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Personal Injuries Action1996

CHU WO HEUNG AND ANOTHER v. HUI LAI WA AND OTHERS

Related cases with same parties

  • CACV1715/2001CHU WO HEUNG AND ANOTHER v. HUI LAI WA AND OTHERS
  • CACV364/2003CHU WO HEUNG AND ANOTHER v. HUI LAI WA AND OTHERS

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24461-EN-2003-07-18

CHU WO HEUNG AND ANOTHER v. HUI LAI WA AND OTHERS

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HCPI 952/1996

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

PERSONAL INJSURIES CASE NO.952 OF 1996

-----------------------

BETWEEN
CHU WO HEUNG and PAK YUEN SAU the Administratrices of the estate of YUEN FOOK WAH, deceasedPlaintiffs
AND
HUI LAI WA formerly trading as
LUNG FUNG SUPER SEASONAL FRUIT
1st Defendant
WONG SHUET YING and LIU WAI KEUNG2nd Defendant
INCORPORATED OWNERS OF
LUNG FUNG GARDEN
3rd Defendant
WONG PUN WAI4th Defendant
HANG YICK PROPERTIES
MANAGEMENT LTD
5th Defendant
LO MANG LUN, CHAN WAI CHUN NELLY and
CHOW SIU LIN suing on behalf of themselves and
all other owners of Lung Fung Garden,
Fanling Sheung Shui Town, Lot no.20 as on
3 August 1994 except the estate of
Yuen Fook Wah, deceased and
Wong Shuet Ying & Liu Wai Keung
6th Defendant

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Coram: Hon Waung J in Court

Dates of Hearing: 3 to 6, 26 to 28 June 2002

Date of Judgment: 18 July 2003

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J U D G M E N T

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1. On 3 August 1994, Yuen Fook Wah ("the Husband") a resident owner of a flat in Lung Fung Garden, Fanling was killed when an awning erected by the 4th defendant with the permission of the 5th defendant collapsed. A metal pipe of this awning penetrated into the chest of the Husband killing him. The awning was a flimsy and dangerous structure. He left behind his wife, Chu Wo Heung ("the Wife") and two children of the marriage, Chin Pang and Chin Yu. The Wife was then aged 29 and the sons aged 2 and 1. The Husband himself was aged 40.

2. After a trial on liability, Seagroatt J held in May 2001 that the 4th and 5th defendant were both liable for the accident and held the 4th defendant 1/3 to blame and the 5th defendant 2/3 to blame.

3. The parties were unable to agree on quantum and therefore the trial on quantum came before this Court with the main oral evidence coming from the testimony of the Wife. The 4th and 5th defendants ("the Defendants") called no oral evidence.

Life before the accident

4. The Husband was not a native of Hong Kong. He was born in China in 1954 and lived there until coming to Hong Kong in 1971 at the age of 18. He then worked in Hong Kong for some 18 years in various jobs with no known success. In 1989 he met the Wife and also started driving professionally as a driver of goods vehicle between China and Hong Kong.

5. He married the Wife on 22 July 1991. Two children were born to the marriage, the first son in 1992 in Dongguan and the second son in 1993 in Hong Kong. They lived in Dongguan and the regular work of the Husband was to drive his goods vehicle from Dongguan to Hong Kong and then drive back from Hong Kong to Dongguan. His major customer was Cheuk Hung which gave him a lot of work.

6. Payment was made to the Husband by both cheques as well as cash. The bank accounts of the Husband which have been studied at the trial disclosed large number of cash transactions, namely deposits in cash and withdrawal in cash. The true nature of these cash transactions are not stated.

7. The Husband did not keep proper record of his business transactions and practically no documentary material was produced to the Court evidencing his business dealings. The only business record which is of value is the log book pages recording the trips done by the Husband for Cheuk Hung for the period from 1991 to 1993.

8. Over the years, the Husband had managed to purchase properties in China and in Hong Kong. A larger Hong Kong property was purchased to replace the small Hong Kong property bought in early 1992 and sold a few months later. The large Hong Kong property was purchased with bank finance and this property is Lung Fung Garden in Sheung Shui where the Husband met with the accident.

9. The death of the Husband was not known to the Wife immediately after it occurred. She was apparently kept ignorant even though she came to Hong Kong to look for him. Eventually she did find out but that was long afterwards in 1996. She also managed to recover the Hong Kong property where she and her children have resided thereafter.

10. The Husband died leaving behind total assets valued at $3.7 million comprising of funds in various banks totally over $2 million and the Sheung Shui property worth $2.4 million less the mortgage of just under $1 million.

11. The substantial assets left behind by the Husband unfortunately attracted also the attention of the Inland Revenue which then using the Asset Betterment Statement method assessed the income of the Husband for 1990 to 1995 and required additional payment of tax of $477,077. The demanded tax was paid and the assessment of the tax liability of the Husband for those years is the source of substantial argument by the Wife that her Husband's income was very large in the years before his death.

Dispute on quantum

12. What was the amount of income which the Husband earned in the period before his death is critical in this case. This is a question which took up most of the time at the hearing. The Wife unfortunately could not help very much probably because she did not know. I formed a reasonable impression of her as a witness. She came from a rural background in China and she was relatively uneducated. On the whole, I accept her evidence subject to reservation specially when it is clear that she was exaggerating her case. It was however unfortunate that I found it necessary to find against her on many aspects of her case which had been pitched unreasonably high by those acting for her.

13. The parties differ on practically all heads of claim. To assist the Court, Mr Yau for the plaintiffs has helpfully divided up the quantum claims into the following 14 Headings:-

(1) Net Earning;

(2) Loss of Dependency of Wife and children;

(3) Pre-Assessment Period;

(4) Total Pre-Assessment Loss of Dependency;

(5) Multiplier for Loss of Dependency;

(6) Total Post-Assessment Loss of Dependency;

(7) Multiplicand for Pre-Assessment Loss of Accumulated Wealth;

(8) Total Pre-Assessment Loss of Accumulated Wealth;

(9) Multiplier for Loss of Accumulated Wealth;

(10) Total Post-Assessment Loss of Accumulated Wealth;

(11) Bereavement;

(12) Funeral Expenses;

(13) Interest on Bereavement; and

(14) Interest on Accrued Pecuniary Loss.

Earnings

14. Of all the heads of claim the quantum of the income or earning of the Husband was the most contentious part of the whole trial. This is not surprising because of its critical importance, the lack of contemporaneous documentation in support and having regard to the fact that the plaintiffs put up three very different versions on earnings.

15. In the original Statement of Claim endorsed on the Writ dated 10 September 1996, it was pleaded in paragraph 9(a) that:

"The plaintiff was a transportation worker and his monthly salary was estimated to be at least HK$20,000 (subject to discovery). The plaintiff cannot be sure of the figure of the deceased's monthly salary unless and until discovery of the wages record against the deceased's employer was made."

16. In the Re-Re-Re-Amended Statement of Claim dated 26 July 1999, paragraph 9(a) pleaded a totally different case thus:

"The deceased owned a plastic toys factory in Dongguan, China and a transportation business in Hong Kong. The deceased also carried on business of currency exchange in China and his monthly income was estimated to be in the region of HK$300,000."

17. In the Statement of Damages dated 21 February 2001, the third version of the plaintiffs is pleaded thus at paragraphs 1, 2 and 6:

"1. .... At that time, he earned his income and profits from several sources. He owned a lorry (registration no. EZ8537) and used it to carry on the business of transporting goods for reward between Hong Kong and Mainland China under the auspices of Kong Hing Transportation Company. In addition, he and his cousin Yuen Lai Yin set up a toy factory in Dongguan, China. Finally, he carried on an unlicensed money exchange operation in China.

2. ... his gross income at the time of the accident is estimated to be in the region of $200,000 per month. It is further estimated that half of that amount was attributable to the last-mentioned source of income.

...

6, For purpose of assessing loss of dependency and other heads of damages herein, only income of the deceased from the first 2 sources mentioned above would be brought into the account. They would be in the total sum of $100,000. No account will be taken as to the earnings the deceased would make out of the money-exchange operation given the rather risky nature of the business."

18. It can be seen therefore that the original claim made in 1996 of income of $20,000 (not less) jumped to $300,000 in 1999 and then went down to $100,000 in 2001 and that position of $100,000 was maintained at the trial. The bulk of that income of $100,000 was said to be derived from the truck driving business. What the Husband was earning from the truck driving business in the period before his death is therefore central to the final outcome of the trial.

19. I first start with the gross income from the trucking business. The only contemporaneous document submitted to the Court by the plaintiffs on the trucking income is the Cheuk Hung Log Book (341a to 341o) evidencing the trips between Hong Kong and China done by the Husband setting out the dates, the trips and the sums earned. I place great weight on that document ("the Log") and it is not suggested that the Log is anything but genuine, contemporaneous and containing a true record of the relevant transactions. The Log shows that in 1991 the Hong Kong to China leg commands $1,200 but the China to Hong Kong leg commands $900 but that in 1993 the respective legs had gone up to $1,400 and $1,000. The Log also shows that on many days during all those months there were either no trip recorded or that there was only a one-way trip recorded. Two questions were raised arising from this, namely did the Husband work for others apart from Cheuk Hung and whether the Husband was also regularly doing more than one round trip in one day.

20. So far as daily round trip is concerned, it seems to be clear from the nature of the work and the distances covered that it was practically physically impossible to do more than one round trip per day. This goods vehicle transportation makes sense because each truck had to be fully loaded with goods. It takes time to go to a place in Hong Kong and in Dongguan to loan a full cargo and it takes time to unload a cargo (specially if there is not just one pick up or drop off point). It is not realistic to suggest no matter how hard the Husband was prepared to work that it was possible to do more than one round trip per day. In fact it seems to me that the nature of the work was such that it was not possible to do 30 round trips (60 single trips) a month. There must be many days when either there was no work or that there was just enough work for only one single trip and the Husband had to drive back with no cargo or stay the night and return next day with cargo. A study of the Log shows a range of total single trips in one month, from a low of 9 in May 1993 to a high of 34 in October 1991. I accept that Cheuk Hung was not the exclusive customer of the Husband and that whenever there was no work from Cheuk Hung, he worked for others in respect of which there was no record submitted to the Court. Doing the best I can, I find as a fact that the Husband was doing 20 round trips a month or 40 single trips per month at the average rate of $1,100 per trip. I find therefore as a fact that from his truck business his gross income per month was $44,000.

21. Having established a gross income per month from the trucking business the next task is to find out what was the net income after deducting all the trucking expenses, such as fuel, insurance, maintenance, tolls, fees and charges. I have practically nothing to go on coming from the plaintiffs. Mr Yu has referred me to the Report of Annual Survey of Transport and Related Services where the profit margin ranged from 32% (1998) to 49% (1991). It seems to me that this general survey covers truck drivers driving locally in Hong Kong as opposed to the long distance drivers who command by the nature and difficulty of their work a much higher profit margin. Doing the best I can in the circumstances, I find as a fact that the monthly net income of the Husband was $26,400 on the basis that the profit margin was 60%.

22. Mr Yau argued that I should adopt the IRD Asset Betterment Method and that I should not try to work out the actual trucking income of the Husband and the other income of the Husband. I disagree. Firstly because it has to be clearly established by evidence as to what was the income of the Husband and if he had more than one line of income then what was the income from each line. Secondly because having regard to the concession made by the plaintiffs that the money exchange income is to be ignored then an important component of the IRD Asset Betterment Method is undermined. Thirdly because I agree with Mr Yu that the IRD Asset Betterment Method is fundamentally flawed.

23. The foundation of the IRD Asset Betterment Method is that over a period of years the Husband had built up assets of certain value. The assumption is that there was no asset built up prior to that date. There was simply no evidence placed before the Court as to what asset the Husband had in 1989 at the start of the period in question. In fact having regard to the fact that the Husband had been working in Hong Kong for some 18 years prior to 1989, it seems to me somewhat perverse to assume that there was no asset built up at all over those years. I therefore reject the IRD Asset Betterment Method as a means to identify the net income of the Husband or the loss of dependency of his family.

24. It seems to me that in this case, the Court ought to be careful in assessing what was the net income of the Husband and what was the loss of dependency because of several factors. Firstly because of the lack of contemporaneous documents. Secondly because of the lack of independent third party evidence. Thirdly because of the allegation that the Husband was involved in three lines of work, each bringing in income. Fourthly because most of the bank documentation shows that cash was extensively used both to deposit money and to withdraw money but cash has no character which can be related to the true nature of the transaction. The circulation of cash tells nothing. Finally the built up of assets can give a deceiving picture unless one is able to identify the way the asset was built up and in this case, it is almost impossible because of the paucity of data.

25. I therefore do not regard it as being reasonable to indulge in speculating on what was the large income of the Husband from his allegedly fast built up of assets. The Husband was said to have three lines of business and apart from the trucking business on which there is some foundation of certainty, there is very little hard evidence on the other two lines of business.

26. In relation to the money exchange business there was originally in 1996 no allegation that there was such business or that it brought in income. Then there was the subsequent allegation that this business brought in very large income and the final abandonment of any income being derived from money exchange business. The large cash movements in the bank accounts of the Husband might well suggest that in one way or another he was involved in the illegal business of money exchange or of other nature. Afterall long distance travel such as being undertaken on a regular basis by the Husband can give rise to illegal and profitable activity such as smuggling. But these activities could not possibly form a proper basis for claims of loss of proper earnings or loss of dependency.

27. The toy business that the Husband was supposed to have invested into is a murky business with most unsatisfactory evidence. I do not accept the evidence of the Wife on this. There was simply no basis for the Court to find that the Husband had derived any part of his income prior to his death from the toy business.

28. I therefore come to the conclusion in relation to Heading (1) that the Husband was engaged in profitable trucking business with a net income of $26,400 per month. I realise of course that this is a much higher figure than $12,350 submitted by Mr Yu and that it is even higher than the $20,000 figure stated in the Statement of Claim in 1996. But I must have regard to the reality of the boom years in 1991 to 1993. $12,000 would be regarded as a rather low income and certainly wholly inadequate to support a family such as that of the Husband. Here we have someone who had to work long hours with some danger and travelling long distances and quite often even sleeping away from one's home. In all the circumstances, I do not regard the sum I have found of $26,400 to be unreasonable. It is right and I so find.

Loss of dependency

29. The only dependants in this case are the Wife and the two children. I do not regard any other person as being a dependent although some of them such as the mother-in-law might have benefited in the past indirectly through the Wife from the largess of the Husband.

30. The evidence that the Wife and the children came to live in Hong Kong was not challenged and I have no doubt that had the Husband lived, the same thing would have happened, namely that the Wife and the children would move to Hong Kong where they would receive a better education and where the standard living would have been much higher. This would of course entail a much larger contribution from the Husband towards his family.

31. It was argued by Mr Yu in his final submission that the Pre-Assessment award for loss of dependency should be a low $60,000. It was argued on the basis that hardly any loss was suffered because the Wife admitted in evidence that one male friend then another male friend supported her and the children. The Wife was extremely uncomfortable when she gave her evidence about her relationship with these male friends and I can well understand her embarrassment and I accept her evidence on this aspect of the case. What it added up to for me was that she was willing to accept the generosity of boy-friends who had no obligation to provide for her or her family. A young attractive lady cannot be blamed upon loss of a husband and his financial support to accept the help of friends even male friends. Gifts can be received whether in the form of jewellery or a cheque but there are nevertheless gifts and not money earned or legally entitled to. No account should be taken of these private gifts in assessing the Pre-Assessment Loss of Dependency. The position is clearly stated in McGregor on Damages, 16th edition at para.1625. I need to quote only the short passage there cited from Lord Reid's speech in Parry v. Cleaver:

"... be revolting to the ordinary man's sense of justice, and therefore contrary to public policy, that the sufferer should have his damages reduced so that he would gain nothing from the benevolence of his friends or relations or of the public at large, and that the only gainer would be the wrongdoer."

The receipt of a gift before the accident does not reduce the obligation of the Husband to provide for the Wife and the children and I see no reason why after his death, the receipt of a gift by the Wife reduces her loss of dependency.

32. Mr Yu referred to the case of Tegel v. Madden [1995] NSWLR 591 but that is in respect of an application for on leave to appeal on a question turning on facts arising out of a local statute. The facts of our case is very different and I am clearly of the judgment that in this case no account should be taken of the fact that the Wife had received gifts from boy friends.

33. What then is the loss of dependency. Having two young children with the necessity that they have to be educated and properly looked after I have no doubt that a very large proportion of the Husband's net income of $26,400 would have to go the family. I assess the loss of dependency under Heading (2) at $16,000 per month which is a sum sufficient for the Wife and children and out of the total income, there will be enough left for the Husband's own considerable expenses plus a small saving.

34. So far as Pre-Assessment Period [Heading (3)] is concerned, the period in question is from 3 August 1994 (date of accident) to 18 July 2003 (date of Judgment), a period of eight years and 11.5 months or 107.5 months.

35. The total Pre-Assessment Loss of Dependency under Heading (4) is therefore $16,000 times 107.5 months or $1,720,000. This sum is of course much lower than the plaintiffs' final submission figure of $4.3 million but much higher than the Defendants' final submission figure of $60,000.

36. I now turn to the future. The first question which arises relating to the future is the multiplier for loss of dependency [Heading (5)]. The final pleaded figure of the plaintiffs is 13 and at the trial, leave was sought to restore the original pleaded figure of 15. I grant leave but in my judgment, having regard to all the circumstances, a proper multiplier should be 14.

37. Having regard to this multiplied of 14, the Total Post-Assessment Loss of Dependency of the Wife and children under Heading (6) is therefore $16,000 times (14 x 12 less 107.5) or $16,000 times 60.5, namely $968,000. This is to be contrasted with the plaintiffs' final submission figure of $3.95 million and the Defendants' final submission figure of $500,000.

Loss of accumulation of wealth

38. Having regard to the fact that the Husband travelled between China and Hong Kong on a daily basis, a fairly substantial amount would have to be spent by the Husband on himself. I do not regard him as an extravagant person. I believe that he would want to support his family properly as well as trying to save as much as he could from his income. The past history does suggest that he was capable of saving. I would asses the monthly sum he would save at $3,000 [Heading (7)], thereby leaving for his own spending and other expenses a monthly sum of $7,400.

39. The Total Pre-Assessment Loss of Accumulated Wealth [Heading (8)] is therefore $3,000 times 107.5 months or $322,500.

40. Having regard to my finding of multiplier of 14 under Heading (5), the multiplier for Loss of Accumulated Wealth under Heading (9) should also be 14 and it follows therefore that the Total Post-Assessment Loss of Accumulated Wealth [Heading (10)] is $3,000 times (168 less 107.5) or $3,000 times 60.5, namely $181,500.

41. Bereavement under Heading (11) is agreed at $70,000. Funeral expenses under Heading (12) is agreed at $185,000. Interest on Bereavement under Heading (13) is non controversial at 2% per annum.

42. So far as interests on accrued pecuniary loss [Heading (14) is concerned, I hold that interest rate of 4% p.a. should apply.

Conclusion

43. The conclusion is that the final sums I award are:-

Total Pre-Assessment Loss of Dependency$1,720,000
Total Post-Assessment Loss of Dependency$968,000
Total Pre-Assessment Loss of Accumulated Wealth$322,500
Total Post-Assessment Loss of Accumulated Wealth$181,500
Bereavement$70,000
Funeral Expenses$185,000
Interest on Accrued Pecuniary Loss4% p.a.

44. I also make an order nisi for the costs of the Action in favour of the plaintiffs.

45. I further direct that the parties be at liberty to apply to ensure that the order to be drawn up will fairly reflect what is decided in this judgment.

(William Waung)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Representation:

Mr Albert Yau and Miss Jennifer Ng instructed by Messrs Chan Wong and Lam for the Plaintiffs

Mr Benjamin Yu, SC and Mr Alfred Liang instructed by Messrs Pang and Associates for the 5th Defendant

Mr Wong Pun Wai, the 4th defendant appearing in person

Remarks: Appeal by the Plaintiffs to Court of Appeal. Appeal dismissed. Please refer to CACV364/2003

32906-EN-2001-06-29

CHU WO HEUNG AND ANOTHER v. HUI LAI WA AND OTHERS

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HCPI000952/1996

HCPI 952/1996

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO. 952 OF 1996

____________

BETWEENPlaintiffs
CHU WO HEUNG and PAK YUEN SAU, the administratrices of the estate of YUEN FOOK WAH, deceased
AND
HUI LAI WA formerly trading as LUNG FUNG SUPER SEASONAL FRUIT1st Defendant
WONG SHUET YING and LIU WAI KEUNG2nd Defendants
INCORPORATED OWNERS OF LUNG FUNG GARDEN3rd Defendants
WONG PUN WAI4th Defendant
HANG YICK PROPERTIES MANAGEMENT LIMITED5th Defendant
LO MANG LUN, CHAN WAI CHUNG NELLY and CHOW SIU LIN sued on behalf of themselves and all other owners of LUNG FUNG GARDEN, Fanling Sheung Shui Town Lot No. 20 as on 3rd August 1994 except the estate of Yuen Fook Wah,deceased and WONG SHUET YING and LIU WAI KEUNG6th Defendant

____________

Coram: Hon Seagroatt J in Court

Date of Hearing: 7-10 May 2001

Date of Judgment: 29 June 2001

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J U D G M E N T

_______________

1. On the 3 August 1994 at about 1800 hours, Mr Yuen Fook Wah was walking past a line of shop premises in Lung Fung Garden when he was struck by a piece of metal piping which entered his chest and caused his death within a relatively short time. On the face of it, his tragic death was the result of a freak accident. The pipe in question was part of an awning structure outside shop number 39A2 in the Lung Fung Garden commercial complex.

2. At about 1700 hours the Hong Kong Observatory hoisted the rainstorm signal effective until 2200 hours. Heavy rainfall was recorded from about 1800 hours onwards. Winds became stronger gusting on occasions up to 60 k.p.h. The effect of these weather conditions at Lung Hung Garden was to detach the awning structure outside the shop in question from its moorings and cause one of the metal pipes to act as a projectile swinging with such force as to enter a man's chest.

3. It is not disputed that Mr Yuen Fook Wah died as a result of this pipe or pole penetrating his chest. No allegation of contributory negligence could sensibly be made against him. He was going about his lawful business on the pavement or walkway outside these shop premises. It is also agreed that the offending awning structure was attached to part of the shop premises, being number 39A2, a fruit vendor's business. The sole issue is who, singly or in the plural, amongst the Defendants, is or are liable in negligence to the Plaintiffs for the deceased's death.

4. It may be sensible to identify at the outset all the Defendants involved in this action.

The Parties

5. The first Defendant, to whom I shall refer throughout as Madam Hui, is the lady who signed the lease of the shop premises, as lessee, on the 15 July 1994, just over two weeks before this fatal accident. She also signed the application for the Business Registration Certificate for the Lung Fung Super Fruit business to be carried on at these premises. She is unrepresented in these proceedings.

6. The second Defendant, the registered owners of the shop premises who are the lessors under the lease to Madam Hui, are no longer parties to this action, the Plaintiffs having discontinued against them by consent order dated the 25 April 2001. However they remained in the action by reason of the Contribution/Indemnity Notices served by the 5th and 6th Defendants until the first day of the trial and the third day of the trial respectively. I no longer have to be concerned with them in any respect and there is no costs issue to be resolved.

7. The third Defendants being the Incorporated Owners of the premises subsequent to the date of the incident, should not have been involved and were struck out as Defendants by order of the court dated 6th October 2000.

8. The fourth Defendant is the manager of the fruit business at the shop premises in question. He is a friend of Madam Hui. He ordered and arranged the installation of the awning. He was working at the premises when the tragedy occurred. He is also unrepresented in these proceedings.

9. The fifth Defendant is the management company for the Lung Fung Garden complex. Its duties or obligations are set out clearly in the Deed of Mutual Covenant entered into by all the owners of the various units. There are strict requirements imposed upon the various owners to be enforced by the management company.

10. Finally the sixth Defendants are the unincorporated owners at the time of the accident on the 3 August 1994. These unincorporated owners exclude of course the owners of shop premises 39A2, i.e. the original second Defendants. Their relationship with the management company is clearly identified in the Deed of Mutual Covenant. The manager existed and acted as their agent and they had covenanted to that effect.

The Case against the First Defendant

11. This is based entirely on the two documents signed by her as lessee of the shop premises (on the 15 July 1994) and as sole proprietor of the business in the application for a Business Registration Certificate (7 August 1994). The evidence as to how these came about comes from her and the fourth Defendant.

12. Originally Madam Hui's sister who lives on the Mainland was to provide the capital and set up the fruit business with Mr Wong Pun Wai. According to Madam Hui herself, her sister changed her mind preferring to invest the money in a flat. Mr Wong thought that she was still interested in running a business with him but was unable to bring the money over to Hong Kong in time to set up the business in their name or her name.

13. Accordingly Madam Hui was asked to sign the lease and the application in order to protect what was believed by Mr Wong to be her sister's future investment. When his attention was directed to the date on the application form and the fact that he agreed that the sister had ceased to be interested by them, he said the reason for using Madam Hui's name, and persuading her to sign the form was that he did not want his wife who was divorcing him (or he, her) to know he was involved in such a business.

14. Madam Hui says that she is virtually illiterate, that she had no money to invest in a business, paid no rent under the lease, and received no benefit from it. Nor did she play any part in running it. Mr Wong confirmed that she had no part in it and that he alone ran the business with some help from others.

15. Although at one stage I thought his change of explanation for Madam Hui's signature on the application form was facile and may have been a quick change of tune, I have concluded that he was using Madam Hui for his own purposes, that she never intended to play any part in the business, and never did so, and signed her name under mistake of fact and law, without appreciating the implications and potential liabilities. I think she was, at the very least, na?ve, and innocently so.

The Case against the Fourth Defendant

16. I need not repeat the matters set out under my consideration of the First Defendant. Mr Wong admits running the business at the shop premises as his own.

17. He ordered from New Star Company a red awning sometime in July. The invoice is dated the 22 July 1994. Someone from that company came to the premises to take measurements. The awning and fittings were delivered in late July and New Star's employee made preparations to fit and install it. At this stage the evidence takes a significant turn. It comes from Mr Wong himself, no one from the company having been called to give evidence, and the company is not a party to the proceedings.

18. Before the 1 August 1994 he said New Star's employee came prepared to fix the awning. The awning itself was to be attached to the underside of the projecting part of the building which seemed to act as a canopy over the first few feet of the exterior of the shop premises. The awning was then to extend across the forecourt and part of the pavement area, the end of it being stretched and held by a horizontal pipe. That pipe was then supported at either corner by a vertical pipe with a U-shaped cup or fork in which the end of the horizontal pipe rested. These vertical pipes were then braced by two stays or guyropes tightened and secured to a metal ring which was fixed in the ground. It is important to note that the bottom end of the two vertical pipes rested simply on the ground. There was no insert or recess into which the vertical pipes could fit and be given any lateral support. The sole means of support were the two stays or guyropes.

19. However before the awning could be fixed some two or three persons from the Management, the fifth Defendants, came and stopped it from going ahead, saying that no application had been made to fix the awning. How far the installation had gone at that stage is not clear but it is likely that it had not gone further than the positioning of a ladder for New Star's employee to fix one end of the awning to the edge or underside of the projecting tiled concrete canopy. It must have been obvious however that he was in the process of so fixing it.

20. Mr Wong, concerned no doubt to get permission, asked how he should go about it. He was told to produce a drawing showing the awning's dimensions for the Management's consideration. He said that on that same day he made a drawing and took it to the Management office where he saw two of the same people he had seen earlier that day. He explained that he was producing a drawing and making an application for permission to have the awning installed. He was not asked to fill in a form and he was told that he would have to wait for his application to be approved, but he was not told how long it would take. About 3 or 4 days later he visited the office again and asked if it was in order for him to proceed. He was told he could proceed. No written authorisation was given to him. One of the persons present had also been present at the time that he handed over the drawing. Following this he telephoned New Star and arranged for the installation to be carried out the following day. It was duly completed in a few hours - his best recollection was that this was towards the end of July, perhaps the 27 or 28. During the period which followed up to the 3 August he said he frequently saw Management staff walking near the premises, although he cannot recall anyone specifically coming to look at his awning. No one told him to remove it.

21. At this stage it is convenient to consider and contrast the evidence given on behalf of the Management company. It came from Mr Leung Yui then Regional Manager of the 5th Defendants.

22. He explained what the normal procedure was for any tenants seeking to erect awnings. - a formal application with drawing giving the colour of the awning; a visit to the premises by the Management staff; a consideration of the application by him with his staff; then permission or rejection communicated to the applicant within a week. He produced documentation relating to formal applications made collectively by a number of businesses for approval of awnings. It appears that approval or otherwise was communicated orally to the applicants.

23. Although Mr Yeung said that he did not learn of the fatal accident until July or August 1997 some three years later, as a result of these proceedings being commenced, he was able to say that he had visited the premises in question on 1 August, two days before the accident. I need to return to this chronology later but for the moment it is necessary to state that he had no written record of such a visit to rely upon.

24. He says he recalled seeing the awning already fully erected and had the clear impression that it was attached to the underside of the projecting podium. He is correct on this at least. The other end of the awning was held in position by several poles positioned on government land. By that he must mean the pavement itself or the walkway between the kerbed edge of the pavement and the flower and shrub concrete trough.

25. He with his colleagues approached the man in charge of the shop and informed him that he would have to make an application for permission to install the awning otherwise it would have to be removed. A letter and drawings would have to be submitted. He also made complaint about the obstruction of the frontage by the fruit and other goods or items. According to Mr Yeung there were no records or documents in relation to any visit, application or authorisation in respect of the awning, and no recollection on his part of any subsequent visit to these premises though he said his next visit was at the end of the week. He has no recollection in respect of the awning.

26. A number of aspects of his evidence in cross-examination are significant. The reason he requested an application in respect of the awning was that it was attached to the building over which the management company obviously had control and an interest in ensuring that structures were not attached without permission or approval. He did not tell the person in charge of the shop to take the awning down there and then. His approach was that an application should be made or the awning should be removed. He viewed the awning as safe in itself. If he had thought the awning dangerous he would have told the person in charge to take it down straightaway. His concern was that it was not a legal structure - at least, not yet, is the inevitable corollary of his prime thought.

27. There are clear conflicts in the evidence of Mr Wong, the 4th Defendant, and Mr Yeung for the 5th Defendants. Some of them do not matter. They are agreed that there was a visit during which Mr Wong was told that he would have to obtain permission for the awning. Whether it was already fully installed or was being prepared for installation does not really matter. I think Mr Wong is more reliable on this aspect because his recollection would have been triggered by the tragedy which followed so soon afterwards. Mr Yeung on the other hand did not start to reflect upon the position until at least three years later. It may well have been in a somewhat more advanced state of installation than Mr Wong thought but Mr Yeung was concerned to ascertain what form this awning would take. I am satisfied that at some stage he did see it fully installed though this was later than the occasion he mentions.

28. It follows that I am satisfied, because I accept Mr Wong's evidence on this, that he did make application at the management office, to have the awning installed, supported by a drawing, and that several days later he was granted this permission and accordingly arranged for the awning to be installed. I do not accept Mr Yeung's evidence as to the date of the visit by management staff when Mr Wong was told to make an application. Mr Wong was probably correct in putting the occasion several days earlier in July.

29. I also accept his evidence that he was given oral approval for the awning to be installed. There are several factors which support his evidence on this aspect. Mr Yeung did not tell him to take the awning down when he saw it in the course of being installed - or as he says fully installed. At that stage he saw nothing intrinsically wrong or dangerous about it. It was not legal simply because permission had not been given for its existence. Had he had any serious doubts as to whether permission would be granted when sought, he would in my view have said, there and then, that it should be taken down. I also accept that Mr Yeung visited the premises when the awning had been fully installed. I am equally sure that this was after permission had been given and that he is understandably confused and mistaken bearing in mind three years had elapsed before his recollection was activated.

30. Mr Wong's evidence was of course that he was told before it was erected that permission was needed. I have already dealt with his evidence and that of Mr Yeung about the stage reached but what matters is Mr Yeung's attitude and the inferences reasonably to be drawn from it.

31. Photographs taken of the frontage of the business premises, which included the one in question, in 1995 and later, show the existence of some awnings which are significantly different from the structures which the management sought to regulate. I shall return to this topic but they illustrate a rather easy-going attitude by the management toward the awnings installed by shop operators. Despite the form of documents in respect of other applications, I am satisfied on all the evidence that the handling of Mr Wong's application was far less formalised than the ideal - and norm - advanced on behalf of the 5th Defendants.

32. Against this evidential background the Plaintiff's case against the fourth Defendant is quite clear. He installed the awning albeit with permission. It was in my view an inherently dangerous structure with little if any stability or firmness of structure. A passer-by could easily strike one of the vertical poles thus dislodging it and in effect lowering the outer part of the awning which would then become dangerous in at least two respects: the horizontal pole could fall on the head of any passer-by and the vertical pole, no longer vertical, had negligible restraint by the guyrope or stay. Extra stress would be put upon the guyrope. It was eminently foreseeable that moving poles, horizontal or partly vertical or both, constituted an obvious risk of injury to passers-by.

33. The fourth Defendant ought to have appreciated this inherent danger. It was obvious to anyone. In adverse weather conditions, particularly wind and rainstorms, this risk was so heightened that it constituted a threat to anyone in the vicinity. There had been a warning of adverse weather conditions. Such conditions were highly likely to exert upward or downward pressure on the awning. Great strain would be put on the guy-ropes or stays causing them to be slackened or broken. Upward pressure beneath the awning would lift the vertical poles. It had only to lift them a fraction to cause them to move freely, there being no recess to hold them steady.

34. The observatory hoisted a thunderstorm warning at 1700 hours which was to be effective until 2200 hours. Even if Mr Wong was unaware of such a warning, which I find difficult to accept, he was nonetheless aware of worsening weather conditions before the accident and he did nothing. The awning ought to have been taken down.

35. In my judgment he was undoubtedly negligent.

The case against the fifth Defendant

36. I do not need to re-iterate the evidence relating to the management company's knowledge and understanding of the existence of the awning installed nor repeat my findings in that regard.

37. On Mr Yeung's own evidence he had seen the installation. He seems to have discounted the significance of the flimsy installation at the outer end i.e. the poles and guyropes, because they were positioned on government land. It is in fact wholly irrelevant that they were so positioned. What was relevant was that the awning was fixed to the projecting part of the building and extended across the frontage onto the footpath or pavement.

38. Mr Yeung did not appreciate that it was a dangerous structure. He seemed concerned only that it was not legal i.e. that there was no permission from the management for it to be installed. He said that had he appreciated that there was such a danger he would have ordered that it be taken down. And so he left it.

39. It is clear from Mr Yeung's evidence that the shopkeeper was obliged to seek permission to erect such an awning and submit a drawing of its dimensions, that the management exercised control over the existence and form of such structures. They obviously had a responsibility in that regard. They therefore assumed a duty of care towards the public to ensure that no building, structure, fitting or attachment over which they had control constituted a hazard. In purporting to exercise control over this awning they clearly asserted responsibility in that regard.

40. The projecting concrete canopy, to which the awning was fixed, fell within the common parts of the building. It certainly was not within the exclusive possession of the fourth Defendant. The very fact of the demand of Mr Yeung for compliance with the management's requirements makes this doubly clear.

41. By virtue of the Deed of Mutual Covenant the management of the Estate had been delegated by the owners to the Management Company, namely the fifth Defendant. Clause 41 of the Deed provides that:

"The management of the Estate shall be undertaken by the Manager and in accordance with the conditions from the date of issue of the first Occupation Permit for any part of the Estate and each owner hereby appoints the Manager irrevocably as afterway to enforce the provisions of this Deed."

42. The fifth Defendant had thereby contractually assumed the rights and obligations in respect of the common parts of the building constituting the estate. As I have already stated, their attitude towards the awning and the requirements they imposed upon the fourth Defendant is a clear assertion of their responsibility and liability in this regard. The contrary is just not arguable. The duty of care imposed upon the fifth Defendant extended to all members of the public, including other owners, to ensure that the awning, or any attachment to or extension of the common parts, or any section of the common parts themselves e.g. the projected canopy, was reasonably safe at all times.

43. In Cunard v Antifyre 1933 1 K.B. 551 Talbot, J. said, (at p. 562) in relation to a claim for damages for personal injuries occasioned by the fall of guttering from the main roof of a building through the glass roof of a kitchen of a third floor flat:

"There is no doubt that if this guttering had overhung the street in the condition proved in the case ..... and had fallen on someone passing below and injured him, that person would have had an action against the defendants on the principle of Tarry v. Ashton (1876 1 Q.B.D. 314). What is that principle? It is in our opinion that anyone in occupation and control of something hung over a place, - (to this could equally well be added 'or attached to part of a building') - in which people may be expected lawfully to be, is bound to take reasonable care that it does not fall and injure them. This seems to us to be both law and justice; ..... it makes no difference whether the Plaintiff was on the highway ..... or in any other place where he had a right to be, and where people might be expected to be."

44. The fifth Defendant was undoubtedly negligent in allowing a structure of this nature to exist in the first place. The danger was obvious. Furthermore the fifth Defendant ought to have been aware of the weather warning that late afternoon/early evening. Mr Yeung said that the Management had a practice of informing of rainstorm warnings. Saddled with the knowledge of the existence of such a flimsy awning structure it ought to have conducted a patrol to ensure that it was closed down and stowed. That itself was negligent.

45. I ought to state at this stage that I find the fifth Defendant's claim that it exercised strict control over the form and nature of awnings on this estate wholly lacking in conviction, not simply on the basis of the evidence to which I have already referred but also in the light of the photographic evidence of the situation just less than a year later.

46. In a photograph of the shop frontages taken in May 1995, a slack and relatively loose, large coloured awning extends across the footway and walkway and is tied at its two outer corners to the branches or trunk of trees in the concrete trough (A-1). One can also see a smaller but similar slack or loose awning, shorter than the former with no obvious, outer form of attachment (B-1). It is agreed that one of these fronted the fourth defendant's leased premises. Two inferences are irresistible. Firstly, the Management Company did not enforce a consistent policy. Secondly they acquiesced in some rather "ad hoc" awnings of doubtful efficiency and safety. Both factors support, if extra support were needed, the conclusion that in relation to the fourth Defendant's awning the Management was prepared at best to tolerate it, at worst to be totally indifferent to its style, fixing and the hazard posed. On his own evidence Mr Leung seemed more interested in the nuisance or inconvenience which could be caused by the displays of fruit and vegetables extending beyond the shop frontage to the pavement and walkway.

47. In his written submissions Mr Sarony S C, for the fifth Defendant, seeks to rely on a number of cases in support of some propositions. I will deal with each submission in turn. Wong Lai Kai v. Incorporated Owners of Lok Fu Building, Yuen Long 2000 3 HKC p. 633 is readily distinguishable on the facts. It has no relevance to the facts of this case.

48. Although the Deed of Mutual Covenant governed the relationship between the owners and the Management Company, the latter assumed the obligations and the duty of care towards the public. It is not necessary for the Plaintiffs to rely upon or plead a breach of the Deed of Mutual Covenant. The Deed is evidence of the assumption of the duty of care by the fifth Defendant. Mr Sarony's point hereunder is not valid.

49. The Plaintiff's case is not based upon "pure omission" as Mr Sarony describes it. The evidence is quite clear that the fifth Defendant regarded itself as responsible for any such structures. It had a declared policy though, as I have found, it was not consistently followed. It acquiesced in the continuance of the awning, and it had given permission for it; it was obviously dangerous, it seemed not to have appreciated the danger, it was responsible for its existence. "Pure omission" is not sustainable as a description of the fifth Defendant's role.

50. The suggestion that there was a "latent defect" of which the fifth Defendant was unaware is not sustainable on the evidence. This was a flimsy structure vulnerable to collapse under ordinary circumstances. It is not possible to determine whether the guyrope(s) or stay(s) broke or simply became loose and detached in the weather conditions. That does not matter. Such was the form of the structure that strong winds would have dislodged the poles from their resting position and allowed them to have a flailing effect. This, as I have found, was entirely foreseeable; indeed, it was so obvious that it would not withstand moderate wind conditions that it should have been taken down, at the latest, when a wind threatened. It would not have taken freak weather conditions to bring about collapse or partial collapse of the structure.

51. The suggestion that because the poles and/or stays or guyropes were positioned on Government land i.e. the pavement and/or walkway, the fifth Defendants were relieved of any liability for structures attached to common parts is unsound in law and logic.

52. Mr Sarony's reference to Sellers LJ's judgment in Walsh v. Holst Co Ltd 1958 1 W.L.R. 800 does not assist. The facts are entirely different. In the light of the evidence and the facts which I have found the alleged "reasonable precautions" taken by the fifth Defendant have no relevance. In any event they were not "reasonable".

53. In my judgment the awning so obviously gave rise to a danger that it would be flying in the face of common sense to assert the contrary. It may well be that the type of injury which resulted was unusual, even not foreseeable i.e. the penetration of a man's chest by a bar or pole with fatal consequences, but I reject any argument that injury of some type, even fatal, was not foreseeable. It seems to me that to argue the contrary lacks any appreciation of the potential effect of a structure which becomes subject to the predictable forces of nature.

54. I do not need to consider the claim on the basis of nuisance and therefore do not propose to canvass the issue further other than to say that I do not consider the claim lies in nuisance.

The case against the Sixth Defendants

55. All owners are responsible for the common parts. These owners had, under the Deed of Mutual Covenant, contracted to appoint the Manager (the fifth Defendant) to manage the Estate. That included management of the common parts which themselves included the canopy to which the awning was fixed. This is a standard provision in the management of such estates.

56. Mr George Lam, on behalf of these unincorporated owners cites the pithy, uncontroversial statement of Lord Bridge in D.&.F. Estate Ltd v. Church Commissioners for England 1989 A.C. p. 177.

"...the employer of an independent contractor is, in general, not liable for the negligence or other torts committed by the contractor in the course of the execution of his work."

57. The carrying out of management work is in my judgment, clearly a delegable duty. It is to be distinguished from the duty of an employer towards his employee.

58. Had the owners of the common parts adequately discharged their duty? In my view one need not look beyond the clause A1 in the Deed of Mutual Covenant and the evidence of Mr Leung who unequivocally set out that the Management Company in acting in the way he described, was, purportedly, discharging the delegated duty.

59. This is of course very much an academic exercise in this case. The fifth Defendants have agreed to indemnity the sixth Defendants in respect of any liability for damages and costs adjudged in this case. This extends to a dismissal of the fifth Defendant's indemnity/contribution proceedings against the sixth Defendants with costs. It is difficult to see how on the fifth Defendant's own evidence, and the documents, how any such contribution/proceedings could have been maintained in the first instance, let alone for the length of time which ensued.

60. I am satisfied that no liability rests with the sixth Defendants, they having discharged their duty.

Conclusion

61. The Plaintiff succeeds against both the fourth and fifth Defendants. I am equally satisfied that the first Defendant has no liability. She had no realisation of the significance of the documents which she signed. She thought that she was signing them merely to protect her sister's position. She did not realise that any liability would attach to her by her so doing. The fourth Defendant confirmed the generality of this and I am satisfied that he was using her for his own purposes, though he may have had some confused thinking about the sister's position. The sister was his original proposed partner in the venture.

62. There are contribution/indemnity proceedings between the fourth and fifth Defendants. Accordingly I must make a finding as to the respective proportion of their liabilities. In my judgment the fifth Defendant must bear the larger share of the responsibility. It was responsible for ensuring that the shop tenants complied with certain requirements. Through its servants or agents, it examined, or had the opportunity to examine the awning. It gave permission for it to be erected. On their own evidence they allowed it to continue in position. It posed an obvious danger. In my view they relieved the shop tenant, the fourth Defendant, of a degree of responsibility, which was a significant degree, by so doing. They had far more experience than he had. The photographic evidence of what they continued to allow to exist as awnings indicates their gross failure, as I find it to be, to discharge their duty as the Management company. In these circumstances, it is small wonder that the fourth Defendant had a reduced awareness of, or concern for the obvious hazards presented by this awning. The fourth Defendant is liable to the extent of one-third, and the fifth Defendant is liable to the extent of two-thirds. I make contribution orders accordingly between those two Defendants.

63. There will be judgment for the Plaintiff against the fourth and fifth Defendants with costs, and for damages to be assessed.

64. There will be judgment for the first Defendant with costs to be paid by the fifth Defendant. The fourth Defendant did not contend that the first Defendant was liable.

65. There will be judgment for the sixth Defendant with costs to be paid by the fifth Defendants, such costs to include the costs of the contribution/indemnity proceedings. I make this order out of an abundance of caution in case it is not already formally recorded.

66. It would not be right to conclude this judgment without expressing my recognition of the lucid and wholly valuable written submissions by Mr Albert Yau for the Plaintiff. He set out in a balanced and authoritative way the case in relation to all Defendants. He bore in mind the fact that the first and fourth Defendants were unrepresented and unable to make proper submissions themselves. He demonstrated commendable fairness in their regard. His was quite the best statement of all the issues and law that I have seen for a long time.

67. Likewise Mr George Lam for the sixth Defendants was economical, succinct and entirely to the point. This was also extremely helpful.

Interim Award of Damages

68. There is a substantial difference between the Plaintiff's claimed loss of earnings and that conceded by the 5th Defendant. However for the purposes of this I propose to take simply the figure conceded by the 5th Defendant reduced solely for this exercise to a dependency of $20,000 monthly which is, I readily agree, far too low on the basis of the Inland Revenue assessments. In so doing all the arguments remain at large.

69. The multiplier for the loss of dependency is 13 conceded by the 5th Defendant. The total figure under this head, on the basis which I have set out is $3,120,000.

70. The bereavement award is $70,000.

71. The funeral expenses are $185,000. There is clearly a loss of accumulation of wealth claim. All in all the value of this claim cannot be less than $5,000,000. This is therefore the interim award of damages which I order to be paid within 21 days by the 4th and 5th Defendants.

(Conrad Seagroatt)
Judge of the High Court

Representation:

Mr Albert Yau, instructed by Messrs Lee & Chow, for the Plaintiffs.

Madam Hui Lai Wa, first Defendant, in person.

Mr Wong Pun Wai, fourth Defendant in person.

Mr Neville Sarony S C, and Mr Alfred Liang, instructed by Messrs Pang & Associates, for the fifth Defendant.

Mr George Lam, instructed by Messrs Martin Law & Co, for the sixth Defendant.

Remarks:
Appeal by the 5th Defendant to the Court of Appeal. Appeal dismissed. Please refer to the Appeal Judgment CACV001715/2001.