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Civil Action1994

鄭秀琴 訴 伍淑賢

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26965-CH-2002-02-05

鄭秀琴 訴 伍淑賢

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HCA009459A/1994

HCA 9459/1994

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

民事訴訟案件編號1994年第9459號

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原告人鄭秀琴為死者伍秀蘭之遺囑執行人
對
被告人伍淑賢

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主審法官 : 高等法院原訟法庭法官關淑馨

審訊日期 : 2002年1月8日至10日,1月16日

判案書日期 : 2002年2月5日

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判案書

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1. 1994年9月22日,原告人鄭秀琴女士,以伍秀蘭女士(下稱“死者”)遺囑執行人的身份,向被告人伍淑賢女士發出傳訊令狀。涉案的物業位於九龍青山道285至287號三樓B室(下稱“涉案物業”或“該物業”),被告人是註冊業主。在第二次修改的申索陳述書,原告人要求法庭作出兩項聲明:

(1) 在所有關鍵的時間,被告人都是以受託人的身份,代死者或死者的遺產受益人持有該物業;

(2) 死者就該物業簽署的買賣合約及轉讓契,兩份文件上的日期都是1992年6月1日,均屬無效。

原告人又要求法庭作出財產的歸屬命令,把該物業轉歸死者的遺產,並且頒布禁制令,禁止被告人在沒有原告人的同意下,出售該物業。原告人並作出交替的追討,假若死者真的以港幣五十萬把該物業售予被告人,要求被告人賠償售價五十萬元正。

2. 本案的背景及無爭議的事實,可敍述如下。

背景

3. 死者並非原告人的生母,由於死者在1970年期間,曾與原告人的生父鄭錫池同居四、五年,直至鄭先生在1974年4月9日逝世,因此死者一向把原告人視作女兒,原告人也稱她為母親。原告人現年六十八歲,她在1952年在內地結婚,育有一子一女,丈夫很久以前去了委內瑞拉工作,雖然在1981年8月兩人在港補辦手續,領取結婚証書,這純粹是為了方便丈夫申請兒子移民,原告人和丈夫一向沒有聯系,她丈夫也沒有供養她。在原告人退休前,她在一家酒樓做傳菜的工作。

4. 被告人年約四十,在1999年8月之前,她在九龍半島酒店一家商店做售貨員,她是死者弟弟的孫女兒,她稱死者為姑婆,死者稱她為姪孫女。死者與鄭先生同居前,和被告人及其家人居住在筲箕灣。被告人未婚,她的家人都已移民美國,被告人在1992至1993年間,也申請往美國定居,她後來取得了綠咭。自從1999年8月沒有當售貨員後,她便沒有再工作。

5. 根據死者的身份証,她的出生日期是1906年5月3日。她在1993年12月27日,在廣華醫院病逝,享年八十七歲。在1992年間,死者在香港較為親近的親人,就只有原告人和被告人。

6. 1963年3月15日,鄭先生購入涉案物業,成為註冊業主。1973年7月12日,鄭先生立下遺囑,委任死者作為遺囑的唯一執行人,並把他一切財產,遺贈死者。1979年5月18日,法庭把遺囑認証發給死者。根據死者向遺產稅署長呈報的明細表,該物業是鄭先生主要的遺產。

7. 1981年6月10日,死者當時七十五歲,她委託律師草擬並簽署了一份遺囑(下稱“第一份遺囑”),委任「她的女兒」原告人作為遺囑執行人,並把她一切的財產遺贈給原告人。當時,原告人是知道死者訂立了第一份遺囑及其內容。據原告人向遺產稅署長申報的明細表,該物業是死者主要具價值的遺產。

8. 1981年10月21日,死者就該物業簽署了一份允許書,以鄭先生遺囑執行人的身份,同意把該物業轉到她本人 - 作為鄭先生的遺產受益人 - 的名下。

9. 死者去世前,直至1993年9月,都在該物業居住。她把該物業其中兩個房間,分租予租客,靠收取租金過活。

10. 1991年12月20日,死者在律師見証下,簽署了一份新的遺囑(下稱“第二份遺囑”),委任林建華作為她的遺囑唯一執行人,並把她所有的財產遺贈給他。林先生在1989至1990年間,是該物業的租客,其後他去了美國。據原告人稱,死者告訴她欲認他作誼子,原告人卻勸死者考慮,她不知道最後死者有沒有這樣做。原告人承認,因為林先生的原故,死者曾對她有點「成見」。

11. 林先生在1991年底,從美國返港,住在該物業。原告人稱,被告人告訴她林先生返港的事。被告人則否認,指稱是原告人告訴她林先生返港。據原告人稱,死者訂立第二份遺囑時,原告人並不知道,原告人是在本案訴訟展開後,才從被告人處獲悉有第二份遺囑。

12. 1992年5月19日,死者和被告人簽署 了兩份由被告人委託的律師所草擬的文件,兩份文件所寫的日期,都是1992年6月1日。一份是該物業的買賣合約,一份是該物業的轉讓契。兩份文件的賣方及買方,是死者和被告人。死者當時八十六歲。

13. 根據買賣合約,死者以港幣五十萬的代價,把該物業賣給被告人,樓價須在簽署合約時或之前由被告人向死者支付。雙方同意在1992年5月19日或之前,簽署轉讓契,屆時死者須以物業空置的情況下,把該物業的管有權交予被告人。見証死者的簽署,是李湘律師行的文員Simon C M Wong,這位黃先生又見証了死者在合約的樓款收據上的簽署。見証被告人的簽署,則是司徒維新律師行的文員溫永明。

14. 根據轉讓契,死者確認收到五十萬元的代價,把該物業轉讓給被告人。死者和被告人的簽署見証者,和買賣合約相同。被告人在本案並無爭議,她並沒有付樓款給死者。被告人在抗辯書指稱,死者把該物業轉讓給她,其實是饋贈,而不是買賣,死者作出饋贈是基於被告人答應照顧和供養死者一生。被告人宣稱,直至死者去世,她都有遵守她的承諾。

15. 被告人承認,該物業轉讓給她不久後,她便負責向死者的租客收租。她宣稱她這樣做,是代死者收租,而收取的租金,她把部份給予死者作日常生活之用。在1992年5月19日,即死者簽署文件把該物業轉讓給被告人的同一天,死者和被告人在廖創興銀行開了個聯名帳戶。被告人稱,死者需要用錢的時候,被告人便作適當的存款,供死者提取。再者,自從1992年8、9月間,被告人便委託明愛中心的家務助理,每週六天送膳食給死者,膳食費由被告人支付,每月約四百元,直至1993年9月,被告人接死者去被告人的住所居住。1993年11月18日,被告人安排死者入住安老院,不到一個月,死者便在廣華醫院留醫,病狀瀕危,在12月27日病逝,死因是胃腸出血。她的殮葬,由被告人辦理。死者搬往被告人處居住,入住安老院及病逝醫院,被告人都沒有通知原告人。原告人遍尋死者不獲,在1994年初報警後才獲悉死者已身故。

16. 1994年初,原告人或功申請法律援助,對被告人提出本案的訴訟。1995年3月27日,原告人就第一份遺囑取得遺囑認証。1999年9月22日,被告人再次修改抗辯書,提出新的反申索,要求法庭撤銷發給原告人的遺囑認証,原因是死者後來訂立了第二份遺囑,委任林建華作為遺囑的唯一執行及受益人,故此第一份遺囑已被廢除。原告人回應,死者簽署第二份遺囑,是受到林先生的不當影響、威嚇或滋擾。原告人指出,死者當時八十四歲,智能已十分衰退。

17. 原告人與被告人其後同意,第二份遺囑是否有效,及第一份遺囑的遺囑認証應否撤銷,這些問題應該作為本案的初步爭論點(preliminary issue)審理。2000年7月底,特委法官黃褔鑫資深大律師審理上述的初步爭論點。2000年9月1日,黃法官裁定被告人敗訴,因為第二份遺囑,並沒有賦予被告人任何權益,故此她在法律上沒有充份的權益(locus standi),去質疑原告人的遺囑認証。假若被告人有充份權益提出質疑,黃法官以附帶意見的方式說,被告人也未能証實,死者在簽署第二份遺囑時,她充份明白她的產權處置,和完全清楚遺囑的條文。

18. 本案尚未審理的爭議,就是死者把該物業轉讓給被告人是否有效。該轉讓在文件上雖然是買賣形式,但被告人承認從沒有付樓款給死者,並指稱實質上是饋贈。這與審查第二份遺囑的有效性的情形一樣,被告人必須証實,死者在簽署買賣合約和轉讓契,及口頭同意實質把該物業饋贈給被告人時,死者充份明白她的財產處置,和完全清楚她所簽署的文件的內容。因為該物業是死者主要具價值的財產,故此死者在作出轉讓及饋贈該物業給被告人時,她的精神上行為能力(mental capacity),應該與立遺囑時必須具備的精神上行為能力一樣。死者必須知道,產權的處置是佔有她財產的多少,並且把該物業轉讓及贈送給被告人,將會使她的遺囑受益人一無所得。她需要理解,所有她可能會作出饋贈的人,對她的遺贈的期望(參看In re Beaney, deceased [1978] 1 WLR 770)。

19. 此外,原告人也基於死者對被告人施加不當影響的原故,要求法庭宣告,死者簽署轉讓該物業的文件,均屬無效。原告人指稱,死者當時十分倚重被告人,對她信任有加。如被告人所稱,該物業轉讓給她,其實是饋贈的話,死者就是把唯一具價值及賴以為生的資產,不是遺贈而是立即轉送給被告人。這種情況下的豐厚饋贈,不是基於常理或常情,可以理解為出於親情、友情、善心或平常的動機而作出的。故此,受饋贈者必須証實,饋贈人作出饋贈時,是出於他本人的意願,經過他周詳、自由和充份知情下的考慮,而不是由於受饋贈者的不當影響(參看Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145; Inche Noriah v Shaik Allie Bin Omar [1929] AC 127; In re Craig, deceased [1971] Ch 95)。

本案的証人及証物

20. 原告人方面,只有她自已作証。被告人除了自已作証外,還傳召了五位証人,他們是

(1) 關兆權醫生,他在1992年5月19日發出了証書,証明死者當日神志清醒,言詞清晰,能辨認所處的環境和接觸的人物;

(2) 何細妹女士,她是明愛中心的社會工作者,曾往該物業向死者作家庭探訪;

(3) 溫永明先生,他是律師行文員,見証買賣合約及轉讓契;

(4) 楊棣燊先生,他是死者的租客;

(5) 鍾季珍女士,她是廖創興銀行的職員,死者曾在鍾女士所工作的分行開帳戶。

21. 除了証人的証供,本案有一樣重要的証物,就是原告人提供的錄音帶,是原告人和死者的談話錄音,內容是原告人向死者詢問,把該物業轉讓給被告人的經過。據原告人作供,當時她不讓死者知道會把談話錄音,於是把錄音機收藏在她的手袋。錄音帶部份帶有雜音和聽不清楚,不過整體上錄音的質素很好,可以清楚聽見兩人的對話和聲音。

22. 原告人的律師做了一份錄音帶的謄本,被告人同意謄本是正確的。不過,被告人後來卻質疑,錄音帶是否真的是死者的談話,因為她從來沒有聽過死者錄音的聲音。被告人又質疑為甚麼原告人在2001年5月,錄音的八年後,才把錄音帶提供給被告人。被告人十分熟悉死者的聲音,即使她從來沒有聽過死者錄音的聲音,本席不相信她不能辨認錄音帶的聲音,是否是死者,因為錄音帶的聲線和說話的人的語氣,大致上十分清晰。本席並且接納原告人的解釋,在2001年5月前,她曾對她的律師提及這錄音帶,而律師則認為對案情的作用不大,她在2001年5月本案初次在本席席前審訊時,才堅持要把錄音帶呈堂,以致審訊要押後。本席裁定,錄音帶是死者與原告人在1992年談話的真確錄音。

23. 原告人和被告人的積怨頗深,兩人在死者去世前,和死者去世後的一兩年間,多次因死者財產的紛爭吵架,甚至互相毆打,經常鬧上警署。兩人在本案的証供,有不少分歧的地方。本席認為不需要就每一項分歧的証供,作出事實的裁決,這需要視乎証供對本案重點爭議的重要性而定。

24. 對於証人証供的分析,本席就以下幾方面逐一考慮:

(1) 向林建華取回該物業業權契據的經過;

(2) 死者把該物業轉讓給被告人的原因;

(3) 關兆權醫生的証明書;

(4) 死者簽署文件的過程及溫永明的証供;

(5) 死者的談話錄音;

(6) 原告人對被告人的其他指稱;及

(7) 被告人就其他事項的証供及其可信性。

向林建華取回該物業業權契據的經過

25. 如前所述,原告人和被告人對於向林先生取回物業契據的原委,有不同的說法。本席不認為有需要在這事件上,就兩人証供分歧之處,逐一裁決。雙方並無爭議的地方,而本席又接納為事實的事項,可敍述如下:

(1) 林建華在1991年底或1992初,從死者處取得該物業業權契據。

(2) 原告人和被告人獲悉這事,兩人都認為林先生對該物業有覬覦之心,於是兩人聯合起來,要林先生交出契據。

(3) 被告人成功從林先生處取得契據後,一直保有文件。原告人多次要被告人交出契據,被告人都沒有答應。

死者把該物業轉讓給被告人的原因

26. 被告人在庭上作供,死者把該物業即時轉送給她,只有一個原因,就是因為1992年之前,被告人一直照料死者,死者清楚她的為人,所以把該物業饋贈給她。至於死者為甚麼簽署了一份買賣合約而不是饋贈契據(下稱“送契”),把該物業轉讓給被告人,被告人有這樣的解釋。

27. 被告人宣稱,死者起初提出要把該物業轉送給她時,被告人拒絕接受,因為她不想受到原告人的傷害和滋擾。為了保障被告人,死者遂提議,轉讓以買賣的形式進行,但實質上仍然是饋贈。於是被告人接受了饋贈,被告人並且和死者口頭協議,她不用付出樓款,只要被告人負責供養死者一生就可以了。

28. 本席不接納被告人以上的証供,原因有幾點:

(1) 被告人以上的証供,與她在第二次修改的抗辯書及她的証人供詞的說法不同。在該兩份文件,被告人指稱,死者要把該物業轉送給被告人,原因是原告人多次強迫死者,要死者從被告人處取回業權契據,並把該物業轉讓給原告人,令死者感到害怕和困擾,死者於是提議把物業饋贈給被告人,這樣原告人就不會再迫脅她。

(2) 被告人指稱,提議以買賣形式進行轉讓的是死者,提議把樓款定於五十萬元的也是死者。本席對此甚表懷疑。據溫永明的証供,在1992年5月19日之前,被告人在電話上曾向他詢問,買賣合約和送契的分別和利弊。本席不相信以買賣形式進行,是死者本人的提議。

(3) 據被告人的証供,死者當時的經濟狀況很「坎坷」,故此,轉讓該物業給被告人的律師費、印花稅,和關醫生發出醫生証明的費用,都是被告人支付的。該物業的租金,是死者唯一的入息。被告人作供,死者拒絕收取五十萬元的樓款,是因為被告人告訴她,被告人需要向人借錢,才可付樓款。以死者當時的經濟狀況,本席不相信她會拒絕收取被告人任何金錢,無條件即時把該物業送給被告人。

關醫生的証明書

29. 1992年5月19日,被告人前往深水埗的涉案物業,先把死者帶去關醫生在筲箕灣的診所,然後才去中環的律師事務所簽署文件。在這之前,關醫生從來沒有替死者診病,被告人卻曾經向關醫生求診。據關醫生保存的病歷紀錄,死者報稱的地址,是被告人的住址,而不是涉案物業。被告人承認地址是她提供的,她只是隨口說,沒有特別用意。

30. 被告人作供,要找一位醫生証明死者簽署文件當日神志清醒,是死者的提議。因為死者沒有刻意要求看哪位醫生,所以被告人才帶死者去看被告人曾經求診的關醫生。本席不接納被告人以上的証供。第一,她的証供與她在抗辯書的指稱不相符。在抗辯書的指稱是,溫永明向被告人建議,死者年紀大,被告人應該請醫生發出証明書,証實死者簽署文件時神志清醒。第二,如果死者真的有向被告人作出這建議,死者理應提議找她相識的醫生發証明書。被告人承認,她沒有向死者詢問,有沒有熟悉的醫生。如果任何一位醫生都可以發出這樣的証明,被告人不需要把死者從深水埗帶往筲箕灣看醫生,然後再去中環簽文件。本席裁定,找醫生發証明書,是被告人的主意。

31. 關醫生作供,從死者病歷紀錄所見,她當日求診,是醫治左眼膜結膜炎。關醫生已記不起他發出証明書的原因,因為他沒有就此作任何紀錄。在1992年5月19日的診斷紀錄,他記下死者的記憶力衰退。在1993年9月13日,他為死者作身體檢查,因為死者將入住安老院,他斷定死者聽覺衰退,有老人癡呆癥狀。關醫生不能憶述,死者患老人癡呆的嚴重程度。他知道當時死者打算入住安老院,而安老院的體格檢查表格,需要填寫病人有沒有老人癡呆,所以在1993年9月13日的檢查,他特別留意這方面。關醫生不排除,在1992年5月19日,死者可能已患有老人癡呆,因為當時他沒有特別留意這些癥狀,死者只是為眼疾求診。

32. 本席不認為關醫生的証書,能夠充份証明在簽署文件當日,死者具備法律所要求的精神上行為能力。即使死者當日神志清醒,能辨認她所處的環境和接觸的人,這只不過是基本的心智能力,並不等於死者有足夠的認知,去明白她所作出的財產的處置和後果。再者,關醫生在這之前從來沒有替死者診病,他對於死者的心智和精神狀態,所知不詳,他所發出的証明,只是基於他第一次診斷的表面觀察,本席不認為他的意見具影響力。

死者簽署文件的過程及溫永明的証供

33. 被告人作供,她向溫永明查詢買賣合約和送契的分別,隨後向死者覆述她所理解溫先生的解釋。死者聽過後,決定以買賣合約的形式進行。於是被告人給指示溫先生,他草擬了買賣合約和轉讓契給被告人和死者簽署。在1992年5月19日,死者和被告人前往司徒維新律師行,當時代表死者的李湘律師行的文員Simon Wong也在場,溫先生與黃先生向死者和被告人,解讀兩份文件的內容,又向她們再次解釋買賣合約和送契的分別。就溫先生的解釋,被告人的理解是,如果是送契,受饋贈者在三年內不能變賣物業,而且要負責前業主在物業的債項,買賣合約則沒有上述的規限。被告人並沒有告訴溫先生,死者和她私底下同意,轉讓雖然以買賣合約形式進行,實質上是饋贈,溫先生與黃先生都以為這是一宗買賣交易。被告人承認,當時沒有人向死者提及,她可以立遺囑把該物業遺贈給被告人,而不是即時饋贈,也沒有人對死者說,把該物業轉讓給被告人後,死者便沒有收取租金的權利,被告人也可以隨時出售物業。被告人也承認,該物業當時的價值,超過五十萬元的樓款。在1994年中被告人委託地產代理出售該物業,開出的價錢是一百四十萬元。被告人記不起,溫先生或黃先生,有沒有向死者指出樓款比該物業的市值低。

34. 溫先生作供,黃先生現已移民,1992年5月前,黃先生是他的舊同事。由於買賣涉及的樓款超過二十五萬元,買賣雙方需要由不同的律師行代表。他介紹在李湘律師行的黃先生代表死者,因為被告人要求他找一間律師行給死者。他証實在簽署文件前,黃先生並沒有接觸死者或被告人,他當日才介紹黃先生給她們。

35. 對於簽署文件的過程,溫先生所能記憶的並不多。他記得在1992年5月19日之前,他曾向他的當事人,即是被告人,解釋送契和買賣合約的分別。他的解釋,與被告人的理解不同。溫先生告訴她,如果是送契,受饋贈者在饋贈人去世三年內變賣物業,而饋贈人的財產超過《遺產稅條例》訂明的上限,就需要繳納遺產稅。此外,如果饋贈人破產,他的債權人可向受饋贈者追討。他否認在簽署文件當日,他曾向被告人和死者再次解釋送契和買賣合約的分別,因為之前他已接到被告人的指示,以買賣形式進行,而他已草擬好兩份文件,沒有需要向被告人和死者重新解釋一次。本席相信溫先生,不接納被告人這方面的証供。

36. 溫先生承認,因為當時他是代表被告人,所以對死者沒有特別留意。他記不起簽署文件時雙方的神情,也記不起他有沒有跟死者談話。依他一貫的做法,他會把文件的每一條文,口譯出來,然後他問簽約的人是否明白,如果對方表示明白,他就讓對方簽署。溫先生相信當時死者和被告人簽署文件的過程,就是這樣的,本席接納他的証供。

37. 被告人有沒有向死者覆述溫先生就送契和買賣合約的解釋,本席甚表懷疑。即使被告人真的有這樣做,她所作的解釋,是她錯誤的理解,死者不但得不到應有的資料,反而受到(可能是無意的)誤導。再者,沒有律師行的職員,向死者解釋把物業即時饋贈給被告人的後果,因為他們並不知道這宗買賣,實質是饋贈。他們也不知道,該物業是死者主要具價值的財產,她依靠該物業的租金為生。黃先生的主要任務,只是見証死者的簽署,沒有証據顯示,黃先生有向死者作任何或充份的解釋,她的財產處置的後果。本席不認為,把兩份文件的條文口譯給死者,便足以使她有充份的理解,去明白她所作出財產的處置和後果。

死者的談話錄音

38. 原告人根據死者的談話錄音,指稱在簽署文件當日,被告人給死者服藥,令她神志模糊,死者就在這情況下簽署文件,並不知道文件的內容。

39. 上述的指稱,非常嚴重,本席對此不無保留。原告人在談話錄音數次向死者查問把該物業轉讓給被告人的原因和經過,死者回答說「唔知道」、「唔曉喎」、「唔知」。死者說在律師行的時候,被告人和律師說,「佢(死者)講嘢唔係幾流利,佢八九十歲啦,佢而家講嘢都好論盡」,於是被告人就代死者和律師談話,而死者當時沒有說話。

40. 本席裁定,死者在簽署文件時,不理解她是把該物業即時饋贈給被告人,也不明白她再沒有權收租,所以她後來說不知道。至於被告人給她服藥的事,本席不排除死者所說的,不是簽署文件的時候,而是不同時間所發生的事(見錄音謄本第111句),也有可能只是死者的揣測(見錄音謄本第60句)。本席裁定,被告人給死者服藥,令死者神志模糊下簽署文件的指稱,不能成立。

41. 原告人還對被告人作出其他的指稱,包括被告人介紹兩名租客入住該物業,其後這些租客恐嚇死者,要她把物業轉讓被告人。原告人作供,以上的指稱是死者告訴她的。死者在談話錄音,雖然有說被告人曾找來流氓作租客,經常恐嚇她,但死者卻沒指稱,流氓要她把物業轉給被告人(見錄音謄本第18句)。本席認為,原告人的指稱,可能出於她的誤解(見錄音謄本第230句)。再者,死者的另一租客楊棣燊先作供,死者經常與他傾談,但從來沒有告訴他,那兩個租客曾威脅她要把物業轉給被告人。本席裁定,原告人以上的指稱,並不成立。

42. 原告人又指稱,該物業轉給死者後,由被告人負責收租,被告人郤沒有把租金交給死者作為生活費。原告人提出兩點來支持她的指稱,第一,被告人拿走死者的銀行存摺,不讓她提款,第二,被告人後來替死者向社會褔利署申請綜援。由此可見,即使被告人對死者作出供養她一生的承諾,她並沒有履行諾言。

43. 被告人承認物業轉讓後,由她向租客收取租金,但她否認沒有給死者足夠的錢做生活費。被告人也承認,她曾取去死者的銀行存摺,不過她指稱是死者要求她代為保管,因為原告人強迫死者往銀行提款。至於申請綜援,被告人解釋這是因為死者需要金錢入住安老院。

44. 本席不認為上述原告人的指稱,對本案爭議重點有重大的影響,故此不需要在這方面作出肯定的裁決。本席只是指出,關於被告人取去死者銀行存摺的解釋,本席甚表懷疑,不相信原告人曾強迫死者往銀行提款,因為從死者的存摺所見,她的存款實在很少。再者,被告人作供,死者後來在警署把存摺交給被告人要求她代為保管,也與事實不符,因為原告人把死者的兩本銀行存摺呈堂作証,可見死者並沒有把存摺交給被告人。

被告人就其他事項的証供及其可信性

45. 被告人在1994年4月22日,因為與原告人打架,曾向警察作了一份口供,解釋打架的原因。她在口供裏頭說,該物業是她以五十萬元向死者購買的,有律師的証明。其後,代表原告人的法律援助署職員曾致電被告人,向她查詢購買該物業一事,被告人承認,她告訴法援署,她有付樓款購買該物業,並且指示溫先生把買賣物業的文件,傳真給法援署。被告人對警方及法援署的宣稱,與她在這訴訟的宣稱不符。本席認為被告人沒有作出充份或合理的解釋,為甚麼她不告訴警方或法援署,該物業的轉讓,實質上是饋贈,這大大影響了她的証供的可信性。

46. 被告人的証供,還有其他矛盾的地方。對於本案爭議重點有重要影響的,本席已在上文列舉。整體來說,本席不認為被告人是個誠實的証人,她的証供不是可靠的証供。

結論和命令

47. 根據以上事實的裁決,和上文引用的案例,本席裁定,死者在簽署買賣合約和轉讓契時,並沒有法律所要求的精神上行為能力。本席也裁定,從各方面的証據顯示,包括是租客楊先生、銀行職員鍾季珍女士、社工何細妹女士,及被告人本人的証供,被告人當時負責安排死者生活的一切,死者對她非常信賴。根據案例,被告人必須証實,死者作出的饋贈,是出於她本人的自由意願,不是受到被告人的不當影響。由於被告人未能証實,死者具有法律上所要求的精神上行為能力,被告人也不能証實,死者作出饋贈時,是經過深思熟慮,和在充份知情下作出的決定。

48. 本席裁定,原告人得直,並作出以下的聲明:

(1) 在所有關鍵時間,被告人都是以受託人的身份,代死者或死者的遺產受益人持有該物業;

(2) 死者所簽署的買賣合約及轉讓契,把該物業的業權轉讓給被告人,均屬無效。

49. 本席並作出財產的歸屬命令,把該物業轉歸死者的遺產。本席不認為有需要作出禁制令。至於訴訟費用,本席作出暫准命令,被告人需支付原告人的訟費,訟費的金額如有爭議,交由聆案官評定;原告人本身的訟費,依《法律援助規則》評定。如被告人在判案書頒下十四天內,沒有申請要求更改訟費命令,暫准命令將成為絕對命令。

(關淑馨)
高等法院原訟法庭法官

原告人:由鍾沛林律師行轉聘曾錦鴻大律師代表。

被告人:伍淑賢,無律師代表,親自應訊。

34428-EN-2000-09-01

CHENG SAU KAM v. ENG AUDREY

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HCA9459/1994

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 9459 OF 1994

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BETWEEN
CHENG SAU KAM Executrix of the estate of Ng Sau Lan, deceasedPlaintiff
AND
ENG AUDREYDefendant

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Coram: Recorder Wong S.C. in Court

Dates of Hearing: 27-28 July 2000

Date of Judgment: 1 September 2000

 

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J U D G M E N T

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Background

1. Ng Sau Lan ["the Deceased"] was born on 3rd May, 1906. She died in Hong Kong on 27th December, 1993 when she was about 87 years of age.

2. The Deceased cohabited with one Chang Sek Chee ["Mr Chang"]. Mr Chang passed away on 9th April, 1974. By his will dated 12th July, 1973, Mr Chang bequeathed all his assets in favour of the Deceased. This included Flat B, 3/F, Nos.285-287, Castle Peak Road, Kowloon ["the Flat"].

3. The Plaintiff is the daughter of Mr Chang. She obtained probate in respect of the estate of the Deceased on strength of a will of the Deceased dated 10th June, 1981 ["the 1st Will"]. By the 1st Will, the Deceased appointed the Plaintiff to be her sole executrix and bequeathed her estate in favour of the Plaintiff.

4. The Defendant is the grand-daughter of the Deceased's brother. By an assignment dated 1st June, 1992 ["the Disputed Assignment"], the Deceased assigned the Flat in favour of the Defendant at an alleged consideration of $500,000. The Plaintiff maintains that the Disputed Assignment was procured by the Defendant's wrongful application of medication on the Deceased or by the Defendant's undue influence. The Defendant contends that the Disputed Assignment was a gift made pursuant to an agreement between her and the Deceased.

5. The Plaintiff instituted the present proceedings on 22nd September, 1994 for recoupment of the Deceased's estate. By her Re-amended Defence and Counterclaim dated 22nd September, 1999, the Defendant relied for the first time on another will of the Deceased dated 20th December, 1991 ["the Disputed Will"]. On the basis of this Disputed Will, she counterclaimed for revocation of the probate granted in favour of the Plaintiff.

6. By the Disputed Will, the Deceased appointed one Lam Kin Wah ["Mr Lam"] to be her sole executor and bequeathed in his favour her entire estate. Mr Lam was a tenant who rented one of the 3 rooms in the Flat. The Plaintiff does not admit execution of the Disputed Will by the Deceased. The Plaintiff further avers that the Deceased executed the Disputed Will under undue influence, threats or harassment by Mr Lam. Reliance is placed on the fact that in December, 1991, the Deceased was 84 and very senile.

The hearing before me

7. In February this year, the parties agreed that the validity of the Disputed Will and the revocation of the Plaintiff's grant be tried as a preliminary issue. When the case came before me, I raised with Counsel the question whether the issue is properly raised. Mr Poon cited p.407 of Williams, Mortimer & Sunnucks - Executors, Administrators and Probate pointing out that an action may be commenced for the revocation of grant where a later will revoking it has been discovered since the grant was made. I was then persuaded that the matter could proceed despite serious reservations as to the wisdom in tackling a preliminary issue in these circumstances. Mr Tsang, Counsel for the Plaintiff, felt that he was bound by the agreement reached early this year.

8. It is regrettable that the photo-copying of Mr Poon stopped at p.407. p.409 of Williams (above cited) states that "Where a person can show that the court has jurisdiction to make an order in a probate action which may affect his interest or possible interest in the estate of the deceased, however slightly, such person has a right to be a party to that action.". p.18 of Atkin's Court Forms, 2nd edition 1998 Issue makes it clear that "In order to enable a beneficiary to bring an action he must have a present interest in the property. Thus a contingent interest will be sufficient, but it is not enough if the beneficiary has a mere hope of succeeding.". O. 76, r. 9(1) requires the Defendant to show in her pleading that "if the allegations made [in her pleading] are proved [she] would be entitled to an interest in the estate.". Furthermore, "In an action for revocation of a grant of probate ... the plaintiff must join all those who are entitled to administer the estate under such grant.".

9. The Defendant has no interest under the Disputed Will. It is therefore difficult to see what locus she has in mounting a challenge to the subsisting probate in favour of the Plaintiff. Mr Lam has not been joined. He is obviously interested in any pronouncement on the Disputed Will.

10. On the preliminary issue as to whether the subsisting probate in favour of the Plaintiff should be revoked, I rule in favour of the Plaintiff on the basis that the Defendant has no locus standi to make such challenge.

11. Given the time and expenses incurred in debating the preliminary issue, I set out hereunder my obiter views should the matter proceed further.

The Disputed Will

12. The original of the Disputed Will was not produced before me. The Defendant relies on a copy of the Disputed Will annexed to an affirmation of one Chan Yuk Fun, a clerk of Messrs Chan & Wan, dated 27th July, 1998. Chan Yuk Fun asserted in this affirmation that the original of the Disputed Will was delivered to the Deceased on 20th December, 1991.

13. The Disputed Will consists of 2 pages. It is in the English language. There are altogether 3 clauses. The Chinese name of the Deceased was witnessed by Mr Tony C.S. Wan ["Mr Wan"], a solicitor of Messrs Chan & Wan, and Mr Chan Ho Cheung ["Mr Chan"], a clerk of Messrs Chan & Wan. The signature of Mr Chan also appears in the interpretation clause.

The evidence before me

14. Mr Chan was the only witness called by the Defendant. I was informed by Mr Poon that staff members of Messrs Chan & Wan refused to admit the Defendant's process server into their office for the purpose of serving a subpoena on Mr Wan. Such conduct, if true, is unbecoming and falls short of the standard one expects from a solicitors firm in practice in Hong Kong.

15. Mr Chan told me that Chan Yuk Fun was his superior. It was Chan Yuk Fun who instructed and directed him to prepare the Disputed Will. Chan Yuk Fun gave him the I.D. card number of Mr Lam. After the prepared the Disputed Will, he handed it to Chan Yuk Fun who made the appointment for its execution. When the Deceased arrived, she was accompanied by "a guy". The Deceased was then taken to a conference room. She was attended by Mr Wan, Chan Yuk Fun and Mr Chan. Mr Chan read over the contents of the Disputed Will to the Deceased. The Deceased just nodded after his interpretation. She looked and then she signed the Disputed Will. She did not say a word. Mr Chan could not remember whether the Deceased was paying attention to him. He could not remember who filled in the date of the will. Despite the absence of a reference number on the Disputed Will, he denied that it was prepared in a hurry. He said the Deceased paid the bill of his firm and the original of the Disputed Will was passed either to Chan Yuk Fun or to the Deceased. Mr Chan also pointed out that the Deceased had made a previous will in 1990.

16. The Plaintiff gave evidence. She told me that Mr Lam became a tenant of the Flat in September 1989. She collected rent from Mr Lam. Mr Lam managed to pay initially but not subsequently. Mr Lam stopped paying rent in about April/May 1990. When the Deceased was informed of Mr Lam's default, the Deceased merely observed that Mr Lam did not have money yet. Mr Lam moved out in June 1990. The Plaintiff then discovered that the Deceased had withdrawn her entire bank balance of $8,000 to $9,000. The Deceased told her that this was a loan to Mr Lam which he denied. On the 25th day of the 12th Moon in 1991, the Defendant told her of the return of Mr Lam. They attended the Flat together but could not gain entry as the Deceased failed to answer the door due to her hearing problem. They retired to a nearby Chinese herbal medicine shop and was told by its proprietress that Mr Lam had obtained the title deeds of the Flat from the Deceased. With the assistance of other relatives of the defendant, they managed to persuade Mr Lam to disgorge the deeds. She disagreed with the Defendant's suggestions that Mr Lam readily surrendered the deeds and that Mr Lam handed over the deeds on condition that the same be kept by the defendant.

The applicable legal principles

17. The original of the Disputed Will has not been produced. Mr Poon drew my attention to Para.337 of Vol.50 of Halsbury's Laws of England which states that "Where a later will cannot be produced, the burden of showing that it revoked an earlier will is on the person alleging revocation, and there must be either proof that it contained a clause revoking earlier wills or proof of a difference of disposition.".

18. Both Mr Poon and Mr Tsang place reliance on Para.425.058 of Vol.27 of Halsbury's Laws of Hong Kong :

"Want of knowledge or approval Although knowledge of the contents of a will and approval of it by the testator are essential to the validity of the will, this is normally assumed in the case of a competent testator from the fact that he has duly executed it. However, whenever the circumstances under which the will has been prepared raise a well-grounded suspicion that it does not express the testator's mind, the court ought not to pronounce in favour of it unless that suspicion is removed. Issue is thereupon joined in respect of the testator's will-making capacity and places upon the person propounding the will the onus of proving that the testator knew and approved the contents. The weak state of health or weakened physical condition of the testator will add to the suspicion. The nature of the instrument executed, its simplicity or complexity must also have some bearing in measuring the power of a weakened intellect, as will certain other factors.

If a person who has no rightful claim to a material share of the testator's estate prepared his will leaving a substantial benefit for himself, the person propounding the will must produce additional evidence to prove the knowledge of its contents by the deceased. This principle extends also to cases in which the preparation and execution was in the charge of a person other than the one who takes such benefit under the will. Circumstances exciting the suspicion and vigilance of a court are restricted to those attending or at least relevant to the preparation and execution of the will.

Where a testator has had his foreign will interpreted to him and has thereupon executed it, that would raise a grave and strong presumption that the will has been duly and properly executed by the testator. When verbal instructions are given to an intermediary who repeats them to a solicitor, the opportunities for error are obvious and the court will require to be strictly satisfied that the instructions given to the intermediary were unambiguous and clearly understood, faithfully reported by him and rightly apprehended by the solicitor, before making any presumption in favour of validity. But this would not apply where signed instructions from a testator in his own language were passed on to legal advisers since generally the intervention by a solicitor at the time of execution with proper explanation and, if need be, also interpretation would suffice unless the testator's testamentary capacity was in doubt."

19. Liu J (as he then was) in In re the Estate of Ma Shiu-lim [1992] 2 HKLR 286 at p.290 pointed out that "Very often, how a will came to be made is not or is not fully known to the persons affected by it. Those affected are entitled to invite the court, on the suspicious circumstances they have since discovered, to exercise care and vigilance. In effect, issue is thereupon joined in respect to a testator's will-making capacity 'and place(s) upon the person propounding the will the onus of proving that the testator knew and approved of its contents'."

Applying these principles to the facts of this case

20. It is not disputed by the Defendant that Mr Lam was a mere tenant of the Deceased. Their relationship commenced in 1989. There is no evidence of any exceptional act of kindness shown by Mr Lam to the Deceased. The evidence appears to point the other way. He defaulted in rentals thereby depriving the Deceased of her meagre source of income. It is therefore difficult to see the basis of any rightful claim on Mr Lam's part to the entirety of the Deceased's estate. Whilst there is no evidence indicating that it was Mr Lam who furnished instructions to Messrs Chan & Wan for the preparation of the Disputed Will, the authorities indicate that the Court must be vigilant in face of this sudden manifestation of bounty in favour of a total stranger.

21. The onus of the Defendant is heightened by what transpired on the 25th day of the 12th moon of 1991. It is common ground between the parties that the Plaintiff and the Defendant confronted Mr Lam; Mr Lam disgorged the title deeds and those were handed to the Defendant with the knowledge of the Deceased. At all material times, the Flat constituted the principal if not the sole asset of the Deceased. The Defendant's case is that the Deceased made a gift of the Flat to her thereafter. Given the proximity of these transactions, it is difficult to see what objective the Deceased wished to achieve by making the Disputed Will. This in turn raises doubts on whether she truly understood the effect of her disposition.

22. The Defendant's case rests entirely on the evidence of Mr Chan. He is not a satisfactory witness. He cannot remember whether the Deceased was paying attention to him when he was interpreting the Disputed Will. Given the fact that he did not take any direct instruction from the Deceased, one would expect either Mr Wan or Mr Chan to seek confirmation form the Deceased that the provisions in the Disputed Will accord with her instructions. There is no evidence that this was done. Rather the evidence indicates a somewhat sloppy attempt to attend to the affairs of this lady of 85. The Disputed Will did not contain any file reference of Messrs Chan & Wan. No attempt was made to verify the identity card of the Deceased. In these circumstances, had it been necessary for me so to decide, I would not have been satisfied that the Defendant had successfully demonstrated, on a balance of probabilities, that the Deceased executed the Disputed Will or that she executed the same with full knowledge of its provisions.

Conclusion

23. I decide the preliminary issue in favour of the plaintiff on the basis of the Defendant's lack of locus. I make an order nisi that the Defendant must pay the Plaintiff the costs incurred in relation to this preliminary issue.

24. The disputes between the parties are bitter. It is in the interest of all that the beneficial entitlement in the Flat be resolved as soon as possible.

 

 

(Ronny F.H. Wong S.C.)
Recorder of the High Court

 

Representation:

Mr Tsang Kam Hung for the Plaintiff instructed by Messrs Chung & Kwan, assigned by the Legal Aid Department

Mr Tony S.T. Poon for the Defendant instructed by Messrs W.K. To & Co., assigned by the Legal Aid Department