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Criminal Appeal1992

THE QUEEN v. LAM KWOK KEUNG

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5255-EN-1994-04-13

CHOW KIN LAM v. R.

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CACC000530/1992

1992, No. 530
(Criminal)

H E A D N O T E

Voir dire into admissions made by defendant at interview by ICAC - Defence not given opportunity to dispel adverse impression formed by judge upon listening in private to audio tape of interview - Admissions admitted in evidence - Convictions based on admissions quashed for material irregularity and as being unsafe and unsatisfactory.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

1992, No. 530
(Criminal)

___________

BETWEEN
THE QUEEN
AND
CHOW KIN LAM

___________

 

Coram: Silke VP, Bokhary JA and Saied J

Date of hearing: 13 April 1994

Date of judgment: 13 April 1994

_______________

J U D G M E N T

_______________

 

Bokhary JA (giving the judgment of the Court):

1. This is an application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence. We are now dealing with conviction.

2. On December 3, 1992, before Her Honour Judge Chua in the District Court, the applicant, a man in his late thirties and of previous good character, was convicted on two charges of conspiracy to defraud.

3. Sentence was passed on the 11th of that month. On each charge, the applicant received a concurrent term of three years and ten months' imprisonment.

4. The charges on which the applicant was convicted were the fourth and fifth charges. And, in the circumstances, it is unnecessary to say any more about them than that the scheme in each instance was one by which a bank was defrauded by false credit card transactions.

5. The applicant was arrested by the Independent Commission Against Corruption on October 17, 1991. He was interviewed by officers of the Commission that evening. The interview was conducted in Chinese. Without objection from the defence, the prosecution produced a transcript of that interview, a certified translation into English of that transcript and an audio tape of that interview. No admission was made by the applicant during the interview on October 17, 1991.

6. That interview was not the last encounter between the applicant and officers of the Commission. They said that they also interviewed him on October 18, 1991. And, in respect of that interview, too, they had a Chinese transcript, an English certified translation and an audio tape. Those, however, were objected to by the defence.

7. So a voir dire into their admissibility was held. That voir dire was crucial because the evidence on which the applicant was eventually convicted was what he said at that second interview.

8. According to the officers, the applicant was interviewed in the manner appearing from the second set of transcript, translation and tape.

9. According to the applicant, however, they had forced him - under the threat of being framed as the "mastermind" of the overall scheme - to participate, after two trial runs, in a bogus interview according to a script which they had fashioned.

10. At the conclusion of the voir dire, the judge was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the encounter on October 18, 1991, was a genuine interview and that what the applicant had said at that interview was said freely and voluntarily. So she admitted the relevant transcript, translation and tape in evidence.

11. As was his right, the applicant neither gave nor called evidence on the general issue.

12. Eventually, as we have indicated, the judge convicted on the strength of what the applicant said at the interview on October 18, 1991.

13. In the Amended Perfected Grounds of Appeal against Conviction filed on behalf of the applicant, there are six grounds. After Mr Egan, for the applicant, had addressed us on the fifth ground and before he reverted to certain earlier grounds in order further to develop his arguments on them, we invited Mr Zervos for the Crown to deal with the fifth ground. That ground reads as follows:-

"That there was a material irregularity in the course of the voir dire proceedings in that the learned trial Judge did not allow the audio tape of the contested record of interview to be played in open Court but rather retired to the privacy of her chambers where she alone listed to the tape in circumstances that were and are still unknown to the appellant and/or Counsel."

14. It is certainly a fact that at one stage of the proceedings Mr Egan, who appeared below as he does before us, had invited the judge to listen to the tape in open court. And the judge indicated that she did not need to hear the tape at that stage. Eventually, she listened to it on her own in her room.

15. In her Reasons for Verdict, the judge, referring to the applicant as "D2" since he was the 2nd defendant, said, amongst other things, this:-

"I also listened to both tapes and studied the transcript. Both the interviews were conducted cordially. At no point is D2's allegation he was prompted to say yes to an allegation of conspiracy borne out. In both interviews there are long pauses and non-committal responses by D2. Finally he made no complaint regarding his treatment. I was therefore satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on the evidence that the allegation of oppressive conduct, threat and persuasion by the officers were unfounded and that D2 had given the second interview freely and voluntarily."

16. Now, it seems to us that at least six questions arose:

(1) Was the atmosphere at the interview indeed cordial?

(2) If so, did that support the prosecution's case and undermine the defence's challenge thereto?

(3) If so, to what extent?

(4) Were there indeed long pauses between questions and answers?

(5) If so, did that support the prosecution's case and undermine the defence's challenge thereto?

(6) If so, to what extent?

17. In doing things as she did, the judge had - inadvertently but fatally - deprived herself of the assistance of hearing the defence on those questions. And concomitantly, the defence was deprived of the opportunity of being aware of and addressing her on those matters as ones which were troubling her.

18. Even though she had listened to the tapes in private, if she had come back to open court and put to the defence her anxiety over the cordiality (as she perceived it) of the atmosphere of the interview and what she regarded as long pauses, the harm of the privacy of that course could have been undone. Unfortunately, as things happened, she acted on her anxiety thus generated in private without alerting the defence of the same or giving them an opportunity to allay it.

19. In those circumstances, there has been a material irregularity in the course of the proceedings. Moreover, such irregularity, arising as it did in a voir dire which resulted in the admission of the sole evidence on which the convictions were eventually based, went to the result of the trial so as to render the convictions unsafe and unsatisfactory.

20. Accordingly, we grant leave to appeal, treat the application for leave as the hearing of the appeal, allow the appeal, quash the convictions and set aside the sentences.

(William Silke)(K. Bokhary)(M. Saied)
Vice PresidentJustice of AppealJudge of the High Court

Representation:

Mr K.B. Egan (instructed by Crawford, Miller & Co.) for the applicant

Mr K. Zervos (of the Attorney General's Chambers) for the Crown

72408-EN-1993-08-19

THE QUEEN v. LAM KWOK KEUNG

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

1992 No. 530
(Criminal)

BETWEEN

 

THE QUEEN

and

LAM KWOK KEUNG

-----------------

Coram : Hon. Power V.P., Penlington J.A. & Sears J.

Date of hearing : 19th August 1993

Date of delivery of judgment : 19th August 1993

------------------------

J U D G M E N T 

------------------------

 

Penlington, J.A.:

1. This is an application for leave to appeal against sentence following conviction on a charge under section 76A of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap. 200, the offence having been committed on the 17th October 1991. The maximum sentence for an offence committed contrary to that section was 14 years’ imprisonment.

2. The applicant was found in possession of 18 forged credit cards, 9 pieces of white plastic bearing credit card data, 11 telephone cards, a point of sale credit card terminal and 2 credit card rollers. He pleaded guilty to the offence and taking into account the various matters in mitigation District Judge Chua sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of 4 years. There were two other charges against the applicant of obtaining property by means of forged instruments, namely credit cards. These charges alleged that on the 11th and 14th October 1992 the applicant had fraudulently obtained goods to a total value of $444,000. It is not clear if a plea was entered on those counts but in any event the Crown offered no evidence on them and they were ordered to remain on the court file.

3. It was not brought to the Judge’s attention - and this is by no means the first time this has happened - that by Ordinance No. 49 of 1992 section 76A was repealed and replaced by sections 75 and 76. Section 75 relates to the possession of false instruments (which by definition includes forged credit cards) and section 76 to equipment for making false instruments, such as credit card rollers. Section 75(1) relates to the possession of false instruments with the intention to use them to induce another person to believe they are genuine and carries a maximum sentence of 14 years. Subsection 75(2) is for simply possessing false instruments without such intention and provides a maximum sentence of 3 years.

4. Similarly for an offence under section 76(1) to be proved there must be a finding that the equipment was intended to be used to make a false instrument - such as a credit card payment slip. It carries a maximum sentence of 14 years. Subsection (2) again relates to simple possession of the equipment and the maximum sentence is 3 years’ imprisonment.

5. On the agreed facts here the applicant could have been charged with an offence under both sections 75 and 76 but under subsections (1) of each of them only if the Crown could prove, or the applicant admitted, an intention to use the cards or the instruments for an unlawful purpose. As to whether the applicant here had so admitted is not clear. On the one hand there was a summary of facts which presumably formed the basis upon which sentence was passed in which the applicant is said to have admitted that he had tested the white cards on the POS machine and on the 11th and 14th October 1991 had obtained goods worth $445,000. That admission while it would be strong evidence of an intention to use the cards and other equipment to defraud clearly relates to the charges on which the Crown elected not to proceed and, while the applicant was not acquitted of them, he was not convicted. Presumably because of that Mr. Madigan, for the Crown, conceded here that the maximum sentence was one of 3 years’ imprisonment, under either section 75(2) or 76(2) of the Crimes Ordinance. In the light of the agreed facts that seems to be a generous concession but was presumably on the basis that the Crown had not proceeded with the charges of obtaining property by means of the false credit cards and the Crown could not show that the applicant intended to use the false cards and other equipment in future.

6. This same problem came before the Court in R. v.  Lai Kai Ming, Crim. App. No. 296/92, where Litton J.A. delivered the judgment of the Court and came to the conclusion that where legislation is changed in this manner after the date of the offence but before the date of sentence, the defendant is entitled to be sentenced on the basis of the maximum penalty in force at the time of sentence, not at the time the offence is committed. This is by virtue of Article 12(1) of the Bill of Rights. We therefore must consider this matter on the basis that the appellant should have been sentenced on the basis of a maximum sentence of three years’ imprisonment.

7. It has been argued before us by Mr. Haldane, who appears for the applicant, that in another case of possession of forged credit cards the sentence was reduced to enable the immediate release of a defendant due to this amendment in the legislation but clearly there were factors in mitigation which are certainly not present here. In this case there were admitted facts by which it was clear that the applicant had used these credit cards even if no future such use was intended and that on two occasions substantial sums had been put through the machines although Mr. Haldane informs us and we accept that no loss to the credit card company was in fact incurred. Nevertheless we consider that here the circumstances called for a sentence towards the upper level of the maximum of 3 years. It was not in dispute that the appellant was in possession of not only the credit cards but, as has been pointed out to us by Mr. Madigan who appears for the Crown, of the point of sale machine and 2 credit card rollers.

8. Mr. Haldane has also suggested that the problem involving the use of forged credit cards is not as serious as it was previously when substantial sentences of imprisonment have been imposed. This is not in accordance with what we have been told on another appeal just recently and Mr. Madigan tells us that substantial frauds are still continuing.

9. We consider that the circumstances here call for a sentence of two-and-a-half years. The applicant is entitled to a discount from that due to his plea of guilty, although it was in the face of overwhelming evidence.

10. For those reasons the application is granted, we treat this as a hearing of the appeal and the sentence of four years is reduced to one of two years.

11. Before leaving this case we would express the surprise that despite the fact that the first time this particular problem came before this Court was in January 1993, no attempt seems to have been made to correct what is clearly an anomaly in the law. We accept that credit card forgery is a serious problem and the reputation of Hong Kong is very much at issue in these matters. We consider that the maximum sentence for an offence of this sort of three years is plainly inadequate. We do not consider that on the agreed facts the sentence passed was in any way excessive. It is only because of the amendment to the legislation that we are required to take the course that we have. We only hope this situation does not continue.

           

(N.P. Power)
Vice President

(R.G. Penlington)
Justice of Appeal

(R.A.W. Sears)
Judge of  the  High  Court

Mr. Warwick Haldane (Kwan & Kwan) for applicant

Mr. P.K. Madigan, S.C.C. (Crown Prosecutor) for respondent