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Civil Action1996

LEUNG WING YIU v. SIU KING YUEN AND OTHERS

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21157-EN-2002-02-21

LEUNG WING YIU v. SIU KING YUEN AND OTHERS

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HCA005382C/1996

HCA 5382/1996

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 5382 OF 1996

 

BETWEEN
LEUNG WING YIU
(suing in his capacity as a partner of Jeb Shun Photographic Company and Jeb Shun Output Service Company)
Plaintiff
AND
SIU KING YUEN1st Defendant
JEB SHUN COMPUTER OUTPUT LIMITED2nd defendant
YEUNG KOON WING3rd Defendant

Coram: Master K Y Chan, in Court

Date of hearing: 21 February 2002

Date of judgment: 21 February 2002

_________________

J U D G M E N T

_________________

 

1. This action arose out of a dispute between the plaintiff, on the one hand, and the defendants on the other. The plaintiff and the 1st and 3rd defendants used to be partners of two partnerships called Jeb Shun Photographic Company and Jeb Shun Output Service Company.

2. The plaintiff claimed that the partnership assets had been converted by the 2nd defendant in November 1995 when, at that time, there was merely a discussion of whether to admit one Kung Wing-hong into the businesses and for the businesses to be carried on by the 2nd defendant. Hence this action by the plaintiff against the defendants for various relief.

3. The action was tried before the Honourable Cheung J in March 2001, who gave judgment in favour of the plaintiff on 16 March of the same year. It was adjudged by the learned judge, among other matters, that damages are to be assessed for the conversion by the 2nd defendant of a number of machinery, equipment and furniture which have been listed in paragraph 11C(1) of a set of answers to interrogatories furnished by the 1st defendant on 17 July 2000 and confirmed by Mr Kung's answers to interrogatories filed on 18 July 2000. These appear at pages 164 and 173 respectively, of the bundle of pleadings and documents presented for the purpose of this assessment.

4. Under two judgments made by Deputy Judge Lam on 24 October 2001 and 18 January 2002, the meaning of the relief by Cheung J in his judgment of 16 March 2000 has been clarified. I am to assess the market value of the items converted by the 2nd defendant and the date of assessment should be 30 March 2001. Of any sum that I may assess, I shall award one-third of that to the plaintiff as the 1st and 3rd defendants are each entitled to one-third of such value.

5. I should also mention that Deputy Judge Lam has, on 24 October 2001, ordered interim payment in favour of the plaintiff in the sum of $36,966.67, and whatever sum I shall assess and award to the plaintiff, the interim payment has to be deducted therefrom.

6. The plaintiff has called one witness, Mr Stewart Wong, the valuer. Before the assessment started off, the solicitors for the 2nd defendant applied to be excused from this exercise on the ground that there was a letter from the 2nd defendant saying that there was no instructions for the solicitors to represent it in this assessment. I rule against the application on the ground that once solicitors are appointed, they are solicitors on record and they have a duty to the party appointing them as well as to the court. Whether the solicitors should appear at this hearing is not a matter to be decided on by the 2nd defendant. The 2nd defendant cannot decide on which step in the proceedings should be dealt with by its solicitors and which step should be ignored.

7. Once solicitors accept an appointment to act for a party in a litigation, they will be solicitors representing that party until an order is made allowing them to cease to act or until they are discharged per the Rules of the High Court. They should, therefore, appear for the 2nd defendant in all the steps in this action. If there should be any valid ground for them to be excused I would have allowed the application but there is no valid ground.

8. I am told that there is no costs on account but that is not a ground for the solicitors to be excused, although it may be a ground for an application to cease to act. I therefore refuse the application and I am grateful for the assistance by the solicitors for the 2nd defendant in this exercise.

9. I now come to the evidence of the valuation. Mr Stewart Wong, the valuer, has produced a report, dated 12 October 2001, which can be found at pages 211 to 219 of the bundle. At the hearing he produced a revised report based on information he gathered since then, and based on an inspection of a number of the items in question, which inspection was conducted by him after the preparation of the first report, but also in October 2001. I now refer to his revised report.

10. There are altogether 15 items of machinery, equipment and furniture, the value of which has to be assessed.

11. The first item is a set of Agfa Selectset 5000 Laser Imagesetter. From information given by the supplier, this item was purchased in June 1994 at the price of $800,000. Mr Wong assessed its worth, as at 1 November 1995, at $550,000, and then he obtained information from the second-hand market that it was having a worth of $95,000 on 21 March 2001. After deducting 15 per cent for the betterment or repair of the second-hand item, he arrived at a market value of $80,000 for the equipment as at 21 March 2001. I accept this valuation for this item.

12. The second item is a Shutterdrive 1000MB x 2. For this equipment, Mr Wong gave it a purchase price, in June 1994, of $50,000. He came to this by a process of allocation because items 1 to 7 were purchased as a set at a total cost of $1.575 million, and items 1 and 3 had prices of $800,000 and $300,000 listed for them by the supplier. So the remaining sum of $475,000 was the purchase price for the other items. Mr Wong made an allocation and arrived at the sum of $50,000 for item 2, and then he deducted that for depreciation and arrived at $29,000 as at 1 November 1995. There being no market comparable in March 2001, therefore, he gave it a residual value of $70,500, and I accept this valuation as correct.

13. Moving on to item (3), which is an Optronics Colorgetter III Pro Scanner. This is a scanner for industrial use and not the type of scanner for domestic or office use, and it is a big model. The purchase price, back in June 1994, was $300,000, as confirmed by the supplier, Alpha. By depreciation, Mr Wong gave the value of $200,000 as at 1 November 1995. But then there is a second-hand market for this kind of equipment, and he found that a similar model of a similar age could be acquired at $50,000. And again, giving an allowance for the betterment which the supplier would carry out, he valued this item, as converted by the 2nd defendant in March 2001, at the price of $35,000. And I also accept this to be accurate.

14. The next item is a Mac Quadra, which is a computer. By allocation of purchase price, Mr Wong estimated that it had a worth of $150,000 in June 1994, which was depreciated to $88,000 on 1 November 1995. There is no comparable in the market so he gave it a 15 per cent residual value and came to the figure of $22,500. Again, I accept this figure as correct.

15. Item (5) is a Mod 600 MD and 88 MB R Plus removable hard drive. This is a piece of hardware in a computer system. Again, by the process of allocation of balance of purchase price, he estimated that it had a worth of $80,000 in June 1994 and depreciated it to $47,000 on 1 November 1995. Again, there is no market comparable so he gave it a residual value of 15 per cent and came to $12,000, of which I accept to be correct.

16. Item (6) is a Mac S/W Pagemaker Qxpress, Illustrator and Photoshop. This is a set of software for use in Mac computers. The valuation is at $19,600. This figure was arrived at after quotation had been supplied by one Teamate Soft. The quotation as relied on, in fact, was dated 15 February 2002 and appears to be slightly cheaper than an oral quotation obtained some time in 2001. Taking into account an item not included in the report of 12 October 2001, the valuation in the revised report is slightly cheaper than in the first report, and I am happy to accept this slightly cheaper figure as the correct figure, which is, $19,600.

17. For item (7) it is a sort of software installed in some hardware gadgets or external hard drives. The software, in fact, is made up of 10 sets of Chinese fonts. There is no market comparable, and after price allocation, which came to $115,000 in June 1994, which was depreciated to $67,500 on 1 November 1995, Mr Wong came to the figure of $17,000 as the residual value - or 15 per cent residual value of these software computer programs.

18. Item (8) is a set of Konica RST Rapid Automatic Processor, Model GR-27. There was a second-hand market in March 2001 and a quotation has been obtained - which is at page 230 of the bundle. It is a quotation of a comparable model of comparable age and Mr Wong has not made any betterment, repair, reduction because a processor is rather simple and such betterment and repair exercise is not necessary before a second-hand model is being sold. And he arrived at the second-hand value of $28,000 and I accept this as correct.

19. Item (9) consists of two sets of Eskofot Processor 280-DL. These processors work differently from that in item (8) and these processors can provide light to the film by way of adjustment, in the course of processing, so as to alter the condition of the film. In the revised report, Mr Wong assessed the value of the articles by reference to second-hand market price at $28,000 because he gave them 17 per cent residual value. He assessed the second-hand market value for these two processors at $28,000 on the basis that they were purchased in 1995. However, since the compilation of the revised report, he came to learn that one of the two processors was purchased in 1991 and the other in 1994. He, therefore, further revised his valuation and came to the figure of $15,000 for the processor purchased in 1994, and $10,500 for the one purchased in 1991. He did that after deducting 30 per cent for the betterment exercise. So the total value is $25,500. I accept his latest revision for this item at $25,500.

20. Moving on to the next item, which is item (10), and it is a set of D.S Autofocus Auto-exposure Vertical Compact Camera. Mr Wong was able to find out the purchase price in June 1990 at about $86,000. He depreciated that to $42,000 on 1 November 1995, and then valued this at $15,000 on 21 March 2001 on the basis of a 17 per cent residual value. When he was asked why he adopted 17 per cent instead of the usual 15 per cent that he has been using for some other items, he said that for cameras there are people who would like to collect them as antiques, and this being a camera, he took that into consideration and gave it 2 more per cent. But he has not elaborated on this either in his original report or in the revised report, and when queried about this he said that he is happy to accept 15 per cent as the residual value, which is also a fair valuation according to him. I, therefore, apply 15 per cent residual value as the fair valuation in March 2001. And this gives the figure of $12,900.

21. The next item is an old fax machine. Mr Wong gave it $500 in his revised report because it was purchased at $1,500 in 1995. However, upon being questioned about the current price of new fax machines in the market, he was happy to revise his valuation down to $225, of which I accept.

22. Item (12) consists of four sets of air-conditioners. In his original report he valued them at $2,500, but after inspecting two of the four air-conditioners, he revised his valuation upwards to $500 per air-conditioner, or a total of $2,000. And I accept his valuation.

23. Item (13) consists of eight lighting tables. They have been in use since 1993. Mr Wong assessed their value as at $1,500 per table, and further depreciated them to $400 per table as at 21 March 2001, which gives a total valuation of $3,200, and I accept this as correct.

24. Item (14) is a film cabinet. It was purchased in about 1990 and, Mr Wong, exercising his experience, assessed its value as at 1 November 1995 at $750, and he further depreciated that down to $300 for its market value on 21 March 2001.

25. The last item is item (15), which consists of some miscellaneous articles and stationery. Mr Wong included in this valuation a vacuum cleaner, a refrigerator and certain fans and came to the valuation of $5,000 as at 1 November 1995, and depreciated that to $2,000 as at 21 March 2001.

26. Since the answers to interrogatories do not refer to the refrigerator, fans and vacuum cleaner, he was asked why he should give a valuation for these items as well. Mr Wong, in answer, advised the court that he was given information about the existence of these items by the plaintiff. Unfortunately, such information has never been provided to the court at the trial and I am not prepared to accept such hearsay evidence at this stage. I therefore ask Mr Wong to confine his valuation on the items that he saw in the inspection, and he then gave a valuation of $1,300 for the eight tables and desks and ten chairs and stools that he saw.

27. That gives a total valuation of $267,025. One-third of that is $89,008. After deducting the interim payment of $36,966.67, the award that I shall make in favour of the plaintiff is $52,041.33. I also order costs against the 2nd defendant together with certificate for counsel.

(K Y Chan)
Master of the Court of First Instance,
High Court

Representation:

Mr S Lam, instructed by Messrs Fung Wong Ng & Lam, for the Plaintiff

Miss P Ho of Messrs So, Keung, Yip & Sin, for the 2nd Defendant

21565-EN-2002-01-18

LEUNG WING YIU v. SIU KING YUEN AND OTHERS

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HCA005382B/1996

HCA 5382/1996

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 5382 OF 1996

____________

BETWEEN
LEUNG WING YIU (suing in his capacity as a Partner of Jeb Shun Photographic Company and Jeb Shun Output Service Company)Plaintiff
AND
SIU KING YUEN1st Defendant
JEB SHUN COMPUTER OUTPUT LIMITED2nd Defendant
YEUNG KOON WING3rd Defendant

____________

Coram: Deputy High Court Judge Lam in Chambers

Dates of Hearing: 18 January 2002

Date of Judgment: 18 January 2002

______________

J U D G M E N T

______________

1. I have already given detailed background about these proceedings and this appeal in my judgment of 5 November 2001 and I would not repeat the same here.

2. In the light of my judgment of 5 November 2001, the appeal is now only concerned with the 2nd Defendant and the Plaintiff. At the outset I will deal with the point raised by Mr Chong on behalf of the 2nd Defendant. His submission is that the rationale of my judgment of 5 November 2001 applies equally to the 2nd Defendant, notwithstanding that the 2nd Defendant was not a partner in the partnership. He said so because of paragraph 4 in the order of Cheung J as set out at p.21 of the judgment of Cheung J dated 16 March 2001. That paragraph directed that there would be payment to the 2nd Defendant of all sums found due after the taking of account in sub-paragraph 3 of the order. Sub-paragraph 3 provided for account to be taken by the Master of all monies collected by the Plaintiff and/or Mr Siu and/or Mr Yeung from the new companies, customers and debtors from 1 November 1995 to the date of that order.

3. As stated in my judgment of 5 November 2001 the reason why I say an overall account should be taken is based on the rationale that as between the partners, there is a right akin to a right of set off (see paragraph 12 of my previous judgment). That does not apply to the 2nd Defendant. I have to ask myself whether the order of Cheung J conferred a right of set off upon the 2nd Defendant by reason of the paragraph highlighted by Mr Chong. In general law there is no right of set off because obviously the matters which are directed to be taken into account pursuant to those provisions of the order of Cheung J were not related to furniture, machinery and equipment. I also discern nothing in the order of Cheung J that there should be such a right of set off as far as the 2nd Defendant is concerned. Therefore I hold against Mr Chong on this point. In the light of that I have to deal with the appeal against the order for interim payment by the Master on the basis that there is nothing in the order of Cheung J to prevent the Plaintiff from making that application at this stage.

4. Mr Simon Lam appearing for the Plaintiff pinpointed three outstanding issues. The first question is the date of valuation. Mr Lam argued that the date should be in November 1995. On the hand, Mr Chong said the relevant date should be 14 days after the date of the order of Cheung J.

5. In my judgment reading the order of Cheung J as a whole, it is the intention of Cheung J that the cut off point should be the date of the order. This is reflected in the following provisions in the order:

"(1) An account be taken by the Master of all profits made by the new Company, [that is the 2nd Defendant] during the period from 1 November 1995 to the date of this order.

(2) An account be taken by the Master of all profits made by Mr Siu and Mr Yeung from all business activities of the new company, [that is the 2nd Defendant] during the period from 1 November 1995 to the date of this order.

(3) Payment to the Plaintiff of all sums found due after taking of the accounts and the Plaintiff is to receive sums on behalf of the firms.

(4) Payment to the Plaintiff of interest on sums found at half of judgment rate from 1 November 1995 to the date of this order."

And also at p.21 of Cheung J's judgment, there is an order for:

"(1) an account be taken by the Master of all debts due collected by Mr Siu and/or Mr Yeung and/or the Plaintiff from the firm's customers and debtors from 1 November 1995 to the date of this order.

(3) an account be taken by the Master of all sums collected by the Plaintiff and/or Mr Siu and/or Mr Yeung from 2nd Defendant's customers and debtors from 1 November 1995 to the date of this order."

6. Hence, it is obvious that although the firm was dissolved on 16 January 1996, the intention of the order was that the Plaintiff would still be entitled to benefit from the businesses up to the date of the order. Looking the matter in this way, it is quite clear that up to the date of the order, the use of the furniture, machinery and equipment by the 2nd Defendant should be regarded as with the acquiescence if not express consent of the Plaintiff because otherwise it would be unfair that the Plaintiff should obtain the benefit from such use.

7. In my judgment what paragraph 5 of Cheung J's order provided for is as follow.

8. Upon clarification of the matter by the judgment of Cheung J, the 2nd Defendant was given an option: that is either to deliver up the furniture, machinery and equipment within 14 days or to pay damages for conversion of those furniture, machinery and equipment. The conversion referred to in that paragraph must in my judgment be referring to conversion arising out of the fact that the 2nd Defendant refused to deliver up the furniture, machinery and equipment within 14 days. For these reasons, I agree with the submission of Mr Chong that the correct valuation date should be 14 days from the date of the order. Hence the relevant valuation would be the 2001 valuation. In term of the exact valuation of the plant and machineries, the Plaintiff's expert and the Defendants' expert provided different figures. According to the Plaintiff's expert, the 2001 valuation come up to a figure of $273,000 whilst the figure of the Defendants' expert is $110,900. This being an interim payment application, the court is not in a position to resolve the difference between these experts.

9. Bearing in mind the history of the matter and adopting the relevant test as set out by Stuart Smith LJ in the case of Stringman v McArdle[1994] 1 WLR 1653, the court is to fix a quantum which does not exceed a reasonable proportion of the damages which in the opinion of the court the Plaintiff is likely to recover. Applying that criteria, I propose to take the figure of the Defendants' expert at this stage. In doing so, I bear in mind that in fact the assessment will come on for hearing in February.

10. The third issue that I have to resolve today is whether there should be deduction with regard to the hire purchase payments. This is in respect of items 1-7 in the list of the plant and machinery. The 2nd Defendant has made substantial hire purchase payments with regard to those items.

11. Mr Lam submitted that there should not be any deduction with regard to those. He made a number of points in relation to that. But the one which impressed me is his last point. That is the 2nd Defendant has been using those plant and machineries over the years and the high purchase payment should be regarded as rent for the same. In the hire purchase agreement these payments were in fact described as rental.

12. I should also mention that Mr Lam also cited the case of Chabbra Corporation v Jag Shakti [1986] 1 AC 337, in which the Privy Council decided that the damages for conversion is to be measured by the full market value of the goods.

13. Mr Chong on behalf of the Defendant referred me to the exception mentioned by Lord Brandon at p.345:

"The only exception to the general principle just stated is when B has one or more cross claims against A arising out of the same or some connected transaction. In that case, B may be entitled to set off or deduct the amount of any such cross claim or cross claims from the full market value of the goods in arriving at the amount of the damages recoverable from him by A."

14. In this connection, he referred to sub-paragraph 4 of Cheung J's order at p.21 of his judgment of 16 March 2001. However, that paragraph did not provide for deduction or payment to the 2nd Defendant by the Plaintiff of these hire purchase payments. What this paragraph provided for is payment to the 2nd Defendant in respect of money collected by the Plaintiff from the customers and debtors from 1 November 1995 to the date of the order. Therefore, that order does not give rise to any cross claim in respect of these hire purchase payments. There is also no evidence before me to suggest that upon the account being taken pursuant to paragraph 3 of that part of the order of Cheung J, there would be any amount due from the Plaintiff to the 2nd Defendant. So in my judgment that passage in the judgment of Lord Brandon does not help the 2nd Defendant.

15. Moreover, as I mentioned in the course of arguments, since there will be account taken as to the profit generated to the 2nd Defendant during the period from 1 November 1995 to the date of the order, this hire purchase payments could be regarded as expenses to be deducted from the income of the company. And as I have said, the tenor of the whole of the order of Cheung J is to regard the date of the order as cut off point. If a further deduction is made with regard to the value of these plant and machinery in the calculation of the damages for conversion, there would be deducting the same twice and that would not be fair to the Plaintiff. For these reasons I hold that items 1-7 should not be disregarded in the consideration of the interim payment figure.

16. Applying the aforesaid approach, the figure that I have arrived at for an appropriate sum for interim payment is $36,966.67. I shall allow the appeal of the Plaintiff to that extent and vary the order of Master Yuen accordingly.

(M H Lam)
Deputy Judge of the High Court

Representation:

Mr Simon K C Lam, instructed by Messrs Fung Wong Ng & Lam, for the Plaintiff

Mr Patrick Chong, instructed by Messrs So, Keung, Yip & Sin, for Defendants

25648-EN-2001-11-05

LEUNG WING YIU v. SIU KING YUEN AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCA 5382/1996

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 5382 OF 1996

____________

BETWEEN
LEUNG WING YIU
(suing in his capacity as partner of Jeb Shun Photographic Company and Jeb Shun Output Service Company
Plaintiff
AND
SIU KING YUEN1st Defendant
JEB SHUN COMPUTER OUTPUT LIMITED2nd Defendant
YEUNG KOON WING3rd Defendant

____________

 

Coram: Deputy High Court Judge Lam in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 24 October 2001

Date of Handing Down Judgment: 5 November 2001

_____________

D E C I S I O N

_____________

 

The appeal and the preliminary point

1. This is an appeal against the decision of Master Yuen made on 29 August 2001 in respect of the Plaintiff's application for interim payment. The learned Master ordered the Defendants to pay the Plaintiff forthwith the sum of $7,000 by way of interim payment. The Plaintiff appealed and sought an interim payment of $840,000. On the other hand, the Defendants also cross-appealed and asked for the order be set aside and the application for interim payment be dismissed.

2. The appeal came before me on 24 October 2001. After some arguments by the parties, the Plaintiff applied for an expert report filed on 15 October 2001 to be relied upon although no summons had been issued for that purpose. I have dealt with that application and I decided that if I were to allow the Plaintiff to rely on that report, justice demands that leave and time be given to the Defendants to file a report in reply. Before I gave any directions for the same and adjourned the appeal for that purpose, I was invited by Mr Chong (who appeared for the Defendants) to decide on a preliminary point since it has been fully canvassed before me and if I decide the matter in favour of him on that point, the appeal could be disposed of without any reference to the reports. The point was in respect of the construction of the judgment of Cheung J and its effect on the interim payment application. After hearing Mr Lam (who appeared for the Plaintiff and have no objection to such a course), I decide to accede to such request in the special circumstances of this case. I must stress that I regard it as exceptional for a court to decide on just one of the points raised in the appeal without hearing full arguments as to the other issues. It is not a course to be encouraged and such exercise should not be embarked upon lightly. I fully acknowledge that in general all disputes should be dealt with together (see Hong Kong White Book para.33/4/9). In the present case, the issue has been fully argued before me and by reason of the application of the Plaintiff for admission of new evidence, the hearing of the other issues would have to be adjourned for quite some time. I therefore consider that it is just and convenience that I should not postpone the determination of this issue.

The nature of the dispute in the action and the judgment of Cheung J

3. The present case is exceptional on the facts. We are dealing with an application for interim payment in the context of a partnership dispute. Whilst the Plaintiff relied upon an order for assessment of damages in the judgment of Cheung J of 16 March 2001, I am of the view that one should have regard to the overall position in determining the true purport and effect of that judgment. The Plaintiff and the 1st and 3rd Defendants had been partners in two businesses. The Plaintiff's case was that the 1st and 3rd Defendants have wrongly transferred the businesses to the 2nd Defendant which was a company incorporated by the 1st and 3rd Defendants with one Kung Wing-hong. The defence case was that these were done at a time when further capital was necessary and Mr Kung could provide the same. The transfer was done with the agreement of the Plaintiff. Cheung J found that although there were negotiations and the idea was that the matter would be discussed as the businesses would be carried on with new funds from Mr Kung, the parties had not come to a final agreement on all important issues. Cheung J concluded that the partnership between the Plaintiff and the 1st and 3rd Defendants was dissolved on 16 January 1996. This is important because upon dissolution of the partnership, the Plaintiff's entitlement as a partner, was to have the affairs of the partnership wound up and the accounts of the partnership settled.

4. At the trial before Cheung J, his Lordship was only asked to determine two issues,

(a) whether there was a final and binding agreement among the parties to the effect that the assets and business of Photographic Company and Output Service would be transferred to the new company with effect from 1 November 1995;

(b) if the court finds issue (a) in the defendants' favour, whether the agreement was repudiated by the defendants thereby entitling the plaintiff to terminate the agreement by a letter from his solicitors dated 18 January 1996, and whether the agreement was in fact validly terminated.

5. As mentioned, Cheung J decided issue (a) in favour of the Plaintiff in his judgment of 16 March 2001. There was no need for issue (b) to be considered. His Lordship was then asked to make a declaration dissolving the partnership. There was no dispute that the partnership was dissolved on 16 January 1996 and a declaration was granted accordingly. At p.20-21 of his judgment, Cheung J said,

"The parties had agreed on the relief that they would invite the court to make in the light of the determination by the court. Accordingly, I shall make the following orders :

(1) An account be taken by the Master of all profits made by the new company during the period from 1 November 1995 to the date of this order;

(2) An account be taken by the Master of all profits made by Mr Siu and Mr Yeung from all business activities of the new company during the period from 1 November 1995 to the date of this order;

(3) Payment to the plaintiff of all sums found due after the taking of the accounts. The plaintiff is to receive the sums on behalf of the firms;

(4) Payment to the plaintiff of interest on the sums found at half of the judgment rate from 1 November 1995 to the date of this order;

(5) Delivery up of the furniture, machinery and equipment listed under paragraph 11(c)(i) of the Answer to the Interrogatories for Mr Siu affirmed on 17 July 2000 within 14 days of the date of this order failing which damages for conversion of the furniture, machinery and equipment are to be assessed;

(6) The question of interest on the damages for conversion be reserved to the Master assessing the amount of damages;

(7) A declaration that the firms were dissolved on 16 January 1996;

(8) An account be taken by the Master of the firms' assets, receivables, debts and liabilities as at 16 January 1996;

(9) An inquiry be taken by the Master on whether any of the firms' debts and liabilities have been paid and by whom;

(10) Liberty to apply; and

(11) Costs of the action be to the plaintiff.

The parties further ask the court to make the following orders, which I shall now do :

(1) An account be taken by the Master of all debts collected by Mr Siu and/or Mr Yeung and/or the plaintiff from the firms' customers and debtors from 1 November 1995 to the date of this order;

(2) Payment to the plaintiff of all sums found due after the taking of the account in (1) above. The plaintiff is to receive the sums found on behalf of the firms;

(3) An account be taken by the Master of all monies collected by the plaintiff and/or Mr Siu and/or Mr Yeung from the new company's customers and debtors from 1 November 1995 to the date of this order;

(4) Payment to the new company of all sums found due after the taking of account in (3) above; and

(5) The new company's counterclaim be dismissed and that the costs of the counterclaim be to the plaintiff."

6. The order for delivery up of furniture, machinery and equipment and assessment of damages in the event of failure to deliver up was relied upon by the Plaintiff. Steps were taken by the Plaintiff to have an assessment before Master and directions were given by Master Yuen for that purpose. It was in the context that assessment of damages that the Plaintiff applied by interim payment by a summons dated 20 June 2001.

My analysis of the effect of the judgment of Cheung J

7. In my judgment, one should have regard to the whole of the judgment of Cheung J and the premise on which the orders were made in considering the effect of the same. Delivery up or damages for conversion are not the usual kind of relief granted in respect of partnership disputes. An account is normally required between the partners (see Lindley & Banks on Partnership, 17th Edn., Para.23-72; and Paras.23-116 and 23-121 to 23-128 as to how such account is to be taken). In the winding up of a partnership, each partner is entitled to force a sale of all partnership assets which are capable of being sold and to have the value of any unsaleable asset brought into account by the partner who retains it. No partner can insist on a division of the partnership assets in specie. (see Lindley & Banks on Partnership, 17th Edn., Para.25-54 propositions (2) and (3)) Upon sale, the proceeds would be taken into account in the settlement of the partnership accounts. It follows that in the present context, the Plaintiff could not insist on the return of the furniture, machinery and equipment to him.

8. Mr Lam submitted that I should not go behind the judgment of Cheung J. I agree. However, I still have to ask myself whether the judgment of Cheung J has the effect that the Plaintiff contends for, viz. to give to the Plaintiff the benefits of all these furniture, machinery and equipment notwithstanding that the final account of the partnership has not been settled. The difficulty with such interpretation of the judgment of Cheung J is highlighted by the following contentions of the Plaintiff. Mr Lam argued that in assessing the damages for conversion (and hence in assessing the interim payment), the Court should award to the Plaintiff the full value of these furniture, machinery and equipment without regard to the facts that the Plaintiff was only a 1/3 partner and the Defendants had paid for most of the hire purchase instalments in respect of these goods.

9. I have great difficulty in understanding why the Plaintiff should have such a windfall which clearly exceeds his interest as a partner in those goods. I also doubt very much whether this was the intention of Cheung J in making these orders. Although there is an order for assessment of damages, it is not clear whether the damages is to be assessed on the basis of the limited interest of the Plaintiff in the goods or on the basis of the full value of the goods as contended for by the Plaintiff. Further, it is not clear how this assessment fits into the overall taking of partnership account. There is no provision as to immediate payment by the Defendants to the Plaintiff of such damages upon assessment. Mr Lam contended that it was not necessary to spell this out as this was implied. In a usual case where interlocutory judgment is entered, it is correct that final judgment would be entered in the prescribed form (Form No.43) as of course after the assessment. But can one say the same in respect of the unusual provisions (unusual in the context explained by me in Paragraphs 7 and 8 above) here?

10. The ideal course is to refer the matter back to Cheung J for clarification. However, since the parties did not take such course, I have to try my best in deciding the point. In my judgment, one has to start with the requirement that a partnership account has to be taken and the rationale behind. The rule has been stated by Warrington LJ in Meyer & Co. v. Faber (No.2) [1923] 2 Ch 421 at p.439,

"...in an action by one or more partners, whether using the name of the firm ...or not, against a co-partner alleging that money is due from the defendant to the plaintiffs in connection with the affairs of the firm, whether the claim arises in respect of transactions during the continuance of the partnership, or in the course of the winding up of its affairs after dissolution, the only relief which the plaintiff could obtain would be an account of the dealings and transactions of the partners."

And further at p.441,

"The result is that, in my opinion, neither moneys in the hands of a partner, as the result of his collection and distribution of the assets of a dissolved partnership, nor moneys standing to his debit in the books of the firm, are moneys due to, or held by him for, the firm or proprietors thereof. They could not be recovered by an action in the name of the firm, nor even by an action by the other partners, except after an account has been taken of the dealings and transactions of the partners."

The rationale of this rule can be found at p.437, when Warrington LJ referred to the submissions before the court,

"Secondly, he says further that money got in by one of the partners in a firm can only be recovered in an action by the other partners for an account of the dealings and transactions of the partners in which it would be open to the defendant to show that the money alleged to be in his hands belongs wholly or partially to himself, or even that a larger sum is due to him. That objection is of a substantial character."

(See also Para.23-72 of Lindley & Banks on Partnership, 17th Edn. stating the same rationale for the rule.)

11. To the same effect is the judgment of the Privy Council in Gopala Chetty v. Vijayaraghavachariar [1922] 1 AC 488. It was held in that case that if a partnership has been dissolved but no account has been taken, the proper remedy of a partner in respect of an asset received by another partner is to have an account taken. There was no separate right to sue for the recovery of the asset or a share of it. Hence, if the remedy for an account was time barred, the partner cannot recover by suing for a share in an item as part of the partnership asset.

12. Having regard to such rule and its rationale, it is clear that it is the right of one partner to demand for an overall account to be taken in respect of partnership dealings when he is sued by another partner regarding a specific asset or item in the partnership account. This is particularly so in the winding up of the partnership. In essence, it is a right of set off.

13. In my judgment, what the Plaintiff is seeking to do by proceeding with the assessment of damages without asking for an overall account regarding the partnership to be taken is contrary to these principles of law. The crucial question is whether such a course is warranted by the judgment of Cheung J? Whilst it may follow from an assessment of damages that final judgment would be entered in favour of the Plaintiff, it is at least highly arguable that in the special context of the present case that even if final judgment is to be entered, its enforcement should be stayed pending the other accounts being taken. I see nothing in the judgment of Cheung J to prevent that course from being taken and I note that the judgment did expressly give parties general liberty to apply.

14. Mr Lam argued that the purpose of the order for delivery up and assessment of damages is to give the Plaintiff a right to receive payment of such damages in advance irrespective of the general law. He submitted that such damages would be held by the Plaintiff on behalf of the other partners. That would mean that the Plaintiff would recover the money from the Defendants and then hold part of it for the 1st and 3rd Defendants until final account is taken. I fail to see why I should attribute such an intent to Cheung J, in particular, I cannot discern anything in the order or the judgment of Cheung J nor in the underlying pleadings to suggest that Cheung J wished to depart from the general law when he made these orders. Mr Lam said that the Plaintiff was in effect making a claim against the Defendants on behalf of the whole firm, including the 1st and 3rd Defendants. This cannot be right because although originally, the Plaintiff did sue on behalf of himself and all the partners other than the 1st Defendant, by an amendment to the Writ on 18 December 1998, it was made clear that he was only suing for himself. Further, no action can be maintained against the partners by the firm as a matter of law, see Meyer & Co. v. Faber (No.2) [1923] 2 Ch 421 and Kao, Lee & Yip v. Koo Hoi Yan Donald [1994] 2 HKC 228.

The correct approach

15. Mr Lam also referred to Order 29 rule 11 and submitted that since he was relying on Order 29 Rule 11(1)(b), he was entitled to interim payment subject to the question of quantum in the light of the interlocutory judgment. That is plainly wrong. Rule 11 says the Court may, if it thinks fit, order the respondent to make an interim payment to such amount as it thinks just. The court clearly has a discretion in the matter. Even after an interlocutory judgment, a plaintiff is not entitled to interim payment as of right. In the present case, given the context under which the order for assessment of damages was made and the general principles applicable to dissolution of partnership, I am of the view that the principle set out in Para.23-92 of Lindley & Banks on Partnership, 17th Edn. is equally applicable although in that passage, the learned editor was discussing the matter in the context of Order 29 Rule 12. I hold that in the circumstances of the present case, interim payment should only be made when it can clearly be shown that a balance is due to the Plaintiff without a full account being taken. On the material before me, I am not satisfied that this is such a case.

Conclusions

16. I therefore conclude that the application for interim payment against the 1st and 3rd Defendants should be dismissed. I would therefore set aside Paragraph 1 of the order of Master Yuen and order that the application in paragraph 1 of the Plaintiff's summons of 24th August 2001 be dismissed insofar as the 1st and 3rd Defendants are concerned.

17. However, this does not dispose of the matter with regard to the 2nd Defendant. The 2nd Defendant was not a partner and my above analysis is not directly relevant. However, it follows from what I said in Paragraph 14 above that the Plaintiff can only pursue the application against the 2nd Defendant on the basis of his own interest in the goods, the assessment would be in respect of the conversion of such interest and the application for interim payment should be dealt with in such context. For that purpose, the valuation evidence is relevant and I would give leave to the 2nd Defendant to file its report within 28 days from 24 October 2001. The appeal in respect of the 2nd Defendant is to be restored to a date to be fixed in consultation with counsel's diary.

18. As to costs, I shall reserve my decision until the whole appeal is disposed of.

(M H Lam)
Deputy Judge of High Court

Representation:

Mr Simon K C Lam, instructed by Messrs Fung, Wong, Ng & Lam, for the Plaintiff

Mr Parick Chong, instructed by Messrs So, Keung, Yip & Sin, for the Defendants

20494-EN-2001-03-16

LEUNG WING YIU v. SIU KING YUEN AND OTHERS

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HCA005382A/1996

HCA5382/1996

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO.5382 OF 1996

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BETWEEN
LEUNG WING YIU (suing in his capacity as a partner of Jeb Shun Photographic Company and Jeb Shun Output Service Company)Plaintiff
AND
SIU KING YUEN1st Defendant
JEB SHUN COMPUTER OUTPUT LIMITED2nd Defendant
YEUNG KOON WING3rd Defendant

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Coram: Hon Cheung J in Court

Dates of Hearing: 5 to 8 March 2001

Date of Judgment: 16 March 2001

 

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J U D G M E N T

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The two firms

1. This case began with two partnership business, namely Jeb Shun Photographic Company ("Photographic Company") and Jeb Shun Output Service Company ("Output Service") ("the firms").

2. The plaintiff, the 1st defendant Mr Siu King Yuen ("Mr Siu") and the 3rd defendant Mr Yeung Koon Wing ("Mr Yeung") were the partners of these two firms. Photographic Company was established first, its business was the production of films for printing purpose. Initially the production was done manually, then after Output Service was set up, the partnership used computers to carry out the production.

3. Mr Yeung joined the partnership in September 1995. The firms was then in financial difficulties and the plaintiff had borrowed money from Mr Yeung to be used for the firms. Later on, Mr Yeung was invited to join as a partner and his loans were treated as his capital contribution to the partnership. Although Mr Yeung joined in September 1995, the plaintiff and Mr Siu agreed that he should be treated as having joined the firms on 1 May 1995. The plaintiff was responsible for obtaining orders while Mr Siu was responsible for production. Mr Yeung had no active role to play in the firms. He acted as a consultant.

4. According to the plaintiff, the reason for the financial difficulties of the firms was because of cash flow problems. Although Photographic Company was operating at a profit, there was insufficient work for Output Service. The plaintiff said that Mr Siu was in charge of Output Service. There were also delays by customers of Output Service in paying the invoices. As a result, there were cash flow problems.

Mr Kung's involvement

5. The financial condition of the firms did not improve after Mr Yeung had joined them. Then in August or September 1995, Mr Siu informed the plaintiff that someone, namely Mr Kung Wing Hong ("Mr Kung") was interested to become a partner. He briefly stated that it was better to set up a limited company and Mr Kung wished to inject $860,000 into the firms and that they should prepare an account for Mr Kung. There was no discussion on the details of the investment by Mr Kung.

6. Eventually, in October 1995, Mr Siu arranged the plaintiff and Mr Yeung to meet Mr Kung in a Korean restaurant. At this meeting, Mr Kung did not talk much. Mr Siu introduced Mr Kung by saying that he, i.e. Mr Kung did not know anything about the business. Then Mr Siu talked about the work and their respective positions in the firms afterwards, namely, he would continue to be the production manager, the plaintiff would be the sales manager and Mr Yeung would be the consultant. There was no discussion on the nature of job for Mr Kung or Mr Kung's investment. Mr Siu had said that after Mr Kung's injection of the fund, the business would be in the form of a limited company. He also said that Mr Kung wanted 51% of the shares and the remaining 49% would be divided between the plaintiff, Mr Siu and Mr Yeung. The plaintiff's thinking was that since capital was required for the firms, therefore, he considered that they should carry on with the business first and discuss the details later. The plaintiff said that he had agreed to Mr Kung injecting fund and he also agreed that the firms would be changed to a limited company. He hoped that after Mr Kung had injected the capital, the liability of the firms would be transferred to the limited company. However, this was not discussed by them.

7. On 31 October 1995, Mr Kung began to work at the firms. Although he had not paid up the capital at that stage, nevertheless, the plaintiff accepted Mr Kung's presence in the firms.

The subsequent events

8. In November 1995, the plaintiff saw a Memorandum and

Articles of Association of the 2nd defendant, namely Jeb Shun Computer Output Limited ("the new company"). He realized then that the new company had been established on 31 October 1995. He discovered that he was allotted 16,333 shares in the new company and that the directors of the new company were Mr Siu and Mr Kung only. He was not consulted as to who should be the directors.

9. On 14 November 1995, the plaintiff attended the Bank of Communication together with Mr Siu and Mr Kung to open new accounts for the new company. The three of them were the authorized signatories, however, Mr Kung's signature was mandatory for the signatures to be effective.

10. At the bank, Mr Siu gave the plaintiff a draft shareholder agreement ("the shareholder agreement"), the content of which is as follows :

"A. 甲方有意與乙方合作共同投資經營電腦分色及影版業務。

B. 乙方目前以捷迅影版公司(Jeb Shun Photographic Co. 商業登記 )及捷迅電腦分色公司(Jeb Shun Output Co.商業登記 ) 名義(以下簡稱 '合夥生意')合夥於香港軒尼詩道344-348號昌業大廈閣樓前座(以下簡稱 '營業地址') 經營電腦分色及菲林製版業務。並以蕭景元為代表人。

C. 甲、乙雙方已在1995年10月31日根據香港公司法例成立捷迅分色有限公司(Jeb Shun Computer Output Ltd) (以後簡稱'公司'), 註冊資本為港幣拾萬元($100,000.00)分為拾萬股,每股壹元。雙方有意利用此有限公司合作經營業務。

現甲、乙兩方協議如下:

1. 甲方以現金港幣捌拾陸萬元(HK$860,000)注入'公司',佔股本51%,即是以面值壹元認購'公司'股份51,000股。其餘$809,000作為免息股東貸款。

2. 乙方以'合夥生意'在'營業地址'內所有機器、傢俬、生財、存貨以及按金於扣除未供分期後作價港幣捌拾陸萬元(HK$860,000)注入'公司',佔股本49%。即是以面值壹元認購'公司'股份49,000股,其餘$811,000作為免息股東貸款。所有未供分期由'公司'承擔。

3. 乙方各人在'公司'中應承擔的分工與原'合夥生意'相同,但董事會日後可根據實際情況修正。

4. '公司'將以與'合夥生意'相同的僱用條件續聘全體員工。各員工入職年資,'公司'繼續承認。

5. 股東貸款,即甲方$809,000,乙方$811,000未經全體股東一致同意,不得取回。

6. 除得全體股東同意,股東存/取貸款,以各股東股權攤分。

7. '公司'董事會名額兩名,由甲方:龔永康及乙方:蕭景元擔任,並由甲方出任董事會主席。

8. 乙方所佔'公司'股份49,000股,分配如下:

a. 蕭景元 16,334股

b. 楊觀榮 16,333股

c. 梁榮耀 16,333股

9. 本協議由1995年11月1日起生效。"

According to another document, 甲方 was Mr Kung while 乙方 were Mr Yeung, Mr Siu and the plaintiff.

11. The plaintiff said that the contents of the shareholder agreement had not been discussed before and he asked Mr Siu to redraft it or he would redraft it himself. He said that he wanted to be a director of the new company, the time for the payment of Mr Kung's investment should be specified and the matter should be handled by a solicitor.

12. Also in November, he discovered a notice with the heading "Company Name Change Notice". The English version of this document stated that from 1 December 1995 (this is a wrong date and no issue arises out of this), the names of Photographic Company and Output Service would be changed to that of the new company. The Chinese version of the notice stated that the change of name would be from 1 November 1995.

13. In November and December, there were two meetings between the plaintiff, Mr Yeung, Mr Siu and Mr Kung (in the 2nd meeting, one Mr Poon was also present) to discuss matters concerning the firms and the new company. The plaintiff had also instructed lawyers to assist him in the dispute. He was informed by his lawyers that a notice of transfer of business was published in a local newspaper and the Gazette on 29 December 1995. The notice stated that Mr Siu, Mr Yeung and the plaintiff as transferors had transferred Photographic Company and Output Service to the new company as of 1 November 1995. The plaintiff had not given his consent to the giving of the notice of transfer.

14. The plaintiff who used to receive a salary of $12,000 from the firms was not paid his salaries from November 1995 onwards. He left the firms on 16 January 1996.

15. On 19 January 1996, one of the plaintiff's former customers sent the plaintiff a letter, issued by the new company, stating that the firms (the letter actually referred to one of the firms as a company called Jeb Shun Computer Service Company, which probably was a mistake) had transferred their business to the new company from 1 November 1995 and any invoice issued on or after that day, even in the names of the firms, are "properties" of the new company.

The plaintiff's complaint

16. The plaintiff complained, among other things, that Mr Siu and Mr Yeung had in breach of their duties as partners of the firms allowed the new company to take over the business of the firms. The new company had passed off as the firms.

The agreed issues

17. The parties agree that there are two issues for the court to determine :

(a) Whether there was a final and binding agreement among the parties to the effect that the assets and business of Photographic Company and Output Service would be transferred to the new company with effect from 1 November 1995; and

(b) If the court finds issue (a) in the defendants' favour, whether the agreement was repudiated by the defendants thereby entitling the plaintiff to terminate the agreement by a letter from his solicitors dated 18 January 1996, and whether the agreement was in fact validly terminated.

The defendants' case

18. According to Mr Kung's evidence, Mr Siu approached Mr Kung and asked him whether he was interested in investing in the firms. After discussions with Mr Siu, it was agreed that he would invest $860,000. He informed Mr Siu that he would acquire the assets and the staff of the firms but not their liabilities. The new company would be set up and the firms would have to be closed. The partners of the firms would be treated as investing the same amount in the new company. Mr Kung did not know the plaintiff or Mr Yeung. Mr Siu informed him that he had discussed the matter with his partners. After Mr Kung had agreed on the amount of the investment, he did not discuss with Mr Siu the percentage of his shareholding. This was a matter that needed to be discussed but since the two parties would each invest $860,000, then the amount of shareholding would be 50/50 each.

19. Mr Siu said that in August or September 1995, he had a discussion with the plaintiff and Mr Yeung in a Korean restaurant in Wanchai. He informed them that Mr Kung would join their business and would inject $860,000. A new company was to be set up and Mr Kung would have 51% shares in this new company while the three of them would have 49% of the shares. The new company would not be responsible for the debts of the firms. The plaintiff and Mr Yeung said that there would be no problem. Mr Siu then discussed the matter with Mr Kung.

20. Mr Siu then arranged Mr Kung to meet the plaintiff and Mr Yeung for dinner in a Korean restaurant. At this dinner, Mr Siu repeated what he had said earlier in September, namely that the new company would not be responsible for the debts of the firms. The new company would continue payment of the hire purchase instalments of the machine bought by the firms. Mr Kung would put up $860,000 which was treated as buying up the old machines of the firms. Mr Kung would have 51% shareholding while the three of them would have 49%. Mr Siu then asked if the plaintiff and Mr Yeung had any comments, and they replied "No".

21. After this meeting, Mr Siu arranged for the new company to be set up, which eventually was incorporated on 31 October 1995. Mr Kung also went to the office of the firms to learn how the business was conducted.

22. The new company entered into contracts of employment with the staff of the firms. Five of the staff, however, commenced proceedings in the Labour Tribunal against the firms, seeking severance payment and a proportion of their double-pay. The matter was not contested and the staff received their claim.

23. Mr Kung did not invest the $860,000 all at once. He had made payments for the purchase of equipment and furniture for the new company. He also had made payment for the decoration work which had been carried out in the premises of the firms. He had paid for the salaries and he had made three deposits to the account of the new company in the sums of $100,000, $123,649 and $100,000 respectively. After the new company was set up, Mr Siu instructed Mr Poon to draft the shareholder agreement.

Conflict of evidence

24. There is a conflict of evidence between the plaintiff and the defendants on a number of matters, such as first, whether prior to the meeting with Mr Kung in the Korean restaurant, there was another meeting in the Korean restaurant where the three partners discussed about Mr Kung joining the firms. Second, whether the plaintiff was told that Mr Kung would not take over the liabilities of the firms.

Prior meeting

25. As the events had taken place so many years ago, it is unlikely that the parties would have a clear recollection as whether they had a prior discussion in a Korean restaurant. In so far as Mr Yeung's evidence is concerned, he obviously is not a reliable witness and he did not have any recollection of the events that took place in 1995. What is apparent is that he had agreed to become a partner of the firms because of his previous loans to the firms and also the firms had owed him money in trading transactions. So long as he was not required to make further investments, he would be happy to leave the matter either to the plaintiff or Mr Siu. I accept the plaintiff's evidence that there was no prior meeting in the Korean restaurant discussing Mr Kung's investment. I accept the plaintiff's evidence that Mr Siu had in August or September 1995 informed him of Mr Kung's intention to invest $860,000 in the firms. However, I do not find that Mr Siu had informed him that Mr Kung would not be responsible for the liabilities of the firms.

No discussion on the liabilities of the firms

26. Regarding the discussions between Mr Siu and Mr Kung personally, Mr Kung accepted that what he had agreed with Mr Siu was subject to the approval by the other partners to the firms. Mr Kung stated that he had insisted on the setting up of a limited company because he had previous experience with a partnership business and he found the accounts of a partnership were not as well prepared as that of a limited company. I find that his insistence on a limited company was what he had told Mr Siu at that time, but there was no discussion on the new company not being responsible for the liabilities of the firms.

27. Mr Siu, when he related to the plaintiff of his discussion with Mr Kung, also did not mention to him about Mr Kung not being responsible for the liabilities of the firms. The picture that emerges from the evidence is that the firms were in financial difficulties. They could not even pay the salaries of the staff or rent on time. It was at the forefront of everyone's mind that a new investor would be injecting $860,000 to the firms to help them tide over the difficulties. While no doubt there were also plans to expand the firms by acquiring new equipments, clearly, the partners' concern then was that the money was needed to save the firms from going down. Earlier when Mr Yeung was invited to join as a partner, there was no discussion that he would not be responsible for the liabilities of the firms. If Mr Siu had informed the plaintiff that Mr Kung would not be responsible for the liabilities, I would expect him to react differently.

28. As to the meeting of the four of them in the Korean restaurant, I further find that there was no discussion that Mr Kung would not be responsible for the liabilities of the firms. I find that it was Mr Siu who did the talking at this meeting and Mr Kung did not say much. I find that he had not raised the issue of Mr Kung not wanting the liabilities of the firms. Further, if the parties had actually discussed this issue, then I would expect the shareholder agreement which Mr Siu instructed Mr Poon to prepare would reflect this agreement as well. While it provided for the investment of $860,000 by Mr Kung and that the respective shareholdings would be 51% for Mr Kung and 49% for the partners, it was silent on Mr Kung not being responsible for the liabilities of the firms. I find this to be a glaring omission which showed that the parties had not discussed this point before.

No concluded agreement

29. The defendants' case is that based on the two discussions in the Korean restaurant, there was a concluded agreement in which the new company would take over the assets and business of the firms as from 1 November 1995. I do not find this to be the case. Even if, for the purpose of argument, Mr Siu had informed the plaintiff that Mr Kung would not be responsible for the liabilities of the firms, I still do not find that a concluded agreement had been reached between the parties. I find that there was a general agreement between the four of them that Mr Kung would invest $860,000 into the firms and a new company would be set up which would take over the two firms. However, the details concerning the operation of this new company and how it would take over the firms remained to be discussed. The idea then was that this matter would be discussed as they carried on with the business with the new funds from Mr Kung. There were obviously important and major issues to be agreed between the parties concerning their co-operation.

The major issues

30. Among the major issues that had not been agreed include the following :

1) The composition of the board of directors of the new company. The plaintiff was one of the three partners of the firms, he obviously had taken an active role in the operation of the firms. In fact, he was the one who set up the firms and later on had invited Mr Siu and Mr Yeung to join. If by 1 November 1995, the new company had in fact taken over the assets and business of the firms, then obviously he should be a director of the new company. However, only Mr Kung and Mr Siu were directors. Mr Siu stated that he had informed Mr Yeung that the two of them would be directors but he had forgotten to tell the plaintiff that this was the case. In my view, this is a feeble excuse. Mr Siu had not forgotten to tell the plaintiff but, rather, he had deliberately chosen not to reveal this to the plaintiff for fear that he might object to this arrangement.

31. As it turned out when the plaintiff found out that he was not a member of the board, he took strong objections to this. Mr Kung said that he was quite prepared to let the plaintiff becoming a director in the new company. In my view, the matter is not simply a decision by Mr Kung and Mr Siu to allow the plaintiff to become a director. Rather, this is a matter that must be agreed between all of them beforehand in order for a full and complete agreement to be reached. The attitude of the plaintiff, as reflected in the discussion between the parties in the two meetings in November and December 1995 respectively and also in his letter dated 4 December 1995, are consistent on this issue, that is, his exclusion from the board of directors was not the result of discussion between the parties. The plaintiff's statement in the letter that the purpose of setting up the new company was to take over the business of the firms is not an indication that as from 1 November 1995, after the new company was set up, it had taken over all the business of the firms. The intention of the letter is clearly to complain that he had always been a member of the management of the firms and he was now excluded from it.

32. Also the reference by the plaintiff in his letter to a general consensus or agreement must be viewed in the context in which these words were used. They were not an indication that a final and concluded agreement had been reached between the parties. The plaintiff's entitlement to be a director was the issue that he had focused in this letter. It does not mean that all the other terms had firmly been resolved prior to 1 November 1995.

2) If 1 November 1995 was intended to be a cut-off date, then obviously the parties would need a firm agreement as to when and how Mr Kung's $860,000 would be injected into the firms. There was no discussion on this topic and Mr Kung's contribution of $860,000 by various payments and in various forms supported the plaintiff's case that the only agreement that had been reached was that the matter would be discussed as they carried on with the business. The shareholder agreement divided the $860,000 into two parts : $51,000 being the price of the shares and $809,000 being directors' loans. Obviously, this needed to be discussed between the parties beforehand. This was not done.

3) There was no discussion on the receivables by the firms. While Mr Siu accepted that there was no discussion, Mr Kung stated that there was such a discussion. I do not find this to be the case. As in many of the major issues, the parties simply had not applied their mind to this matter.

4) Matter regarding the transfer of the staff to the new company. It is again a matter that was not discussed, otherwise, the episode of the employees suing for severance payments and pro rata double-pay would have been avoided.

5) Matters relating to the payment of the salaries of the partners and dividends were not discussed. It turned out that the plaintiff was not paid his salaries from November 1995 to the time when he left.

Parties in continuing negotiation

33. As pointed out by Donaldson MR in Pagnan S.P.A. v. Granaria B.V. and others [1986] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 547, in cases where there is a dispute on whether an agreement has been reached or not, there are usually three possible analyses to the situation :

".... First, the parties have indeed concluded an agreement, but thereafter one or both have sought to resile from that agreement or to amend what has been agreed. Alternatively, the true view may be that the parties were in agreement on all the terms but had not yet agreed to contract on those terms. That is more familiar in land law where there is a 'subject to contract' situation, but it can arise in commercial contracts. The third possibility is that the parties were not really agreed on all the terms, even if they appeared to be or thought that they were, due to some misunderstanding or muddle, the true analysis being that there had been a pause in the negotiations but the negotiations viewed as a whole were a continuing process and the point at which it could be said that a contract had been concluded had never been reached."

34. In my view, this is clearly a case where the parties were still in a state of negotiation on and after 1 November 1995 that there was not a point at which a concluded agreement had been reached between the parties.

35. This is not the situation as discussed in Chitty on Contracts, 28th Edn, Vol.1, at paragraph 2-118 where the court would give effect to an agreement which provides for further terms to be agreed. The matters I have referred to are not minor matters to be resolved after the parties have reached a concluded agreement. At that stage, there was some urgency in the matter because according to the defendants, they wished to take advantage of the price discounts offered by the seller of computer equipments in an exhibition. As Mr Kung's investment was required to acquire these equipments, the matter was proceeded with haste. However, that does not mean that a concluded agreement had been arrived at.

Conduct of the plaintiff

36. The defendants argued that the conduct of the plaintiff clearly showed that an agreement had been reached between the parties on the new company taking over the assets and business of the firms on 1 November 1995. It is suggested that the plaintiff had attended the exhibition of the equipments together with the defendants. The plaintiff denied that he had attended this exhibition. I accept his evidence on this.

37. It is suggested that on 9 November 1995, he had signed the agreement with the seller of the equipments. The contract was entered into between the new company and the seller. The plaintiff's evidence was that he was called back to the office to sign the agreement and he left afterwards. The evidence of the defendants was that the plaintiff was present when the sales representatives of the seller took the contract to their office, the plaintiff then took the agreement, read it and signed it himself. I find that the plaintiff obviously knew that the contract was entered into by the new company. It makes no sense that this new equipment was acquired by the firms. However, in my view, this does not mean that a concluded agreement as suggested by the defendant had been reached earlier. The new company obviously needed to carry out its business. Details on how the firms would be taken over by the new company was a matter that needed to be resolved.

38. The plaintiff was also one of the authorized signatories of the bank account of the new company. Again, this is not an indication that a concluded agreement had been reached for reasons I had stated.

39. The plaintiff had also paid a proportion of the claims lodged by the employees of the firms in the Labour Tribunal. I do not think the plaintiff had a real choice in this matter in the light of the order made by the Labour Tribunal.

40. It is said that the plaintiff had issued invoices with the letterhead of the new company to customers. The evidence on the invoices were a little bit confusing. The plaintiff said that he had put a handwritten prefix "A" to the number of the invoice to distinguish products produced with the equipment purchased by Mr Kung. It is not necessary for me to go into the evidence. The mere fact that the plaintiff had issued invoices with the letterhead of the new company is not conclusive evidence on the alleged concluded agreement. The plaintiff had likewise, during the same period of time, continued to use the cheques of the firms to pay for expenses, these expenses are not referable only to the firms. The administrative acts of issuing invoices cannot be seized upon as evidence in support of the defendants' case.

41. The defendants also relied on the fact that on 18 December 1995, the plaintiff offered to sell his shares in the new company to Mr Yeung. The plaintiff had said that he had not accepted the shareholdings of the new company. It is submitted that the offer by the plaintiff to sell his shareholdings is inconsistent with his claim that no agreement had been reached. In my view, the real issue in this case is not whether the plaintiff had, by accepting the shares, also accepted a binding agreement. Even if the plaintiff had accepted the shares, there were still major outstanding issues to be resolved. In any event, at that stage, the plaintiff was obviously frustrated by the actions of the defendants. His confidence with Mr Siu and Mr Kung had clearly been lost and the plaintiff wished to sell the shares in order to get out from the situation.

Credibility

42. The plaintiff was further attacked on his credibility by reference to his complaints to police against the defendants. In one of the statements to the police, he alleged that Mr Siu, Mr Yeung and Mr Kung might have forged his signature. The evidence revealed that his signature was not even on the relevant document. The plaintiff accepted that he was wrong in writing in such a way. Looking at the case as a whole, I find the plaintiff to be a truthful and honest witness and this particular episode does not affect my assessment of his credibility. The recording of the two meetings in November and December were taken by the plaintiff without the knowledge of the others. In these recordings, the plaintiff sounded aggressive and agitated. In my view, one would expect him to react in such a manner when he found out that he was actually excluded as a director in the new company. This is not a reflection that he deliberately wished to resile from any agreement that had been reached between the parties.

Conclusion

43. To conclude, I find for the plaintiff on the first issue that the parties invited me to decide. This being the case, it is not necessary for me to deal with the second issue.

44. The parties had also invited me to make a declaration dissolving the firms. As pointed out by Lindley and Banks on Partnership, 17th Edn, paragraph 24-01, in the case of a partnership, dissolution invariably refers to the moment of time when the ongoing nature of the partnership relation terminates, even though the partners may continue to be associated together in a new partnership or merely for the purposes of winding-up the firms' affairs. In this case, the firms were not terminated on 1 November 1995 when the new company carried its business at the same address of the old firms. However, the firms clearly were dissolved on 16 January 1996 when the plaintiff left and did not return to work from that time onwards. This is not a matter that was in dispute between the parties.

The orders

45. The parties had agreed on the relief that they would invite the court to make in the light of the determination by the court. Accordingly, I shall make the following orders :

(1) An account be taken by the Master of all profits made by the new company during the period from 1 November 1995 to the date of this order;

(2) An account be taken by the Master of all profits made by Mr Siu and Mr Yeung from all business activities of the new company during the period from 1 November 1995 to the date of this order;

(3) Payment to the plaintiff of all sums found due after the taking of the accounts. The plaintiff is to receive the sums on behalf of the firms;

(4) Payment to the plaintiff of interest on the sums found at half of the judgment rate from 1 November 1995 to the date of this order;

(5) Delivery up of the furniture, machinery and equipment listed under paragraph 11(c)(i) of the Answer to the Interrogatories for Mr Siu affirmed on 17 July 2000 within 14 days of the date of this order failing which damages for conversion of the furniture, machinery and equipment are to be assessed;

(6) The question of interest on the damages for conversion be reserved to the Master assessing the amount of damages;

(7) A declaration that the firms were dissolved on 16 January 1996;

(8) An account be taken by the Master of the firms' assets, receivables, debts and liabilities as at 16 January 1996;

(9) An inquiry be taken by the Master on whether any of the firms' debts and liabilities have been paid and by whom;

(10) Liberty to apply; and

(11) Costs of the action be to the plaintiff.

46. The parties further ask the court to make the following orders, which I shall now do :

(1) An account be taken by the Master of all debts collected by Mr Siu and/or Mr Yeung and/or the plaintiff from the firms' customers and debtors from 1 November 1995 to the date of this order;

(2) Payment to the plaintiff of all sums found due after the taking of the account in (1) above. The plaintiff is to receive the sums found on behalf of the firms;

(3) An account be taken by the Master of all monies collected by the plaintiff and/or Mr Siu and/or Mr Yeung from the new company's customers and debtors from 1 November 1995 to the date of this order;

(4) Payment to the new company of all sums found due after the taking of account in (3) above; and

(5) The new company's counterclaim be dismissed and that the costs of the counterclaim be to the plaintiff.

47. The plaintiff further undertakes that in the event that judgment is entered in his favour, he will within 30 days of the judgment execute the necessary documents prepared by the defendants to effect the transfer of the 16,333 shares of the new company registered in his name to a person or persons to be nominated by the defendants at a nominal sum of HK$1. The transfer is to be at the defendants' expense.

 

 

(P. Cheung)
Judge of the Court of First Instance,
High Court

 

Representation:

Mr Simon K.C. Lam, instructed by Messrs Fung, Wong, Ng & Lam, for the Plaintiff

Mr P.K. Chan, instructed by Messrs So, Keung, Yip & Sin, for the Defendants

 

19634-EN-2000-10-19

LEUNG WING YIU v. SIU KING YUEN AND OTHERS

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HCA005382/1996

HCA5382/1996

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO.5382 OF 1996

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BETWEEN
LEUNG WING YIU (suing in his capacity as a partner of Jeb Shun Photographic Company and Jeb Shun Output Service Company)Plaintiff
AND
SIU KING YUEN1st Defendant
JEB SHUN COMPUTER OUTPUT LIMITED2nd Defendant
YEUNG KOON WING3rd Defendant

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Coram: Hon Cheung J in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 19 October 2000

Date of Decision: 19 October 2000

 

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D E C I S I O N

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1. There are two applications before me : one is an application by the plaintiff to strike out the witness statement of Mr Chan Yat Ming, Gary ("Mr Chan"), the other is an application by the plaintiff to obtain an unless order against all three defendants for not complying with the request for further and better particulars in respect of the answers to the interrogatories.

The striking out application

2. I will deal with the first application first. Mr Chan is one of the witnesses of the 1st and 2nd defendants. In the witness statement, Mr Chan explained that he was asked by the 1st defendant in mid-1996 to prepare the ledger accounts of the 2nd defendant. He was also responsible to make audit adjustments to the ledger accounts in accordance with the audit reports prepared by the auditor of the 2nd defendant. He then explained the various adjustments he made to the ledger accounts.

3. The plaintiff attacked the witness statement on the basis that it offends against the hearsay rule. It is said that the documents produced by Mr Chan in his witness statement showed that many accounting entries were made by a person called "Edith" for the period from November 1995 to February 1996, and the transactions were supported by receipts with dates between November 1995 and February 1996. As Mr Chan only took up the matter from mid-1996, he did not have personal knowledge of the truth of his own statement. Further, adjustments were made according to informations provided by others to Mr Chan.

4. In my view, the fact that the original entries and supporting documents were not prepared by Mr Chan himself does not mean that he could not give evidence on the adjustments he had made on the ledger accounts. By referring to the original entries, primary documents and informations provided by others, it does not mean that he is asserting the truth of these matters. A hearsay notice had been served on these documents on 14 September 2000 subsequent to the service of the summons to strike out. When Mr Chan explained how he made the adjustments, neither is he asserting the truth of the adjusted accounts. Ultimately, whether the original documents are true or not, or whether the matters which had caused him to make adjustments are true or not, are matters to be decided at the trial upon the hearing of all the evidence. This being the case, I fail to see how the plaintiff can succeed in striking out the witness statement.

5. It is said that the hearsay notice was served subsequent to the witness statement and it was served out of time. In my view, the objections are purely technical. In fact, Mr Tang, solicitor for the plaintiff, stated that if I grant leave to serve the hearsay notice out of time, he would withdraw the summons to strike out. It is apparent that there really is no substantial objection to the hearsay notice being served out of time. The trial is only to take place in May of next year. I shall grant leave to the 1st and 2nd defendants to serve the hearsay notice out of time and dismiss the plaintiff's application to strike out.

Unless order application

6. In relation to the second application by the plaintiff, I am satisfied that the request is properly made and that the defendants should provide further and better particulars to their answers. However, I would not impose an unless order as requested by the plaintiff, instead, I would order the defendants to provide the answers within 14 days.

 

 

(P. Cheung)
Judge of the Court of First Instance,
High Court

 

Representation:

Mr David Tang of Messrs Fung, Wong, Ng & Lam, for the Plaintiff

Ms Peggy Ho of Messrs So, Keung, Yip & Sin, for the 1st and 2nd Defendants

The 3rd Defendant, in person