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R v. WU CHUN-PIU

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3677-EN-1996-07-25

R v. WU CHUN PIU

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CACC000038/1991

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

1991, No. 38
(Criminal)

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H E A D N O T E

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Criminal law - "Admissions of guilt" made in the course of counsel's speech in mitigation after trial - The need for counsel to make clear his client's intention to "gainsay and set at naught" the original plea of not guilty - Observations of Privy Council in Wu Chun Piu v. The Queen [1996]2 HKC 165 followed.

In allowing the appeal the Court of Appeal refused to order a re-trial.

Observations by Court of Appeal on "expressions of remorse" made to Probate Officers and through the mouth of counsel. "Remorse is meaningless without acceptance of full criminal responsibility."

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

1991, No. 38
(Criminal)

BETWEEN
THE QUEEN
AND
WU CHUN PIU

 

----------------

 

Coram : Hon Yang, C.J., Nazareth, V.-P. & Litton, V.-P.

Date of hearing : 25 July 1996

Date of judgment : 25 July 1996

Date of handing down reasons for judgment: 9 August 1996

 

----------------------

J U D G M E N T

----------------------

Hon Yang, C.J.:

1. By an admission made on behalf of the Crown, we allowed Wu Chun Piu's ("Wu") application for leave to appeal against conviction and allowed the appeal. We accordingly quashed his conviction and set aside the sentences. We are therefore concerned with the question of retrial only.

2. On 14 December 1990, Wu was convicted by a jury after trial of one count of robbery and one count of possession of a real firearm or an imitation firearm while committing a robbery. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 14 years on the robbery count and six years on the firearm count.

3. Wu sought to appeal against his conviction out of time. By Ground 2 of his Grounds of Appeal, Wu submitted:

"That the learned judge failed to direct the Jury upon special weaknesses in the identification evidence, namely whether the identifying police officers had 'colluded with each other about the case and about the identifying features and had told lies about so doing'."

4. On 1 July 1993 the Court of Appeal dismissed his application for leave to appeal against his conviction out of time.

5. The Court of Appeal took the view that his counsel at trial not only accepted the verdict of the jury he was also prepared to accept the truth of Wu's admissions of guilt made to the Probation Officer. He in effect asked the trial judge to sentence upon the basis of those admissions.

6. In conclusion, the Court of Appeal said:

" We are satisfied that the applicant admitted, through his counsel, that he had committed the offence and that we are entitled to take that admission into account when considering whether there has been any miscarriage of justice. We are satisfied that, although the point raised in his appeal might have been decided in his favour, no miscarriage of justice has occurred. In the circumstances, we are satisfied that the proper course is to refuse the application for leave to appeal against conviction out of time."

7. The matter then went to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council with special leave. The opinion of their Lordships: [1996] 2 HKC 165, delivered on 14 May 1996, was (at 174):

" However if that which was said in mitigation by Mr. Iu on the appellant's behalf when he was brought up for sentence is to be held against the appellant to the extent contended for and indeed upheld by the Court of Appeal, then defendants and their counsel mitigating on their behalf after a jury's verdict are in a difficulty."

8. They said in conclusion:

" In their Lordships' view, at least in the present case, one must ask how one should realistically interpret counsel's remarks in mitigation. Was he intending to gainsay and set at naught his client's original plea? Or was he bound in the circumstances to accept the jury's verdict and do what he could from that starting point to mitigate the consequences. In their Lordships' view, in this case at least, the latter is the realistic approach and it would be unjust to attribute to the appellant from counsel's mitigation an admission that he had in fact committed the offence which he had only very recently been contending against.

In the result the Board is respectfully of the view that the Court of Appeal were wrong to dismiss the appellant's application for the reason that they gave for doing so. Their Lordships will humbly advise Her Majesty that this appeal should be allowed, that leave to appeal out of time should be granted and that the case should be remitted to the Court of Appeal of Hong Kong for further consideration in the light of their Lordships' judgment."

9. The case having been remitted to this Court, the Crown argue that it is appropriate for us to order a retrial of Wu.

10. It is convenient here to note that their Lordships were dealing with the facts in the present case and therefore not stating a general principle. R. v. Turner (1975) 61 Cr. App. R. 67 is still good law. There Lawton LJ said (at 82):

"Whenever a barrister comes into Court in robes and in the presence of his client tells the judge that he appears for that client, the court is entitled to assume, and always does assume, that he has his client's authority to conduct the case and to say on the client's behalf whatever in his professional discretion he thinks is in his client's interest to say. If the Court could not make this assumption, the administration of justice would become very difficult indeed."

11. Mr Cross QC submits on behalf of the Crown that had the Judicial Committee not considered the issue of retrial to be a live issue they would have simply quashed the convictions and not remitted the case to this Court "for further consideration".

12. At the retrial, the Crown would seek to adduce evidence that Wu has admitted the offences on three occasions, namely:

(a) In writing, in his homemade grounds of appeal against sentence;

(b) Orally, to the probation officer;

(c) Through counsel, acting as his spokesman.

13. Wu has been detained in custody for some six and a half years.

14. Wu's counsel, Mr Oderberg, made the following points in opposition to a retrial.

15. It is firstly urged that the offences were committed on 27 February 1990 and that Wu had been in custody for some six and a half years for a 14-year sentence: vide R. v. Saunders (1974) 58 Cr. App. R. 248 at 255 (final paragraph on the page) concerning the experience of the English Court of Appeal at that time.

16. The second argument is that it would be unjust to act on admission (c) above and admissions (a) and (b) above were not specifically dealt with by the Judicial Committee because the Crown did not rely on them to show that there had been no miscarriage of justice. And these two admissions are tainted in precisely the same way as admission (c).

17. Thirdly, it is pointed out that this Court in the appeal of Yu Sze Ming (Wu's co-accused) upheld his ground of appeal which was similar to Wu's Ground 2 (see above) and ruled that the evidence of identification by the police officers should have been the subject of a fuller direction. On Yu's retrial, he was acquitted: The Queen v. Yu Sze Ming, Crim.App.No. 38 of 1991.

18. Fourthly, none of the items of evidence which the Crown may rely on, whether taken singly or cumulatively, amount to sufficient evidence to give rise to a prosecution upon which a jury could properly convict given the unsatisfactory state of the identification evidence. The items of evidence which the Crown may rely on as being over and above the evidence of identification are as follows:

(i) That the Appellant was seen by the identifying officers to have an injured right hand at the time of the offences and was found to have an injured right hand some weeks later at the time of his arrest,

(ii) That he was a friend of another accused and had been with him the evening before the alleged offences and,

(iii) Had then seen a box containing inter alia two knives which fitted the description of knives used in the commission of the offence.

19. Mr Oderberg therefore submits that these items of evidence are, at best, circumstantial and tenuous, and in all the circumstances the ends of justice would not be served or enhanced by a retrial.

20. In arriving at our judgment, we should acknowledge the assistance we received from both Mr Cross for the Crown and Mr Oderberg for the appellant Wu. We are particularly indebted to them for their written arguments.

21. Returning now to the three so-called admissions of guilt relied on by Mr Cross (see above), we are of the view that none of them can now assist the prosecution.

22. By an affirmation made after the date of his homemade grounds of appeal against sentence, Wu resiled from his statement to the effect that he was deceived by the first accused into committing the crime of armed robbery. In his affirmation, he affirmed that he only admitted the offences with which he was charged because he was told by fellow prisoners that he ought to make the admission in his grounds of appeal against sentence in order to show remorse. A jury might well entertain a reasonable doubt as to the truthfulness of his admission of guilt.

23. The second admission was alleged to have been made orally by Wu to the probation officer during an interview. In the probation officer's report (made after conviction but before sentence), Wu was said to have "frankly" admitted that he was involved. He gave the reason for committing the crime as follows: because he and Yu Sze Ming had betted heavily on horse-racing and lost and were forced to repay $110,000 within two days. The probation officer has left the service in 1993 and is now residing in Australia. There is nothing to indicate whether she still retains a clear recollection of the interview, or whether the interview was tape recorded, or whether there were contemporaneous notes kept. The weight of the officer's evidence (if available at all) after such a lapse of time will be questionable.

24. Respecting the alleged admission made through defence counsel in mitigation, their Lordships in the Judicial Committee have made clear their views in the passages cited above, i.e. the realistic approach is that defence counsel was simply accepting the jury's verdict and did not make an admission of guilt on Wu's behalf.

25. In our judgment, the Crown can derive little comfort from any of the three so-called admissions.

26. As to the three factual matters relied on by the Crown in their application for a retrial, namely, (i) Wu's injured right hand, (ii) his association with another accused on the evening before the alleged offences and (iii) the finding of the knives, these by themselves are not in our view sufficiently cogent as to entitle the jury to find Wu guilty.

27. For the reasons given above, we refused to order a retrial.

28. Before we leave the matter, we wish to say a few words about post-conviction "admissions" and "expressions of remorse". Their Lordships have pointed to the context in which the matters ultimately relied upon by the Crown were made.

29. It is not uncommon for a convicted person to make a show of remorse when being interviewed by a probation officer, or in a plea for a lenient sentence. He well knows both conduce to leniency. As defence counsel may unwittingly make what appear to be an admission of guilt on behalf of the convicted person when making his plea in mitigation, so the accused may conduct himself in a similar way in appearing in person or in front of the probation officer.

30. We think therefore that use of such post-conviction "admissions" should only be relied upon with caution and only where a court addresses that risk and is satisfied that there is a genuine admission of the offence with acceptance of the verdict.

31. If counsel has in fact received firm instructions to the effect that the accused now accepts full responsibility for the crime, and admits having taken part in the manner averred by the prosecution, this should be stated clearly and unequivocally. Remorse is meaningless without acceptance of full criminal responsibility.

32. In this case counsel said to the judge in mitigation:

"Also my Lord, apparent from the probation officer's report is some sort of remorse on his part since the conviction. He gave to the probation officer the reason why he committed the robbery now, namely that he was in debt, in a gambling situation, that the robbery was committed really to get some money to repay the gambling debt ....."

33. This should never have been taken by the judge as expression of remorse which weighed in the sentencing scales. So-called remorse expressed in front of a probation officer which the accused is not prepared to repeat in court before the judge is meaningless.

34. Where counsel, in mitigation, confines himself to the circumstances of the crime as emerged in the course of the evidence in court, the judge will, of course, sentence the accused according to the degree of his criminal participation: in this regard "remorse" plays no part.

35. Hopefully by exercise of such caution, the kind of problem which has arisen in the present case may be avoided.

( T L Yang )( G P Nazareth )( Henry Litton )
Chief JusticeVice PresidentVice President

Representation:

Mr K Oderberg (D.L.A.) for Appellant

Mr I G Cross QC and Mr Wesley Wong of the Attorney General's Chambers for Crown/Respondent

39480-EN-1993-04-27

R v. WU CHUN-PIU

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CACC000038A/1991

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

1991 No. 38
(Criminal)

HEADNOTE

Attitude of Court of Appeal on appeal against conviction to admissions of guilty involvement made by counsel when mitigating after a finding of guilt.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

1991 No. 38
(Criminal)

____________

THE QUEEN
and
(D2) WU CHUN-PIU

____________

Coram: Hon. Silke, V.-P., Power V.-P., & Nazareth, J.A.

Dates of hearing: 21 January & 27 April 1993

Date of judgment: 27 April 1993

Date of handing down judgment: 1 July 1993

 

_______________

J U D G M E N T

_______________

Power, J.A.:

1. This is the judgment of the Court.

2. The applicant faced a charge that he, together with two other named persons, on 27th February 1990, at the Kam Doa Night Club at 28B, first floor, Bute Street, Kowloon, robbed CHEUNG Ying-sze of cash $200 and an "Omega" wristwatch and WONG Koon-bo of cash $17,300 , a "Citizen" wristwatch and a cheque book. The three defendants also faced a charge that at that time and place they had in their possession a real or imitation firearm while committing a robbery. He was found guilty after trial in the High Court before Deputy Judge Leonard, as he then was, and a jury, and sentenced to imprisonment for fourteen years on the first charge and six years on the second charge, and the sentences were order to be served concurrently. He now seeks leave to appeal against his conviction out of time.

3. The applicant was the 2nd defendant at trial. The 3rd defendant appealed against his conviction (Cr. App. No.38 of 1991). This appeal was heard on 7th May 1992 by a court consisting of Power, J.A., Macdougall J.A. and Bokhary J. On 15th May 1992, in a reserved judgment, the court upheld that appeal. The ground upon which the applicant succeeded was Ground 2 of his Notice of Appeal which is identical with Ground 2 in the present application. The relevant part of that ground reads as follows:

"2. That the learned judge failed to direct the Jury upon special weaknesses in the identification evidence, namely whether the identifying police officers had `colluded with each other about the case and about the identifying features and had told lies about so doing'."

The identification parade which concerned the court in that appeal had been held on 14th March 1991 and PCs 3605, 17224 and 46865 identified the 3rd defendant. In the present application we are concerned with an identification parade on 2nd March at which the same three police officers identified the applicant. As to the parade held on 14th March PC 3605 had said in evidence that prior to the parade the three officers discussed "about the clothing he (D3) was wearing and whether one could recognize him again if one saw him again". The other two officers denied having had any conversation of that sort about D3. When summing-up the trial judge said:

"Before the identification parade on the 2nd March, there was evidence that all three officers were waiting in the same room, but 17224 said that they did not discuss the matter, and, likewise, they were in the same room before the identification parade on 14th March, but again, the only discussion that took place, according to 17224, was a discussion as to the reason why they had not yet received their commendation for their work in this case.

46865 agreed that at the time of making the first statement they had discussed what each of them had seen and done that day. On the first identity parade there was no discussion about the case, and on the second identification parade there was no discussion about the case, but the question of the missing commendation came up again. He told you that this is his first big case, his first appearance in the High Court.

The keenness of these young constables has also been the subject of some comment as to whether, in their keenness to get a good result in this case, and perhaps to get a commendation, they may be convincing themselves about matters which may not really be correct. It's a matter, members of the jury, for you to decide."

4. In its judgment upholding the appeal, the court said:

"This matter turned upon acceptance by the jury of the identification parade evidence given by the police officers. It was the defence that the evidence was suspect not only because of the conditions existing at the time when the observations were made but also because the police officers had made their identifications after having put their heads together. The defence suggested, inter alia, that the police officers were not worthy of credit on this vital issue because they had failed to give frank and truthful evidence about their conversations immediately before making the identifications. This was, of course, a matter for the jury, but it was essential in our view that the judge direct them evenhandedly as to the evidence relevant to this issue.

As can be seen, the judge when dealing with the evidence of PC 3605, who said there had been some discussion about identification prior to the parade on 14th March, made no mention of this. However he did outline the evidence of PC 17224 and PC 46865 in which they denied that there was any discussion about identification. He failed to direct the jury's mind to the evidence which was not only at variance with that to which he did refer but which also, the jury might have taken the view, was of assistance to the defence. The Crown suggest that this omission was cured by reference to the evidence of Chief Inspector Chau in which the Chief Inspector agreed that if there had been any discussion about the culprits by the witnesses waiting their turn to make an identification, it would not be fair. This observation, having been made in the context of a summing-up in which there was a failure to make mention of the one witness who had said that there had been some discussion, in our view, did nothing to alleviate the matter. In the circumstances we do not need to deal with the other two grounds. We are satisfied that this was a fatal flaw in the summing-up and that the conviction must be quashed."

5. It was in consequence of this successful appeal by the 3rd defendant that the applicant made his application to appeal against conviction out of time. When the matter first came before this court on 21st January 1992, Mr. Saw for the Crown opposed the grant of leave referring to the grounds of appeal against sentence which the applicant had filed and abandoned. The applicant was convicted on 14th December 1990 and was sentenced on 8th January 1991. On 18th January 1991 he sought leave to appeal against sentence and filed grounds which he had drafted himself in which he said:

"I was young when the incident in question happened. In fact, I was the youngest among all co-defendants. I was deceived by the 1st defendant into committing the crime of armed robbery. It was a big mistake, but fortunately no one was hurt. Otherwise, the consequence would be more serious.

The 1st defendant, who was the mastermind of the crime, has been given a 9 years sentence while I was sentenced to 14 years. The difference is too large."

The grounds then went on to detail family circumstances which, he suggested, called for a measure of leniency.

On 1st May 1992, six days before his application to appeal against sentence was to be heard, he abandoned that application. On 19th May 1992, four days after the delivery of the judgment in the 3rd defendant's appeal, he wrote a letter which was addressed to the Registrar in which he said:

"The jury, in the Supreme Court on 13 December 1990, returned an unanimous verdict of guilty. As I then had no knowledge of the law, I mistakenly thought that there was no ground for appeal against conviction since the guilty verdict was by an unanimous vote of 7 to 0."

He went on to say that he had learnt from the South China Morning Post that the 3rd defendant's appeal against conviction had been successful and that he was, therefore, seeking leave to appeal against conviction. It is to be noted that nowhere in this letter did he suggest that he had not committed the offence. However, on 11th June, he drafted a ground of appeal in which he said: "I had not committed any robbery." and in his affirmation in support of his application for leave to appeal against conviction out of time he said: "Previously I only appealed against the sentence but as I had not committed any robbery I now apply to appeal against conviction out of time."

6. Mr. Saw submitted that leave should not be granted as, in his application for leave to appeal against sentence, the applicant admitted that he had committed the offence. Mr. Saw further argued that there was, in the case of the applicant, further evidence implicating him which was not so in the case of the 3rd defendant whose conviction rested solely upon the identification evidence.

7. Although other grounds were raised in the Notice of Appeal, the ground upon which reliance was placed by Mr. Mackenzie Ross, who appeared for the applicant before us, was the ground upon which the 3rd defendant had succeeded in his appeal. Mr. Mackenzie Ross submitted that if the conviction was wrong on the evidence that had been presented at trial, the applicant was entitled to have it quashed. He submitted also that the applicant was contesting the truth of the admission made by him in his application for leave to appeal against sentence.

8. The matter was adjourned to allow the applicant to file an affidavit as to the making of that admission.

9. On 3rd February 1993, he filed an affidavit from which he said:

"The reason why I wrote down some mitigation factors in my said home made grounds of appeal against sentence, was that on 13th December 1990, I was convicted of the offences by the Jury by a unanimous verdict of 7 to 0 so, I thought that there was no grounds for appealing against the conviction, and then during my jail custody at Pik Uk Prison, some of the prisoners told me that I could appeal against the sentence, and they also told me that on my said grounds of appeal against sentence I should show remorse and in order to do so I should admit the said offences, so the judge will take it in consideration to reduce the sentences. That is why I stated the things about the first defendant and being deceived by him into committing the offences."

He went on finally to say that he was mistakenly "induced to make a false home made grounds of appeal against sentence ...".

10. When the hearing resumed on 27th April 1993, Mr. Mackenzie Ross submitted that whatever he had said in his application for leave to appeal against sentence it would be wrong to use that against him because of the following statement in English and in Chinese characters which appears on the application form:

"It has been fully explained to me that if I appeal against both conviction and sentence at the same time, one will not have any adverse effect on the other."

He went on to submit that, even if the admission might be able to be used against the applicant in a retrial, it would be quite wrong to make any use of it in this appeal as it was not evidence in the trial. He submitted that if this court, having examined the evidence in the trial, was satisfied that the defendant was entitled to have the conviction quashed, then it must quash the conviction.

11. Mr. Saw further submitted that an admission made by counsel was an admission binding the defendant - he referred to Bryan James Turner (1975) 61 C.A.R. 67 and he then drew our attention to the mitigation by counsel then appearing for the applicant made on 8th January 1991 immediately before the trial judge sentenced in which he said:

"My Lord, I would ask you to bear in mind his age. He's still a very young man at the time he committed the offence - aged 20 (19 and 4 months). And the unfortunate thing in this case, my Lord, is that he has been making good progress in the training centre and it can be said, of course, that his chances of rehabilitation appear now genuine.

Also, my Lord, apparent from the probation officer's report, is some sort of remorse on his part since the conviction. He gave to the probation officer the reason why he committed the robbery now, namely that he was in debt, in a gambling debt situation, that the robbery was committed really to get some money to repay the gambling debt.

His situation, my Lord, apparently is a classic example of a young man coming from a broken family, without adequate parental supervision or education or guidance, that he would have gone astray as it were, had associated himself with bad company, got himself into other offences that we have heard, that you have been told about, got himself into heavy debt and then had to, as it were, commit the present robbery, which is rather serious.

My Lord will also bear in mind that in the course of the robbery, very minimal violence was used, and as is evident from the evidence that the defendant and his associates never intended to inflict any bodily harm on anyone, it's money that they were after. You will recall, my Lord, the evidence of the old lady who came here, who said the robbers told her, 'Don't be afraid. We are only after money'., and there was also evidence from the policemen during the confrontation that the defendants said, 'Ah Sir, we are only after money'. It clearly indicated, my Lord, that they never intended to use any undue violence or force on anyone than is required."

12. It is quite clear that the applicant's counsel was, for the purpose of the plea in mitigation, not merely accepting the verdict of the jury but was prepared to accept the truth of the admissions made by the applicant to the Probation Officer and was asking the trial judge to sentence upon the basis of those admissions. This the trial judge did, saying:

"I have taken into account the matters I have already mentioned in his favour as well as the speech and mitigation made on his behalf by Mr. Iu, but I have to say that I do not accept that the fact that the robbery was carried out to raise money to repay a gambling debt can, in any way, be regarded as a mitigating factor."

13. Mr. Saw relied upon these matters rather than upon the admission made in the application for leave to appeal against sentence, the truth of which the applicant had, as has been outlined above, denied. The applicant has, however, never denied that his counsel made the admissions to which Mr. Saw referred or suggested that he was not authorized so to do. Mr. Saw referred to s.83(1) of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance which states that:

"Provided that the Court of Appeal may, notwithstanding that it is of opinion that the point raised in the appeal might be decided in favour of the appellant, dismiss the appeal if it considers that no miscarriage of justice has actually occurred."

Mr. Saw submitted that, given the admissions which the applicant made through his counsel, this court must be satisfied that no miscarriage of justice had occurred. As to his admission made in the application for leave to appeal against sentence, Mr. Saw, although he did not rely upon that admission, submitted that, as the applicant did not appeal against both conviction and sentence at the same time, he was not entitled to the benefit of the "adverse effect" exemption.

We are satisfied that the applicant admitted, through his counsel, that he had committed the offence and that we are entitled to take that admission into account when considering whether there has been any miscarriage of justice. We are satisfied that, although the point raised in his appeal might have been decided in his favour, no miscarriage of justice has occurred. In the circumstances, we are satisfied that the proper course is to refuse the application for leave to appeal against conviction out of time.

(William Silke)(N.P. Power)(G.P. Nazareth)
Vice-PresidentVice-PresidentJustice of Appeal

Representation:

Mr. D.G. Saw (Crown prosecutor) for the respondent.

Mr. David Mackenzie Ross (Messrs. So & Co.) for the applicant.