership tenant) the death, insanity or other disability of that individual, to the intent that no right to use, possess, occupy or enjoy the said premises or any part thereof shall vest in the executors, administrators, personal representatives, next of kin, trustee or committee of any such individual.

(c) In the case of a tenant which is a corporation, any take-over, reconstruction, amalgamation, merger, voluntary liquidation or change in the person or persons who owns or own a majority of its voting shares or who otherwise has or have effective control thereof.

(d) The giving by the Tenant of a power of attorney or similar authority whereby the donee of the power obtains the right to use, possess, occupy or enjoy the said premises or any part thereof or does in fact use; possess, occupy or enjoy the same.

(e)The change of the Tenant's business name without the previous written consent of the Landlord as required by Section VI Clause (8)(a) hereof."

4. Provision for forfeiture and re-entry in the event of breach of covenant by the tenants was made by SECTION (IX), which is entitled "DEFAULT" and is as follows:-

"It is hereby further expressly agreed and declared as follows:

 

(1) If the rent or any part thereof shall be unpaid for 7 days after the same shall become payable (whether legally or formally demanded or not) or if the Tenant shall fail or neglect to observe or perform any of the agreements, stipulations or conditions herein contained and on the Tenant's part to be observed and performed or if the Tenant shall become bankrupt or being a corporation shall go into liquidation or if any petition shall be filed for the winding up of the Tenant or if the Tenant shall otherwise become insolvent or make or attempt to make any composition or arrangement with creditors or shall suffer any execution to be levied on the said premises or otherwise on the Tenant's goods, then and in any such case it shall be lawful for the Landlord at any time thereafter to re-enter on the said premises or any part thereof in the name of the whole whereupon this Agreement shall absolutely cease and determine but without prejudice to any right of action by the Landlord in respect of any outstanding breach or non-observance or non-performance of any of the agreements, stipulations and conditions herein contained and on the Tenant's part to be observed and performed and to the Landlord's right to deduct all loss and damage thereby incurred from the deposit paid by the Tenant in accordance with Section XI hereof.

 

(2)A written notice served by the Landlord on the Tenant in manner hereinafter mentioned to the effect that the Landlord thereby exercises the power of re-entry herein contained shall be a full and sufficient exercise of such power without physical entry on the part of the Landlord."

5. The only other part of the lease relevant for present purposes occurs in SECTION (XII), INTERPRETATION AND MISCELLANEOUS :-

"(9)Unless the content otherwise requires, words herein importing the masculine gender shall include the feminine and neuter genders and words herein in the singular shall include the plural and vice versa. The word "Tenant"' whenever used in this Agreement shall include either or both of P.H. Shek Limited and Pirest Limited and their respective successors and the undertakings and liabilities of the Tenant hereunder shall be joint and several of the said P.H. Shek Limited and Pirest Limited."

6. The Prudential Enterprise Limited assigned the Prudential Centre, together with the benefit of all leases, to the Prudential Mall Limited on the 10th March 1987. P.H. Shek Limited and Pirest Limited paid the rent to and dealt with the Prudential Mall Limited as landlord after that date.

7. On 25th March 1987, Miss Diana Shek, a director of P.H. Shek Limited, made overtures to Mr Samuel Tuk Yee Lee (Mr Lee), a director of The Prudential Mall Limited to see whether The Prudential Mall Limited would consent to a transfer of the lease or a change in ownership of the lessees. Mr Lee refused any such consent. (See Core Bundle at page 56, and Mr Lee's affirmation of 25th July 1987 in HCA No. 2678 of 1987).

8. A further approach was made to The Prudential Mall Limited on 13th April 1987 when P.H. Shek Limited wrote as follows:-

"Dear Sirs,

 

RE: 3RD BASEMENT FLOOR, PRUDENTIAL CENTRE, 216-228A NATHAN ROAD, KOWLOON, HONG KONG.

 

We refer to the Lease relating to the above property dated 18th December, 1982 ("the Agreement") made between yourselves as Landlord and P.H. Shek Limited and Pirest Limited as Tenant.

 

We are writing to inform you that we are proposing to transfer the business carried on by us under the name Pizza Hut, which will include the business presently carried on at this property, to Jardine, Matheson & Co., Limited ("Jardines"). It is envisaged that completion of this transfer will take place on or about 30th April, 1987.

 

As a related part of the transaction, it is intended that Jardines will also acquire the entire issued share capital of Pirest Limited ("Pirest"). In accordance with the provisions of Clause 19 of the Agreement, we are therefore writing to seek your consent to the following:

 

(a) a change in the ownership of Pirest so that it will become a wholly-owned subsidiary of Jardines; and

 

(b) the release of P.H. Shek Limited from its joint obligations with Pirest as Tenant under the Agreement.

 

So that your position as landlord is not affected by these proposals in any way, Jardines has agreed that it will guarantee the obligations of Pirest as Tenant under the Agreement.

 

We would be grateful if you could indicate your consent to the matters set out above by signing and returning to us the enclosed copy of this letter on or before 27th April, 1987. Our legal advisers will then prepare the relevant formal documentation for your approval and signature. If you have any questions or require any further information, then please do not hesitate to call Miss Diana Shek, who will be pleased to assist.

 

Until the formal completion of this transaction we would be grateful if you would treat the proposals set out in this letter as strictly confidential.

 

Yours faithfully,

 

(P.H. Shek Limited)"

9. That letter resulted in a swift rejection on behalf of The Prudential Mall Limited when their solicitors on the 15th April 1987 wrote back as follows:-

"Dear Sirs,

 

Re: 3rd Basement Floor, Prudential Centre, 216-228A Nathan Road, Kowloon, Hong Kong

 

        We act for your Landlord The Prudential Enterprise Limited.

 

        They have handed to us your letter to them of the 13th instant and they have asked us to reply to it on their behalf.

 

        We therefore write to inform you that in our view the proposals you put forward in this letter require the Landlord's consent under Clause 19 of Section VI of the Lease. Indeed your letter concedes this by requesting consent.

 

        We are instructed to inform you that our client does not consent to the proposed alienation or assignment of the tenancy.

 

        If a purported assignment is made and/or if there is a take-over, reconstruction, or merger as indicated we already have instructions to take the necessary steps on our client's behalf to forfeit the lease and terminate the tenancy.

 

Yours faithfully,

 

(sd.) TAI, HO & CHAN

 

55/11

c.c. client

c.c. Jardine, Matheson & Co. Ltd. (CLD)"

10. A meeting was held on the 29th April 1987 between Mr Lee and his solicitors on the one side, and representatives of the lessees and Jardines on the other side, to explore whether the landlords would be agreeable to the tenancy being transferred and/or the lessees being taken over by Jardines, but again, the landlords declined to give any such consent.

11. Besides the meetings of 25th March and 29th April 1987 and P.H. Shek Limited's letter of 13th April 1987 already referred to, there were various other straws in the wind indicating to the landlords that Jardines wanted the lease to be transferred and to take over Pirest Limited, but all this was of a quite inconclusive nature with no evidential value, so that I do not propose to make any further reference to it.

12. In the usual way, The Prudential Mall Limited on the 23rd April 1987 sent the lessees a debit note for the next month's rent in advance, which was to fall due on 1st May 1987.

13. So that the lessees could be left in no doubt whatsoever that the landlord would not allow any transfer of the tenancy, the landlords fired off the following telex to the lessees on the 2nd May 1987:-

"TO: P.H. SHEK LIMITED AND PIREST LIMITED

 

RE:PART 3RD BASEMENT
PRUDENTIAL CENTRE
216-228A NATHAN ROAD

 

-----------------------------------------------------------

 

FURTHER TO OUR SOLICITOR, MESSRS. TAI, HO N CHAN'S LETTER TO YOU OF 15/4/87 WE WRITE TO PUT YOU ON NOTICE THAT WE HAVE OTHER PARTIES IN THE MARKET THAT ARE INTERESTED IN LEASING THIS PREMISES, AND THEY ARE PREPARED TO PAY A HIGHER RENT FOR THIS PREMISES. SHOULD YOU ALIENATE THE TENANCY, WE WILL FORFEIT YOUR LEASE AND TERMINATE THE TENANCY.

 

IN SUCH CASE, WE DEMAND YOUR IMMEDIATE RETURN OF THE VACANT POSSESSION OF THE PREMISES TO US. WE RESERVE THE RIGHT TO CLAIM FROM YOU ALL OUR LOST RENTALS, COST AND DAMAGES.

 

THE PRUDENTIAL MALL LTD."

14. The next event to happen as far as the landlords were concerned was to wake up on the morning of 5th May 1987 to read headlines in the Hong Kong newspapers such as, "JARDINES NOW THE NOBLE HUT" and "UNDISCLOSED AMOUNT OF DOUGH BUYS PIZZA HUTS". Those newpapers reported that Jardines had made an announcement the previous day, (i.e. 4th May 1987), that it had acquired the Hong Kong franchise of Pizza Hut restaurants from P.H. Shek Limited for an undisclosed sum. (That sum has never been disclosed to the landlords, nor to the court, but, in the words of counsel for the lessees, it is "substantial", or, in the more colourful words of Mr John Swaine, Q.C., for the landlords, it was, obviously, "A whole mint of money").

15. Those press announcements spurred The Prudential Mall Limited to immediate action. Although Prudential Mall Limited was completely lacking in evidence which would stand up in a court of law, it instructed its solicitors to institute proceedings against the lessees for forfeiture. After spending a couple of days preparing the necessary documentation, the landlords' solicitors issued a writ (being H.C.A.2678 of 1987) on the 8th May 1987, seeking possession of the suit premises and damages for breach of covenant on the basis of alienation, contrary to Clause (19)(c) of SECTION (VI) of the lease. I will set out the whole "Indorsement of Claim" from that writ, since the lessees' counsel at one point addressed me on the basis that the form of that Indorsement was significant in the context of waiver:

"INDORSEMENT OF CLAIM

 

The Plaintiff's claim is for:-

 

(A) Possession of 3rd Basement Floor, Prudential Centre, 216-218A Nathan Road, Kowloon, Hong Kong comprised in a Lease (the Lease) dated the 18th December 1982 and made between the Plaintiff of the one part and the 1st and 2nd Defendants of the other part.

 

(B) Damages for breach of the covenant against alienation contained in Section VI Clause 19(c) of the lease whereby the Plaintiff has suffered loss and damage.

 

AND the Plaintiff claims against both Defendants:-

 

(i) Possession of the premises;

 

(ii) Rent and other charges at the rate of $207,455.30 per month for the period from 4th May 1987 to the date of service of the Writ;

 

(iii) Mesne profit at the rate of $207,455.30 from the date of service of the Writ until possession is given up;

 

(iv) Interest on the same rent and other charges and on the mesne profit;

 

(v)Damage for breach of covenant with interest thereon."

16. On the very day that the landlord issued its writ, (namely, the 8th May 1987), a notice appeared in the Hong Kong Government Gazette pursuant to sections 4 and 5 of the Transfer of Businesses (Protection of Creditors) Ordinance, Cap. 49, to the effect that P.H. Shek Limited, carrying on the business of operating restaurants under the name and style of Pizza Hut, had agreed with effect from 30th April 1987 to transfer the business together with, inter alia, the tenancies of the business premises, to Jardines, the transfer having been completed on 30th April 1987. That notice was in the name of P.H. Shek Limited as transferor and Jardines as transferee. Eleven different localities including the snit premises were mentioned in the notice as places where there were Pizza Hut restaurants.

17. That notice cannot be faulted as far as it goes, but it does not tell the whole story. In particular, it made no reference to an agreement made on the 24th April 1987 between (inter alia) P. H. Shek Limited, Mr Shek Pak Hang and Jardines. Discovery of that document has not been made by either of the defendants in the present action, but, presumably, that was the agreement which transferred the Pizza Hut franchise from P.H. Shek Limited to Jardines for "A whole mint of money".

18. There was also another agreement made on the 24th April 1987. That was between Mr Shek Pak Hang, Hut Limited and Jardines. That document first came to the plaintiffs' attention by virtue of the discovery process in the present proceedings. That agreement provided, in effect, that Jardines would take over Pirest Limited from the 30th April 1987. According to that agreement, completion was supposed to take place on the 30th April 1987, but the reality has been that the shares in Pirest Limited were not transferred to Jardines or its nominees until on or about the 4th July 1987.

19. The writ in HCA No. A2678 of 1987 between Prudentia Mall Limited as plaintiff and P.H. Shek Limited and Pirest Limited as defendants, (henceforth referred as "the Abortive Action") which was issued on the 8the May 1987, was served by post on the defendants' solicitors on the 11th May 1987, an Acknowledgement of Service being filed and served on the defendants' behalf on the 21st May 1987.

20. Despite instructions from Mr Lee to his staff at about the beginning of May 1987 not to accept any further rent from, nor send out any further demands for rent to the defendants, The Prudential Mall Limited, nonetheless, did, on the 23rd May 1987, send out a demand to the defendants for June's rent. Before any attempt was made to pay that rent, The Prudential Mall Limited wrote to the defendants on the 27th May 1987 pointing out that the June rent had been demanded by mistake and stating that such rent would not be accepted. The defendants did, after that, attempt to tender the rent for June and for subsequent months, but The Prudential Mall Limited has consistently refused to accept it.

21. On the 5th May 1987, the lessees' solicitors had sent The Prudential Mall Limited a cheque for the rent and other outgoings in respect of May 1987. This is what that letter stated:-

"Dear Sirs,

 

Re: 3B/1-13 & 26-31 Prudential Centre, 216-228A Nathan Road, Kowloon  

 

We are instructed by our clients P.H. Shek Limited and Pirest Limited, tenants of the above premises to send you herewith our cheque for the sum of $207,455.30 being rental for the month of May, 1987 including air-conditioning charges, management fees, water charges and other outgoing payable by our clients in respect of the above premises, receipt of which kindly acknowledge.

 

 

Yours faithfully,"

The Prudential Mall Limited did not acknowledge receipt of that cheque. Nor did the Prudential Mall Limited bank it. The next thing the defendants knew was that they had been served with the writ in the Abortive Action (i.e. H.C.A. No. A2678 of 1987). It was not until the 2nd July 1987 that the defendants' cheque was returned to their solicitors, uncashed, with an explanation that it had been retained by the solicitors for The Prudential Mall Limited owing to an oversight.

22. Attention can now be switched back to the course which the Abortive Action took. The first version of the Statement of Claim was filed on 2nd June 1987. The only paragraph of any significance for present purposes is 9 which reads as follows:-

"9.    The Plaintiff's case is that Pirest is now a wholly owned subsidiary of Jardines and that the Defendants have on a day unknown but believed to be on or about the 30th April, 1987 breached the covenants against alienation of the demised premises contained in the lease. The full extent and nature of the Plaintiffs case can only be stated after discovery has taken place"

Next day, namely 3rd June 1987, there followed an amended version of the Statement of Claim. For present purposes the only paragraph worth mentioning from that is paragraph 13, which was as follows:-

"13.     The Plaintiff's case is that Pirest is now or is becoming a subsidiary (wholly owned or otherwise) of Jardines and that the Defendants have on a day unknown but believed to be on or about the 30th April, 1987 breached the covenants against alienation of the demised premises contained in the lease. The full extent and nature of the Plaintiff's case can only be stated after discovery has taken placed. "

23. Neither the original Statement of Claim of 2nd June, nor the amended version of 3rd June contained any prayer for relief. Then came a re-amended Statement of Claim dated July 1987. That contained a prayer for relief identical to the one I have already set out from the INDORSEMENT OF CLAIM on the writ, except that now the date from which rent and other charges were claimed to the date of service of the writ was 1st May 1987 instead of 4th May 1987. Whether that re-amended Statement of Claim was ever filed, and what its precise status is, have not been clarified for me, but I do not think anything turns on this.

24. On 6th July 1987, an affidavit sworn on the 2nd July 1987 by Mr Emerson, solicitor for The Prudential Mall Limited, was filed in the Abortive Action in support of a summons for interim payments of rent and/or mesne profits. It is necessary to set out the operative parts of that affidavit since the defendants' counsel at one point thought he could detect the seeds of a waiver in it. I now set out the relevant extract from that affidavit:-

"3.     (1)    In this action, the Plaintiff claims against the 1st and the 2nd Defendants for :-

 

(a) Possession of the said premises;

 

(b) rent and other charges at the rate of HK$207,455.30 per month for the period from 4th May 1987 to the date of service of the Writ;

 

(c) mesne profits at the rate of HK$207,455.30 from the date of service of the Writ until possession is given up;

 

(d) interest on the said rent and other charges and on the mesne profits; and

 

(e) damage for breach of covenant with interest thereon.

 

                The particulars of the said claim appear by the Amended Statement of Claim filed herein on the 3rd day of June 1987.

 

    (ii)         The 1st and the 2nd Defendants filed a Defence herein on the 30th day of June 1987.

 

4.               I have been informed by the Plaintiff that the 1st and 2nd Defendants have paid rent and other charges to the Plaintiff up to the 30th day of April 1987 in respect of the tenancy of the said premises.

 

5.               I verily believe that if a final judgment or order were given and made in favour of the Plaintiff, the 1st and the 2nd Defendants would be held liable to pay all rent and other charges under the tenancy and mesne profits in respect of their use and occupation of the said premises during the currency of this action at the rate of HK$207,455.30 per month from the 1st day of May 1987 to the date of delivery of vacant possession of the said premises to the Plaintiff.

 

6.               I verily believe that even if a final judgment or order were given or made in favour of the let and the 2nd Defendants, they would still be under an obligation to pay to the Plaintiff rental and other charges at the rate of HK$207,455.30 per month in respect of their use and occupation of the said premises during the currency of this action.

 

7.    (i)         In this action, the Plaintiff now applies for interim payment by the 1st and 2nd Defendants for a lump sum of HK$622,365.90 to be paid within 7 days of the order and further periodical payments at the rate of HK$207,455.30 per month commencing on the 1st day of August 1987 until final judgment herein or further order.

 

        (ii)      The said sum of HK$622,365.90 equals to the total amount of 3 months' rent and/or mesne profits for the period from 1st day of May 1987 to 31st July 1987 payable by the 1st and the 2nd Defendants under the tenancy of the said premises in this action.

 

8.                 In the circumstances, I humbly crave leave of the Honourable Court to grant an order in terms of the summons filed herein under Order 29 Rule 18 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, Cap. 4."

25. The Abortive Action was doomed to failure from the outset, because The Prudential Mall Limited had failed to comply with the requirement of serving a notice on the defendants under section 58 of the Coveyancing and Property Ordinance, Cap. 219. It is only necessary to set out sub-sections (1) and (2) from that section which are as follows:-

"

"PART VI

 

RELIEF AGAINST FORFEITURE

 

58.     (1)        A right of re-entry or forfeiture under any proviso or stipulation in a lease for a breach of any covenant of condition in the lease shall not be enforceable, by action or otherwise, unless and until the lessor serves on the lessee a notice-

(a) specifying the particular breach complained of; and

(b) if the breach is capable of remedy, requiring the lessee to remedy the breach; and

(c) specifying the compensation, if any, which the lessor requires in respect of the breach,

and the lessee fails, within a reasonable time thereafter, to remedy the breach, if it is capable of remedy, and to make reasonable compensation in money, to the satisfaction of the lessor, for the breach.

        (2)         Where a lessor is proceeding, by action or otherwise, to enforce such a right of re-entry or forfeiture, the lessee may, in the lessor's action, if any, or in any action brought by himself, apply to the court for relief; and the court may grant or refuse relief, as the court, having regard to the proceedings and conduct of the parties under the foregoing provisions of this section, and to all the other circumstances, thinks fit; and in case of relief may grant it on such terms, if any, as to costs, expenses, damages, compensation, penalty, or otherwise, including the granting of an injunction to restrain any like breach in the future, as the court, in the circumstances of each case, thinks fit. "

26. Realizing that The Prudential Mall Limited had failed to serve a notice under section 58, the defendants moved to strike out the Statement of Claim in the Abortive Action. Recognizing the futility of going on after failing to serve a section 58 notice, The Prudential Mall Limited bowed to the inevitable by discontinuing the Abortive Action at the end of July 1987.

27. To put its house in order, The Prudential Mall Limited, together with The Prudential Enterprise Limited, on the 4th August 1987 duly served a notice under section 58 on the defendants in the following terms:-

"     NOTICE UNDER SECTION 58 OF THE CONVEYANCING

 

AND PROPERTY ORDINANCE 1984

 

To : P.H. Shek Limited and Pirest Limited, the tenants of the premises situate and known as ALL THAT PORTION. "B" on the 3rd Basement Floor of Prudential Centre, 216-228A Nathan Road, Kowloon, (which Portion is shown for the purpose of identification only on the plan annexed to the Tenancy Agreement as hereinafter referred to and thereon coloured pink) erected on All That piece or parcel of land situate, lying and being at Kowloon, Hong Kong and registered in the Land Office as Kowloon Inland Lot No. 6361 ("the said premises"), comprised in a written Tenancy Agreement dated the 18th December, 1982 and made between the Prudential Enterprise Limited ("PEL") as Landlord and the said P.H. Shek Limited and Pirest Limited as tenants, and to all others whom it may concern.

 

        We, Messrs. Tai, Ho & Chan, of 12th Floor, Fung House, 19-20 Connaught Road, Central, Hong Kong, solicitors for PEL and Prudential Mall Limited ("PAIL") (who are the assignees from PEL of the said Prudential Centre, including the said premises, and/or who are the successors in title to the said PEL in respect of the said Prudential Centre, including the said premises), HEREBY GIVE YOU NOTICE as follows :-

 

1. By the abovementioned Tenancy Agreement, you, the said Lessees, covenanted, inter alia, as follows :-

 

(a) By Section VI Clause 19 of the Tenancy Agreement you covenanted 'not to assign, underlet, part with the possession of or transfer the said premises or any part thereof or any interest therein, nor permit or suffer any arrangement or transaction whereby any person who is not a party to this Agreement obtains the use, possession, occupation or enjoyment of the said premises or any part thereof irrespective of whether any rental or other consideration is given therefor. The tenancy shall be personal to the Tenant named in this Agreement and without in any way limiting the generality of the foregoing, the following acts and events shall, unless approved in writing by the Landlord, be deemed to be breaches of this clause :-

 

(a) In the case of a tenant which is a partnership, taking in of one or more new partners whether on the death or retirement of an existing partner or otherwise.

 

.............................

 

(c) In the case of a tenant which is a corporation, any take-over, reconstruction, amalgamation, merger, voluntary liquidation or change in the person or persons who owns or own a majority of its voting shares or who otherwise has or have effective control thereof.'

 

2. You have broken or breached the said covenant in one or more of the following ways :-

 

(a) On a date unknown but probably in or about the end of April or the beginning of May 1937, you assigned or underlet or parted with possession of the said premises or any part thereof to Jardine, Matheson & Company Limited ("JMCL") or to a person wholly-owned or controlled by JMCL, or you have permitted or suffered an arrangement or transaction whereby a person who is not a party to the Tenancy Agreement, namely JMCL or a person wholly-owned or controlled by JMCL has obtained the use, possession, occupation or enjoyment of the said premises or any part thereof.

 

(b) In so far as you are a partnership you have on a date,, unknown but probably in or about the end of April or the beginning of May, 1987, taken in a new partner, namely JMCL or a person molly-owned and controlled by JMCL.

 

(c) On a date unknown but probably in or about the end of April or the beginning of May, 1987, you have undergone a take-over, reconstruction, amalgamation, merger or voluntary liquidation by or with JMCL or a person wholly-owned or controlled by JMCL, or there has been a change in the person or persons who owns or own a majority of your voting shares or otherwise has or have effective control thereof, in that the person who now owns a majority of your voting shares or who otherwise has effective control thereof, is JMCL or a person wholly-owned or controlled by JMCL.

 

3. The said breach is incapable of remedy. However, without prejudice to the foregoing, in so far as the said breach may be capable of remedy, we require you to remedy the same sand to make compensation to the said PEL and/or PML in money for such breaches.

 

4. On your failure to comply with this Notice or any part thereof within a reasonable time, it is the intention of the said PEL and/or PML to re-enter upon the said premises and forfeit the said Tenancy Agreement and claim damages for the said breach of covenants.

 

Dated the 4th day of August 1987.

 

Tai, Ho & Chan,

 

Solicitors for the abovenamed PEL & PML"

28. That notice will henceforth be referred to as "the Statutory Notice of 4th August 1987".

29. That was followed on the 6th August 1987 by the service of another notice on the defendants in the followings terms:-

"To : P.H. Shek Limited and Pirest Limited, the tenants of the premises situate and known as ALL THAT PORTION "B" on the 3rd Basement Floor of Prudential Centre, 216-228A Nathan Road, Kowlon, (which Portion is shown for the purpose of identification only on the plan annexed to the Tenancy Agreement as hereinafter referred to and thereon coloured pink) erected on All That piece or parcel of land situate, lying and being at Kowloon, Hong Kong and registered in the Land Office as Kowloon Inland Lot No. 6361 ("the said premises"), comprised in a written Tenancy Agreement dated the 18th December, 1982 and made between the Prudential Enterprise Limited ("PEL") as Landlord and the said P.H. Shek Limited and Pirest Limited as tenants, and to all others whom it may concern.

 

            We, Messrs. Tai, Ho & Chan, of 12th Floor, Fung House, 19-20 Connaught Road, Central, Hong Kong, solicitors for PEL and/or Prudential Mall Limited ("PMLL") (who are the assignees from PEL of the said Prudential Centre, including the said premises, and/or who are the successors in title to the said PEL in respect of the said Prudential Centre, including the said premises), HEREBY GIVE YOU NOTICE as follows :-

 

1. The abovementioned Tenancy Agreement, Section XII Clause 17 provided as follows:-

 

'The Landlord understands that P.H. Shek Ltd. and Pirest Ltd. are the operator of a franchise with the Pizza Hut group headquarters. The Landlord also understands that should such franchise agreement be terminated then P.H. Shek Ltd. and Pirest Ltd. will be required under their franchise agreement to discontinue use of the Piazza Hut style color scheme and will be required to remove all identifying architectural superstructure effectively to distinguish the same from the design under the Pizza Hut registered building design service mark. It is also understood, however, should such franchise be terminated, the Landlord shall have the right to terminate the lease of P.H. Shek Ltd. and Pirest Ltd. upon giving two months' notice in writing.'

 

2. We believe that on a date unknown to PEL and/or PML but probably in or about the end of April or the beginning of May 1987, your franchise with the Pizza Hut group or with the Pizza Hut group headquarters has been terminated and/or transferred to Jardine, Matheson & Company Limited or to a person wholly-owned or controlled by the said company.

 

3. Accordingly acting on behalf of PEL and/or PML we hereby give you 2 months' Notice to terminate your lease in accordance with the said provisions of Section XII Clause 17 of the Tenancy Agreement.

 

4. This Notice is entirely without prejudice to any breach which you have committed todate and/or which are continuing and upon which PEL and/or PML are entitled to rely against you. Further, for the avoidance of any doubt, this Notice is specifically without prejudice to the Notice dated 4th August 1987, sent to you pursuant to Section 58 of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance 1984.

 

Dated the 6th day of August 1987.

 

Tai, He S Chan,

 

Solicitors for the abovenamed PEL & PML"

30. That notice, dated 6th August 1987, will henceforth be referred to as "the Contractual Notice".

31. Next, on 13th August 1987, the defendants were served by the plaintiffs with a notice described as a "NOTICE OF FORFEITURE" in the following terms:-

"NOTICE OF FORFEITURE

 

To : P.H. Shek Limited and Pirest Limited, the tenants of the premises situate and known as ALL THAT PORTION "B" on the 3rd Basement Floor of Prudential Centre, 216-228A Nathan Road, Kowloon, (which Portion is shown for the purpose of identification only on the plan annexed to the Tenancy Agreement as hereinafter referred to and thereon coloured pink) erected on All That piece or parcel of land situate, lying and being at Kowloon, Hong Kong and registered in the Land Office as Kowloon Inland Lot No. 6361 ("the said premises"), comprised in a written Tenancy Agreement dated the 18th December, 1982 and made between the Prudential Enterprise Limited ("PEL") as Landlord and the said P.H. Shek Limited and Pirest Limited as tenants ("the said Tenancy Agreement"), and to all others whom it may concern.

            We, Messrs. Tai, Ho & Chan, of 12th Floor, Fung House, 19-20 Connaught Road, Central, Hong Kong, solicitors for PEL and/or Prudential Mall Limited ("PML") (who are the assignees from PEL of the said Prudential Centre, including the said premises, and/or who are the successors in title to the said PEL in respect of the said Prudential Centre, including the said premises), HEREBY GIVE YOU NOTICE subsequent to the Notice under Section 58 of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance 1984 ("the said Notice") which was served on you on 4th August 1987 that as you have not remedied any breach in paragraph 2 of the said Notice which may be capable of remedy, the said Tenancy Agreement is hereby forfeited.

Dated the 13th day of August 1987

Tai, Ho & Chan

Solicitors for the abovenamed PEL & PML"

32. That will henceforth be referred to as the "Notice of Forfeiture".

33. Lastly, the writ in the present proceedings was filed on behalf of the plaintiff on 14th August 1987. That went to the length of actually pleading the Statutory Notice of 4th August 1987 and the Notice of Forfeiture so that there was no risk of repeating the mistake which sank the Abortive Action. Strictly speaking, a landlord is not required to plead the giving of the notice required by S.58 of the Conveyancing Property Ordinance. All that matters is that the landlord has in fact duly given such a notice. Due compliance by a landlord with S.58 is a condition precedent to bringing an action for re-entry for breach of covenant so that performance of that statutory condition is implied and need not be specifically pleaded. See the Supreme Court Practice (the White Book) 1988, para. 18/7/10-11 and Bullen and Leake (12th Edition), para. 42. Thus, the landlords' pleading of the Statutory Notice of 4th August 1987 and the Notice of Forfeiture was unnecessary, but, on the other hand, it does no harm to the landlords' claim in the present action.

34. The only point of any interest in the relief sought by the present proceedings is that now what the plaintiffs ask for in respect of May 1987 is ''meson profits at the monthly rate of HK$515,000 or such other sum as may be assessed from 1st May 1987 or such other date as this court deems just until the delivery up of vacant possession of the said premises".

(B)    Reasons For Findings Of Fact

35. My findings of primary fact are based on a Statement Of Agreed Facts, undisputed correspondence, and my acceptance of the evidence of Mr Emerson, and Miss Yip Mei Yee, an assistant accountant employed by The Prudential Mall Limited, as witnesses of truth who gave me reliable evidence. My findings of secondary fact are based on common sense inferences.

II.    THE ISSUES

36. Six issues arose for determination. They were as follows:-

(1)Whether either of the plaintifffs was entitled to sue on the covenants contained in Clause (19) of SECTION (VI) of the lease.

(2)Whether the defendants had committed breaches of the covenants contained in Clause (19) of SECTION (VI), namely, whether they had assigned, underlet etc. the suit premises and/or whether, contrary to sub-clause(c) of Clause (19), Pirest Limited had been taken over.

(3)Whether the Notice of Forfeiture of 13th August 1987 was premature because insufficient time to remedy breaches had been allowed by the Statutory Notice of 4th August 1987.

Although this issue arose on the pleadings, Mr Wong, for the defendants, ultimately, for his own purposes, adopted the plaintiffs' contention that if the defendants were guilty of the two alleged breaches of covenant then both breaches of covenant were incapable of remedy. Hence, it was unnecessary for the plaintiffs to allow the defendants any time to remedy such breaches.

(4)Waiver

Paragraph 6 of the defence sought to rely on two instances of waiver.

Firstly, it was alleged that the demand for June's rent, mistakenly sent to the defendants by The Prudential Mall Limited on 23rd May 1987, waived any breach occuring when the lease was assigned, etc. to Jardines on the 30th April 1987. Secondly, it was contended that by claiming rent from the 1st May 1987 to the date of service of the writ in the Abortive Proceedings, and, more particularly, by claiming interim payments of rent and/or mesne profits under the summons taken out in July 1987, the plaintiffs had somehow waived any breach occuring when the tenancy was transferred to Jardines on 30th April 1987.

Although not pleaded, a third instance of alleged waiver was raised before me by Mr Wong for the defendants. This was to the effect that by not returning the defendants' cheque for May rent until the 2nd July 1987, having received that cheque on or about the 5th or 6th May 1987, the plaintiffs had thereby accepted rent from the defendants for May 1987, thus waiving the transfer of tenancy to Jardines on 30th April 1987.

(5)Whether the Contractual Notice of 6th August 1987 prevented the Statutory Notice of 4th August 1987 from bringing about a forfeiture which could be relied on by the plaintiffs in the present proceedings.

(6)If the plaintiffs are otherwise entitled to forfeiture, should the defendants have the benefit of relief from forfeiture?

III.    THE LAW AS APPLIED TO THE ISSUES

(1)Which, if either, of the plaintiffs is entitled to sue?

For the purpose of the proceedings before me only, counsel for the defendants conceded that by virtue of the operation of Section 31 of Conveyancing and Property Ordinance, the 2nd plaintiff, as assignee of the Prudential Centre together with the benefit of the leases, was entitled to sue the defendants for breaches of covenant in the lease. However, he made it clear that the defendants reserved the right to withdraw that concession in the event of this case going on appeal.

No argument was addressed to me on behalf of the plaintiffs in support of the proposition that the 1st plaintiff was still entitled to sue on the covenants in the lease, despite having assigned the lease and its reversion to the 2nd plaintiff.

It is the case for the plaintiffs that the covenants in issue in the present case referred to the subject matter of the lease. In such circumstances, I am satisfied that the 1st plaintiff is no longer entitled to sue on such covenants. Authority for that proposition can be found in Halsbury's Law of England, 4th Edition, Vol. 27, paragraph 389: "Once the original lessor has transferred the reversion, the right to recover rent and to enforce covenants which refer to the subject matter of the lease passes to the transferee, even as against the original lessee, and the transferee alone is then able to sue on the covenants in the lease".

Thus, judgment in the present case could not be in favour of the 1st plaintiff.

(2)Are the defendants in breach of the covenants contained in Clause (19) of SECTION (VI) of the Lease?

The defendants have put the plaintiffs to proof on this.

There can be no doubt that the defendants are well and truly in breach of Clause(19) on the grounds alleged by the plaintiffs. It is an agreed fact that, with effect from 30th April 1987, the 1st defendant transferred the tenancy of the suit premises to Jardines. Such a transfer of tenancy inevitably means that the 1st defendant has brought itself squarely within the prohibitions of Clause (19) against parting with the possession of or transferring the said premises or any part thereof or any interest therein or permitting or suffering any arrangement or transaction whereby any person who was not a party to the lease obtains the use, possession, occupation or enjoyment of the premises or any part thereof.

True, there is nothing to chow that the defendants have, in the technical sense, "assigned" the lease to Jardines. An "assignment" pre-supposes a deed with the necessary formalities, and there was no evidence of that. However, "assigning" is only one of the many ways in which Clause (19) can be broken, so that to claim there is no breach of Clause (19) for lack of an assignment is simply to waste the court's time.

For the defendants to continue putting the plaintiffs to proof about a breach of sub-clause (c) of Clause (19) by virtue of Jardines taking over the 2nd defendant flew in the face of the admitted facts.

(3)Was the forfeiture premature?

As I have already indicated, that issue is no longer live.

(4)Waiver

The outcome of the issue of waiver in the present case is profoundly affected by the answers to two subsidiary questions, namely, (a) whether the absence of a notice under section 58(1) of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance prior to the brining of the Abortive Action means that the service of the writ in that action failed to bring about the usual effect of re-entry on the suit premises, and (b) whether the breach of the part of the covenant prohibiting alienation etc. of the premises inevitably meant that there also must be a breach of the part forbidding any take-over of a corporate party.

37. Had the plaintiffs served the defendants with the requisite notice under section 58(1) of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance before issuing the writ in the Abortive Action, the defendants would have been deprived of any scope for successfully arguing that the demand for June's rent, mistakenly sent by the 2nd plaintiff's staff on the 27th May 1987, waived the breach when the 1st defendant transferred the tenancy of the suit premises to Jardines on the 30th April 1987.

38. There is no doubt from the authorities that the receipt of rent by a landlord after he has served a tenant with a writ for possession, (which has been preceded by the due service of a notice under section 58(1)), does not amount to a waiver of the breaches complained of in the notice. Some of the many cases establishing that proposition are the following:- Doe d. Morecraft v. Meux(1); Jones v. Carter(2); Evans v. Enever(3); Civil Service Co-operative Society v. McGrigor's Trustee(4); and Central Estates (Belgravia) Ltd. v. Woolgar No. 2)(5).

39. The effect, however, of failing to serve that notice is, I think, that the Abortive Action was a nullity from outset. That is a conclusion I arrive at from a series of cases stemming from section the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881 which, for present purposes, is indistinguishable from section 58(1) of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance. Those cases are in Re Riggs, ex parte Lovell(6); Jolly v. Brown(7); Fox v. Jolly(8) and Gates v. W.A. & R.J. Jacobs Ltd.(9).

40. Where a landlord has served his tenant with properly constituted proceedings for possession, the effect in law is that the landlord is deemed irrevocably to have elected' to treat the lease as an end: Sergeant v. Nash Field & Co.(10); and Wheeler v. Keeble (1914) Ltd.(11). That is because service of such proceedings is deemed the equivalent of re-entry on the premises by the landlord. Re-entry, whether deemed or actual, is treated by the law as an unequivocal act by the landlord which can leave the tenant in no doubt that the lease has been irrevocably terminated, so that any subsequent receipt of rent by the landlord will do nothing to revive the lease.

41. Provided the writ had been properly preceded by a notice under S.58(1) of the Conveyance and Property Ordinance, there would still have been an irrevocable re-entry by the landlord, notwithstanding any discontinuance of the proceedings. Authority for that proposition is to be found in Calabar Properties Ltd. v. Seagull Autos Ltd.(12), explaining Moore v. Ullcoats Mining Co. Ltd.(13). Thus, despite the discontinuance of such proceedings, any subsequent receipt of rent by the landlord would not waive the forfeiture.

42. Where, however, the proceedings, as here, are a nullity for lack of a notice under section 58(1) of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance, I fail to see how the court could be Justified in attributing any effect to such proceedings. In particular, the landlord will have no deemed re-entry to rely on for the purpose of showing that rent subsequently demanded and/or accepted will not amount to a waiver of earlier breaches of covenant known to the landlord.

43. By the 27th May 1987, it would be unrealistic to suppose that the plaintiffs did not know about the breach committed by the 1st defendant on the 30th April 1987 when the tenancy of the suit premises was transferred to Jardines. There had been the announcement in the Government Gazette of 8th May 1987 about that transfer. It is virtually inconceivable that the plaintiffs would not have known about that notice before the 27th May 1987.

44. Knowing by the 27th May 1987 of that breach of covenant involving the transfer of tenancy, yet on that same day sending a demand to the defendants for the June rant produces the effect in law that the plaintiffs must be treated as having waived the breach committed by the 1st defendant when the tenancy was transferred on 30th April 1987. As part of a policy of leaning against forfeitures, the law adopts what can only be regarded as a highly artificial approach in its treatment of the effect of a demand for rent accruing subsequently to the landlord's knowledge of a breach of covenant. Even if, as in the present case, it must have been abundantly clear to the tenant that the landlord had only issued the demand for rent because of a temporary mistake on the landlord's part, the effect in law, nonetheless, is that the breach is waived. I do not find that a just result, particularly in the present case where the defendants could not have been under any illusion that the plaintiffs might suddenly have relented in their efforts to kick the defendants out, but, on the view I take of the authorities, I am left with no choice. Three relatively modern cases in support of the principle that demand for rent, albeit mistaken, results in waiver in the circumstances I have just described are, Central Estates (Belgravia) Ltd. v. Woolgar (No.2)(5); Blackstone (David) Ltd. v. Burnetts (West End) Ltd.(14); and Expert Clothing Service & Sales Ltd. v. Hillgate House Ltd.(15). Although such a rule can result in injustice in individual cases, there is, at least, the merit of certainty to commend it.

45. A word can be said about the alleged waivers which counsel for the defendants sought to show had arisen even before the 27th May 1987.

46. The defendants sent the plaintiffs a cheque for the May rent on or about the 5th May 1987. Failure by the plaintiffs to return that cheque to the defendants until the 2nd July 1987 amounted to a waiver according to the defendants. At the time the plaintiffs received that cheque, they did not know that the 1st defendant had committed a breach of covenant on the 30th April 1987 by transferring the tenancy to Jardines. As at the time of the receipt of that cheque, the plaintiffs knew that something funny was going on, but did not know what. The only information they had was what appeared in newspaper reports on the 5th May 1987. As at that time, the plaintiffs had their suspicions that the defendants might have committed a breach, but the plaintiffs then had no way of proving anything and lacked sufficient facts to be put to their election: Blackstone (David) Ltd. v. Burnetts (West End) Ltd.(14a); Kammins Ballrooms Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd.(16); Fullers Theatre & Veaudeville Co. v. Rofe(17); and Matthews v. Smallwood(18). Because of the plaintiffs' lack of knowledge until at least after the 8th Nay 1987, when the Hong Kong Gazette notice appeared, the defendants are in no position to prove waiver against the plaintiffs in relation to the non-return of that cheque. (For an analogous situation, see Chrisdell Ltd. v. Johnson(19).)

47. Even if the defendants were able to prove that, at the time when the plaintiffs received the cheque, they knew about the breach of covenant, I do not think that failure to return the cheque could be regarded as a sufficiently unequivocal act to give rise to a waiver. The omission to return the cheque was reasonably consistent with many explanations other than election by the plaintiffs to treat the defendants as their tenants. Had the plaintiffs cashed the cheque or issued the defendants with a receipt for it, the result would have been different, but mere non-return of a cheque, in my view, fell far short of waiver.

48. The fact that the plaintiffs intended to return the cheque to the defendants straight away, but failed to do so because of an oversight does not assist the defendants, in my view. The plaintiffs, in the light of their knowledge at the time, were intending to return the cheque to the defendants as the result of ultra-caution on the part of the plaintiffs, rather than because they knew of a breach. The plaintiffs did not want to run the slightest risk that any action inaction on their part might result in the lease continuing any longer than necessary.

49. Although, for reasons I have already given, I regard the Abortive Action as a nullity, I think it was at least good for the purpose of disabusing the defendants of any notion that the plaintiffs were hanging on to their cheque because the plaintiffs wanted the defendants as their tenants.

50. Yet a further reason exists why failure to return the cheque does not give rise to a waiver. Even if the plaintiffs had accepted the cheque, there would have been no waiver because it related to rent which had accrued due before the plaintiffs knew of any breach of covenant. The rent under the lease, it will be recalled, was payable monthly in advance on the first day of each month. Thus, on the 1st May 1987, the full rent for May accrued due to the plaintiffs as a debt due and owing. Because the plaintiffs subsequently got to know of a breach occuring on the 30th April 1987 would not mean that by accepting the debt due and owing to them before they knew of the breach, they somehow waived the breach. Authority for the proposition that a landlord who, after learning of a breach, receives rent which has accrued prior to his knowing of the breach, will not have waived, are as follows: Green's Case(20); Marsh v. Curteys(21); Price v. Worwood(22); Ellis v. Rowbotham(23); Civil Service Cooperative Society v. McGrigor's Trustees(4), a case involving a forfeiture brought about by bankruptcy, where Russell, J. at page 357, said :-

"There remains for consideration the point as to waiver. The facts are these. [His Lordship stated the facts relating to the demand for and acceptance of the rent and continued:] This amounts to a demand by the plaintiffs (with knowledge of the bankruptcy) for rent (accrued in part before the bankruptcy, in part between the bankruptcy and the writ, and in part subsequent to the writ), followed by payment and acceptance. Does this operate as a waiver of the forfeiture? Upon a consideration of the authorities I am of opinion that it does not."

and Canas Property Co. Ltd. v. K. L. Television Services Ltd.(24), where, at page 442, Lord Denning observed :

"The lease is determined as from the date on which the writ is served. The rent is payable up to the date of service. Mesne profits are payable after the date of service. The writ should be indorsed accordingly. Take an instance when the rent is payable quarterly (for instance on March 25, 1968) and the writ for possession is issued and served during the quarter (for instance, on April 25, 1968). If the rent is payable advance, the writ should claim for the whole quarter's rent due in advance on March 25, 1968: Ellis v. Rowbotham [1900]1 Q.B. 740; and mesne profits from June 24, 1968, to the date of delivery of possession. If the rent is payable in arrear the writ should claim the last quarter's rent due (for example, on March 25, 1968), and then there should be a claim in words for 'rent at the rate of ........ from March 25, 1968, to the date of service of the writ and mesne profits at the rate of ......... from the date of service of the writ till the date of delivery of possession'."

51. The same point about how a landlord does not waive when he claims for rent already accrued prior to his learning of the breach can be made in relation to Mr Wong's contention that by claiming in the statement of claim (as amended) in the Abortive Action for rent from the beginning of May 1987 until service of the writ for rent and thereafter for mesne profits, the plaintiffs had somehow waived the breach involving the transfer of the tenancy to Jardines on the 30th April when they pursued a summons for interim payments under Order 29, rule 12. In my view, there would have been no waiver even if the plaintiffs' summons for interim payment had characterised the payments for the whole of May 1987 as rent, since such rent had already accrued due to the plaintiffs on the 1st May 1987, at which stage they did not know of the breaches by the defendants.

52. The statement of claim, as amended, in the Abortive Action claimed rent from the beginning of May until service of the writ. The summons for interim payments followed the same pattern. A claim couched in that way was, if anything, unduly favourable to the defendants. A claim worded in that way would have been appropriate if the rent were payable monthly in arrear, rather than in advance. The pleader for the plaintiffs would have been wholly within his rights to state from the outset that he was claiming rent for the whole of May. In doing that, he would only have been actin in conformity with the law, as laid down Canas Property Co. Ltd. v. K.L. Television Services Ltd.(24).

53. By adopting the formulation to be found in the various versions of the Statement of Claim in the Abortive Action and in the consequential clam for interim payments, the landlords did not, in my opinion, raise the slightest suggestion of waiver.

54. The upshot of what I have said so far is that I regard the breach by the 1st defendant in transferring the tenancy to Jardines on the 30th April 1987 as waived by the 2nd plaintiff's demand on 23rd May 1987 for the June rent.

55. The plaintiffs say they have a second string to their bow. Even if they are found to have waived the breach which occurred on the 30th April 1987 when Jardines received the transfer of the tenancy from the 1st defendant, they contend there was another operative breach on the 4th July 1987 when Jardines took over the 2nd defendant.

56. In reply to that, the defendants sought to argue that the take-over of the 2nd defendant by Jardines was all part of the same transaction as the transfer of the tenancy by the 1st defendant to Jardines, with the result that if the breach involved in the transfer of tenancy was waived, the breach arising from the take-over should likewise be waived. The defendants contended that the case of Downie v. Turner(25) supported the proposition they were arguing for.

57. However, a scrutiny of Downie v. Turner reveals that it is merely authority for the principle that, where the breach of one covenant (in that case, not to underlet) necessarily involved breach of another covenant (in that case, to use the premises as a single dwelling house), waiver of a breach of the first covenant necessarily waived the breach of the second covenant.

58. In the case before me, waiver of a breach of the covenant not to part with possession of the tenancy by no process of logic necessarily waives a breach of the covenant against the defendants being taken over. A landlord with a covenant in the form of Clause (19) of Section VI might not be too worried about the tenancy being transferred, so long as he knew that he could still look to the original corporate tenant, owned by people of whom he approved, for performance of the covenants. However, if the ownership of the original corporate tenant changed, the landlord might find his position prejudiced. The new owners of the corporate lessee might be in some way undesirable and not the type of people with whom the landlord would choose to do business. In the face of sub-clause (c) of Clause 19, I do not think the landlord can have new owners of the 2nd defendant foisted upon him unless he chooses to accept them.

59. It makes no difference to the interpretation of Clause (19) that, as events have turned down, the new owners of the 2nd defendant happen to be a highly reputable company like Jardines. If the landlords do not want to continue with the 2nd defendant as tenant under the ownership of Jardines, that is the privilege of the landlords: that is why sub-clause (c) of Clause 19 is there. I do not see how the landlords could have expressed themselves more clearly, and so long as the doctrine of sanctity of contract continues to operate in this territory (except in so far as it is modified by the doctrine of relief against forfeiture), I do not see how the landlords can be denied the protection which sub-clause (c) of Clause 19 explicitly gives them.

60. No doubt, counsel for the defendants is correct when he says that the transfer of the tenancy and the take-over of the 2nd defendant are all part of the same transaction, but such an observation is neither here nor there. The correct question to ask, in my opinion, is whether the transfer of the tenancy necessarily entails a change in the ownership of the 2nd defendant. The answer is obviously, 'No'.

61. In sum, I hold that the waiver on the 27th May 1987, arising from the landlord's demand for June's rent, does not extend to the breach occurring on the 4th July 1987 when the defendants allowed the 2nd defendant to be taken over.

62. One further matter can conveniently be dealt with at this point in relation to the breach occurring on the 4th July 1987. Counsel for the defendants contended that the Statutory Notice dated 4th August 1987 did not embrace the breach of the 4th July 1987 because, in effect, it made no reference to the 4th July 1987. What the Statutory Notice dated 4th August 1987 said was:-

"2.         You have broken or breached the said covenant in one or more of the following ways :-

 

................................

 

(c)On a date unknown but probably in or about the end of April or the beginning of May, 1907, you have undergone a take-over.........."

That notice to my mind sufficiently identified the breach arising from the take-over. At the time of serving the Statutory Notice dated 4th August 1987, the plaintiffs were not aware of the actual date of the take-over. The defendants did not tell them, and the plaintiffs had no means of knowing the correct date until after Discovery in the present action. In such circumstances, the plaintiffs did all that could reasonably be expected of them to identify the breach, and it is inconceivable that the defendants did not know that it was the breach of 4th July 1987 which was being referred to in paragraph 2(c) of the Statutory Notice dated 4th August 1987.

(5)

The effect of the Contractual Notice dated 6th August 1987 on the Statutory Notice dated 4th August 1987.

63. It will be remembered that whereas the Statutory Notice dated 4th August 1987 was to the effect that the landlords intended within a reasonable time to re-enter upon the suit premises and forfeit the lease for breaches of the covenant against parting with possession or being taken over, the Contractual Notice served two days later purported to give the defendants two months notice to quit pursuant to clause (17) of Section (XII) of the lease but went on to state that such notice to quit was without prejudice to any breaches that the defendants had committed to date, and, in particular, was specifically without prejudice to the Statutory Notice dated 4th August 1987.

64. The first contention by counsel for the defendants about that Contractual Notice, if I understood him correctly, was that it amounted to an election by the plaintiffs to affirm the continuation of the lease for a further two months, the Statutory Notice dated 4th August 1987 being thereby superceded.

65. As I understand the law, the defendants will be entitled to succeed on their contention if, objectively speaking, the Contractual Notice should be regarded by the court as amounting to an unequivocal election by the plaintiffs to affirm the continued existence of the lease. No matter what the real intention of the plaintiffs was in serving that Contractual Notice, and despite any knowledge on the defendants' part that the plaintiffs intended to re-enter upon the suit premises for breach of covenant, the duty of the court is to construe the Contractual Notice objectively. Although the court must construe the Contractual Notice objectively, that in no way means that the court has to close its eyes to all the surrounding circumstances in arriving at its decision on whether the plaintiffs can be said to have elected to affirm the lease through the Contractual Notice.

66. The court's approach to the issue of election in a situation like the one presently under consideration is to be contrasted with the position where the court is called upon to consider whether the demand and/or acceptance of rent by a landlord with knowledge of a breach of covenant amounts to an election. The situation of a landlord demanding or accepting rent when knowing about a breach of covenant is treated by the law as a special category of case where the landlord will be deemed to have waived the breach. In that special category of case, it will avail the landlord nothing to demand or accept the rent under protest by adding, for example, such words as "without prejudice to the landlord's rights in respect of the breach". That the cases involving the demand or acceptance of rent fall into a special category is made clear by Expert Clothing Service and Sales Ltd. v. Hillgate House(15). That case also makes clear that in other types of situation the court is free to look at all of the circumstances to see whether, on "any fair objective consideration" (361D), the landlord's acts should be regarded as an unequivocal election to continue with the lease. The concept of what is meant by an unequivocal ac t received attention in Peyman v. Lanjani(26), where, at page 499, Lord Justice Slade cited the following well known: passage from the speech of Lord Blackburn in Scarf v. Jardine(27), with approval:

".............. and whether he intended it or not, if he has done an unequivocal act - I mean an act which would be justifiable if he had elected one way and would not be justifiable if he had elected the other way - the fact of his having done that unequivocal act to the knowledge of the persons concerned is an election."

67. On the topic of Election generally, a useful discussion is to be found in Chapter XIII of Spencer Bower and Turner's Estoppel By Representation (Third Edition).

68. When dealing with situations that do not involve the demand or acceptance of tent, the Court is entitled to give proper weight to attempts at disclaimer of election by landlords who use such terminology as "without prejudice to any breach ..............". An example of how a landlord can resort to a "without prejudice" formula, without immediately committing himself to an election, can be found in the pleadings in the case of Calabar Properties Limited v. Seagull Autos Limited(12a), There, in the Statememt of Claim, the landlord claimed possession, but also, "without prejudice", claimed injunctions from the tenant. The tenant there took the point that, in asking for injunctions, the landlord must have impliedly affirmed the continuations of the lease. The Court rejected that argument, holding that the landlord's claim for injunctions was put forward as an alternative in such a way as not to prejudice the claim for possession. Thus, the option still remained open to the landlord as to whether he would elect to pursue the claim for possession or the claim for the injunctions.

69. In the case before me, I would regard it as perverse to treat the Contractual Notice as amounting to an unequivocal election by the plaintiffs to keep the lease on foot. The Contractual Notice is no more than an alternative or contingent claim that the lease should determine by notice to quit in the eventuality of the Statutory Notice of 4th August 1987 not being effective to bring about a forfeiture. By that Contractual Notice, the plaintiffs were doing no more than keeping their options open, a course which I regard as unobjectionable. Making reference to maxims such as "blowing hot and cold", or "having their cake and eating it" to support the tenant's position, or "wearing both a belt and braces" in support of the landlord's position, does little to clarify the real issues.

70. In my view, the combined effect of the Statutory Notice of 4th August, the Contractual Notice of 6th August, the Notice of Forfeiture of 13th August, and the writ in the present proceedings issued on the 14th August and served shortly thereafter, is that the plaintiffs have unequivocally demonstrated their resolve to re-enter the suit premises for the forfeiture arising, from the defendants' breach of covenant.

71. A case was relied on by counsel for the defendants to show that a notice to quit can amount to an affirmation of a tenancy. That case was Marche v. Christadoulakis(28). The only similarity between that case and the present case is that in both of them there was a notice to quit. However, in the Marche v. Christadoulakis case there was no suggestion of the notice to quit being without prejudice to the landlord's enforcing his right to re-enter for a forfeiture. The landlord there simply made a straight forward and unequivocal election to terminate the tenancy by a notice to quit. In the circumstances of that case, his action brought about the unfortunate consequence for him, under the rent restriction legislation in force in England, of recognising the continuation of the tenancy, with the result that a sub-tenant was able to claim the protection of that legislation.

72. An alternative argument put forward on behalf of the defendants was to the effect that somehow the Statutory Notice dated 4th August 1987 would not take effect till 6th October 1987, because of the service of the Contractual Notice giving two months notice to quit from the 6th August 1987. I was not able to follow that argument, and have nothing to say about it.

73. I refrain from making any observations on the effectiveness of the Contractual Notice of 6th August 1987 in the event of it turning out that I am wrong in my view that the service of the writ in the present proceedings successfully effected a re-entry by the landlords to the suit premises for breach of covenant.

(6)      Relief against forfeiture

74. Clearly, by virtue of section 58(2) of the Conveyancing and Property Ordinance, discretionary power is vested in the court to grant the defendants relief against forfeiture if the court deems the circumstances appropriate. In exercising that discretion, I have to pay "regard to the proceedings and conduct of the parties under the foregoing provisions of this section and to all the other circumstances ............."

75. As early as the 25th March 1987, Mr Lee for the landlords, made it abundantly clear to Miss Diana Shek for the tenants that the landlords would not consent to any change in the ownership of the tenants. That stance of the landlords was emphasised to the tenants again, in writing, on the 15th April 1987, the 29th April 1987, and the 2nd May 1987.

76. Despite the landlords' continuous refusal of consent to a take-over, the tenants blithely went ahead with the take-over of Pirest Limited by Jardines on the 4th July 1987.

77. The obvious motive of the owners of Pirest Limited in allowing it to be taken over was to make "A whole mint of-money" for themselves. Is this the type of situation where Equity should intervene to protect the tenant? I do not think it is. The plaintiffs are, I feel, entitled in this context to pray in aid the words of Lord Wilberforce in Shiloh Spinners Limited v. Harding(29):

"Established and in my opinion sound principle requires that wilful breaches should not, or at least should only in exceptional cases, be relieved against, if only for the reason that the lessor should not be compelled to remain in a relation of neighbourhood with a person in deliberate breach of his obligations."

78. I think the observation in Tulapam Properties Limited v. De Almeida(30) to the following effect is correct: "Relief from forfeiture is in the nature of being an equitable relief, and he who comes to equity must come with clean hands". A corporate tenant, whose owners have caused it deliberately to break a covenant so as to enrich themselves, must expect a frosty reception from equity.

79. The only point which can be made in favour of Pirest Limited is that there now stand behind it the vast resources of Jardines, so that there can never be any question of the tenant not being good for the rent or not being able to afford to comply with any other covenants which require the expenditure of money. Equity, as I understand her, is fair but stern. She is not impressed when told how wealthy a litigant is. Equity does not have one standard for the wealthy, yet another for the not so wealthy. If a wealthy litigant flagrantly disregards a covenant in a lease in the way the defendants have here, Equity will withhold her assistance.

80. Thus, the defendants are not entitled to relief against forfeiture.

IV.    CONCLUSION

81. In view of the foregoing, I give judgment against both defendants in favour of the 2nd plaintiff for possession of the suit premises.

82. From the outset, it was agreed all round that I should only concern myself with the issue of liability, and that the issues of quantum of damages, mesne profits and the other items of relief particularised under paragraph 10 of the amended statement of claim should meanwhile stand adjourned. I now direct that the 2nd plaintiff is at liberty to have a date fixed by the Clerk of Court for the hearing of those issues of quantum (unless such issues can be agreed out of court between the parties).

83. This being a reserved judgment under Order 42, rule 5, I make an order nisi that costs are to follow the event.

(J.J. Rhind)

Judge of the High Court

(1)     [1824]1 C. & P. 346

(2)     [1846]15 M. & W. 718

(3)     [1920]2 K.B. 315

(4)     [1923]2 Ch. 347

(5)     [1972]1 W.L.R. 1048

(6)     [1901]2 K.B. 16 (in particular, at p. 20)

(7)     [1914]2 K.B. 109 (in particular, at p. 120)

(8)     [1916]1 A.C. 1 (in particular at pp. 8, 14, 17, 18, 19 and 21)

(9)     [1920]1 Ch. 567 (in particular at p. 569)

(10)    [1903]2 K.B. 305

(11)    [1920]1 Ch. 57

(12)    [1969]1 Ch. 451, 454

(12a)    [1969] 1 Ch. 451, 452

(13)    [1908]1 Ch. 575

(14)    [1973]1 W.L.R. 1487

(14a)    [1973]1 W.L.R. 1487, 1496 and 1498

(15)    [1986]1 Ch. 340

(16)    [1971] A.C. 850, 883

(17)    [19231 A.C. 435

(18)    [1910]1 Ch. 777

(19)    [1987]2 E.G.L.R. 123

(20)    [1582] Cro. Eliz 3

(21)    [1596] Cro. Eliz. 528

(22)    [1859]4 H. & N. 512

(23)    [1900]1 Q.B. 740

(24)    [1970]2 Q.B. 433

(25)    [1951]2 K.B. 112

(26)    [1985] Ch. 457

(27)    7 App. Case 345, 360 - 361

(28)    (1948) Times Law Reports 466

(29)    [1973] A.C. 691 at p. 725

(30)    [1981] E.G.L.R. 919, 920

Representation:

Mr John Swaine, Q.C., with Mr Geoffrey Ma (instructed by M/S Tai, Ho & Chan) for the Plaintiffs

Mr Ronny Wong (instructed by M/S Deacons) for the Defendants