WONG WAN LEUNG AND OTHERS v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
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WONG WAN LEUNG AND OTHERS v. DIRECTOR OF LANDS
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WONG WAN LEUNG & OTHERS v. DIRECTORS OF LANDS
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LDMR000010B/1996
MR 10 OF 1996
IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
MISCELLANEOUS REFERENCE APPLICATION NO. 10 OF 1996
_______________
| Between | ||
| Wong Wan Leung, Wong Kam Por and Wong Siu Chung as the Managers of Wong Wai Tsak Tong | Applicants | |
| AND | ||
| Director Of Lands | Respondent |
_______________
Coram : H. H. Judge Chow, Presiding Officer of the Lands Tribunal
Date of Decision : 21st November, 2001
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D E C I S I O N
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1. This is the application by the Respondent for an order to be made by the Lands Tribunal ("the Tribunal") in respect of the following matters: -
"1. Paragraph (4) of the Order of His Honour Judge Z.E. LI, then Presiding Officer, dated 5th February 1999 which provides that the parties do exchange Expert Reports at least 2 months before the trial be varied;
2. Save for the matters referred in paragraphs 7 and 8 hereinbelow, the question or issue of liability of the Respondent, if any, to the Applicants in this application be tried as a preliminary issue before the question or issue of assessment of compensation, if any, and subject to the determination of the issue of liability in favour of the Applicants.
3. The issue of assessment of compensation, if any, be heard separately and subsequently and subject to the determination of the issue of liability and in such manner as may be directed by the Presiding Officer.
4. The Applicants and the Respondent do identify in each and every schedule annexed to the Applicants' Re-Re-Amended Notice of Application filed herein jointly acceptable lots or interests in land, which should be limited to 3 or such number as may be thought just and convenient in each of the schedule, for the purpose of determination of the issue of liability, if any.
5. Failing of agreement between the Applicants and the Respondent on jointly acceptable lots or interests in land within 14 days from the date of this Order, the Applicant and the Respondent can each identify 3 lots or interests in land in each of the schedule for the purpose of determination of the issue of liability, if any.
6. If the parties cannot agree to jointly acceptable lots or interests in land within 14 days, both the Applicants and Respondent have to inform the other party in writing within 5 days thereafter the 3 lots or interests in land for which they want to refer to for the purpose of determination of the issue of liability, if any.
7. The Applicants do within 21 days thereafter file and serve their expert report on the assessment of compensation of the lots or interest in land they identified in the manner referred to in either paragraph 4 or 5.
8. The Respondent do within 90 days thereafter file and serve his expert report on the assessment of compensation of the lots or interest in land he identified in the manner referred to in either paragraph 4 or 5."
2. By this application the Respondent seeks directions from the Tribunal in respect of the Applicants' claims for split trials of "liability" and "quantum of compensation", trial by samples and variation of the Tribunal's Order made on 5.2.1999 relating to the exchange of expert reports.
3. The Applicants agree that the issue of liability may be heard before the issue of assessment of compensation. The Tribunal holds the same view.
4. Trial by samples
In the course of submissions, Mr. Yin, Counsel for the Respondent, informed the Tribunal that he would utilize the criteria listed out at pp. 66 to 69 of the Hearing Bundle for the purpose of selecting samples under various schedules specified in the re-re-amended Notice of Application.
4.1 Miss Chan, Counsel for the Applicants, said that the Applicants do not object to trial by samples. But they do object to trial by samples which does not serve its proper purpose. Pointing that the Tong is ready for sample trial, but the Respondent is not, she said: -
"No evidence is disclosed so far regarding:
(a) conduct of any sublessee amounting to adverse possession;
(b) identification of sublessees (other than the two who have given statements) who refused to renew or pay rent because of the additional charges and conditions for renewal.
(c) Identification of sublessees who remained in occupation after refusing to renew or to pay rent.
(d) Identification of sublessees who did not renew the 1994 sublease because of the alleged additional terms in the sublease;
Without knowing whether there is any sublessee who supported a particular defence raised by the Respondent as in the case of adverse possession, or identifying sublessees (who will support the Respondent's case) of whom different samples represent, sample trial will not achieve the effect it should."
5. Criteria for selection of samples
In order to achieve the purpose of having a trial by samples, there must be a set of suitable criteria for selecting the samples. In this case the only criteria are those drawn up by the Respondent; but they are not accepted as suitable criteria by the Applicants. As a result, the Tribunal has to decide whether these criteria are suitable criteria for the purpose of selecting samples. If they are not, then no samples can be selected, and trial by samples cannot be held. The Respondent's written submissions made no reference to the basis upon which these criteria were chosen. However, they must have been drawn up on the basis of the Respondent's perceptions of the legal issues involved in this case. Unfortunately his perceptions differ from those of the Applicants.
6. The Applicants' perceptions of the legal issues
Miss Chan, Counsel for the Applicants, stated that the Tong's claim is for loss of interest in land on the basis that its land was not subject to a five year sub-lease at the operative dates of the Block Crown Lease (Cheung Chau) Ordinance. At different points in time, the sublessees failed to renew their subleases or pay rent and therefore lost their right to renew/to sublease. The Applicants compiled schedules A, C, D, F, H, E2, G, G(1), and G(2) showing different points in time when the respective sublessees ceased to renew their subleases or to pay rent. The schedules are compiled in accordance with the Land Registry Record and the materials the Tong has about the sublessees. Once these records are accepted by the Tribunal, the Applicants have proved their case. Alternatively it claims for loss of rental income and other income it derived from the landlord and tenant relationship.
6.1 The Respondent's defence is that the sublessees' refusal to renew or pay rent was justified and did not result in the loss of their right to renew the sublease. The alleged justifications are: -
(a) The Tong imposed new charges and conditions for renewal;
(b) The rent payable was so low, its non-payment was not taken seriously.
6.2 Miss Chan took the view that the onus is on the Respondent to prove its defence. But the Respondent's criteria would unnecessarily impose an evidential burden on the Applicants. She quoted schedule D(1) at Page 66 of the Hearing Bundle as an example. Under that schedule it was proposed by the Respondent that samples are selected from those sublessees who (i) did not renew; (ii) ceased to pay rent; (iii) remained in occupation. She drew one sample of a sublessee who refused to renew the sublease "because of the action of the Tong", and one sample from those who "voluntarily" refused to renew. She said that the Applicants' case is that once the sublessees refused to renew the sublease or pay rent, that is the end of the matter. All the sublessees within schedule D are at fault. The Applicants do not need to drag a sublessee to court to testify that he refused to renew the sublease "voluntarily". By the proposal as set out in the criteria, the Respondent is putting an additional evidential burden on the Applicants which is totally unfounded in the law of evidence.
6.3 In relation to the sample of "action by Wong Wai Tsak Tong", Miss Chan submitted that the Respondent has the burden to (a) prove the facts, and that (b) the facts have the legal effect as alleged. The Applicants cannot be expected to drag out a sublessee to support the Respondent's defence case. If the Respondent has the witness, he has to put the witness to the box and prove the defence case.
6.4 For those sublessees in respect of whom the Respondent fails to come up with the defence evidence, the Respondent simply has to accept that it does not have the evidence to contest the Applicants' established case. It is therefore ridiculous for the Respondent to suggest that the parties are to agree on a sample and in the absence of which, each to select one. She queried why a burden should be imposed on the Applicants to find a sublessee in support of the defence case and prove that the defence is wrong.
6.5 She stated that the same analogy applies to Schedule D(2), Schedule F, Schedule G2 and Schedule H.
7. The Respondent's perceptions of the legal issues
Mr. Yin, Counsel for the Respondent, argued that in order to succeed on their claim, the Applicants must prove that the Tong was entitled to terminate the subleases in question. There is no legal basis for the assertion that "the sublessees failed to renew their subleases or pay rent and therefore lost their right to renew/to subleases." A sublease does not automatically determine upon the mere failure on the part of the sublessee to pay rent or to renew his sublease formally. Insofar as the Tong's case is based on a sublessees' failure to pay rent, proof of the fact of non-payment of rent would be necessary, but not by itself sufficient, to establish the Tong's right to forfeit the lease. In the absence of any dispensation with formal demand, the Tong would not be entitled to forfeit the lease unless it had formally demanded rent.
7.1 Insofar as the Tong's case is based on a sublessee's failure to exercise the right to renew the sublease, it is likewise not sufficient to show that there has been no formal renewal of the sublease by the execution and registration of a written memorandum of the renewed term. An option to renew a lease can be exercised by the tenant merely by remaining in occupation of the demised premises and continue to pay rent. Since the Tong must prove that the subleases in question were not renewed (formally or otherwise), the onus is squarely upon the Tong to prove that it has not received rent from the sublessees who undoubtedly remained in possession. It follows from the above that the Applicants' contention that the Tong has proved its case upon adducing the schedules compiled from the Land Registry records is wholly misconceived. Mr. Yin said that the Applicants' contention that the Respondent has the burden of proving the so-called "specific defences" is simply misconceived. These proceedings are concerned with the Tong's claim for compensation and it alone has the burden of proving its entitlement to compensation, and insofar as the alleged entitlement is founded on a right to terminate certain subleases, the Tong must prove as part and parcel of its case that the sublessees concerned would not be able to successfully defend if actions for ejectment were to be brought by the Tong against them. There is no question of "a higher burden of proof being imposed on the Applicants."
7.2 It can be seen from the afore-said submissions that the parties have different perceptions of the legal issues involved in this case. They also have conflicting views of the onus of proof on essential matters raised in the pleadings. It is due to such differences that the Applicants do not agree to the criteria for selecting samples as proposed by the Respondent. If there are no common or agreed criteria for selecting samples, then there are no basis by which samples can be selected. It would not be right for the Tribunal merely to rely upon the Respondent's criteria for the selection of samples, because to do so would imply the acceptance by the Tribunal of these criteria as suitable criteria for this purpose, and the rejection of the Applicants' arguments in this regard. To determine whether the Respondent's criteria are suitable criteria or not, the Tribunal must decide in the first place what are the legal issues involved in this case, and who bears the onus of proof on the allegations raised in the pleadings. But these matters should only be decided by the trial judge during the trial; they should not be decided at this pre-trial stage. Even if it is appropriate for the Tribunal to do so, the Tribunal must first determine what are the materials facts involved in this case, so that the Tribunal can identify the legal issues. Whilst the Respondent admits some of the facts pleaded in the re-re-amended Notice of Application, he makes no admissions of other facts. Essentially the Respondent puts the Applicants to strict proof of their case. As the Tribunal cannot act upon the facts not admitted in the re-re-amended Notice of Application, it may not have all the material facts required for the purpose of ascertaining the legal issues, which are essential for determining the criteria for selection of samples for the trial by samples. That being the case, the Tribunal cannot decide whether the Respondent's criteria are suitable criteria or not. Furthermore the Respondent must have faced the same difficulty which confronts the Tribunal. It follows that it is doubtful whether his criteria are suitable criteria. Consequently they should not be adopted. There being no other criteria for the selection of samples, no samples can be selected. Therefore the applications made under paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 must fail.
8. Preparation of Expert Reports
The basis for the Respondent's application to vary the Tribunal's order made on 5th February 1999, as submitted by Mr. Yin, is that "it is unreasonable for the Tong to insist on expert reports on valuation to be prepared in respect of each and every lot of land or undivided shares in the lot which presently form part of the Tong's claim for compensation, given that a significant number of them ........ would be eliminated from the Tong's claim upon the trial of the preliminary issues. Given that one of the main objectives of seeking trial of preliminary issues is to save time and costs, for the time being it would be appropriate for the preparation of expert reports on valuation to be confined to such of the lots of land and/or undivided shares in the lots as are required for the trial of preliminary issues. This would avoid the incurring of much unnecessary costs in the valuation of lots of land or undivided shares in the lots in respect of which the Tong would not be able to maintain its claim for compensation in view of the outcome of the trial on preliminary issues." The Tribunal is unable to say at this stage whether any number of the lots of land would be eliminated from the Tong's claim upon the trial of the preliminary issues. Indeed, it should not make any such decision at this stage.
8.1 Whether the Respondent would succeed in its application under paragraphs 1, 7 and 8 of the Summons depends on the outcome of its application for selection of sample cases for the trial under paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of the Summons. The Respondent fails in this regard. The Respondent has not advanced any other ground for varying the Tribunal's Order dated 5th February, 1999; the application to vary this order must fail.
9. I make the following orders: -
(1) I make an order in terms of paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Summons, but dismiss the applications under the other paragraphs;
(2) I order that the trial of the preliminary issues under paragraph 2 be held before a Presiding Officer, and the trial on the issue of assessment of compensation (if so required) be held before a Presiding Officer and a Member of the Tribunal;
(3) I order that 1/5 of the costs of this application be costs in the cause, and that the Respondent has to bear 4/5 of the costs of this application, to be taxed, if not agreed. Certificate for Counsel;
(4) I make an order that the parties do have liberty to apply.
| (H.H. Judge Chow) | |
| Presiding Officer, | |
| Lands Tribunal |
Representation:
The Applicants : represented by M/S Joseph P. K. Pang & Co., Solicitors.
The Respondent : represented by Secretary for Justice.
Wong Wan Leung and Others v. Director Of Lands
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LDMR000010A/1996
IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
Lands Tribunal Application No. LDMR 10 Of 1996
_______________
| Between | ||
| Wong Wan Leung, Wong Kam Por and Wong Siu Chung as the Managers of Wong Wai Tsak Tong | Applicants | |
| AND | ||
| Director Of Lands | Respondent |
_______________
Coram: H.H. Judge Chow, Presiding Officer of Lands Tribunal
Date of Judgment: 30 June 2000
_____________
Decision
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1. This is my decision on item (1) of the Summons for Further Directions taken out by the Applicants. Item (1) reads as follows:-
"The Respondent do within 14 days make specific discovery of New Grants, Rateable Value, Government rent and area of each tenement in respect of the Schedule A Sub-leases;"
In support of the application the Applicants filed the Affirmation of Wong Kam Por ("the Affirmation"), the 3rd paragraph of which referred to a letter dated 13.9.1999 ("the letter") written by the Applicants' solicitors Messrs Joseph P.K. Pang & Co. to the Department of Justice. In this letter the subject matter of this application was fully set out :-
"We refer to the above matter.
In order to verify with accuracy the quantum arrived at by our expert on the loss suffered by our client as a result of the operation of the Block Crown Lease (Cheung Chau) Ordinance, our client requires the following information for the tenements on all the lots listed in Schedule A annexed to our client's Re-Amended Notice of Application filed herein on 6th July 1998:
(a) full address of the each tenement;
(b) saleable floor area of each tenement;
(c) the rateable value of each tenement from the years 1 July 1997 up to date of this letter;
(d) the land surrendered under each of the New Grants for which the New Lots as defined in our client's said Re-amended Notice of Application were granted;
(e) the Government Rent of each New Lot;
(f) the lease terms of each New Lot;
(g) the Permitted maximum gross floor area and site coverage of each New Grant;
(h) Special restriction on land use under each New Grant.
Our client will also require information listed in items (a), (b) and (c) for the tenements ...... listed in Schedule B ......
The information regarding items (a), (b) and (c) above are prepared managed and kept by the Rating and Valuation Department ...... The information sought by our client under items (d) to (h) inclusive are information contained in the New Grants which are prepared and maintained by the District Lands Office of the Hong Kong SAR Government.
All these information are in the control and possession of the Hong Kong SAR Government to which your client Department forms a part. We have been advised by Counsel that these information are necessary for the Lands Tribunal ...... to determine the amount of compensation. You are hereby requested to make disclosure of all the information sought under this letter within a time agreeable to us. In the absence of your response in the next 7 days, our client will take out a summons in the Lands Tribunal under section 10(2) of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance, Cap. 17." (Underlines provided)
2. In support of their application, the Applicants are relying on paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 10(2) of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance, which are as follows:-
"(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers vested in it under subsection (1), the Tribunal may -
(a) on the application of any party to any proceedings before it, or of its own motion, order any party to the proceedings to disclose to the Tribunal the existence of any document which is in the power of such party to produce and which the Tribunal considers is or may be material to the determination of the matter being heard by the Tribunal;
(b) order any party to any proceedings before it -
(i) to produce to the Tribunal any document which it may require and which is in the power of such party to produce; and
(ii) to afford to any other party to the proceedings an opportunity to examine any such document or copy thereof and to take copies thereof;"
(Underlines provided)
3. The meaning of "document" is, of course, different from that of "information". The former is a tangible thing which contains the latter. To disclose a document or documents to another party to any proceedings is one thing. To disclosure to another party the information sought by the requesting party is a totally different thing. In the former case, the disclosing party simply produces the document or documents, but in the latter case, the disclosing party has to go through the process of separating the information required from other information. That may take up the disclosing party a lot of time. The letter (dated 16.12.1999) issued by the Department of Justice to the Applicants is an example of the time that may be required to be spent :-
"We are instructed that our client department is trying to sort out the relevant rateable values from the computer print-out provided by R&V but it may take at least more than two months to complete."
4. Apart from the time spent on extracting the information required, if the disclosing party makes any mistake in the selection process, he may have to bear the legal consequences. But if he simply discloses to the requesting party the documents which contain the required information, he need not face the aforesaid problems.
5. The contents of section 10(6) clearly show that "information" and "document" are two different matters. Section 10(6) reads :-
"The Tribunal may admit in evidence any statement, document, information or matter, whether or not it would otherwise be admissible in evidence and attach such weight to it as may be appropriate in the circumstances."
(Underlines provided)
The applicability of section 10(2)
6. In the letter the Applicants asked the Respondent for "information" required by them. The sentence, namely, "The information sought ...... under items (d) to (h) inclusive are information contained in the New grants which are prepared and maintained by the District Office of the HKSAR Government" clearly indicates that the Applicants were seeking for information in the true sense of the word, because information is invariably contained in documents.
7. There is no mention in the Affirmation about the discovery of documents. What Mr. Wong Kam Por was asking for was merely "information". In paragraph 11 of his affirmation he said,
"So far as the rateable value of Schedule A lots are concerned, the Government is at all times willing to provide us with the information. The only question is delay ...... In this letter, Mr. Chan wrote that rateable value of all Schedule A lots should be ready by the date of this affirmation. However, since that letter, the Tong or its solicitors was not provided with even part of the information sought. Without a proper direction from the Tribunal, there would be further delay on the part of the Government."
Thus by this application the Applicants asked for an order from the Tribunal to direct the Respondent to provide the "information" they require, in order to avoid further delay on the part of the Government. Under section 10(2) of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance, the Tribunal has no power to order a party to the proceedings to disclose information to the other party.
8. According to Para. 9 of the Affirmation, the Applicants know that the information relating to New grants are contained in Government leases, which are kept by the Government. The relevant part of Para. 9 reads:-
"......For lots granted to the Tong under new grants subsequent to the Block Crown Lease dated 18 March 1905, terms regarding these matters are questions for each individual Government lease. According to Mr. Tse, original copies of Government leases of Cheung Chau land are kept by the Islands District Office. Although certified copies of Government leases can be obtained through land search with the Land Registry, the cost is HK$340 each. That will make HK$126,480 (HK$340 x 372)."
9. If the relevant documents are available for inspection, then there is no need necessity for this discovery application to be made.
10. There is no reason given by the Applicants as to why the Respondent should be ordered to make disclosure to the Tribunal, or to produce to the Tribunal any document it may require. If the Respondent is ordered to disclose the required information, then they are being ordered to do something which they are not legally bound to do. In effect, the Applicants are making use of section 10(2) to force the Respondent to disclose to them the information they require for their case, and the Respondent would have to do a task which should be done by the Applicants themselves.
11. In paragraph 7 of the Affirmation, the Applicants said that "Almost every year, the Tong surrendered some lots in exchange for new lots. The surrender and re-grant resulted in increase of Government rent imposed on the Tong each year. The Tong has no idea at all the amount of Government rent imposed on each lot of Schedule A land." The Applicants did not say that they have lost the records of such New Grants. They only said that they have no idea at all the amount of Government rent imposed. The Department of Justice in its letter dated 16.12.1999 rightly stated :-
"In respect of items (d) to (h), your client or their predecessors, being the managers of Tong were a party to the surrender and re-grant of all the lots under sub-leases in Cheung Chau before 9.1995. Your clients should be in a better position to know the land surrendered under each of the New Grants and etc. We do not see why it is necessary for your clients to seek discovery from us."
Since the Applicants' expert has already arrived at a quantum suffered by the Applicants as indicated in Para. 2 of the letter, then the Applicants must have most, if not all, the material information/documents they required. Assuming that they do not have the information relating to the amount of Government rent imposed on the lots of Schedule A land, they must have the information/records in respect of items (d) to (h) (save and except (e)). If they have such records then there is no necessity for any discovery to be made.
12. As rightly pointed out by the Department of Justice in its letter dated 16.12.1999, if the Applicants' record is incomplete, they should approach the Land Registry which should have all the information they wanted. The information relating to the New grants, namely, the Government rent (item (e)), lease terms (item (f)) and land restriction (item (h)) are fully recorded in documents and are available for public inspection in the Land Registry. There is no necessity for discovery to be made in respect of these items.
13. Section 10(2)(a) stipulates that the Tribunal may order any party to the proceedings before it to disclose the existence of any document which the Tribunal "considers is or may be material to the determination of the matter being heard by the Tribunal". The only matter being heard by this Tribunal the application by the Applicants for "Further Directions". This application is not within the meaning of the word "matter" referred to under section 10(2)(a) because the disclosure of the existence of any document cannot be material to the application for "Further Directions". There is in fact no "matter" being heard by the Tribunal within the meaning of Section 10(2)(a) at the present, and therefore there is no determination which requires to be made.
14. The Applicants asked the Respondent for the information, relating to the saleable floor area of each tenement. On the assumption that "information" can be interpreted to have the same meaning as "document", the Tribunal has to be satisfied that this information is or may be material to the case before it.
15. Based on a list of interest provided by a consultant of the Respondent, the Rating and Valuation Department ("R&V Dept.") made a computer print-out which contained the saleable areas and rateable values of certain tenements of Cheung Chau. Due to the difference in descriptions of the lot number and address of each interest, R&V Dept. was not able to sort out the information on the rateable values from their computer database. Instead they printed out all the information relating to the lots on the list provided by the consultant, and the total tenements turned out to be over 8,000. Exhibit R3 is part of the computer print-out.
16. The Schedule A lots, unlike the Schedule B lots, do not have any addresses at all. Thus it would be very difficult for the Tribunal to know at this stage which are the tenements that should be included under a certain lot under Schedule A. There are 300 odd lots in total under Schedule A lot, and the total number of tenements involved are least 8000.
17. As it is the Applicants' intention to find out the size of each lot by reference to the area of each tenement in the lot, it is important to know the area of Lot A land in the tenement which also comprises of Lot B land. But some tenements involve an amalgamation of lot A land and lot B land. A small portion of Exhibit R3 is reproduced hereinbelow to demonstrate the amalgamation.
Lot Description DD CC 7 B
DD CC 10 B (RP)
DD CC 800 A
DD CC 800 BCHEUNG CHAU LOTS 7 SB & 10 SB RP & 800 SA & SB 5 SAI WAN CARE VILLAGE 1ST FLR CHEUNG CHAU DD CC 7 B
DD CC 10 B (RP)
DD CC 800 A
DD CC 800 BCHEUNG CHAU LOTS 7 SB & 10 SB RP & 800 SA & SB 6 SAI WAN CARE VILLAGE GRD FLR CHEUNG CHAU DD CC 7 B
DD CC 10 B (RP)
DD CC 800 A
DD CC 800 BCHEUNG CHAU LOTS 7 SB & 10 SB RP & 800 SA & SB 6 SAI WAN CARE VILLAGE 1ST FLR CHEUNG CHAU
18. Nothing has been shown to the Tribunal as to how the area of Lot A land can be determined when the same tenement also comprises of Lot B land. These basic materials may be useful to the Applicants for the purpose of extracting information to be used by their expert. But as for the Tribunal, in the absence of evidence relating to the method for the calculation of the area of Lot A land in respect of a tenement as referred to above, I could not see how these materials can be applied for the assessment of the amount for compensation.
19. In short, Section 10(2) is not applicable in this application. Even if it is applicable the Tribunal has a discretion to grant or to refuse the application.
20. For the reasons referred to above, I do not exercise my discretion in favour of the Applicants. I therefore dismiss their application for specific discoveries.
21. This case is adjourned to 17.8.2000 for arguments on costs.
| Stephen Chow | |
| Presiding Officer Lands Tribunal |
Representation:
Applicants: Represented by M/S Joseph P.K. Pang & Co.
Respondent: Represented by Department of Justice.
Wong Wan Leung and Others v. Director of Lands
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LDMR000010/1996
LDMR 10/1996
IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
Lands Tribunal Application No. LDMR 10 of 1996
_______________
| Between | ||
| Wong Wan Leung, Wong Kam Por and Wong Siu Chung as the Managers of Wong Wai Tsak Tong | (Applicants) | |
| AND | ||
| Director of Lands | (Respondent) |
_______________
Coram: H.H. Judge Chow, Presiding Officer of Lands Tribunal
Date of delivery of Decision: 7th April, 2000
_____________
Decision
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1. This is a decision on the award of costs, following the application by the Applicants to the Lands Tribunal for leave to re-re-amend their notice of application for determination of compensations for the termination of the Block Crown Lease under the Block Crown Lease (Cheung Chau) Ordinance, Cap. 488 ("the BCL Ordinance").
2. On 11.12.1999 the Applicants took out a summons returnable on 20.12.1999 for the hearing of the re-re-amendment application, which involved a number of lots of land, including the inclusion of Lot 241 in the notice of application.
3. On 20.12.1999, the Tribunal was informed that the Respondent would oppose the re-re-amendment application on two grounds, namely, abuse of process and addition of new causes of action out of time. With the consent of the parties the hearing was adjourned sine dine, with liberty to restore.
4. The hearing was restored on 25.2.2000. At the commencement of the hearing on that day, Respondent conceded that it would not oppose the re-re-amendment application, save that relating to the inclusion of Lot 241. During the hearing the Applicants presented a substantial part of their submissions. However, the hearing could not be concluded on that day and so it was adjourned to 17.3.2000.
5. On 17.3.2000, at the commencement of the hearing, the Tribunal was informed that the Respondent would not oppose to the re-re-amendment in respect of the inclusion of Lot 241, but it would apply for an award of costs occasioned by the re-re-amendment application on the ground that it was an abuse of process for the Applicants to make the re-re-amendment application resulting in 2 separate actions proceeding on the same subject matter when they adopted conflicting stances in the 2 cases.
Abuse of process
6. On 22.10.1998 the Applicant Wong Wai Tsak Tong instituted an application in the Lands Tribunal for compensation pursuant to S.29(7) of the Roads (Works, Use and Compensation) Ordinance, Cap. 370, under case LDMR 33 of 1998. This case was heard on 26.8.1999. On 17.9.1999 judgment was handed down. On 5.10.1999 the Applicant appealed against the decision. Judgment was delivered on 7.3.2000. In dismissing the appeal the Court of Appeal held that the Block Crown Lease of Wong Wai Tsak Tong (the Applicant) covering Lot 241 was duly terminated under section 3 of the BCL Ordinance on 8 September 1995, and therefore the Tong had no interest in that property in respect of which it was entitled to compensation under the Roads (Works) Use and Compensation Ordinance, Cap. 370.
7. On the allegation of abuse of process, the Applicants argued that there is nothing wrong for the applicants to protect its position by making an alternative claim.
8. The Respondent submitted that in LDMR 33 of 1998 the Applicants' stances were, as referred to in the Lands Tribunal's judgment, as follows :-
"The Tong contended that Cap. 488 did not apply to the lot. Even if it did so apply, it should not prevent the Tong from claiming the compensation under Cap. 370." (Underline provided)
"The Lot does not fall within Sections 4(1) and 5(1) [Cap. 488], as there were no sub-lessee as defined in Section 2(1)1 of Cap. 488 to receive the sub-lease." (Underline provided)
9. The Respondent submitted that all along the Applicants' stances are that they are the absolute owner of Lot 241 and their right should not be affected by the operation of the BCL Ordinance. That is absolutely in contradiction with the re-re-amendment application where they claim that the sub-leases of Lot 241 was determined as a result for the commencement of the BCL Ord. on 8.9.1995. The Respondent submitted that it is a classic example of abuse of process if the Applicants were allowed to proceed with 2 parellet proceedings relating to the same matter with 2 different stances. In support of its arguments the Respondent quoted a passage from the case of Berthier Godown Ltd. v. C Wah Realty Ltd. as Anor [1986] HKC 8:
"Save in the most exceptional circumstances a party must take all the points he wished to raise on any issue in the same proceedings. It was quite clear that separate proceedings on the same issue could not be maintained. Multiplicity of proceedings might give rise to conflicting judgments. Hoystead v Commissioner of Taxation [1926] AV 155 and Yat Tung Investment Co. v Dao Heng Bank [1975] AC 581 followed."
"If the party sought to raise new matters in separate proceedings or sought to reverse a previous assumption that had been the basis of the earlier proceedings in the new proceedings, that amounted to an abuse of process and he was estopped from doing so. A fortiori this must be so if the earlier proceedings were still in existence and party could raise those matters in those proceedings in which orders had already been made. He must pursue all the remedies available to him and raise all the arguments that were available to him in the earlier proceedings."
Finding
10. One of the grounds of appeal in LDMR of 1998 was that in holding that the Tong (the Applicant) was no longer the owner of Lot 241 by reason of the operation of the BCL Ordinance, the Presiding Officer and the Member erred in law by construing the BCL Ordinance as to apply to the lease of which the lessee was non-existent at the commencement date of the BCL Ordinance. By this ground of appeal the Applicant still maintained its stand that the BCL Ordinance did not apply to Lot 241.
11. On the re-re-amended notice of application, it is stated that the Applicants require the Lands Tribunal "to determine the amount of compensation to be paid under section 10 of the BCL Ord. in respect of land or undivided shares in land as more particularly set out in Schedule A, in respect of which sections 4(1) and 5(1) of the said Ordinance have effect and in respect of which the Block Crown Lease as defined in the said Ordinance was determined by section 3 of the said Ordinance." (Underlines provided) Lot 241 is a lot under Schedule A.
12. The stances of the Applicants in LDMR 10 of 1996 in respect of the re-re-amendment application relating to Lot 241 are in direct conflict with that which they adopted in LDMR 33 of 1998 in which they advanced the argument, which formed the crux of the whole case, that Lot 241 did not fall within Sections 4(1) and 5(1) of the BCL Ordinance. The conflicting stances in the 2 cases in so far as Lot 241 is concerned constitute an abuse of process. The point on the abuse of process was validly made by the Respondent.
13. On 25.2.2000 the Respondent also submitted that the re-re-amendment application was pre-maturely made. It should have waited for the outcome of the appeal in LDMR 33 of 1998. By virtue of the point on the abuse of process, this submission made on 25.2.2000 was also validly made.
14. It was correct and sensible for Respondent not to pursue on the point of abuse of process on 17.3.2000 and not to oppose the re-re-amendment application relating to Lot 241, in light of the Court of Appeal decision. By that time the Court of Appeal decision had already been handed down and the issue as to whether the BCL Ordinance applied to Lot 241 had been clarified.
15. The Respondent was entitled to refer to the point of abuse of process in the arguments on the award of costs.
16. The Applicant conceded that it should pay costs to the Respondent for the re-re-amendment application up to and including 20.12.1999. That is correct.
17. As regarding the costs for the preparation of the argument of re-re-amendment application for the hearing on 25.2.2000 (save and except Lot 241), the Respondent conceded to the re-re-amendment application (save and except Lot 241) on 25.2.2000. Before that day no agreement in this respect had been reached between the parties, and the Respondent was aware that the Applicants would proceed to make the application. Thus the preparation in this regard by the Applicants was wasted.
18. Regarding the hearing on 17.3.2000, it was adjourned on 25.2.2000 for continuation of the arguments on the re-re-amendment application itself. The Applicants had completed a substantial part of their submissions. The court's time was spent on the arguments in respect of the award of costs relating to Lot 241. The Respondent succeeded in its arguments. Therefore the costs of this date and 17.3.2000 should be awarded to the Respondent.
19. I make the following order on costs :-
(1) Costs up to and including 20.12.1999 be borne by the Applicants in favour of the Respondent.
(2) Costs on the preparation of the re-re-amendment application (save and except that relating to Lot 241) after 20.12.1999, but up to 25.2.2000 be borne by the Respondent in favour of the Applicants.
(3) Costs of the hearing on 25.2.2000 and 17.3.2000 be borne by the Applicants in favour of the Respondent.
(4) The above costs to be taxed, if not agreed.
| Stephen Chow | |
| Presiding Officer Lands Tribunal |
Representation:
Applicant : Represented by M/S Joseph P.K. Pang & Co.
Respondent : Represented by Secretary for Justice.