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Companies Winding-up Proceedings1998

RE C.A. PACIFIC FINANCE LTD. (in Liquidation)

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  • HCCW37/1998RE C.A. PACIFIC FINANCE LTD. (in Liquidation)

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[2019] HKCFI 2152-EN-2019-09-10

RE C. A. PACIFIC FINANCE LTD

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HCCW 36/1998 & HCCW 37/1998
(HEARD TOGETHER)
[2019] HKCFI 2152

HCCW 36/1998

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES WINDING-UP PROCEEDINGS NO 36 OF 1998

________________________

 IN THE MATTER of the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap 32)
 and
 IN THE MATTER of C. A. Pacific Finance Limited

________________________

AND

HCCW 37/1998

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES WINDING-UP PROCEEDINGS NO 37 OF 1998

____________________

 IN THE MATTER of the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap 32)
 and
 IN THE MATTER of C. A. Pacific Securities Limited

____________________

(HEARD TOGETHER)

Before: Hon Harris J in Chambers

Dates of Hearing: 6 November 2018

Date of Decision:  6 November 2018

Date of Reasons for Decision:  10 September 2019

________________________

R E A S O N S  F O R  D E C I S I O N

________________________


1.  The Liquidators of C A Pacific Finance Limited and C A Pacific Securities Limited have applied for orders approving the final allocation and distribution of trust monies held by the Liquidators on behalf of the clients of the respective companies. The trust monies consist of three tranches: approximately HK$2 million being residual trust monies being left after the previous rounds of allocations; approximately HK$16.5 million being a refund of bank interest on trust monies paid into the companies’ liquidation accounts and approximately HK$0.9 million being surplus processing fees which need to be returned to specific clients.

2.  The liquidations commenced in 1998 and were associated with the Asian financial crisis of that period.  They have been the subject of various decisions and the background details of the liquidations do not need to be repeated [1].

3.  The Court has previously made a series of orders for the distribution of securities and trust monies. There have, prior to the present applications, been three distributions: 30 June 2003, 30 April 2004 and 23 March 2007.  As I indicated at the outset the orders sought are intended to be final and bring the liquidations to a conclusion and provide for assessment and payment of the Liquidations costs and disbursements.

4.  The applications are, as one might expect by this stage, straightforward.  There are only two issues that requires some comment. There are over 5,000 clients of the companies who are eligible to receive trust funds and surplus processing fees.  In some cases the sums to which they are entitled are minimal.  Over 680 clients are eligible to receive less than HK$200.  It will be appreciated that the costs involved in processing applications for such small sums will exceed the amount to be distributed.  In these circumstances the Liquidators have sought a direction that, without prejudice to the Securities and Futures Commission’s (“SFC”) right of subrogation, where any client’s allocation pursuant to the directions sought above totals less than HK$200, the Liquidators are not required to distribute that sum to that particular client and may apply such amount towards settlement of the Liquidators’ remuneration, fees and expenses. 

5.  The direction does not affect the payment of any sum due to the SFC pursuant to its rights of subrogation (recognised in the previous orders of the Court); any amounts due to the SFC pursuant to its rights of subrogation will be calculated by the Liquidators and paid to the SFC as one, composite payment.

6.  Seven hundred and twenty-eight clients previously failed to collect distributions or cash cheques sent to them.  It is anticipated that, at least, the same number (if not more) will similarly be non-responsive in respect of this final distribution. To avoid the need to return to Court in the future to obtain further directions at a separate hearing, the Liquidators seek directions that:

(1)  In circumstances where any corporate client has, as at the date the cash distribution is to be made with these been dissolved, the Liquidators are not required to distribute any sums allocated, in accordance with these directions, to that dissolved corporate client and the Liquidators are at liberty to immediately pay any such distribution to the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (together with all further interest accrued thereon (if any)) pursuant to s752 of the Companies Ordinance (Cap 622) (“CO”); or

(2)  In respect of cheques for cash distribution which have not been banked by clients within six months after the date on which the cheques in respect of the further cash distribution were posted, such assets be regarded as unclaimed assets and;

(a)  In the case of any corporate client which has been dissolved, the Liquidators be at liberty to pay any such distribution to the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (together with all further interest accrued thereon (if any)) pursuant to s752 of the CO; or

(b)  In any other case

(i)  The Liquidators be at liberty to pay any such unclaimed distribution into Court pursuant to s62 of the Trustee Ordinance (Cap 29) (“TO”) and

(ii)   The Liquidators shall advertise in an English and Chinese language newspaper a notification of the order made, the payment into court and the rights of the affected clients to apply for payment out of such monies under Order 92 Rules of the High Court and any unclaimed monies be dealt with in accordance with Rule 23 High Court Suitors Fund Rules (Cap 4B).

7.  The proposed direction above to pay unclaimed monies into Court pursuant to s62 of the TO (as opposed to s67 of the TO as provided for in the 24 July 2009 Order) differs from that initially proposed in the draft order annexed to the Summons.  The Liquidators engaged the Official Solicitor in correspondence to solicit his views on the proposed directions.  In summary, the Official Solicitor’s response was:

(1)  One of the “crucial” factors that the Official Solicitor will consider in determining whether consent should be given under s67 of the TO is the value of the trust and the amount involved;

(2)  The Official Solicitor was concerned if a meaningful administration of trust assets could be conducted in light of the fact that previously (in distributing the unclaimed monies previously paid to the Official Solicitor’s account) the Official Solicitor was only able to distribute monies to 64 out of the 719 clients who failed to collect their previous allocations;

(3)  In view of the foregoing, the Official Solicitor was unable to consent to the Liquidators’ proposal until the number of clients and amounts were ascertained; and

(4)  There was an alternative to dispose of unclaimed trust assets pursuant to s62 of the Trustee Ordinance which has been held, in Re Drake & Morgan Ltd [2] and in Re Gainwell Securities Co Ltd [3], to be a “flexible and pragmatic solution”.

8.  Given the passage of further time and the increasingly small value of the final distribution to be made, it is highly likely that the same number (if not more) clients will fail to claim their final distributions.

9.  S62 of the TO provides:

“Trustees, or the majority of trustees, having in their hands or under their control money or securities belonging to a trust, may pay the same into court, and the same shall, subject to the rules of court, be dealt with according to the orders of the court.”

10.  It is well established that monies and securities held by a broker on behalf of its clients are trust monies: Re CA Pacific Finance Ltd [4], Re Gainwell Securities Co Ltd ibid.  In these circumstances where trust monies cannot, despite all reasonable efforts having been made, be returned to clients, s62 of the TO provides a “flexible and pragmatic” solution.

11.  In a letter dated 22 October 2018, the Official Solicitor confirmed, having reviewed the evidence, that he “maintained [its] view that section 62 arrangement is more appropriate to the present situation”.  In my opinion this is correct.

12.  I will make an order in the terms appended to these reasons.

 (Jonathan Harris)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Christopher Dobby, of Hogan Lovells, for the liquidators (in both actions)

Attendance of Official Solicitor’s Office, for the Official Trustee was excused (in both actions)

Attendance of the Official Receiver was excused (in both actions)

 

Order

1.  In respect of the residual trust monies representing fractional amounts resulting from the rounding of allocations of shares to clients or of allocations of cash proceeds of the sale of shares to clients in accordance with paragraph 15 of the Order of the Honourable Madam Justice Yuen JA dated 1 November 2006, together with any interest accrued thereon, the Liquidators do allocate and distribute these monies (after payment of fees, costs and other deductions as permitted by this Order) to those affected clients of CAP Finance and CAP Securities (i) whose share allocations included an entitlement to fractional share(s) and / or (ii) who received allocations of cash proceeds of the sale of shares on a pari passu basis in accordance with the relevant proportions by which securities were previously allocated to such clients.

2.  In respect of the surplus provisional processing fees collected from clients of CAP Finance and CAP Securities in accordance with the Orders of the Honourable Madam Justice Yuen dated 20 November 2001 and 1 November 2006, the Liquidators do return such surplus provisional processing fees (after payment of fees, costs and other deductions as permitted by this Order) to the clients of CAP Finance and CAP Securities on a pari passu basis calculated in accordance with the relevant proportions by which the provisional processing fees were paid by the clients.

3.  In respect of the monies received in refund of the total bank interest earned and retained by the Official Receiver pursuant to sections 294(3) and 295(4) of the former Cap 32 on the trust monies received and paid into the Companies Liquidation Account by the Liquidators of CAP Finance and CAP Securities during the period from August 1998 to November 2011 received by the Liquidators pursuant to the Orders of the Honourable Mr Justice Harris made in HCCW 36/1998 and HCCW 37/1998 dated 9 November 2016, together with any interest accrued thereon, the Liquidators do allocate and distribute these monies (after payment of fees, costs and other deductions as permitted by this Order) to the clients of CAP Finance and CAP Securities who (i) received allocations of Available Corporate Actions (as defined in paragraph 1 of  the Order of the Honourable Madam Justice Yuen dated 1 November 2006) and / or (ii) received allocations of cash proceeds of the sale of their securities (in accordance with paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Order of the Honourable Madam Justice Yuen dated 20 November 2001) on a pari passu basis in accordance with the relevant proportions by which the aforesaid allocations were made.

4.  The distribution to any client of an allocation of cash under this Order shall be subject, as the case may be, to:

(a)  Payment of any outstanding provisional processing fees;

(b)  Deduction of any outstanding debt owing to CAP Securities or CAP Finance;

(c)  Deduction in respect of any legal costs owing to CAP Securities, CAP Finance or the Liquidators;

(d)  The statutory subrogation rights of the Securities and Futures Commission (“SFC”) under s118 of the former Securities Ordinance (Cap 333) to participate in the allocation of cash to the client arising from any compensation payments received and retained by the client.

5.  Subject to paragraphs 6 and 9 below:

(a)  Where there is to be an allocation and distribution of cash to a client pursuant to paragraphs 1 to 3 above, the Liquidators do send to each client a further allocation statement (substantially in the same form as that exhibited at Tab 3 of exhibit “MCR-1” to Rowbotham 1) providing details of the sums allocated and to be distributed to the client after taking into account permitted deductions as permitted by this Order; and

(b)  The payments of monies to be distributed to clients pursuant to this Order shall be made by way of cheque to be sent by the Liquidators together with the further allocation statements by ordinary post to the last known address of the client according to the records (including updated records) of CAP Finance and CAP Securities.

6.  Notwithstanding the foregoing:

(a)  Where any client’s allocation pursuant to paragraphs 1 to 3 above (net of permitted deductions authorised by the Order) totals less than HK$200, the Liquidators are not required to distribute that sum to that particular client and shall apply such amount towards the discharge of the costs associated with the distribution; and

(b)  In the event that any surplus trust monies remain as consequence of the further rounding down of clients’ cash allocations to be made pursuant to this Order, the Liquidators are not required to further allocate and distribute those remaining sums to clients and are authorised to pay these sums to the general liquidation estate of CAP Securities.

7.  In respect of cheques for cash distributions sent to clients in accordance with the provisions of this Order which have not been banked with three months after the date of distribution, the Liquidators do advertise the availability of such cash distribution entitlements no less than three months following the making of the further cash distribution.

8.  In respect of cheques for cash distributions (sent to clients in accordance with the provisions of this Order) which have not been banked by clients within six months after the date on which the cheques in respect of the further cash distribution were posted, such assets be regarded as unclaimed assets and;

(a)  In the case of any corporate client which has been dissolved, the Liquidators be at liberty to pay any such distribution to the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (together with all further interest accrued thereon (if any)) pursuant to s752 of the Companies Ordinance (Cap 622); or

(b)  In any other case; the Liquidators be at liberty to pay any such unclaimed assets into Court pursuant to s62 of the Trustee Ordinance (Cap 29) and

(i)  the Liquidators shall advertise in an English and Chinese language newspaper a notification of the order made, the payment into court and of the rights of the affected clients to apply for payment out of such monies under Order 92 Rules of the High Court; and

(ii)  any unclaimed monies be dealt with in accordance with Rule 23 High Court Suitors Fund Rules (Cap 4B).

9.  In circumstances where any corporate client has, as at the date the cash distribution is to be made by the Liquidators in accordance with this Order, been dissolved, the Liquidators are not required to attempt to distribute any sums to that dissolved corporate client (in accordance with paragraphs 5, 7 and 8 above) and the Liquidators are at liberty to immediately pay any such distribution to the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (together with all further interest accrued thereon (if any)) pursuant to s752 of the Companies Ordinance (Cap 622).

10.  In respect of any payments to be made into court under paragraph 8(b) above, at the time of making any payments into Court, the Liquidators do provide the Registrar of the High Court with a schedule identifying the unclaimed assets to be paid into Court on behalf of designated clients specifying the name and address of the client and the amount being paid into court on behalf of that client.

11.  The Liquidators’ remuneration, fees, and expenses incurred in relation to the trust estates, to be incurred in respect of this application and the allocation and distribution of the remaining trust monies in accordance with the directions and orders herein (as particularised at Tabs 4, 5 and 6 of exhibit MCR-1 to Rowbotham 1) (“Trust Fees”) be hereby assessed and approved by the Court in the total sum of HK$13,629,289.10.

12.  The Liquidators be authorised to receive the sum of HK$13,629,289.10 from the account of the provisional processing fees in respect of the Trust Fees to be paid to the Liquidators in respect of their approved remuneration, fees and expenses.

13.  There be liberty to the Liquidators to apply.



[1]  [2002] 2 HKLRD 2; [1999] 2 HKLRD 1.

[2]  [2009] HKEC 1396.

[3]  [2018] HKCFI 1497; [2018] HKEC 1881.

[4]  [1999] 2 HKLRD 1.

83288-EN-2012-08-28

RE C.A. PACIFIC FINANCE LTD (in Liquidation)

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HCCW36/98, 37/98

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES (WINDING-UP) ACTIONS NO. 36 and 37 OF 1998

---------------------------

  IN THE MATTER of the Companies Ordinance Cap. 32
 and
  IN THE MATTER of C.A. PACIFIC FINANCE LIMITED (in Liquidation)
  IN THE MATTER of C.A. PACIFIC SECURITIES LIMITED (in Liquidation)
Before: Hon Yuen, JA (as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance)
Date of hearing (on computation only): 27 August 2012
Date of decision: 28 August 2012

----------------------------------------

DECISION
on applications for remuneration
for administration of trust assets
from 11 June 1998 to 30 June 2011 

----------------------------------------

 

Hon Yuen JA:

Background

1. The collapse of CA Pacific Securities (“CAPS”) and CA Pacific Finance (“CAPF”) and its aftermath has been recorded in a number of earlier judgments.  On the application of the Securities and Futures Commission (“SFC”), accountants from PricewaterhouseCoopers (“PWC”) were appointed provisional liquidators on 19 January 1998.  The companies were wound up on 4 June 1998 and the same persons were appointed liquidators.  At the time of collapse, CAPS was one of the largest securities brokers in Hong Kong, and CAPF provided margin finance facilities to CAPS clients who wished to have them.  Some securities were placed under the control of CAPF which in turn pledged them with a number of banks (these banks have been referred to as “the lenders”).  At first it was thought that there were about 13,000 clients (later verified at 3,900), holding one or more account(s), and the securities portfolio comprised nearly 1,000 lines of shares and warrants, with a total value of $1,145m.  At the time of collapse, there was also cash of about $484m gross.  The unexpected manner in which these companies failed, the shortfall in the securities left in their custody, the difficulties in the share-tracing exercise caused by unnumbered securities held in the Central Clearing And Settlement System (“CCASS”) the market system of Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Ltd (“HK Ex”), complications caused by the involvement of lenders and of some companies associated with CAPS and CAPF, the large number of aggrieved clients with conflicted interests, and the magnitude of the sums of money involved were unprecedented in this jurisdiction. 

Title to securities

2. It was determined by the court in December 1998 in proceedings (which have been called “the Title Application”) that clients who had acquired securities through CAPS were entitled to the beneficial interest in those securities, with the result that the securities (and funds associated with those securities) were not part of the broker’s assets. In other words, the broker held the securities on trust for the clients.  This feature made this case different from liquidations of other types of companies. 

“Trust assets”

3. The “trust assets” comprised securities held on trust at the date of the companies’ collapse (19 January 1998), additional securities returned between 19 January 1998 and 30 June 2003 from the lenders (who  had sold part of the securities pledged with them), and cash held on trust for the clients.   

4. It was further determined by the court that by reason of the nature of property held on trust, the securities themselves should be delivered to the clients, unless the clients gave instructions for sales to be made on their behalf.  The more difficult issue was when a shortfall in the securities was encountered, giving rise to conflicts between the clients.  It was determined in proceedings in December 2000 that where a shortfall was encountered in the distribution, priority should be given to cash clients before margin clients, and that as between those clients themselves, allocation of shortfall securities should be made pari passu (these proceedings have been called “the Share Application”).  This required an investigation of each account to see whether in relation to each line of securities, the account holder was a cash client or a margin client, what was the state of his account with the broker, and in respect of that line, the quantum of securities to be allocated to the individual client after calculating the claims of other clients with the same standard of entitlement. 

Liquidators’ appointment

5. Due to these factual and legal complexities, the tasks referred to above had to be undertaken by professional accountants with a sufficiently large work force, directed by persons with appropriate ability and experience. I append a table showing PWC’s staff levels and their hourly rates through the years.  

6. As I have said earlier, accountants from PWC were appointed by the court as provisional liquidators on the application of the SFC as a matter of urgency.  They were later appointed as liquidators.  (As there were changes in the identities of the individuals due to retirement, I shall refer to them collectively as “the liquidators”).

7. This decision is concerned with the remuneration for the liquidators in respect of their administration of the trust assets. It should first be said that the liquidators in this case have performed their tasks in a most able and professional manner and have been of great assistance to the court.  Of course the services they have provided must come at a price, and the question to be determined in this decision is what is the fair price to pay.

8. I shall first set out some relevant background.

Provisional liquidation

9. The period of provisional liquidation was 4½ months (19 January 1998 to 4 June 1998).  In accordance with the normal procedure governing provisional liquidation, the provisional liquidators’ remuneration was subject to the court’s approval. 

10. The liquidators had originally sought a sum of slightly more than $21m for their remuneration.  There were subsequent reductions and in a judgment given on 17 July 2001, I sanctioned payment of $13.5m as remuneration and $340,000 as disbursements for the period up to 10 June 1998.  (The end date is 6 days later than the winding-up order/the end of the provisional liquidation, but this is of no significance). 

11. This remuneration was for the period when the liquidators were first brought into the case as a matter of urgency and had to be fully engaged in taking over the offices of CAPS and CAPF (including branch offices), ascertaining the identities and whereabouts of assets, ascertaining the quantum of liabilities, dealing with clients’ enquiries on a large scale, dealing with the lenders and the SFC, identifying assets with CCASS, and a host of other pressing tasks which had to be dealt with as a matter of urgency in trying circumstances. 

Administering non-trust assets

12. As far as the liquidations of CAPS and CAPF themselves were concerned, the liquidators’ claims for remuneration for the period after winding-up have been scrutinized by the Committees of Inspection of the respective companies.  (I should add that, unless necessary to draw a distinction, I have referred to both companies together as the affairs of both companies were so inter-twined.  This decision specifically relates to  the remuneration of the liquidators for the administration of trust assets, in whichever name they were held).    

13. According to the liquidators, the Committees of Inspection have sanctioned remuneration for them in the sum of more than $55m for the period from 11 June 1998 to 30 June 2007 for dealing with the two companies’ own assets with a total book value of $385m, of which the liquidators realised about $177m.  In other words, the remuneration approved by the Committees of Inspection was more than 30% of the value of the realised assets. 

Remuneration - for administering trust assets

14. As the trust assets belonged to the clients and not the companies however, the liquidators’ remuneration for administering the trust assets did not fall to be determined by the Committees of Inspection. The question arose as to how the liquidators were to be remunerated for their work in administering the trust assets.  

15. The court heard submissions on this issue from the liquidators and from legal representatives appointed by the court to protect the interests of clients. (I should add that after this hearing, legal representation appointed by the court for the clients was not continued to avoid incurring further costs, and none of the clients appointed lawyers thereafter).

16. In Re Berkeley Applegate Ltd (No.2) [1989] 1 Ch 32, it was held that where a person (ie a client) seeks to enforce a claim to an equitable interest in property (ie the trust assets), the court may order, as a condition for giving effect to that equitable interest, that an allowance be made for skill and labour expended and costs incurred in connection with the administration of the property.

17. Following the approach in that case, the court made an orderon 8 April 1999 that the liquidators may take their proper costs out of the property before handing over the trust assets to the clients. 

Assessing liquidators’ remuneration for administering trust assets

18. Proceedings were held in October and November 2001 to determine how the liquidators’ remuneration for administering trust assets was to be assessed.  Legal representatives from the liquidators, the SFC, and the Official Receiver (“OR”) made submissions.  For reasons given in a Decision dated 27 November 2001, it was held, after consideration of the Ferris Report (www.open.gov.uk/lcd/civil/ferris.htm), that the court would assess the liquidators’ remuneration either by appointing a taxing master with accountancy and insolvency practice qualifications, or with the assistance of an assessor. 

Appointment of Assessor

19. No taxing master with the requisite qualifications was available.  Fortunately in 2002 Mr Thomas Brian Stevenson, a retired accountant with extensive insolvency experience, was prepared to act as assessor at no expense.  Notice of the assessor’s appointment was given to clients in 2002.  I would like to express the court’s gratitude for the assessor’s time, advice and contribution. It must be recognized however that in the future, if there are to be what have been called colloquially “mega-insolvencies”, the stakeholders (liquidators and creditors) will have to accept that it would be necessary for one or even two assessors to be appointed, even though the assessment process would be rendered more elaborate and expensive (Re Independent InsuranceCo Ltd (in provisional liquidation) [2004] BCC 919).  The responsibility for the assessment remains of course that of the court. 

20. The court has dealt with the assessment of the liquidators’ remuneration for administering the trust assets more or less in the same way that courts normally deal with applications to approve provisional liquidators’ remuneration, but with the added input of the assessor.  The OR has throughout been served with the papers in all oral hearings and paper applications, and regular reports have been made by the liquidators to the clients.

Data for claims for remuneration

21. In support of their claim for remuneration for administering trust assets, the liquidators have provided reports which have been called Trust Fees Memoranda (“TFM”) for the period from 11 June 1998 to 30 June 2011.  TFM1 covered the 34-month period from 11 June 1998 to 31 March 2001.  TFM2 covered the 26-month period between 1 April 2001 to 30 June 2003.  Each of the 8 following TFMs covered the 12-month period between 1 July and 30 June (ie from 1 July 2003 until 30 June 2011).  The first two TFM were overly-detailed, perhaps prepared in an abundance of caution in light of previous judgments in other cases where liquidators have been criticized for providing inadequate data for  the court to scrutinize their claims. Subsequently the liquidators have been requested to present the TFM in a less elaborate way.  Some inquiries made by the court and by the assessor directly were answered in correspondence.  

Approach to assessment

22. I have approached the assessment in the following way.

-    Where items require accounting expertise in assessment, for TFM1 and TFM2 I have adopted the percentage of reduction proposed by the assessor.  During these periods (TFM1 and TFM2), each category of work (as set out in para. 34 below) was undertaken, the securities portfolio had the highest value ($508m and $538.5m respectively) and the claims for remuneration were largest ($31.3m and $24.7m respectively).  For subsequent periods (TFM3 - TFM10), Iassessed remuneration having considered the assessor’s views on TFM1 and TFM2, but also paying particular attention to the value of the securities portfolio during each subsequent period. 

-  Where items are of a nature not requiring accounting expertise in assessment, I have undertaken the assessment for all the TFM periods in the light of the court’s knowledge of the way in which this case developed. 

-    Whatever the items, the criteria set out in the Ferris Report have been applied.

23. It should be noted that an assessment such as this is not in the nature of an audit of the liquidators’ charges, and figures applied are not necessarily references to specific rates.  In fact in most assessments of provisional liquidators’ remuneration, no reasons are given for the court’s exercise of discretion in awarding a particular sum.  As will be seen below, the question is not simply whether one accepts that the liquidators and their staff have truly worked a particular number of hours which they genuinely believed was necessary, but also whether the “return” to the clients was worth the entirety of the liquidators’ effort.  

Global view of remuneration 

24. It may first be helpful to step back and view the claims for remuneration in context.  The total sum of remuneration sought is about $99.4m for the 13 years from June 1998 to June 2011.  The total sum of disbursements sought for the same period is about $2.5m.  The value of the trust assets at the start of the period was in the region of nearly $1,630m comprising about $1,145m in the securities portfolio, and the rest in cash.  Viewing the figures globally, the remuneration claimed by the liquidators for administering the trust assets is about 6% of the value of those assets, but of course the administration of cash was much easier than that of the securities portfolio by reason of the nature of the latter asset.

Provisional payments

25. Since the liquidators commenced their claims for remuneration for administering the trust assets, I have ordered some interim payments to be made, on the liquidators’ undertaking to refund any sums subsequently disallowed.  For reasons set out in Reasons for Decision handed down on 27 November 2001, a provisional “processing fee” set at 14% of the value of the securities (as at the date of liquidation) has been held back before each distribution of shares to each client.  The figure of 14% was derived from the estimated total sum of liquidators’ remuneration and legal costs as a percentage of the value of the total securities portfolio.

Criteria for assessment

26. In the Report of Mr Justice Ferris’ Working Party on the Remuneration of Office Holders, the following factors were considered relevant in the assessment of remuneration of provisional liquidators:

(1)   value and nature of the property dealt with;

(2)   time spent;

(3)   exceptional responsibility assumed;

(4)   complexity;

(5)   effectiveness of performance.

As was held in MGN v Maxwell [1998] BCC 324, “remuneration should be fixed so as to reward value, not so as to indemnify against cost”.  The guiding spirit throughout is “value for money”. I have also taken into account Ferris J’s judgment in Re Independent Insurance.  Although we are dealing with trust assets in the present case, and not a provisional liquidation, the criteria set out above similarly apply, because both provisional liquidators and the administrators of trust assets are fiduciaries.  These have therefore been the guidelines followed in considering the reasonableness of remuneration claimed. 

27. The liquidators were for all practical purposes trustees of the trust assets and they must be able to justify that it was prudent from the point of view of the clients to expend cost on the task in hand.  The fact that some of the work was done pursuant to court order is of course relevant, but discretion still had to be exercised by the liquidators as to the methodology to be adopted in going about a task, and the choice of personnel to perform it.  Furthermore, if at any stage it became apparent to the liquidators that implementation of any order in any way would not have been of benefit to the clients, in that the expense that has been or may be incurred outweighed the benefit to be achieved, then it was their duty to come back to the court and to bring that to its attention.

28. On the other hand, one must be fair to the liquidators and avoid challenges or criticism made only with the benefit of hindsight. Especially in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the companies, exceptional responsibilities had to be assumed by the liquidators. A large work force had to be mobilized at short notice to deal with many anxious (and sometimes agitated) clients.  Further, it is not only the value of the trust assets that is relevant, but also its nature.  The nature of the trust assets in this case was complex - legally, factually and logistically.  Apart from the original securities portfolio, there were also ongoing corporate actions, such as warrants, bonus issues and rights issues. 

Recording of time and rates of charges

29. As far as the recording of time worked is concerned, there is nothing to indicate that the liquidators’ records are inaccurate.  The first TFM has set out in detail the way in which fees are recorded.  The liquidators’ staff were required to maintain daily summaries of the work performed (by way of time sheets for junior staff and additional diaries for senior staff).  Work codes were allocated to record the type of work done by each individual.  The assessor has confirmed that the systems of recording time costs were in accordance with general accountancy firm practices.  There is no reason to doubt the integrity of the liquidators or their staff.  Having said that, the court must also consider whether the numbers and seniority of staff assigned were proportionate to the value of the work undertaken.  

30. As far as the rates of charges are concerned, the court order for the appointment of liquidators (both provisional and full) provided that they would be remunerated at the OR’s approved hourly rates.  Their rates have been set out in the appended Table of Staff Levels and Hourly Rates.  The liquidators have referred to a “rates discount” which is the difference between their own rates and those approved by the OR, but that is not a relevant consideration as the court order for their appointment restricted the rates to those approved by the OR.  I should mention as a matter of completeness that the liquidators’ firm at times had 8 levels of seniority whereas the OR had 9, but the assessor has confirmed that no specific adjustment is needed for this.  

Relevance of recovery rate?

31. The assessor has drawn attention to the high “recovery rate”  claimed by the liquidators.  I understand the liquidators’ response that since they were dealing with trust assets pursuant to court orders, the assessor’s suggested “commercial” approach of applying a lower “recovery rate” across the board is not appropriate, and I note that a similar approach was not accepted by Ferris J regarding the “utilisation rate” argument for the provisional liquidation in Re Independent Insurance.  For that reason, although the liquidators have subsequently provided information on their “recovery rate”, I have not applied an overall “across the board” percentage reduction.

32. As for the percentage of reduction proposed by the assessor for the charges in TFM1 and TFM2 which I have applied to the items requiring accountancy expertise, the liquidators accepted the percentage reduction because they considered that to be more cost-effective than answering queries on individual items from the court.  However this does not mean that the court cannot or should not examine charges for other  items, or for subsequent periods, to arrive at an appropriate figure.  I have started from the time costs charged and then taken into account the criteria listed above, in particular the criterion of what the work was worth in terms of the “return” to the clients.

Disbursements

33. I have no reason to doubt the disbursements claimed.  The assessor had raised only one point about disbursements, which is that the cost of photocopying should be reduced from $4 a copy as per the OR’s rates to $3 a copy as per solicitors’ rates on taxation, following the judgment in ReAqualityEngineeringCo Ltd, HCCW1023/2001 unrep. 12 March 2003. The liquidators have applied the lower rate starting from the TFM3 period (1 July 2003).  Since it was only a period of 3 months between the handing down of that judgment and the start of TFM3, I do not consider it cost-efficient to attempt to re-calculate the disbursements to reflect the difference of only $1 for that short period prior to TFM3, and so I would allow the disbursements in full.

Categories of work

34. It would be helpful to first set out the different categories into which the liquidators have divided their work (to avoid further lengthening this Decision, the work involved under each category has not been set out in full, and the descriptions of work are for the assistance of the general reader only):

A.  Title Application -  

   involvement in court proceedings determining clients’ entitlement to the trust assets;

B1.   Managing trust assets -

   (1)reconciling records with CCASS and the lenders;   and

   (2) monitoring corporate actions eg warrants, bonus    issues, etc;

B2.   Determining clients’ claims -  

(1)& (2) creating, verifying and updating a client database;

(3)dealing with inquiries from regulators, press and clients; and

(4)classifying clients as cash clients or margin clients.

B3.   Compensation Fund -

   assisting with SFC and HKEx compensation payments for clients; 

C.  Claims for securities and proof of debt -

   calling for and verifying clients’ claims;

D1.   Lenders’ return of shares -

   securing return of surplus pledged securities;

D2.   Masterise and Inviting -

   investigating the possibility of proceedings relating to these companies;

E.  Share Application and (after 2001) Processing Fee -

   involvement in court proceedings determining allocation of shortfall securities to clients;

   and after 2001, 

   calculating sums to be withheld as provisional processing fees;

F.  Delivery of Shares -

   distributing securities and cash;

G.  General administration.

I have hived off as a separate category:

R.  Review of legal fees.

Analysis of claims for remuneration by reference to time

35. In terms of time, the table entitled “Analysis of Claims for Remuneration by reference to Periods” attached to this Decision shows that the largest claim (per month) is for the period of TFM3 (01/07/03-30/06/04) followed by the periods for TFM1 (11/06/98-31/03/01) and TFM2 (01/04/01-30/06/03).  Of course the levels of importance and difficulty of each category of work varied according to the time at which the work was undertaken.  I have already referred to the period of provisional liquidation. The liquidators have received $13.5m remuneration for this most difficult period of 4½ months.  In the years that followed, there were important milestones in the administration of the trust assets, but as most of the securities were distributed to clients as securities or in cash by 2004 (end of TFM3), particular attention must be paid to the claims for remuneration for the subsequent periods to see if the value achieved by the clients was worth the expense.

Analysis of claims for remuneration by reference to types of work

36. As far as the types of work undertaken were concerned, it is clear from the matters previously set out in judgments of the court and from the TFM that the most complex work were:

-   identifying, reconciling and retrieving trust assets from CCASS and the lender banks; and

-   implementing the distribution of trust assets.

It would be fair to say that some categories of work, such as the court proceedings for the Title Application and the Share Application, were more “lawyer-driven” with the liquidators only in the role of professional lay clients, and some categories of work were predominantly clerical in nature, such as the creation of a database of clients.  It will be seen from the table entitled “Court’s Schedule” that the largest claim for remuneration is for Category F (“Delivery of Shares”) at $45m, followed by Category B2 (“Determining Clients’ Claims”) at $14m and Category E (“Share Application & Processing Fee”) at nearly $12m. (For completeness, figures for “Rates discount” and “Write-offs” as provided by the liquidators have been included in the “Court’s Schedule” but they have not been subject to examination).   

Assessment

Category A - Title Application

37. Starting with the Title Application, this was unique to the TFM1 period.  This is a matter on which the court has more experience as it involves legal proceedings. 

38. The following assessment has been performed on the basis of the time and effort that would be expected from a lay client charging at professional rates in such proceedings.  There were 11 hearings during that period.  I consider that the liquidators should be remunerated for each hearing (on the basis of 5 hrs per hearing) for attendance in court and an additional 2 days (on the basis of 8 hrs a day) for pre-hearing preparation and post-hearing consideration of the court orders.  Although it is appreciated that the liquidators must have expended quite some time earlier in the proceedings on briefing lawyers on problems they encountered, it should also be noted that not all hearings were of equal length or complexity or importance.  The sum under this head is $1,007,160 ([11x5+22x8]x$4,360, the last figure being a partner’s average hourly rate at that time). 

39. As the issues were more legal or conceptual, and given that the liquidators themselves had been involved, I do not see the need for additional involvement at senior manager level.  That said, I accept that managerial level assistance was required for the liquidators in their preparation for the hearings and consideration of implementation of court orders.  I would assess managerial level remuneration at $482,240 (22x8x$2,740, taking the higher of the manager 3rd year’s rate). 

40. The total remuneration for category A is therefore $1,489,400.  I am aware that this is a greater reduction than that proposed by the assessor on an “across the board” percentage basis, and it is also substantially less than the taxed costs of the legal representatives for the parties, but it must be recognized that for this category, it was the legal representatives (rather than the liquidators) who had the main conduct of the proceedings. 

Category B1 - Managing Trust assets

41. This category comprised tasks in the following 2 parts:

(1)   reconciling shares between the companies’ records and those kept by CCASS and the lenders;

(2)   monitoring corporate actions after the companies’ collapse, such as rights issues, bonus issues, warrants, dividends, etc.

I shall first set out some relevant background.

(1) Reconciliation of records

42. Part (1) refers to the reconciliation work that had to be done between the companies’ records with those of CCASS and the 14 lenders.  Also it was necessary to reconcile the companies’ records as a whole with the records of individual accounts.  These tasks were rendered more difficult and complex by a number of factors: (a) errors and omissions found in the companies’ computer records by the time of their collapse, (b) the lenders’ sale of some of the pledged securities, (c) CCASS’ close-out procedures, (d) the involvement of a related company Pui Hang Enterprises, and (e) the refusal of key IT personnel of the companies to co-operate with the liquidators’ staff. 

43. The reconciliation work was one of the most important and productive tasks undertaken by the liquidators for the benefit of the clients.  As noted in previous judgments, securities held at CCASS are not numbered, and therefore tracing the movement of individual securities by reference to the numbers of share certificates in the traditional way was not possible.  The reconciliation work done by the liquidators led to the reconciliation of records with CCASS, and the recovery from lenders of securities surplus to the lenders’ entitlements. 

44. Having said that, the involvement of senior personnel was necessary only at the earlier stages of the 13-year period from 1998 to 2011 when deciding what courses of action to take, for establishing the procedures for such reconciliations, and for directions to be given to junior personnel when unexpected problems occurred. In the TFM1 period, 9 of the 14 lenders returned surplus securities and cash. In the TFM2 period, the remaining 5 lenders did the same.  So by the time of TFM3 (2003-2004), all the reconciliation work with the lenders had been completed.

(2) Monitoring corporate actions

45. As for part (2), the companies’ collapse affected not only the securities they were holding for clients but also corporate actions such as warrants, bonus issues, rights issues, dividends, etc.  Upon the termination of CAPS’ participation in CCASS on 19 January 1998 following its default, CCASS terminated access to its entitlement information.  Accordingly when the liquidators took over, they had to track corporate actions manually at first. 

46. This work would have started during the period of provisional liquidation.  Indeed Jardine Fleming was appointed during the period of provisional liquidation to advise on specific issues relating to the sale, disposal or exercise of warrants.  They also undertook the sale of warrants.  HSBC was appointed custodian of the securities portfolio as from January 1999 and Hang Seng Bank from November 2003.  On their appointment, the involvement of the liquidators and their staff in monitoring corporate actions would have been reduced, although not completely eliminated as HSBC reported only to the liquidators and not to individual clients since that would have been more costly.  According to the liquidators’ calculation, had individual accounts been opened, the estimated cost of transfers would have been about $9.9m.  

47. In any event however, the quantum of securities reduced substantially after the bulk of securities was distributed to clients in 2003-2004 (by “distribution” I include sales made on behalf of clients).  Applying the principle of proportionality, this should lead to a commensurate reduction in the remuneration charged. So much for the relevant background. 

48. Coming to the assessment of remuneration for this category of work which required accountancy expertise, the assessor proposed that a 10.8% reduction be made to the remuneration charged in TFM1, on a broad-brush approach rather than one based on examining the details of individual charges. Although the liquidators were initially opposed to that approach, they subsequently accepted that it would be less cost-effective to seek to answer queries subsequently raised by the court on specific items.  Consequently, applying the assessor’s percentage of reduction to Category B1, I would assess the remuneration for the 34 months covered by TFM1 at $5,371,109 up to 31/03/2001.  Similarly, on the assessor’s reduction of 11.2% on the remuneration charged in TFM2 which was accepted by the liquidators, I would assess the remuneration for 01/04/2001 – 30/06/2003 (26 months) at $2,216,779.

49. To underline the relevance of the proportionality consideration, which impacts on the assessment for this category for the subsequent periods, the following table shows the value of the securities portfolio, the assessment by the assessor for TFM1 and TFM2, and the charges for the subsequent periods for this category.

Period Value of portfolio  Charges for Cat B(1)
(98/01)
TFM1
$508m$5,371,109 (assessed)
[$1,895,685 average p.a.]

(01-03)
TFM2
$538.5m$2,216,779 (assessed)
[1,023,128 average p.a.]

(03-04)
TFM3
$19.1m $540,211 (claimed)

(04-05)
TFM4
$28m$128,649 (claimed)

(05-06)
TFM5
$35.2m$210,886 (claimed)

(06-07)
TFM6
$1.1m$104,338 (claimed)

(07-08)
TFM7
$0.9m$21,703 (claimed)

(08-09)
TFM8
$0.1m$11,987 (claimed)

(09-10)
TFM9
$0$4,719 (claimed)

(10-11)
TFM10
$0$16,036 (claimed)

50. As noted above, one of the relevant factors in assessing remuneration is proportionality. By 2004, all the lenders had returned the surplus securities and cash to the liquidators, and the bulk of the securities had been distributed to clients.  Although I accept that the liquidators’ staff still had to reconcile corporate actions returned by the lenders, which was labour-consuming, the work could have been left to the most junior staff since procedures had been established in the earlier years.

51. The remuneration assessed by the assessor for TFM1 was 1.1% of the value of the portfolio, and that for TFM2, about 0.4%.  I am prepared to accept the figure claimed for TFM3 ($540,211), although it comes up to 2.8% of the value of the portfolio, because more work would have had to be done that year in preparation for distribution of the securities.

52. The charges claimed for TFM4 ($128,649) is 0.5% of the value of the portfolio, and that for TFM5 ($210,886), 0.6% of the portfolio, which are acceptable.  However for TFM6 and TFM7, it is difficult to see the justification for the much higher percentage rate of charges to the value of the portfolio (see the table at para. 49 above).  I am prepared to accept that there would be a minimum level of work done even though the value of the portfolio has been reduced, so taking the figure ($11,987) claimed for TFM8 (when the portfolio still contained some active securities), I would assess the remuneration for TFM6, TFM7 and TFM8 at $11,987 each. 

53. As for TFM9 and TFM10, the periods where the securities had no value eg because they related to delisted companies, I accept that staff still had to keep records up to date until an application to court could be made to relinquish the title to those securities, and although an order has been obtained, the implementation of relinquishment procedures had to be done by the custodians. I accept the remuneration charged for TFM9 at $4,719.  As for TFM10, an increase in “Manager 3rd year” participation for that period has not been justified and I would therefore assess the remuneration at the same figure.

54. The total remuneration for Category B1 is therefore assessed at $5,371,109 + 2,216,779 + 540,211+ 128,649 + 210,886 +11,987 +11,987 +11,987 +4,719+4,719 = $8,513,033.

Category B2 - Determining clients’ claims

55. The claim for this category is the second largest, at $14m for the 13-year period.

56. This category comprised the following tasks:

(1)   creating a database of clients;

(2)   verifying the same;

(3)   dealing with inquiries from regulators, press and clients; and

(4)   classifying clients as cash clients or margin clients.

Some of these tasks required accountancy expertise but some did not, depending on what tasks were done and when.   

57. I shall deal first with the TFM1 period.  Considering the tasks that were performed during this period, I do not consider accountancy expertise to be necessary for assessment.  To perform the assessment, I have tested the total figure claimed against what I consider to have been reasonable charges for each task during that period. 

58. As far as tasks (1) and (2) are concerned, I accept that the liquidators and more senior personnel would have been required at the outset to establish the methodology for (1) the creation and (2) verification of the database.  But whilst the database was essential, and the mechanics for its creation and verification would have been time-consuming, it  would only have needed junior staff, as it involved clerical rather than professional accountancy work.  It should be noted that this category did not include verifying clients’ claims about the accuracy of their accounts (this is under a separate category, viz Cat. C). 

59. I would therefore take an assumed basis of 0.2 hour per client for an associate (at average $565/hr) for collating client details and inputting them into the database, and 0.1 hour per client for a senior associate 2nd year (at the higher rate of $1,090/hr) for verification work.  That would give a total sum of say $222 per client, and on the basis of 3,900 clients, the total sum would be $865,800.  As for the initial work in establishing a methodology for the creation and verification of the database, I would assess this at 3 hours each of liquidator time (at $4,240/hr) and manager time (average between manager 2nd year and 3rd year at $2,300/hr),  which would give a further $19,620 or a total of $885,420 ($865,800+ 19,620) for the creation and verification of the database.  Updating work carried out thereafter (eg due to changes of addresses) would take very little time and could be undertaken by junior staff.  I would round up the figure relating to the tasks of (1) creating and (2) verifying and updating of the database of clients in the TFM1 period to $900,000. 

60. Before dealing with task (3), I shall deal first with task (4) ie. classification of clients.  This was an important preparatory step for the Share Application. The work started at the end of 2000 and finished in February 2001.  Put succinctly, each client’s account records were  reviewed to see if the client had signed a “memorandum of deposit”.  If he had, that account would be classified as a margin account.  There were 5,500 securities accounts, and on the basis that it took an associate (at $565/hr) 0.1 hr to review each account and note down the result, and 0.1 hr for a senior associate 2nd year (at $1,090/hr) to verify it, this would come up to $165 per account, and for 5,500 accounts, a total of $907,500.  As the method of determination by reference to the memorandum of deposit was directed in court proceedings, the liquidators should also be remunerated for preparing for and attending those proceedings, and I would assess this at 10 hrs of liquidators time in the TFM1 period i.e. $44,800, for a total under task (4) of $952,300.  

61. Dealing now with task (3), ie. dealing with inquiries from  regulators, press and clients, the companies’ collapse left many clients understandably confused and aggrieved, and the liquidators became one of the focal points for agitation.  I also accept that this was a high-profile company collapse, and the liquidators received inquiries from the press and regulators. 

62. However, one must at the same time bear in mind the fact that the companies underwent provisional liquidation for nearly 5 months after the initial throes of the collapse, and the liquidators have already been remunerated for their work in the provisional liquidation. 

63. One must also bear in mind that the liquidators are now claiming professional fees for the administration of trust assets, and generally speaking, time spent on what one might describe as public relations should not attract compensation on the basis that professional accountancy work was being undertaken.  Whilst I accept that the liquidators were required to address inquiries from regulators as part of their work in administering the trust assets, I am not persuaded that answering questions from the press should be included, given that press releases should have been adequate.  In the absence of particulars as to how much time was spent by the liquidators dealing with regulators, as distinct from clients, I would assess remuneration under this head at $304,640 (0.5x4x34x$4,480) on the basis of 0.5 hr a week every month throughout the TFM1 period when there were events such as the Title Application and the Share Application which would have attracted the regulators’ interest.  Of course there would have been periods when contact was more frequent, but at the same time, it has not been suggested that there was any requirement for fixed-interval contacts. 

64. Pausing there, I have accepted that the following claims for Cat.  B2 for TFM1 were justified: for tasks (1) and (2), the sum of $900,000; for task (4) $951,980; and for the regulators part of task (3), $304,640.  The total of these figures is $2,156,620.  The balance of the claim under this category for the part of task (3), for dealing with the clients only, would therefore be $4,357,548 (ie $6,514,168- $2,156,620).  

65. I accept that as part of the administration, it was necessary for the liquidators to inform the clients of the way in which the matter was proceeding and for their staff to deal with legitimate individual inquiries.  However general administrative costs such as costs incurred in translation should be absorbed in the liquidators’ general office overheads.  Moreover since the liquidators had regularly released general information, time should only have been spent on productive individual inquiries, even at the risk of unfavourable client relations.  Having earlier noted that the liquidators are charging on the basis of performing professional work, it would not be fair for the liquidators to charge for time spent on unproductive dealings with unreasonable clients at the expense of the reasonable ones. 

66. Taking all these matters into account, I am not persuaded that the balance of Category B2 of $4,357,548 would be justified by reference to the criterion of “value for money”.  That would amount to $128,163 per month which seems to me to be an unreasonable sum for answering inquiries from clients only.  Whilst I recognize that some objections to classifications would have been received during that period, it would be noted that objections to classifications would only have started in the last month of that period (March 2001) as the letters of classification were only sent out in the last week of February and the deadline for objections had not expired.  I shall deal with these objection inquiries in the TFM2 period.

67. For dealing with client inquiries in the TFM1 period (i.e. not relating to objections), the claim for $128,163 per month amounts to about  $6,400 a day (on the basis of 5 working days a week) continuously for 34 months.  In my view, that would not be justified on the criterion of value for money. 

68. Even if each and every one of the 3,900 clients made general inquiries every quarter every year in the TFM1 period (say 12 times in the TFM1 period), and each inquiry took 0.1 hr for an associate to deal with, that would come to only $2,644,200 (3900 x 12 x 0.1 x $565 average/hr). 

69. For such general inquiries it is unlikely that the liquidators would have to be personally involved but I accept that they needed to deal personally with clients on the initial occasion when some clients behaved in an unruly manner in their office.  Thereafter security measures would have been put in place, and as I indicated earlier, it would not be fair for reasonably-behaved clients to have to pay professional fees to accountants just to placate unreasonably-behaved ones. I would assess the liquidators’  remuneration in this category on the basis that they had to deal personally with general inquiries for 0.5 hr every week throughout the 34-month period of TFM1. This would come up to say $304,640 (0.5x4x34x$4,480).  The sum for the “clients” part of task (3) would therefore be $2,948,840 (2,644,200+ 304,640).

70. The total assessment for Cat. B2 for the TFM1 period is therefore $5,105,780 ie.

tasks (1) + (2): the sum of $900,000;

task (3): $3,253,480 (304,640 for dealing with regulators + 2,948,840 for dealing with clients); and

task (4): $952,300,

or an average of $150,170 a month.

71. For TFM2, I accept that this was a busy time for the liquidators’ staff as this was the period during which clients’ objections to classifications were dealt with.  There were about 400 objections.  The determination of the objections required tracing of records of trades, and of sums of money transferred between accounts.  This required professional accountancy expertise.  Some objections were resolved without the need to go to court.  For those which needed resolution in court, the hearings took 7 days.  The court orders gave rise to further inquiries, and in some cases, new objections from clients.

72. This was also the period during which the Processing Fee application was prepared and heard.  Further, the methods for distribution and allocation of shares to individual clients were ascertained during this period. 

73. The assessor has reduced the liquidators’ claims for remuneration by 11.2% for the TFM2 period.  For this category this would mean a reduced remuneration of $5,686,378 (about $218,706 a month) which I consider to be a fair amount for this important category of work at an important period in the administration.  I am aware that this is a larger sum than that awarded for the same “category” of work during the TFM1 period, but the reason for that is because this is not a true comparison of like for like. The nature of the classification work during the TFM2 period required more accountancy expertise than the work done during the TFM1 period.

74. Not surprisingly, the claim for category B2 dropped substantially in the TFM3 period.  There were however some court hearings which required the liquidators’ input, and I am prepared to accept the claim of $238,643 in its entirety.

75. The claim for the TFM4 period is only $29,311 and I accept it in its entirety.

76. The claim for the TFM5 period however rose to $313,808.  A comparison of the charges in TFM4 and TFM5 shows that in TFM5, 2 senior managers charged for a total of 63.8 hrs whereas the same personnel charged for 2.8 hrs only during the preceding period.  Most of the work would have been the same, except that in the TFM5 period, one of the clients sent lengthy submissions for 2 court hearings held during that period.  However the same client had commenced his complaints during the TFM3 period already, and 1 of the 2 managers had already participated in this category of work then (albeit as manager rather than as senior manager).  Further it is the court’s experience that the submissions from this client tended to be repetitive.  Accordingly it would not have been necessary for 2 senior managers to have been involved for any substantial periods to deal with him.  I accept the senior manager who had prior knowledge of this client’s matters would have had to prepare for and attend the court’s hearings.  On the basis that she would have had to prepare for it for say 2 hrs before each hearing and attend court for 2 hrs for each hearing (making a total of 8 hrs), I would deduct say 55 hrs from senior manager time, resulting in remuneration for the TFM5 period being assessed at $127,358 ($313,808 – [$3,390/hr x 55 hrs]). 

77. For the TFM6 period, the amount claimed is $315,213.  Two progress letters were sent to the clients during this period, but it would appear that these were general rather than specific, and in any event legal representatives were involved in their preparation.  Junior staff were trained to man “hotlines” for clients with inquiries arising therefrom. However it would be seen from the Summary of Time charges that this took less than 45 hrs so there would not have been a large number of inquiries.  During this period, there were also some court proceedings and the senior manager (and to a lesser extent the liquidators) would be involved in preparation and attendance. 

78. However it would be noted that by this period, the value of the securities portfolio had dropped to $1.1m, and so the sum claimed for this category alone is more than 28% of the value of the portfolio.  Given the “value for money” criterion, I would assess the remuneration at no more than say $72,110 (2 hrs of partner time @$4,480/hr, 10 hrs of manager 3rd year time @$2,740/hr and 50 hrs of associate time @$715/hr, taking the average rate between senior associate 1st year and associate). 

79. In the TFM7 period, a sum of $102,847 is claimed.  There do not appear to be any substantial events, and it is difficult to evaluate the discussions as to claims conversions without reference to the value of those unsecured claims.  In the circumstances, I would assess the remuneration at the same figure as that for the TFM4 period, ie $29,311. 

80. The claims for the TFM8, TFM9 and TFM10 periods are relatively insignificant, being an average of $2,300 per month and they are allowed in their entirety.

81. The total remuneration for Category B2 is therefore assessed at $5,105,780+ 5,686,378+ 238,643+ 29,311+ 127,358+ 72,110+ 29,311+ 24,829+ 27,995+ 31,361= $11,372,876.

Category B3 - Compensation Fund

82. The liquidators undertook verification work at the request of the SFC and HKEx so as to facilitate the payment of compensation to clients.  I accept that this was part of their work as administrators of the trust assets, and I also accept that this required some professional accountancy work.  The assessor having applied a 10.8% reduction for the TFM1 period, I would assess the remuneration in this category at $800,763, an average of $23,551 a month. 

83. As for the TFM2 period, I note that the liquidators had said in September 2001 that the Compensation Fund had “largely completed” its assessment of client compensation claims, and that the liquidators expected there to be less work of this type.  But it does not seem to have been reflected in the claims for remuneration.  The claim for the 34 months of the TFM1 period was $897,717, an average of $26,403 per month, yet the claim for the 26 months of the TFM2 period (01/04/2001 to 30/06/2003) was $601,550, an average of $23,136 per month.  I am unable to see from TFM2 how the relatively small reduction of 13% is justified, given that the Compensation Fund assessment had been “largely completed”.  Nor can I see the explanation for 233 hrs claimed for senior associate (3rd yr)’s work in TFM2 when in TFM1, only 1.8 hrs work at that level was claimed.  I appreciate that in TFM1, 76 hrs of senior managers’ work were claimed, compared with 5.3 hrs at that level in TFM2, but as noted above, the substantial work was done during the TFM1 period.  Taking these matters into account, I would assess the remuneration for the TFM2 period at half of the average monthly charge assessed for the TFM1 period, i.e. $306,163 ($23,551x0.5x26). 

84. As for TFM3, there were only 20 claims of clients left and it is not suggested that the work was anything other than routine and minimal.  It is difficult to see the justification for a claim for 16 hrs of manager 1st and 2nd yr time.  Nor for the 15 hrs of senior associate 3rd yr time @$1,490/hr which could have been done by junior personnel @ $1,090/hr.  Deducting the claim for 16 hrs manager 1st and 2nd year time, and substituting the 15 hrs of senior associate 3rd yr time with the same amount of senior associate 2nd yr time, I would assess the remuneration for the TFM3 period at $20,958.

85. As for TFM4, HKEx further admitted 8 claims and advised that all outstanding claims had been finalized.  Again it is difficult to see the justification for a claim for 3.8 hrs of manager 3rd yr time.  Nor for the 13.7 hrs of manager 1st and 2nd (mistyped as 3rd) yr time.  After deducting the 3.8 hrs of manager 3rd yr time, and substituting the 13.7 hrs of manager 1st and  2nd yr time with the same amount of associate time, I would assess remuneration for the TFM4 period at $10,325.  

86. As for TFM5, there is a claim for $19,491 but in light of the preceding paragraph and as it is not stated that there were any newly admitted claims, it is difficult to see how any sum can be justified.

87. The total remuneration for Category B3 is therefore assessed at $800,763+ 306,163+ 20,958+ 10,325 = $1,138,209.

Category C - Claim to securities and proof of debt

88. This relates to the contesting by some clients of their securities/cash position as shown in their statements of account. When requests for  amendments were made, the liquidators had to carry out investigation work.  I accept that this required professional accountancy work and adopting the assessor’s reduction of 10.8%, I would assess the remuneration for TFM1 at $2,788,849. 

89. For TFM2, adopting the assessors’ reduction of 11.2%, I would assess the remuneration at $75,779.

90. The total remuneration for Category C is therefore assessed at $2,788,849+ 75,779 = $2,864,628.  

Category D1 - Lenders’ return of shares

91. This was an important part of the liquidators’ work.  The 14 lenders had possession of many valuable securities pledged to them.  The liquidators had to ascertain the extent of the lenders’ entitlements, meet with the lenders, press for the return of surplus securities and consider (after consulting legal representatives) the clients’ options for recovering the surplus securities.

92. After applying the assessor’s reductions, I would assess the remuneration for the TFM1 period at $149,153, and that for the TFM2 period, at $97,657.  I would allow the relatively small claim of $33,956 in the TFM3 period in its entirety.

93. The total remuneration for Category D1 is therefore assessed at $149,153+ 97,657+ 33,956 = $280,766.

Category D2 - Masterise and Inviting

94. This concerns litigation against these companies.  By reason of the confidential nature of legal advice given to the liquidators, it is inappropriate to reveal details in this Decision. 

95. I accept that the sums involved were such that initially it would have been appropriate for the liquidators to investigate these matters, even though the documentation was incomplete and the data required a certain degree of reconstruction.

96. After applying the assessor’s reductions, I would assess the remuneration for the TFM1 period at $926,573 and that for the TFM2 period, at $263,185.  I accept the relatively small claim for the TFM3 period at $23,014 in its entirety. 

97. During the TFM4 period, the liquidators instituted s.221 proceedings against a bank in respect of a claim involving Masterise which related to securities worth about $70m.  During the TFM5 period, those proceedings continued, with the liquidators having to review some 1200 transactions.  There was another set of proceedings against another bank in respect of a claim involving Inviting which related to securities worth about $40m. During the TFM7 period (there being no claims for remuneration for the TFM6 period in this category), investigations pursuant to the results of those proceedings continued.  I accept that the work in preparation for the proceedings required substantial analytical skills and I accept the claims of $237,524 (for TFM4), $1,075,784 (for TFM5) and $917,030 (for TFM7) in their entirety.  Unfortunately it transpired that the difficulties and expense of pursuing those proceedings were such that it was considered that no further action should be taken in respect of Masterise and Inviting.

98. During the TFM9 period, the liquidators “revisited” the work in this category.  It seems to me that this was essentially a duplication of work which had been done earlier, albeit by a partner instead of an associate director and I do not see the claim being justified. 

99. The total remuneration for Category D2 is therefore assessed at $926,573+ 263,185+ 23,014+ 237,524+ 1,075,784+ 917,030 =  $3,443,110.

Category E - Share Application and (after 2001) Processing Fee

100. I now come to the Share Application and (after 2001) Processing Fee category.  This included initially the identification of the problems relating to the tracing of specific securities to specific clients, the devising of mechanisms for doing so, and the postulation of alternative solutions.  Although the issues in the Share Application were essentially legal, I accept that the liquidators were required to liaise closely with the legal advisers in order to brief them in detail as to the position on the ground, particularly on the information available from the companies’ operating systems and their internal control procedures. 

101. I accept that this required accountancy expertise and after applying the assessor’s reductions, I would assess the remuneration for TFM1 at $3,125,344. 

102. It would be seen from TFM2 that the work undertaken under this category focussed mainly on the method of charging a provisional processing fee.  It is well established that liquidators are entitled to charge for the time spent in preparing their bills, but it must be recognised that the liquidators had obviously spent some time simply searching for the appropriate methods or procedures for charging the provisional processing  fee which was of course for their benefit.  Taking this into consideration,  I would apply a discount of 20% to reflect the extra time spent in the search for these methods or procedures, and assess the liquidators’ remuneration at 80% of the claim, ie $1,360,284.

103. The same consideration applies to the claim for remuneration under TFM3, which involved the preparation of TFM1 and TFM2, which I have observed were over-detailed.  However I accept that the liquidators conducted a detailed review of all trust expenses incurred and paid over 6 years, a matter which required accountancy expertise, and there were a number of court appearances.  Taking these matters in the round, I would assess the liquidators’ remuneration at 80% of the claim, ie $787,984. 

104. For TFM4, while there were some court hearings, I find it difficult to accept a total of 420 hrs were necessary when by this time, the work of calculating processing fees and preparing TFMs had become more or less settled.  Given the liquidators’ personal involvement in the court hearings and substantial work done by a senior associate 3rd year, I would deduct the fees claimed for the senior manager, and the two managers 3rd year. That would result in the assessment for TFM4 being $432,819.

105. For TFM5, I accept that time was spent by the liquidators and their staff responding to the assessor’s queries and also the review of legal advisers’ bills.  It is difficult however to see how this could have taken more time than the TFM3 period.  I would therefore assess the remuneration for this period as equivalent to that for TFM3 ie $787,984. 

106. It is clear from TFM6 that the work done in this category for this period involved only settled work procedures which could have been performed by junior staff, overseen briefly by someone slightly more senior.  By this time, the work of reviewing legal fees had been hived off to another category.  Further it is important to note that by this period, the value of the securities portfolio had diminished to $1.1m after distributions were made to the clients.  It does not appear to me to be prudent to expend a sum equivalent to 46% of the value of the portfolio as fees for this category only.  Even if processing fees had to be calculated for distributions of corporate actions, the criterion of “value for money” would still have required more attention to be paid to the issue whether some other method of undertaking this work would be more appropriate.  I would therefore assess the remuneration for this period at $282,502 being the same proportion that the approved sum for TFM4 bears to the claimed sum.  That works out at about $23,540 per month which would be adequate for a junior associate essentially updating records, having his work overseen by a more senior associate, and the liquidators’ involvement in more complicated matters. 

107. I would adopt a similar figure for the further TFMs.  Although I note the liquidators’ statement that as a result of the court’s queries, time was spent considering them, the end result was that the liquidators considered it more cost-effective not to respond to detailed queries.  I do not see why the clients would have to pay for time spent by the liquidators discussing and making these essentially strategic decisions on how to proceed with the claims for remuneration.  This is particularly so when the value of the securities portfolio for the last 2 periods was nil.  

108. The total remuneration for Category E is therefore assessed at $3,125,344+ 1,360,284+ 787,984+ 432,819+ 787,984+ 282,502+ 282,502+ 282,502+ 282, 502+ 282,502 = $7,906,925.

Category F - Delivery of shares

109. The delivery of shares is the single largest claim.  It is justifiably so, as it is the final step, and indeed the main objective, of the long process whereby all the clients recovered the securities or cash to which they were entitled (or at least such of the securities as were available in cases of shortfall).

110. I accept that this category of work involved accountancy expertise.  Adopting the assessors’ deductions, I would assess the remuneration for TFM1 at $2,511,997, and for TFM2, at $10,284,637. 

111. For TFM3, the value of the portfolio had by this time been reduced to $19.1m by reason of distributions, but there was the problem of corporate actions, which required time and manpower to manage.  These included dividends in cash or in scrip, bonus shares, bonus rights issues sales proceeds, open offers, bonus warrants sale proceeds, cash dividends declared before liquidation but paid afterwards, surplus funds returned by the lenders and interest earned on the trust funds.  I accept that for this period, time and effort was expended in establishing the methodology of distribution of these corporate entitlements and putting it into practice, but I cannot see how under the “value for money” principle, it would be justified to expend any more than the sum assessed for the previous period, particularly when the TFM2 period was more than twice as long as TFM3.  I would therefore assess the remuneration for TFM3 also at $10,284,637.

112. By the time of the following TFM periods, the methodology would have become established, the procedures developed and the staff experienced.  There should therefore be even more attention paid to the value for money principle.  I am prepared to accept the claim for $4,922,718 for TFM4 which comes up to 17.6% of the value of the portfolio for that period.  Adopting this percentage, I would assess the remuneration for TFM5 at $6,195,200 when the value of the portfolio was approximately $35.2m.  

113. In the TFM6 period, the liquidators arranged the sale of 85 lines of bonus shares worth $40m pursuant to court order.  There was also trust cash which was distributed.  There was some interaction with clients who were divided into 4 different categories.  It was also necessary to make distributions to the SFC in relation to each of the more than 3,000 subrogated clients and there was also distribution of unlisted physical bonus shares. Some 2900 hours of work were claimed for this period, although mainly by junior staff.  Given the magnitude of the task, I am prepared to accept the claim for the TFM6 period of $4,138,794 which is about 10% of the value of the bonus shares. 

114. By the TFM7 period however, the bulk of distributions had been done and the only matters that needed to be dealt with were unclaimed monies and other such relatively insignificant administrative matters.  The value of the portfolio was by now less than $1m with unclaimed trust monies of $19m belonging to about 700 clients.  However, dealing with this unclaimed trust money was essentially a legal matter rather than one requiring the liquidators’ accountancy expertise.  The matter was resolved by an order that the money be paid into court.

115. The claim for TFM7 is equal to the value of the securities portfolio and that for TFM8, substantially more.  The portfolio was not worth anything at all for the remaining two periods TFM9 and TFM10.  I accept that some staff time was used to deal with a re-allocation of sales proceeds which had previously been allocated to a particular corporate client, but in such an exercise there must have been a certain amount of duplication, and the size of the proceeds has not been stated.  Given the tailing off of this category of work after TFM6, I consider 10% of the value of the trust assets would have been adequate. That would amount to $90,000 for TFM7, and no more than half of that or $45,000 for TFM8, TFM9 and TFM10. 

116. The total remuneration for Category F is therefore assessed at $2,511,997+ 10,284,637+ 10,284,637+ 4,922,718+ 6,195,200+ 4,138,794+  90,000+ 45,000+ 45,000+ 45,000 = $38,562,983.

Category G - General Administration

117. I accept the sums claimed for general administration in their entirety.  They come up to a total of $7.3m for 108 months (or less than $68,000 per month) which, considering an administration of this size and complexity, is acceptable.

118. The total remuneration for Category G is therefore $7,304,834.

Category R - Review of legal fees

119. I also accept the fees claimed for the work of reviewing legal fees which are relatively modest.

120. The total remuneration for Category R is therefore $376,189.

Order

121. I would therefore propose to assess the total remuneration for the 13-year period covered by TFM1-10 at $83,252,953.  I accept the sum of disbursements for these periods of $2,543,663 as claimed.  For reference only, these sums totalling $85,796,616 come up to a little more than 84% of the total claims made by the liquidators, and a little more than  5% of the total value of the trust assets, using a very rough figure of $1,630m made up of $1,145m securities and $484m cash. Since I understand from counsel for the liquidators that the total sum of provisional processing fees received by the liquidators is $82,952,156, there should be a balance payable to the liquidators of $2,844,460.  Accordingly I order the Official Receiver to release to the liquidators the sum of $2,844,460 from the account of the provisional processing fees.  

 (MARIA YUEN)
 Justice of Appeal
 Sitting as an additional judge of the
 Court of First Instance

Mr Charles Manzoni SC instructed by Hogan Lovells for the Liquidators

The Official Receivers (not appearing)


Analysis of Claims for Remunerationby reference to Periods

Table of the Liquidators’ Staff Levels and Hourly Rates

Court's Schedule

54802-EN-2006-10-24

RE C.A. PACIFIC FINANCE LTD (in Liquidation)

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HCCW 36/98
HCCW 37/98

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES (WINDING-UP) ACTIONS NO. 36 AND 37 OF 1998

---------------------------

IN THE MATTER of the Companies Ordinance Cap. 32
and
IN THE MATTER of C.A. PACIFIC FINANCE LIMITED (in Liquidation)
 and
 IN THE MATTER of C.A. PACIFIC SECURITIES LIMITED (in Liquidation)

------------------------

THE LIQUIDATORS OF C.A. PACIFIC FINANCE LIMITEDApplicants
(IN LIQUIDATION)
THE LIQUIDATORS OF C.A. PACIFIC SECURITIES LIMITED
(IN LIQUIDATION)

-------------------------

Before: Hon Yuen JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance) in chambers (open to the public)

Date of hearing: 20 October 2006

Date of Decision: 24 October 2006

--------------

DECISION

--------------

1.  This is an application on the part of the liquidators of CA Pacific Finance Ltd and CA Pacific Securities Ltd for directions relating to the allocation and distribution of:

(1)corporate actions (primarily cash and stock dividends, bonus shares, etc.) which have been
 -received by CAP Securities, or
 -recovered from the Lenders to CAP Finance to whom securities belonging to CAP Securities’ clients had been pledged ("the Lenders");
(2)other cash, being
 -cash recovered from Yu Fung Bank, one of the Lenders,  being surplus proceeds of sales effected by that Lender;
 -cash recovered from Lenders which are believed to be referable to corporate actions although it has not been segregated as such;
(3)what one might term "residuary assets", being
 -cash resulting from the rounding down of share allocations and cash proceeds;
 -unclaimed shares and cash;
 -balance of interest (after deductions made for the Official Receiver’s charges). 

2.  I am grateful to the liquidators and their legal advisers for a very clearly drafted affirmation of Mr Rainier Lam Hok Chung, one of the joint and several liquidators.

3.  Essentially the directions are for the purpose of effecting a just and also pragmatic way of dealing with the above corporate actions, cash and residuary assets.

4.  I do not intend to reproduce the proposed directions in respect of each of the above categories, save to say that the theme running through them is that corporate actions would be converted into cash (save in a few exceptional cases where allocation and distribution to specific clients can be done efficiently and cost-effectively because of the small numbers involved), and allocation and distribution of the proceeds and other cash would be along the lines of the guidelines set in my earlier judgments (briefly, where there is a shortfall in a line of stock, distribution to cash clients in priority to margin clients, and as between cash clients themselves, pari passu).  The proposals are also similar to directions given by Kwan J in other cases involving failed brokerages, namely Peregrine Brokerage Ltd in 2003 and Chark Fung Securities in 2002 and 2005.

5.  I approve the liquidators’ proposals.  In so doing I am satisfied that the general creditors of CAP Finance are not prejudiced, because that company was not the beneficial owner of the shares which it had pledged to the Lenders, having only a security interest in those shares as lender to the margin clients.  As such, the corporate actions and cash never formed part of that company’s free assets. 

6.  I am mindful that some clients may prefer to have shares distributed to them rather than cash, but taking into account:

-    the desirability of finalizing the liquidators’ dealings with the trust assets as soon as possible to reduce costs,

-    the fact that the average value of the bonus shares (including stock dividends) - spread over approximately 100 stocks - per client entitled thereto is only about $7,000,

-    the fact that clients on the Committees of Inspection have not expressed concern over the proposals,

-    the fact that the liquidators have by letter dated 31 August 2006 informed all clients of the application on 20 October 2006, and

-    the Official Receiver’s support for the proposals, 

I am prepared to give the directions along the lines of the proposals set out in Mr Lam’s 5th Affirmation.

(MARIA YUEN)
Justice of Appeal
(Sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance)

Mr D. Karliner of Heller Ehrman for the Applicants

Miss P. McKenna of the Official Receiver’s Office

53612-EN-2006-08-09

RE C.A. PACIFIC FINANCE LTD (in Liquidation)

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HCCW 36/98, 37/98

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES WINDING-UP PROCEEDINGS NOS. 36 AND 37 OF 1998

____________________

IN THE MATTER of the Companies Ordinance Cap. 32
and
IN THE MATTER of C.A. Pacific Finance Limited (in Liquidation)
 

and

 IN THE MATTER of C.A. Pacific Securities Limited (in Liquidation)

____________________

Coram: Mr. Registrar C. Chan in Chambers

Dates of Hearings: 11 January 2006, 22 February 2006 and 19 July 2006

Date of Handing Down:  9 August 2006

___________________________________

Decision on Review Applications

___________________________________

Before me there are 4 applications to review my decisions on the different items in the 8 bills relating to the costs incurred by the solicitor firm Heller Ehrman for work done in the liquidation process in the above two cases.  I heard them on two different occasions i.e. 11 January 2006 and 22 February 2006 and the firm also submitted to me different letters containing detail arguments.  Mr. Karliner who is the solicitor in charge has no objection that I deal with the 8 bills under review in one judgment.

2. The 8 bills are for work done by the solicitor firm in the periods mentioned below:

HCCW 36/98
C.A. Pacific Finance Limited
(“the Finance Company")

Bill No.

Period Covered

Amount Claimed

Amount Allowed

Difference

10333307

August 2004

$119,600.00

$87,075.00

$32,525.00

10336880

September 2004

$207,498.00

$140,228.00

$67,270.00

10339668

October 2004

$494,325.50

$320,278.00

$174,047.50

10342731

November 2004

$692,895.00

$471,641.80

$221,253.20

HCCW 37/98
C.A. Pacific Securities Limited
(“the Securities Company”)

Bill No.

Period Covered

Amount Claimed

Amount Allowed

Difference

10333306

August 2004

$32,492.00

22,977.00

$9,515.00

10337084

September 2004

$76,629.80

$59,739.80

$16,890.00

10339242

October 2004

$89,566.00

$62,496.00

$27,070.00

10343806

November 2004

$60,978.60

$49,948.60

$11,030.00

3. The amounts I have deducted from the bills ranging from 18% to 32%, mostly around the region of 30%.  For each bill, the solicitor firm prepared and produced a bundle of documents for taxation.  To a certain extent, it gives me an impression that the solicitor or solicitor firm does not fully understand how the Masters conduct taxation of the bills in this type of cases.  I take this opportunity to pass my remarks on the procedure and practice generally.

4.  The Companies (Winding-Up) Rules (Cap. 32H) provides an outline of how the bills of agents employed by the liquidators should be taxed.  In April 2004, pursuant to the direction of Madam Justice Kwan, the Registry published two Procedural Guides for determination of the liquidators’ bills and taxation of the agents’ bills respectively.  The idea is to streamline the procedure and to facilitate the taxation process.  I accept that practitioners give different interpretations to the contents of the Guides and have produced different bill formats and documents.  We do not intend to set any prescribed form to be used as each firm has different practice and method of keeping accounts records.  They have different ways of preparing the bills.  In the present case I have a number of comments on the bundle submitted because it fails to give me the relevant materials and information.  These comments are restricted to solicitors’ bills of costs and they may not be applicable to liquidators’ bills.

5. It is necessary to understand that when the Master carries out a taxation, he does not have any material or information except the bill about the subject which it covers.  The Master needs to be informed what is the subject matter, to which the bill is related.  The materials have to be as informative as possible but must avoid duplication.

6. For each taxation, Mr. Karliner prepared and produced a bundle of documents divided into sections as follows:

Annex 1:

Background

Of the 8 pages (take the example of bill no. 10339668), 6 pages deal with background information which has already appeared in papers submitted in the previous bills: it is a waste of time and paper to produce the same.  The remaining two pages explain the work done during the period covered by the bill.  Unfortunately, the narrative is written in such general terms that the reader hardly appreciates what is the specific issue that the fee earners  had to deal and for what reason during that period and how they justify their claim, especially at unusually high fees.

Annex 2:

Word codes

For each type of work the solicitor gives a code number to identify whether the costs should be borne by trust assets or otherwise, by the Security Company or the Finance Company or shared by both.  Again we do not consider it necessary to reproduce the same document every time the solicitor submits his bill.  We have already had “Word Codes” in the file.

Annex 3:

Allocation of costs which is necessary

Annex 4:

Breakdown of the legal fees

I do not know for what purpose it serves.  At least it does not help me in doing the taxation as I go to the bill itself for each item.

Annex 5:

Summary of costs and Disbursements

Although it is so called, in effect it is no more than a summary of disbursements.  I have the same comment as Annex 4.

Annex 6:

The Bill itself

(a)

I do not know why it is necessary to be annexed to the bundle the bill itself as the solicitor has already submitted it in duplicate together with the notice of appointment.

(b)

On the format itself, I find it difficult to make reference to any of the item in the bill as they are not given any serial numbers.  The reference to any particular item in the bill is by page, date and person.    To say the least, it is very cumbersome.

Annex 7:

Note as to Messrs. Heller Ehrman Lawyers

It sets out each fee earner’s Standard Rate and the firm’s Agreed Rate with the Liquidator.  I do not find the Standard Rate charged by the firm helpful as I have to decide the rate according to what I consider as fair and reasonable in the circumstances of the case.

Other information I would require in this section is how much time each fee earner has spent during the period covered by the bill submitted for taxation and how much he has charged in total.  Some solicitor firms give me such information at the end of the bill so that calculation can easily be made after taxation.  I do not have any objection if it is given on a separate sheet in this Annex.

Annex 8:

Matter breakdown summary and time breakdown summary for each fee earner

Matter breakdown summary is to enable me to understand how much time has been spent on each subject.  It will be more helpful if the costs of which are shown.  For time breakdown summary it is not useful.

The Remaining Dividers:

The breakdowns of each fee earner’s work and time.

The breakdowns are no more than extracts from the bills grouped together under the name of each person.  It may be useful for the firm itself to see the income of each fee earner.  I find no relevance in the taxation.

If my above suggestions are adopted, it will make taxation much easier and definitely it will save a lot of paper.

General Principles

7. In respect of bills submitted by solicitors in connection with liquidation, there are two kinds of bills: (a) as between solicitor and client and (b) as disbursement of the liquidator (see Re PeregrineInvestments Holding Ltd [1998] 2 HKLRD 670).  The first kind is taxed on solicitor and client basis.  In this case I am not concerned with it.  The bills are submitted for the purpose of obtaining payment out of the estate: the costs of the solicitors are treated as disbursements of the liquidators.

8. For the latter type of taxation, in my decision in the case of Pro KTA Limited dated 1 September 2004 I have decided in paragraph 25 that it should be taxed on common fund basis.  In taxing those bills I have to ask the following questions:

(a) whether the costs are reasonably incurred;

(b) whether the amount is reasonable;

and (c) in case of any doubt, the benefit goes to the paying party (62/App/16 Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2006).

9. As stated in my earlier judgment in Pro KTA the claimant carries the burden to justify its claim as decided by Mrs. Justice Le Pichon’s in her judgment in Re Peregrine Investments Ltd, [1998] 2 HKLRD 670 at 684.  I have repeated it in paragraph 29 of my said judgment as follows:

“ - have the provisional liquidators adduced sufficient evidence to explain the nature of each task undertaken and the considerations which led them to embark upon that task?

- have the provisional liquidators linked the time spent to the explanation?

- Is the court satisfied that a reasonably prudent man faced with the same circumstances in relation to his own affairs, would have laid out or hazarded his own money in doing what the provisional liquidators have done?

- Have the provisional liquidators produced contemporaneous records of what they have done and why they did it?

- Have they produced contemporaneous records of all items of expenditure and of services rendered, how they were calculated and how they were justified?

- Should the fees for any item of work be disallowed as being unnecessarily incurred?

- Should the fees for any item of work be disallowed as being incurred in breach of duties?”

The Review

10. Having set out the general principles I proceed to review my decision in connection with the items raised in the 8 bills.  They can be briefly classified into 2 main areas: (A) charge-out rates of different fee earners and (B) the individual items.

The Charge-out Rates

11.  The charge-out rates under review are (a) Mr. Doron Karliner, (b) Mr. Sam Tung, (c) Mr. Sunny Ho, (d) Mr. Donnelly Chan and (e) Ms. Chloe Wang.

12.  Mr. Karliner has been handling these cases from the days when he was with Messrs. Richard Butler.  At first, he worked under the supervision of Mr. Rogers but later on his own.  On the previous occasions I had approved the rate of $3,300.  He has moved to Messrs. Heller Ehrman and has become a consultant.  In my earlier comment when I made the decision, I thought he was a partner and took up more responsibility.  In fact, he is not a partner.  Is there any difference in responsibility between consultant and assistant solicitor?  I do not know: it varies from firm to firm.  I do not want to speculate on this.  Mr. Karliner submits he is entitled to more than $3,300: he now works more independently.  I have no doubt that with more experience gained after working on the case for several years he can work more efficiently and independently.  But, his hard earned experience has been well remunerated by the same client.  Should the client also take advantage of this and benefit from it?

13.  He claims that a discount has been given by agreeing at the rate of $3,600.  As a taxing master I should not blindly follow the agreement between the liquidator and the solicitor firm.  The agreement is good for solicitor and client taxation but not on common fund basis.  I have to assess the work that has been performed and also the different factors set out in paragraph 2 of Part II of the First Schedule to Order 62.

14.  Mr. Karliner was admitted in Hong Kong in 2000.  In 2004 when he handled those matters he was qualified as a Hong Kong solicitor for 4 years.  Of course, I must not ignore his experience in another jurisdiction and his specialization in that area.  I accept that the normal rate for a 4-year solicitor does not apply to Mr. Karliner.  In the past I awarded $3,300 for the works that he had done.

15.  I must acknowledge that the cases as those before us are usually handled by a partner of at least 7 to 8 years’ standing.  Whether that person is a partner may be a relevant factor; but a more important factor is the manner how the work is performed and the responsibility carries with it.  Mr. Karliner works very independently and takes up full responsibility.  He also supervises his colleagues in performing their work.  The point I have to decide is what level of solicitor I should allow to handle such matters.  Is the decision of $3,300 unreasonably low?  Is the hourly rate of $3,600 not justifiable?

16. By looking at the type work that was done by Mr. Karliner, I have some hesitation to award that rate of $3,600.  Take an example from Bill No. 4 on 27 August 2004 he updated the draft writ against the debtor Shit Wai Ying.  It was a claim instituted in the District Court.  In that matter he was throughout assisted by Mr. Tung who was also admitted in 2000.  What Mr. Karliner had done was to review the revised schedule of interest calculations etc.  Does it require a person of such calibre to do such work?  There are other instances of this type that do not justify a claim of $3,600 or not even $3,300.

17.  However, there are other works done which are much more complicated and require more skill than those illustrated in the example given.  I must take all the works done by Mr. Karliner as a whole.  He is practically all on his own without supervision.  He takes up full responsibility and do the supervision work as well.  I find my former decision of the rate is on the low side.  For this reason, I am prepared to revise his rate from $3,300 to $3,600 per hour.

18.   Mr. Sam Tung claims $2,400 and was admitted in 2000 as Mr. Karliner in Hong Kong.  But, the nature of the work carried out by Mr. Tung and his responsibility are quite different.  The bills are related to works done in 2004.  He was admitted for about 4 years.  He could not do any work independently.  He was under the close supervision by Mr. Karliner, even for drafting a statement of claim to be instituted in the District Court.  Nearly all steps taken by him had to be scrutinized by Mr. Karliner.  Unless there is any special reason to justify it, only one fee earner will be allowed for a particular item of work.  The scale suggested by the Law Society for solicitors with 2 to 4 years’ standing range from $2,000 to $2,500 for High Court and from $1,350 to $1,650 for District Court.  I see no reason for awarding the top rate of $2,500 or near the top rate at $2,400.  When I look into the cases further I find that a number of claims fall within the District Court and I have to resist the temptation of reducing the rate I have already fixed at $2,300.  I do not intend to revise the rate.

19.  Mr. Sunny Ho is a senior paralegal as described in the bills; I was told he is a legal and litigation executive with 20 years experience.  The firm’s standard rate for him is $2,000.  As I have stated earlier, the firm’s standard rate is not relevant in this taxation.  Neither is the rate of $1,500 agreed by the Liquidator relevant.  I have to consider what is reasonable.  He is a supporting staff: we understand the type of work carried out by him is hardly more than clerical.  In considering the charge-out rate of a paralegal carrying out such clerical work, I doubt long experience can be regarded as an important factor.  What he did were preparing some standard forms of documents like inserting names and addresses of the parties, arranging issue of writs etc.  It is generally expected that the work is properly done.  Experience does not add much to it.  I fix it at $1,200 which is already higher than usual litigation clerk of $800 to $1,000.

20.  Mr. Donnelly Chan and Ms. Chloe Wang, both were trainee solicitors I gave the rate of $1,200.  In the letters submitted, I find no argument why I have to review the rates except a bare submission as follows:

“ It is submitted that the hourly rate for the trainees (including Mr. D.W. Chan and Ms. C.L. Wang in the present bills at HK$1,400 is appropriate and should not be reduced to $1,200.”

The rate for trainee solicitors as suggested by the Law Society is from $1,066 to $1,300.  I have given a rate higher than the average.  I refuse to review it.

Individual Items

21.  Having dealt with the charge-out rates I come to the individual items.  Majority of the grounds for objection can be broadly classified into two types: (a) that I made arbitrary reductions and (b) that I overlooked the fact that the several matters are included in one item.

Classification

22.  For the first kind of objections, I can find them in the following items in the bills referred to below:

HCCW 37

Bill No. 1

Items 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11.

HCCW 37

Bill No. 2

Items 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10.

HCCW 36

Bill No. 4

Item 11

HCCW 36

Bill No. 6

Items 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 17, 19, 21, 27 and 28.

HCCW 36

Bill No. 8

Items 7, 8, 9, 13, 55, 60, 67, 69 and 75.

HCCW 36

Bill No. 9

Items 12, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 45, 49, 53, 54, 56, 58, 61, 67, 68, 69, 76, 77, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 92, 93, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 112, 113, 114, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 132, 138, 139, 140, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151.

23.  For the second kind of objections, I can find them in the following items in the bills referred to below:

HCCW 37

Bill No. 1

Nil.

HCCW 37

Bill No. 2

Nil.

HCCW 36

Bill No. 4

Items 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 17 and 18.

HCCW 36

Bill No. 6

Items 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36 and 37.

HCCW 36

Bill No. 8

Items 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87 and 88.

HCCW 36

Bill No. 9

Items 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 26, 29, 41, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, 52, 55, 57, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 78, 79, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 115, 123, 124, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 141,

24.  Apart from the above, there are applications for review that do not fall within those standard objections: they are related to Bills Nos. 3 and 5.  I deal with them first.

Bills Nos. 3 & 5 in HCCW 37/98

25.  Relating to Bill No. 3 Mr. Karliner raised two objections in respect of items, from which I had deducted substantial amounts.  He gave detail explanation of how he spent the time of 3.40 hours and 1.60 hours.  There are no reasons I do not believe what he said.  Accordingly I allow the original sums and I add back 1 hour and 0.60 hour respectively.

26.  As to Bill No. 5, the items where I had deducted were mainly related to Mr. Goh’s works.  I have given my comment on them in point 3 of the letter of 9 December 1995 where I stated as follows:

“3. There are items I consider as excessive.  Mr. Goh spending many hours in reviewing files and (sic instructing) trainee solicitors to do researches.  I have cut them down accordingly.”

27.  Instead of replying to my comment, the grounds for review emphasize the “complexity”, the voluminous documents that Mr. Goh reviewed and the necessity of the researches.  I must say that this case had gone on for quite some time and Mr. Goh was familiar with the issues.  He should have prepared notes for use.  Take the example of objection 6 on page 2 of the Bill No. 5.  He claimed that he needed to review the various files re Inviting.  In the bill it did not mention for what purpose the review was made.  In the objection it was stated that the files are files of background and transactional documents.  I doubted such explanation.  He had been working on the case for months, if not years, and should be most familiar with the files.  I do not allow reviewing the files without specific purpose.

28. As to objections 7 and 8 the solicitors have demonstrated why the time of 1.2 hours and 2 hours are necessary: I re-instate the amounts I have deducted i.e. 0.6 hour and 1 hour respectively.

29. As to objection 9, no research papers or other evidence has been produced.  I am not shown why the research required 5.5 hours.  I maintain that 3 hours is sufficient.  I disallow the review in objection 9.

Arbitrary reduction

30. The items which I classify under this category are set out in paragraph 21.  The objections are rather similar in each case.  In respect of those items in Bills 1 and 2 in HCCW 37/98, the objection is simple as follows:

“This reduction made on taxation is objected to as it appears to be arbitrary.”

31.  I must say that these objections are totally unfounded.  I have considered every item before I make any reduction.  It is not arbitrary at all.  I dismiss all the applications for review under this category in Bills Nos. 1 & 2.

32.  In the other 4 bills, the objections are almost identical to each other and give more reasons for their objections; they refer me to Section 2 of the two letters dated 23 December 2005 (in respect of Bills Nos. 4 & 6 in HCCW 36/98) and dated 8 February 2006 (in respect of Bills Nos. 8 & 9 in HCCW 37/98) respectively.  The two Sections 2 are again almost identical.  The reasons given can be briefly summarized as follows:

(a) The solicitor is not given an opportunity to address the court;

and (b) The cases dealt with by Mr. Tung and Mr. Ho though similar, each has its own circumstances and needs to be carefully reviewed.  I should not arbitrarily reduce the amount.

33.  At the time of hearing the review Mr. Karliner supplied me with no further information or material.  I do not consider point (a) brings the objections any further.

34.  As to point (b) above, I had taken into account the individual circumstances of each item before I made any reduction.  I refuse the application for review in respect of the items classified under this category in Bills Nos. 4, 6, 8 and 9 in HCCW 36/98.

Several matters under one item

35.  The solicitor raised these objections only in Bills Nos. 4, 6, 8 and 9 in HCCW 36/98.  He asked me to refer to Section 3 of the two letters referred to in paragraph 32 above.  His main submission is that “there should be an examination and assessment of the individual items or sub-items of work done rather than an arbitrary approach and reduction of the time set out in the entire entry.”

36.  As I have stated earlier in paragraph 4 above, the court does not wish to lay down the format how the bills are prepared.  Each individual firm has its own ways of preparing its own bill.  In the present case, the bills in question put several items or sub-items in one entry; I find that the several items or sub-items in one entry are closely related and I believe it is the intention of the drafter of the bill to ask me to make a global assessment of each entry.  I am of the view that I entitled so to do.

37.  Take the example of S.K. Tung on 17 September 2004.  There are two entries as set out in page 11 of Bill No. 4.  The drafter of the bill deliberately group the items into two entries.  I have to assess each entry as one whole item for the purpose of taxation.  I do not see what is wrong with it.  I dismiss all those objections.

Burden of Proof

38.  As clearly stated in the judgment of Madam Justice Le Pichon in Re Peregrine Investments Holdings Limited [1998] 2 HKLRD 670 at 679E: “It is for the office-holder who wishes to be remunerated at a particular level to justify his claim.”  The solicitor has the burden to show that the amount claimed is reasonable.  He should give full particulars and produce proper contemporaneous records.  In case of any doubt, the benefit goes to the paying party as mentioned in paragraph 8 above.

39.  I do not find that the solicitor raising the objections in respect of the items as classified under the 2 categories and described by me as standard has discharged the burden of proof.  I dismiss them all.

Conclusion

40. Under paragraph 17 I allow the charge-out rate of Mr. Karliner to be revised in respect of the items that I have allowed to $3,600 per hour.

41.  Under paragraph 25 I re-instate 3.40 hours and 1.60 hours of Mr. Karliner’s time in Bill No. 3.

42.  Under paragraph 28 I re-instate O.60 hour and 1 hour of Mr. Goh’s time in Bill No. 5.

43.  Other than those mentioned in paragraphs 40 to 42, I dismiss the application for review.  I would like to receive written submission as to costs for the review.

 

 

(Christopher C. Chan)
Registrar

 

Mr. D. Karliner of Messrs. Heller Ehrman on 11 January 2006 and 22 February 2006.

Messrs. Heller Ehrman, excused from attendance on 17 July 2006.

 

21056-EN-2002-09-02

RE C.A. PACIFIC FINANCE LTD. (in Liquidation)

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33212-EN-2002-01-10

RE C.A. PACIFIC FINANCE LTD. (in Liquidation)

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HCCW000036I/1998

HCCW 36/1998, 37/1998

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES WINDING-UP PROCEEDINGS NOS 36 AND 37 OF 1998

____________

IN THE MATTER of the Companies Ordinance Cap. 32

AND

IN THE MATTER of C.A. PACIFIC FINANCE LIMITED (in Liquidation)

AND

IN THE MATTER of C.A. PACIFIC SECURITIES LIMITED (in Liquidation)

(Heard Together)

____________

Coram: Hon Yuen J in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 10 January 2002

Date of Decision: 10 January 2002

_______________

D E C I S I O N

_______________

 

1. I have before me an application for reclassification by Mr Chan Fun Ngok, Client Objection Reference No. 123, for reclassification of himself originally classified as "a margin client" to be classified as a "cash client".

2. The evidence before me shows that as far as Mr Chan Fun Ngok's account was concerned, all the statements that he was provided with carried a 02 suffix and not a 01 suffix.

3. Although he had on 3 previous occasions been late with payment and had been given financing, it would appear that he was given financing purely on the basis that he was a cash client. This is shown by the fact that the interest charged was on the entire purchase price and not on any percentage which would have been relevant in the case of a margin client. Also, the rate of interest charged was prime plus 10% which was a rate referred to in the client agreement with CAP Securities, where as CAP Finance would normally charge interest at the rate of prime plus 3% or 4%.

4. Furthermore, there are no statements from CAP Finance relating to this client.

5. Therefore even though in his case he had signed the MOD, the point remains that he was treated throughout by CAP Securities as a cash client of its own and not of CAP Finance, and therefore I would direct that his account be reclassified as a "cash client" account.

(MARIA YUEN)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Representation:

Mr D Karliner of Herbert Smith for the Liquidator

Mr S C Chan, of S C Chan & Co., for Chan Fun Ngok, a client

Miss T Wong from the Official Receiver's Office

20382-EN-2001-11-27

Re C.A. PACIFIC FINANCE LTD & C.A. PACIFIC SECURITIES LTD

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HCCW 36/98, 37/98

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES (WINDING-UP) ACTIONS NO. 36 AND 37 OF 1998

---------------------------

IN THE MATTER of the Companies Ordinance Cap. 32

AND

IN THE MATTER of C.A. PACIFIC FINANCE LIMITED (in Liquidation)

AND

IN THE MATTER of    (in Liquidation)(Heard Together)

Coram: Hon. Yuen, J. in Chambers

Dates of Hearing: 5 October, 19 October, 20 November 2001

Date of Decision on Distribution: 20 November 2001

Date of Reasons for Decision: 27 November 2001
(Handed down in Court)

------------------------------------

REASONS FOR DECISION

------------------------------------

Background

1. In January 1998, petitions were presented for the winding-up of CA Pacific Securities Ltd (CAPS) and CA Pacific Finance Ltd (CAPF). Provisional Liquidators were appointed as a matter of urgency.

2. In June 1998, the companies were wound-up. In due course, the Provisional Liquidators were appointed Liquidators of the companies.

3. One of the first tasks of the Provisional Liquidators, which they continued as Liquidators, was to determine whether clients of CAPS and CAPF had the title to shares acquired by CAPS through CCASS, a computerised book-entry settlement system where unnumbered share certificates are immobilised and deposited with a central share depositary.

4. In December 1998, I held that notwithstanding the acquisition of the shares through CCASS, the shares belonged to the clients, and not to CAPS.

5. The consequence of that decision is that the shares that have remained are held by the companies in trust for the clients. The present application deals with matters arising in relation to the administration and delivery of the shares.

6. Since I held in December 1998 that the shares belonged to the clients, there have been other proceedings and decisions regarding first, the order of priority in relation to shortfall shares and secondly, the classification of clients arising from the order of priority.

Berkeley Applegate order

7. Pursuant to the finding that the shares were held on trust for the clients, in April 1999, I made a Berkeley Applegate order for the proper remuneration of the Liquidators to be paid out of the trust assets ie the shares. This type of order was named after Berkeley Applegate Ltd (No. 2) [1989] 1 Ch 32, where it was first made.

8. In Berkeley Applegate, an investment company, which held funds and mortgage estates on trust for investors under a scheme which provided that no costs whatsoever would be incurred by the investors, went into liquidation. The liquidators' remuneration and expenses greatly exceeded the company's free assets. The liquidators asked that their remuneration and expenses be paid out of the trust assets.

9. Deputy High Court judge Edward Nugee QC granted the liquidators' application. He held that although the liquidators were not in the position of a trustee (the trustee being the company), the Court had been asked to enforce the investors' equitable interests in the funds and mortgage estates. In doing so, it had a discretion to require an allowance to be made for costs incurred and skill and labour expended in the administration of the property.

10. The deputy judge held that since the work done by the liquidators had been of benefit to the trust property and the investors, and would have had to be done by either the investors themselves or by a court-appointed receiver, the court would exercise its inherent jurisdiction to order a proper allowance to be made to the liquidators out of the trust funds to the extent not covered by the company's own free assets.

11. At 50C-D, the deputy judge justified his order on traditional trust grounds by finding that the liquidators' skill and labour had added to the estate in the sense of carrying out work which was necessary before the estate could be realised for the benefit of the investors.

12. In the present case, I made a Berkeley Applegate order as it was clear that but for the intervention of provisional liquidators (and later, liquidators), an orderly presentation of the various issues which have arisen - as to title, order of distribution and (later) classification of clients - and implementation of the decisions made by the Court would not have been possible. The situation in this case had never been encountered previously, and the numbers of clients, and quantities and amounts of shares involved were also substantial.

Order for allocation and delivery of shares

13. In December 2000, following proceedings for the determination of the order of priority for shortfall shares, I made an order (amended on 5 October 2001) that each allocation and delivery of shares to a client shall be subject to:-

(a) payment of any sum due by him under the general lien in clause 6 of the Client Agreement; and

(b) payment by each client to whom a delivery of shares is to be made of a proper proportion of the Liquidators' proper and reasonable remuneration and expenses (calculated by reference to the value of the shares to be delivered in proportion to the value of the total portfolio of shares administered by the Liquidators) in:

(i) determining the entitlement to such deliveries; and

(ii) management of the portfolio of shares prior to such deliveries; and

(iii) carrying out the actual work of delivering the shares ; and

(c) payment by him of any administrative expenses in carrying out the actual work of such deliveries.

The "processing fee"

14. The Liquidators have referred to the sums payable under sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) above as a "processing fee". The Liquidators claim that their actual and estimated remuneration and expenses (excluding legal costs) relating to the administration of the shares amount to $95m (including the period of provisional liquidation). This comprises work relating to the following categories:-

(a) Title Application;

(b) Management of the shares including custodian and transaction fees, and classification of clients;

(c) Claim to securities and proof of debt process;

(d) Lenders return of shares, Masterise and Inviting;

(e) Share Application and Objections to Classification;

(f) Delivery of Shares;

(g) General Administration;

(h) Disbursement and Expenses.

15. Actual and estimated legal costs relating to the same categories amount to $23m. The sums of $95m and $23m amount to 13.2% of the value of the share portfolio as at 19 January 1998, the date of liquidation (the Value Date). It is this percentage of the value of each client's portfolio as at the Value Date that the Liquidators propose should be paid as a processing fee as a condition of delivery of shares.

16. These claims need to be examined and assessed. Legal costs can be subject to taxation for which the Court has established procedure and experienced taxing masters. The situation is however different with an examination and assessment of the Liquidators' claim for their own remuneration and expenses. This issue will be addressed below.

This application

17. The present application deals with:-

(a) the mode of distribution of the shares;

(b) the setting of a provisional processing fee to be paid by clients before recovery of the shares (subject to refunding as referred to below);

(c) examination and assessment of the remuneration and expenses charged by the Liquidators for administering the shares.

As this Decision affects all clients, these Reasons for Decision have been handed down in open court.

(a) Mode of distribution of the shares

18. The first question posed by the Liquidators for the Court's consideration relates to the way in which the shares are to be distributed.

19. On this aspect, written submissions were sent to the Court shortly before the hearing on 19 October 2001 by solicitors for the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC). The SFC, by reason of subrogation rights arising from its payment of compensation to clients from the Unified Exchange Compensation Fund, has the single largest interest in the distribution. The SFC submitted that all shares be sold and the proceeds distributed.

20. As a result of that, the hearing on 19 October 2001 was adjourned part-heard for further submissions to be made on this and other matters.

21. Three options have been submitted for the Court's consideration. Under Option 1, the Liquidators would sell all clients' shares and distribute the net cash realised to each individual client (i.e. after deducting first, any amount owed by the client and secured by a lien and secondly, the processing fee). This is the SFC's preferred option. It has the advantage of easy (and therefore, less costly) administration, and would mean that a client would not have to pay the processing fee first before receiving the shares.

22. In my view, however, this would be equivalent to a forced sale. A sale of all clients' shares, irrespective of individual clients' wishes, would be an infringement of their proprietary rights in the shares. Each client has his own reason for acquiring a certain stock, varying from pure speculation, to a personal interest in a particular company's long-term growth potential. It cannot be assumed that a stock represents no more than a current monetary value to all clients, although it may be to some. I would therefore have no hesitation in rejecting this option.

23. Under Option 2, the Liquidators would sell a portion of each share allocation to pay the processing fee, before distributing the balance of the shares (less the amount subject to a lien) to the client. This was an option which I advanced at the hearing on 19 October 2001. In their submissions of 14 November 2001 however, the Liquidators informed the Court that there would be added complexity and administration due to the numbers of clients and different lines of stock and allocations, and as such this option was not viable.

24. Under Option 3, as suggested by the SFC and supported by the Official Receiver's Office, each client would have the option of receiving either shares or cash proceeds. However, the Liquidators have indicated that there would only be costs benefits if an individual client's election applied to all his shares. In other words, it would have to be an "all or nothing" option, where the clients would not be able to elect which line of shares to retain and which to sell. It seems unlikely that such an option, lacking in freedom for the clients, would be welcome by them.

25. Having considered the above, it appeared to me that the interests of the clients would be best served by simply distributing the shares to them upon payment of the processing fee, so that each client would have the greatest freedom to decide what to do with his shares. Depending on each client's personal circumstances, he may wish to sell some shares and retain others, and for those shares which he may wish to sell, he would have the freedom to choose for himself a date and price for sale.

26. I realise that there may be some clients who may find it difficult to raise the processing fee at the outset due to a drop in share prices since early January 1998. However, given that option 2 would be more costly to operate, there seems no real alternative. The fact is that the value of their shares has decreased due to general economic forces operating during the time taken to ascertain their entitlements and to implement distribution of the shares.

(b) Setting of provisional processing fee

27. The provisional processing fee is based upon the amounts claimed by the Liquidators, amounts which may have to be reduced after taxation (in the case of legal fees) and examination and assessment (in the case of the Liquidators' own remuneration and expenses). Should there be a reduction, the clients should be refunded any sums overpaid.

28. I have considered whether it would be appropriate to require the clients to pay only a part of the provisional processing fee for delivery of the shares, pending the taxation and examination and assessment which may result in a reduction of the charges claimed.

29. However, should the claims be allowed in full (or even substantially) after taxation and examination and assessment, difficulties would arise for the Liquidators to pursue the balance from the thousands of clients to whom shares have been delivered. In the course of time, there may be changes of addresses and other contingencies rendering it difficult for the Liquidators to locate clients.

30. It would therefore appear to be more just and practical for the provisional processing fee to be placed in a separate bank account from which any refund could be claimed by the clients, than to require the Liquidators to run the risk of trying to recover any unpaid balance from clients (numbering in the thousands). The Liquidators will have to make regular reports of receipts and payments from this separate bank account to the Official Receiver and the Committees of Inspection.

(c) Examination and assessment of Liquidators' remuneration and expenses

31. In relation to the Liquidators' claims, I have considered the following:-

(i) can, and should, there be an examination and assessment?

(ii) if there is to be such an examination and assessment, who should undertake it?

(iii) who should bear the costs of the examination and assessment exercise?

(i) Examination and assessment ordered

32. First, it is clear that an examination and assessment can be ordered. The Liquidators have not disputed this and have accepted that their remuneration and expenses should be reviewed before payment. As far as the basis in law for such an examination is concerned, since the claim to remuneration and expenses is made by virtue of a Berkeley Applegate order in favour of the Liquidators made in the exercise of the Court's discretion, it must follow that the Court has a right to ensure that its exercise of discretion is not abused by the making of improper, unreasonable or disproportionate claims.

33. Further, it is clear that an examination and assessment should be ordered for the benefit of the clients. The amount of the remuneration and expenses claimed is large, although it must also be recognised that the tasks undertaken in this case were by no means simple.

34. Relationships between the Liquidators and some of the clients have not been good, and at least the more vocal critics among the clients would be highly suspicious of any claims to remuneration and expenses made by the Liquidators. It is therefore important that a fair and independent examination and assessment be undertaken.

(ii) By whom the examination and assessment is to be undertaken

35. The second aspect is more problematic. As far as legal costs are concerned, there is existing procedure and expertise for their examination and assessment in the form of taxation by the Court's taxing masters. Taxation can be (and has been) sought by the Liquidators who are in the position of clients vis-a-vis their legal advisers.

36. But the examination and assessment of the Liquidators' own remuneration and expenses, in cases of substantial size and complexity, poses a real problem. Submissions in this regard have been made by the Liquidators, the SFC (as the single largest "client") and the Official Receiver. The Court has also had the opportunity to consider the Ferris Report on liquidators' remuneration.

Committee of Inspection

37. The Liquidators have suggested review by the Committees of Inspection. However the Committees have no jurisdiction to assess the Liquidators' remuneration and expenses, because under the statute they are concerned only with the companies' free assets, and not with assets which are held by the companies as trustees.

Official Receiver

38. The Official Receiver's Office does have overall supervision over liquidators by virtue of s.204 Companies Ordinance, but the inadequacy of resources available to the Official Receiver is well-known (see Re Peregrine Investments Holdings Ltd [1999] 3 HKLRD 59, 65J-66B, 67H-J). In that case, the Court of Appeal emphasized the important role that the Official Receiver has to play in the supervision of liquidators and urged that more funding should be sought. Unfortunately it would appear that there has been little change.

39. Whilst work is being done by the Official Receiver regarding guidelines on liquidators' remuneration, those guidelines would assist in the area of presentation of claims, and whilst that would of course be helpful, there remains the problem how claims can be examined and assessed by persons able to do so quickly and professionally in a complex, substantial case such as the present.

Court -

Judges

40. Liquidators' claims for remuneration and expenses in this type of case are supported by voluminous documentation. Judges' time cannot be set aside to read, digest and critically examine and assess the documentation at the expense of other litigants whose cases are waiting to be heard and decided.

41. More importantly there is the question of judges' expertise in undertaking such an exercise. In Re Potter's Oils Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 201, quoted in the Ferris Report (referred to below), Hoffmann J (as he then was) said, at 207:

"The court is ill-equipped to conduct a detailed investigation of receivers' charges on an itemised basis. A judge could not do so without being expensively educated by expert evidence".

Law Costs Draftsmen

42. In Peregrine, Le Pichon J (as she then was) ordered the Official Receiver to appoint a law costs draftsman to prepare a report on the remuneration sought by the liquidators in that case. The liquidators appealed.

43. The Court of Appeal unanimously decided that the judge had jurisdiction to make the order she did, and the majority held that there had been no wrongful exercise of discretion in appointing a law costs draftsman.

44. Mayo JA however considered that a law costs draftsman was unlikely to possess sufficient knowledge or experience to enable him to make a judgment as to whether any particular task undertaken by liquidators was necessary or appropriate.

45. In the event, none of the law costs draftsmen approached by the Official Receiver was willing to accept appointment, presumably due to apprehension whether they were professionally qualified for the work required of them. The matter was remitted to the judge, but in the end, no examination or assessment took place after the liquidators reduced their claim.

Taxing master

46. In England, the taxing master was asked to assess the receiver-liquidators' remuneration in MGN v Maxwell [1998] BCC 324 but the same difficulties were encountered. I think it would be unfair to ask any taxing master not qualified in accountancy and insolvency practice to examine and assess the Liquidators' claim in the present case, as he would be suffering from the same lack of expertise as the judges.

47. The decision in Maxwell led to the establishment of a Working Party chaired by Ferris J. Their Report published in July 1999 (www.open.gov.uk/lcd/civil/ferris.htm) recommended that the practice of referring the claims to the taxing master should continue, but that in cases of special size or complexity (such as the present case), "new procedures", less cumbersome than the taxation of a solicitors's bill, would have to be devised.

48. The Ferris Working Party was also concerned with the increase in costs that would result from the submission of a substantial bill to the taxation process. A supplemental report is being prepared but has not been published as yet.

Sitting with Assessor

49. In the Ferris Report, it was suggested that in substantial cases, the Court could sit with an assessor who has expertise in the relevant field. In Hong Kong, assessors can be appointed pursuant to s.53 High Court Ordinance. This is an option which I raised with the parties, and there does not appear to be any dispute that this would be a sensible option.

50. However, what did cause concern was whether such a person would be available, and the incidence of costs of his appointment, given that such an assessor would probably be an accountant, whether practising or retired from private practice. The incidence of costs is dealt with below. As for the availability of such an individual, approaches to various individuals are being made.

51. As a matter of completeness, I should add that despite the endeavours of the legal advisers who appeared before me, it is not known what is the practice in other jurisdictions for the examination and assessment of liquidators' remuneration in cases like the present. In 13 Coromandel Place Pty Ltd v CL Custodians Pty Ltd (in liq) [1999] FAC 144, where liquidators had to deal with assets held by a trust company, the Court recognised that appropriate directions would have to be given for the challenge to the liquidators' remuneration by beneficiaries. Unfortunately, it is not known what, if any directions, were subsequently given.

52. In light of the matters set out above, I conclude that the examination and assessment of the Liquidators' claim in the present case should be undertaken by either a taxing master with accountancy and insolvency practice qualifications, or the Court sitting with an assessor with those qualifications under s.53 High Court Ordinance.

(iii) Incidence of costs of the examination and assessment

53. The Liquidators have in their submissions dated 16 November 2001 estimated that the direct cost of an external accounting review of their remuneration and expenses to date and for a review of future remuneration and expenses could be in the order of approximately $6m. That appears to be a generous estimate, but to avoid spending any further time in a more accurate estimation, that would have to be adopted. Such costs should be claimed from the trust assets in the first instance. Incorporating this into the provisional processing fee, the percentage to be applied would be 14%.

54. The parties have made submissions on the test to be applied in determining who should bear the costs of the examination and assessment.

55. The Liquidators have submitted that they are in the position of constructive trustees of the shares, so that the incidence of costs should be identical to that in an action taken by beneficiaries against trustees for an account of the administration of the trust estate. In that situation, a trustee would only be liable for the costs of the action if the proceeding is necessary because of the neglect or default of the trustee. Even if the trustee's conduct has been mistaken, provided that the conduct has been honest and correct, the trustee would be entitled to his costs out of the trust estate.

56. I accept the submissions of the SFC that this is not applicable. First, the Liquidators are not trustees. They are the subject of a Berkeley Applegate order, which is predicated upon their not being trustees, as it is the company which is the trustee.

57. Further, in Mirror Group Newspapers plc v Maxwell and others [2000] 2 All ER (D) 706, Ferris J held that the remuneration of court-appointed receivers is not costs, with the result in that case that the examination and assessment of their remuneration (even though by a taxing master) was not a taxation of legal costs for which fees were payable to the Court under the relevant schedule. Although that decision dealt with court-appointed receivers, the rationale of a Berkeley Applegate order is that if the liquidators did not administer the trust property, the Court would have had to appoint receivers.

58. The SFC has submitted that the position is not unlike a solicitor-client taxation of legal costs. In such taxations, the legislature has provided in s.67(5) Legal Practitioners Ordinance that in non-contentious cases, generally the client pays the costs of the taxation, unless the bill is reduced by one-fifth, in which case the solicitor pays for the taxation.

59. An alternative is that a proportion of the costs directly incurred in examining and assessing the disallowed costs be borne by the Liquidators.

60. The SFC has submitted that the Court should adopt either a "specified proportion" approach as in solicitor-client taxation, or the alternative approach which, it submits, is likely to produce a more exact and fairer result.

61. The Official Receiver has submitted that the entire costs of the examination and assessment of the Liquidators' remuneration and expenses should be borne by the trust estate.

62. I take the view that the "specified proportion" approach would be too arbitrary. However, to order that the entirety of the costs of the examination and assessment of the liquidators' remuneration and expenses be borne by the trust estate would be a dangerous precedent which could lead to irresponsibility in the lodging of claims and unfairness.

63. I consider that the interests of justice and fairness as between the Liquidators and the clients would be best served by the Court's adopting a discretionary approach, and making such orders as to the costs of the examination and assessment (whether it be undertaken by a suitably qualified taxing master or an assessor sitting with the Court) depending on the propriety, reasonableness and proportionality of the claims.

Order

64. I would therefore direct that the Liquidators distribute the shares to each client upon payment of a provisional processing fee of 14% of the value of each client's portfolio as at the Value Date. The provisional processing fee so received is to be placed by the Liquidators in a separate interest-bearing account, for which an account is to be supplied to the Official Receiver and the Committees of Inspection, at periods to be decided by the Official Receiver. Upon the completion of taxation of the legal costs and an examination and assessment of the Liquidators's remuneration and expenses, any excess in the provisional processing fee paid with interest accrued is to be paid back to the clients.

65. The Liquidators are to notify the clients as to the steps to be taken by them (the clients) for the delivery of their shares, including the amounts to be paid for the provisional processing fee (and to release any liens, if applicable). Should no payment be made within 60 days in the first instance, the Liquidators are to notify the clients again (by advertisement and individual notification) in case of any miscommunication of the first notification.

66. Upon the expiry of 120 days from the Liquidators' first notification, clients who have not paid the provisional processing fees (and any debts due under the lien, if applicable) would be deemed to have instructed the companies (in liquidation) to sell the shares and to hold the proceeds of sale (subject to the provisional processing fee and any debts) in place of the shares, such proceeds to be paid to the clients as soon as practicable.

67. The sale of shares by the Liquidators is to be effected as soon as practicable in such mode as the Liquidators see fit and at such prices to be determined by them upon taking advice from such stockbrokers or financial advisers as they consider proper.

68. As for the costs of this application, I would make an order nisi that half (reflecting the issues of the mode of distribution and the setting of the provisional processing fee) should be paid from the trust assets, and the balance (reflecting the issue of incidence of the costs of examination and assessment of the Liquidators' remuneration and expenses) to be in the examination and assessment.

(MARIA YUEN)
Judge of the Court of First Instance High Court

Representation:

Mr D Karliner of Herbert Smith for the Liquidators

Mr R Jindal (on 19 October 2001) and Miss T M Lee (on 20 November 2001) of Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer for the SFC

Miss Teresa Wong of Official Receiver's Office

20383-EN-2001-11-21

RE C.A. PACIFIC FINANCE LTD. & C.A. PACIFIC SECURITIES LTD.

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HCCW000036H/1998

HCCW 36/1998, 37/1998

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES WINDING-UP PROCEEDINGS NOS 36 AND 37 OF 1998

____________

IN THE MATTER of the Companies Ordinance Cap. 32

AND

IN THE MATTER of C.A. PACIFIC FINANCE LIMITED (in Liquidation)

AND

IN THE MATTER of C.A. PACIFIC SECURITIES LIMITED (in Liquidation)
(Heard Together)

____________

Coram: Hon Yuen J in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 21 November 2001

Date of Decision: 21 November 2001

________________________________________

DECISION ON APPLICATION FOR
ADJOURNMENT OF PUBLIC EXAMINATION

________________________________________

1. This is an application made in chambers by Mr Jason Wong But-sit for an adjournment of his public examination under Section 168IA(1) of the Companies Ordinance.

2. The grounds of Mr Wong's application appear in his affirmation filed on 12 November 2001. In paragraph 2 of that affirmation Mr Wong says that his criminal appeal CACC 72 of 2000 (on appeal from HCCC 364 of 1998) had been fixed for hearing on 3 May 2001, but due to the late filing of written arguments by his counsel, the court had ordered that a new hearing date be fixed and that new hearing date had been fixed for 30 October 2001. However, another adjournment had had to be granted because Mr Wong's counsel had been discharged from hospital a few days earlier. Stuart-Moore V-P had therefore granted Mr Wong's application for an adjournment of the hearing of the appeal scheduled for 30 October 2001 and the new hearing date for that criminal appeal is now 12 March 2002.

3. Mr Wong says in paragraph 2 of his affirmation that according to his knowledge and understanding, if he succeeded in his criminal appeal then he had "no obligation or any responsibility in the present proceedings", i.e. HCCW 36 of 1998 and HCCW 37 of 1998. He further says that "by law" if he faces a charge in both civil and criminal proceedings, the criminal case had priority and therefore he asks that the hearing date of his public examination be fixed after the conclusion of his criminal appeal in March 2002.

4. He further says in his affirmation that it would be unfair and unjust if the public examination were to take place before the conclusion of this criminal appeal. Although he has not stated in his affirmation how a public examination would work an injustice, he has expanded on that aspect in chambers today.

5. The first point that he has raised this morning is that a civil case mounted by CA Pacific Finance's Liquidators against him had also been adjourned until after the criminal appeal. In this regard, no materials have been put before me, although the Official Receiver has been informed that there has been no formal order or agreement for a stay or an adjournment until after the criminal appeal. In any event, in my view, the fact that an examination takes place before the criminal appeal followed by a civil case mounted by liquidators against him does not suggest any injustice or unfairness to me.

6. Secondly, Mr Wong says that he is confused by what would appear to be different approaches taken against him. He says that in his criminal trial, the prosecutor had said that he was not a director and that he had no authority, and yet in the examination for the purposes of considering disqualification proceedings, the Official Receiver has taken the approach that he was a de facto or shadow director.

7. In this regard, I do not see any injustice when he is simply being required to give answers in an examination applied for by the Official Receiver for the purposes of considering whether to institute disqualification proceedings on the basis that he was a de facto or shadow director. Should Mr Wong wish to take any point that he was not a de facto or shadow director, those would be points taken in any disqualification proceedings.

8. Thirdly, Mr Wong said that there has been adverse publicity since the publication of the fact that he is to be publicly examined. He says that he has been followed by reporters and he fears that this would affect the minds of any jurors in case on appeal, the appeal is allowed but with an order that there be a retrial.

9. In my view, this is not a weighty factor because his appeal may or may not be allowed, and even if it is allowed, a retrial may or may not be ordered. Even if a retrial is ordered, that would be some way off and it would appear to me that any publicity now would be likely to have very little effect on the mind of a juror one year or two years hence.

10. The fourth point that Mr Wong has taken is that the evidence that may be taken in a public examination could be used against him. This is a matter which has caused me some concern. In an examination, Mr Wong would be compelled to give evidence whereas in a criminal retrial, there would be no obligation on him to give evidence. The accused person's right to silence in a criminal trial is a fundamental right which the accused person enjoys in our courts. Therefore, I am concerned that if this were to continue by way of a public examination, the prosecution would be able to use the evidence given by Mr Wong by way of his answers and would be free to use his answers in the criminal retrial if one be ordered.

11. It seems to me that this objection would be met if a private examination under Section 221 is ordered against Mr Wong. In my view, the use of Section 221 by the Official Receiver to examine a "target director" is not excluded by the enactment of Section 168IA(1).

12. I have, in my ruling concerning Mr Alex Wong on 6 November 2001, set out my analysis of Section 221 and it seems to me that it would not be necessary to repeat it here. I had considered that a Section 221 examination order could be made at any time after a winding-up order has been made, on the Official Receiver's application, against any person and for any legitimate purpose of the Official Receiver in a winding-up. I had there considered that there is no exclusion of Section 221 merely by the enactment of Section 168IA.

13. In my view, Section 221 comes with what one might call certain factors which are of benefit to a potential examinee. One of those benefits is that he would be able to put forward to the court evidence that such an examination would cause him oppression. This would be so even after the setting aside of the "Rubicon" test by the judgment in Clover Bay Limited v BCCI [1991] Ch 90 and Re British and Commonwealth Holding Plc v Spicer & Oppenheim [1993] AC 426.

14. The fact that Section 168IA opens a second, wider doorway for a party wishing to conduct an examination does not, in my view, shut the narrower doorway that is provided by Section 221, in the absence of any express language to that effect and in the absence of any clear inference of the same. Accordingly, I take the view that an examination under Section 221 is not excluded by the enactment of Section 168IA.

15. The examination under Section 221 would protect the interest of Mr Wong in his apprehension that evidence might be used in the criminal trial against him. In a Section 221 examination, the examination is conducted in private and under Rule 62 of the Companies Winding-up Rules, only the Official Receiver or Liquidator or their counsel or solicitors employed for the purpose may attend the examination.

16. Further, Rule 62(2) provides that the notes of the depositions of a person examined under Section 221 shall not be filed or be open to the inspection of any person except the Official Receiver or Liquidator unless and until the court shall so direct and the court may, from time to time, give such general or special directions as it shall think expedient as to the custody and inspection of such notes and the furnishing of copies of or extracts therefrom. Therefore, there would not be any fear that the prosecution would simply by attending the examination be able to obtain the answers of Mr Wong to any questions that may be put to him in a Section 221 examination.

17. Further to that, the Official Receiver has offered an undertaking to the court to the effect that he would not disclose the contents of the private examination of Mr Wong, or any document disclosed by him in such examination, to any third party other than officers of his department and his legal and accountancy advisers except with the prior written consent of Mr Wong or the leave of the court. The Liquidators who are entitled to attend the private examination have also been contacted and they have also offered a written undertaking to the same effect.

18. In my view, an examination under Section 221 would serve the interest of justice best. It would enable the Official Receiver to get answers which he would then consider for the purposes of disqualification proceedings and which he would be able to use in any disqualification proceedings. I accept Mr Lam's submissions that there is some urgency in this matter in that if the appeal leads to a setting aside of the order of disqualification in the criminal case, then there would be all the more reason why the Official Receiver needs to consider the taking of disqualification proceedings. Balancing that is the effect of Section 221 on the protection of Mr Wong in his criminal trial; the restriction of the evidence to be taken in a Section 221 examination would not affect his right not to give evidence in the criminal trial.

19. No other point has been raised by Mr Wong as to why a Section 221 private examination would cause any oppressiveness to him. In the circumstances, I take the view that a Section 221 examination could be proceeded with in chambers against Mr Wong. I will now hear Mr Lam as to the drafting of the appropriate order.

(MARIA YUEN)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Representation:

Mr Godfrey Lam, instructed by the Official Receiver

Mr Wong But-sit, Jason, appearing in person

20381-EN-2001-11-06

Re C. A. PACIFIC FINANCE LTD. & C.A. PACIFIC SECURITIES LTD.

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HCCW 36/1998, 37/1998

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES WINDING-UP PROCEEDINGS NOS. 36 AND 37 OF 1998

____________

IN THE MATTER of the Companies Ordinance Cap. 32

AND

IN THE MATTER of C. A. PACIFIC FINANCE LIMITED

AND

IN THE MATTER of C.A. PACIFIC SECURITIES LIMITED
(Heard Together)

____________

 

Coram: Hon Yuen J in Court

Dates of Hearing: 1, 6 November 2001

Date of Ruling: 6 November 2001

__________

R U L I N G

__________

 

1. In January 1998, C A Pacific Securities Limited and C A Pacific Finance Limited collapsed. Winding-up orders were made against both companies in June 1998.

2. On 19 July 2001, the Official Receiver issued an ex parte summons and filed a report to the court for an order under Section 168IA of the Companies Ordinance.

3. Section 168IA provides at subsection (1) that:

"the court may, on the application of the Official Receiver, by a report stating that that in his opinion, a prima facie case exists against any person that would render him liable to a disqualification order under this part, direct that the person shall attend before the court on the day appointed by the court for that purpose, and be publicly examined as to the conduct of the business of a company or as to his conduct and dealings as a director."

Subsection (2) provides that:

"the court may require a person referred to in [the preceding sub-section] to submit an affidavit to the court containing an account of the conduct of the business of the company or his conduct and dealings as a director of the company, or to produce any documents in his possession or under his control relating to the conduct of the business of the company or his conduct and dealings as a director of the company."

Subsection (3) provides that:

"where an application has been made under subsection (1), the court may require any person, other than the person referred to in subsection (1), whom the court deems capable of giving information concerning the conduct of the business of the company concerned or as to the conduct and dealings of directors of the company to produce any documents in his possession or under his control relating to the conduct of the business of the company or as to the conduct and dealings of directors of the company."

4. On a careful reading of Section 168IA(3), it is clear to me that although it refers to a person being "capable of giving information", those words only define the category of person who is liable to be required to produce documents, and there is no express power for a court order that he attend to be examined.

5. I do not think it would be right to imply that power into Section 168IA(3), when in the same section, the power to require a "disqualification target" to attend for examination is given expressly in clear language under Section 168IA(1). I therefore hold that Section 168 IA(3) is restricted to the production of documents.

6. However, this restrictive scope of Section 168IA(3) seems to have been missed in the Official Receiver's summons and report. The Official Receiver's first report was for orders for the examination of three persons under subsection (1) and orders for the examination of two persons, Mr Lam Kwan Wood and Mr Vincent Hoe, under Section 168IA(3).

7. On 24 July 2001, Chu J gave an order that Mr Lam and Mr Hoe be publicly examined as to the conduct of the business of C A Pacific Finance Limited and as to conduct and dealings of the directors of C A Pacific Finance Limited pursuant to Section 168IA(3) Companies Ordinance. Since Section 168IA(3) does not give a court power to require them to attend to be examined, that order was given without jurisdiction and was not a valid order.

8. That error was continued in September 2001 when the Official Receiver issued another ex parte summons adding two other persons, Mr Alex Wong Ching Ping (whom I shall refer to as "Mr Wong") and Mr Wan Yiu Kwan to the list of persons to be publicly examined. That summons was supported by the Official Receiver's third report.

9. On 18 September 2001, I ordered Mr Wong and Mr Wan to be publicly examined. Although this order did not specify under which section or subsection the examination was ordered, it cannot be denied that this order was also made without jurisdiction because the Official Receiver's third report supporting the summons also referred to Section 168IA(3).

10. At the hearing on 1 November 2001, which was scheduled for the examination of Mr Wong and Mr Wan purportedly under Section 168IA(3), neither Mr Wong, who is legally represented, nor Mr Wan applied for discharge of those orders, but Mr Godfrey Lam, counsel for the Official Receiver, very properly drew the court's attention to the lack of jurisdiction to make those orders for examination. By reason of the lack of jurisdiction under Section 168IA(3) as set out above, I would therefore discharge my order of 18 September 2001 and I would also discharge the orders made by Chu J against Mr Lam and Mr Hoe on 24 July 2001.

11. However, that was not the end of the matter. Counsel for the Official Receiver has submitted that the examination of those four persons may nevertheless proceed (albeit in private, whether in chambers or in camera) under Section 221 Companies Ordinance. This has been disputed by Mr Jimmie Ho, counsel for Mr Wong, who has submitted that the court has no jurisdiction under Section 221 to order examination for the purposes of considering whether disqualification proceedings should be taken. Counsel for Mr Wong has submitted that Section 221 can only be used for the purposes of the winding-up of the Company. He submitted that disqualification proceedings are catered for in Part IVA of the Companies Ordinance and there is no provision in that part for the examination of a third party who is not a disqualification target. Mr Wan has appeared in person and has indicated that he has nothing to say on this issue of jurisdiction. Mr Hoe and Mr Lam, against whom Chu J gave orders for examination, have also been served with the summons for the hearing of this issue. They have appeared in person and they have indicated that they have nothing to say as far as jurisdiction is concerned.

12. Before I deal with the issue whether it is permissible to employ Section 221 in the present circumstances, it is first necessary to analyse it.

13. Section 221 provides that:

"(1) The court may, at any time after the appointment of a provisional liquidator or the making of a winding-up order, summon before it any officer of the company or person known or suspected to have in his possession any property of the company or supposed to be indebted to the company, or any person whom the court deems capable of giving information concerning the promotion, formation, trade, dealings, affairs, or property of the company.

(2) The court may examine him on oath concerning the matters aforesaid, either by word of mouth or on written interrogatories, and may reduce his answers to writing and require him to sign them.

(3) The court may require him to produce any books and papers in his custody or power relating to the company, but, where he claims any lien on books or papers produced by him, the production shall be without prejudice to that lien, and the court shall have jurisdiction in the winding up to determine all questions relating to that lien.

(4) If any person so summoned, after being tendered a reasonable sum for his expenses, refuses to come before the court at the time appointed, not having a lawful impediment (made known to the court at the time of its sitting, and allowed by it), the court may cause him to be apprehended and brought before the court for examination."

14. It is noted from the language of Section 221 that it is couched in very wide terms, such that it has been called the "Star Chamber Clause". As a matter of language, it would be noted that:

(1) there are no restrictions as to the circumstances under which an order may be made;

(2) there are no restrictions as to who may apply for such an order;

(3) there are no restrictions as to the person from whom information may be sought (whom I will refer to as "the Section 221 examinee"); and

(4) there are no restrictions for what purpose an order may be made against the Section 221 examinee.

15. By reason of the width of the language of Section 221, there had come to be developed by case law in England the so-called "Rubicon test" - signifying the point after which the court would not in practice permit the use of Section 236 Insolvency Act (which is the equivalent section of Section 221 Companies Ordinance). That point is reached if the evidence shows that the purpose of the examination was to achieve an advantage beyond that available to an ordinary litigant, where, for example, liquidators have commenced or were definitely contemplating litigation against an examinee. The judge-made Rubicon test applied from 1979 until 1990 when the English Court of Appeal in Cloverbay Ltd v. BCCI [1991] Ch 90 disapproved the Rubicon test.

16. Now in any application under Section 236 Insolvency Act, as the House of Lords has held in Re British & Commonwealth Holding Plc v. Spicer and Oppenheim [1993] AC 426, the court has a wide and general discretion, although the court still has to balance the usefulness of making the order against any oppression to the examinee.

17. It is clear first, from Section 221 itself that it is only available for use after a winding-up order has been made.

18. Secondly, it is clear that by reason of that, the natural applicant for a Section 221 order would be the liquidator, although creditors and contributories may also seek to invoke it . It is also clear that the Official Receiver (where he is not also the liquidator) can also apply for a Section 221 order. Counsel for Mr Wong has not disputed that, save that he submits that the Official Receiver cannot use Section 221 to gather information relevant to potential disqualification proceedings. (This submission will be dealt with later).

19. In my view, Section 221 contains no express restrictions on who can invoke it and I see no reason to exclude the Official Receiver under any implied restrictions. In a winding-up of a company, the Official Receiver does not drop out of the picture on the appointment of private liquidators. The Official Receiver still has many interests in the course of a winding-up. The following are examples: under Section 191, the Official Receiver has a duty to report to the court if fraud is found; under Section 204, the Official Receiver exercises supervision in the course of the winding-up of the company by exercising general control over liquidators; under Section 168P(2)(b), the Official Receiver may apply for disqualification orders against officers of the company if in the course of winding-up, it appears to him that an officer of the company has been guilty of fraudulent trading, fraud or breach of duty (see Section 168G(1)) and where the liquidators of a company being wound up discover that a director's conduct makes him unfit to be concerned in the management of the company and they report to the Official Receiver as required under Section 168I(3).

20. In the light of these extensive interests of the Official Receiver in the winding-up of a company, it is reasonable that there would be no express or implied restrictions excluding him from applying for an order of examination under Section 221. I note that in England, Section 236 Insolvency Act expressly provides that it is the office-holder who may apply for an order of examination but where the winding-up has been ordered by the court, the Official Receiver may apply even though he is not the liquidator.

21. Thirdly, as to who may be an examinee under an order made under Section 221, there are no express restrictions on the category of persons who may be Section 221 examinees and there is no reason to imply any such restrictions. It has been held that it is not limited to employees or officers of a company that is being wound up, and auditors have been subjected to examination under this section (see British & Commonwealth Plc v. Spicer & Oppenheim).

22. Fourthly, I consider the purpose for which Section 221 examinations may be sought. The House of Lords has said that the purpose of Section 236 Insolvency Act is not limited to reconstituting corporate knowledge (see British & Commonwealth Plc v. Spicer & Oppenheim). That case has been applied to Hong Kong by the Court of Appeal in Chark Fung Securities v. Chan Kwok Hung [2001] HKC 335. In British & Commonwealth Plc, the House of Lords held that the court has a general discretion to order examination after balancing the need to get information in the course of a winding-up against any possible oppression against the Section 221 examinee. That the discretion to order a Section 221 examination is general and unlimited is supported by a number of cases quoted in British & Commonwealth Plc at p. 48.

23. The above considerations would reasonably lead to the conclusion that a Section 221 examination order could be made:

(1) at any time after a winding-up order has been made;

(2) on the Official Receiver's application;

(3) against any person; and

(4) for any legitimate purpose of the Official Receiver in a winding-up.

24. Given that in a winding-up, even in a winding-up run by private liquidators, the Official Receiver remains interested in the conduct of ex-directors (for which private liquidators have to report to him), there would appear to be no reason why Section 221, this important weapon in the arsenal of law, should not be made available where the Official Receiver's purpose was to gather information about the conduct of a director to see if he is suitable to hold office or to manage a company.

25. As against this, counsel for Mr Wong has submitted that:

(1) if Section 221 could be used for this purpose, it would have been otiose for the legislature to have enacted Section 168IA;

(2) this court should follow the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Re Pantmaenog TimberCo. Ltd.

I shall deal with his first submission first.

26. Mr Ho has submitted that the fact that the legislature thought it necessary to enact Section 168IA or its predecessor Section 221(1)(b) meant that the Official Receiver did not otherwise have power under Section 221 to examine a target director. I shall examine the substantive provisions in Section 168IA to test this submission.

27. Firstly, it is clear that Section 221 only applies to a company being wound up. Section 168IA is not so restricted. It applies also to disqualification under Section 168F for persistent breaches by a director even though a company is not in winding-up.

28. Secondly, even if consideration is made in the context of a company being wound up, the legislature had good reason to enact Section 168IA to strengthen the Official Receiver's powers, even though Section 221 also applies to a situation where information needed to be gathered for the consideration of disqualification proceedings.

(a) Section 221 requires the court to undertake a balancing test, balancing the need to gather information against oppression to the Section 221 examinee. Even after the Rubicon test was approved, the requirement to consider any oppression to an examinee still remains. This is to be contrasted with Section 168IA which provides that a report by the Official Receiver of his opinion that a prima facie case exists would be sufficient to invoke that section.

(b) The examination under Section 221 and an examination under Section 168IA are different. Section 221 examinations are held in private and the evidence obtained is restricted, whereas Section 168IA provides for the examinations of disqualification targets in public. Section 168IA is therefore a more powerful weapon against a disqualification target than a Section 221 examination.

(c) Although Section 168IA(4) is restricted in the persons from whom information is sought, it requires no application to the court, whereas Section 221 does (when the balancing exercise referred to in British Commonwealth would apply).

29. The only possible overlap that I can see between Section 221 and Section 168IA is in the order for production of documents. But even then Section 168IA gives the Official Receiver greater power because the balancing exercise referred to in British Commonwealth would not require to be satisfied.

30. In my judgment therefore, the enactment by the legislature of Section 168IA does not lead to the conclusion that the court has no jurisdiction under Section 221 to order examination of any person for the purpose of the Official Receiver's consideration of directors disqualification proceedings.

31. I shall then deal with the submission in relation to Re Pantmaenog Timber. The Court was referred to this decision by counsel for the Official Receiver. Re Pantmaenog Timber Co. Ltd [2001] 1 WLR 730 was the decision of Judge Weeks QC sitting as a High Court Judge and was upheld by the Court of Appeal under the name of Official Receiver v. Meade-King (unreported).

32. In that case, the Official Receiver had made a report to the Secretary of State concerning the conduct of a director. An application for a disqualification order was made by the Official Receiver acting on the direction of the Secretary of State.

33. The director sought to strike out the disqualification proceedings for want of evidence. The Official Receiver then applied to Court for a Section 236 Insolvency Act examination against the solicitors and accountants who had acted for the company or for the director.

34. It was held by the judge that Section 236 Insolvency Act cannot properly be used by the Official Receiver if his sole purpose was to obtain evidence to support disqualification proceedings already on foot against a director under the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (see p. 740).

35. In the case before me of course, no disqualification proceedings have yet been brought. This is an important distinction which is relevant to the exercise of the court's discretion (see p. 12 of the Court of Appeal decision).

36. However, the English decision did not turn only on the exercise of discretion; it was primarily based on statutory construction. It was considered that the legislative scheme in England was such that it was not within the jurisdiction of the court to order a Section 236 Insolvency Act examination on the application of the Official Receiver where disqualification proceedings had been commenced. It was held by the Court of Appeal that there were two reasons for this decision.

37. First, the Secretary of State cannot invoke Section 236 Insolvency Act because Section 236 expressly provides that only liquidators could apply (although if the case were a compulsory winding-up, the Official Receiver might also apply). Since Parliament did not allow the Secretary of State to invoke Section 236 Insolvency Act, Parliament could not have intended that he (acting through his agent, i.e. the Official Receiver) could do something which he himself is not entitled to do.

38. That reason does not apply to Hong Kong because Section 221 is drafted differently from Section 236 Insolvency Act in this respect. The legislature in Hong Kong has not restricted the persons who can apply for a Section 221 examination. And for disqualification proceedings in Hong Kong, the Official Receiver can institute them in his own right, unlike in England where it is only the Secretary of State who can institute those proceedings, either directly in the case of a voluntary winding-up or indirectly through the Official Receiver in a compulsory winding-up. So in Hong Kong there is no distinction between the Official Receiver as an applicant in a Section 221 examination application and the Secretary of State (or in Hong Kong, the Financial Secretary) as an applicant in disqualification proceedings.

39. Secondly, under Section 235(3)(c) Insolvency Act, the Official Receiver could get any information from liquidators. Therefore, why should there be the need for that in Section 7(4) of the Company Directors' Disqualification Act? The answer that the English Court of Appeal gave was that Parliament gave the Official Receiver power under Section 7(4) because Section 235 was not intended to be applicable. If Section 235 was not intended to be applicable, Section 236 (which the Court of Appeal considered to be part of the same cluster of powers as Section 235) was similarly not intended to apply.

40. That reasoning also does not apply to Hong Kong because, as accepted by both counsel, there is no equivalent of Section 235 Insolvency Act in Hong Kong.

41. I have dealt above with the Hong Kong statutory regime which does not preclude the use of Section 221 for disqualification purposes. I find that Section 221 examination provisions can be used to gather information for considering disqualification proceedings. That has been recognised by Chadwick LJ in Re Pantmaenog and also by the court in Bishopsgate v Maxwell [1993] Ch. 1.

42. To hold otherwise would mean that in the absence of fraud, the Official Receiver would simply be unable to gather oral information from a third party (say, a contracting party) in his consideration whether a director's conduct renders him unfit to hold office. In the absence of clear statutory provisions to that effect, I am unable to accept that submission which would be against the spirit of good corporate governance, a spirit that has been shown in the legislation which has been consistently strengthened.

43. I will now hear the parties on the exercise of discretion under Section 221 whether to order examination of these four individuals.

(MARIA YUEN)
Judge of the Court of First Instance High Court

Representation:

Mr Godfrey Lam, instructed by the Official Receiver's Office

Mr Jimmie Ho, instructed by Messrs Tang Lai & Leung, for the Examinee Mr Wong Ching Ping Alex

Mr Stephen Wan (in person)

Mr Vincent Hoe (in person)

Mr Lam Kwan Wood (in person)

33134-EN-2001-10-31

RE C.A. PACIFIC FINANCE LTD. (in Liquidation)

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HCCW000036E/1998

HCCW 36/98, 37/98

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES (WINDING-UP) ACTIONS NO. 36 AND 37 OF 1998

---------------------------

IN THE MATTER of the Companies Ordinance Cap. 32

AND

IN THE MATTER of C.A. PACIFIC FINANCE LIMITED (in Liquidation)

AND

IN THE MATTER of C.A. PACIFIC SECURITIES LIMITED (in Liquidation)

(Heard Together)

Coram: Hon Yuen, J. in Chambers

Dates of Hearing: 18 September 2001

Date of Decision: 31 October 2001

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DECISION

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1. This is an application by the Liquidators of C.A. Pacific Securities Ltd ("CAPS") and CAP Finance Ltd ("CAPF") for the determination by the Court of objections raised by certain clients of CAPF to their classification by the Liquidators as "margin" clients.

Background

2. The matter arises in this way. CAPS was a stockbroker which was associated with CAPF, a finance company which provided finance to clients to enable them to trade in securities on margin. In January 1998, CAPS and CAPF collapsed. CAPS had some 11,000 clients on its books, and some 8,000 of these were also clients of CAPF. After the presentation of petitions to wind up the companies, Provisional Liquidators were appointed.

3. Most (though not all) of the clients claimed the return of shares that had been acquired by CAPS on their instructions. It turned out that there was a substantial shortfall in some shares, apparently because CAPF had charged large volumes of shares to its own lenders which had disposed of the shares.

4. It was impossible to identify exactly which clients' shares had been disposed of in this way, because the shares had been acquired by CAPS through CCASS, a computerised book-entry settlement system where unnumbered share certificates are immobilised and deposited with a central share depositary.

Title Application

5. In those circumstances, the first question that confronted the Liquidators was the title to the unnumbered shares acquired through CCASS:- were these shares the property of the clients (in which event the clients could demand the return of the shares as owners) , or not (in which event the clients could only claim as unsecured creditors against the companies' assets in liquidation)?

6. The Liquidators sought the determination of the Court on this question in proceedings in November 1998, which proceedings have been referred to as the "Title Application".

7. In December 1998, I held in a written Decision that the property in the shares belonged to the clients. I shall not repeat the reasons for the Decision here. The consequence of that Decision was that clients could demand the return of the shares as owners.

Share Application

8. However, where there was a shortfall in some shares, the next question that confronted the Liquidators was:- since the shares were unnumbered, how were the Liquidators to know which clients' shares had been charged by CAPF to their lenders and been disposed of, and which clients' shares had remained? In other words, how were the available shares to be distributed amongst the clients demanding them?

9. The Liquidators sought the determination of the Court on this question in proceedings in November 2000, which proceedings have been referred to as the "Share Application".

10. Essentially, the Court's task in the Share Application was to determine from the available evidence the intention of CAPS and CAPF as to the choice of which clients' shares were to be charged to CAPF's lenders. The evidence was that this was not done indiscriminately.

11. All clients of CAPF were clients of CAPS, but not all CAPS clients were CAPF clients. A client opening an account with CAPF would be asked to sign a document entitled "Memorandum of Deposit", the terms of which will be referred to later in this Decision. He would also be asked to sign a Letter of Authorization to transfer funds or properties among intergroup or related companies, including CAPS and CAPF, enabling shares to be withdrawn from any one of them.

12. According to the Liquidators, a signed Memorandum of Deposit has been found for 95% of CAPF clients. For convenience in the Share Application, clients who had signed the Memorandum of Deposit were referred to as "margin" clients and those who had not were referred to as "cash" clients.

13. After signing the Memorandum of Deposit, the client would be allocated an account number with a suffix "-01" in CAP's record system known as Financial Investment System ("FIS"), which the Liquidators have ascertained was kept accurately. Another mode of identifying clients was that "cash" clients had a 4-digit client number, whereas "margin" clients had a 6-digit client number or a 4-digit number starting with a letter other than "M".

14. CAP staff would check the FIS on a daily basis, and the shares of "margin" clientsonly (identified by the code numbers) would be considered for charging to CAPF's lenders. Even for shares so identified as belonging to "margin" clients, not all shares would be chosen for charging, as different shares had different security values. It would appear that this daily exercise of identifying only "margin" clients' shares for charging to CAPF's lenders was maintained until apparently at the last stages of the companies before their collapse.

15. In the light of this evidence as to the intention and the course of conduct of CAPS and CAPF in drawing on the shares of only "margin" clients to charge to CAPF's lenders, I held in a written Decision delivered in December 2000 that CAPS as trustee must be presumed to have first exhausted shares attributable to "margin" clients before drawing on shares attributable to "cash" clients. I shall not repeat here the legal principles applied and the reasons for the Decision.

16. The consequence was that what remained in each line of stock must be returned first to the "cash" clients who had acquired that stock, with the balance of the shares in each line to be allocated to the "margin" clients who had acquired that stock. Where there was a deficiency in either class, the clients in the same class were to share pari passu.

Classification of clients

17. This decision led to the Liquidators having to distinguish between "cash" clients and "margin" clients. In light of the evidence in the Share Application, I directed that any clients who had not signed any Memorandum of Deposit in favour of CAPF would be treated as "cash" clients, and any clients who had signed a Memorandum of Deposit would be treated in the first instance as "margin" clients.

18. Any client objecting to being classified as a "margin" client notwithstanding his execution of the Memorandum of Deposit was to lodge his objection (together with reasons and supporting documentation) within 28 days of his being notified by the Liquidators of his classification as a "margin" client.

19. However, as I indicated in that Decision, no purpose would be served in permitting objections to classification based on any alleged misrepresentation at the time when the client signed the Memorandum of Deposit. Misrepresentation only renders a transaction voidable, not void. What was important, when considering the question which clients' shares had been delivered for charging to CAPF's lenders in January 1998, was the trustee CAPS' perception of the status of the client then. Any claim now made by a "margin" client of misrepresentation would not have affected CAPS' perception in 1998 that he was a "margin" client, and that his shares were eligible for charging to CAPF's lenders.

20. That does not mean of course that any client who had been the victim of a misrepresentation would be left without remedy. He would have to pursue his claim for damages by lodging a proof of debt in CAPF's liquidation.

Determination of Objections

21. The Liquidators' exercise in classification led to objections from some clients. There were a total of 408 objections, excluding one made by a "cash" client in error. Having considered the nature of the objections, the Liquidators had initially grouped the objections into 10 categories.

22. However at a directions hearing in July 2001, a further analysis showed that the objections could be distilled into 5 types, where:-

(i) the client had not signed a Memorandum of Deposit [Category C according to the Liquidators' categorization];

(ii) (a) the client had signed a Memorandum of Deposit, but had never used margin facilities [Category B1];

(b) the client had signed a Memorandum of Deposit and had used margin facilities, but the account was in credit at the time of the liquidation [Category B2];

(iii) the client claimed to have been the victim of misrepresentation when he signed the Memorandum of Deposit [Category A];

(iv) the client claimed to be entitled to be treated as a "cash" client because he had been paid compensation by the Securities and Futures Commission [Category F];

(v) the client claimed that there had been an "internal error" in CAP [Category H].

Apart from the above, there was also Mr Yue Ming's unique case [Category K], referred to below.

23. At the directions hearing in July 2001, legal representatives appeared for some clients whose objections covered types (i) to (v) above. It became apparent that by reason of such legal representation, the time and costs of making a representative order for each category of client could be saved.

24. At the hearing in September 2001, I heard those clients' legal representatives, as well as two clients in person Mr Yue Ming and Mr Yuen Charn Ming, who had filed affirmations in support of their objections.

25. This Decision deals with samples of all the types of objections, as well as Mr Yue Ming's unique case. It is hoped that when the reasons in this Decision are considered, the other clients and the Liquidators will be able to apply these reasons to individual cases and thus be spared the time and costs of having a determination by the Court of each individual objection. (For this purpose, a Chinese translation of this Decision will be made available through the Liquidators to unrepresented clients who do not read English). Should any individual client wish to pursue his objection by way of a separate determination hearing notwithstanding this Decision and the reasons expressed in it, there would be possible ramifications by way of costs orders.

(i) No Memorandum of Deposit signed

26. The first type of objection was from clients who had been classified as "margin" clients even though there was no signed Memorandum of Deposit.

27. According to the Liquidators, there were 22 clients who were in this category. Five clients were represented by counsel, these 5 clients comprising Mr David Wong Yau Kar, and 3 companies and 1 individual represented by him. By the time of the hearing however, the Liquidators had re-classified the 3 companies and the individual as "cash" clients, leaving Mr Wong's own case to be determined.

28. In respect of Mr Wong's case, the evidence was that he had previously used Peregrine Brokerage Ltd as his stockbrokers but due to concerns about Peregrine's continued operation at the beginning of 1998, he transferred his portfolio to CA Pacific for safe custody as a matter of urgency on 14/15 January 1998 (Wednesday/Thursday). It would appear that his debit balance with Peregrine had been settled with money from CAPS but CAPF provided him with an account statement on 16 January 1998 (Friday). On 18 January 1998 (Monday), CAPS and CAPF collapsed. No trading was ever done.

29. Mr Wong's case is simple. He has gone on affirmation to say that he did not sign any Memorandum of Deposit, nor indeed any account opening forms, and that he never agreed to charge his shares to CAPF.

30. The Liquidatorssuggest that it was likely that Mr Wong would have signed a Memorandum of Deposit, although no Memorandum of Deposit has been found. CAPF's statement of account recorded a debit entry and debit balance of the same amount paid by CAPS to settle his debit balance with Peregrine. That suggests, the Liquidatorssubmit, that although CAPS paid Peregrine the money, it did so on behalf of CAPF and that is consistent with the companies' respective areas of operations.

31. However the fact remains that Mr Wong has deposed on affirmation that he did not sign a Memorandum of Deposit and there is no evidence to contradict it. He has also deposed on affirmation that concern at the time was to effect the transfer of his shares from Peregrine to the safe custody of the CA Pacific group and that he was not concerned about opening a new trading account. Having just retrieved his shares from a brokerage which was about to collapse, it is certainly plausible that he would not wish to risk them by charging them to a finance company.

32. The fact that CAPF might have arranged for CAPS to settle Mr Wong's debit balance with Peregrine is not consistent only with his having agreed to charge the shares to CAPF pursuant to the sort of transaction contemplated in the Memorandum of Deposit. The transaction could just as possibly have been only in the form of a loan from CAPF. Mr Wong's case of an urgent transfer from another broker was unusual; indeed it would appear interest was not even charged before the CA Pacific companies themselves collapsed.

33. In my view, a client cannot be presumed to have agreed to charge his shares to CAPF when there was no contemporaneous documentary evidence (in the form of a signed Memorandum of Deposit or otherwise) showing that he had agreed to do so, when he has deposed on affirmation that he had made no such agreement orally, and when the available evidence is consistent with some other arrangement such as a loan.

34. By reason of the above, I would direct that the Liquidators re-classify Mr Wong as a "cash" client.

35. As for the other clients in this group of 22 clients for whom no signed Memoranda of Deposit have been located by the Liquidators, apparently 13 had never used margin facilities and did not owe a debt to CAPF at liquidation. However, there have been no affirmations from these clients as to whether they had in fact signed Memoranda of Deposit. Should affirmations to that effect be provided and assuming the Liquidators find no evidence consistent only with a charge of shares to CAPF, it would be in order for the Liquidators to re-classify them as "cash" clients.

36. As for those remaining in this group who had used margin facilities or had a debt owing to CAPF as at liquidation, again there have been no affirmations from these clients as to whether they had in fact signed Memoranda of Deposit, and if they say they had not, explaining under what arrangement they were allowed to use margin facilities. These clients and the Liquidators should have liberty to restore the hearing, and I will leave it to the Liquidators to fix a date for the restored hearing, allowing a reasonable time for the clients to file evidence if they so wish.

(ii)(a) Margin facilities never used

37. The second type of objection was from clients who had been classified as "margin" clients even though they had not used their margin facilities.

38. One of these clients was Mrs Tiffany Hung Pui Yee Vaswani. She had signed the Memorandum of Deposit even though she asserts she had no intention of trading on margin. Mr Cotterell, who appeared for Mrs Vaswani, accepted however that she cannot rely on the doctrine of non est factum to disavow her execution of the Memorandum of Deposit, and this case seems to be typical of the many cases where the clients' failure to read the Memorandum of Deposit before signing it has resulted in an unfortunate state of affairs. There was a brief reference in the written submissions that the Unconscionable Contracts Ordinance cap. 458 was "relevant". Under that Ordinance, the burden is on a party claiming that a contract was unconscionable to prove that it was, but this argument was not pursued at the hearing.

39. Mrs Vaswani's evidence was that she had not used the margin facilities and that out of 20 transactions, she had only once failed to settle on T+2. On that occasion, she settled shortly thereafter. Mrs Vaswani also relied on the statements from CAPF which showed that the margin value of the shares that she held was "0".

40. Mr Cotterell submitted that it was inequitable in these circumstances for Mrs Vaswani to be classified as a "margin" client. It was suggested that the Court should adopt the criteria set out in the schedule to his written submissions as being more equitable.

41. However, in this classification exercise, the Liquidators are not dividing up the remaining shares in vacuuo according to notions of equity. What the Liquidators are doing, in accordance with the Decision in the Share Application, is to list those clients who CAPS and CAPF understood in January 1998 to have agreed to charge their shares to CAPF's lenders.

42. The language of the Memorandum of Deposit was wide enough to make a charge of a client's shares valid even though she did not actually use margin facilities. Clause 1 provided that in consideration of CAPF continuing to grant advances or credit to the client from time to time at its sole discretion, the client expressly charged all stocks which at any time thereafter were deposited with CAPF "as a continuing security for the payment or satisfaction ... of all monies and liabilities which now are or at any time hereafter may be due owing or incurred ...". Mr Cotterell submitted that this clause meant that the client's shares could only be subject to a charge when there was an amount actually due and owing. I am not persuaded that that is so.

43. Clause 16 provided that "this is to be a continuing security notwithstanding any intermediate payment or settlement of account or satisfaction of the whole or any part of any sum or sums of money owing as aforesaid or otherwise". This shows that the parties intended to secure margin facilities made available by CAPF (at its discretion) by a charge over shares acquired by the client from time to time. Whilst it is well-established that in construing a document which was drafted by one party, the agreement should be construed contra proferentem in the case of any ambiguity, Mr Cotterell was unable to proffer any submissions that suggested that this clause was otherwise than clear. In any event, to the world, the charge remained valid whether margin facilities were used or not. It was also the case in practice, according to Mr Karliner, that a client's balance was not considered when shares were charged by CAPF to its lenders.

44. As for the "security value", the Liquidators' evidence is that that was CAPF's assessment of those shares as security. The assessment varied according to the type of shares and was used to ascertain the interest rate to be charged for any margin facilities used. Therefore, the fact that the security value of Mrs Vaswani's shares was "0" meant simply that that was CAPF's assessment of those shares as security. It did not mean that there was no valid charge over those shares.

45. By reason of the above, I would confirm the Liquidators' classification of Mrs Vaswani as a "margin" client in light of her having agreed, by signing the Memorandum of Deposit, to charge her shares as a continuing security in consideration for CAPF making margin facilities available, even though she had not actually used those facilities.

46. If Mrs Vaswani had been the victim of any misrepresentation by CAPF staff, she has her remedies in damages against the estate of that company.

47. The same would apply to the account which Mr Yuen Charn Ming claimed was beneficially owned by him, though opened in the name of his wife Madam Kam Chun Fong. A Memorandum of Deposit was signed and indeed Mr Yuen's cheques were expressly made out in favour of CAPF in compliance with the printed instructions on statements of account which stated, amongst other things, "security transactions are conducted through CA Pacific Securities Ltd., CA Pacific Finance auto transfers in/out shares and funds to settle these transactions. Client settles with CA Pacific Finance Ltd".

(ii)(b) Account in credit at liquidation

48. The next type of objection was from clients who had been classified as "margin" clients even though their account was in credit at the time of liquidation.

49. One of these clients was Mrs Katija Chuang. She had signed the Memorandum of Deposit although she asserts that she was not aware that she had done so and she had not asked for margin facilities. In this respect, I would repeat the observations made regarding Mrs Vaswani's case.

50. Mr Cotterell, who also appeared for Mrs Chuang, has done an analysis of Mrs Chuang's trading which showed that of 54 trading transactions, she had paid the full amount for the shares in 36 transactions within T+2, 13 transactions within T+3, and only 5 transactions within a longer period than T+3 but in any event no later than T+6. It was submitted on her behalf that this analysis showed that she was not a "genuine margin trader".

51. I have dealt with issues regarding the construction of the Memorandum of Deposit and the validity of the charge above and need not repeat them here. If anything, Mrs Chuang's case is less strong than Mrs Vaswani's, the latter having never used margin facilities to settle her trading transactions. For the same reasons, I would confirm the Liquidators' classification of Mrs Chuang as a "margin" client even though her account was in credit at the time of liquidation.

(iii) Objections on basis of misrepresentation

52. I have in my Decision in the Share Application explained why it is thought that any misrepresentation at the time an account with CAPF was opened would only afford a client a right to claim against its assets in liquidation.

53. Although Mr Cotterell's clients did allege that they were victims of misrepresentation, he did not seek to pursue any arguments contrary to the above view.

54. I would therefore confirm that allegations of misrepresentation should be disregarded by the Liquidators in their exercise in classification.

(iv) Objections on ground that compensation paid by SFC

55. A number of clients have apparently objected to being classified as "margin" clients on the ground that they had been paid compensation by the Securities and Futures Commission ("SFC"). It is not known whether the rationale for this objection is (a) that the SFC had accepted that these clients were "cash" clients, and so should the Liquidators, or (b) that the Court should adopt the same "flexible" approach as the SFC. I shall consider both arguments below.

56. In January 1998, the SFC and the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong announced a policy decision regarding compensation arrangements for CAPS clients. The policy decision was to effect payment of compensation not only to cash clients, but also to clients of CAPS who had signed margin agreements with CAPF and had not used the facilities under the agreements (see Joint Press Release dated 10 June 1998). It was expressly stated that this was a relaxation of the statutory compensation rules, and it was announced that "as there might be cases where clients of CA Pacific had been led to open margin account[s] without their consent or under misrepresentation, the authorities considered that a more flexible approach should be adopted in assessing their claims against the Compensation Fund" (see Press Release dated 25 January 1998).

57. It would thus be seen that the SFC was not only paying compensation to "cash" clients, and thus the receipt of compensation provides no support for argument (a) above.

58. As for argument (b), whilst it may have been open to an executive body, administering a solvent fund established, funded and administered by itself, to adopt a discretionary "flexible approach" in the payment of compensation, those policy considerations cannot apply to the return of the shares, which belong to clients and which are deficient. It is a matter of property law in which the sort of discretion that the SFC exercised plays no part.

59. Accordingly, objection (iv) cannot be a valid ground of objection.

(v) Objection based on alleged "internal error"

60. The fact that a client has signed a Memorandum of Deposit is evidence of the objective intention, on the part of CAPF to make margin facilities available at its discretion, and on the part of the client to charge his shares to CAPF. The question is whether the Memorandum of Deposit should be regarded as conclusive evidence.

61. The Liquidators have ascertained that 95% of CAPF clients had signed Memoranda of Deposit and that clients who had signed Memoranda of Deposit would have had appropriate coding in their account numbers to identify them as such. However it would appear that there were some cases where clients who had signed Memoranda of Deposit had coding that nevertheless identified them as "cash" clients only, with the result that these clients' shares would not have been considered for charging to CAPF lenders. These cases are considered below. Given that such cases existed, I am not persuaded that the mere fact that Memoranda of Deposit had been signed per se, where the clients were coded as "cash" clients, could be regarded as conclusive and irrebuttable evidence that those clients should in all cases be regarded as "margin" clients.

62. The account of Ng Chun Hoi and Chau Wai Fong (Mr and Mrs Ng) was an account which was coded as "cash" even though they had signed a Memorandum of Deposit. Although in their supplemental affirmation they accepted that they had signed a Memorandum of Deposit, they said in their affirmation that they had not asked for margin facilities and no margin facilities were ever used. Significantly their account was designated an "-02" account, and no "-01" account of Mr and Mrs Ng has been referred to in any documents of CA Pacific.

63. No explanation has been found by the Liquidators as to why, if the intention was to open a "margin" account, a code for "cash" accounts was then used, and the account operated and treated as a "cash" account. The Liquidators dispute that there were any "internal errors" in CAP's record-keeping, which apparently was accurate to a high degree.

64. The fact that the "cash" code was used for Mr and Mrs Ng's account and their account was treated as a "cash" account is consistent with a variation of an initial arrangement, with the original intention to open a "margin" account (as shown by the signing of the Memorandum of Deposit) being changed to a "cash" account (as shown by the use of the "cash" client code and treatment of the account as a "cash" client account).

65. Given the contemporaneous documentary evidence emanating from CAP, I am satisfied that the common objective intention of the Ngs and CAP was that theirs was a "cash" account only, and I would direct that the Liquidators should re-classify them as such.

66. The same considerations apply to Cheuk Mei Yuk and Lo Chi Wai, whose factual situations were identical to that of Mr and Mrs Ng.

Mr Yue Man's case

67. Finally, there is Mr Yue Man's unique factual situation. Mr Yue had accounts with CAP Futures and CAPS with an "02" suffix although a signed Memorandum of Deposit has also been located.

68. In January 1998, he was in funds and instructed CAP Futures to use those funds to acquire certain shares which were to be deposited with Sun Hung Kai Securities. He exhibited a deposit slip.

69. Mr Yue explained that he did not wish the shares to be deposited with CAPS as he had heard rumours that the SFC was investigating it. Thereafter CAP Futures, acting on his instructions, acquired the shares through CAPS but before the shares could be deposited with Sun Hung Kai Securities, the transaction was interrupted by the CCASS close-out procedures. There is no evidence to contradict Mr Yue's evidence of his instructions to CAP Futures, even though it is not in liquidation.

70. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that CAP Futures and CAPS would have been holding the shares as a bare custodian before their deposit with Sun Hung Kai Securities, and as such Mr Yue should not be classified as a "margin" client.

Costs

71. Finally there is the question of costs. The Liquidators' reasonable fees, costs and expenses in the classification process (including their attendance at the hearings) and their legal advisers' fees for the present application (subject to taxation) should be borne by the trust estate in the first instance.

72. As for the costs of the represented clients, I see no reason why they should be borne by the trust estate or by the Liquidators. I would therefore make no order as to their costs.

Liberty to restore

73. I will also give liberty to restore to the Liquidators and those of the remaining clients who wish to have their individual objections determined by the Court, save that any applications to restore should be made within 28 days from the date of this Decision and subject to costs ramifications as stated above.

(MARIA YUEN)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Representation:

Mr D Karliner of Herbert Smith for the Liquidators

Miss G Lan instructed by Joseph SC Chan & Co for David Wong Yau Kar, United Overseas Capital Ltd., Kar Mau Trading Co Ltd., Wong Po Yan and Win Cheers Development Ltd.

Mr Cotterell of Stephenson Harwood & Lo for Chuang Tsoi Hung, Katija Chuang and Tiffany Hung Pui Yee Vaswani

Mr S Leung of Joseph CT Lee & Co for Ng Chun Hoi and Chau Wai Fung

Mr SC Chan of SC Chan & Co for Lo Chi Wai

Miss Teresa Wong of Official Receiver's Office for the Official Receiver

Mr Yue Ming, in person

Mr Yuen Charn Ming, on behalf of Madam Kam Chun Fong

22551-EN-2001-07-17

RE C.A. PACIFIC FINANCE LTD. (in Liquidation)

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HCCW000036D/1998

HCCW 36/1998, 37/1998

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES WINDING-UP PROCEEDINGS NO. 36 AND 37 OF 1998

____________

IN THE MATTER of the Companies Ordinance Cap. 32

AND

IN THE MATTER of C. A. PACIFIC FINANCE LIMITED (in Liquidation)

AND

IN THE MATTER of C.A. PACIFIC SECURITIES LIMITED (in Liquidation)
(Heard Together)

____________

Coram: Hon Yuen J in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 29 June 2001

Date of Decision: 17 July 2001

_____________

DECISION

_____________

1. This is an application by the Joint Liquidators ("the Liquidators") of C.A. Pacific Securities Ltd ("CAPS") and CAP Finance Ltd ("CAPF") for approval of their remuneration as Provisional Liquidators.

2. I should record that although the latest hearing of this application took place on 29 June 2001, the application has been the subject of a number of reports, affidavits, written submissions and hearings over a period of time. Where possible, to save on costs of appearances in Court, the Court has raised queries and the Liquidators have provided responses to them in writing.

3. The application is in respect of the period of provisional liquidation from 19 January 1998 to 10 June 1998. This was not a routine provisional liquidation.

4. CAPS was the third largest stockbroker in Hong Kong when it collapsed in the middle of January 1998. It had 11,000 clients. Some (about 5,000) of its clients were also clients of CAPF, a finance company which had obtained authorization from clients to pledge their shares to its (CAPF's) bankers as security for loans made to it. It has been alleged by some clients of CAPS that they had executed CAPF documents as a result of misrepresentation. Some were not even sure whether they were clients of CAPF at all. Consequently, there were anxieties additional to those that would be expected upon any collapse of a large brokerage.

5. There was also the complication arising from the fact that virtually all the shares acquired on the market by CAPS were held in CCASS, a computerised book-entry settlement system where unnumbered share certificates are immobilised and deposited with a central securities depositary. Thus, when shares were pledged by CAPF and sold by its financiers, it was impossible to ascertain exactly which clients' shares had been so taken. It is believed that this was the first time in the common law world where a brokerage dealing with shares in such a system had collapsed.

6. Friday 16 January 1998 was the last trading day for CAPS. On Monday 19 January 1998, the Securities and Futures Commission presented the petition against CAPS on an urgent basis. The Liquidators were appointed on 20 January and 21 January 1998 as provisional liquidators of the two companies on an urgent basis. CCASS also undertook various close-out procedures.

7. From that date until the date when the companies were wound-up on 10 June 1998, the Liquidators were immersed in a number of activities including taking over the various branches of the companies, dealing with anxious clients, securing the companies' records, dealing with officers and employees, verification of clients' claims to shares, finding out from CCASS the positions of shares in the companies' accounts after close-out, reconciling them with the companies' records and clients' claims, undertaking investigations into the way the companies had been operated, making attempts at asset recovery, dealing with the various authorities (Financial Secretary, Official Receiver, SFC and the Stock Exchange), press and politicians in this high-profile matter, and making reports to the Court.

8. It would be fair to say that the Liquidators had to put a great deal of work into the 5-month period of provisional liquidation, due to a large extent to having to deal with unknown factors such as the way CCASS worked and the nature of clients' claims. Apart from the sheer number of anxious clients, it would be noted that not all clients spoke with one voice and a vast portfolio of securities had to be dealt with.

9. The total recorded charges of the provisional liquidators were originally $21.122m. However, there was a voluntary reduction of nearly $4m for overtime claimed and of $1.23m for administrative staff. From this, there was also a reduction to adjust the charges to the Panel A scale agreed between the Official Receiver's Office and the Hong Kong Society of Accountants, which is lower than Cooper & Lybrand's rate referred to in the order appointing them as provisional liquidators. The effect of these voluntary reductions was that the claimed amount was reduced from $21.122m. to $15.418m.

10. At a previous hearing, the Court had approved an on account payment of $10.3m. Certain specific items of work were queried by the Court. Since then, there have been more reports submitted by the provisional liquidators to explain and verify their claims. These are dealt with individually below. I should add that the record keeping in this case has been very full.

11. First, there is a claim for CCASS work in the sum of $915,158. The provisional liquidators have explained that this was necessary for a complete reconciliation of the position of securities held by CAPS on behalf of its clients. Such a reconciliation was essential given the uncertainties at the time immediately after the collapse of the brokerage and finance company, and in the long run, for the purposes of eventual distribution, whether of proceeds or securities. Initially one manager was placed in CAPS head office and the other in the provisional liquidators' office. The former focussed on records kept by the company and the latter was responsible for verification against information kept by CCASS and from CAPF's financiers.

12. The provisional liquidators have clarified this claim to show that most of the time charged was for junior staff. As for managerial time, one manager logged 102.5 hours and the other, 180 hours in the course of 21/2 months. This translates into an average of 56.5 hours per manager per month, or on the basis of 25 working days a month, slightly over 2 hours a day on this work.

13. This reconciliation work provided an accurate position of the share portfolio held by CAPS both as to location and quantities. I note that such information was not previously available from the records of CAPS itself. In my view, this work was essential to implement the distribution order made by the Court and I am satisfied that the charges are justified and reasonable given what was achieved.

14. Secondly, there is a claim for $2,801,906 and $1,231,379 in respect of work related to branches and investors. There were nine branches located in different parts of Hong Kong. All branches were kept open at first to deal with client inquiries, with one senior and one junior staff member assigned to secure company assets and records, and to deal with queries from clients and employees. Seven branches were closed with two kept open (1 on Hong Kong Island and 1 in Kowloon) at the specific request of the SFC to act as centres for client inquiries. After early April 1998, however, time was spent mostly in supervising the packing of records for storage.

15. It is noted that the charges claimed for the month from 29 January to 28 February 1998 came to a total of $686,190, and for the period 1 March to 4 April 1998, a total of $825,720. Annie Chan and Rainier Lam were specifically involved. It seems to me that it was unnecessary for much managerial time to be spent on the tasks specified in paragraph 3.2F(p) of the Consolidated Report. Consequently, I would deduct these amounts claimed by 2/3 to reflect the difference in charges between managerial time and charges for a supervisor. This would reduce the claim regarding Branches by $1,007,940, leading to a figure of $1,793,966.

16. As for "Investors", this comprised during the 5-month period, 555 units (55.5 hours) of the provisional liquidators' time, 2655 units (265.5 hours) for Rainier Lam a Senior Manager, and 1090 units (109 hours) divided between two managers. There were 5 large-scale protests during the 5 months. Rainier Lam was given primary responsibility for dealing with client issues. It is understandable that a more senior member of the provisional liquidators' staff would help in alleviating clients' concerns and I would therefore accept the charge as being reasonable.

17. I would add that there was initially a charge for dealing with press and politicians. After queries were raised, the liquidators have indicated that they are prepared to write off the charge of $204,720 in its entirety.

18. Finally there is the costs of preparing the liquidators' reports to the Court. During the provisional liquidation, three reports were submitted to the Court. I remain of the view that although these reports were of assistance to the Court, they ought to have been a summary of the work done and of the way ahead, rather than a work in itself. Thus the work of 1 liquidator and 2 managers 8 hours a day for 3 days ought to be sufficient, given that the drafting was done by lawyers. This would add up to say $230,000 for each report or $690,000 for 3 reports. Having read the materials in the Consolidated Report, I would halve the claimed amount of nearly $1.5m.

19. Save as indicated above, the provisional liquidators' remuneration and disbursements are approved.

(MARIA YUEN)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Representation:

Mr D Karliner of Herbert Smith, for the liquidators

32317-EN-2000-12-20

Re C.A. PACIFIC FINANCE LTD. (in Liquidation)

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HCCW000036C/1998

HCCW 36/98, 37/98

HEADNOTES

(1) Cash clients (meaning exclusive CAP Securities clients) were different from margin clients (meaning clients who were also CAP Finance clients).

Cash clients' agreements with CAP Securities stated that CAP Securities shall not, without the prior written consent of the clients, deposit any of their shares as security for loans, or lend or otherwise part with possession of their shares for any purpose.

Margin clients' agreements with CAP Finance stated that they consented to CAP Finance pledging their shares for loans made by CAP Finance's lenders to it, and CAP Securities was authorized to deliver shares to CAP Finance for that purpose. The extent of CAP Finance's pledge to its lenders was not expressly restricted to any amount owing by the margin clients to CAP Finance.

This contrast between cash clients and margin clients was respected and implemented in practice. The two categories of clients were identified differently in CAP's record system. Shares of margin clients only were considered by CAP Finance for transfer to the Lenders, until the last few trading days when due to the sale of shares by CAP Finance's lenders and their retention of surplus shares, CAP Securities drew on available shares in CCASS to meet settlement obligations including shares attributable to cash clients.

(2) Where shares now available completely matched clients' claims, the shares should be delivered to the clients, subject to payment of costs and expenses and any lien of CAP Securities, and subject to the SFC's statutory subrogation to the extent decided in Re Forluxe Securities. Where there is any dispute between margin clients and CAP Finance's Liquidators as to any indebtedness, the Liquidators of CAP Securities should interplead.

(3) Where there is a shortfall of shares now available, the rule in Clayton's case ("first in, first out") was in the present case, unjust, inapplicable and impractical.

(4) In the light of the difference between the cash clients and the margin clients, and the practice that had been implemented by CAP Securities until the last trading days, since CAP Securities as trustee could have lawfully delivered shares attributable to margin clients to CAP Finance's Lenders, but could not have lawfully delivered shares attributable to cash clients, it must be presumed to have done the lawful thing first, i.e. to have first exhausted shares attributable to margin clients before drawing on shares attributable to cash clients. The consequence is that what remains in each line of stock must be attributable first to cash clients.

(5) The most just and fairest solution was therefore to give priority to the remaining shares in each line of stock to cash clients who had acquired that stock (subject to any sale effected by CAP Securities under clause 4 of the Client Agreement), the balance of the shares in each line to be allocated to margin clients who had acquired that stock, with clients in the same class sharing pari passu in the event of deficiency.

(6) Directions as to classification of clients and objections to classification given.

 

HCCW 36/98, 37/98

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES (WINDING-UP) ACTIONS NO. 36 AND 37 OF 1998

---------------------------

IN THE MATTER of the Companies Ordinance Cap. 32

and

IN THE MATTER of C.A. PACIFIC FINANCE LIMITED (in Liquidation)

and

IN THE MATTER of C.A. PACIFIC SECURITIES LIMITED (in Liquidation)

 

Coram: Hon. Yuen, J. in Chambers

Dates of Hearing: 30 November, 1 December 2000

Date of Decision: 20 December 2000 (in Court)

 

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DECISION

--------------

 

1. This is an application by the Liquidators of C.A. Pacific Securities Ltd and CAP Finance Ltd for directions as to the distribution, or allocation, of shares to clients of CAP Securities.

2. This application is consequential upon my decision in December 1998 (Re C.A. Pacific (No.1) [1999] 2 HKC 632) that the company's clients had a proprietary interest in shares as individual beneficiaries notwithstanding the fact that the shares were unnumbered and "immobilized" under the Central Clearing and Settlement System ("CCASS") operated by the Hong Kong Securities Clearing Co. Ltd. In view of the time that has elapsed since that decision, it is imperative that a decision on the allocation of shares be made as soon as possible.

3. The hearing of the application, whilst in chambers, was open to all clients and was attended by a number of them. Whilst representation of different classes of clients would have been ideal, that would have taken more time and costs. The Liquidators have discussed this application with the Committee of Inspection and their counsel has endeavoured to present different views to the Court.

4. It may be helpful to summarize the factual background first.

CAP Securities

5. CAP Securities started business in Hong Kong as a broker or dealer in shares in 1986. It was a member of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and was a broker participant in CCASS. In the 12 years up to 1998, it had grown to become one of the largest local stockbrokers with a large client base.

6. CAP Securities acted only as a stockbroker, not as a financier, of its clients.

7. Its clients could be classified into 3 categories :-

(1) those clients who had opened accounts with CAP Securities only and who bought shares with their own resources. These clients have been referred to as "cash clients". They could also be described as "exclusive CAP Securities clients";

(2) those clients who had also opened accounts with C.A. Pacific Finance Ltd., a finance company which provided margin facilities for buying shares. These clients have been referred to as "margin clients" although a more accurate description would have been "CAP Finance clients" as some had margin facilities but had not drawn upon them or had not actively used them;

(3) those clients who were also clients of a company called Pui Hang Enterprises Ltd which was operated by persons related to the persons who operated CAP Securities and CAP Finance respectively. Pui Hang (which is still operating) carried on the business of trading in shares. Whilst Pui Hang was itself a client of CAP Securities, some of its clients also opened their own accounts with CAP Securities. However, this is of no relevance for present purposes. Shares attributable to Pui Hang's clients were capable of being transferred to lenders to Pui Hang, but as Pui Hang did not suffer the same fate as CAP Finance, nothing turns on this for present purposes.

8. Cash clients signed a Client Agreement. Under this Agreement, the client's shares were held for and on behalf of the client, and it was provided that CAP Securities shall not, without the prior written consent of the client, deposit any of the client's shares as security for loans or advances or lend or otherwise part with possession of any such shares for any purpose (clause 11).

9. The Client Agreement restricted the client's rights to the shares that he had bought in only two instances. First, it would only be where a cash client fails by settlement date (Transaction + 2 days) to pay for his shares that CAP Securities would be authorized to transfer or sell his shares in satisfaction of his payment obligation (clause 4). Secondly, there was a general lien whereby all the client's shares were subject to a general lien for the discharge of his obligation to it arising from the business of dealing in shares (clause 6).

CAP Finance

10. CAP Finance carried on business as a finance company offering margin facilities to persons wishing to buy shares.

11. On opening an account with CAP Finance, margin clients would be required to sign, amongst other documents, a Memorandum of Deposit. Under Clause 28 of the memorandum, the margin client consented to CAP Finance mortgaging, charging, pledging or creating any security interest in or over any or all of his shares by way of security for loans or advances of any amount made or to be made to CAP Finance for the discharge of obligations of any kind and amount undertaken or to be undertaken by CAP Finance. The extent of the charge or pledge by CAP Finance to its lenders was not expressly restricted to the amount owing by the margin client to CAP Finance.

12. Clause 28 was implemented in practice by CAP Finance causing CAP Securities to deliver shares acquired for margin clients to various financial institutions ("the Lenders") as security for loans made to CAP Finance by the Lenders. Margin clients had also signed a Letter of Authorization to transfer funds or properties among intergroup or related companies, including CAP Securities and CAP Finance, enabling shares to be withdrawn from any one of them.

Comparison between margin clients and cash clients

13. There is thus a clear contrast between the cash client's position and the margin client's position.

14. As far as the cash client was concerned, his stockbroker CAP Securities would only be entitled to deal with shares acquired for him if he failed to pay for the shares by T+2. Apart from that situation, CAP Securities was obliged to always retain enough shares for delivery to the cash client, though it need not deliver the very shares that it had acquired from the selling broker in that particular trade (Solloway v McLaughlin [1938] AC 247).

15. As far as the margin client was concerned however, he had authorized his stockbroker CAP Securities to deliver shares to CAP Finance for pledging with the latter's own lenders. In exchange for having margin facilities made available to him by CAP Finance, he was in effect risking his shares to finance CAP Finance's private commercial operations.

16. This contrast between cash clients and margin clients was respected and implemented in practice. The Liquidators' investigations have revealed that the two categories of clients were identified differently in CAP's record system known as Financial Investment System or "FIS", a record system which the Liquidators have ascertained was kept accurately.

17. Cash clients had a 4-digit client number, whereas margin clients had a 6-digit client number or a 4-digit number starting with a letter other than "M".

18. On a daily basis, CAP Finance staff would check the FIS, and the shares of margin clients only would be considered for transfer to the Lenders, until at the last stages of the companies before collapse.

Matters regarding margin clients

19. With reference to the distinction between cash clients and margin clients, I should mention two matters that had previously been drawn to my attention by the Liquidators although they did not feature prominently in their present submissions. In my view, for present purposes, neither matter impacts on the issue of the recovery of shares.

20. First, some margin clients have, after the liquidation of CAP Securities and CAP Finance, claimed that misrepresentations had been made to them by CAP Finance staff on the effect of the documentation prior to their execution.

21. Secondly, the Liquidators have also, in another context, previously drawn the Court's attention to a possible question over the CAP Finance documentation regarding formalities set out in the Money Lenders Ordinance.

22. Neither of these matters has been brought before the courts for decision. However in my view, neither should have any influence upon the Court's determination of the present application for directions on the allocation of shares.

23. To determine which clients should receive the remaining shares, the shortfall being due largely to the sale by the Lenders of shares delivered to them under CAP Finance's pledge, it is relevant to consider whether in 1998, CAP Securities would have been likely to have delivered shares attributable to cash clients, or shares attributable to margin clients. This involves the ascertaining of CAP Securities' intention at the time of delivery of the shares in 1998.

24. Any alleged misrepresentation or failure of compliance with the money-lending legislation could not have affected CAP Securities' intention in 1998 when it delivered shares to the Lenders. Even if one assumes that the CAP Finance contracts signed by the margin clients were to be now declared unenforceable, the fact is that CAP Securities had historically acted on those clients' authority to deliver shares to CAP Finance's lenders. In considering whose shares had been so delivered (i.e. whether the cash clients' or the margin clients'), CAP Securities' intention in 1998 is a historical fact that cannot be reconstructed.

25. The delivery of shares by CAP Securities as stockbroker is not enforcement of the CAP Finance contract. Where shares are to be delivered to margin clients who are indebted to CAP Finance, the latter's liquidators may well claim a charge over the shares to the extent of the debt. If the margin clients were to dispute that charge, the Liquidators of CAP Securities would be in the position of interpleaders vis-a-vis the shares, and to avoid any conflict of interests (as the same persons have been appointed liquidators of both companies) I expect they would have to seek directions from the court as to how to deal with the shares pending resolution of any disputes between the clients and CAP Finance. A provision to this effect will be included in my order.

Cause of shortfall of shares

26. As stated above, it would appear from the Liquidators' investigations that even as late as 3 days before the collapse of CAP Securities and CAP Finance, the holdings of shares by CAP Securities and CAP Finance were still "whole", meaning that there were enough shares to be delivered to all clients.

27. However, when CAP Finance's lenders sold some of the pledged shares and retained surplus shares, CAP Securities drew on available shares in CCASS to meet settlement obligations without distinguishing between those shares attributable to cash clients and those attributable to margin clients. It is the Liquidators' view that these transfers would probably not have been the result of deliberate decisions to directly transfer shares between the companies, but an indirect consequence of an automatic drawing on available shares in CCASS to meet settlement obligations without distinguishing shares attributable to cash clients.

Liquidations

28. On 4 June 1998, both CAP Securities and CAP Finance were wound up, CAP Finance on a petition presented on the basis of its inability to pay an inter-company loan, and CAP Securities on a petition presented by the Securities and Futures Commission ("SFC") on the grounds that it was insolvent and that it was just and equitable, and in the public interest, for it to be wound-up.

Title application - CAP Securities trustee of clients' shares

29. In view of the CCASS procedures and a shortfall in some of the shares, the Liquidators brought an application to the Court ("the title application") for determination of the question whether CAP Securities' clients had any proprietary interest in shares which they had instructed that company to acquire. The question arose because under CCASS, unnumbered share certificates were immobilised and deposited with a central shares depositary, and there was therefore no `earmarking' of specific shares to individual clients.

30. The postulation adopted at the title application was of cash clients who had paid for shares from their own resources and on whose instructions CAP Securities had purchased shares settled through CCASS.

31. On 17 December 1998 I found that notwithstanding the CCASS procedures, CAP Securities' clients had a proprietary interest in shares as beneficiaries under individual trusts.

32. I noted however that a finding of individual proprietary interests may pose difficult or cumbersome administrative problems which would take substantial time and money to unravel. That was due to a shortfall in some lines of shares claimed by CAP Securities' clients.

Allocation of shares

33. That shortfall has led to the present application being brought by the Liquidators for directions on allocation of the shares, a term which is preferable to distribution of shares as it is important to bear in mind that it is the clients' own shares which are being recovered by them.

34. In the present application, as in Re Forluxe Securities (HCCW 310/98) heard one day after this hearing, the Court has been taken to very full materials presented by the Liquidators, and at the Forluxe hearing, the Court has also been referred to Canadian, Australian and New Zealand cases to assist in the determination of the fairest and most just solution in the circumstances.

35. In the present case, there are two situations:- where there is no shortfall in shares; and where there is a shortfall.

No shortfall in shares

36. The 13th Affidavit of Mr Jan Blaauw, one of the Liquidators, reveals that for some 250 lines of stock, the shares now available to the Liquidators match the claims made by all the clients who had bought that stock.

37. In relation to these lines of stocks, there is no difficulty in delivering the shares. In the title application, I had found that as between a stockbroker (CAP Securities) and each of its clients, there was an individual trust relationship under which the stockbroker was obliged to deliver to its client an equivalent quantity of the shares which it had bought on behalf of the client. The Privy Council had held in Solloway v McLaughlin (cited above) that the broker need not deliver the very shares that the selling broker had transferred to it in that specific transaction, but it has to have an equivalent quantity of those shares to satisfy the client's proprietary interest.

38. Accordingly, where there are sufficient shares in a particular line of stock available now to meet the claim of each client who had bought that stock, each such client should be entitled to the recovery of his trust property, being the equivalent quantity of the shares which he had instructed CAP Securities to buy for him.

Conditions

39. This recovery should however be subject to 2 conditions. First, the payment of proper and reasonable costs, fees and expenses of the Liquidators in relation to this aspect of their work

40. I had held in Re C.A. Pacific (No.2) [1999] 2 HKC 652 that as far as the incidence of costs of the title application was concerned, it would only be right for those costs to be borne by the trust assets, and not by the free assets as that would place an unfair burden of costs on unsecured creditors (applying Re Berkeley Applegate (Investments Consultants) Ltd (in liquidation) [1989] Ch 32).

41. The present application being part of the execution of the decision in the title application, it follows that delivery of the shares should be subject to payment by the recipient clients of a proper proportion of the Liquidators' proper and reasonable costs, fees and expenses attributable to (i) determination of the entitlement to such delivery, (ii) management of that portfolio of shares prior to delivery and (iii) carrying out the actual work of delivering the shares.

42. As far as (i) legal costs and (ii) expenses for the management of that portfolio of shares are concerned, Mr Moss QC has suggested, and I agree, that it would be fair to apportion these costs and expenses by reference to the value of the shares in proportion to the value of the total portfolio of shares the subject-matter of this application. As for (iii) the administrative expenses of withdrawing the shares from CCASS and then transferring them to the individual clients, these expenses should be borne by those clients themselves.

43. The 2nd condition is payment of any indebtedness to CAP Securities. In the case of any amount owed by a client to CAP Securities, delivery of the shares to him should be subject to CAP Securities' general lien under clause 6 of the Client Agreement.

44. As for any amount owed by a margin client to CAP Finance, I have referred above to the interpleader position that I would expect would be adopted by the Liquidators of CAP Securities in the event that a margin client disputes his liability to repay any amount to CAP Finance.

SFC's claim to statutory subrogation

45. Apart from the above, I should record that at the Re Forluxe Securities hearing, the liquidators there sought directions on the SFC's claim (under s.118 of the Securities Ordinance cap.333) to a statutory right of subrogation to shares where compensation had been paid to any clients out of the Unified Exchange Compensation Fund. A similar right has been asserted by the SFC against clients of CAP Securities, although the Liquidators here have not issued a summons for directions in this respect.

46. My decision in Re Forluxe Securities is being delivered immediately after the delivery of my decision in the present case. In allocating the shares here, the Liquidators will no doubt also consider the decision in that case, although they would of course be free to return to Court for any further directions that may be needed.

Physical scrip held for individual clients

47. I have dealt above with the situation where shares available matched claims made. It would further appear that in a small number of cases, CAP Securities actually held physical scrip for particular individual clients. Presumably this arose from specific instructions given by those clients for shares they had acquired to be withdrawn from CCASS.

48. In the light of my finding of a proprietary interest of the clients in the shares under individual trusts, it is clear that these scrip should be delivered to the particular clients, subject to the same conditions set out above.

49. There is a further variation on this situation disclosed in Mr Blaauw's 14th affirmation. It would appear that there were further stock which were similarly withdrawn by CAP Securities from CCASS on the instructions of particular individual clients. However, for reasons of administrative convenience, the Liquidators then returned the stock to CCASS.

50. Since these stock would have remained held as physical scrip for those particular clients had it not been for their return to CCASS by the Liquidators for purely administrative reasons, it is clear that these scrip should similarly be delivered to the particular clients, subject to the same conditions set out above.

Shortfall

51. The more difficult part of the application lies in finding the solution in cases of shortfall in particular lines of stock. In arriving at the decision in this case, I have also drawn on the submissions of law made by counsel for the liquidators in Re Forluxe Securities, who was also junior counsel for the Liquidators in the present case.

Various methods of allocation

52. In considering the proper solution in cases of shortfall, I have been referred to the following methods of allocation of the remaining shares:-

(1) adopting the rule in Clayton's case, whether by way of "First In First Out", or "Last In Last Out";

(2) adopting what has been called the "pari passu ex post facto" approach, and its variations:-

(i) the "North American" or "rolling charge" basis;

(ii) the "weighted pro rata" basis suggested by the Liquidators.

53. I have also considered a third solution, namely -

(3) a method whereby for each line of stock, priority would be given to cash clients as a class before margin clients, with clients in each class as between themselves sharing pari passu.

(1) Rule in Clayton's case

54. The usual "first port of call" in situations where beneficiaries are competing for distribution in case of deficiency is the rule in Clayton's case, where it is presumed that the first amount paid into a bank account would be the first amount taken out. The same result can be achieved by considering the facts backwards, i.e. by assuming that the last amount paid in would be the last amount taken out.

55. When one considers that Clayton's case itself was concerned with appropriation of payments credited to a running account, that rule accords with presumed intention and is fair and just. In the present case however, such a method of allocation is unattractive and is in any event inapplicable and impractical.

Injustice of applying the rule

56. I am not the first judge, nor I expect will I be the last, to echo with respect the words of Learned Hand, J. in Re Walter J Schmidt & Co., ex p Feuerbach (1923) 298 F 314:

"When the law adopts a fiction, it is, or at least, it should be, for some purpose of justice. To adopt [the fiction of first in, first out] is to apportion a common misfortune through a test which has no relation whatever to the justice of the case."

57. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeal in Barlow Clowes (International) Ltd (in liq) v Vaughan [1992] 4 All ER 22 has recognised it to be a long-established general practice that the rule in Clayton's case is to be applied when several beneficiaries' moneys have been blended in one bank account and there is a deficiency. In Barlow Clowes however, the rule was not applied because there was evidence that the parties intended to participate in a collective investment scheme.

58. In the title application, I have found that the clients here were beneficiaries in individual trusts, not in a collective scheme. Therefore the Barlow Clowes method of distinguishing the rule in Clayton's case is not applicable.

59. However, the rule in Clayton's case was based on presumed intention. In the present case, there are no facts which can support any presumed intention that CAP Securities would have first withdrawn for delivery to the Lenders the shares which had been deposited with them first. None of the documentation signed by either the cash clients or the margin clients supports the presumption of such an intention, nor did any past course of dealings between CAP Securities and any of its clients. To apply the "first in, first out" rule in Clayton's case here would be contrary to the parties' intentions and would work arbitrary and unjust results.

Inapplicability

In any event, given the circumstances in which the rule in Clayton's case evolved and has been developed, it can be restricted to situations where beneficiaries are competing only for funds in an account into which different trust moneys have been paid and from which amounts have been withdrawn so as to result in a deficiency. The Court of Appeal in Re Diplock's Estate [1948] Ch 465 said (at p.555) that they saw no justification for extending the rule beyond the case of a banking account. In the present case, the trust is of shares, so that strictly speaking, the rule in Clayton's case does not apply.

Impracticality

61. Even if it did apply on the basis that there is no real distinction between moneys in a bank account and shares in CCASS, it would be impractical to apply that rule in the present case. The Liquidators have estimated that a detailed Clayton's case type tracing process would cost $187 million and would take 5 years to complete. The cost and time required for this method of allocation render it unacceptable. It could not possibly be in the interests of any of the clients for them to have to spend so much and to wait so long, for a potentially unjust result not intended by any of them.

(2) "Pari passu ex post facto" approach and variations

62. As an alternative to the rule in Clayton's case, the "pari passu ex post facto" approach was adopted in Barlow Clowes. As explained in that case (at p.36)

"this involves establishing the total quantum of the assets available and sharing them on a proportionate basis among all the investors who could be said to have contributed to the acquisition of those assets, ignoring the dates on which they made their investment. ... It has the virtue of relative simplicity and therefore relative economy and also the virtue of being in this case more just than the first solution [the rule in Clayton's case]. It would have the effect of sharing the pool of assets available proportionately among the thousands of investors in a way which reflected the fact that they were all the victims of a `common misfortune'".

63. One can easily see the attraction of applying that approach in a situation where the contractual positions of all clients were identical.

64. In the present case, however, the contractual positions of the clients were not identical. Although all clients of CAP Securities were individual beneficiaries vis-a-vis CAP Securities, only the margin clients had separately authorised CAP Securities to transfer their shares to CAP Finance to enable the latter to pledge those shares as security for loans made to it (CAP Finance) by the Lenders. As noted above, this was a distinction which was respected and implemented in practice.

65. In light of the above facts, whilst all clients have suffered a misfortune arising from the collapse of the CAP companies, it is only fair to recognise that the cash clients were the victims of a greater misfortune, because shares attributable to them had been transferred for the benefit of CAP Finance when (a) they had never signed any documentation authorizing any such transfer and (b) CAP Securities had respected and implemented their instructions in practice, never having drawn on shares attributable to cash clients until the last few trading days when a deficiency in shares attributable to margin clients led to the transfer of shares attributable to cash clients.

66. This is a distinction between the two types of clients which renders the equal treatment of all, under the "pari passu ex post facto" approach, unjust and unfair to the cash clients. Equal treatment would only be just and fair if the equities were equal.

(i) The "North American" or "rolling charge" variation

67. I have also been referred to a number of cases decided in the Canadian courts where the "North American" or "rolling charge" basis has been considered. This is a refinement which also recognises that a broad-brush equal treatment of all may lead to injustice.

68. This involves treating credits to a bank account at different times as a blend, with the result that when a withdrawal is made from that account, it is treated as a withdrawal in the same proportions as the different interests in the account bear to one another just before the withdrawal.

69. This is a refinement in the time element which makes the "pari passu ex post facto" approach fairer. Assuming that at some stage, the account was completely depleted, contributors before that date would not be able to share in any balance in that account at a subsequent date. For that reason, this basis has been said to be subject to a "lowest intermediate balance" restriction.

70. Whatever the improvement effected by this variation to the pari passu ex post facto approach, it does not address the distinction between the two types of clients in the present case, where the distinction is not one of time of contribution, but one of authorisation.

(ii) The weighted pro rata variation

71. The method recommended by the Liquidators in the present case has been called the "weighted pro rata" approach. This involves a 2-pool approach: the 1st being the shares which were held at CCASS or otherwise under CAP Securities' control prior to liquidation, and the 2nd pool being shares under the control of the Lenders.

72. As I understand it, the suggestion briefly, is that the proportions of each stock in each pool be calculated as between cash clients, margin clients and Pui Hang clients, and those proportions would be applied to the shares remaining in each pool available for allocation now.

73. Whilst this approach attempts to crystallize the position at a moment in time prior to the collapse of CAP Securities and CAP Finance, again it does not address the distinction referred to above, that of the lack of authorization from the cash clients for any transfer of shares to CAP Finance's lenders.

(3) Priority to cash clients, clients in same class sharing pari passu

74. This distinction is reflected in the method of allocation which I believe would be the most just in the circumstances:- under this method, priority to the remaining shares in each line of stock is given to cash clients who had acquired that stock (subject to any sale effected by CAP Securities under clause 4 of the Client Agreement to which I will refer later), the balance of the shares in each line to be allocated to margin clients who had acquired that stock, with clients in the same class sharing pari passu in the event of deficiency.

75. In my view, this would reflect the presumed intention of all parties. I have referred above to the differences in the documentation between cash clients and margin clients. The Liquidators have also found that the actual practice of the companies was that it was generally not the policy to pledge shares attributable to cash clients to CAP Finance's Lenders, and it could therefore be assumed that shares attributable to cash clients remained, as far as possible, at CCASS or otherwise under the control of CAP Securities.

76. In Re Hallett's Estate, Knatchbull v Hallett (1880 ) 13 Ch D 696, it was held by the majority of the Court of Appeal that where a trustee had blended moneys held by him for a beneficiary and for certain other trustees with his own moneys in a bank account which he operated for his own purposes, he must be deemed to have drawn on his own moneys first, rather than trust moneys, in paying expenses for his own purposes.

77. The principle behind that decision was that where a person can do an act lawfully, it would not be assumed that he had intentionally done the act wrongfully (at p.727). The position is clear where a trustee has mixed his own money with that of a beneficiary, and has spent some of the mixed money for his own purposes. He would be presumed to have used his own money first because that would be the lawful thing to do.

78. Similarly here, where CAP Securities as trustee could have lawfully delivered shares attributable to margin clients to CAP Finance's Lenders, but could not have lawfully delivered shares attributable to cash clients, it must or must be presumed to have done the lawful thing first, i.e. to have first exhausted shares attributable to margin clients before drawing on shares attributable to cash clients. The consequence is that what remains in each line of stock must be attributable first to cash clients.

79. This method of allocation does not seem to have been adopted in any of the cases referred to me, where different facts prevailed. In any event, this method of allocation does not appear to be inconsistent with any decisions.

80. In Re Bryant, Isard & Co, ex parte Turner [1925] 7 CBR 44, a case referred to by counsel in Forluxe, a customer (T) of a stockbroker had deposited shares with him with instructions to sell those shares. Other customers (E and B) had deposited their shares with him as collateral for their trading accounts. The stockbroker pledged all the shares to a third party and then became bankrupt. The stockbroker's pledgee sold all the shares and returned surplus proceeds to the stockbroker's trustee in bankruptcy. Customer T sought an order that he should rank in priority to the other customers E and B.

81. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Ontario held that the pledging by the stockbroker of all the shares was wrongful because the stockbroker there had no right to pledge E and B's shares for any sum in excess of their respective debts, and in fact their indebtedness had been eliminated by other collaterals.

82. Not surprisingly in those circumstances, no distinction was made between T of the one part, and E and B of the other. The act of pledging was unlawful in both cases.

83. As a matter of completeness, I would note that the method of allocation to be adopted in the present case was alluded to obiter in the decision of the Registrar in Re Carroll & Wright, ex p Bain quoted by Urquhart J. in Re Nakashidze (No.2) [1948] 2 DLR 522, 531-2.

84. The registrar in Carroll & Wright had referred to customers whose securities were wrongfully pledged as having priority over those whose securities had been rightfully pledged. That statement although obiter was accepted by Urquhart, J. in Nakashidze when he remarked that where there was both a lawful and an unlawful pledging of shares, the equities would not be equal.

85. As for the practicalities of this method of allocation, I have been informed by the Liquidators that they would have no difficulties implementing it.

86. As a distinction has to be drawn between cash clients and margin clients, any clients who had not signed any Memorandum of Deposit in favour of CAP Finance would be treated as cash clients, and any clients who had signed a Memorandum of Deposit would be treated in the first instance as margin clients.

87. Should any client object to being classified as a margin client notwithstanding his execution of the Memorandum of Deposit, he should lodge his objection (together with reasons and supporting documentation) within 28 days of his being notified by the Liquidators of his classification as a margin client. However, as has been decided above, since any misrepresentation by CAP Finance staff would not have affected CAP Securities' perception of the client as a margin client when shares attributable to him were delivered to CAP Finance's Lenders in 1998, no purpose would be served in permitting objections to classification based on any alleged misrepresentation. In those circumstances, the client would have to pursue his remedies against CAP Finance.

Order

88. In conclusion therefore, there is therefore nothing in logic, case law or practicalities that detracts from the fair and just solution of giving priority to the cash clients in each line of stock, save for any cash clients who had fallen foul of Clause 4 of the Client Agreement by having failed to make payment for the shares. Should there be any such clients, it should be assumed that CAP Securities would have sold the shares acquired to satisfy the defaulting clients' obligations to it.

89. In relation to any shares which had not been paid for by a cash client by T+2, but which had nevertheless been attributed to that client in the FIS after T+2, the conclusion that should be derived from those facts would be that CAP Securities did not intend to sell those shares, but only intended the general lien under Clause 6 of the Client Agreement to apply. The Client Agreement gave no power of sale of shares covered by the lien.

90. After the recovery of shares in each line of stock by cash clients who had acquired that stock, the balance of shares in each line should be recovered by margin clients, subject to any charge in favour of CAP Finance for any indebtedness, and in the event of any dispute between the liquidators of CAP Finance and the margin clients in relation to such indebtedness, the liquidators of CAP Securities should apply for directions by way of interpleader.

91. In the event that there should be a deficiency within either class, the shares should be allocated pari passu amongst the members of that class.

92. In either case, the allocation of shares is subject to the right of the SFC to statutory subrogation to the extent set out in the decision that I am about to deliver in Re Forluxe Securities Ltd.

93. In the light of my decision above, I would ask that counsel for the Liquidators prepare a draft of the proposed order for my consideration and approval.

 

 

(MARIA YUEN)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

 

Representation:

Mr Gabriel Moss QC and Mr Godfrey Lam instructed by Herbert Smith for the Liquidators

19584-EN-1999-12-16

Re C A Pacific Finance Ltd.

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HCCW000036B/1998

HCCW 36/1998

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES (WINDING UP) PROCEEDINGS

NO. 36 OF 1998

____________________

IN THE MATTER of the Companies Ordinance (Chapter 32)

and

IN THE MATTER of C A Pacific Finance Limited

____________________

Coram: Hon Yuen J in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 16 December 1999

Date of Decision: 16 December 1999

_______________

D E C I S I O N

_______________

 

1. This is an application under section 227B of the Companies Ordinance on the part of the Official Receiver for an order that 3 vacancies in the Committee of Inspection of C A Pacific Finance Limited be filled.

2. The report of the Official Receiver filed with the Court on 30 November 1999 shows that on 10 June 1998, the Court appointed a total of 6 persons and companies to be members of the Committee of Inspection of C A Pacific Finance Limited. Of those 6 persons and companies, 3 had since tendered their resignation: the papers disclose that in January 1999, Mr Poon Kwok Fai resigned; on 30 July 1999, Mr Harry Hon resigned and on 1 September 1999 Mr Kwok Tsz San resigned. This has left the Committee with only 3 members.

3. It would appear from the papers that as early as March 1999, the meeting of the Committee of Inspection was inquorate as only two members turned up. A further meeting was scheduled in April 1999 which was attended by only the 3 remaining members.

4. Obviously, this is not satisfactory. The whole point of having a Committee of Inspection is to enable the creditors, especially in a high profile case such as this, to be aware of and to assist in the liquidation of the company.

5. Upon the Official Receiver's enquiries, a number of persons have expressed their interest in appointment to the Committee of Inspection and I have seen some of the correspondence. The Official Receiver recommends that the following persons and companies be appointed to fill the vacancies: first of all, Mr Peter Chow whose claim as at 16 or 19 January 1998 was slightly in excess of $24 million; High Stake Limited whose amount of claim was $14 million and Mrs Yuen Kwong Wai Sheung whose amount of claim was $400,000.

6. In my view, the Court should accept the Official Receiver's recommendation as to the appointment of these persons. The first two persons, Mr Chow and High Stake Limited, have substantial claims and therefore could be expected to be interested in the progress of the liquidation. In relation to Mrs Yuen, although her claim is far less compared with the other two, and also compared with some other interested persons whose name have been proffered to the Official Receiver, it would appear from the correspondence that has been exhibited that she has expressed a keen interest in the progress of the liquidation. And it would also be fair that parties or creditors with small amounts of claims should also be represented so that the liquidation would take into account a wide spectum of parties involved.

7. Accordingly, the liquidators having indicated that they have no preferences one way or the other, I would order on this application that the vacancies in the Committee of Inspection of C A Pacific Finance Limited left by the resignation of Mr Kwok Tsz San, Mr Harry Hon and Mr Poon Kwok Fai be filled by the appointment of Mr Peter Chow, High Stake Limited and Mrs Yuen Kwong Wai Sheung.

(MARIA YUEN)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
of the High Court

Representation:

Ms Angel Li from the Official Receiver's Office

Messrs Herbert Smith for Liquidators not attending.

21940-EN-1999-04-08

DENIS M.P.C. HO AND ANOTHER v. CHAN KAM TIM AND ANOTHER

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HCCW 36/98
HCCW 37/98

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES (WINDING-UP) ACTIONS NO. 36 AND 37 OF 1998

---------------------------

IN THE MATTER of the Companies Ordinance Cap. 32

and

IN THE MATTER of C.A. PACIFIC FINANCE LIMITED (in Liquidation)

and

IN THE MATTER of C.A. PACIFIC SECURITIES LIMITED (in Liquidation)

BETWEEN:
DENIS M.P.C. HO and JAN G.W. BLAAUW JOINT LIQUIDATORSApplicants
AND
CHAN KAM TIM1st Representative Respondent
TSUI YUET LING2nd Representative Respondent

Coram: The Hon Madam Justice Yuen in Court

Dates of Hearing and Submissions: 17 December 1998 and 4 January 1999

Date of Handing Down of Decision on Costs: 8 April 1999

-----------------------------

DECISION ON COSTS

-----------------------------

1. In November 1998, I heard the submissions of the parties, principally of the 1st and 2nd Respondents, in what has been called the "Title Application", on the issues:-

(i) whether clients of C.A. Pacific Securities ("CAPS") who have paid for the securities from their own resources and upon whose instructions CAPS purchased securities on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange settled through the Central Clearing and Settlement System ("CCASS") operated by the Hong Kong Securities Clearing Co. Ltd may have

(a) acquired

(b) thereafter retained whilst subject to the arrangements for the custody of securities in CCASS and

(c) subsequently upon removal from CCASS acquired or re-acquired a proprietary interest in securities so purchased; and

(ii) if so, what is the nature and basis of such proprietary interest.

2. I delivered judgment on 17 December 1998 and heard the parties' preliminary submissions on costs. These submissions were subsequently supplemented by written submissions lodged in Court in January 1999. I am grateful to counsel for their comprehensive and helpful submissions.

3. Before I go into the issues that arise in relation to the question of costs, it should be understood that the "costs" referred to in this Decision are the costs referable to the Title Application only, and not the costs of the liquidation as a whole.

4. It should also be understood that the Title Application was not ordinary hostile litigation, nor a run-of-the-mill summons issued by liquidators in the course of the administration of a liquidation.

5. The Title Application was initiated by liquidators who were faced with a situation never previously encountered before:- the computerised book-entry settlement system known as CCASS (where unnumbered share certificates are immobilised and deposited with a central securities depositary which recognised only the broker as contracting party) had only been in operation since 1992, and prior to the collapse of CAPS, there had never been a liquidation of a broker's firm, in which the question of beneficial title to securities acquired through CCASS fell to be determined. (Unfortunately, since CAPS' collapse, there has been at least one other broker's firm which has suffered the same fate).

6. The question as to how to deal with the securities could not have been properly and satisfactorily resolved without the Title Application being raised for the Court's determination. There had been conspicuous protests by the more vocal sector of CAPS' clients, arising from the fact that the liquidators had not transferred the securities to them. The inability of the liquidators to do so stemmed from the fact that there was a serious shortfall in the securities that were held by CAPS.

7. The shortfall in securities was bound to give rise to a conflict of interests amongst the clients, which in turn left the liquidators in an invidious position. On the one hand, there were clients in the position of the 1st Respondent, whose choice of securities was not commonplace, with the result that all the securities acquired by CAPS on his behalf remained intact when the curtain fell on CAPS.

8. On the other hand, there were clients like the 2nd Respondent who, through no fault of their own, found the quantity of securities remaining at CAPS inadequate to meet their proprietary demands. These clients might well have great practical difficulty pursuing a tracing claim, and it would be perfectly understandable for them to argue the contrary case to the 1st Respondent, in the hope of increasing the size of the company's free assets for unsecured claims.

9. Neither Respondent's case could have been dismissed out of hand by the liquidators. One only needs to see the number of authorities from other jurisdictions and academic writings that were cited to the Court at the hearing of the Title Application to acknowledge the difficulty of the title issue. The situation required a comprehensive legal analysis in a context in which all parties would have the opportunity to present arguments and counter-arguments.

10. It is therefore clear, in my view, that a determination by the Court, after full legal submissions from representatives of both classes of clients, was necessary to decide the fate of the securities in the proper administration of the liquidation. The Respondents were chosen as representatives of each class and approved by the Court. The situation is exactly that described by Browne-Wilkinson V-C in Re Westdock Realisations Ltd [1988] BCLC 354. Having said that there was no fixed practice as to the incidence of costs on summonses issued by liquidators to determine questions arising in the course of their administration, he said (359h):-

"However, there are many cases in which it is essential for the due administration of the liquidator's or receiver's duties to obtain a decision from the court. In such cases, there are often large classes of creditors, contributories or other claimants, the exact membership of which class is often not easily established or even known, who will be affected by such decision. In such a case, the liquidator or receiver joins a representative respondent to argue the point on behalf of the class. Frequently the sum at stake for the individual respondent joined does not justify him incurring the costs involved in litigating the matter. As a result, in order to ensure that the matter is properly determined the costs of the representative respondents are frequently paid out of the fund."

11. Clearly there is no question of the Respondents having to foot the bills themselves and their costs should be provided for. The only question is from which source of funds. As for the liquidators' own costs, they would be fees and expenses that would be subject to scrutiny and approval by the Court in its jurisdiction over liquidators under the provisions of the Companies Ordinance, but the same question arises over the source of funds for the recovery of costs.

12. The issues as to the source of funds for the costs of the Title Application are as follows.

(1) Should any part of the costs be borne by C.A. Pacific Finance ("CAPF")?

(2) Should the costs be recovered completely, or partly, from

(a) CAPS' own assets ("the free assets")

(b) the securities held by CAPS as trustee ("the trust assets")?

(3) If part or all of the costs should be recovered from the trust assets, how should the liquidators go about its implementation?

13. In relation to the 1st issue, I take the view that CAPF should not bear any part of the costs because the Title Application really did not concern it. Although the preliminary issues in this application, as originally framed, were drafted widely enough to include CAPF's involvement, it became clear when the issues in the Application were refined by the parties and when submissions were made, that the Application had little, if anything, to do with CAPF.

14. Although preparation for the Title Application may have involved investigation into the way both CAPS and CAPF operated, and consideration of the books of CAPF, the Application dealt, and dealt only, with the proprietary interest in the securities as between CAPS as broker and its clients. In my view, it would be unfair for CAPF to have to bear any of the costs of the Title Application.

15. The issue then is whether the costs of the Application should be recovered (a) completely from CAPS' free assets, or (b) completely from the trust assets, or (c) partly from the free assets and partly from the trust assets. I am told that the value of the trust assets is about $1b. and that of the trust assets in CCASS alone is about $500m. As opposed to that, the free assets in CAPS are worth only about $38m., even ignoring expenses which may from time to time be incurred and which would have to be met from that fund. Those amounts are approximate only, and would have to remain approximate until all clients' claims are investigated and concluded.

16. The parties have presented a number of suggestions, some more finely-tuned than others, as to the right order on the incidence of costs. In my view however it would be in the best interests of all concerned to make a final and simple order as to costs now.

17. In my view, it would be unfair and unjust for the costs of the Title Application to be recovered from the free assets, whether in whole or in part. One only has to consider the situation of the 2nd Respondent to appreciate the inequity of those options. As far as her relationship with CAPS was concerned, there was no difference from that of the 1st Respondent. CAPS owed a fiduciary duty to both. She and others in her position are as innocent as the 1st Respondent and others in his position. It was due to chance, not by choice, that there was a shortfall in the securities purchased on their behalf when CAPS collapsed.

18. If the costs of the Application are to be recovered in whole or in part from the free assets of the company, that would mean a depletion in the funds which would be available to persons like the 2nd Respondent because it is likely that practical difficulties in tracing would mean that her claim would in effect become an unsecured claim. There is no reason why this class of clients, in addition to losing their securities, should suffer this further injustice.

19. There have been a number of authorities in which the courts have held that the costs of all representative respondents to an application by the liquidators over entitlement to property should be recovered from the property itself. Re Westdock Realisations referred to earlier was one. An earlier case in point is Re Exchange Securities Ltd (No.2) [1985] BCLC 392, 395g. The Court's inherent jurisdiction to make an order of costs such as this has been well-established in cases of administration of trust funds.

20. For the same reason I have given why the costs of the Respondents should not be recovered from the free assets of the company, I am of the view that the fees and expenses of the liquidators in the Title Application should also be recovered from the trust assets. No less injustice would be suffered by the company's unsecured creditors if they had to bear the liquidators' fees and expenses (the quantum of which would be subject to the Court's approval).

21. The jurisdiction of the court to make an order that the fees of the liquidators be paid out of the trust assets was considered in detail in In re Berkeley Applegate Ltd (No.2) [1989] 1 Ch 32. It was recognized that there was a general principle that where a person (in the position of the 1st Respondent) seeks to enforce a claim to an equitable interest in property, the court has a discretion to require as a condition of giving effect to that equitable interest that an allowance be made for costs incurred and for skill and labour expended in connection with the administration of the property, and to allow the liquidators to take their proper costs out of the property before handing it over to the successful litigants (50H, 51G-H). That type of order has since been followed in the Companies Court, e.g. in Re Telesure Ltd [1997] BCC 580.

22. Accordingly in the light of the circumstances and in the exercise of my discretion, I would order that the costs of the Respondents and the fees and expenses of the liquidators referable to the Title Application should be recovered from the trust assets.

23. The third issue is how that should be implemented. Mr Godfrey Lam for the liquidators suggests that the logistics and matters of detail can be worked out at a later stage. I would however agree with his suggestion that in principle, a fair method would be for all trust asset securities to bear the burden pari passu. Since the value of those trust asset securities fluctuate from time to time, it would I think be fair if their values were crystallised as at the date of CAPS' collapse (20 January 1998). With that principle in mind, I would leave it to the professional judgment of the liquidators to consider the most cost-efficient and "client-friendly" way of implementation, in the trust that the liquidators would consult the Court should they run into any difficulties that would require the Court's resolution.

24. Finally, I have been asked by the parties to consider sanctioning actual interim payment of counsel's fees and 50% of the solicitors' costs incurred in the Title Application, subject to an undertaking from the respective solicitors to effect reimbursement in the event that the costs are taxed down. I have been told the rough figure for counsel's fees and disbursements, and in light of the preparation that has gone into the submissions in the Title Application, I have no difficulty giving that sanction.

25. As for the costs that might have been incurred in considering the merits of any appeal, referred to in the 2nd Respondent's Supplemental Submissions, the appeal period has now expired without an appeal being lodged, and such costs would presumably be quite low. Subject to the quantum being subject to taxation, I also have no difficulty in giving a direction that in principle, the costs of instructing leading counsel to consider the Decision and any merits of an appeal therefrom should also be regarded as costs in the Title Application, as are the costs of the hearing on 17 December 1998 and the further written submissions on costs.

(MARIA YUEN)
Judge of the Court of First Instance High Court

Representation:

Mr Godfrey Lam (instr'd by Herbert Smith) for the Liquidators (Applicants)

Mr Sanjay Sakhrani (instr'd by Lovell White Durrant) for 1st Respondent

Miss Jennifer Tsang (instr'd by Allen & Overy) for 2nd Respondent

Miss Angel Li (Official Receiver's Office) attending

31462-EN-1998-12-17

DENIS M.P.C. HO AND ANOTHER v. CHAN KAM TIM AND ANOTHER

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