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Building Management Application1998

THE INCORPORATED OWNERS OF TROPICANA GARDENS v. TROPICANA GARDENS MANAGEMENT LTD. AND ANOTHER

Related cases with same parties

  • HCSA19/2006THE INCORPORATED OWNERS OF TROPICANA GARDENS v. CHEONG MING INVESTMENT CO LTD

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17964-CH-2003-04-04

THE INCORPORATED OWNERS OF TROPICANA GARDENS 訴 TROPICANA GARDENS MANAGEMENT LTD

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LDBM000374B/1998

LDBM 374/1998

香港特別行政區

土地審裁處

建築物管理申請編號1998年第374宗

The Incorporated Owners of Tropicana Gardens申請人
訴
Tropicana Gardens Management Limited第一答辯人
Cheong Ming Investment Company第二答辯人

主審法官: 唐文暫委法官

宣判日期: 2003年4月4日

_______________

判 決 書

_______________

1. 申請人豪苑業主立案法團,於1999年3月1日以表格29入禀本審裁處向第一答辯人Tropicana Gardens Management Limited及第二答辯人Cheong Ming Investment Company,要求取回該位於九龍龍翔道110號一個名為「豪苑」的屋苑的管理權。案件並於2000年9月7日進行了審訊,而本席亦於2000年10月4日頒下判決書,判申請人得直,及頒下三項判令。其中第3項判令只關乎訟費,故與是次爭議無關。而第1及第2項判令,則是本次爭論之要點,故本席將之複述如下:-

(1) 宣告"申請人於1998年9月5日所舉行的業主大會中所通過的一項决議即『終止「豪苑管理有限公司」為大廈管理經理人,由法團收回管理權,以公開招標聘請新管理公司』為一項合法的决議"

(2) 申請人可與第一答辯人商議取回商塲及停車塲管理權之細節安排,倘若雙方不能達成協議,則申請人可在本命令發出的21天後向法庭申請輔助性頒令以執行本案之裁决。

2. 其後由於與訟各方未能就交回管理權事直達致共識,於是申請人於2000年10月26日以傳票方式要求本席就交接事宜發出指引。本席亦於2000年11月29日就該傳票進行了聆訊,結果雙方就交收事宜達致協議,並由本席批准並且頒令執行。

3. 就該命令之內容而言,主要分為兩部份,第1部份之命令,主要針對第一答辯人,即令其交出所掌有的公用地方的鎖匙及佔用權,以及第一答辯人所保管的各項公用服務的按金單,另外再加上由1998年1月1日到1999年6月30日核數的收支表與資產負債表。而第2部份,則針對由第一答辯人所管有所有的會計文件與資產。

4. 其後直到2002年4月22日,申請人再以傳票方式向本席作出是次具爭議之申請。即要求第一答辯人交出於1998年11月30日有關豪苑管理賬戶上所顯示於該日應該向由第一答辯人所管有的管理費按金、水電費按金、後備金、累積盈餘等等的各項金額,合共2,692,761.59港元之資產,以及該等資產於1998年12月1日至今所滾存的利息及投資的回報等的會計報告。

5. 代表第一及第二答辯人的林大律師反對是項傳票之申請,理由是第一答辯人已遵照本席於2000年10月4日於有關判詞中所頒下的命令,即已將豪苑中的商用住宅及停車場管理權以及有關的會計賬目,悉數交回申請人法團,至於現金方面,由於有關於2000年11月30日為結算日之資產負債表顯示,由第一答辯人所管有的各項資產錄得128,346元4毫3仙的負數,所以根本沒有資產可以交付給申請人。

6. 對於第一答辯人的說法,申請人說本席於2000年10月4日的判詞以及於2000年11月29日所頒下的判令,明顯是要強制第一答辯人交出1998年12月15日由其管有的管理權及資產,而不是由命令中的交收日,即2000年11月30日為結算日。由於第一答辯人管有的資產因為本席己清楚判定於1998年9月5日業主大會上所通過收回第一答辯人就豪苑的管理權是一項有效的決議。故在正式法定通知生效日,即1998年12月15日第一答辯人即被免去大廈經理人的職務,故它無權運用大廈法團的公用資產。因此於該日起第一答辯人為豪苑管理所支付的費用,亦屬無效,為此第一答辯人所交出所管理公司的資產,應該是1998年12月15日的資產而不是2000年11月30日的資產。這是《建築物管理條例》中附表7第8段中所規定離任經理人所要做的事。

7. 在解決是次訴訟的問題,本席認為我們必須首先看看申請人在其於1999年3月1日向本審裁處遞交的表格29,即由申請通知書所要求的頒令內容,該份以英文寫成的表格29所要求的頒令為:-

"1. The Applicant applies for an order relating to the removal of Tropicana Gardens Management Limited as manager within the meaning of Section 34D(1) under paragraph 5(c) from all parts of the said Building and transfer of management to the Incorporated Owners of Tropicana Gardens."

8. 故由該等字眼可見,申請人在作出有關的申請時,只是要求本審裁處頒令使申請人可以免去第一答辯人作為大廈管理人的職位,以及收回有關的管理權而已。其申請書並未要求有關之交收是以那一天作為準則。

9. 另外本席在聽取雙方的證供及法律上的爭議後,最後於2000年10月4日的判詞中的頒令,亦只是「申請人可與第一答辯人商議取回商塲及停車塲管理權之細節安排,倘若雙方不能達成協議,則申請人可在本命令發出的21天後向法庭申請輔助性頒令以執行本案之裁决。」故同樣地,此判令亦沒有指定那一天為交收日。

10. 及後到2000年11月29日本席頒下有關執行輔助命令亦是限令第一答辯人於2000年11月30日交出有關命令中的5項內容,及於判令後的30天內交出仍然由第一答辯人所持有或控制之金錢、基金、以及其他的會計賬目文件,而1998年12月15日的這個日期,是判令中沒有提到的。

11. 雖然,一如申請人所說,在2000年11月29日的聆訊的數碼錄音謄本中,申請人的代表律師陳先生曾要求過第一答辯人去提供以1998年12月15日為結算日之資產負債表。並曾在其陳詞中提及豪苑的業主不能為第一答辯人自該結算日起就豪苑的管理的洗費去負上法律責任,但這個法律上的觀點,並未為答辯人一方所認同,而本席亦未就此觀點作出裁決。本席認為這是最後有關的書面命令沒有提及1998年12月15日的原因。

12. 至於《建築物管理條例》中附表7中規定經理人在離職時的職責與安排,那是法律規定他要在當時要做的東西。但如果他在當時沒有做到的話,那其他人又可以怎樣呢?法律就此並沒有一成不變的規定,其中的一個做法,可以向本審裁處申請一項強劉的執行令,命令經理人交出管理權及由他所管有的公產財物,但如果判令日期與原本經理人要交出管理權的日期相去甚遠時,那卸任的經理人是否便要負責一切在原本交收期後他為大廈管理的洗費作出賠償呢?

13. 本席認為要解決這個問題,我們必須先了解本審裁處在頒發強制執行令的權力來源,那便是《土地審裁處條例》第10節(1)之規定,即:-

"10. 審裁處的常規及程序

(1) 審裁處就以下事項具有歸於原訟法庭在行使其民事司法管轄權時的權力

(a) 證人出席聆訊、接受訊問及支取費用的事直;

(b)在一名或多於一名裁判委員的協助下對任何事直進行聆訊;

(c) 任何事直的合併或聆訊;

(d) 對犯藐視罪者的處罰;

(e) 下令視察任何處所或地方;

(f) 進入並觀察任何處所或地方;

(g) 決定、判決及命令的強制執行;

(h) 就中期付款作出命令;

(i) 因某一方共無採取任何行動而作出命令,

並可在其認為合適的範圍內,沿用原訟法庭在行使其民事司法管轄權時所採取的常規及程序。"

14. 由此可見,本審裁處在頒下強制執行令時,定會採用原訟庭的考慮準則,以決定是否就某個個案去頒發強制執行令,而原訟庭在考慮是否頒下此等命令的其中一個衡平法的準則是衡平法不會頒令執行一項不可能予以執行的命令,另外衡平法亦只會在作出全盤考慮後。認為在並不違背公平原則下,才會頒下有關的命令。

15. 於本案中第一答辯人已就其在任期間,包括其於1998年1月1日到1999年6月30日的會計文件及賬目作出交代,另外不可爭議的是實是第一答辯人在1998年12月15日到2000年11月30日為止仍然執行着停車場及商場的大廈管理人的工作。在大廈的每部份的管理費用須由全部大廈業主共同承擔的大原則下,本席看不到為甚麼該部份的大廈管理正常支出在沒有證據顯示第一答辯人有侵吞公產或疏忽的情況下要由第一答辯人一力承擔的理由。

16. 固然,審訊的結果是第一答辯人錯誤地作出抗辯,但在訴訟有結果之前這還是未知之數。《建築物管理條例》中第7附表亦固然規定了一名被免職經理人的責任,但那是以一名接受了通知的經理人在交出職權時所應採取的步驟而已。本席不接受申請人所稱附表7也同樣適用於經法庭頒令引制交出管理權的經理人的情況,理由是隨着時間的轉移,法庭沒有可能硬將附表7的規定,套用在一名經過差不多兩年時間才由法庭頒令交出管理權的管理人的身上。因為這樣做時候,會無可避免地引致不公平的情況,即有關大廈部份的業主,可以享用有關的設施而無需付出該付的代價。另外如果法庭下令第一答辯人交出如傳票中所列的數目,那第一答辯人並非交出他現時所持有及管有的數目,而是要他向申請人補償它在錯誤地以為自己還是經理人為大廈管理而作出的開支作出補償,本席從不認為這是本席以前所頒下的判令的原意。為此,本席駁回申請人在是項傳票中的申請,並作如下的頒令:-

17. 頒令 :

1. 撤銷原訴人於2002年4月22日傳票中的各項申請;

2. 頒下臨時訟費命令,申請人須付予兩名答辯人是次傳票申請的訟費,其計算則以與訟雙方訟費的方式計算,在本命令頒發的21天後,倘雙方就此命令並無提出反對之申請,則此項命令變為一項永久性之頒令。

唐文暫委法官
土地審裁處

申請人 :由王潘律師行聘Kenneth Chan大律師代表

第一及第二答辯人:由梁錦濤關學林律師行聘Jacky Jim大律師代表

19946-EN-2001-09-18

THE INCORPORATED OWNERS OF TROPICANA GARDENS v. TROPICANA GARDENS MANAGEMENT LTD. AND ANOTHER

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LDBM000374A/1998

LDBM374/98

IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

BUILDING MANAGEMENT APPLICATION NO.374 OF 1998

___________________

BETWEEN
THE INCORPORATED OWNERS OF TROPICANA GARDENSApplicant
AND
TROPICANA GARDENS MANAGEMENT LIMITED1st Respondent
CHEONG MING INVESTMENT COMPANY LIMITED2nd Respondent

___________________

Coram: Acting Registrar Simon Kwang in chambers

Date of Hearing: 20 July 2001

Date of Handing Down Judgment: 18 September 2001

___________________

JUDGMENT

___________________

 

Background

1. The Applicant lodged its bills of costs on 3 March 2001 for taxation of its costs in the action herein pursuant to the Orders of Deputy Judge Tong (sitting as Presiding Officer of the Tribunal) made on 4 October, 3rd November and 29th November 2001 respectively whereby the 1st and 2nd Respondents were ordered to pay the Applicant's costs to be taxed if not agreed.

2. After 2 call-over hearings on 20 March and 10 April 2001 respectively, the formal taxation of the bill of costs was adjourned to be heard on 20 July 2001. Just 3 days before the scheduled taxation, on 17 July 2001, his Honour Judge Li (in his dual capacity of District Judge and Presiding Officer of the Lands Tribunal) handed down a Judgment in another Lands Tribunal Case of The Incorporated Owners of Honour Building v. Lou Chui Sim and Wong Kwong Wai (LDBM 266 & 373/1999) ("the Honour Building case"). While I shall deal with the said Judgment in more detail in the latter part of this Judgment, in gist, his Honour Judge Li held that taxation of Lands Tribunal costs should be handled in the Court of First Instance by a High Court taxing master and neither a District Judge nor a Master of the District Court have jurisdiction to handle such taxation.

3. In light of the Judgment of the Honour Building case, at the taxation hearing on 20 July 2001, in my dual capacity as the Acting Registrar of the District Court and the Lands Tribunal, I invited both parties to make written submission on whether the District Court or the Lands Tribunal have jurisdiction to tax the bills of costs for Lands Tribunal cases and in particular on the following 2 issues:

(a) whether I am bound by the said decision of Judge Li in the Honour Building case; and

(b) the effect of Section 7A of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance on the jurisdiction of the Registrar of the Lands Tribunal to tax the subject bill of costs.

While the Applicant's solicitors requested some more times to consider the issues, I directed that parties to file and serve written submission within 30 days and be at liberty to fix a hearing for the purpose of making oral submission (if necessary) after exchange of their respective written submission. Both parties have also agreed that there be no order as to costs of the said hearing.

4. At the request of the Applicant's solicitors, on 20 August 2001, I granted leave to them to file and serve their written submission out of time on or before 29 August 2001. The Applicant's solicitors eventually filed their written submission on or about 29 August 2001. The Applicant's solicitors in their written submission argued that the Registrar of the District Court and the Registrar of the Lands Tribunal have jurisdiction over the taxation of the Lands Tribunal bills and have all the powers and duties in the cause as in the case of a High Court Taxing Master. The Applicant's solicitors further submitted that the decision of his Honour Judge Li in the Honour Building case is not a binding precedent that I must follow.

5. No separate written submission was filed by the Respondent. Instead, on 31 August 2001, the Respondent's solicitors wrote to the Court confirming their agreement with the Applicant's submission that a decision of the District Court shall not be binding on the District Court.

The Honour Building Case

6. The case first came before Judge Li for an issue unrelated to the jurisdiction point but to deal with an application by the Respondents to set aside an order of Master Chow of District Court dated 29 May 2001. In that case, the Applicant lodged their bill of costs to the Lands Tribunal for taxation. The bill was provisional taxed and a Notice to the Party Commencing the Proceedings for Taxation was issued by the Tribunal to the Applicant on 8 March 2001 notifying the Applicant the outcome of the provisional taxation. On or about 9 May 2001, the District Court received a written request by the Respondents for an appointment of taxation and a notice was issued on 11 May 2001 to the parties requesting them to attend a call over hearing for taxation on 29 May 2001. However, on 10 May 2001, the Lands Tribunal has issued an Allocator for costs allowed by the Tribunal. On 29 May 2001, Master Chow found that the Respondent's application for review of the taxation was out of time under Order 62 Rule 33(2) and dismissed the Respondent's application accordingly. Since that part of the Judgment is not relevant to my decision in this case, I shall not set it out here in detail save that Judge Li finally decided to set aside the said Order of Master Chow and exercised his discretion to allow the Respondent's application for review out of time.

7. Judge Li then proceeded to deal with the taxation procedure of the Lands Tribunal. It is not clear from the Judgment whether the parties, in particular the Applicant's solicitors (the Respondents appeared in person at the hearing), had made any submission on the issue. Judge Li referred to Section 12 of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance which gives the Tribunal the power to award costs and Order 62 of both the Rules of the High Court ("RHC") and Rules of the District Court ("RDC"). Judge Li compared the difference in wordings of Order 62 Rule 2 of the RHC and RDC and concluded that Order 62 of RDC does not apply to non-District Court proceedings such as the proceedings in the tribunals.

8. In the Judgment of his Honour Judge Li, he decided that :

"13. According to Order 62 Rule 21 of RHC, after the Lands Tribunal has ordered taxation of costs, the bill of costs should be filed in the High Court, not in the Lands Tribunal or District Court, because the taxation procedure ought to be conducted in the High Court. In this respect, there was no legal basis for solicitors for the Applicant to file their bill of costs in the Lands Tribunal; and it was not in order for officers of the Lands Tribunal or the District Court to proceed with taxation.

14. According to Order 62 Rule I of the Rules of the High Court, Cap. 4 taxing masters are judicial officers of High Court Registrar grade. In practice, because of the combined effect of Order 62 Rule 13 and Rule 21, after the Court of First Instance has received bill of costs for taxation, a Chief Judicial Clerk (not a taxing master) will undertake preliminary taxation and issue a notice of provisional taxation. If the parties do not raise issue over the certificate, the amount of costs indicated in the certificate will automatically become confirmed. In case of dispute, the bill of costs has to be passed to a High Court taxing master for formal taxation by appointment and representation and evidence from the parties have to be heard.

15. In summary, taxation of Lands Tribunal costs should, according to the law, be handled in the Court of First Instance by a High Court taxing master (or Chief Judicial Clerk). However, for the two instant cases, when the Respondents requested taxation, staff of the Lands Tribunal referred them to the District Court, and the Registrar, District Court (acting through subordinates) took over the cases and fixed appointment for taxation by a Master of the District Court (Master Chow). Such steps were taken without lawful authority. Neither Master Chow nor the Court to which he is attached has the authority to handled taxation of the two instant cases.

16. In matters of taxation of costs in Lands Tribunal cases, neither I nor other district judges have jurisdiction, not to mention a master of the District Court. Nonetheless, because Master Chow and the Registrar, District Court have made decisions on matters relating to costs in the two instant cases, causing the Respondents to ask a district judge to intervene, I have to adjudicate on the validity of the decisions of the master and the Registrar."

9. Judge Li while setting aside the Order of Master Chow dated 29 May 2001, transferred the matters relating to the taxation of costs to the Court of First Instance.

Is the Honour Building case Strictly Binding?

10. The long established common law rules of precedent (or commonly known as the doctrine of stare decisis) are that courts of all levels of the judicial hierarchy must loyally adhere to decisions of the courts above them. In the premises, the District Court should follow the decisions of the Court of Final Appeal, the Court of Appeal and the Court of First Instance. However, as appeared from the previous authorities of the District Court, it is doubtful whether the District Court is bound by its own previous first instance decisions. Neither did the Applicant's solicitors refer me to any authority that a Master sitting in chambers is bound to follow a decision of the Judge in chambers of the same level.

11. Back in 1959, the Full Court decided in Tsang Shiu Tim v. Hang Fong &Others [1959] HKLR 308 that a District Judge, when exercising appellate jurisdiction under the provisions of the Landlord and Tenant Ordinance, would be right, when considering the previous decisions, to follow the principles applicable in the Court of Appeal in England so that it could depart from its own previous decision according to the 3 exceptions as established in Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. [1944] KB 718. In my view, the principle of the said case would only apply to isolated incidents when a District Judge is exercising appellate jurisdiction and would clearly have no application in the present case.

12. In 1962, Judge Pickering held in Ngan Che Sum v. Mok Leung Choy [1962] DCLR 149 that he was bound to follow a previous District Court decision (KDC Action 829 of 1961, unreported) where the court there made a specific finding on the effect of a "receipt" for construction money and the "receipt" formed the subject matter of the 1962 action. Judge Pickering took the view that it was not open for him to rule that the previous finding was wrong and that should be the function of the Full Court. It appears that this decision was confined to its own facts and did not establish any general principle.

13. In the case of Liu Chi Cheung v. Tsang Wai Choi [1958] DCLR 165, Judge Huggins (as he then was) after referring to English authorities concluded that the District Court was not bound by its own decisions in cases tried at first instance but he expressly reserved the question whether the District Court was bound by decisions in its appellate jurisdiction. Judge Huggins remarked:

"It seems to me, therefore, that the so-called principle of judicial comity has been whittled down until it has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist. A judge of first instance is not absolutely bound by a previous decision of the same court or of a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction and he must bring his own judgment to bear on the point in issue."

I am not aware of any recent reported Judgment of the District Court which decides on the issue. I agree with the views of Judge Huggins and conclude that the Judgment of his Honour Judge Li in the Honour Building case is not absolutely binding on me which I must follow and at most, the case is of persuasive authority.

Lands Tribunal Ordinance

14. Judge Li referred in his Judgment Section 12(2) of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance. For sake of completeness, I set out in full the provisions of Section 12:

"12. Costs

(1) Subject to the provisions of the Ordinance giving the Tribunal jurisdiction in any matter, the Tribunal may award costs to and against any party to any proceedings and may order that those costs be taxed on the basis of any one of the Scales of Costs set out in the First Schedule to the District Court Civil Procedure (Costs) Rules (Cap. 336 sub. leg.) and the Schedules to Order 62 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4 sub. leg.).

(2) Subject to any rules made by the Chief Justice under section 10(3), Order 62 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4 sub. leg.) shall apply to the award, taxation and recovery of costs in the Tribunal."

Under Section 12(1), the Tribunal has the power to award costs and may order costs to be taxed according to the Scale of Costs under Order 62 of the RHC or under the First Schedule to the District Court Civil Procedure (Costs) Rules. However, upon implementation of the RDC in September last year, the District Court Civil Procedure (Costs) Rules has been repealed so that for the time being, the costs of the Lands Tribunal cases will be taxed under the Scales of Costs of the Schedule to Order 62 of the RHC. The Landlord and Tenant (Consolidation) (Amendment) Bill 2001 proposes to restore to the previous position to allow the Presiding Officer to order costs to be taxed according to Schedules to Order 62 of RHC or RDC.

15. Section 10(3) of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance empowers the Chief Justice after consultation with the President may make rules and in particular under subsection (e) for the award, taxation and recovery of costs. Therefore, before the Lands Tribunal has its own rules for the taxation of costs in the Tribunal, Section 12(2) provides that the Rules of High Court shall apply. So far, up to now, the Lands Tribunal do not have its own rules for taxation of costs.

16. Section 12 was replaced to the present form in 1982 when at that time there was no taxing master in the District Court nor the Lands Tribunal. Further, the Registrars of both the District Court and the Lands Tribunal were not Judicial Officers. Not until September 2000 when the RDC was implemented, taxation of bill of costs of the District Court case save provisional taxations were by then handled by the Taxing Masters of the High Court. This may explain why under Section 12(2) of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance, Order 62 of the Rules of High Court shall apply to taxation of costs.

17. Judge Li in his Judgment then referred to various provisions of the RHC and then concluded that because Order 62 of the RHC applies to taxation of costs in the Lands Tribunal and Order 62 Rule 1 of RHC defines taxing master as judicial officers of High Court Registrar grade, bill of costs of Lands Tribunal cases should be filed in the High Court Registry and the taxation should be handled in the Court of First Instance by a High Court taxing master.

18. I take a different view from Judge Li on the interpretation of Section 12(2) of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance. Section 12(2) does not specify the venue for taxation of the bill of costs of the Lands Tribunal cases. Instead, it just provides that for the purpose of taxation, RHC shall apply. So it only specifies the procedure rather than the venue for the taxation. Further, it does not confer exclusive jurisdiction to the High Court Taxing Master to handle the taxation of Lands Tribunal costs.

19. Without the benefit of legal submission by parties in the Honour Building case, Judge Li has overlooked the effect of Section 7A of the Ordinance and the definition of "registrar" under Section 2. Since the implementation of the District Court (Amendment) Ordinance 2000, the Registrar and the Deputy Registrars of the District Court are Judicial Officers. Section 2 of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance was also amended so that the registrar of the Lands Tribunal means the Registrar of the District Court so that the Registrar of the District Court will also look after the Registry and other business of the Lands Tribunal. Section 7A (2) of the Ordinance provides :

"In addition to the powers and duties conferred or imposed by or under this Ordinance or any other enactment, the registrar, any deputy registrar, assistant registrar, bailiff, clerk, interpreter and other officer attached to the Tribunal my exercise such powers and perform such duties, insofar as the same are applicable to the business of the Tribunal, as those respectively exercised or performed by the registrar, deputy registrar, assistant registrar, bailiff, clerk, interpreter or other officer attached to the High Court."

Therefore, the registrar of the Lands Tribunal when exercising his powers and duties conferred upon him under the Ordinance has the same powers of the registrar of the High Court. Since the Registrar of the High Court can perform the function of a taxing master for taxation of bill of costs under Order 62 of the RHC, it is my view that by virtue of Section 7A(2) of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance, the registrar of the Lands Tribunal can tax the bill of costs of the Lands Tribunal cases.

Order

20. For the reasons as stated above, I conclude and find that the Registrar of the Lands Tribunal has the powers to tax bill of costs of the Lands Tribunal cases in accordance with the provisions of Order 62 of the Rules of the High Court. Accordingly, I make the following directions and order for the present action:-

(1) the formal taxation of the Applicant's bill of costs under the Appointment To Tax filed herein on 6 March 2001 be adjourned to a date to be fixed for arguments to be heard before the Registrar of the Lands Tribunal, 3 hours be reserved;

(2) there be no order as to costs of and incidental to the hearing on 20 July 2001 and arising out of this Judgment.

21. Finally, I have the parties' consent to circulate this Judgment.

(Simon Kwang)
Acting Registrar
Lands Tribunal

Representation:

Mr. K.S. Chan of Messrs. Wong & Poon for the Applicant

Mr. Frank Ha, Law Costs Draftsman instructed by Messrs. Ford, Kwan & Co. for the 1st and 2nd Respondents

27523-CH-2000-10-04

The Incorporated Owners of Tropicana Gardens 訴 Tropicana Gardens Management Ltd.and Another

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LDBM000374/1998

LDBM 374/1998

香港特別行政區土地審裁處

建築物管理條例申請編號1998年LDBM第374宗

 

The Incorporated Owners of Tropicana Gardens

申請人
訴
Tropicana Gardens Management Limited第一答辯人
Cheong Ming Investment Company第二答辯人

 

主審法官:唐文暫委法官

宣判日期:2000年10月4日

 

______________

判 決 書

______________

 

1. 申請人豪苑業主立案法團,通過本案要求本審裁處頒令,宣告申請人於1998年9月5日所舉行的一次業主大會中投票通過“終止「豪苑管理有限公司」(即第一答辯人)為該大廈管理經理人,並由法團收回管理權,以公開招標聘請新管理公司”之决議為一項有效之决議,而與第一答辯人同屬華懋集團的第二答辯人昌明置業有限公司,則反對是項申請。

(一)背景

2. 位於九龍龍翔道110號的豪苑,是由華懋集團公司於1985年所建成的建築物。其中包括了3座住宅單位及一座商塲及停車塲的單元,申請人自1997年2月21日成立後,到了1998年便着手佈署根據大廈公契及築物管理條例的規定,由第一答辯人處收回大廈的管理權,惟當時擁有大廈業權17%主要是商舖與車位的第二辯人反對該項計劃,最後業主大會在1998年9月5日晚上舉行,有關終止第一答辯人的决議在53%業權業主贊成,17%業權業主反對的情况下獲得通過,申請人隨後即向第一答辯人發出法例規定的3個月預先通知着第一答辯人於同年12月15日交出大廈管理權,惟第一及第二答辯人反對,最後申請人僅能取得住宅部份之管理權,另聘新公司管理,而商場及車位部份之管理,則繼續由第一答辯人負責,終於引發是次訴訟。

(二)被指有問題的授權書

3. 第一及第二答辯人拒絕交出大廈全部管理權的理據是在1998年9月5日所通過的有關决議,是一項無效的决議,理由是他們發覺當晚有許多授權書,是無效的授權書,故有關的决議實在並未獲得不少於50%業權業主所通過,而就該等授權書是如何無效一事上,答辯人第二証人原本在其預先交入法庭存案的證人供辭指出有24%的授權書是沒有公司印鑑,及有20%的授權書是沒有填妥的,但在案件開審時,代表兩名答辯人的大律師詹先生向本席表示在看過有關選票的原本後,他已不再為沒有公司印鑑的授權書提出任何爭議,而他的爭議,現在僅就佔業權19%沒有填上業主身份証號碼的授權書所提出,而該等有問題的授權書的影印本,亦可見於訴狀文件夾的第102頁至238頁中。

(三)被指有問題的程序

4. 另外兩名答辯人的另一個證人,答辯人第一證人,亦在其書面證人口供中,指出她在開會當晚6時左右還在一個申請人設立的意見箱內,看見兩叁張授權書,而會中對核對到會業主及其授權人的措施馬虎,故令人懷疑有人有可能作弊。

(四)申請人証人的證供

5. 申請人只提供了一名証人作供,他是豪苑業主立案法團的主席唐俊賢。他供稱自立案法團成立後,發現許多大廈管理的問題,在向第一答辯人要求改善後均沒有結果,於是法團在98年7月份向業主發出問卷調查,得出的結果為58%的業主,均同意終止第一答辯人的管理合約,於是法團便着手籌備開業主大會,作出有關的表决,第一步是向各業主發出有關的通告(見申請人証物A1第41頁)。該通告於上半部詳列有關業主大會所需要進行表决的事項即“以通過投票方式終止「豪苑管理有限公司」,為本大廈管理經理人,由法團收回管理權,以公開招標聘請新管理公司。"而該通知書的下半部,為出席業主大會的授權書,以供有關業主在自己不出席大會時,可以授權其他人士為該缺席的業主就議案投票。為了爭取業主支持並出席大會,證人及其他法團的委員在發出通告後便向各戶業主進行家訪,法團的秘書處亦已在田土廳獲得業主的新近名冊,在收到授權書後亦已核對有關發出授權的業主的名字是否與名冊上所載的相同,有關的授權書有一些是在証人及委員進行家訪時即時由業主填妥而收回的,亦有些是由業主在填妥後交回四個分別設於每座大廈大堂的法團意見箱,證人本人管有所有意見箱的鎖匙,而且他也是負責開意見箱收集授權書的人,他在98年9月5日的大會前最後一次收取授權書的時間是9月4日的下午8時,他在該次收取授權書後,以後也沒有再在任何意見箱發現過其他的授權書了,證人同意有兩個委員是分別持有他們自己所住的那座大廈的意見箱的鎖匙,但他們只是負責在証人不在香港的時候,在該等意見箱收集意見的。

6. 証人亦同意他亦有發現有一部份授權書,是沒有填上業主的身份証號碼的,証人亦有為此事多次諮詢法律意見,而他每次所得到的答案均是由於私隱條例的關係,法團無權堅持要業主填上他們的身份証號碼,而沒有業主身份証號碼的授權書,只要其他項目符合要求,則一樣為有效的授權書。

7. 至於有關98年9月5日當晚開會的情況,證人有以下的作供,他說他在下午6時已到達會場,工作人員將業主名冊上的業主名字預先編制了一份業主大會登記表(見證物A1第407至492頁)放在桌上以供出席的業主或持有其授權書的代表簽署,而有關的授權書亦會同時放在桌上以供人查閱,及將之與登記表上的業主名字互相核對,而有關的授權書及登記表在當日下午6時30分已經放在桌上供人查閱,到了下午8時30分,工作人員便開始計算到會人士所持的業權份數,看看是否達到法定標準,由於這個關係,大會要稍為延遲才告開始,到了下午9時20分,在核查票箱後,投票便開始,先由出席的業主投票,再由獲授權人投票,投票結朿後隨即由政務處代表監點票,並將結果寫在一張大卡紙上,(該卡紙的縮印本可見於証物A1第493及494頁),最後决議在53%業權業主的支持及17%業權業主的反對下獲通過並由林文輝區議員,政務處代表任玉英女士及證人本身簽名確認有關結果,而當晚的大會會議記錄,亦可見於証物A1第495頁至498頁中,當晚整個大會的程序,均在第一答辯人的兩名職員謝麗敏小姐及趙達雄先生的監察下進行,期間兩人對大會的程序,並無提出任何的質疑,証人亦否認法團工作人員在核對業主的身份時馬虎,他說如果他發現授權書上的業主名字與登記冊上不符,他會查證由該名新業主所提供由律師樓發出的書函以確認該業主身份,另外亦有當晚到會的新業主帶同文件給他查證後才在登記表上更改業主身份的,最後亦曾經是因為工作人員在編寫登記表的時候打錯字,在業主向工作人員指出有關錯誤後而即塲進行更改的。

8. 在回答本席的提問時,証人亦曾作供說,在所有答辯人所指沒有業主身份証編號的授權書中,撇除了只獲一名業主授權的代表及另一名獲5名業主授權名為李富強的代表外,其餘的代表均為法團的委員,其中更大部份是授權証人本人為投票代表的,而在本席問証人那些業主是如何得知証人的身份証號碼時,証人說如授權書是在做家訪時收到的,則證人會取出自己的身份証給業主填上或由証人在業主面前代其填寫,又如果授權書是在意見箱收到的,證人又或是其他獲得授權的委員,會親自拿着該張授權書,造訪有關的業主,讓該業主自己填上代表的身份証號碼並在訪問中向該業主查詢其就是項决議的投票取向。証人說所有授權他投票的業主,均是要他投贊成票的。

(五)答辯人証人的證供

9. 兩位答辯人共提供了兩名證人作供,首位証人是謝麗敏小姐,她受僱於華懋集團為助理分區經理,而自98年則開始在第一答辯人公司服務。她亦是在1998年9月5日有份代表第一答辯人出席有關業主大會的兩名代表之一,她供稱於當天下午6時許,在公司保安員的通知下,到過第一座的法團意見箱,看見有兩張授權書還在箱內,並未被取出,於是她在心中記下了這件事件,但事後並未有作任何書面記錄,亦沒有為此對法團的任何人士作出投訴,其後她到下午8時20分到達開會地點,當時已有業主及法團代表在場,亦有人在登記到塲的業主及代表,當時登記表及授權書均放在桌面,但工作人員用手壓着授權書,而證人與趙先生亦曾查詢是否需要協助,但得到的回覆是不用,於是她與趙先生站在一旁進行視察,發覺工作人員替個別人士登記時是先登記業主及獲授權代表的身份証,然後讓他們簽名,而在發現業主的姓名與登記冊上的不符時,只會修改名冊上的名字,並不作查證便草率地發出選票,証人說他曾為此事向申請人証人投訴,而得到的回覆是“會紀錄低及Check番的"另外大會在下午8時30分時本已有許多業主到塲,但到8時45分,大會司儀宣佈因為未夠人數所以要等一會,結果在晚上9時開會然後進行投票,點票及宣佈結果,證人稱事後她亦曾用口頭向其上司滙報開會的情況。

10. 辯方第二証人是吳耀海先生,他的主要作供以採納其於2000年7月20日存交於法庭的口供在經過某些數字上作出修改後進行,查該口供對申請人的質疑主要有兩個方面,即(1)有關若干數目的授權書不完整,即沒有公司印鑑或沒有業主身份証編號及(2),申請人在法庭頒令前,拒絕讓他檢視有關授權書,故此他質疑有關議决的有效性。

(六)本席就各名證人證供可信性的評估

11. 就申請人證人的證供而言,本席發覺他的證供清楚明確,而證人在回答問題時的態度亦直接而堅定,另外他就1998年9月5日所舉行的大會的程序的作供,亦有當晚的大會會議記錄(証物A1-495至498頁)作為支持,故本席接受該名證人是一名誠實可靠的證人,而他亦是憑事實在法庭上作供,故本席就他的證供給予十足份量。

12. 另外就首名答辯人證人的證供而言,本席發現了不少問題,現本席將這些問題列舉如下:-

(1) 第1辯方証人說她在保安員的知會下,到一座的意見箱看見兩張授權書在開會當晚的6時還未取出,她覺得有問題,但卻沒有再到其他的意見箱進行視察,沒有在當晚向申請人的任何委員或工作人員作出投訴,而只是在心中作了個記錄。連即時的書面記錄也沒有作出,她這項作供實在令人懷疑。

(2) 第1辯方證人在接受盤問時,提及她曾就工作人員於核對身份時,過程輕率一事向申請人證人作出投訴,而對方亦答允事後就此事跟進,此點供辭的內容固然非常重要。卻不見於此名證人事先交來法庭的口供之中,在申請人證人作供時,詹先生亦沒有向他指出此事,此外,在此名答辯人證人在主要作供時亦沒有提及此點,而在接受盤問時,當她被追問為何發現了核對身份有問題為何不投訴時,她才說出這點如此重要的證供,這不禁令人懷疑此名證人只是在被緊迫盤問時信口開河,以圖脫困的做法而已。

(3) 在接受盤問初段時,第1辯方證人曾接受一個說法就是她覺得在1998年11月15日開的另一次業主大會在各方面均沒有問題,但到了盤問的末段被問及雙方律師樓的書信往還時,證人則改口說其實她覺得該次業主大會也是有問題的。這是此名證人明顯地在改變她的證供。

13. 綜合以上各點,本席並不認為答辯人第一證人是一名誠實可靠的證人,故本席對她就她在意見箱內發現授權書及對大會開會過程所提出的指控一概存疑。

14. 就答辯人第二證人所作的證供,就有關交出授權書一事的指控,申請人在有關的誓章已作出解釋,而本席認為該項解釋合情合理,故此事並不影响本席對申請人證人證供的評價。另外有關沒有業主身份證編號碼的授權書,到底是否有效的授權書是一個法律上的問題,本席會對此作出裁決。故此名證人到底是否誠實可靠,相對地而言並不重要。

15. 但本席亦應該在此指出,此名證人的作供就辯方第一證人是如何向其公司彙報有關1998年9月5日大會的一事上,與辯方第一證人所說的有很大的出入,此名證人曾在某個階段說他聽了辯方第一證人的報告後,便懷疑該次會議的有效性,就是沒有理由那次會議會是這樣完美的。但證人卻承認,他曾着梁錦濤關學林律師行出信給申請人去質疑1998年11月15日所舉行的業主大會的合法性一事(見証物A1第526頁及527頁),其中卻沒有提及9月5日的大會,可是辯人第一證人卻說她一直心中認為有問題的主要是1998年9月5日開的業主大會,因為那個大會有她所指出的問題。如果兩名證人說的都是真說話,那本席真的不知道答辯人第一證人在有第二證人出席的簡報會上就1998年9月5日業主大會作了些甚麼的彙報了。

(七)沒有填上業主身份證號碼的授權書,是否無效的授權書

16. 詹先生陳辭時指出該等授權書是無效的授權書,理由是根據法例規定,業主是有權制定開會的程序的,既然授權書上有業主身份證的一欄,附註上亦說明身份證號碼將會保密及不會外泄,故此項是申請人所決定一項必須的要求,用以查證有關業主的身份,倘若業主身份證號碼之一欄沒有填上,該授權書在法律上應被視為無效。

17. 本席對詹先生這番陳辭有很大的保留,詹先生所指“業主有權制定開會的程序”相信是指建築物管理條例內第8附表的第15條,該條全文如下:

“業主會議程序,須為業主所決定者”

18. 本席認為該條中“程序”一辭的含義,只限於業主大會會議上所討論及表決的事項及次序,因此並不能涵蓋本案中申請人所制定的授權書中有關的格式,固然,倘若業主肯在授權書上填上自己的身份證編號,會給核對該業主身份的人仕帶來方便及有更大程度的保證,但倘若業主沒有填上身份證號碼時,有關核對該業主身份的人仕,仍然可以有足夠方法核對該業主的身份,其中包括查證土地註冊處就有關樓宇所登記的業主資料,又甚至到有關的樓宇進行家訪而查証該業主的身份,而建築物管理條例,亦從無規定大廈業主大會中的授權書要包括授權業主的身份證號碼,另外第8附表中第14條,即:

"(14)(1)委任代表的文書,須由業主簽署;如業主乃法人團體,則須蓋上其印章"

19. 亦僅規定有關授權文書只需要有業主的簽名,就此點而言,該等所謂有問題的授權書均已符合此項要求。

20. 另外本案中之大廈公契在開業主大會的部份,即第5附表(見證物A1第32至第33頁)就授權書的格式亦沒有業主身份證號碼規定,為此,本席裁定本案中那些沒有業主身份證號碼的授權書均仍然為有效的授權書。

結論及頒令

21. 基於上述分析,本席現在裁定申請人已能提供証供及証據在相對可能性的衡量的標準下,成功地證明有關的業主大會決議,是一項合法的決議。故本席裁定申請人獲得勝訴,本席同時頒令:

(1) 宣告"申請人於1998年9月5日所舉行的業主大會中所通過的一項决議即『終止「豪苑管理有限公司」為大廈管理經理人,由法團收回管理權,以公開招標聘請新管理公司』為一項合法的决議"

(2)申請人可與第一答辯人商議取回商塲及停車塲管理權之細節安排,倘若雙方不能達成協議,則申請人可在本命令發出的21天後向法庭申請輔助性頒令以執行本案之裁决。

(3)頒下臨時命令即第一及第二答辯人須支付申請人本案的訟費(包括申請人聘請大律師的費用),如雙方未能協議訟費的數額,則由法庭評定,如與訟各方於14天內不向本席就此臨時訟費命令提出申請,則此命令變為永久命令。

 

 

唐文暫委法官
土地審裁處

 

申請人 :由王潘律師行聘Kenneth Chan大律師代表

第一及第二答辯人:由梁錦濤關學林律師行聘Jacky Jim大律師代表