HK CourtDB
HomeDirectoryMCP
Hong Kong CourtDB
Back to directory
Constitutional and Administrative Law Proceedings1999

NG SIU TUNG AND OTHERS v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

Related cases with same parties

  • CACC760/1980DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION v. CHU SHIU-FAT
  • CACV100/2007BUTT, AZIZ AKBAR v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV103/2015BH v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV104/2021TAMANG MINITA v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV1077/2001DURGA MAYA GURUNG v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV108/1999LAU KONG YUNG v. THE DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV109/1999LAU KONG YUNG v. THE DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV112/2018LUBIANO NANCY ALMORIN v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV113/1986THE DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION v. CHEUNG YUK SAI
  • CACV117/2016QT v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV118/1997CONG VAN HA and Others v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV119/2007CHU WOAN-CHYI AND OTHERS v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV12/2018RAM CHANDER v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV12/2022SHAHIN, alias SHAHIN SEKH, alias KHAN SUJAN, alias WASHIM, alias SHAK SHAHIN v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV134/2015BH v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV144/1985YIP CHI LIN v. THE DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV149/2016DEMBELE, SALIFOU AND OTHERS v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV162/1992HO MING SAI AND OTHERS v. THE DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV163/1992LI JIN FEI AND OTHERS v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION
  • CACV164/1992YAN CHEN CHANG MEI AND OTHERS v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

Files (7)

59677-EN-2008-01-04

NG SIU TUNG AND OTHERS v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

HTML content

HCAL 81/1999

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO.81 OF 1999

------------------------------

BETWEEN

 NG SIU TUNG AND OTHERSApplicants
 and 
 DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATIONRespondent

------------------------------

 

Before : Hon Hartmann J in Court

Dates of Hearing :10-14, 17-21, 24, 27 and 28 September, 2, 5, 8, 9, 11, 12, 15-17, 26, 29, 31 October and 19-20 December 2007

Date of Handing Down Report : 4 January 2008

 

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

SIXTH REPORT TO THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 

Introduction

1. This report concerns the determination of 14 applications.

2. The first 11 applications were made by persons whose legal aid had been withdrawn from them on the basis that there was no merit in their applications.  In particular, as I understood it, it was said that in respect of each application, even if a claim for right of abode had been made, there was simply no record of it.

3. In my determination of these 11 applications, I was satisfied that there was no record and on this basis alone each had to fail.

4. A number of these applicants conceded that there was no record of their claims in the possession of the Immigration Department but submitted that this was due to the oversight, negligence, brusk conduct (falling short of intimidation) or poor practice on the part of immigration officers.  It was their submission that there would therefore have been a record if there had been no failure on the part of those officers of the kind described.  In my judgment, this submission was of no assistance to them.  In the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal dated 30 July 2002 (Ng Siu Tung and Others v. Director of Immigration (No.2) (2002) 5 HKCFAR 499, paras.30 and 31 the following was said :

“It is submitted on behalf of the applicants that in all these cases, the absence of a record in the hands of the Immigration Department is due to deficient practices adopted by officers of that department.  The Court is therefore invited to treat these applicants as having met all the requirements of the Concession notwithstanding the absence of a record. 
 We cannot accept that this is how the January Judgment is to be applied.  In cases where nothing capable of amounting to the required record of a claim for right of abode exists, the applicant necessarily falls outside the Concession.  The argument that a record ought to have come into existence if the applicants’ claims had duly been noted is not an answer to the requirement that there must be a record of the claim in the possession of the Immigration Department.” 

5. Applicant 4581, Madam Hui Ching Na, may originally have been given legal aid but there had been no contact with her since early 2000.  Her application was heard in her absence.  It was not successful.

6. Only two applications were presented by counsel.  They are the last two in this report; namely, the applications of Mr Yeung Ka Wong (5088) and Mr Leung Wai Keung (2144).  Neither was successful.

7. As things stand, I am informed that all the applications referred to me have now been determined.  There are no outstanding applications.

8. Before concluding, it should be said that in October 2007, during the course of this last hearing, I received a large number of letters which can best be described as petitions.  The letters came in the main from applicants whose claims had already been heard and dismissed.  In broad terms, the letters asked me to exercise my discretion to review the applications and, whether on compassionate grounds or otherwise, to grant right of abode.  Some letters were received from persons who had never been claimants or who wrote on behalf of children who had never been claimants.  These people asked for their cases be taken into account.

9. All of the letters were written in Chinese characters.  Regrettably, therefore, before I could begin to consider them, they had to be translated.  This presented the Department of Justice and the Immigration Department with an unenviable task.  A delay in completion of the work was inevitable.  In the result, two files containing all relevant papers and translations were only delivered to me a few days before Christmas.

10. I am in the process now of acknowledging each letter, explaining briefly that I have a limited mandate and can be of no assistance to them and that, if they wish to take their matter further, they should first seek legal advice.

Madam Kwok Ching Man (4625, a ‘group one’ applicant)

11. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in 1970.  She was one of five children in the family.  Her father settled in Hong Kong in 1976, her mother joining him in 1984, bringing one child of the family with her.  By the change of sovereignty, both of the applicant’s parents were permanent residents.

12. The applicant married in the Mainland in 1991.  There are two children of the marriage.  

13. It was the applicant’s case that in early 1997 she discussed with her parents the possibility that, when the change of sovereignty took place, children of Hong Kong permanent residents would be able to obtain Hong Kong identity cards.  In anticipation of this happening, she said, she and her husband were able to obtain two-way permits to visit Hong Kong.  At that time there was only one child of the family, a daughter, and a permit was obtained for her too.  The family arrived in Hong Kong on 22 April 1997, being permitted to remain until mid-May.

14. As her husband did not have parents living in Hong Kong, he returned to the Mainland in accordance with the terms of his two-way permit.  The applicant and her daughter overstayed.  She overstayed, said the applicant, hoping that, when the change of sovereignty took place, both she and her daughter –then aged about 5 – would be able to obtain Hong Kong identity cards.

15. However, when the change of sovereignty took place, the applicant discovered that there was no general amnesty.  She was aware that people were being arrested and repatriated.  But she was also aware, she said, that people in her position were fighting for right of abode and that litigation was in process.  This encouraged her, she said, to remain in Hong Kong to await developments.

16. It was the applicant’s testimony that she would have continued to await developments in Hong Kong if it was not for the fact that, towards the end of 1997, she received a telephone call from her husband saying that she must return to the Mainland.  Her husband, she said, had been contacted by the local health authorities to say that the applicant was due for a ‘contraceptive check-up’.  In her affirmation of 21 March 2007, the applicant said the following in respect of this apparent requirement :

“The local authorities required all pre-menopausal woman to attend a local clinic every three months to ensure that contraceptive measures were in place.” 

17. According to the applicant, she was afraid that, if she did not return, her husband may be arrested.  In her affirmation, she said that she was also concerned that her parents-in-law may be arrested too.

18. Accordingly, she said, on 2 December 1997 she went to the Immigration Tower with her daughter.  They were accompanied by the applicant’s mother and the applicant’s younger sister who had settled in Hong Kong several months earlier.  As to the primary purpose of that visit, the applicant, who was supported in this by her younger sister, said that she wished to see if it was possible to claim right of abode and remain in Hong Kong.  The applicant explained her purpose in the following way.  If it was possible to claim right of abode, there would be no need for her to return to the Mainland.  She would then be able to advise the local authorities in Fujian Province that she had been accepted as a permanent resident in Hong Kong and was no longer subject to their jurisdiction. 

19. However, in her affirmation of 21 March 2007, the applicant did not state her purpose in such clear terms.  In that affirmation, she said that she felt she had no choice but to return to the Mainland.  As for her desire to discover whether she was entitled to right of abode, she went on to say the following :

“At that time, I really did not understand what a claim was or what constituted making a claim.  Although at that time my main purpose was to return to the Mainland for the contraception check, I wanted to, and am sure I did, make it clear to the officer that my parents were Hong Kong Permanent Residents and I wanted to settle in Hong Kong.”

20. During the course of cross-examination, it was put to the applicant that she had not been under any form of coercion imposed by the health authorities in Fujian Province in late 1997.  It was put to her that she had surrendered herself for the simple reason that, some five months after the change of sovereignty and with no general amnesty announced, she appreciated that nothing was to be gained by remaining in hiding in Hong Kong and that it would be best to return to the Mainland to join her husband.  This was denied by the applicant.  However, in a statement prepared for the Removal Special Project Sub-Division of the Immigration Department in May 2000 – just some two and a half years after the event in question – the applicant, when describing her visit to the Immigration Department, made no mention of any need to return to the Mainland to undergo a contraceptive check-up.  Her statement was instead to the following effect :

“However, after Hong Kong’s reunification on 1 July, no announcement had been made all along.  Therefore, on 2 December 1997, my family and I, with the permit for traveling to and from Hong Kong and Macau, went to the Immigration Department to make request for application for right of abode.  But the officer of the Immigration Department said that there wasn’t yet any mechanism for application for the right of abode in Hong Kong and I had to return to the Mainland to make the application.  After officer of the Immigration Department had looked at my document, he/she said that I had already overstayed and if I didn’t leave, I would be prosecuted.  At that time I was frightened and did not know that application for legal aid could be made.  So I just did as was told by the officer and surrendered myself and returned to the Mainland.”

21. The failure in the statement made in 2000 to mention any requirement to return to the Mainland for a contraceptive check-up has obviously raised the concern that it was a late invention, one created to try and explain why the applicant surrendered herself in December 1997.  However, despite that concern, I believe that the applicant may well have desired to discover whether she could claim right of abode.  Her younger sister put it in direct terms.  She said that the applicant wished to discover one-way or the other whether, by reason of her parents’ permanent residence, she was entitled herself to live in Hong Kong.

22. The applicant impressed me as an essentially credible witness.  She was calm, almost gentle.  She was not prone to exaggeration.  Her younger sister too, although somewhat more emotional, struck me as a credible witness.

23. If the applicant was called back to the Mainland for a contraceptive check-up – and there was no evidence to the contrary – I can well understand her feeling that the time had come to discover one way or the other whether she had any entitlement to live permanently in Hong Kong.

24. Both the applicant and her younger sister said that, upon arrival of the Immigration Tower, they went initially to make enquiries.  On the evidence, it is clear that they went to the enquiry counter on the 2nd floor.  The applicant’s younger sister said that, as she spoke Cantonese the best, she spoke on behalf of the applicant.  Although she could not remember exactly what she had said, she told the officer at the counter that the applicant’s parents were permanent residents and she then asked if in the circumstances the applicant herself was entitled to stay in Hong Kong.  The officer, she said, asked to see the applicant’s two-way permit and, as the younger sister remembered it, replied to the effect that, as the applicant was the holder of a two-way permit, she was not entitled to remain in Hong Kong.  The officer then directed them to the offices of GIS on the 13th floor.

25. At the offices of GIS, it was again the younger sister who spoke to the officer at the counter.  When she testified, the younger sister said that she told the counter officer that they had been directed to this floor.

26. On reflection, the younger sister could not remember – understandably after such a long lapse of time – whether she made her enquiry at the enquiry counter on the 2nd floor or at the reception counter of GIS on the 13th floor.  It was the clear thrust of her testimony, however, that she made only an enquiry. 

27. The younger sister went on to say that, having presented herself at the reception counter of GIS, she was then given an ID 457 form to complete.  She said that she had no idea of the purpose of the form.  She simply completed the details that she was capable of completing.  She was the one who completed the form for the applicant.  Indeed, she also completed a second form for the applicant’s daughter.

28. Nothing appears on the face of the ID 457 to indicate that the applicant’s parents were Hong Kong permanent residents.  Indeed, the applicant’s younger sister accepted that she initially wrote the character ‘nil’ in the column reserved for giving details of the Hong Kong identity card numbers of the applicant’s parents.  She then crossed out the character, she said, but did not replace it with anything else.

29. Both the applicant and her younger sister said that their mother, who had accompanied them to the Immigration Tower, had to report for work at 11 o’clock that morning and was therefore compelled to leave them before the ID 457 form was completed.  It was for that reason, they said, that her Hong Kong identity card number was not recorded on the face of the form.

30. After the form had been completed and handed back, the applicant was called for an interview.  She went in with her daughter.

31. Although the applicant could not remember the sequence of events during the course of the interview, she had some recollection of being asked by the interviewing officer, Mr Lui Chun Pong, whether her daughter had been going to school in Hong Kong.  She replied that her daughter had not been going to school.

32. The applicant recalled that she was then asked why she had overstayed and she replied that she had done so because she had wanted to be here when the change of sovereignty took place in order to remain permanently in Hong Kong.  According to the applicant, she was asked by the interviewing officer if she was talking about the rumoured amnesty.  She was told that there was no amnesty. 

33. The applicant said that she was then given a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form and, at the dictation of the interviewing officer, she wrote on that form.  The characters that she wrote were to the following effect :

“I came to Hong Kong with my daughter Kwok [Wai] Sze on 22 April 1997.  I knew that we can stay in Hong Kong till 16 May 1997 but have overstayed because of keeping company with our family.  Now I and my daughter are willing to return to China.”

34. The applicant initially testified that she was happy enough to write the characters at the dictation of the interviewing officer.  However, she qualified this by saying that, when the interviewing officer asked her to write on the form, he did not explain “clearly and fully”, that she could write what she wished to write.

35. The applicant accepted that she did not object to what she was asked to write.  She accepted that she was under no particular form of compulsion.  It was rather her case that she did not know that she had a choice as to what she could write.  If she had been told by the interviewing officer that she could write whatever she wished, she said, she would have written exactly why she had overstayed; namely, that she had overstayed in anticipation of being able to obtain right of abode and still wished to do so.  As it was, she said, matters not being fully explained to her, she simply wrote what she was asked to write and put her signature to the document without complaint.

36. Although the interviewing officer, Mr Lui, had no independent recollection of the interview, he accepted that the characters written on the face of the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form must have been written with his assistance.  He would give assistance, he said, if it was needed.  It was his custom, however, to inform interviewees that they could write what they wished and certainly, he said, he would not prevent an interviewee from doing so.

37. On my assessment of all the evidence, when asked during the course of the interview why she had overstayed, I believe that the applicant may well have told the interviewing officer that, as the child of permanent residents, she had overstayed in anticipation of being able to live in Hong Kong permanently after the change of sovereignty.  In addition, I think that the applicant may well have told the interviewing officer that she still hoped to be able to live permanently in Hong Kong.  Objectively, I believe that would have amounted to a claim for right of abode, going further than a mere enquiry and amounting to a stated desire to remain permanently in Hong Kong based on the residential status of her parents.

38. That is not to say that I disbelieved the interviewing officer.  But it would have been so easy, even in the best of faith, to deflect a passing statement concerning a desire to remain in Hong Kong, to say simply that there was no amnesty.  The applicant, as I have said, struck me as an inherently gentle person, shy and unassertive.  There was no suggestion by her that she in any way debated the issue with the interviewing officer.

39. The difficulty, of course, is that there is simply no record of that claim.  Nothing is to be found in either the ID 457 form or the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  Nor is there anything to be found in any of the other papers retained by the Immigration Department.

40. It is not sufficient, in my view, for the applicant to say that, if the interviewing officer had fully explained matters to her, then she would have created a record.

41. In the circumstances, my determinations are as follows :

(i)the applicant did make a claim of right of abode;
(ii)the Director has no record of any claim.

Madam Lam Nga Li (applicant 1771, a ‘group one’ applicant)

42. It was this applicant’s case that she had made an oral claim for right of abode on two occasions while, on a third occasion, her mother had made a claim on her behalf and in her presence.

43. As to the existence of any kind of record of these claims, the applicant accepted that there was no record.  It was her assertion, however, that the fault for that lay not with herself but with individual immigration officers who neglected to record the claims.  This neglect, she said, amounted to a ‘dereliction of duty’.  The applicant did not at any time suggest that the immigration officers had refused to make a record of her claim nor that they had been guilty of oppressive conduct by threatening her or in some way preventing her from making a record.  Her case was restricted to an assertion of neglect.  However, for the reasons set out in my introduction, I did not consider this to be an answer to the admitted fact that there was no record in the possession of the Immigration Department.

44. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in 1970.  Her father settled in Hong Kong in 1978 and was joined by her mother in 1985.  The applicant’s younger brother and sister were able to settle permanently in Hong Kong with their parents, the applicant being the only member of the immediate family denied that privilege.

45. It appears that in 1993 the applicant made an application for a one-way permit.  However, this was refused by the Mainland authorities.

46. In January 1997, the applicant came to Hong Kong on the strength of a two-way permit.  She was permitted to remain until March of that year.  The applicant, who by then was married, was accompanied by her young daughter.  The applicant’s husband had come to Hong Kong a little earlier, his parents also being permanent residents.  However, being unable – at that time – to obtain a two-way permit, the husband had entered Hong Kong illegally.

47. It is apparent on the evidence that the family intended to remain in Hong Kong until the change of sovereignty took place, the expectation being that, as the children of permanent residents, they would then be able to benefit from an amnesty which would give them the same rights of residence as their parents.  The evidence in a considerable number of applications has shown that, in Fujian Province, in the months leading up to the change of sovereignty, there were widespread rumours of an amnesty.

48. At or about the time when the change of sovereignty took place, it appears that the applicant’s mother made enquiries at the Immigration Tower as to the existence of an amnesty.  On one occasion, said the applicant, she accompanied her mother to the Immigration Tower, going, she thought, to the 2nd floor.  On each occasion, however, the advice given was to the same effect; namely, that any claim for permanent residence would have to be processed on the Mainland and not in Hong Kong.

49. Accordingly, the applicant accepted that, when the change of sovereignty took place, she quickly learned that there would be no amnesty.  However, she decided to remain in Hong Kong with her husband and daughter.  She was still hopeful of an amnesty, she said, and had heard that certain people had instituted litigation to challenge the lack of an amnesty.

50. In the result, the applicant remained in Hong Kong until March 1998.  At that time, according to her, a crisis arose which demanded her return to the Mainland.  The exact nature of this crisis was somewhat confused, different versions being given by the applicant and her mother.  But the applicant was the second person to speak of the need to return to the Mainland to undergo a contraceptive check.

51. Identification of any kind of crisis itself arose late in the day.  Several years earlier, in a case summary prepared by her first solicitors, Pam Baker & Co., the applicant had been recorded as saying that she had attempted to return to the Mainland because her request for right of abode had been refused and her daughter needed to start kindergarten.  To the same effect, when interviewed in May 2000 by the Removal Special Project Sub-division of the Immigration Department, the applicant had said :

“As my request for staying in Hong Kong was rejected and my daughter, Yeung Chan Ni, had to return to the Mainland to start kindergarten, I decided to return to the Mainland myself.” 

52. It was only in her affirmation of 18 January 2007 that the applicant spoke for the first time of a crisis.  She had learnt, she said, that her husband’s aunt had been arrested in Fujian Province for failing to comply with the operational dictates of the ‘one-child’ policy in the Mainland.  The aunt had apparently failed to attend a clinic for a mandatory contraceptive check-up.  The suggestion appeared to be made by the applicant that she was afraid that, if she herself did not return and submit to a mandatory check-up, she too may face some form of punishment including the possibility of her house being demolished.  When her mother testified, however, she said that the aunt had been arrested for the sole purpose of ensuring that the applicant herself returned to the Mainland for a check-up; in short, that the aunt had been detained as some sort of ‘hostage’.  The mother even spoke of the family planning authorities in Fujian telephoning Hong Kong to demand that the applicant return.

53. I have doubts as to the veracity of this evidence to explain the reason why the applicant was compelled to return to the Mainland, her case being that otherwise she would not have returned and would have remained in Hong Kong hoping for an amnesty.  Her earlier explanation, of course, had contained an implied acceptance that, having had her claim for right of abode rejected, she saw no purpose in remaining.

54. On 15 March 1998 the applicant attempted to pass through Lo Wu with her daughter and her father-in-law.  As an overstayer, the applicant was stopped and made the subject of an enquiry.

55. The interview record kept by the examining officer at Lo Wu shows that the reason why the applicant had overstayed for more than a year was investigated.  According to that record, it was asserted by or on behalf of the applicant, that she had overstayed for ‘humanitarian’ reasons; namely, to look after her husband’s grandmother, an elderly lady who required constant care.  The record indicates that the applicant’s father-in-law, who was present during the enquiry process, confirmed that the applicant had remained in Hong Kong to care for his mother.

56. In her testimony, when I originally asked the applicant what had been said at Lo Wu, she made no mention of making any claim for right of abode.  The meeting had been a ‘simple’ one, she said.  However, later in her testimony she said that she had in fact made a claim.  She told the officer, she said, that she had overstayed because she hoped to benefit from an amnesty when the change of sovereignty took place.  That was because she wished to live permanently with her parents in Hong Kong.  The officer, however, just looked at her.  He failed to write down her words.  That, she said, was a dereliction of duty on the part of the officer.

57. In my judgment, this assertion of making a claim for right of abode was an invention.  I was not prepared to accept that it may have been made.  Nothing had been said of it in any earlier papers, not even in her affirmation made with the help of her then solicitors just seven months before the hearing.

58. As it was, the applicant and her daughter were not permitted to leave Hong Kong that day.  They were instead referred to the offices of the General Investigation Section (‘GIS’) on the 13th floor of the Immigration Tower.  Together with the applicant’s father-in-law, they presented themselves there two days later on 17 March 1998.

59. The applicant said that her father-in-law spoke on her behalf to the officer at the reception counter.  She remembered something being said to the effect that she had overstayed in order to look after her grandmother-in-law but she could not hear clearly.  The applicant said that she was then given an ID 457 form to fill out.  She gave the names of her parents but did not state their Hong Kong Identity Card numbers nor give any details of their residential status.  The applicant said that she did not state the numbers because she did not know them.

60. The applicant said that she was then called in for an interview.  The interview was conducted in Putonghua which she understood. 

61. As to what happened in that interview, in an interview record submitted to the Removal Special Project Sub-division of the Immigration Department in May 2000, the applicant had another right of abode claimant write the following on her behalf :

“When I was asked why I stayed in Hong Kong until then, I answered, it is because all my relatives have settled in Hong Kong, I have no connection on the Mainland.  My parents and relatives in Hong Kong all need me to look after them, just like my grandmother needed to be look after when she was ill this time.” 

62. In her affirmation of 18 January 2007, the applicant said the following :

“The officer asked me why I had overstayed and I told him that my whole family had been settled for a long time in Hong Kong, I had no close relatives remaining in the Mainland.  I needed to take care of my aging parents.” 

 

63. However, in her testimony, when initially asked about the interview, the applicant said nothing of making a statement to the effect that I have outlined.  She said merely that the officer told her what to write on the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form and that she did so.  The English translation of what was written on that form is to the following effect :

“I have overstayed because of keeping company with my family.  I now want to go back to the Mainland together with my daughter, Yeung Chan Ni.” 

64. When asked if she had been happy to write these words, the applicant said that she was.  She had in fact overstayed and it was now her wish to return to the Mainland as soon as possible to deal with the crisis there.  For that reason, she said, she was content to sign.

65. It was only later in her testimony, when I took her back over the chronology of her evidence, that the applicant asserted that she had told the interviewing officer that she had overstayed because her whole family had been settled in Hong Kong for a long time, that she had no close relatives remaining in the Mainland and that she had needed to care for her parents.

66. I accept that the applicant may simply have overlooked this important part of her evidence when she commenced her testimony.  It must have been a nerve-wracking experience presenting her own case, especially in the initial stages.

67. Although I regret to say that I did not find the applicant to be a credible witness, in this single respect I believe that she may have made an assertion along the lines outlined by her.  However, as Mr Fok SC, leading counsel for the Director, pointed out, it is doubtful whether the words spoken by her, even on a benevolent interpretation, could be said to amount to a claim for right of abode.  The words amount rather to an explanation for why the applicant had overstayed.  On an ordinary reading, they do not go so far as to constitute a purposive claim for right of abode; that is, an assertion that, through her parents, she has a legal right to remain in Hong Kong.

68. When asked by myself why, if she had said these words, she had not of her own initiative written them on the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, the applicant replied to the effect that she had not done so because the interviewing officer had not dictated the necessary characters to her.  In short, as I understood it, it was her assertion that, having made her purported claim, but being content to accept the interviewing officer’s summary of what should be written on the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, a duty then fell on the interviewing officer to include in his form of words her detailed assertion as to the why she had overstayed.  He had failed in that duty.

69. At the conclusion of her interview, the applicant was permitted to remain in Hong Kong for a further 7 days, being asked to return to the Immigration Department on 23 March 1998.  

70. The officer-in-charge of the applicant’s file at that time was Immigration Officer Tsang Wai Leung.  He was called to give evidence but was not cross-examined by the applicant.  In his statement, Mr Tsang explained that overstayers were normally subject to criminal prosecution.  However, overstayers who had young children may be exempted from prosecution if the Prosecution Section of the Immigration Department decided that would be the appropriate course.  So that the matter could be considered by the Prosecution Section, the overstayer would be given an appointment card to return to the Immigration Department a few days later, normally a week.  Such a card was given in this case.

71. Having considered the relevant evidence, I am satisfied that the procedures adopted by the Immigration Department in respect of the applicant and her daughter related solely to the issue of whether the applicant should be prosecuted.  Nothing appears in the documentary evidence to suggest otherwise.

72. On 23 March 1998, the applicant returned with her daughter to the offices of GIS on the 13th floor of the Immigration Tower.  On this occasion she was accompanied by her mother.  It was her testimony that her mother went to the reception counter and spoke to an officer there.  In her statement of 18 January 2007, the applicant said the following in respect of this incident :

“During the visit on 23 March 1998, my mother spoke to the officer at the counter, and after she did so, she came back and told me that she had spoken to the officer, saying that I, as daughter of Hong Kong permanent residents, was entitled to the right of abode.  She told me that the officer told her that the application had to be made in the Mainland, not in Hong Kong.” 

73. However, when she testified, the applicant said that she was close enough to her mother to hear what was said.  She heard her mother, she said, claiming right of abode on her behalf.  When it was suggested to the applicant that this version of events was different from the one contained in her statement, she replied to the effect that her mother could not know that she had overheard.  That was why she had reported back to her.

74. As to the purported conversation at the reception desk, the mother herself testified to the following effect; namely, that she told the officer that, now that Hong Kong had returned to China, Hong Kong children were entitled to apply for right of abode.  She said she told the officer she had heard that there would be an amnesty for the children of Hong Kong permanent residents.  When asked if she had said anything to the officer about her daughter, the mother replied that she had.  She had told the officer, she said, that her daughter should not have to go back to the Mainland, that she was being forced to go back because a family member had been arrested and only if she went back to the Mainland would that family member be released.  According to the mother, the officer at the reception counter said very little in reply, saying that it appeared to him to be a matter for the Mainland authorities.

75. At no time during the course of her testimony, at least as I understood it, did the mother assert that she had told the officer at the reception counter that she and the husband were permanent residents and that the applicant was their daughter.  It was her testimony, however, that she said words to the officer to the effect that ‘we have been waiting for the right of abode for so long.’

76. If I accept the evidence of the applicant and her mother, I believe it would amount to a claim for right of abode.  The relationship of mother and daughter would have been apparent and any objective listener would have taken the mother’s words to amount to an assertion that her daughter should not be in her present predicament because she should be entitled to right of abode.  The real issue, in my judgment, is whether the mother made any such assertion.  Frankly, I have the gravest doubts that she did.

77. In her affirmation of 18 January 2007, the applicant’s mother said the following as to the conversation at the reception counter, stating matters which she did not refer to in her testimony :

“I told the staff that my husband and I had lived in Hong Kong for a long time, that my daughter was often alone in the Mainland – her husband travelling frequently to Hong Kong – and I said to the staff that my daughter, being a child of Hong Kong permanent residents, was entitled to the right of abode.”  [my emphasis] 

78. The evidence revealed, however, that in March 1998, when the conversation had taken place, the applicant’s husband had not been travelling frequently to Hong Kong.  A statement made by the husband in other proceedings revealed that he had come as an illegal immigrant to Hong Kong in late 1996 and had remained here for all of 1997 into 1998.  Immigration records showed that it was only from late 2002 until the present time that the husband had made regular, lawful trips to and from Hong Kong.  It was put to the mother that what was asserted in her affirmation of January 2007 was an invention, one made on a misunderstanding of the true historical context; namely, that, because the husband had in recent years been coming and going frequently, she had assumed that the practice must have reached back to 1997 and early 1998 when, in fact, it had not.  The mother had real difficulties dealing with this suggestion.  Although she protested not to understand, I am satisfied she knew full well what was being put to her and could only do her best to avoid the question.

79. By the time the applicant and her mother had completed their testimonies, it was apparent to me that both had attempted to build their case largely on the basis of invention.  Their assertions changed from minute to minute.  When the mother’s testimony began to be at odds with the daughter’s earlier testimony, the daughter on several occasions interrupted either to attempt to prompt the mother or to protest that, as an elderly person, she could not be expected to remember events. 

80. I am satisfied, therefore, that, even though the applicant came to Hong Kong hoping to benefit from a rumoured amnesty, once the rumour was proved to be false, she herself made no claim for right of abode nor did her mother make any claim on her behalf.

81. In addition, as I have said earlier, the applicant’s assertions as to the lack of any record of a claim were incapable of advancing her case. 

82. My determinations are as follows :

(i)the applicant did not make an claim for right of abode;
(ii)the Director has no record of any claim.

Mr Yeung Kam Shui (applicant 4138, a ‘group one’ and ‘group five’ applicant)

83. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in November 1972, one of three children.  His father settled in Hong Kong in 1978, his mother joining him in 1985.  When his mother came to Hong Kong, she was able to bring one child with her, the applicant’s eldest brother.

84. In 1986, 1987 and 1991, the applicant either entered Hong Kong unlawfully or entered lawfully and overstayed.  This, he said, was evidence of his long-lasting determination to be in Hong Kong with his family and, if at all possible, to settle here permanently.

85. In February 1998, some seven or eight months after the change in sovereignty, the applicant came to Hong Kong on the strength of a two-way permit, being authorised to remain until early March.  He overstayed.  He did so on this occasion, he said, because he had heard rumours in his village that it may be possible to claim right of abode in Hong Kong.

86. After his arrival, said the applicant, he and his father went to the enquiry counter on the 2nd floor of the Immigration Tower to discover whether there was a process through which he could claim right of abode.  According to the applicant, he was told that there was ‘no such thing’.

87. The applicant struck me as a reasonably quick-witted person.  It is more likely than not, I think, that some seven or eight months after the change of sovereignty he would have heard something to the effect that people in his position, indeed many from his own province, were not successfully claiming right of abode.  But even if I am wrong in that regard, on his admission, he knew soon after his arrival in February 1998 that, according to the immigration authorities, there was no process in Hong Kong for seeking right of abode.  Early in his testimony, the applicant said that, having received a negative answer to his enquiry, he felt he had no alternative other than to return to the Mainland.  As he put it : “What else could I do?  I had no way out.”

88. However, the applicant did not return to the Mainland when his permit expired.  He remained in Hong Kong

89. On 15 April 1998, in the early afternoon, the applicant was arrested by the police.  The arrest took place in the immediate vicinity of the Yau Ma Tei Fresh Fruit Market temporary loading area.  He was then taken to the Yau Ma Tei Police Station.

90. The applicant knew that for an overstayer to be caught working could have serious ramifications.  But he was not working at the loading area, he said, nor seeking work.  The applicant explained that he was, in fact, looking for an office of the Immigration Department where, he had been told, he could apply to extend his two-way permit.

91. His explanation, in my judgment, was false.  The applicant protested that he was a man of little education.  But, as I have said, he was quick witted enough.  He knew full well the case he had to meet and the pitfalls that had to be avoided. 

92. The applicant said that he had gone to Yau Ma Tei that day, a district he did not know, without obtaining the address of the Immigration Department office or even attempting to ascertain its approximate location.  He said he did not think of telephoning ahead.  He simply went to the area, he said, and began his search, asking people on the street if they could help him.  Nobody he stopped, however, was able to do so.  On the applicant’s own evidence, he was wandering in the Yau Ma Tei area for several hours before he was arrested and at the time of his arrest still had no idea of the location of the Immigration Department office.

93. It was the applicant’s testimony that he was attempting to locate the office so that he could seek an extension of his two-way permit and perhaps, by that route, seek right of abode.  However, when arrested, he had no documents on him.  He had left all the documents at home with his father, he said.  He attempted to explain this by saying that he was afraid he might lose the documents.  It was therefore his intention, when he found the immigration office, to telephone his father and ask his father to bring the documents to the office.  His father, he said, had a bag in which the documents could be placed.  The documents would therefore be more secure if carried through the streets by his father.  It was all totally unconvincing.  Many of the answers, in my view, were invented on the turn. 

94. I am unable to say why the applicant was in Yau Ma Tei that day.  However, I reject the suggestion that he was attempting to find an Immigration Department office in order to seek an extension of his already expired two-way permit.

95. At the Yau Ma Tei Police Station, the applicant made a cautioned statement.  The brief exchange of recorded questions and answers was to the following effect :

“Q.Until when were you allowed to stay in Hong Kong?
 A.Until 7 March 1998.
Q.What have you done since your arrival in Hong Kong until today?
 A.I have fun around every day.
 Q.Have you ever worked in Hong Kong?
 A.No, I haven’t.”

96. It was the applicant’s case, however, that, when asked why he had overstayed by the interviewing officer, he told him that he had done so in order to claim right of abode so that he could be ‘reunited’ with his father.  According to the applicant, the interviewing officer said that he had ‘no idea about this right of abode matter’ and did not bother to record the answer.

97. The applicant accepted that the statement, which was written for him, was read over to him.  When he realised that nothing had been said to the effect that he had overstayed in order to claim right of abode, he said, he queried this omission with the officer.  The officer, however, replied to the effect that right of abode had nothing to do with the reason for his arrest.  The applicant said he did not protest further.  “I felt I had no way out,” he said.  “So I signed the statement.”

98. However, when it was put to the applicant that he had also signed an endorsement to the statement acknowledging that he was able to correct, alter or add anything to the document, he then said that he had in fact made a request to add something more to the statement.  He wished to add characters to the effect that he had right of abode and wished to be reunited with his father.  Because he was effectively illiterate, said the applicant, he asked the interviewing officer to write that for him.  The officer, however, simply asked why he could not write it himself and when the applicant explained that he was illiterate the officer refused to copy the extra words. 

99. In the result, it was the applicant’s eventual assertion that the interviewing officer had not merely neglected to record his claim for right of abode but had specifically refused to do so, demeaning the applicant for his lack of education. 

100. In his affirmation dated 19 January 2007, made with the assistance of his then solicitors, the applicant said that, when he was taken to Yau Ma Tei Police Station, he told an officer, presumably the interviewing officer, that his parents were Hong Kong permanent residents and that he wanted to stay in Hong Kong to be with them as he had right of abode.  The officer, he said, replied that he did not know about this matter.  In the affirmation, the applicant went on to say that he was then interviewed under caution.  However, in an exchange of correspondence between the Department of Justice and the applicant’s then solicitors, more particularly in a letter dated 27 January 2007, the applicant’s solicitors said that, having taken instructions from their client, they were able to confirm that –

“… the Applicant’s appeal relies on the claims made to the Immigration Department and does not rely on the claims for right of abode made to the Police.  Indeed, we do not know that there has been any suggestion to the contrary made in respect of this Applicant to date.” 

101. It was for this reason, I understand, that the Director did not call any member of the Police Force to give evidence.  The applicant, however, protested that he had never given such instructions to his solicitors.  During his testimony he insisted that his claim made to the interviewing police officer had always been an important part of his case.

102. The cautioned statement itself contains nothing which, directly or indirectly, supports the applicant’s assertions.  Indeed, there is no mention even of the applicant’s father.  What is of direct relevance, however, is the fact that the applicant’s Hong Kong address given in the cautioned statement is not the address of his father where apparently he had been staying.  It is puzzling why, if, in fact, the applicant was at that time determined to state his right to live permanently in Hong Kong because of his father’s residential status that he would not have given his father’s address.  It was put to the applicant that his principal concern was to avoid a prosecution for working illegally in Hong Kong and to avoid implicating his father and that was why he had provided a false address.  This was denied by the applicant who said that the address he had given was that of his paternal grandmother.  He explained that, when he had come into Hong Kong, he had intended to overstay and, to avoid the police catching him, had given his grandmother’s address rather than his father’s address.  For purpose of transparency, he said, he decided he should give that same address a second time.

103. On the balance of probabilities, may the applicant have made an oral claim for right of abode during the taking of his cautioned statement?  I am satisfied that he did not.  

104. The applicant’s father, Yang Chang Szu, testified that he went to the Yau Ma Tei Police Station to try and find his son.  According to the father, he said to a police officer : “My son has the right of abode and I want him to be bailed out.”  He said to another officer : “I am a permanent resident and all are entitled to right of abode.”  But no bail was secured.

105. It was the testimony of the applicant’s father that he returned to the Police Station the following day and was told that his son was being transferred to the Victoria Immigration Centre and he must seek bail there.  The father said that he immediately made his way to the Victoria Immigration Centre and, after a long wait, saw his son being transferred into the custody of the Immigration Department.

106. The father was not a credible witness.  He could be as emotional and aggressive as his son.  Volume and outrage all too often were substituted for the truth.  This was compounded by much of his testimony being confused. 

107. The records show that the applicant was transferred to the Victoria Immigration Centre on the day after his arrest.  The records further show that, on his arrival, he was interviewed by the Duty Officer in the Reception Office, Immigration Officer David Luk. 

108. It was the applicant’s case that, during this brief interview, he told Mr Luk that he was entitled to right of abode through his father who in 1997 had agreed that he should be able to exercise it.  He also told the officer, he said, that his father was already in the immediate vicinity of the reception office and ready to bail him out.  According to the applicant, however, without any enquiry being made, he was informed by Mr Luk that he would receive no bail. 

109. In his affirmation of 7 March 2007, Mr Luk said that every day the Duty Officer received many suspected immigration offenders from the police.  It was standard practice, he said, to ask both illegal immigrants and two-way permit overstayers whether they had any local connection; that is, a family member or relative, or any fixed abode in Hong Kong.  The purpose of this practice, he said, was to determine whether the person should be referred to the Processing Unit for detention or to the Recognisance Office so that a decision could be made as to bail.  Although obviously Mr Luk had no independent recollection of his brief interview with the applicant, he had no reason to think, he said, that he would have done anything other than follow the standard practice.  He said that if he had been informed by the applicant that he had a father in Hong Kong and/or a fixed place of abode, he would certainly have referred the applicant to the Recognisance Office.

110. It was, however, the applicant’s case – supported by the testimony of his father – that he had not arrived at the Victoria Immigration Centre at or about two in the afternoon, as the records of the Centre show, but had instead arrived in the morning.  As best I understood it, it was the applicant’s testimony that his father was waiting for him inside the Centre when he arrived.

111. Indeed, it was the father’s testimony, as best as I understood it, that when he was admitted into the Centre he told an immigration officer that he was carrying a notarial certificate which, together with his own identity card, showed that his son had right of abode.  When he asked for bail for his son, he said, he was simply told : “no bail”.

112. As to when the father arrived at the Immigration Centre, after a lapse of nine years I believe more trust can be placed in the written records.  As Mr Luk said, the record did not pretend to be accurate to the minute.  But it was not possible that the record would show the transfer taking place in 2 o’clock in the afternoon when it had taken place at least two hours earlier.  In preferring the written record, I take into account that in a case summary prepared in or about 2000 by Pam Baker & Co. it is said that, by the time the applicant arrived at the Victoria Immigration Centre, ‘it was the afternoon’. 

113. Surprisingly, bearing in mind that much of the applicant’s testimony, and that of his father, was centred on a failure to obtain bail, the case summary says the following :

“Mr Yeung [the applicant] himself reiterated when speaking to the Immigration Officer that his parents are Hong Kong residents, he should be allowed to stay and get bail.  The officer told him to record all his family members details onto the form provided, which Mr Yeung did.  He was subsequently released on recognizance.” 

114. This suggests that there was, in fact, an interview in the Recognisance Office as a result of which the applicant was granted bail.  But that, as the records showed, was wrong.  The applicant was not granted bail.  Nor is there any record of him completing the required form to even attempt to obtain bail. 

115. The following day, 17 April 1998, the applicant was interviewed by another Immigration Officer, Mr Lai.  During this interview a personal particulars form was completed together with a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  The personal particulars form gave details of both the applicant’s father and mother and their Hong Kong address.  Nothing appears on the face of the form, however, to indicate that either of them was at the time permanent residents.

116. The ‘grounds for non-removal’ form is very much a bureaucratic document, reading as follows :

“My name is Yeung Kam-shui, Fujianese, Mandarin-speaking.  I hold no government position in the Mainland, (and I) am not a cadre.  I have been overstaying in Hong Kong without extension (of stay) or taking up any employment.  I wish to go back to the Mainland as soon as possible.” 

117. The applicant said that, so that the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form could be completed, the interviewing officer wrote out a set of characters and asked him to copy them.  It was the applicant’s case that he felt he had no alternative but to do as demanded.  However, at this time, he said, he told the interviewing officer that his father was a Hong Kong permanent resident and as a result he had right of abode.  He asked the officer to add this to the set of characters as he himself did not know how to write it out.  For a second time, according to the applicant, his lack of literacy was used to demean him.  According to the applicant, the officer’s response was to say, well, if you cannot write it yourself then it will not be written.

118. The attitude of the interviewing officer, said the applicant, was hostile; he behaved in a ‘very fierce’ manner.  The applicant made the surprising assertion that – at that time, many years before the concession policy was created – he knew how important it was to have it recorded in writing that he had overstayed because he believed he was entitled to right of abode.  But he was defeated, he said, by his illiteracy.

119. In my judgment, no claim for right of abode was made during the interview.  I am satisfied on the probabilities that the applicant, with his history of immigration offences, once he was arrested, knew that he would have to be repatriated and was concerned in the main to reduce any possible criminal culpability. 

120. In any event, even if I am wrong, it is clear that there is no record of any claim.

121. Concerning the lack of a record, it was the applicant’s submission that, if the various officials who dealt with his arrest and repatriation, had done their jobs properly and fairly then there would have been a record.  The lack of a record could not therefore be blamed on him.  But, as I set out in the introduction, inadvertence, even poor practice, is not capable of constituting a form of estoppel.

122. In the circumstances, my determinations are as follows :

(i)neither the applicant, nor his father on his behalf, made a claim for right of abode;
(ii)there is no record of any claim in the possession of the Director.

Mr Chong Man Kai (5286, a ‘group one’ applicant)

123. This applicant’s legal aid had been discharged before his solicitors had been able to prepare and file any affirmation on his behalf.  The applicant was virtually illiterate and for some time prior to the hearing (which took place on 11 and 12 October 2007) he had been living in the Mainland with his family.  It is not surprising, therefore, that he had not made any affirmation or statement in preparation for his hearing.

124. The applicant was assisted in presenting his case by his uncle, Mr So Cheung Yik, a Hong Kong permanent resident.  While Mr So was able to give a certain amount of advice to the applicant, and undoubtedly gave him a good deal of moral support, he knew little about the details of the applicant’s case and was himself a stranger to legal process. 

125. As it was, however, the applicant’s case was not complex.  It was founded on two asserted claims for right of abode.  The first, he said, was made by himself on 12 December 1997 when he was being held at the Victoria Immigration Centre.  The second, he said, was made by his mother and father the following day at the Victoria Immigration Centre when they attempted to obtain bail for him.  

126. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in 1961, one of five children.  His father settled in Hong Kong in 1978, his mother – suffering from a number of chronic illnesses – joined her husband in 1986.  At the change of sovereignty, therefore, both the applicant’s parents were permanent residents.

127. The applicant, by then a married man with one child, came to Hong Kong on 14 November 1997.  It was his second visit.  His two-way permit authorised him to remain until 9 December 2007.  However, he overstayed.  He did so, he said, in order to look after his mother.  He said nothing of wishing to claim right of abode.

128. His father, however, who had come down overnight from Fujian Province to testify at the hearing, remembered that his son had come to Hong Kong because rumours were still persisting that there would be an amnesty for children of permanent residents.  In this regard, the father said that he and his son went to the Immigration Tower to ask whether his son was entitled to apply for right of abode.  They were told that it was not possible. 

129. The father’s testimony in this regard accords with a statement made by the applicant in July 2000 in documents submitted to the Removal Special Project Sub-Division of the Immigration Department.  In that statement, the applicant said the following :

“On the expiry date of my travel document, i.e. 9 December, accompanied by my father CHUANG Mou-huan, I went to the Immigration Department in Wan Chai to apply for an extension of stay and submit my proof of identity, seeking permission for me to reside in Hong Kong.  However, I was refused.  Therefore, I chose to overstay.  Two days later, i.e. 11 December, I was detained for investigation by the police and was handed over to the Immigration Department.” 

130. However, when the applicant himself gave evidence, he did not speak of any visit to the Immigration Tower.  Indeed, during the course of his evidence he said on two occasions that he did not go to the Immigration Department to make enquiries.  It was only when he was shown the statement written in July 2000 that he remembered that he had, in fact, gone with his father to the Immigration Tower on 9 December 1997.

131. As I have said earlier, the father came down overnight to give evidence in this application.  His son had given evidence the previous day.  The father came directly to court and met his son who was waiting for him.  The opportunity for collusion was therefore limited.  In any event, the father impressed me as a credible witness. 

132. I am satisfied on the probabilities that the father and the applicant did go to the Immigration Tower to make enquiries concerning right of abode.  Over a span of almost ten years, it is not overly surprising that the son should have forgotten the incident. 

133. The applicant was arrested by police on 11 December 1997, a couple of days only after his two-way permit had expired.  The police made a raid on a construction site on Lantau.  The applicant was found on the 12th floor of one of the buildings under construction.  The applicant testified that he had not, however, been working illegally.  He had gone to the site, he said, to look for a clansman.  Apparently, the clansman had heard from others that extensions of stay could be obtained by two-way permit holders.  The applicant said that he had gone to the construction site to find out more about the matter.

134.  I am not in a position to determine whether the applicant was or was not working unlawfully.  The applicant, however, must have appreciated that there was a risk he would be prosecuted for breaching his conditions of stay by working.  To some degree that would have coloured his subsequent actions. 

135. The applicant spent the night of 11 December 1997 in police custody.  He accepted that he did not at any time, while in police custody, make a claim for right of abode.  However, he remembered telling the police, he said, that his mother and father were permanent residents and he hoped that they would be able to arrange bail for him.  The applicant’s memory of events in this regard accords with the case summary prepared for him by Pam Baker & Co. :

“… on 11 Dec 1997, he was identity checked in Lantau and arrested for overstaying.  He told police his father is permanent resident who can come and post bail for him.  The police said no.  The police asked him what he was doing in Hong Kong.  Mr Chong told police he came to be with his mother and father.” 

136. The day after his arrest; that is, on 12 December 1997, the applicant was transferred to the Victoria Immigration Centre.  The documentary evidence shows that he was referred by the reception office to the recognisance office.  The officer on duty at the reception office that day, Immigration Officer Lui Fung Ming, said that he would have been referred only if he had indicated some possibility of being able to obtain bail. 

137. It was in the recognisance office that the applicant was interviewed by Senior Immigration Assistant Wong Kwok Fai.

138. It was policy at that time that two-way permit holders who had overstayed for less than a month would not have to complete a personal particulars form and would not be prosecuted.  The applicant was not, therefore, required to complete a personal particulars form.  However, he did put his signature to a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form. 

139. Somewhat unusually, the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form was a sample form, all of it pre-written, the only requirement being to fill in certain details.  According to the interviewing officer, there were so many illegal immigrants and overstayers at that time that, in order to speed up the process, sample forms were run off.  The applicant’s ‘grounds for non-removal’ form contained the following :

“I overstayed in Hong Kong without taking up unlawful employment or (applying for) an extension of stay.  I cannot find any relatives in Hong Kong to bail me out but I hope that I would be arranged to return to Mainland China as soon as possible.” 

140. The Minan interpreter, Mr Sae Lin Po Lin, endorsed the form to the effect that during the interview and the completion of the form, the Fujian dialect was spoken. 

141. The form also bore an endorsement to the effect that its contents had been written by the interpreter at the applicant’s dictation.  The form being pre-written, that was not possible.  But, as the interpreter testified, the essential intention was to signify that the applicant agreed to what was written on the face of the form.

142. As to the completion of the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, the applicant said that, as a person who was virtually illiterate, he had very little understanding of the contents of the form.  It was completed for him, he said, and he was simply told where to put his signature.  The applicant accepted, however, that the form was read over to him.  He understood, he said, that he was required to return to the Mainland and said that he was agreeable to being repatriated.

143. As to his claim for right of abode, it was the applicant’s testimony that, before the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form was put before him, he spoken to the interviewing officer.  He told the officer, he said, that both of his parents were permanent residents and that he wanted them to come to the immigration centre to bail him out.  He told the officer, he said, that he wished to remain in Hong Kong in order to look after his mother.  According to the applicant, the interviewing officer reply by saying : “No way”.  The ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, of course, contains, an assertion on the part of the applicant that he was unable to find any relatives in Hong Kong to bail him out.  This is in direct contradiction to his statement that he had earlier told the interviewing officer that both his parents were permanent residents and he wanted them to come to the immigration centre for the specific purpose of obtaining bail for him.  But little reliance can be placed on the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  As I have said, it was a pre-written form.  It was not therefore ‘tailored’ to the occasion.  More than that, the interpreter accepted that, after such a long period of time, he could not say for sure that the applicant had understood all of the contents of the form. 

144. The interview only took place in the recognisance office because, as Immigration Officer Lui Fung Ming testified, the applicant must have indicated that it was possible he could obtain bail.  In my judgment, therefore, it may well be the case that at some time prior to completion of the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form the applicant did speak to the interviewing officer in the terms he spoke of during his testimony.

145. But did that amount to a claim for right of abode?  In my judgment, it did not.  His claim was not to a right to remain in Hong Kong by reason of his parents’ residential status.  His claim was instead to remain in Hong Kong to look after his mother, a claim based on compassionate grounds.

146. But even if I am wrong in that regard, there is simply no record of that claim.

147. The completion of the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form may in retrospect have been unsatisfactory.  But the applicant himself accepted that the form was read to him in a dialect which he understood.  He further accepted that he signed the form without objection, appreciating that it contained a statement that he was willing to be repatriated.  It may well be that, rather than facing the risk of prosecution for working unlawfully in Hong Kong, the applicant was more than happy to be repatriated.  Whatever the position, there can be no suggestion that the applicant was in any way made the subject of oppressive conduct, the result being that he was denied the ability to write what he had sought to write.

148. The applicant’s parents did not come to the Victoria Immigration Centre that day.  The applicant said that he was not allowed to try and contact them.  That, I think, is unlikely.  Evidence in other hearings has shown that detained persons were given the opportunity to contact family and friends in order to secure bail.  It is possible that the parents could not be contacted.

149. Whatever the true position, at 4.30 that afternoon the applicant was placed in the cells for the night, the recommendation being that he be repatriated the following day to the Mainland.

150. Shortly before his physical repatriation, apparently while the applicant was waiting to board a vehicle, his parents arrived at the Victoria Immigration Centre and, seemingly from some distance, were able to see him and very briefly communicate with him. 

151. It was the father’s testimony that, when he got to the Victoria Immigration Centre that day, he went to an office in order to seek bail for his son.  In that office, he said, he spoke to an immigration officer.  He showed the officer his identity card.  He said that he told the officer that he and his wife were permanent Hong Kong residents and wanted to bail out their son so that he could remain permanently in Hong Kong.  He told the officer that, as the two of them were getting old and his wife was often ill, they hoped that the son would be able to stay in Hong Kong to look after them.  According to the father, however, the officer said that bail was not possible.  His son had already been put on a list for repatriation and was being sent back to the Mainland that day.

152. The father said that he and his wife were then able to see the applicant but only from a distance. 

153. I found the father to be a dignified, inherently credible witness.  Upon first consideration, it may seem unlikely that the father would have combined a claim for right of abode with a request for bail.  But that, I think, approaches the matter from the viewpoint of somebody who is educated in law.  I can understand a parent, desperate not to lose a son, seeking bail on the basis that the son had a real connection with Hong Kong, indeed an entitlement to stay here permanently.

154. In the circumstances, I accept that the father may well have claimed right of abode for his son.  Again, however, the difficulties arises in attempting to identify some record.

155. When the father gave his testimony, he did not speak of the officer recording the details of his identity card in any log or other book.  He spoke only of showing his identity card to officer.  I am informed that there is no record in any log or journal kept at the time recording the visit of the applicant’s father.  Nor does anything appear in the applicant’s file which was compiled during his detention.

156. In this latter respect, evidence was given that, if an application for bail had been made, it was standard practice at the Victoria Immigration Centre to request that the application be reduced to writing so that the request could be transferred to the recognisance office.  However, no such document is to be found in the applicant’s file.

157. In the circumstances, while I am satisfied that the father did make a claim for right of abode on behalf of his son while his son was in Hong Kong, I regret that I can identify no record of any such claim in the possession of the Director.

158. In the circumstances, my determinations are as follows :

(i)the father did make a claim for right of abode on behalf of the applicant; 
(ii)there is no record of any claim in the possession of the Director. 

Mr Yau Shui Yuan (5075, a ‘group one’ applicant)

159. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in 1961, one of five children.  His father settled in Hong Kong in 1978, his mother being able to join him nine years later.  When the change of sovereignty took place, both were permanent residents.

160. The applicant married in the Mainland in 1990.  Three children were born of his marriage, the youngest in 1993.

161. In May 1997, the applicant arrived in Hong Kong.  He was travelling on a Mainland passport which contained a visa permitting him to visit Thailand.  He was allowed to remain in Hong Kong for a week.  The applicant, however, did not continue on to Thailand.  He remained in Hong Kong, staying with his parents.  He did so, he said, because, like many others, he had heard rumours that, when the change of sovereignty took place, there would be an amnesty permitting the children of permanent residents to settle in Hong Kong.

162. As to how he came to be travelling on a Mainland passport, the applicant said that in 1996 he had been given a two-way permit allowing him to come to Hong Kong to be with his parents.  He knew that this precluded him from obtaining a second permit before the handover took place.  He therefore obtained a passport, he said.  However, Thailand had never been his true destination.  It had always been Hong Kong.

163. According to the applicant, on 3 July 1997, he went alone to the Immigration Tower in Wanchai.  He hoped to be able to claim right of abode.  However, frightened that he might be arrested, he said that he did not attempt to make a claim.  He expressed it as follows in a affirmation dated 26 January 2007 (prepared with the assistance of his then solicitors) :

“… I saw many people at the Immigration Tower were being arrested.  I did not fully understand why they were being arrested, but as I had overstayed I thought that I might also be arrested.  I therefore left.  My mother’s rheumatism was particularly bad at the time, and I did not want to risk being detained or repatriated as this would prevent me from taking care of her.” 

164. The applicant testified that, at the Immigration Tower, he did not really know what was going on.  He did not, therefore, appreciate at that time that his hopes for an amnesty were false.  Indeed, if his testimony was to be believed, some six weeks later when he surrendered himself to the immigration authorities he still believed that, if a claim could be made, it would be successful. 

165. The records reveal that the applicant surrendered himself on 14 August 1997.  On that occasion, he said, he went to the Immigration Tower in the company of his father and a cousin, Mr Yau Chiu Kwun, a long-term Hong Kong resident.

166. The applicant was certain in his testimony that his single purpose for surrendering himself that day was in order to claim right of abode.  His father was there, he said, ‘to support my pursuit of the right of abode’ and also, if the applicant was arrested, to secure bail for him.

167. The applicant’s cousin, Mr Yau, had an important role to play.  In his affirmation, the applicant said that it was to ‘act as a guide and to provide translation if needed’.  It was the applicant’s case that his cousin knew that his purpose that day was to claim right of abode and understood he was there to assist in that endeavour. 

168. For reasons to which I will come, I am satisfied that the applicant had no intention of claiming right of abode that day.  The probabilities, in my view, indicate that the applicant surrendered himself on 14 August 1997 for the single purpose of being repatriated.  However, if I am wrong in that regard and if the applicant’s stated purpose that day was to claim right of abode, his cousin did nothing to assist him.  In his final submissions, the applicant had to accept that fact, saying that his cousin had not paid attention to his words. 

169. During the course of cross-examination, the applicant denied that his memory of events on 14 August 1997 was poor.  He had a good recollection, he said.  If so, this does not appear to have been the case in or about the year 2000, much closer to the events in question.  In his case summary, prepared by Pam Baker & Co. at about that time, the following is said :

“Mr Yau [the applicant] is illiterate and inarticulate.  His memory of what happened is foggy….” 

170. In this regard, it should be mentioned that, when the applicant was interviewed in July 2000 by the Removal Special Project Sub-Division, although in the papers he made mention of his visit to Hong Kong in 1997, he did not speak of it in any way as being a visit during which he claimed right of abode.  No mention was made of a visit to the Immigration Tower on 14 August 1997.

171. The applicant attempted to explain this apparent inconsistency by saying that in the intervening years he had been able to think much more about the events of 14 August 1997.

172. As to what happened that day, it was the applicant’s case that he was referred to the 13th floor, to the offices of GIS.  The applicant testified that he told the officer at the reception counter that he wished to stay in Hong Kong.  According to him, an exchange then took place.  The applicant insisted on several occasions that, with the change of sovereignty, he was now entitled to remain permanently in Hong Kong.  The officer at the counter, however, told him that it was not possible and that he would have to return to the Mainland to make an application.

173. The applicant recalled being given a personal particulars form, an ID 457, and recalled that his cousin, the literate one, completed the form.  When he testified, the cousin recognised his handwriting on that form.  In his affirmation of 26 January 2007, the applicant said that his cousin completed the form ‘with information supplied by me and my father’. 

174. The ID 457 form, however, while it gives the names of the applicant’s parents does not record their identity card numbers in the column provided for that purpose, not even the number of the father’s identity card.  Yet, if both the applicant and his father are to be believed, the father was present at that time and was aware that the single purpose of the visit was to claim right of abode, a status that had to be conferred on the applicant by reason of the residential status of one or more of his parents.  It is puzzling, therefore, if the evidence of the two is accepted, that not even the father’s identity card number was recorded.

175. In his affirmation, the applicant said that he could not recall why the details of his father’s identity card had been omitted.  However, during the course of testimony, he said that the three of them asked the officer at the counter how to fill in the form, including presumably the column requiring the insertion of identity card details, but were given no answer.  In the circumstances, the applicant suggested that they did not know how to complete the relevant column.

176. That I do not accept.  The cousin, who was called to give evidence, struck me as a reasonably competent individual and in any event he had managed to put the required details in other columns.  In my assessment, the assertion that the counter officer refused to help them in completing the form was a recent invention.  Nothing to similar effect appears in the applicant’s affirmation nor in any earlier documents.

177. After the personal particulars form had been completed, the applicant said that he was called into a room to be interviewed.  The records reveal that the interviewing officer was Immigration Assistant Yip Ka Man who at the time was a member of Team M3, the team which dealt with PRC passport overstayers.

178. In his affirmation, the applicant said the following concerning the earlier part of the interview process :

“I was then taken to an interview room.  Kwun [the cousin] did not come through with me.  Once in the interview room, I spoke to the officer in Putonghua and told him that I wanted to take up residence in Hong Kong and also apply for an identity card.  The officer then spoke, but did so in Cantonese and I could not understand what he was saying.”  [my emphasis] 

179. However, in his affirmation of 26 March 2007 Mr Yip said that in August 1997 he was able to speak both Punti and Putonghua and ‘could communicate effectively with interviewees in both dialects’.  I have no reason to disbelieve him, and no reason to think that, if spoken to in Putonghua, he would not have answered in Putonghua.

180. When the applicant gave evidence, I found it difficult to know with any real certainty whether he was referring to what had been said at the reception counter or had been said later during the course of the interview.  After the passing of some ten years, I think the applicant himself – understandably – had difficulty distinguishing between what had been said on the one occasion or the other.

181. As best as I understood it, the applicant testified that, when the interview process commenced, the interviewing officer asked him why he was there; that is, why he had surrendered himself.  The applicant said he replied that he had come to apply for an identity card.  The officer replied : ‘No’.  The applicant said that he attempted to advocate his cause by saying that sovereignty had now changed, his parents were Hong Kong permanent residents and he was therefore entitled to an identity card.  The officer, however, insisted that there was ‘no such policy’.  The applicant recalled the officer telling him that he would have to return to the Mainland, that he had already overstayed for three months and that he must go back and make any claim there.

182. Although it was the applicant’s case that he had on more than one occasion asserted his right to live permanently in Hong Kong on the basis that his parents were permanent residents, the interviewing officer, he said, refused to write these things down.  Instead, the officer wrote some characters himself and asked the applicant to copy them onto a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  According to the applicant, when he told the interviewing officer that he was illiterate and could not do so, the officer then went outside and called his cousin into the room.

183. At this stage, said the applicant, his cousin began to act as a translator.  In his affirmation, the applicant said the following :

“Kwun [the cousin] then acted as the translator.  He used Minnan to explain what the officer was saying.  Through Kwun, I repeated my wish to take up residence in Hong Kong to take care of my mother.  I described how she was suffering particularly at that time from her rheumatism.  The officer responded by saying that I could not stay and must return to the Mainland.  I felt that I had no choice but to accept that I would be removed.” 

184. As to the manner in which he came to put his signature on the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, the applicant said the following in his affirmation :

“The officer then took out a pen and a form.  He spoke to Kwun in Cantonese, and Kwun began to write on the form, while the officer was speaking.  After Kwun finished writing, he explained the content of what he had written to me in Minnan.  The officer then put the form in front of me and, in Cantonese, asked me to sign my name.” 

185. In his affirmation, therefore, the applicant accepted that his cousin explained to him (in his home dialect) what had been written on the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.

186. During the course of his testimony, the applicant said that nevertheless he did not understand.  I had difficulty in accepting that.  It may not have all have ‘sunk in’ at the time.  No doubt he was anxious.  But he would have understood the important fundamental; namely, that what was written contained no claim for right of abode.

187. The characters written by the cousin on the form were to the following effect :

“I, Yau Shui Yuen, arrived at Hong Kong on 24 May this year.  Originally, I was to go to Thailand via Hong Kong, but as my mother was ill and had to have an operation after I arrived at Hong Kong, I remained in Hong Kong so as to take care of her.  I know that I have overstayed since 1 June this year.  I declare that I have no right of abode in Hong Kong or other country except in China.  I now hope to return to the Mainland as soon as possible.” 

188. At the foot of the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, the following short endorsement was written :

“The contents above are dictated orally by Yau Shui Yuan and translated by cousin Yau Shiu Kwun …” 

189. It is plain that the applicant – a fairly slow, unsophisticated person – could not, and did not, dictate the contents of the form.  What was written in all probability was composed by the interviewing officer.  But that does not mean that was written was somehow false or was not at the time acknowledged by the applicant as being acceptable to him.

190. When he testified, the applicant’s evidence was ambiguous.  He said that he did speak to his cousin as to what was to be written on the form.  However, he said, he just told his cousin to write the characters that had already been prepared by the interviewing officer.  He said that he did not instruct his cousin to write down on the form that he was claiming right of abode.  He did not do so, however, because his cousin already knew what his purpose and wishes were.  Perhaps leading from this last assertion, in his closing submissions the applicant appeared to suggest that his cousin had let him down by not paying attention to his words and simply copying the characters given to him by the interviewing officer.

191. When the cousin himself was called to give evidence, he made it plain that he had little, if any, memory of what had taken place.  He said that he had gone along that day to help.  He had been the one who did the writing.  He had not expected it to become ‘a big affair’.  In the result, he said, he had not paid much attention.

192. The cousin’s testimony was relatively brief.  As to his character, however, he did not strike me as being timid.  He was a man of relatively mature years.  Although I come to the conclusion with some hesitation, and do not base too much on it, it would have been unlikely, I think, that the cousin would have written out the characters he did without any form of protest or enquiry if he knew that the applicant was still insistent on claiming right of abode.

193. But if I am wrong and a claim for right of abode was made either at the reception counter or in the interview room, there is simply no material capable of constituting a record of any such claim.  Indeed, the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form makes a statement to the opposite effect; namely : “I declare that I have no right of abode in Hong Kong.”  According to the interviewing officer, all PRC passport overstayers were requested to make this declaration.

194. The applicant conceded that there was no record of his various asserted claims.  But the fault for this, he said, should not be visited upon him.  If the officers who dealt with him on 14 August 1997 had written down all that he said then there would have been a record created.  The fault therefore lay in the inadvertance or poor practice of those officers.  Inadvertance or poor practice, however, are not sufficient to create any form of estoppel.

195. In the circumstances, my determinations are as follows :

(i)the applicant did not make a claim for right of abode.
(ii)there is no record of any claim in the possession of the Director.

Mr Sit Kwong Kuen (applicant 2979, a ‘group one and group 5’ applicant)

196. The applicant was born in Guangdong Province in 1965, the eldest of four children.  His father settled in Hong Kong in 1973, being joined by his mother in 1986.  Unfortunately in that same year his father died.  Despite this however the applicant’s mother continued to live in Hong Kong and by mid-1997 had become a permanent resident.

197. The applicant came to Hong Kong for the first time on 11 April 1997, his two-way permit authorising him to remain until early June.  According to the applicant, his principal reason for coming to Hong Kong was to remain here until the change of sovereignty.  Like many others, he believed that, as the child of Hong Kong permanent residents, he would then be able to claim the right to permanent residence.  The applicant therefore remained in Hong Kong as an overstayer.

198. In his affirmation of 29 January 2007, the applicant accepted that, soon after the change of sovereignty had taken place, he discovered that there would be no amnesty for people in his position.  However, different rumours were circulating, he said.   These include the rumour that, as he was claiming right of abode, if he surrendered himself to the immigration authorities, he would be allowed to remain in Hong Kong.  He was encouraged by his mother and younger brother to surrender himself.  But despite this encouragement, said the applicant, he was nervous that he would be repatriated.  In addition, he had heard that people sent back to Guangdong Province were being made to pay heavy fines.  He therefore decided not to surrender himself but to await developments.

199. On 11 December 1997, said the applicant, he was on his way to meet his brother when he was stopped by police and arrested.  At that time, his expired two-way permit was left at his mother’s home and, without any form of documentation on him, he was suspected to be an illegal immigrant.  The applicant was taken to the Tai Hing Police Station where he made a cautioned statement.  It was during the course of making this statement, he said, that he made the first of two claims for right of abode. 

200. During the interview with the statement-taking officer, he said, he emphasised that his deceased father had been a permanent resident.  His mother and brother were also ‘Hong Kong people’.  He told the officer, he said, that he had overstayed in Hong Kong to see if, upon the change of sovereignty, an amnesty would be granted to people in his position allowing him to live here permanently.  He informed the officer that he wanted to remain in Hong Kong, one of his primary concerns being the need to care for his mother.

201. In his affirmation of 29 January 2007, the applicant spoke of this asserted claim for right of abode in the following terms :

“I explained to the interviewing officer that my father was a Hong Kong permanent resident but had passed away.  I said that my mother and my younger brother came to Hong Kong and were Hong Kong residents.  I also said that I needed to stay in Hong Kong to take care of my mother, and asked whether that was possible.” 

202. During the course of the hearing, I put it to the applicant that there was a difference between the mere statement that a parent was a Hong Kong permanent resident – in this case, the applicant’s father – and making a claim for right of abode based on that status.  In response to my observation, the applicant immediately shifted the emphasis of his recollection.  He remembered telling the interviewing officer, he said, that his deceased father had been a permanent resident and through him “I could have right of abode”.  That change, in my judgment, was quite patently an invention; sadly, one of a number.  The longer the hearing endured, the less credible the applicant became.

203. As it is, the cautioned statement contained nothing that may reasonably be read as constituting, directly or indirectly, a claim for right of abode.  There was no mention of the applicant’s late father having been a Hong Kong permanent resident; indeed, no mention of him at all.  Nor was anything said of the applicant’s mother being a ‘Hong Kong person’.  The mother was only mentioned in the context of her advanced age and the need for the applicant to look after her.

204. The relevant portion of the cautioned statement made at the Tai Hing Police Station was to the following effect :

“In the period when I was in Hong Kong, I lived at my mother’s home at To Kwa Wan and took care of my mother at home because she, my old mother, suffers the diseases old people suffer … 
 My exit and entry permit for travel to Hong Kong and Macau expired on 11 June 97.  But as my mother was old, I remained in Hong Kong up to approximately July to take care of her.  By approximately July, I learnt from people from the same village that if one has overstayed, one will be fined heavily when one returns to the Mainland.  Therefore, I remained in Hong Kong, staying at To Kwa Wan …” 

205. At no time did the applicant suggest that during the statement taking he was in any way subject to oppressive behaviour by the interviewing officer.  To the contrary, he praised the officer, Constable Chan Siu Fai, as being polite and considerate.  He remembered the Constable giving him water to drink and getting a blanket for him so that he could stay warm.  Nevertheless, he said that the Constable had failed in his duty to record his claim for right of abode and to that extent the cautioned statement had deviated from what he had said and from what he wished to have recorded.

206. As to the contents of the statement, the applicant accepted that they were all true.  His concern, of course, was not with what appeared in the statement but what did not.

207. As to why, if his claim for right of abode was so important to him, the applicant had not added to his statement or asked to amend it, it was the applicant’s evidence that he was ignorant of such things and did not know how to do it.  While I accept that the applicant was no doubt under stress, nervous and largely at a loss in strange surroundings, the fact remains that, on his own admission, the interviewing officer was considerate and, in addition of course, the applicant signed an endorsement at the end of the statement saying that he knew he was free to make any amendment, correction or supplement that he wished.

208. On 12 December 1997, the applicant was moved from the Tai Hing Police Station to the Victoria Immigration Centre where on the following day; that is, on 13 December 1997, he was again interviewed.

209. In respect of this interview, the testimony of the applicant was markedly different from that of Immigration Officer Sin Fu Ming, the officer who testified that he was the one who conducted the interview.

210. First, the applicant testified that he underwent two separate interviews that day, not just one, and it seemed to him that they were conducted by different officers.  In this regard, in his affirmation of 29 January 2007, the applicant spoke of having a first interview, being taken back to his cell and then —

“After a while, I was taken into another room, and saw another Immigration officer.  This officer produced another form.”  [my emphasis] 

211. This second interview, said the applicant, was conducted by an officer who was not in uniform but was wearing civilian clothing.  His most startling assertion, however, was that this second interview was conducted in total silence.  His evidence was to the effect that he was escorted to a large table that was raised above the others.  There were a lot of papers on the table.  The man at the table – in civilian clothing – tapped his finger on one sheet of paper and with hand movements indicated to the applicant that he was to copy from that paper onto another paper which was placed in front of him.  The applicant said that he complied with this instruction without speaking.  When he had copied the characters, the officer indicated, again with hand movements, that he should sign.  The applicant duly signed.  That being done, he was then escorted back to his cell.

212. The document which the applicant completed during that purported second interview was identified by him as a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, the characters that he copied being translated to the following effect :

“I am called SIT Kwong Kuen, a person of Guangdong Province and speak in Cantonese.  I have overstayed in Hong Kong without applying for extension of stay and taking up employment.  Now I want to return to Mainland China as soon as possible.” 

213. During the course of cross-examination, the applicant was asked how it was, if no questions were asked, the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form contained an assertion that he had not taken up employment in Hong Kong.  The applicant had no answer. 

214. The applicant, of course, made no assertion that any claim for right of abode was made during this purported second interview.  It was afterall, according to him, conducted in silence.  It appeared to be the thrust of his evidence that he really did not know what he was signing, had no idea of the true import of the document and simply did what he was instructed; in short, in such circumstances, he could not have been expected to write down any sort of claim for right of abode.

215. It was, however, the applicant’s case that in the first purported interview he had made an oral claim.  According to the applicant, the purpose of this first interview appears to have been simply to complete a personal particulars form.  It was when he was completing this form, he said, that he made his claim.  In his affirmation of 29 January 2007, the making of the claim and the response to it is described as follows :

“I told the Immigration officer that both my parents are Hong Kong permanent residents and that my younger brother also came and is a Hong Kong resident and that I should be able to stay in Hong Kong.  The officer ignored me and told me not to talk so much and told me that these things were not important – ‘we don’t need that’ – and just do what he told me to do.”  [my emphasis] 

216. I have emphasised the phrase ‘both my parents’ in that extract from the affirmation because during his testimony the applicant laid considerable emphasis on the assertion that in December 1997, although his mother was a Hong Kong permanent resident, he did not appreciate that fact and had therefore relied only on the fact that his deceased father had been a permanent resident and that his claim to remain in Hong Kong was through him and him only.  Indeed, at one part of his testimony, after I had told him that by December 1997 his mother would have been a permanent resident, he acknowledged that this was a matter he had not earlier understood.  The contents of his affirmation, of course, was not consistent with this.

217. As to the completion of the personal particulars form, details were not given of the father.  It was the applicant’s evidence that, when he came to the line requiring him to give details of his father, he hesitated.  It was then, he said, that he told the immigration officer who was with him that his deceased father had been a permanent resident.  It appeared to be the applicant’s testimony that, if his father had been alive, he would definitely have written something on the form to the effect that his father had been a Hong Kong permanent resident and he wished to remain in Hong Kong on the strength of that status.  It was only the fact that he did not wish to speak of the dead, said the applicant – that being his custom, or at least his family’s custom – that gave him pause before writing.  As it was, he said, the officer told him that it was not important and there was therefore no need to write down that his father he had been a permanent resident. 

218. The applicant said that this conversation with the immigration officer was continuing as he wrote down details of his mother on the next line.  He put nothing about her immigration status, he said, because at that time, as I have just said, he did not appreciate that she was also a Hong Kong permanent resident.

219. The applicant said that he was planning to write something on the personal particulars form to record his statement that, as the son of a permanent resident, he should be entitled to stay in Hong Kong but was not able to do so because the form was then taken away from him.  The officer apparently told him that there was nothing more that need be written on the form.  In the result, nothing was written about his brother or sister or other family members in Hong Kong.  A line was put through this portion of the form.

220. It was, therefore, the applicant’s case that, the opportunity to record his claim in this first interview was denied him while the opportunity to make a record in the second interview was also denied him, the second interview of course being conducted in silence, he having no idea of the nature or purpose of that interview.

221. On behalf of the Director, however, Immigration Officer Sin Fu Ming testified that there was only one interview that day.  That single interview was conducted by himself.  I am satisfied that Mr Sin’s evidence must be correct.  Both the personal particulars form and the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form bear his handwriting.

222. Mr Sin said that, contrary to the assertion of the applicant, he was not dressed in civilian clothing.  He and the other immigration officers came to work everyday in uniform.  Mr Sin also denied that there was any raised table of the kind described by the applicant.  All the tables in the working area, he said, were on the same level.

223. Mr Sin had no independent recollection of the interview but said that, if any interviewee wished to endorse a personal particulars form with specific information or wish to say anything in a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, he would have been permitted to do so.

224. The ‘grounds for non-removal’ form contains a familiar order of characters.  It is very unlikely that those characters would have been written by the applicant without assistance.  But Mr Sin accepted that he kept a stock of sample answers to which he could refer if an interviewee required assistance.  In this regard, I can do no better than refer to his affirmation of 21 March 2007:

“… I had come across interviewees who had indicated a willingness to return to the Mainland, but had difficulty in organizing their answers to the questions that I put in completing the Grounds for non-removal forms.  For these cases, having heard their answers given during the interview, I would provide 1 or 2 sample statements for their consideration and reference as appropriate to assist them to complete the Grounds for non-removal form.  During my attachment to the Processing Unit, I had used approximately five samples written in Chinese.  However, due to the lapse of time, I cannot retrieve or remember the contents of the samples that I had used at the material time save that I recall they covered the more common cases that I came across on a day to day basis in the Processing Unit.  The interviewees were entirely free to decide (i) whether they wished to make reference to the said sample at all; and (ii) whether they wished to adopt the contents of the sample in whole or in part.  If the interviewees wished to make reference to the said sample, they were free to make any addition, deletion, or amendments, as appropriate, and I would not direct the interviewees to follow the exact wordings of said sample against their will.” 

225. As I have said earlier, in my opinion the applicant was not a credible witness.  It was apparent that he was prepared quite significantly to shift his evidence if he thought that it may advance his case.  Although not highly educated, the applicant well understood the dynamics of what was required to prove his case.  His cross-examination of witnesses illustrated that.

226. In my judgment, if, when making his cautioned statement, the applicant had explained that he had remained in Hong Kong hoping to claim amnesty, his father being a Hong Kong permanent resident, I see no reason why something to that effect would not have been written on the face of the statement.  It appears to me that the applicant’s main concern in the course of his interview was not to record a claim for right of abode but was rather to co-operate with the interviewing officer as to how he had come into Hong Kong and to put himself into a sympathetic light, again unsurprisingly, by talking of his responsibility to care for his aged mother.  In fact, as it transpired during the course of the hearing, at the time his mother was just 53 years of age and in good health.  She was not, therefore, an old woman prone to the ailments of old age as appears in the cautioned statement.

227. It is to be remembered that the applicant did not suggest that Constable Chan who took the cautioned statement, or Mr Sin who conducted the interview at the Victoria Immigration Centre, threatened or intimated him.  In essence, his allegations were restricted either to an assertion of neglect or of deficient, brusk practice.

228. As for the single interview at the Victoria Immigration Centre, I find it difficult to believe that the applicant could in good faith have such an erroneous memory of what took place.  During the course of his testimony, he admitted that not a great many incidents of high moment had happened in his life and that was why he had a very clear memory of the events in question.  If that was the case and he did have a good memory of events then he must have intentionally distorted his recollection for tactical purposes.  Indeed, I am sure he did in order to try and explain why, if he was anxious to record a claim for right of abode, he had nevertheless written nothing on the particulars form or the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.

229. As to the record of any claim, it was the applicant’s case that the cautioned statement was itself the record of the first claim while the personal particulars form was the record of the second claim.  It appeared to be his case that these documents should have contained the claims and, as such, were relevant records.  But, of course, as the applicant himself admitted, while they were records, they did not record, directly or indirectly, the claims for right of abode which the applicant said he had made.  In the circumstances, in my view, they could not constitute records of any claim. 

230. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)the applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;
(ii)the Director has no record of any claim.

Madam Li Yeuk Wai (2300, a ‘group one’ applicant)

231. This applicant’s legal aid was also discharged before her solicitors were able to prepare and file any affirmation on her behalf.  Thereafter, acting without the benefit of any form of legal representation, it is not surprising that the applicant did not prepare any affirmation or statement of her own.  In the circumstances, when she presented her case, it was necessary to guide her slowly through her evidence to understand both the basis of her application and the matters of asserted fact which supported it.  The applicant was virtually illiterate.  This was a further factor which added to her difficulties in presenting her case.  As it turned out, however, her case was not complex.  Her application was based on a single visit to the offices of GIS on 2 January 1998.

232. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in 1961, one of five children.  Her father settled in Hong Kong in 1979, her mother joining him in the mid-1980s.  It appears that, at the change of sovereignty, both were permanent residents.

233. The applicant came to Hong Kong on 10 January 1997, her two-way permit authorising her to remain until 1 March 1997.  The applicant, however, overstayed.  She did so, she said, because of the rumour that, when the change of sovereignty took place, there would be an amnesty permitting people in her position to be reunited with their parents in Hong Kong.

234. During the course of the hearing, it transpired that the applicant had overstayed on two previous visits to Hong Kong in 1993 and 1996.  On both those occasions she had been prosecuted, being fined $2,000 on the first occasion and $6,000 on the second.  When the applicant overstayed on this third occasion, therefore, she well understood the risk of prosecution and, on her own admission, understood that the longer she overstayed the more severe the likely punishment. 

235. Like so many others, it took only a matter of days after the change of sovereignty for the applicant’s expectations of an amnesty to be dashed.  The applicant said that she heard of people in her position being arrested.  In the circumstances, she said, she went into hiding in her parents’ home. 

236. However, at about the end of 1997 the applicant said that people spoke to her mother, commenting that her daughter had overstayed for a very long time while others in her position had apparently applied for and been granted Hong Kong identity cards.  The applicant said that, in light of what was said, it was decided that it would be best to go to the Immigration Tower ‘to check’ if it was indeed possible to obtain an identity card.

237. The applicant said that she went with her father and her mother to the Immigration Tower on 2 January 1998.  They went first, she said, to the enquiry counter on the 2nd floor.  She remembered that there were many people at the counter.  She said that somebody who understood their dialect made an enquiry on their behalf.  She did not remember what was said, she said, she only remembered that they were directed to the 13th floor.  When they arrived at the offices of GIS on the 13th floor, she remembered that there were two officers at the reception counter.  Her mother went up to these officers and asked : “Can this daughter of mine get an identity card?  Can she get right of abode in Hong Kong?  Can she stay here?”

238. Her mother spoke in the Minnan dialect, said the applicant, and it was possible that the officers did not understand what she had said to them.  However, she had some vague recollection that one of the officers replied : ‘No, no such thing.’

239. Thereafter, said the applicant, they were given a form, an ID 457.  She said that they did not know the purpose of the form and were puzzled as to how best to fill it out.  Her father, she said, was the most literate of the three of them and he therefore filled out the form while she and her mother stood next to him.

240. Nothing emerges from the information given in the form to suggest that the document was completed in order to support any kind of application for right of abode.  Although it would have been easy for the father to put down his own Hong Kong Identity Card number and that of the applicant’s mother, he did not do so.  More than that, he gave as his address the home village in Fujian Province not his place of residence in Hong Kong.

241. After the ID 457 form had been completed, said the applicant, she and her mother gave it to one of the officers at the reception counter.  Thereafter, said the applicant, she was called into a room to be interviewed.  Her memory of this interview was very vague.  For example, she could not recall whether the interviewing officer was male or female.  She could not remember whether she went in with one of her parents or alone.  All she remembered of the interview, she said, was being asked to copy characters onto a form.  When shown her ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, she recognised this as the form onto which she had copied the characters.  Those characters followed the familiar litany :

“I have overstayed because of keeping company with my family and now want to go back to China.”

242. The applicant said that she had no memory of the dialogue that took place between herself and the interviewing officer.  She copied the characters, she said, because, as an overstayer, indeed one who had been prosecuted on two previous occasions, she was very nervous.  She accepted that she could not remember being threatened in any way by the interviewing officer.  She accepted that she had put her signature to the document.

243. There was, therefore, no suggestion made by the applicant that she had claimed right of abode during the interview.

244. As for the copying of characters, the fact that she was virtually illiterate would explain why she had required assistance.

245. For this third offence of overstaying, the applicant was prosecuted and fined $4,800.  She accepted that, when given an opportunity to speak in mitigation at the court, she had said nothing concerning a desire to claim right of abode.

246. The applicant spoke of making a further claim for right of abode when she returned to Hong Kong in 1999.  The records show, however, that she had entered Hong Kong on this occasion on 10 March 1999 after the closure of the concession period.  

247. In the result, therefore, the applicant’s assertion that she had claimed right of abode was based on one incident only; namely, the words that her mother spoke to the two officers at the reception counter of GIS.

248. During the course of the hearing, the applicant twice described what her mother had said and on both occasions she framed her mother’s words not in the form of any sort of claim but rather as an enquiry.  Indeed, admitting that her memory of events was vague, during the course of cross-examination, the applicant accepted that her mother’s words may even have been spoken at the enquiry counter on the 2nd floor and not at the reception counter of GIS.

249. The applicant struck me as an essentially credible witness.  She did not exaggerate.  From the outset, she accepted that her memory of events – after so many years – was very vague.  She did not overtly invent matters.

250. Although, at the beginning of the hearing, I explained as clearly as I could that I had jurisdiction to determine only two questions under the concession policy, it struck me during the course of the hearing that the applicant did not really understand the policy at all.  Her claim seem to be based more on the fact that, as she was here at the change of sovereignty, and as she was the child of Hong Kong permanent residents, those facts alone warranted her obtaining the right of permanent residence in Hong Kong.  Like a number of others, she added the assertion that she had now been in Hong Kong over seven years as the result of the ongoing litigation and that fact too entitled her to permanent residence.

251. In about May 2000, the applicant submitted details of the basis upon which she sought right of abode to the Removal Special Project Sub-Division of the Immigration Department.  In her bundle of documents, she did not make any assertion that she had claimed right of abode on 2 January 1998.  Instead, at that time too it seemed to be her assertion that her mere presence in Hong Kong at the change of sovereignty was sufficient.  In this regard, she made the following declaration :

“I was present in Hong Kong from 1996 to December 1997 and also surrendered myself to the Immigration Department.  According to judgment handed down by the Court of Final Appeal, I should be entitled to the right of abode in Hong Kong.” 

252. In my judgment, it was clear that on 2 January 1998 the applicant had gone with her parents to the Immigration Tower to surrender.  That I am satisfied was her essential purpose.  It is to be remembered that she had a husband and son in Fujian.  It is also to be remembered that she had been in hiding since July of the previous year.  I accept that an enquiry as to the possibility of remaining in Hong Kong may have been made, either on the 2nd floor or at the reception counter of GIS.  But I can put it no higher than that.

253. The applicant was at one time represented by Pam Baker & Co.  Like so many others, she had a summary of her case prepared.  That summary, however, does not speak of any form of claim for right of abode being made, either by the applicant or by her mother.  It speaks only of the applicant herself asking if she could stay in Hong Kong to be with her family.  The relevant portion of the case summary reads :

“… Ms Li surrendered to Immigration Department rather than wait until she was arrested.  Accompanied by both her parents, she surrendered to Immigration Department Wanchai on 2 January 1998.  There she asked the officer if she could stay in Hong Kong with her family, the reply was no you cannot.  Ms Li is almost illiterate and her Family History form was completed by her father.” 

254. One clear claim for right of abode was recorded in or about May 2000, not by the applicant but by her younger sister who was a Hong Kong permanent resident.  The bundle of documents prepared for the Removal Special Project Sub-Division contained a declaration by the younger sister to the following effect :

“In late 1997, my elder sister LI Yeuk-wai went to the office on the 13th floor of the Immigration Department in Wan Chai to make a verbal claim to the officer of the Immigration Department : ‘I, LI Yeuk-wai, am entitled to the right of abode and can stay in Hong Kong for re-union with my parents.’  But the officer of the Immigration Department turned down her claim, saying that the Immigration Department then had no such a mechanism which allowed one to apply for settlement in Hong Kong and told her to return to the Mainland to make an application.” 

255. This assertion, of course, was made by a person who was not present at the time.  More importantly, it was never made by the applicant herself, certainly not in the course of her testimony.

256. In summary, therefore, while I found the applicant to be an essentially credible witness, there was no evidential basis, in my view, which enabled me to conclude that a claim for right of abode was made.  But, even if I am wrong in that regard, it is clear, in my view, that there is no record of any such claim.  The ID 457 form, as I have said, while it could so easily have contained relevant information as to the residential status of the applicant’s parents – both of them being present at the time and the father himself filling out the form – contains nothing related to their residential status.  The ‘grounds for non-removal’ form takes the matter no further.

257. In all the circumstances, my determinations must therefore be as follows :

(i)neither the applicant nor her mother made a claim for right of abode;
(ii)the Director has no record of any claim.

Mr Chong Kam Ku (904, a ‘group one’ applicant)

258. This applicant’s hearing took place in his absence.  However, he had been present in court in early May 2007 when I directed that his hearing would take place on 24 and 25 September 2007.  At the time, I had informed the applicant that the dates were ‘cut in stone’. 

259. As to his absence from the hearing, on 20 September 2007 a faxed letter was received from the applicant saying that he was in the Mainland and had suffered a fracture of his foot or leg.  His doctor, he said, had told him that it would take ‘nearly half a year’ to recover.  In the circumstances, said the applicant, he was not in a position to attend the hearing which, at that stage, was just four days away.

260. My clerk replied by fax to the effect that I was prepared to adjourn the hearing until 31 October 2007.  However, I was not prepared to grant a longer adjournment unless the applicant provided the court with an official medical report.  This response was not only faxed to the fax number from which the applicant’s letter had originated but was also sent by registered post to the last known physical address of the applicant in Hong Kong; that is, the address of his parents.  Although the applicant’s father had died in 1998, immigration records showed that the mother was still in Hong Kong and it was possible therefore that she was still at the same address.  The registered letter was not returned nor was any notification received from the post office that it was unclaimed.

261. To try and ensure that the applicant received my response, a member of my staff was able to contact a Ms Cheung who confirmed that she had sent the original letter by fax on behalf of the applicant and that she had received the response.  Despite this, however, nothing further was heard from the applicant.  Attempts were made on the night before the hearing to contact Ms Cheung but they were unsuccessful.

262. On the morning of 31 October 2007, the applicant’s name and the name of Ms Cheung were called.  There was no response.

263. In the circumstances, I proceeded with the hearing.  If indeed the applicant had been injured and was not able to travel, the burden was on him to supply reasonable evidence of that fact.  The indications are that he received my letter requesting formal medical details of his condition.  He chose not to reply. 

264. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in 1967, one of seven children.  His father settled in Hong Kong in 1980, his mother joining him in 1988. 

265. In an affirmation dated 26 January 2007 prepared with the assistance of his then solicitors, Messrs Barnes & Daly, the applicant said that, shortly after the change of sovereignty, he received a telephone call from his father saying that he had read in newspapers that the children of Hong Kong permanent residents were themselves entitled to live permanently in Hong Kong.  Prior to this, the applicant said, he had not heard of any rumours to like effect. 

266. The applicant continued by saying that he then applied for a two-way permit and entered Hong Kong on 18 November 1997, being permitted to remain until 1 December of that year.  His purpose for coming to Hong Kong was to secure the right to live here permanently.

267. After he had arrived, said the applicant, he and his father went to the information office on the 2nd floor of the Immigration Tower.  The applicant said that he did not understand Cantonese and his father did the talking for him.  His father told him that he had asked whether the children of Hong Kong permanent residents were entitled to right of abode and had been told that there was no such thing. 

268. Shortly before the expiration of his two-way permit, the applicant said that he went back to the Immigration Tower, this time on his own.  He went to make further enquiries, to see whether perhaps matters had changed.  He put it as follows in his affirmation :

“I asked whether there was any entitlement to the right of abode.  The reply was simply ‘no, there is nothing like that’.  Much the same as what my father and I had been told before.” 

269. At that time, therefore, on his own case, the applicant well knew the official position; namely, that a claim for right of abode could not be lodged by a person in his position with the Immigration Department.

270. In January 1998, immigration records show that the applicant’s mother and father left Hong Kong for the Mainland.  According to the applicant, a few weeks after his departure, his father telephoned him from the Mainland to say that he was ill.  As it was, his father was to die shortly thereafter.

271. The applicant surrendered himself on 2 February 1998, going to the Immigration Tower with his wife’s younger sister.  As to his purpose, in his affirmation the applicant said the following :

“I had a dual purpose in going to the Immigration Department.  On the one hand I wanted to return to the Mainland to take care of my father who was gravely ill, and on the other, I wanted to press my claim for right of abode based on his status.  Although when I previously visited there with my father I had been told that I was not eligible, I was not altogether satisfied with this.  With the assistance of someone who speaks Cantonese fluently, I would be able to press my claim concerning right of abode.  For this reason I decided to go with my sister-in-law.” 

272. However, in an interview record submitted to the Removal Special Project Sub-Division of the Immigration Department in April 2000, just two years after his surrender, the applicant did not speak of having a ‘dual purpose’ in surrendering.  He spoke of no need to return to the Mainland to care for his father who was seriously ill at the time and who the records show was in the Mainland at that time.  The interview record speaks only of a desire to remain in Hong Kong :

“In early February 1998, I approached the General Investigation Section at Room 1307, Immigration Tower, Wan Chai, requesting to be allowed to stay in Hong Kong to take care of my parents since according to provisions of the Basic Law, a person born on the Mainland to a Hong Kong permanent resident has the right of abode in Hong Kong.” 

273. The applicant and his sister-in-law – who was only 14 years old at the time – were referred to the 14th floor to the offices of the Outside Investigation Section (‘OIS’).  This was because the applicant had originally come into Hong Kong as part of a group tour.

274. According to the applicant, when he reached the offices of OIS, he asked his sister-in-law to enquire whether a person in his position; that is, the son of permanent residents, had right of abode.  His sister-in-law, he said, spoke to an officer who said that he did not have any such right.

275. In her affirmation of 23 January 2007, the sister-in-law, Ms Sze Kam Kam, made an assertion to the same effect :

“When we got to the upper floor, Mr. Chong’s travel document was produced to the officer at a counter.  I told the officer Mr. Chong’s parents were permanent Hong Kong residents and asked whether he was entitled to live and stay in Hong Kong.  The officer simply replied ‘No, not at all’.” 

276. The sister-in-law remembered the applicant completing a personal particulars form.  While it was the applicant’s case that he wanted to press his claim for right of abode based on his father’s status, it appears he did not take any proof of that status.  The personal particulars form does not give the identity card details of either parent.  That being said, of course, his parents were already in China and had been there for several weeks.

277. According to both the applicant and his sister-in-law, the applicant was then taken into a room to be interviewed, the sister-in-law having to wait outside.  Indeed, in a case summary prepared for the applicant by Pam Baker & Co., it is said that the sister-in-law ‘was not allowed to accompany him into the room’.  As a person who had virtually no knowledge of Cantonese, if his sister-in-law had been directed to remain outside, it would, of course, have placed the applicant at a real disadvantage.

278. It was, however, the evidence of Mr Ho Yuen Tung, the Immigration Assistant who conducted the interview, that, on all the evidence, it is apparent that the sister-in-law was present during the interview and even acted as interpreter.  Mr Ho observed not only that he had written on a minute that the applicant spoke the ‘Fuzhou dialect’ but had also taken a photostat copy of the sister-in-law’s identity card and placed it in the file.  He would only have done this, he said, if the sister-in-law had been present during the course of the interview.  It was not the practice to make photostat copies of the identity cards of relatives who merely waited outside.  It was quite common, said Mr Ho, to use relatives as interpreters.  The interview process was purely administrative and, if a relative could interpret, it saved the delay of having to telephone for an official interpreter. 

279. On the basis of the documentary evidence contained in the immigration file, I think it is more likely than not that the sister-in-law did accompany the applicant into the interview and did act as an interpreter during the course of the interview.  This is of some importance because, according to the applicant, when he was presented with the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, he had difficulty understanding it.  In this regard, he said the following in his affirmation :

“I tried to read the words ‘Please state your grounds for non-removal’ but I could not understand them, and I asked the officer what they were, and he read them out for me.  I still did not understand their meaning.  At this point the officer told me to copy the words written on another piece of paper or card into the space on the form, and I did so.  He said if I did not copy then I would not be allowed to return to the Mainland.  He then asked me to sign, in two places and I did that.” 

280. If the sister-in-law had been present – as I believe she was – she would, despite her young age, have acted as interpreter, doing her best to ensure there was no misunderstanding.  She would also have had a fuller understanding of the traditional (as opposed to simplified) characters written out by the interviewing officer to assist the applicant.

281. The applicant was clearly guided as what to write on the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  The sentences are arranged in an orderly fashion, the relevant points being covered to ensure the administrative purposes of the form are met.  But that does not mean that the assistance given to the applicant was improper.  It is not suggested in any of the records available to me that an untruth was written.  The following was written on the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form :

“I, CHONG Kam-ku, came to Hong Kong for visit on 18 November 1997, I should return to Fujian Province with a tour group on 1 December 1997 as scheduled but I overstay in Hong Kong because I have been staying in Hong Kong to take care of my father who has fallen ill.  I know it is wrong to overstay and I now request the authorities to arrange for me to return to Fujian Province as soon as possible.” 

282. As to what took place during the course of the interview, the case summary prepared by Pam Baker & Co. tends to mirror what the applicant submitted to the Removal Special Project Sub-Division in April 2000; namely, that he wanted to remain in Hong Kong :

“He told the officer that his parents are permanent residents and that he wanted to stay in Hong Kong but they did not reply to this.  The interviewing officer asked why he overstayed.  He said that his father is sick and he needs to stay to look after him.” 

283. There is no mention there of any ‘dual purpose’.  Of course, without hearing from the applicant himself and giving him a chance to explain, I appreciate the potential dangers of too rigid a reading of his earlier written versions.  They may not have been written with an understanding of the need for a full explanation placed in context.  But that being said, with the applicant making the choice not to attend I am compelled to do the best I can with the material I have.  That material, in my view, tends to show a material difference between the earlier accounts and the much later account in the affirmation.

284. In my judgment, again doing the best I can, the records in the possession of the Director tell against the applicant’s versions of what took place, particularly having to fend for himself in the interview.  In addition, as I have said, there are inconsistencies in the applicant’s versions of what took place.  On balance, therefore, I conclude that there was no claim for right of abode made.  There may have been enquiries, that I accept.  But enquiries are a different matter.

285. But even if I am wrong in respect of an oral claim being made, it is apparent that there is no record of any claim in the possession of the Director.  Nothing appears in the personal particulars form nor in the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  I have had the opportunity to read through the immigration file but could find nothing in that file which could constitute a record of any claim.

286. The applicant’s father died in or about April 1998 by which time the applicant was back in the Mainland.

287. The applicant returned to Hong Kong on 20 April 1998, being permitted to remain until 13 May 1998.  He said that he returned to continue his struggle for right of abode.  He spoke to his clansmen, he said, who told him there was little that could be done. 

288. On 29 May 1998, the applicant was arrested.  The cautioned statement records that he was arrested at 8.15 in the morning outside a construction site.  In the cautioned statement the applicant wrote that his mother was sick and he needed to stay in Hong Kong to take care of her.  He said that, ‘as soon as his mother had recovered, he had intended to leave Hong Kong’.  However, the immigration records indicate that on 29 May 1998 the applicant’s mother was not even in Hong Kong.  She had left Hong Kong on 6 May 1998 and was not to return until 18 June of that year.  In short, the applicant’s statement was a lie. 

289. In his affirmation of 26 January 2007, the applicant said that the police were rude to him and for this reason he did not dare to say anything other than to put forward a ground of sympathy.

290. In his interview record in April 2000, the applicant said that, while he was in Hong Kong at this time, he had been to the Immigration Tower to request an extension of stay “regarding the right of abode issue” but “was rejected”.  It is not clear what this was intended to mean.  Did he merely seek an extension on his two-way permit or did he intend to say that he made a further claim?  Without the benefit of testimony, the ambiguity remains.  However, it is to be noted that in his affirmation of 26 January 2007 no mention is made of this.  In the affirmation, the applicant spoke only of making enquiries with his clansmen and of waiting for developments.  He spoke of no approach to the immigration authorities.

291. In the circumstances, my determinations are as follows :

(i)the applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;
(ii)there is no record of any claim in the possession of the Director.

Madam Lam Kam Pui (5440, a ‘group one’ applicant)

292. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in November 1974, one of five children.  Her father settled in Hong Kong in 1981, her mother only being able to join him in 1993.  At the change of sovereignty, therefore, it was just the father who enjoyed the status of a permanent resident. 

293. In addition to the mother, two children of the family were able to settle in Hong Kong, an elder brother of the applicant and a younger sister.

294. It appears that in 1996, wishing to join her family in Hong Kong, the applicant had made an application in the Mainland for a one-way permit.  That application was refused.

295. In April 1997, the applicant came to Hong Kong on the strength of a two-way permit.  She was authorised to remain until mid-May.  She overstayed.  She did so, she said, because, like so many others from Fujian Province, she had heard rumours that, when the change of sovereignty took place, it would be possible for her to obtain the right to live permanently in Hong Kong.  It was the applicant’s case that this rumour was given support by assurances received from her mother and her younger sister in Hong Kong that the Basic Law guaranteed her a right of permanent residence.

296. Like so many others, however, when the change of sovereignty took place, the applicant was disappointed to discover that there was no declared amnesty.  Indeed, the applicant read in the media that many people who went to claim right of abode had been arrested and repatriated.  In particular, she said, she discovered that an old school companion from her village had been arrested and sent back to the Mainland.  The applicant said that she was aware that some children were not being repatriated but she did not think that any exemption granted to them would apply to her as she was an adult.

297. In the circumstances, she said, she went into hiding.  As she put it, she dared not go out.  Some five months later, however, on 11 December 1997, the applicant surrendered herself at the offices of GIS on the 13th floor of the Immigration Tower. 

298. She went to the Immigration Tower, she said, in the company of her mother and her younger sister.  They went first to the enquiries counter on the 2nd floor and from there they were referred to the offices of GIS. 

299. As to the reason for her surrender, the applicant contended that, while she appreciated that there was a risk she might be arrested and repatriated, her sole purpose that day was to claim right of abode in order to be able to remain permanently in Hong Kong.  More than that, she said that she was fairly confident she would be able to make her claim successfully.

300. Her asserted optimism, of course, flew in the face of fact that, on her own admission, she had been in hiding for the past few months and, as she was reluctantly forced to accept during the hearing, she had no knowledge of any material change in the attitude of the Hong Kong authorities concerning the issue of an amnesty to people in her situation.  The applicant, however, denied that she had surrendered herself because, after several months in hiding, she saw no alternative other than her surrender and repatriation.  Her faith, she insisted, still lay in the Basic Law itself and the guarantee it provided to her.

301. While I accept that the applicant no doubt overstayed in Hong Kong, like so many others, in anticipation of an amnesty, I am unable to accept that her surrender to the immigration authorities on 11 December 1997 was for the sole and specific purpose, as she repeatedly emphasised, of claiming right of abode. 

302. Among other things, the applicant knew at the time that, if she had any right to benefit from an amnesty, it had to be based on her father’s residential status.  He was a permanent resident but her mother was not.  In the circumstances, if the sole purpose of the applicant’s visit was to claim right of abode, it is puzzling that she did not take with her any proof of her father’s status.

303. It was the applicant’s testimony that, on their arrival at the offices of GIS on the 13th floor, her younger sister led the way to the reception counter.  At the counter, her younger sister showed the officer the applicant’s expired two-way permit and asked if the applicant, as the child of a Hong Kong permanent resident, could make an application to live in Hong Kong.  In her affirmation of 14 February 2007, the sister, Madam Lam Kam Ying, put it as follows :

“I handed over my sister’s Two-way Permit and said to the counter officer words to the effect ‘my father was a Hong Kong permanent resident, this (gesturing to my sister) is my elder sister, can she make application to stay and live in Hong Kong?’” 

304. Both the applicant and her younger sister accepted that the counter officer’s reply was unambiguous.  The sister expressed it as follows in her affirmation :

“The officer said this was not possible and that, if she wanted, she could go back to Mainland China to apply.” 

305. Although, in her final submissions, the applicant asserted that her sister’s brief conversation with the counter officer had amounted to a claim for right of abode, it was never suggested in testimony by either the applicant or her sister that it had been anything other than an enquiry; in short, a question as to whether it was possible to make a claim.

306. In her affirmation cited above, the applicant’s sister described her words as being in the form of an inquiry and not a claim.  In her affirmation of the same date, the applicant gave a mirror description :

“She told the officer about our father being a permanent resident of Hong Kong and asked if her sister (meaning me) could apply to stay in Hong Kong?  I understood the response to be that I had overstayed, and even if I was eligible, an application could not be made there, but I had to go to the Mainland to apply.” 

307. The case summary prepared for the applicant by Pam Baker & Co. is reasonably early support for the contention that an enquiry was made at the reception counter.  It reads :

“They went to the Immigration Department, Wanchai, 13th floor, and asked the officer, ‘can I get an extension to be with my Hong Kong parents.  I believed that after the changeover, I should be able to stay.’  The officer gave her a form and told her that she cannot stay, if she wants to apply, she will have to go back to the Mainland.” 

308. That advice, of course, would have fitted with what the applicant herself must have anticipated; namely, that claims were not being entertained in Hong Kong and overstayers were still being repatriated.

309. It was the evidence of the officer on duty at the counter that day, Immigration Assistant Leung Wing Yee, that, if a claim for right of abode had been made, he would have taken specific steps.  He would have —

“… asked her to produce the supporting documents, if available, such as her birth certificate and her parents’ Hong Kong identity cards, and would request her to make photocopies of the supporting documents.  When she returned to the reception counter to submit the completed form ID 457, I would also collect the original and the copy of her travel document and copies of any other supporting documents submitted by her.  All the papers submitted would be put together for further processing by a Senior Immigration Assistant.” 

310. As the evidence revealed, no such process was undertaken.

311. I am satisfied, therefore, that, while an enquiry as to right of abode may have been made, no claim was made.

312. As to what then transpired in the reception area, it was the applicant’s testimony that the ID 457 form which had been given to her at the counter was filled out by her sister while she and her mother went to another floor so that she could be photographed.  According to the applicant, the personal particulars form was therefore completed in her absence.  More than that, it was handed back to the reception officer by her sister before she and her mother had returned.

313. The ID 457 form does not contain any details of the residential status of the applicant’s parents.  There are no details of their Hong Kong Identity Card numbers.

314. The younger sister, however, made it plain in her testimony that she believed the ID 457 form was effectively a form in support of a claim for right of abode.  It was therefore, she accepted, an important form.  Despite this, she put down no information to indicate the residential status of her father, he being the one with permanent residence.  Nor did she put down any details of siblings; no details, for example, pertaining to herself to show that other immediate family lived in Hong Kong.

315. The sister said that she did not bother to get her mother’s identity card details because her mother was not a permanent resident.  In respect of her father, however, she said that she went back to the reception counter to ask if she could telephone home to obtain the details of his identity card.  Her implied purpose for the request was so that she could record on the face of the form that her father was a permanent resident.  It was the sister’s testimony that the officer at the counter – presumably the same officer who had told her no claim for right of abode could be made in Hong Kong – advised her that it was not necessary to record her father’s identity card details.  Accordingly, she said, she did not make the call.

316. When it was put to the sister that, if she remained intent on recording the applicant’s right to permanent residence, it is strange that nothing whatsoever was recorded on the face of the document, she replied to the effect that she gave her parents residential address and thought that the address would be sufficient.  If the Immigration Department required details, they could contact the parents at that address, she said.

317. The younger sister, in my judgement, was an intelligent witness.  She was not, however, a credible witness.  She was far too easily roused to indignation.  I do not believe that she completed the ID 457 form in any sort of belief that it constituted a form to support a claim for right of abode.  On her own evidence, before handing over the form for completion, the counter officer had told her that a claim for right of abode could not be made in Hong Kong.  Why therefore would he immediately give her a form to seek what was not capable of being sought?

318. It was the testimony of the applicant herself that, after she and her mother had returned to the 13th floor, she was taken in for an interview.  Her mother and sister remained outside.

319. During the course of the interview, said the applicant, some writing was placed in front of her and she was asked to copy it onto a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  The characters, in translation, were to the following effect :

“I overstayed in Hong Kong to keep company with my family.  I now want to return to China.”

320. Although the applicant had already been advised at the counter that she could not claim right of abode in Hong Kong, she said that she objected to having to write these characters.  She told the officer that her father was a permanent resident and she had the right to live in Hong Kong with her family.  The officer, however, told her that she should just copy the characters “and that will do”.  The applicant said that she then complied.  She complied, she said, because she was frightened.  In her evidence-in-chief the applicant made some mention of the interviewing officer telling her that, as an overstayer, she would have to go to court and should take $6,000 with her, failing which she would have to go to jail.  It seemed, therefore, to be her evidence that she was given a prosecution notice even before she had completed her ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  In cross-examination, however, there was a considerable shift, the assertion being to the effect that the interviewing officer had made a direct threat that, if she did not copy the characters, she would have to go to jail.

321. It was the applicant’s evidence that the conduct of the interviewing officer offended her so much that, when she left the interview, she complained to her mother and younger sister.  Her mother commented that the officer’s conduct had been ‘unreasonable’.  According to the applicant, the three of them then complained to a staff member.  They were told, however, that the applicant would still have to be returned to the Mainland.  In the result, or so it appears, the complaint was taken no further.

322. If the applicant is believed, her interview was therefore an event in which she was threatened with imprisonment and denied the opportunity to write what she really wished to write.  The interview itself was followed by a complaint made to the Immigration Department in the company of her mother and sister.

323. However, the case summary prepared by Pam Baker & Co. does not speak of any threat nor of any subsequent complaint.  It reads :

“Ms Lam was taken into a room alone.  In the room Ms Lam told the officer she wants to stay here to be with her mother and father.  The officer said that was not possible.  For such an application, she must apply in the Mainland.  The officer gave her sample Grounds and told her to copy it.  The officer then told her to bring $6000 and be at Wanchai on 16 Dec 1997 for prosecution.”

324. The applicant’s affirmation of 14 February 2007, made only some seven months earlier, makes no mention of a threat :

“The officer showed me another piece of paper and told me to copy the words on that paper into the space provided on the Grounds for Non-Removal form.  I protested.  The officer said that I should just copy the words and that would be enough.  I said that I wanted to stay and to make an application.  I said that my father was a permanent resident and that I had the right to live here with my parents and that I wanted to be with them.  The reply was simply – you don’t need to write that, just copy the words. 
 After I came out of the interview room I told my younger sister about the interview with the officer.  I told her that the officer in the interview room required me to copy a sentence from a piece of paper onto a form, and told me that I did not need to write anything else.” 

325. During the course of cross-examination it was shown that, in respect of later dealings with the Immigration Department, the applicant had been prepared to lie if she thought it would assist her.  She admitted as much.  The applicant was therefore a witness whose assertions demanded to be weighed with particular care.  As to the interview, I am satisfied that the applicant’s evidence was exaggerated and in part probably entirely fabricated. 

326. But even if I am wrong, there is no record of any claim.  It was – or more correctly, became – the applicant’s case that there would have been a record if the interviewing officer had not threatened her.  It appears that the applicant attempted to transform being told that she would have to attend court into some form of threat, a threat made during the course of the interview itself.  I have no hesitation in rejecting that assertion.  I note, for example, that the case summary by Pam Baker & Co. does not describe it in any way as a threat.

327. In the circumstances, my determinations are as follows :

(i)the applicant did make a claim for right of abode;
(ii)the Director has no record of any claim.

Madam Lau Wun Hoi (4682, a ‘group one’ applicant)

328. The applicant was born in Guangdong Province in 1962, the eldest of five children.  Her father settled in Hong Kong in 1980, her mother joining him in 1988.  At the change of sovereignty, therefore, both parents were Hong Kong permanent residents.

329. In 1995, while still living in the Mainland, the applicant was divorced from her husband.  The couple agreed that the two children of the marriage should remain with the husband in his home. 

330. The applicant came to Hong Kong in February 1997, her two-way permit authorising her to remain until April.  This was her third visit.  Like so many others, she had heard rumours that, when the change of sovereignty took place, there would be an amnesty which would enable people in her position to live permanently in Hong Kong.  After her arrival, said the applicant, she discussed the matter with her mother who was keen that she should overstay in order to take advantage of the rumoured amnesty.

331. As it was, again like so many others, the applicant’s expectations were dispelled.  The applicant testified that on 3 July 1997 her father went to the Immigration Tower in Wanchai hoping to obtain confirmation that there was indeed an amnesty.  However, when he returned, he reported that he had seen people being arrested and taken away in vehicles.

332. The applicant remained in hiding until 22 October 1997 when she went to the Immigration Tower to surrender herself.  She testified that she did so because she could not continue to stay in Hong Kong without the ability to walk freely on the streets.  Reading that into the context of her testimony as a whole, I took it to mean that she was of the view that the matter had to be settled one-way or the other.  Either she would be permitted to remain as the child of permanent residents or she would be repatriated. 

333. The applicant said that she went to the Immigration Tower with her younger sister, Lau Choi Ngan.  She said that both of her parents had to work and were not therefore able to accompany her.  As I understood it, therefore, when both she and her younger sister gave evidence, it was their assertion that just two of them went to the Immigration Tower.  However, at the very end of her case, when I asked the applicant if she wish to call any further witnesses, she said that she and her sister had, in fact, been accompanied that day by a friend.  For a short time she indicated that she wished to call this friend.  However, she then accepted that she did not know how to contact the friend and did not wish to call that person.

334. Both the applicant and her younger sister testified that, when they arrived at the Immigration Tower, they went first to the enquiries counter on the 2nd floor.  The applicant said that she could not remember what had been said at the counter.  She could only remember that she had been referred to the offices of GIS on the 13th floor.

335. The younger sister, however, purported to have a better memory of what was said at the enquiries counter.  The younger sister said that she went with the applicant that day for two reasons; first, to give her sister moral support and, second, to try and discover the true position concerning right of abode.  For that reason, she said, she asked the officer at the enquiries counter whether a child of Hong Kong permanent residents had right of abode.  As I initially understood the younger sister’s testimony, it was to the effect that she was told quite firmly that there was no such entitlement.  However, she went on to indicate that what she was told at the counter was essentially ambiguous. 

336. It was the applicant’s testimony that, when they arrived at the offices of GIS, her younger sister went to the reception counter.  The applicant said that she heard her younger sister say to the officer at the counter that the applicant wanted to go back to the Mainland and needed to know how that could be achieved.  It was the applicant’s testimony, therefore, that her younger sister spoke only of surrender for purposes of repatriation. 

337. However, when the younger sister herself came to testify, she said that she told the officer that their parents were Hong Kong permanent residents and asked whether, even though the applicant was an overstayer, it was possible for her to remain in Hong Kong.  It was, therefore, the younger sister’s testimony that she made a claim for right of abode, or at least made an enquiry concerning right of abode at the reception counter.

338. The younger sister accepted that this time she did receive a clear reply; namely, that there was no entitlement or policy of the kind suggested by her.  She said that she was given a personal particulars form, an ID 457, told to fill it out and told to wait until the applicant’s name was called.

339. As to the completion of the ID 457, this was done by the younger sister who was more literate.  When the applicant herself was asked if she understood the nature of the ID 457 form, she replied with a rare and disarming frankness that she understood it to be a document which had to be completed by people in order to be returned to the Mainland.

340. The younger sister herself did not suggest that the form was understood by her in any way to be related to a claim for right of abode.  For example, she said that she telephoned one of her parents to get their dates of birth to insert into the form but did not bother to find out their Hong Kong Identity Card numbers which would have confirmed their status as permanent residents.

341. In her affirmation of 2 March 2007, the applicant said that she did not obtain the Identity Card numbers of her parents as she ‘did not consider that it was important’.

342. I pause at this juncture to say that, in my opinion, the applicant did not exaggerate her evidence.  If she could not remember, she said so, explaining that too many years had passed.  The applicant considered each question put to her and spoke calmly in answer. 

343. Her younger sister, however, was far more aggressive, sometimes not waiting for a question to be completed before giving an answer.  During cross-examination, she rose to almost every question with an air of indignation.  I did not find the younger sister to be a credible witness.  While I accept that there may well have been an enquiry made on the 2nd floor concerning the issue of right of abode, if such an enquiry had been made I am sure that both the applicant and her younger sister would have been advised in accordance with standard practice that any claim to live permanently in Hong Kong would have to be processed on the Mainland.

344. I do not accept the testimony of the younger sister that she either made a claim for right of abode or, at the very least, made an enquiry concerning it at the reception counter on the 13th floor.  It was the first time that such an assertion had arisen.  It had not been mentioned by the younger sister in her affirmation while the applicant herself, in her testimony, spoke only of the younger sister asking about the process of surrender for purposes of repatriation.

345. In any event, there is no record of any such claim.  The ID 457 form, completed by the younger sister herself, contains no indication of any kind that the parents of herself and the applicant were permanent residents.

346. After the completion of the ID 457, the applicant testified that she was called in for an interview.  Her sister, she said, remained outside.  Her younger sister confirmed that this was the case. 

347. However, during the course of cross-examination, it was suggested to the applicant that her younger sister had, in fact, been with her during the interview process.  In this regard, the applicant was referred to a case summary prepared by her original solicitors, Pam Baker & Co.  The summary contained the following :

“After completing the ‘natural’ family members form, Mdm Lau was taken to a separate room for interview.  Her sister was permitted to stay with her.  They explained that her parents are permanent residents and that Mdm Lau needed to stay to care for her mother.” 

348. It was also pointed out to both the applicant and her younger sister that the last entry on the ID 457, which had originally contained the word ‘nil’ in black ink, had been over-written in blue ink, the clear inference being that this last entry – which gave the details of the younger sister herself – had been amended with a new pen.  The ‘grounds for non-removal’ form completed during the course of the interview was also in blue ink, the thickness of the nib suggesting that both the last entry on the ID 457 and the entry on the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form may well have been completed with the same pen.  It was put to both the applicant and the younger sister that this tended to suggest that the last entry on the ID 457 form, which, as I have said, related to the sister herself, was not completed until both were in the interview room and the interviewing officer – probably because of the presence of the sister – asked the sister to fill in her own details.

349. Both the applicant and her younger sister, however, were firm in their memories that the applicant had been interviewed alone.  The applicant said that any statement in the case summary by Pam Baker & Co. to a different effect must have been the result of an misunderstanding.

350. As to what occurred during the interview, the applicant testified that the interviewing officer, Immigration Assistant So Tsz Chung, asked her why she had overstayed for so long.  The applicant said that she told the officer that her mother and father were Hong Kong permanent residents and that she did not wish to leave Hong Kong but wished to stay here with them.  A little later in her testimony, she went on to say that she told the officer her mother, a Hong Kong permanent resident, was the one who ‘kept me here’.  I understood this phrase to mean that it had been the mother who had prevailed on the applicant to overstay. 

351. In her testimony, therefore, the applicant made an assertion that the issue of right of abode was raised with the interviewing officer.  However, when the applicant was given the opportunity to cross-examine the interviewing officer and put her case to him, she did not suggest that she had said anything at all concerning right of abode.  Instead, she put it to the officer on more than one occasion that she had said words to the following effect : ‘My mother is ill and I overstayed in order to look after her.’  The applicant was, of course, a stranger to court process.  She must have been nervous.  Sometimes, in such circumstances, the obvious can be overlooked.

352. But when all matters are taken into account, I believe the applicant, in truth, could not recall what she had said during the interview.  That was the reason for her somewhat ambiguous testimony.

353. Indeed, when the applicant gave her testimony, she said that the interviewing officer did not enter into any sort of dialogue with her.  She said that the officer simply handed her a card, instructing her to copy the characters on the card onto the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  The characters followed the familiar litany :

“I overstayed because of keeping company with my family members.  Now I wish to return to China.” 

354. Although the interviewing officer, Mr So, had no independent recollection of the interview, he said that it was his practice, if an interviewee had difficulty with characters or sought assistance, to write out some appropriate characters on a piece of paper and asked the interviewee to copy them.  If however the interviewee wished to write something else then he or she was free to do so. 

355. It was the applicant’s testimony that she did not want to write the characters which she was told to copy.  She wrote them down however, in the belief that she could not question the officer or suggest to him some alternative form of characters.  She said that she was very frightened at the time, her fear arising out of the fact that she was an overstayer.  The applicant accepted that she did not question the officer or suggest any alternative form of characters.  She simply copied the characters that she had been told to copy.  She further accepted that the officer did not threaten her in any way or act in an oppressive manner towards her.  As I understood it, her case was simply that, as she was an overstayer and he was a public figure in authority, she believed that she had no entitlement to enter into any sort of debate with him as to what should be written on the form.  As I have said in respect of earlier applications, it was a form of self-induced timidity. 

356. In all the circumstances, I cannot be satisfied that the applicant made a claim for right of abode during the interview.  But even if I am wrong in that regard, there is no record of any claim.

357. The ID 457 form which was completed by the sister gives no indication of the residential status of the parents.  I have already cited what was written on the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  There is nothing there capable of constituting a record.

358. In all the circumstances, my determinations are as follows :

(i)the applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;
(ii)the Director has no record of any claim.

Mr Wong Cheung Wan (3583, a ‘group one’ applicant)

359. This applicant’s hearing commenced on 29 October 2007, three days after his appeal against the discharge of his legal aid had been refused.  I asked the applicant if he was sufficiently prepared to proceed.  He informed me that he was.

360. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in 1962, the eldest of four children.  His father came to Hong Kong in 1973 and has lived here since then.  His mother was able to join him in 1982, bringing two children of the family.

361. In or about 1990, the applicant came into Hong Kong as an illegal immigrant.  He was arrested, prosecuted and sent back to the Mainland.

362. The applicant returned to Hong Kong on 14 March 1997, his two-way permit enabling him to remain until 11 April 1997.  He overstayed.  Like so many others, he did so, he said, because he had heard that, when the change of sovereignty took place, the children of Hong Kong permanent residents would themselves be entitled to right of abode.

363. The applicant said that on 8 July 1997, he went with his father to the Immigration Tower.  He was aware that many people were being arrested and repatriated.  However, he still wished to check whether a person in his position would be entitled to remain permanently in Hong Kong.  The applicant said that he was too nervous to go into the building itself.  So he remained outside while his father went in to make enquiries.  His father, he said, reported to him that he could not claim right of abode in Hong Kong and that, to do so, he would have to return to the Mainland.

364. However, hoping that there would be a change for the better, the applicant said that he continued to overstay.  Indeed, in August 1997, he said, he went with his father to the Legal Aid Department, hoping to join others fighting for right of abode.  His application, however, was not processed.  He received no tag nor did he complete any application form.  He was told, he said, that he was not able to join in the litigation as he had been born before either of his parents became permanent residents.  There is no suggestion that anything other than a general form of enquiry was made at the offices of Legal Aid.

365. The following month, in September 1997, the applicant said that he returned with his father to the Immigration Tower to make further enquiries.  During the course of cross-examination, however, he was reminded that in his affirmation of 18 July 2007 he had asserted that his father had merely telephoned the Immigration Department.  The applicant said that his affirmation was correct and that his memory was at fault.  There had not been a second visit.  There had only been a telephone call.  The information that his father received, he said, remained unchanged.  As to whether there was one or more visits to the Immigration Department, the case summary prepared for the applicant by Pam Baker & Co. tends to support the assertion that there was only one.  It reads :

“I came to Hong Kong in March 1997 and in July and September my father and I went to Immigration and made telephone enquiries.  But the Immigration officers all said they would not give any amnesty and settlement.” 

366. On 3 November 1997, the applicant went on his own to the Immigration Tower in order to surrender himself.  In this regard, the case summary prepared by Pam Baker & Co. is to the following effect :

“I waited in vain in Hong Kong for 8 months and on 3 November 1997, carrying my disappointment in my hands, I went to Immigration Wanchai, 13th floor, to surrender.”

367. During the course of his testimony, the applicant made it plain that his principal purpose for surrendering himself was to secure his return to the Mainland.  Not only was he disappointed that his wait for an amnesty had been in vain but his wife was not well.  As he put it in a letter addressed to the court a day or so before the hearing :

“… in November 1997, my wife in my native place had appendicitis and needed me to return there urgently, so I surrendered myself to the Immigration Department.”

368. The suggestion in the applicant’s affirmation of 18 July 2007 that he went to the offices of GIS ‘to make one last attempt to pursue my right of abode’ and, only if that was not successful, would he return to the Mainland goes directly against his testimony and the contents of his letter.

369. The applicant’s recollection of what happened at the offices of GIS was (understandably) vague.  The applicant recalled an officer – seemingly the officer on duty at the reception counter – asking him why he had overstayed for so long.  The applicant said that he replied to the following effect : “I overstayed because I thought there would be an amnesty.  But I know now that there is no amnesty and so I want to return to the Mainland.”  This testimony accords with the case summary prepared by Pam Baker & Co.; namely, that, disappointed there was no amnesty, the applicant surrendered himself so that he could be returned to his family in the Mainland.

370. The applicant had no real memory of completing a ‘personal particulars form’.  When shown the document, he recognised his handwriting.  But he could not remember the circumstances in which the document had been completed.  Suffice to say that the ID 457 form, while it gives the names, ages and the Hong Kong address of the applicant’s parents, does not give their Hong Kong identity card numbers nor does it say anything, direct or indirect, as to their residential status.

371. It is to be noted that in the case summary prepared by Pam Baker & Co. no suggestion is made that the applicant at any time made an enquiry about right of abode or asserted a claim in that respect.  All the case summary records is the following :

“I was asked to complete a family background document.  Immigration officers asked me why I overstayed that long before wanting to return to the Mainland.  I answered that I was waiting for the amnesty, but now that there was no amnesty, I wanted to return to the Mainland.” 

372. The applicant struck me as a slow, taciturn individual.  I found him in most matters to be credible.  Indeed, I gained the strong impression that he wished simply to tell his story as he remembered it in the hope that somewhere in it I would be able to extract sufficient to find that he was entitled to benefit under the concession policy.

373. The applicant clearly understood the importance of a record in successfully advocating his case and only in one respect – concerning the possible existence of a record – did he make a foray into what, in my assessment, was a spur-of-the-moment invention.  During his interview, the applicant said that he was asked a second time why he had overstayed so long.  He then replied that he had overstayed believing there would be amnesty.  More than that, he wrote on a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form characters to that same effect.  However, he said that he did not know how to write the characters for the word ‘amnesty’.  He therefore asked the interviewing officer, Ms Ma Suk Kwan, for assistance.  However, the interviewing officer then gave him a new sheet on which to write, suggesting an entirely new form of words.  He complied with that suggestion, copying the characters that she had written.  As to the first sheet of paper, the one that was partially completed, he said, he did not know what had happened to it.  But that would constitute a record.  The applicant’s GIS file was examined but there was no partially completed ‘grounds for non-removal’ form found in it.

374. The ‘grounds for non-removal’ form contained in the file, the one to which the applicant put his signature, is in familiar form.  It reads :

“I have overstayed because of keeping company with my family.  I now want to return to Fuqing City, Fujian Province, China.”

375. Ms Ma, the interviewing officer, said that, if an interviewee did not know what to write, she would assist.  But an interviewee, she said, was always free to write what they wished.

376. As I have indicated earlier, in the Pam Baker & Co. case summary, nothing is said specifically of what occurred during the interview.  The summary makes no mention of any partially completed document.  The applicant’s affirmation is more detailed but nor does it make any mention of a partially completed form.  It says only :

“I was then taken into another room for an interview.  I recall that the officer was female.  She asked me the same question as had the counter officer – namely why I had overstayed for so long.  I gave the same reply, i.e. that I thought there would be an amnesty.  The officer gave me a form, and another piece of paper and told me to copy the words down on to the space in the form.” 

377. In any event, even if there had been an initial, partially completed form, on the basis of the applicant’s testimony, it would not have amounted to a record of a claim.  According to the applicant, all he wrote, or began to write, was an explanation of why he had overstayed; namely, that he had overstayed because he believed there might be an amnesty.  That, of course, is different from making an assertion that he is entitled to remain permanently in Hong Kong.

378. In summary, while I am satisfied that the applicant’s father did make enquiries on his son’s behalf concerning right of abode – once by a personal visit and once by telephone – I am satisfied they were no more than enquiries.  Even if I am wrong in this regard, there is no record of these contacts.

379. I am further satisfied that by November 2007 the applicant had accepted what he then saw as being the reality of the situation; namely, that there was – and would be – no amnesty.  He therefore surrendered himself so that he could return to his life in Fujian Province.  Even on the applicant’s own evidence, taken at its highest, it would distort matters to find that he made a claim for right of abode.

380. Concerning the visit to the Legal Aid Department by the applicant and his father, while I accept that such a visit was made, on the evidence, as I have said earlier, it did not amount to anything more than a general enquiry.  In any event, the judgment of the CFA given in January 2002 deals with the issue, para.219 of the judgment reading as follows :

“According to the evidence, it was the practice of the Legal Aid Department to accept applications and consider their merits in order to decide whether to grant legal aid or not.  Those persons who were ‘turned away’ were likely to have been people who had made general inquiries only and had been informed by the staff of the rulings of the court at the relevant time.  If they were not merely making enquiry and were serious about their claims, they would have insisted on applying for legal aid to pursue their claims and their applications would normally have been accepted and considered, even if consideration resulted in refusal of the application.  There were also those persons who had been granted legal aid but later, upon legal advice, had their legal aid certificates discharged.  However, after the Chan Kam Ngadecision at first instance was publicised, if they had applied again, they would have been reconsidered. In any event, the approach which these persons made to the Legal Aid Department cannot be regarded as a claim because it was not a claim made to the Immigration Department of which there was a record.” 

381. As for the applicant’s surrender to GIS on 3 November 1997, it was his submission that the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form which he signed constitutes evidence both of a claim for right of abode and a record of that claim.  In his letter addressed to the court, the applicant put his argument in the following way :

“In the column of ‘reason for overstaying’ in the surrender form, I wrote that I overstayed for keeping company with my family.  That is to say, my parents have been living in Hong Kong for more than 20 years, I came for reunion with my father and mother and thus overstayed.  Because the term right of abode had not yet been created back then, keeping company with my family is indeed a claim that I have the right and the obligation to stay in Hong Kong to take care of my aged and ailing parents, especially my mother whose health is poor.” 

382. It is a disarming submission but, in my opinion, of no weight.  No matter how it is read, the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form does no more than explain why the applicant had overstayed and then state a wish; namely, the desire to return to the Mainland.  It is not capable of constituting either a claim or a record of a claim.

383. Accordingly, my determinations are as follows :

(i)that the applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;
(ii)there is no record of any claim in the possession of the Director.

Madam Hui Ching Na (4581, a ‘group one’, ‘group five’ and ‘group six’ applicant’)

384. This applicant may originally have had legal aid but there has been no contact with her since about February 2000 when apparently she passed through Hong Kong on her way to the Philippines.  This is despite the fact that a number of letters have been written to her.

385. By letter dated 23 July 2007, addressed to her last known Hong Kong and Mainland addresses, the applicant was informed that her application had been set down for hearing on 9 and 10 October 2007.  She was informed that, if she did not attend, her application would be determined in her absence.  As with all other correspondence sent to the applicant, the letter was in both English and Chinese.

386. The applicant did not attend court on either 9 or 10 October 2007.  In the result, her application was determined in her absence. 

387. The applicant’s last known Hong Kong address was problematic.  I say that because it was the address of her father who died in 2003.  Although in October 1997 the applicant recorded in a personal particulars form that she had a brother living at the same address, it is not known whether, after his father’s death, the brother continued to live there and, if so, for how long. 

388. The Mainland address appears to be more certain.  It is the address which the applicant wrote on her personal particulars form in October 1997 and which she recorded again in an application submitted to the Philippines Consulate General in Xiamen in December 1999 when applying for a non-immigrant visa to visit the Philippines.  It is the address of her village in Fujian Province, the village where she was raised.  

389. For what it is worth, it should be said that none of the letters addressed to the applicant’s last known Hong Kong or Mainland addresses have been returned.

390. During the course of 2007, aside from the one letter written by the Registrar of the High Court, two letters were written to the applicant by the Department of Justice, the first dated 13 June and the second dated 11 July.

391. In my judgment, all reasonable steps had been taken to contact the applicant to advise her of the hearing of her application.  It is to be remembered that the essential burden has rested on her to pursue her claim.  She has not shouldered that burden.  Indeed, the probabilities suggest she had simply abandoned her claim.

392. Because there has been no contact with the applicant since early 2000, no formal papers were prepared for her, or by her, setting out the basis of her claim to be a beneficiary under the concession policy.  There was only one document in which the claim had been outlined.  That is a case summary prepared by Pam Baker & Co. in or about 1999 or 2000.

393. In that summary, three separate claims are outlined.  First, a claim made to the police when the applicant was arrested as an overstayer on 14 October 1997; second, a claim made to the Immigration Department on the following day at the Victoria Immigration Centre and, third, a number of claims apparently contained in letters written by the applicant’s father to the Director of Immigration between October 1997 and February 1998. 

394. By way of background, it should be said that the applicant was born in July 1954 in Fujian Province.  She was one of six children.

395. The applicant came to Hong Kong on the strength of a two-way permit in May 1990.  Although she was married with three children, she overstayed.  Indeed, she remained in Hong Kong as an overstayer until her arrest by the police on 14 October 1997, a period in excess of 7 years.

396. The applicant may well have overstayed in order to look after her parents.  The records showed that her mother was not a well woman.  Among other ailments, she was a diabetic.  Her mother died at a relatively young age in 1993.  Her father was to die 10 years later in 2003.

397. The applicant’s case summary also gave as one of her reasons for overstaying the anticipation that, when the change of sovereignty took place, there would be an amnesty for the children of Hong Kong permanent residents. 

398. Concerning the applicant’s asserted claim for right of abode made while in police custody, the case summary records the following :

“After being arrested, [the applicant] told police that she had stayed to be with her father who is a permanent resident.  Her mother had died, and her father needed her to stay and care for him.  She was asked for her parents’ names, address and other details, which she gave.” 

399. On an ordinary reading of that extract, I have difficulty in concluding that it amounts to a claim for right of abode.  In my view, it amounts rather to an explanation of why the applicant had overstayed for so long.  Yes, it does mention the fact that her father is a permanent resident but I do not see that this on its own, in the context of what is written in the case summary, can transform what is an explanation into an assertion of a right in law.

400. As is mentioned in the case summary, it is clear that the applicant did give certain personal particulars to the police.  These appear in an Overstayer Referral Proforma dated 14 October 1997.  There is however nothing on the face of that document which, directly or indirectly, constitutes evidence of any claim.

401. As the applicant was transferred into the custody of the Immigration Department on the day of her arrest, no cautioned statement was taken from her by the police.  It is possible, of course, that the arresting officer may have made certain notebook entries.  The notebook, I understand, was destroyed in accordance with normal police practice many years ago.  Its contents are not known.

402. In the circumstances, I cannot be satisfied that a claim for right of abode was made while in police custody.  Even assuming that a claim for right of abode was made, there is simply no record of any such claim.  

403. As I have said, the applicant was transferred into the custody of the Immigration Department at the Victoria Immigration Centre on the day of her arrest.  While there, she completed a personal particulars form and, in the course of an interview, put her signature to a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.

404. The personal particulars form gives the names of the applicant’s father and her deceased mother but says nothing concerning their residential status. 

405. The ‘grounds for non-removal’ form is a pre-written form to which the applicant placed her signature.  It is very much an administrative form, bureaucratic in its language.  It reads :

“I, HUI Ching-na, have overstayed in Hong Kong.
 I have not worked or applied for extension in Hong Kong.
 I wish to return to the Mainland China as soon as possible.”

406. As to what occurred in the custody of the Immigration Department, the applicant’s case summary is to the following effect :

“She completed a family background form giving her parents’ address.  She was asked whether her father could post bail for her but [the applicant] had so far been unable to contact her family by telephone.  She was then held in detention pending prosecution.  Although [the applicant] cannot recall whether she specifically asked to be permitted to remain in Hong Kong with her father on the basis of his permanent resident status, she believes she probably did.”  [my emphasis] 

407. It will be seen from the portion of the case summary that I have emphasised that, even at the time the summary was prepared, the applicant could not remember whether she had in fact made a claim for right of abode.  She could put it no higher than she believed she probably had.  

408. No suggestion is made in the case summary that, when completing her personal particulars form or when putting her signature to the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, the applicant was in any way made the victim of oppressive conduct.

409. In the circumstances, in my view, there is simply not enough evidence to show that the applicant did claim right of abode at the Victoria Immigration Centre.  But if I am wrong in that regard, and it is assumed that such a claim may have been made, there is no record of any such claim.

410. On 17 October 1997, the applicant was convicted of breach of her conditions of stay and sentenced to six months’ imprisonment.  Upon her release from prison in early 1998 she was repatriated.

411. According to the case summary, while she was serving her term of imprisonment, the applicant’s father wrote a number of letters to the Director of Immigration asking that, upon his daughter’s release, she be permitted to remain in Hong Kong.  In this regard, the case summary is to the following effect :

“Throughout the time that [the applicant] was imprisoned, her father wrote numerous letters to the Director of Immigration asking that she be permitted to remain with him after her release.  He is now elderly and unable to remember the precise dates, but he emphasises that he wrote numerous letters to the Director of Immigration in this period.” 

412. Although the case summary asserts that the father wrote ‘numerous’ letters to the Director of Immigration while his daughter was in prison, the Director has no record of any letter being received from him during that period.  The adjective ‘numerous’ is, of course, open to interpretation.  But, on an ordinary reading, it would indicate more than just one or two letters.  If more than just one or two letters were in fact written during this period of time, it seems unlikely that the Director should not have a record of receiving even one.

413. It is also to be noted that, if letters were written by the father to the Director of Immigration when the applicant was serving her prison sentence, there is no evidence that he kept copies.  Their content is therefore a matter of conjecture.  Did they contain claims for right of abode or were they simply requests seeking an exercise of compassion on the part of the Director by allowing the applicant to remain in Hong Kong to look after an aged parent?  The case summary, if anything, obliquely suggests the latter.

414. It is pertinent to note that the evidence revealed that the applicant’s father did keep copies of some of the letters that he wrote.  These, however, were all letters written after the closure of the concession period at a time when there would have been a dawning appreciation of the importance of having claimed right of abode during the concession policy.  However, even these later letters remain somewhat ambiguous, the lines being blurred between what may be read as recording a past claim for right of abode or a past request based on compassionate grounds only for the applicant to be allowed to remain in Hong Kong to care for the father.

415. I find it difficult to accept that, after the concession period had closed, the father then kept copies of all his letters but had failed to do so before.  This raises a real doubt in my mind as to whether there were any earlier letters.

416. In all the circumstances, I have come to the following determinations :

(i)the applicant did not make a claim of right of abode;
(ii)the Director has no record of any claim.

Mr Yeung Ka Wong (5088, a ‘group one’ applicant)

417. This applicant was the first of the two applicants who had the benefit of legal representation, his counsel being Mr Kwok Sui Hay.

418. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in 1962, one of four children.  His father settled in Hong Kong in 1981, his mother joining him in 1988.  By the change of sovereignty both had become permanent residents.  Two of the applicant’s siblings, his elder brother and a sister, were also able to settle in Hong Kong before the change of sovereignty.

419. At the change of sovereignty, only the applicant and one brother still lived in the Mainland.  The applicant was then 35 years old.  He was married and had two children.

420. It was the applicant’s evidence that he had long wished to settle in Hong Kong.  In the months preceding the change of sovereignty he had heard rumours, he said, that, when the change took place, there would be an amnesty permitting the children of Hong Kong permanent residents to take up residence in Hong Kong.  He therefore applied for a two-way permit, hoping to be in Hong Kong when the handover took place.  His permit, however, only permitted him to come to Hong Kong on 16 July 1997 for a period of 30 days.

421. The applicant said that when he arrived in Hong Kong he was informed by his elder brother that the rumoured amnesty had proved to be false.  However, he was told that people were still actively pursuing the right to settle in Hong Kong.  For this reason, said the applicant, on the very day of his arrival, having left his luggage at his parents’ home (or perhaps more correctly, the home his parents shared with his elder brother), he and his elder brother went to the Immigration Tower in Wanchai to seek to claim right of abode.

422. It was an important part of the applicant’s case that, before departing for the Immigration Tower, his father made out a power of attorney.  In that power of attorney, the father appointed the elder brother, already a Hong Kong resident, to act as his agent in claiming right of abode on behalf of the applicant and the other son of the family who still lived in the Mainland.

423. The applicant testified that he was present and witnessed his father writing out the power of attorney.  The English translation of the document is to the following effect :

“POWER OF ATTORNEY
 I, Yeung Sai Ming, holder of identity card no. xxxxxxx(x) hereby appoint my eldest son Yeung Ka Lung as attorney with full power to make on my behalf claims to right of abode in Hong Kong for my two sons Yeung Ka Wong and Yeung Ka Hing to the Immigration Department because I am troubled by various diseases and old age and I am inconvenienced in many ways.  I hope that the Government will grant approval for that.”
 Thanks.
 Yeung Sai Ming (signature)”

424. At that time the father was hardly in his ‘old age’, he was in fact 62 years old and worked at a factory.  But, according to both the applicant and his elder brother he was not in good health.  The applicant added that his father did not know his way around or ‘how to speak’ which I took to mean that his father remained unfamiliar with Hong Kong and Hong Kong ways.

425. It was the applicant’s case that, armed with the power of attorney, he and his elder brother went to the Immigration Tower that same day; that is, on 17 July 1997.  The applicant remembered that they went to the enquiries counter on the second floor.

426. As to what took place at the counter, as the applicant was not conversant in Cantonese, he had to leave matters to his brother and rely on what he reported to him.  In his affirmation of 8 August 2007, the brother, Yeung Ka Lung, said the following :

“When we got to the counter, I took the document out of my pocket and handed it to the officer at the counter, who took it and put it on the counter in front of him.  I told the officer that this was a Power of Attorney document from my father and that my two younger brothers were entitled to the right of abode in Hong Kong under the Basic Law.  I told the officer, gesturing towards my younger brother [the applicant], that one of my younger brothers was with me to obtain his right of abode.  The officer looked at my brother’s Two-way Permit.  I told the officer my father was already a permanent resident of Hong Kong.  The officer asked whether my father had a ‘black seal’ on his ID card when my brother was born.  I said he had not.  The officer replied that they did not process these sorts of things there and that such applications had to be made in the Mainland and in any event right of abode would only be granted to those who were born after at least one parent had become a permanent resident of Hong Kong.  The Power of Attorney and my brother’s Two-way Permit were given back to us, and we left the office.” 

427. If it is accepted that this conversation may have taken place then, in my judgment, even though it took place at the enquiries counter, it would have constituted a claim for right of abode made by the brother on behalf of the applicant.

428. During the course of his testimony, the elder brother said that he pressed the power of attorney on the officer at the counter, wanting him to place it into the records of the Immigration Department.  The officer, however, refused to accept it.  The information office, of course, referred matters, if necessary, to other sections.  It did not itself keep records of that kind.

429. In April 2000, less than three years after the event, the applicant was able to describe the visit to the Immigration Tower in some detail.  His record of interview with the Removal Special Project Sub-Division of the Immigration Department was to the following effect :

“I … went together with my blood elder brother, Yeung Ka Lung, on the morning of 17 July 1997 to the Enquiry at the second floor of the Immigration Department at Wan Chai to enquire about and ‘claim’ the handling of right of abode in Hong Kong.  The officer on duty was a male.  He replied: If you want to have right of abode in Hong Kong handled, either of your father and mother should be a Hong Kong permanent resident at the time of your birth.  Only in such case can you have it handled.  That was the first time I was rejected.
 No document was accepted.”

430. The insertion of the final phrase – “No document was accepted” – is, in my view, of some relevance.  The applicant and his brother spoke only of two documents that were shown to the officer at the counter, the applicant’s two-way permit and the power of attorney.  It must have been expected, of course, that the two-way permit would be given back to the applicant.  It was his effective identity card while in Hong Kong.  That would leave just the power of attorney which, as I have said, the elder brother, during his testimony, said he attempted to give to the officer.

431. It should also be mentioned that in the year 2000 the applicant wrote on a number of occasions to the Director of Immigration, speaking of events in 1997.  For example, in a letter dated 13 February 2000, he wrote :

“On 17 July 1997, I went to the second floor of the Immigration Tower in Wan Chai to make a declaration to a male officer on duty and requested to have my right of abode application processed.  But the duty officer rejected my request and did not verify my permanent resident status for me.” 

432. It was the evidence of both the applicant and his brother that they returned to the Immigration Tower the very next day; that is, on 18 July 1997, indeed to the same counter.  As to how this came about, the brother said the following in his affirmation :

“Upon returning home we discussed the matter with our parents, who wanted us to return to the Immigration tower to clarify the position.  According to my understanding of the Basic Law, my younger brothers were entitled to the right of abode.  Therefore, on 18 July 1997 my younger brother and I returned to the same counter at the Immigration Tower.  I reiterated that under the Basic Law, if either of the parents had lived in Hong Kong for 7 years, then the children born to them in the Mainland would be entitled to right of abode here.  The officer told me such applications had to be lodged in the Mainland.” 

433. Again, in my view, if it is accepted that this conversation took place, it would have amounted to a claim for right of abode.  This was no mere enquiry.  According to the brother, it amounted to an assertion of the applicant’s rights under the Basic Law.

434. In his affirmation, the brother said that, despite being rebuffed on two occasions, he still did not accept that the applicant had no entitlement to right of abode.  He knew that, if his brother went back to the Mainland, he would never be able to obtain a one-way permit.  His age stood against him.  He said that he therefore suggested to his brother that he should remain in Hong Kong.  As the brother said in his affirmation :

“At this time there was a lot of confusion as to the issues relating to right of abode, and there were various reports in the news about the issues, and we hoped they would become clearer.” 

435. Both the applicant and his brother spoke of a third visit to the Immigration Tower.  The brother described it as follows in his affirmation :

“My younger brother’s permission to remain was due to expire on 14 August 1997.  I went back with him on 13 August 1997 to try to seek a way for my brother to obtain right of abode.  However, the advice we obtained was the same as that on 17 and 18 July 1997.” 

436. The visits of 18 July and 14 August were also mentioned by the applicant in his record of interview with the Removal Special Project Sub-Division and mentioned (in a general way) in at least one letter dated 24 February 2000 addressed to the Director of Immigration.

437. As to whether a claim for right of abode may have been made on 17 July 1997, or on either of the two subsequent occasions, much depended on the testimony of the applicant’s elder brother, Leung Ka Lung.  He was the one who spoke to the immigration officers and was said to have made the claims.  However, when the brother first started to give his evidence, he was, in my view, cagey and evasive, acting as if there was somehow some merit in avoiding issues.  It seemed to me that he fundamentally misunderstood the purpose of testimony.  Stern words ensued.  I attempted to make it plain to him that the purpose of giving evidence was not to play a game of cat and mouse.  The brother was clearly shaken by my intervention.  But, having been informed of the essential purpose of evidence, his testimony thereafter was, I believe, a good deal more honest.

438. Were visits made to the Immigration Department on the three occasions described by the applicant and his brother?  I am prepared to accept that they may well have been.  No doubt the applicant – and his family – were anxious at the time to secure the best outcome for the two sons of the family who remained in the Mainland and in the circumstances repeated visits are understandable.

439. Were claims made on one or more of those visits?  Again, I am prepared to accept that they may well have been made.  Normally, of course, only enquiries would be made at the enquiries counter but that does not mean that direct assertions of right may not also have been made.  Certainly the elder brother spoke in his affirmation – and also his testimony – of making an assertion of right on behalf of the applicant and, in the final analysis, although I approached his testimony with some caution, I was not able to reject that evidence as it related to the three visits.

440. In my judgment, however, while I accept on the probabilities that one or more claims for right of abode were made, there is no record of any such claim in the possession of the Director.

441. The information office, as I have said, did not keep records.  It was not part of its function.  The power of attorney drawn up by the father may have been examined by the officers at the counter but it was never retained nor was a copy made for record purposes.  The fact that, for the moment or two when the power of attorney was examined, the officers had the document in their possession is, in my view, simply not sufficient to meet the requirements of the concession policy.

442. In Ng Siu Tung and Others v. Director of Immigration (2002) 5 HKCFAR 1, at 73A, the CFA said :

“The Director of Immigration requires that, to constitute a claim, there must either be something in writing or it was made in such a way that the Immigration Department would have kept a record of it.  In other words, it need not be in writing, but there must be a record of such claim with the Department.  In our view, this requirement is neither a misinterpretation of the policy decision nor misapplication of it.”  [my emphasis] 

443. By way of illustration, on page 75 of the same judgment (para.221), the Court said the following :

“With regard to those who had registered with the Legal Aid Department between 8 December 1998 and 29 January 1999, again their intention to lodge a claim for right of abode was sufficiently clear.  However, the Legal Aid Department did not process their applications for legal aid but wrote the Legal Aid pro forma replies to them saying that they need not take any action since the Court of Final Appeal would soon be hearing and determining the same issues.  Unfortunately, the Legal Aid Department did not forward their names, about 1,000 in number, to the Immigration Department before the end of the Concession period.  This may be understandable in view of the large number of applicants during this period of less than two months.  The list was only forwarded to the Immigration Department about a year later in December 1999.  In other words, while these persons had intended to lodge a claim for right of abode through the Legal Aid Department, their claims were not processed, and the Immigration Department at the relevant time did not have any record of their claims.  Hence, these claims do not fall within the policy decision.” 

444. Even if it was demonstrated that the officers should properly have kept the original or referred the applicant to another department where his claim could be properly dealt with and a file opened, that would point to nothing more than deficient practice.

445. Concerning the power of attorney, in April 2000 the applicant’s elder brother also made a statement for the Removal Special Project Sub-Division which ended with the following sentence :

“As the staff of your Department refused to accept the power of attorney that I tried many times to hand in to the Enquiry at the second floor of the Immigration Department, I sent the power of attorney to the Immigration Department by post.  I am not clear of the time when I sent it.” 

446. That statement, however, was deleted by the brother by putting a line through it.  On the face of it, therefore, it was an assertion which was acknowledged as being incorrect.

447. When the brother testified, he said he could not remember what had happened to the power of attorney.  He said he had actually looked for the original at his home the right before giving evidence.

448. No mention was made of posting the document to the Immigration Department within the concession period in the brother’s affirmation and nothing appears in the case summary prepared by Pam Baker & Co.  Suffice to say that the Immigration Department has no record of receiving the power of attorney through the post.

449. On that basis, I do not see how it can be claimed that the document may nevertheless have been posted.  That would constitute a generous guess not a rational deduction.

450. On 20 November 1997, in the early hours of the morning, the applicant and his elder brother were in a taxi which was stopped at a police road block.  The applicant was arrested as an overstayer.

451. At the police station, the applicant put his signature to what appears principally to be a standard administrative document bearing the title ‘overstay’.  The document does, however, record a brief series of questions and answers in which the applicant says nothing about coming to Hong Kong to claim right of abode but speaks instead of coming to visit his relatives and continuing to overstay in order to spend Christmas here.  The applicant did not accept the accuracy of the document and complained as to the manner in which it was taken.  As a piece of evidence, I considered the document to be essentially irrelevant and gave it no weight.

452. Later that same day, the applicant was transferred to the Victoria Immigration Centre and the following day; that is, on 21 November 1997, he was interviewed by Immigration Officer Chiu Wai Hung, an officer in the Processing Unit.

453. Officers in the Processing Unit dealt with overstayers who it was believed had no local connections or fixed abode in Hong Kong.

454. It was the applicant’s case that, to the best of his memory, the interviewing officer, Mr Chiu, spoke to him in Cantonese while he replied as best he could in a mixture of Putonghua and Minnan.  The implication was that there must have been only limited understanding.  Mr Chiu, however, said that he spoke Putonghua and, if he believed that there was a language barrier to communication, he was able to call in an interpreter.

455. In his affirmation of 8 August 2007, the applicant said the following as to the course of the interview :

“During the interview I asked to be released and told the officer I wanted to remain in Hong Kong to care for my parents.  I told the officer that my parents were permanent residents of Hong Kong and I had the right to be with them.  The officer did not comment on this, but asked whether I had worked and I replied that I had not.  I was then told to complete a form called a ‘grounds for non-removal’.” 

456. However, when he testified, the applicant’s evidence was much more ambiguous.  He said he remembered saying he wanted to stay in Hong Kong to look after his parents but could not remember making a claim for right of abode.  At best, he said that “perhaps” he had told the interviewing officer that his parents were in Hong Kong and he “should have the right of abode”.  This, in my view, left the matter very much in doubt.

457. It was the applicant’s case that he was told to copy characters onto the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form from another piece of paper.  Accordingly, although the characters were in his handwriting, they did not reflect his wishes.  The ‘grounds for non-removal’ form was to the following effect :

“I, Yeung Ka Wong, have overstayed in Hong Kong.  I have not taken any job in Hong Kong.  I speak Mandarin and Minnan Dialect.  I now want to go back to the Mainland as soon as possible.” 

458. When he testified, Mr Chiu accepted that, if necessary, he would assist interviewees with what to write and, in this respect, kept a number of precedent forms.  It appears almost certain that such a form was employed.

459. During the course of cross-examination, it was put to the applicant that he had a pen in his hand and there was nothing therefore to prevent him from putting his claim into writing.  The applicant admitted that he had made no complaint but he said he “did not understand” and so, when he was directed to copy, he simply did so.  At that time, he said, he “knew nothing”.

460. In the same interview, the applicant completed a ‘personal data’ sheet.  In that document, he gave details of both his parents and set down their Hong Kong address.  But nothing appears in that document indicating that the parents were Hong Kong permanent residents.

461. At the conclusion of the interview, the interviewing officer, Mr Chiu, completed a standard minute which he labelled “M3”.  The minute was a pre-printed form which he completed largely by deleting what was not applicable.  He did not delete the following :

“4.Subject has incentive to leave Hong Kong … 
 5.Subject’s presence in Hong Kong is not required by Police.” 

462. Under the heading of ‘recommendation’ Mr Chiu left the following; namely, that he recommended —

“passing the file to PD Section for consideration of O/S [overstaying] charge and following ‘VR’ [voluntary repatriation] afterwards.” 

463. In summary, he recommended passing the file to the Prosecutions Section for a possible prosecution, this to be followed by his voluntary repatriation.

464. However, at the foot of the form Mr Chiu wrote the following words :

“He was informed to be interviewed by another officer within two weeks.” 

465. On behalf of the applicant, Mr Chiu was questioned as to why he would have written this endorsement in a standard case.  He replied to the effect that he had simply recorded what he had told the applicant; namely, that he would in due course; that is, within the next two weeks, be contacted about his prosecution and repatriation.

466. It was put to Mr Chiu that the applicant had claimed right of abode during the interview and he had acknowledged that claim by writing down that he would be interviewed concerning it at a later stage.  This Mr Chiu denied.  If the applicant had claimed right of abode, he said, he would have asked him to write that down on his ‘grounds for non-removal’ form and would have referred the matter to the Removal Section.  The matter would then have been out of his hands.

467. In the final submissions made by counsel on behalf of the Director, the following was said in respect of the minute, M3 :

“Mr Chiu Wai Hung, the interviewing officer who made the notation on Minute M3, explained that he did this according to his own practice.  The purpose of the notation was to indicate that he had told the detainee that he would be seen by another officer within two weeks and informed of what was to happen to him.  This was necessary since a final decision to prosecute would not be taken until after the interview and the repatriation would follow thereafter.  The Immigration Department file showed that the Applicant was seen by other Immigration Department following the interview in relation to his prosecution and also the practical arrangements for his repatriation.” 

468. That, I am satisfied, is an accurate historical summary.

469. While I accept that the endorsement, being somewhat cryptic, is open to interpretation, I had no reason to disbelief Mr Chiu.  I found him to be an impressive witness.  He explained in clear, persuasive terms why he followed certain practices.  I am satisfied that, if the applicant had made a claim for right of abode, he would not have recognised it by putting a short, ambiguous note at the bottom of his minute and then failing to follow it up.  I am satisfied that he would have taken more definitive steps.

470. In any event, it would be illogical for Mr Chiu to recommend possible prosecution and repatriation while at the same time noting an assertion that the applicant claimed the lawful right to reside in Hong Kong and undertaking that the claim would be investigated.

471. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that, having been arrested as an overstayer, the applicant knew that he would be repatriated and submitted to that process.  I do not accept that he tried to resist it by claiming right of abode.

472. But even if I am wrong in that regard, there is simply no record of any claim.  The minute M3, as I have said, is not and cannot be taken as a record.

473. For the reasons given, my determinations are as follows :

(i)the applicant’s elder brother did make a claim for right of abode on behalf of the applicant and in his presence; 
(ii)however, there is no record of any claim in the possession of the Director. 

Mr Leung Wai Keung (2144, a ‘group one’ applicant)

474. This was the second represented case, the last to be heard, and, in a number of ways, one of the most problematic.

475. In December 2005, the applicant was arrested in the Mainland for the offence of kidnapping.  He was convicted of that offence and, I am told, was sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment.  He is presently serving that sentence.  In light of this – more especially as the applicant is incarcerated in North West China – it was not feasible for him to attend court in person.  Attempts were therefore made to have him testify by way of a video link.  Regrettably, this was not possible.

476. In the result, it was agreed that the hearing would proceed in his absence, the application being supported by the testimony of the applicant’s father, Mr Leung Ho Shum, and written statements made by the applicant; in particular, his affirmation made on 1 June 2004.

477. The applicant was born in Guangdong Province in 1974, one of three children in the family.  He was the middle child, having an older sister and a younger brother.

478. The applicant’s father settled in Hong Kong in 1979.  His mother, was permitted to join him (together with the applicant’s younger brother) in 1991.  When the change of sovereignty took place, the applicant’s father was therefore a permanent resident but his mother was not.  His mother was only to acquire that status in September 1998.

479. The testimony of the father was that in the months leading up to the change of sovereignty he became aware of the rumour of an amnesty.  He discussed the matter with his son, the applicant, and it was agreed that, if possible, his son should come to Hong Kong in order to benefit from the amnesty.  That amnesty, of course, allowed the children of Hong Kong permanent residents born in the Mainland to settle in Hong Kong.  It was the father’s testimony that he even made a trip to the Mainland to help his son secure a two-way permit.

480. In the result, the applicant was able to come to Hong Kong in April 1997 as a visitor, being permitted to remain until early June.  The applicant, however, overstayed.  On the evidence, I am satisfied that his primary reason for overstaying was in anticipation – if he was in Hong Kong when the change of sovereignty took place – of being able to benefit from the rumoured amnesty.

481. In his affirmation, the applicant said that, when the change of sovereignty took place, both he and his father were “shocked” to learn that abode seekers who went to the Immigration Department were being arrested and repatriated.  But this did not appear to be happening to everybody, he said.  Some people were being allowed to remain for the time being on recognisance.  The impression gained was that younger people – those under 18 – were the ones who were allowed to remain.  As the father put it in his testimony : “My impression was that, because he was an adult, he [the applicant] would definitely be arrested and removed”.

482. In his affirmation, the applicant said that in the weeks after the change of sovereignty he learnt that some abode seekers had instituted legal action to try and secure their right to settle in Hong Kong.  As the applicant expressed it : “I thought that if they won then I would also win.”

483. In his testimony, the father said that neither he nor his wife wanted to see their son leave them.  The father said that he was not well at the time, suffering from kidney stones, and he benefited from having his son’s care.  The father testified that he made a visit to the Immigration Tower to see if there was an answer to the problem.  To the best of his memory, he said, he went to the enquiries counter.  He was told that, if his son wished to settle in Hong Kong, he would have to return to the Mainland and make his application there.  It could not be done in Hong Kong.

484. After his visit, said the father, there was a family discussion at which it was agreed that his son should return to the Mainland to await events there.  The father recalled that, in any event, his son was leading a very restricted life in Hong Kong, being afraid to venture out for fear of arrest.

485. That being the case, when the decision was made that the applicant should return to the Mainland, neither he nor his father could have been under any illusions that a claim for right of abode made by the applicant in Hong Kong at that time would have stood any realistic chance of success.  Their only hope lay in the eventual success of the litigation that they knew had been instituted.

486. At this juncture, I should say that I found the father to be an honest witness.  As Ms Gladys Li SC, the applicant’s counsel, observed, he did not fall into the trap of invention or embellishment to try and improve the case for the applicant.  If the father could not remember, he was willing to say so. 

487. The evidence revealed that on 9 May 1998 the applicant attempted to leave Hong Kong via Lo Wu.  By then, of course, he had overstayed for close to a year.  He was stopped and interviewed.  The father, who said that he went with his son for fear that he might be arrested, was not present during the interview.

488. It was not part of the applicant’s case that any form of claim was made at Lo Wu.  It appeared to be accepted that the interview notes made by the interviewing officer accurately recorded the reason given by the applicant for overstaying; namely, that he had done so in order to care for his father who had been suffering from kidney stones.  In short, at Lo Wu the applicant did not protest that he should be entitled to right of abode or had overstayed in the hope that he may be able to claim that right.  His stated reason for overstaying was based instead on the compassionate ground of caring for his father.

489. It was the applicant’s case, however, that, having been referred to the Immigration Tower for administrative processing as an overstayer, he decided that he would then “at least … try to assert my right and the reason for overstaying.”

490. It was on 12 May 1998 that the applicant, in the company of his father, presented himself at the offices of GIS.

491. The father testified that he was the one who spoke to the officer at the counter.  He conceded that he could no longer remember what had been said but he did remember that three documents were given to the officer; first, his son’s Mainland identification, second, the document given to his son at Lo Wu and, third, his own Hong Kong identity card.  The father recalled that his identity card was held for some time, certainly longer than was necessary simply to examine it.  But why it had been held he did not know.

492. In his affirmation, the son said that all the documents delivered up at the reception counter had been photostated.  He was able to remember this, he said, because later that day, when his fingerprints were taken, he saw the copies in his file.  However, an examination of the file revealed no copy of the father’s identity card.  Nor was there any indirect evidence that a copy may at one time have been in the file.  For example, the file index gave no such indication.  In my judgment, the probabilities indicate that no copy was made.  This was an error of recollection on the part of the applicant and, in so far as it may be relevant, an error of recollection too on the part of the father.

493. In any event, while this aspect of the evidence may potentially have gone to issues of credibility, it was of no greater importance.  I say that because it was not part of the applicant’s case that a claim for right of abode was made at the reception counter.

494. What the evidence did reveal is that the officer at the reception counter gave an ID 457 form either to the applicant or to the father for completion and that it was the father who attended to the work of filling in the form.

495. Although the father readily accepted that he had no idea of the purpose of the ID 457 form, in the column reserved for details of the applicant’s parents he gave both the number of his Hong Kong identity card (showing him to be a permanent resident) and the number of his wife’s card.  In order to get his wife’s number, he said, he had to telephone her.

496. It was put to the father that he simply filled in the details of the two identity cards because the form asked him to do so.  The father, however, did not accept that it was such a mindless exercise.  He filled in the numbers, he said, to prove his status as a permanent resident and also to show his relationship with his son.  As he put it, in answer to one question : “I wanted to show that this son of mine had parents who were in Hong Kong.”

497. I am satisfied on the evidence that the father had hoped at all times to find a way, through his status as a permanent resident, of securing right of residence for his son.  Accordingly, whether he understood the overall purpose of the ID 457 or not, when he recorded the details of his identity card and that of his wife, he did so to demonstrate both their own residential status and, through that status, their son’s link to Hong Kong.

498. All too often in hearings before me, the identity card number of one or more parents were not recorded in ID 457 forms for the simple reason that the parent in question was not physically present.  On this occasion, while it would have been easy for the father to leave blank the box requiring his wife’s identity card number, he chose to make a telephone call to obtain that number from her.  In my view, it is more likely than not that he did so for the purpose he described in his testimony.

499. In my judgment, the recording of the father’s identity card number on the ID 457 was capable of constituting the record of a claim for right of abode – if there had been such a claim.

500. But, as I have said, it was not asserted that a claim for right of abode was made at the reception counter.  The applicant’s case was based instead on the making of an oral claim later in the administrative process, during the applicant’s interview.

501. When that interview took place, the applicant’s father waited outside the interview room.  As he was not present, he could not testify to what was said and done.  As to the making of a claim for right of abode, therefore, the applicant’s case was based entirely on the written records read in conjunction with assertions made by him in his various statements.

502. In his affirmation of 1 June 2004, made with the assistance of his solicitors, the applicant said the following as to what was said and done during the interview :

“In the interview room I recall saying to the officer that I wanted to stay in Hong Kong, and that my father was sick.  I asked the officer whether I could stay.  The officer responded with: ‘It’s not my decision.’  I then said ‘If one parent is a Permanent Resident is it true that Mainland children can apply for right of abode.’  There was no reply. 
 I was then told to complete the Grounds for Non-Removal form in the manner directed by the officer.’

503. The ‘grounds for non-removal’ form bears the standard recitation –

“I have overstayed because of keeping company with my family.  I now want to return to China.” 

504. The applicant has not at any time asserted that he was made to write what he did under duress.

505. The ‘grounds for non-removal’ form therefore does not – on its face – advance the applicant’s case.

506. The applicant’s first written statement in support of his claim appears to be contained in the record of interview kept by the Removal Special Project Sub-Division.  These papers date from May 2000.  At that time – just two years after the event in question – the applicant was only able to describe how he had claimed right of abode by saying the following :

“Around May in 1998, I went to the General Investigation Section on 13/F, Immigration Tower, Wan Chai in person.  A female officer took a record of my relationship with my father and my identity documents.  My photograph was submitted and my information in Hong Kong was verified.  At that time, the Immigration Department issued me with a one-week recognizance pending trial by the court of Hong Kong.” 

507. Nothing is said in that statement (which the applicant had time to prepare) of any specific claim for right of abode or even any enquiry being made as to whether such a claim could be made.  At best the statement records an assertion that a “record” of the applicant’s relationship with his father was taken.  What constituted that “record” was remains.  The applicant may have been referring to the ID 457 form or to his recollection that his father’s identity card was photostated and the photostat copy put in the file.  If it was the latter, I have earlier said that, in my opinion, no such copy was made.

508. The second record would appear to be the case summary prepared by the applicant’s first solicitors, Pam Baker & Co.  In my judgment, less weight can be given to this summary than to the earlier interview record.  The earlier interview after all consisted of the applicant’s own words.  The summary was made without any reference to him and was never intended to be exhaustive.  In respect of the attendance at GIS, the summary was to the following effect :

“[The applicant] reported to the Immigration Department, Wanchai, on 12 May 1998, again accompanied by his father.  His father explained to the officer that the reason [the applicant] had overstayed was for family reunion.  As best he recalls, he asked: ‘Both parents are in Hong Kong.  Does he have the right to stay here?’  The officer simply replied that [the applicant] had overstayed and must return to the Mainland.” 

509. The summary does not contain any assertion that a claim for right of abode was made during the applicant’s interview.  As I have read it, it says nothing of the interview itself but focuses instead on what was said earlier at the reception counter by his father and the counter officer.  But, as I have said, the case presented to me was not based on any exchange at the reception counter between the father and the counter officer.  The father himself, when he testified, had no memory of what had been said at that time.

510. In his affirmation of 1 June 2004, while the applicant spoke of the counter officer making photostat copies, he did not speak of his father making any claim on his behalf to that officer :

“I produced to the officer at the reception room counter my Two-Way Permit and Mainland ID card and my father handed to the officer his ID card.  I believe that the officer went away and obtained copies of these documents.  He then came back and handed the originals back to us.  I believe that, because later, when my fingerprints were taken, I saw copies of these documents on the file.” 

511. When the father made his supporting affirmation on the same date; that is, on 1 June 2004, he did not make any independent assertion as to what had happened at the reception counter.  His statement said simply :

“The affirmation of my son to be signed contemporaneously herewith has been translated to me.  I confirm that to the best of my knowledge, information and belief the facts and matter described in that affirmation are true.” 

512. During the course of the hearing, evidence emerged that from about 2001 the applicant had begun to take heroin.  Indeed, in December 2004 he was arrested in Hong Kong for possession of the drug and subsequently convicted.  The father admitted quite candidly that he knew his son had been an addict since about 2001.

513. On this basis, it appears that, when the applicant gave his instructions to Pam Baker & Co and, two or three years later, gave further instructions to his solicitors, Barnes & Daly, he may, to a greater or lesser extent, have been under the influence of his addiction.  May that account for the different versions?  Perhaps it may.  But, if so, the confusion was fairly deep, the one version suggesting a claim by the father, or at least an enquiry by him, the second suggesting a claim, or perhaps also an enquiry, by the applicant himself at a later stage of the proceedings when he was no longer in the company of his father.

514. Equally, of course, it may be said that to assume the confusion must have emerged primarily out of the applicant’s heroin addiction would be speculation and that to give the most beneficial interpretation possible to the conflicting statements based on such speculation would be wrong.

515. As to the applicant’s failure to testify, it was submitted on behalf of the Director that I should not give an undue benefit to the applicant by reason of the fact that he did not testify and could not thereby have his credibility tested, a test to which the great majority of other applicants submitted themselves.  On behalf of the applicant himself, it was argued that his failure to testify was not voluntary and that, in the circumstances, he should not be penalised.  In my judgment, it would have been wrong either to penalise the applicant for his failure to testify or to assume he must be entirely credible because he had avoided cross-examination.  In attempting to reach a just determination I have had to take all the available evidence into account.

516. If I am to conclude that the applicant may have claimed right of abode during his interview, I can only do so on the basis of the facts asserted in his affirmation of 1 June 2004, an affirmation made some six years after the event.  The question therefore is what reliability can I place on those assertions, assertions that – as an objective fact – remain untested by way of cross-examination?

517. As I have indicated, reliability, in this context, can only be judged by having regard to all relevant circumstances and I believe the most compelling of these circumstances must be the presence or absence of corroborative evidence.

518. For the applicant, Ms Li argued that corroboration was to be found in the case summary prepared by Pam Baker & Co. in or about 2002.  The discrepancy between the case summary and the affirmation, it was said, should in all the circumstances be considered immaterial.  I am unable to agree.  As I have said, the summary speaks of the father making a claim, or enquiry, on behalf of the applicant at the reception counter when father and son were together.  The affirmation, however, speaks of the applicant making a claim, or enquiry, himself, not in the same conversation at the reception counter, but at a later stage when the father was not even present.  Different events are being described.  In such circumstances, I do not see how I can classify the differences as being immaterial.

519. I do accept, of course, that, with the passage of time, memories become blurred.  A conversation can be remembered but, in a continuing scenario, not exactly who said what and when.  The case summary may therefore be said to be some corroboration.  But is it sufficient?  Again, this can only be determined by looking at all relevant circumstances.

520. In doing so, I must take into account one issue which received considerable attention; namely, an endorsement made on the applicant’s ID 457 form.  It was accepted that the notation was made by an immigration officer when the applicant’s file was checked.  This checking, I understand, probably took place on 13 May 1998, the next day.  The notation was as follows :

“1st Reg 12/79.  No P of R.”

521. Mr Ho Kin Chung, who at the time was an Immigration Officer at GIS, was the officer who considered the applicant’s file.  The notation, he said, was not made by him but would have been made by another officer under his instruction.  The notation meant : “First registration December 1979.  No proof of relationship.”

522. Mr Ho said that, if an overstayer gave the identity card details of one or more of his parents in the form ID 457, it was his practice to make a record check of the number, or numbers, confirming the date of first registration.  At the time, he said, one of the factors which determined whether an overstayer should be prosecuted was whether, if one of his parents was a permanent resident, he had been born before or after the parent achieved that status.  The check, therefore, may have been of some help to the prosecutions section.

523. It was pointed out to Mr Ho that (seemingly) a record check had only been made in respect of the father, who was, in fact, a permanent resident but not in respect of the mother who had not yet acquired that status.  Mr Ho had no independent recollection of the file and could not say why there had been an omission.  It may have been oversight.  It may have been that the check on the mother was made but nothing put down when it was learnt that she had not yet become a permanent resident.

524. Mr Ho denied that the check would have been made as some sort of ‘follow-up’ check in the event that a claim for right of abode had been made.  If such a claim had been made, he said, the interviewing officer would have collected all relevant documentation and specifically referred the matter to him for consideration of that claim.

525. Whether Mr Ho’s practice was useful or not I cannot say.  But I have no reason to doubt its purpose.  If it had been made in respect of a claim for right of abode, it is surprising that there was nothing more specific spelt out in the file, in particular no form of minute from the interviewing officer referring to the fact that a claim had been made.

526. In the circumstances, I do not see how the notation can be said to support the assertion that the applicant made an oral claim for right of abode during his interview.

527. IF a claim for right of abode had been made by the applicant during his interview why did he fail to mention it in his statement made in May 2000 to the Removal Special Project Sub-Division?  That was just two years after the event.  The applicant’s memory would still have been relatively fresh.  The applicant may not have been a man of sophistication but he must have appreciated the importance of the statement.  Pam Baker & Co. circulated detailed instructions.  This was the applicant’s first real, opportunity to describe in simple terms how he came to claim right of abode.  But he said nothing about a conversation in the interview process, nothing at all. 

528. In the final analysis, therefore, while I accept that there may be some corroboration for the applicant’s affirmation, it is in my view entirely too tenuous to be of any weight.

529. I am not prepared to accept the affirmation on its own.  There are too many inconsistencies in the case generally, despite the fact that I found the father to be a credible witness, to justify me doing so.

530. What also causes difficulties, of course, is the fact that the asserted claim was couched in the form of a question; that is, an enquiry, rather than a statement of right under law.  I accept, of course, that a claim can be made in the form of a question.  But each case must be determined according to its own facts and in the present case, taking into account the history of events, if anything was said, which I doubt, the evidence points to it being exactly what it is described as being : an enquiry only.

531. By way of a postscript, it is to be emphasised that, in coming to my findings, I have not in any way been guided by a moral compass.  Put bluntly, the criminal history of this applicant was irrelevant to me.  I have had no mandate to assess suitability.  My mandate has been limited to answering hard-edged questions of fact.

532. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)neither the applicant nor his father made a claim for right of abode.
(ii)there is no record of any claim in the possession of the Director.

Conclusion

533. My determinations may therefore be stated again (in summary) as follows :

1.Madam Kwok Ching Man (4625) :
 “(i)the applicant did make a claim of right of abode;
  (ii)the Director has no record of any claim.”
2.Madam Lam Nga Li (1771) :
 “(i)the applicant did not make an claim for right of abode;
  (ii)the Director has no record of any claim.”
3.Mr Yeung Kam Shui (4138) :
 “(i)neither the applicant, nor his father on his behalf, made a claim for right of abode;
  (ii)there is no record of any claim in the possession of the Director.”
4.Mr Chong Man Kai (5286) :
 “(i)the father did make a claim for right of abode on behalf of the applicant;
  (ii)there is no record of any claim in the possession of the Director.”
5.Mr Yau Shui Yuan (5075) :
 “(i)the applicant did not make a claim for right of abode.
  (ii)there is no record of any claim in the possession of the Director.”
6.Mr Sit Kwong Kuen (2979) :
 “(i)the applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;
  (ii)the Director has no record of any claim.”
7.Madam Li Yeuk Wai (2300) :
 “(i)neither the applicant nor her mother made a claim for right of abode;
  (ii)the Director has no record of any claim.”
8.Mr Chong Kam Ku (904) :
 “(i)the applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;
  (ii)there is no record of any claim in the possession of the Director.”
9.Madam Lam Kam Pui (5440) :
 “(i)the applicant did make a claim for right of abode;
  (ii)the Director has no record of any claim.”
10.Madam Lau Wun Hoi (4682) :
 “(i)the applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;
  (ii)the Director has no record of any claim.”
11.Mr Wong Cheung Wan (3583) :
 “(i)the applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;
  (ii)there is no record of any claim in the possession of the Director.”
12.Madam Hui Ching Na (4581) :
 “(i)the applicant did not make a claim of right of abode;
  (ii)the Director has no record of any claim.”
13.Mr Yeung Ka Wong (5088) :
 “(i)the applicant’s elder brother did make a claim for right of abode on behalf of the applicant and in his presence;
  (ii)however, there is no record of any claim in the possession of the Director.”
14.Mr Leung Wai Keung (2144) :
 “(i)neither the applicant nor his father made a claim for right of abode.
  (ii)there is no record of any claim in the possession of the Director.”

 (M.J. Hartmann)
Judge of the Court of First Instance,
High Court

 

10-11 September 2007

Applicant (legal aid discharged), Lam Nga Li, in person, present

Mr Joseph Fok, SC and Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

12-13 September 2007

Applicant (legal aid discharged), Sit Kwong Kuen, in person, present

Mr Joseph Fok, SC and Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

14, 17-18 September 2007

Applicant (legal aid discharged), Yeung Kam Shui, in person, present

Mr Joseph Fok, SC and Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

18-20 September 2007

Applicant (legal aid discharged), Yau Shui Yuan, in person, present

Mr Joseph Fok, SC and Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

20 and 24 September 2007

Applicant (legal aid discharged), Lam Kam Pui, in person, present

Mr Joseph Fok, SC and Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

21 September 2007

Applicant (legal aid discharged), Lam Kam Pui, in person, present

Ms Gladys Li, SC, Mr Kwok Sui Hay and Mr Sean Fang, instructed by Messrs Barnes & Daly, for the Applicant (legal aided) (present in the afternoon)

Mr Joseph Fok, SC and Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

27-28 September 2007

Applicant (legal aid discharged), Lau Wun Hoi, in person, present

Mr Joseph Fok, SC and Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

2 October 2007

Applicant (legal aid discharged), Li Yeuk Wai, in person, present

Mr Joseph Fok, SC and Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

5 and 8 October 2007

Applicant (legal aid discharged), Kwok Ching Man, in person, present

Mr Joseph Fok, SC and Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

9 October 2007

Applicant (legal aid discharged), Hui Ching Na, in person, absent

Mr Joseph Fok, SC and Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

11 and 12 October 2007

Applicant (legal aid discharged), Chong Man Kai, in person, present

Mr Joseph Fok, SC and Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

15-17 and 26 October 2007

Mr Kwok Sui Hay and Mr Sean Fang, instructed by Messrs Barnes & Daly, assigned by Director of Legal Aid, for the Applicant 5088, Yeung Ka Wong

Mr Joseph Fok, SC and Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

29 October 2007

Applicant (legal aid discharged), Wong Cheung Wan, in person, present

Mr Joseph Fok, SC and Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

31 October 2007

Applicant (legal aid discharged), Chong Kam Ku, in person, absent

Mr Joseph Fok, SC and Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

19-20 December 2007

Ms Gladys Li, SC and Mr Sean Fang, instructed by Messrs Barnes & Daly, for the Applicant 2144, Leung Wai Keung

Mr Joseph Fok, SC and Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

 

57275-EN-2007-06-01

NG SIU TUNG AND OTHERS v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

HTML content

HCAL 81/1999

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO.81 OF 1999

---------------------

BETWEEN

 NG SIU TUNG AND OTHERSApplicants
 and 
 DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATIONRespondent

----------------------

 

Before : Hon Hartmann J in Court

Dates of Hearing : 2, 3, 25, 28 and 30 May 2007

Date of Handing Down Report : 1 June 2007

 

---------------------------------------

FIFTH REPORT TO THE
COURT OF FINAL APPEAL

---------------------------------------

 

Introduction

1. In my fourth report, I said that two hearings were scheduled for 2007 so that all outstanding applications (capable of being prepared and argued) could be determined and a final report submitted before 2008.

2. The first of the two hearings was scheduled for the month of May.  Regrettably, however, for reasons which I shall explain, it was only possible to hear one case in that month; that case being the application of Madam Wong King Fan, applicant 3681.  My findings in respect of that single case are contained in this report.

3. Although an adequate number of cases had been prepared for hearing in May, shortly before the hearing commenced I was informed by the Director of Legal Aid that legal aid had been withdrawn from a number of applicants on the basis that their cases lacked merit.  As it transpired, legal aid was removed from ten applicants.

4. One applicant, 5286, had returned to the Mainland.  He has been informed by letter of his loss of legal aid and asked to indicate his intentions.  As at the date of this report, no response has been received from him.

5. The remaining nine applicants were in Hong Kong and I was able to speak to them; to a first group on 3 May and to a second group on 25 May.

6. All nine applicants have appealed the discharge of their legal aid.  Their appeals are to be heard on 8 June 2007.

7. However, so that there will not thereafter be any undue delay in dealing with the cases of these applicants, I have given to each of them the substantive hearing date for his or her application.

8. The detailed directions that I have given to the nine applicants have been reduced to writing and have been, or will be, sent to each applicant together with a translation in Chinese characters.  Copies of the two sets of directions are annexed to this report together with a translation of the first set.  The second translation is still being prepared.

9. As to the way ahead, the position appears to be as follows :

(i)Assuming that applicant 5286 indicates a desire to proceed, there are ten applicants from whom legal aid has been withdrawn.  Whatever happens to their appeals, nine of those applicants have already been given their substantive hearing dates in September and/or October of this year.
(ii)Messrs Barnes and Daly, the solicitors instructed to represent all legally-aided applicants, now have only five remaining applicants whose cases they are instructed to prepare.  In respect of one of those cases, they have been unable to obtain instructions.  That applicant apparently lives in the Philippines.  It is likely that their representation will shortly be discharged.  As to the remaining four applicants, I am told that negotiations are taking place to settle two of them.  But in any event, I am told that the four cases can be prepared in time to be heard in the hearing set to commence in September of this year.
(iii)In my fourth report, I made mention of applicant 2144 who is presently serving a prison sentence in the Mainland.  It is very unlikely that he will be released in time to appear later this year in support of his application.

10. In the circumstances, assuming that all the cases – with the exception of application 2144 – go ahead, it will still mean that just 15 cases now remain to be determined.  There should be no difficulty in those 15 cases being heard later this year and a final report being submitted before year’s end.

The single application

Madam Wong King Fan (3681, a ‘group one’ applicant)

11. In respect of this application, it is accepted that there is no record of any claim.  The application was advanced, however, on the basis that, at the time the applicant made her claim, she was subjected to a threat of prosecution and/or imprisonment.  If it was not for this threat, it was said, the applicant would have recorded her claim.  In the circumstances, so it was argued, the oppressive conduct of one of his officers has estopped the Director of Immigration from denying the existence of any record.

12. In my fourth report, I spoke of this issue of estoppel, concluding my remarks by saying :

“On behalf of the Director, leading counsel, Mr Fok SC, suggested that, whether the principle of estoppel (or anything allied to it) was applicable was not a matter for this court but was rather a matter for the CFA.  The authority conferred on this court, said Mr Fok, was to make factual findings not to interpret the concession policy.  As such, perhaps the better way forward, is to make two findings only; first, whether there is a record of a claim and, second, if not, whether that has resulted from the oppressive conduct of the Director’s officers or some other material failure on their part.”

13. On this basis, in the present case, I have determined the following three factual matters :

(i)Whether the applicant made a claim for right of abode;
(ii)whether there is a record of the claim;
(iii)if no record, whether this has resulted from the oppressive conduct of any person in authority.

14. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in February 1970.  Her father settled in Hong Kong in 1984, her mother joining him in 1992.  At the change of sovereignty, therefore, only the applicant’s father was a permanent resident.

15. In early 1997, the applicant came to Hong Kong as a visitor.  Her two-way permit allowed her to remain from 28 March until 22 April 1997.

16. The applicant at the time was a married woman, living with her husband in Shenzhen.  She had two children.  Although Minnan was her native dialect, the applicant said that, having lived in Shenzhen for several years, she had learnt to speak Cantonese.

17. It was the applicant’s case that her principal reason for coming to Hong Kong was to care for her grandmother.  She said that an elder sister had also come from the Mainland for the same purpose.

18. After her arrival in Hong Kong, the applicant said that she learnt from her mother of a rumour that after the change of sovereignty Mainland-born children, whose mothers or fathers were Hong Kong permanent residents, would be granted an amnesty, enabling them to obtain an identity card and to settle in Hong Kong.  The applicant said that the decision was made by her, and apparently by her elder sister too, to remain in Hong Kong until after the change of sovereignty in order to benefit from the amnesty.

19. This was not the first time that the applicant had overstayed.  She had done so in 1991.  On that occasion, she had been arrested by the police and detained pending her repatriation.  She had not, however, been prosecuted.  Nevertheless, the experience of her arrest, detention and repatriation would have remained with her.

20. It was the applicant’s case that on 16 July 1997, just a couple of weeks after the change of sovereignty, she went with her elder sister and her father to the offices of the General Investigation Section (‘the GIS’) on 13th floor of the Immigration Tower.  Expressed in the broadest of terms, the purpose of her visit was to claim right of abode.  But there was some confusion as to that issue.

21. When he testified, the applicant’s father, Mr Wong Yan Fai, said that by 16 July 1997 he knew that the rumours of an amnesty had been proved wrong.  Despite this, he said, he was of the view that, under the Basic Law, he being a Hong Kong permanent resident, his two daughters were entitled to right of abode.  The purpose of the visit was, therefore, to enable his two daughters to ‘demand’ their rights under the Basic Law.  Quite what the effective difference was between a claim under the rumoured amnesty and under the Basic Law, the father was not able to explain.  Nor frankly did he really attempt to do so, preferring, in my view, to avoid the issue.

22. If the father knew that the rumoured amnesty had been proved wrong, it seems likely that the applicant would have known too, if only through her father.  In her testimony, however, the applicant’s evidence was somewhat ambiguous.  At one stage she appeared to accept that she knew there was no amnesty, at another she indicated that she had no such awareness and went to the offices of GIS to seek to benefit under the amnesty.

23. Shortly after the applicant had commenced her testimony, two matters became obvious.  First, although not visibly unsettled, she was nervous.  Second, after almost ten years, understandably, her independent memory of what took place at the offices of GIS was negligible.  The result, in my view, led to confusion in her evidence compounded by the fact that a great deal of what she said was founded more on what she now understood her case should be rather than what it was.

24. The applicant testified that, when she arrived at the offices of GIS with her sister and father, she was the one who went up to the counter to speak to the officer on duty.  She was supported in this by her father who said that he hung back with his other daughter and did not himself take any part in the exchange.  Indeed, it was the father’s evidence that at that time he spoke only the Minnan dialect, his knowledge of Cantonese being very limited.

25. It must be said, however, that this version of who spoke at the counter is different from the version recorded by Pam Baker & Co. in or about 2002.  The solicitor’s record is to the following effect :

“Mdm Wong went with her father to surrender.  Father specifically asked about an amnesty after 1 July 1997. They were told there was no amnesty and that Mdm Wong would have to return to the Mainland.  Mr Wong asked whether there was any way she could stay with her family.  The officer said no.  They completed a ‘natural’ family members form.”  [my emphasis]

26. Bearing in mind the nature of the records of interview composed by Pam Baker & Co., I would not normally place much reliance on any inconsistency in an applicant’s case revealed by that applicant’s record of interview.  In the present case, however, I cannot ignore the fact that the record of interview emphasises the fact that it was the father who spoke.  It is said that he ‘specifically’ asked about an amnesty.

27. This was one of a number of inconsistencies.  For example, in her affirmation of 1 February 2007, the applicant said that she spoke to the officer in Cantonese.  However, the father, who had said he had overheard some of what his daughter said, asserting that at the time he did not speak Cantonese, found himself in a position where he had to say that, to his memory, his daughter spoke in Putonghua.

28. In my judgment, the father was not a credible witness, being prepared to say anything which, on the spur of the moment, he believed would advance his daughter’s case or extricate him from some difficulty in his testimony.

29. The applicant commenced her testimony by saying that she asked the officer at the counter if the children of Hong Kong permanent residents were able to apply for right of abode.  The officer replied that there was ‘no such thing’.

30. Doing the best I can to give some structure to her evidence-in-chief, the applicant spoke of the officer examining her two-way permit and telling her that, as she had overstayed, she had broken the law and must return to the Mainland.  The officer, she said, gave her a form to fill out.  This was a standard ID 457 form.  The officer told her that she must fill it out and then go back to the Mainland.  If she did not then she would have to go to jail and would not be able to see her husband and children.

31. According to the applicant, her father must have overheard this because he then left the office, taking his other daughter with him.

32. According to the father, however, he only heard the officer tell his daughter that she could not stay in Hong Kong.  It was his daughter, he said, who came back from the counter to tell him that, if she did not go back to the Mainland, she would be sent to jail.  Having heard that, said the father, he decided that he must leave immediately, taking his other daughter with him.  If both his daughters were detained, he said, there would be nobody left to care for their grandmother.

33. When she came to complete the ID 457 form, said the applicant, she could not record the details of her father’s identity card because he had already departed.

34. It was the applicant’s case, therefore, that the mention of possible imprisonment by the officer at the counter had an important consequence, prompting her father to leave and thereby denying her the opportunity to record on an official document that he was a Hong Kong permanent resident.  However, in her affirmation of 1 February 2007, nothing is said by the applicant of any mention of incarceration by the officer at the counter.  The affirmation reads :

“I produced my two-way permit to an officer standing at a counter.  The officer looked at the permit and asked why I had overstayed.  I replied that I was awaiting in handover of Hong Kong to care for my grandmother.  I also said that I had remained to wait for an amnesty, and to get an ID card, because I was the child of Hong Kong permanent resident parents.  The officer simply said that there was ‘no such thing’ and that as an overstayer I had to return to the Mainland.  I spoke in Cantonese.
After this, my sister left the 13th Floor, with my father.  I remained at 13th Floor.  I was given a form to fill out … As my father was not with me at the time I completed the form, I could not put down his ID card number on the form.  I handed the form back to the counter.”

35. That being said, there is a mention of prosecution and imprisonment in a much earlier document.  The earliest written record of what the applicant said happened when she arrived at the offices of GIS is contained in a set of forms given to the Removal Special Project Sub-Division of the Immigration Department in about 2000, only some three years after the events in question.  These forms were completed so that the Director could decide whether the applicant was entitled to benefit under the concession policy.  Part C of the forms required the applicant to state how she had declared that she had right of abode.  In answer, her father wrote for her :

“We stated to the responsible officers [the staff in office] that in accordance with the Basic Law, Hong Kong permanent residents’ children born on the Mainland would automatically become Hong Kong residents after the reunification of Hong Kong to the motherland.  However, the Immigration Department staff receiving us said that there was no such thing.  Mainlanders visiting relatives in Hong Kong should immediately return to the Mainland if they were overstaying.  Otherwise, they would be prosecuted, imprisoned and fined.  The staff hoped that we should return to the Mainland as soon as possible.  So I followed what the officer said, and surrendered to them immediately.” 

36. In Part D of the same set of forms, the father wrote the following to similar effect :

“I arrived at the Immigration Department to request to be issued an identity card so that I could be reunited with my father, mother, younger brothers and younger sisters.  Yet, the reply was that there was no such policy and requested me to return to the Mainland.  I followed what was told by the Immigration Department, a government department, and surrendered myself immediately.”

37. These is, therefore, in Part C a mention of what would happen to the applicant if she refused to return to the Mainland.  But the statement is very broad.  It is not said, for example, who gave the warning, whether it was the officer at the counter or the officer who later interviewed the applicant or perhaps both.  Nor, importantly, is the statement contained in Part C to be read as any kind of assertion that the applicant was specifically threatened.  I say it is important because, of course, it is central to the applicant’s case that she was threatened with imprisonment if she attempted to write down anything which recorded the fact that she had sought right of abode.

38. In the early part of her evidence-in-chief, the applicant became confused as to what she asserted happened at the counter with what she asserted happened later during her interview.

39. The applicant said initially that, when she was at the counter, she was given a form to complete.  She was nervous, she said, and did not know how to fill it out.  The officer said he would teach her.  He asked her why she had overstayed and, when she gave her reasons, insisted that she merely write that she had overstayed to keep company with her family.  The applicant said that she refused to write this.  The officer insisted, however, that she did so and even taught her the characters to write.  Thereafter, said the applicant, she was taken to a small room.  She was told by her interviewing officer that she must go back to the Mainland.  If she did not, she would be prosecuted and may go to jail.  This frightened her, she said, and so she wrote what she was told to write.

40. Clearly, the applicant, in her anxiety, had confused the filling out of the ID 457 form with the later completion of her ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  Errors of this kind do crop up for entirely innocent reasons.  In his submissions, however, her counsel, Mr Kwok Sui Hay, said that this ‘telescoping’ demonstrated her honesty.  She had told the court what she could remember, he said, she had not tailored her evidence according to the documentary evidence placed before.  With respect, I do not see how that follows.  It could equally be said that, because her story was an invention, she forgot to whom the oppressive conduct should be attributed.  In my judgment, therefore, as to credibility, nothing turned on this initial confusion.

41. What I do consider relevant, however, is the nature of the threat that the applicant said was levelled at her.  The threat, as initially described, was to the effect that she must return to the Mainland and that, if she refused to do so; that is, to agree to go back to the Mainland, she would be prosecuted.  It was for that reason, said the applicant, that she agreed to write what was suggested to her; namely :

“I have overstayed because of keeping company with my family.  I now want to go back to the Mainland.”

42. The threat I have just described is, of course, very different from the one which formed the basis of the applicant’s case; namely, that by intimidation she was prevented from writing anything down concerning her claim for right of abode.

43. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that in the record of interview prepared by Pam Baker & Co. in or about 2002, nothing is said in direct terms of any threat of prosecution and possible imprisonment.  The record reads :

“Mdm Wong was interviewed away from her father.  She was asked why she overstayed.  Mdm Wong explained that her father and grandmother are old and unwell, and need her to care for them.  The officer asked if she had worked and told her not to lie.  Mdm Wong said no, what she had said is true.  The officer gave her the Grounds of Non-Removal form, which she had to complete.”

44. As to what was written down by the applicant on the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, the record of interview says the following :

“[The applicant] can remember being told she must write that she wants to return to China, but cannot remember whether it was orally dictated or she had to copy.”  [my emphasis]

45. That record of interview would seem to accord with the applicant’s initial evidence-in-chief; namely, that she was told she must agree to return to the Mainland.  If she did not, she would face criminal proceedings.

46. On the evidence given in numerous applications, it has emerged that officers in GIS, as a matter of course, sought to obtain the agreement of overstayers to return voluntarily to the Mainland.  Agreement to return avoided protracted proceedings and, it may be said, was therefore for the benefit of both the overstayer and the immigration authorities.

47. I do not see, however, that advising an overstayer of the likely consequences if he or she did not agree to return to the Mainland would necessarily constitute abusive or oppressive conduct.

48. To cite it again, the statement made to the Removal Special Project Sub-Division in or about 2000, this being the applicant’s first statement, was as follows :

“We stated to the responsible officers [the staff in office] that in accordance with the Basic Law, Hong Kong permanent residents’ children born on the Mainland would automatically become Hong Kong residents after the reunification of Hong Kong to the motherland.  However, the Immigration Department staff receiving us said that there was no such thing.  Mainlanders visiting relatives in Hong Kong should immediately return to the Mainland if they were overstaying.  Otherwise, they would be prosecuted, imprisoned and fined.  The staff hoped that we should return to the Mainland as soon as possible.  So I followed what the officer said, and surrendered to them immediately.”  [my emphasis]

49. In that same set of documents, the following is said :

“I followed the advice of the Immigration Department and honestly returned to the Mainland because I had already lodged a claim to the Immigration Department, stating that after the Reunification with China, children born on the Mainland to parents who were Hong Kong permanent residents were automatically entitled to the right of abode in Hong Kong and automatically became Hong Kong residents.”

50. In summary, just some three years after the events in question, it was asserted that, having made a claim for right of abode, the applicant was informed that such a claim would not be recognised and that the applicant, as an overstayer, had to return to the Mainland or face prosecution.  Having been told these things and encouraged to return, the applicant then co-operated with the authorities.

51. On balance, in my judgment, this is a credible, indeed likely, scenario.  The applicant went with her father to the offices of GIS.  There was a conversation as to the applicant being entitled to benefit from an amnesty.  That conversation – however it was formulated – may be said, in practical terms, to constitute a claim for right of abode.  However, having been told that there was no amnesty and that all overstayers had to return to the Mainland or face criminal proceedings, the applicant did, as many others no doubt did; that is, accepted what she saw to be inevitable and agreed to comply with whatever administrative processes would effect her repatriation with the minimum of punitive consequences.

52. The applicant was, in fact, prosecuted and fined $2,000 before being sent back to the Mainland.

53. However, as to the lack of a record of the applicant’s claim, that was not the case advocated before me.

54. On the objective evidence, it is plain that, having completed the ID 457 form, the applicant then had to wait to be interviewed.  It was a wait apparently of several hours, suggesting that the GIS interviewing officers were working under pressure.

55. The interviewing officer was Immigration Assistant, Cheng Po Lin.  It was during this interview, said the applicant, that she was directly threatened with prosecution and imprisonment if she wrote down anything suggesting that she had sought right of abode.

56. It is a little odd, however, that the applicant had no memory of whether the interviewing officer was a man or a woman.  As I said in an earlier report, injustice rankles.  If the applicant had been subjected to intimidation, I would have thought it probable that she would at least have remembered the sex of the intimidator.

57. When the interview commenced, said the applicant, she was asked why she had overstayed.  She replied that she had overstayed in order to look after her grandmother but also in order to claim right of abode.

58. It was not clear from the applicant’s testimony whether, in the course of her interview, she attempted a second time to make a claim for right of abode or whether, having already been told at the counter that there was no amnesty, she was simply recording as an historical fact why she had overstayed.  A little later in her testimony, in answer to a question by me, the applicant went on to say that she spoke in the following terms; namely, that her parents were permanent residents and that : “I hope there will be an amnesty and I hope that I can obtain right of abode in Hong Kong.”

59. In my judgment, that statement by the applicant was no more than a recitation by her of what she now understood she should have said.  It was manifestly artificial.  I gave it no weight.

60. It was the applicant’s evidence that, having spoken of seeking right of abode, she was told by the officer that she should not write this.  If she insisted on doing so she would be prosecuted. In her affirmation of 1 February 2007, it was put more clearly :

“The officer told me to write down what she dictated to me.  She warned me that if I did not obey her instructions I would go to prison and not see my husband or children.  I was very frightened by this.  She then dictated the words …”

61. It should be noted that the affirmation – prepared for the applicant – gives the sex of the interviewing officer as female although the applicant herself, as I have said, had no memory of whether the interviewing officer was male or female.

62. After her experience in 1991, said the applicant, she was afraid of what would happen and therefore felt she had no option but to write what she was instructed to write.

63. The characters written by the applicant, which I have cited earlier, formed a standard litany.  I have seen numerous examples of the same wording.

64. The applicant said that she could not write all the characters and that she had to be assisted in doing so.

65. I have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the interviewing officer suggested the form of wording to the applicant.  Nor do I have any difficulty in concluding that the officer may have assisted the applicant with the formation of one or more characters.  The issue is whether the applicant was made to write those characters against her will because she was threatened.

66. As I have said on a number of occasions, the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form was an administrative document, a document that required completion in order to move forward the process of repatriation.  It is plain that many interviewing officers assisted overstayers to put down a short and convenient form of words.  It is equally plain that on numerous occasions they had to assist with the writing of characters.  As a co-operative process, I do not see how it can be criticized.  Of course, if it is not a co-operative process that is a different matter.

67. In my judgment, on a consideration of all the evidence, there was no substance in the applicant’s assertion that in her case it was not a co-operative process.  I am confident that was an invention on her part to try and explain (and excuse) the lack of a record.

68. It was only in February of this year that a direct allegation of intimidation in the interview process was raised.  The applicant’s earliest records indicate that, having been informed that there was no amnesty, she was entirely co-operative; in short, that she was not then forced (under threat) to do anything.  Those records, in my view, are more likely to reflect the broad truth.

69. As I said earlier, it was quickly apparent to me that the applicant had very little independent memory of events that day.  A good deal of her testimony therefore was created to advance her case without any regard for its truth.

70. By way of a postscript, I should mention that during the course of submissions, Mr Kwok Sui Hay referred to the fact that a number of applicants have complained of the conduct of the interviewing officer, Ms Cheng, during the course of interviews.  That is a matter which I have taken into account.  On every occasion that Ms Cheng has given testimony, I have been impressed by the direct, brusk, almost waspish manner in which she has explained herself.  She does not possess an aura of kind concern.  To that extent, no doubt, applicants may have remembered her.  But it does not follow that Ms Cheng, because of her manner, has acted improperly.

71. I am quite satisfied that, if the applicant in this matter had been determined to record her claim, she would have been able to do so.  The probabilities are that, at the time, having been told that there was no amnesty, there was simply no perceived need to record it.  What was more immediately of advantage – as the applicant herself intimated as far back on the year 2000 – was to co-operate in the hopes of minimising any punitive consequences.

72. As to whether an oral claim for right of abode was made, that has proved more difficult.  Although the evidence of the applicant and her father was suspect in several respects, the weight of all the relevant evidence has, at the end of the day, satisfied me that the applicant may well have claimed right of abode at the reception counter.

73. I reject the assertion that she repeated the claim in her interview.  In my judgment, the probabilities very much suggest that the interview was uneventful, the applicant co-operating fully with the interviewing officer.

74. My determinations are as follows :

(i)The applicant did make a claim for right of abode at the GIS reception counter;
(ii)the Director, however, has no record of any claim;
(iii)the lack of record has not resulted from the oppressive conduct of any person in authority.

 (M.J. Hartmann)
Judge of the Court of First Instance,
High Court

 

Mr Kwok Sui Hay and Mr Sean Fang, instructed by Messrs Barnes & Daly, for the Applicants

Mr Joseph Fok, SC leading Mr Daniel Wan, nstructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

 

 

The annexures

HCAL 81/1999

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO.81 OF 1999

---------------------

BETWEEN

 NG SIU TUNG AND OTHERSApplicants
 and 
 DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATIONRespondent

----------------------

 

Before : Hon Hartmann J in Court

Date of Directions : 3 May 2007

 

---------------------------

D I R E C T I O N S

---------------------------

 

1. In our system of law, how you prepare for your cases is a matter for you.  If you are successful in your appeals, or some of you are successful in your appeals, then, of course, your case will be presented by your Legal Aid lawyer.  If you are not successful in your appeals, then it will be a matter for each of you how you wish to proceed.  You may wish to get your own private lawyer, or you may wish to come to court yourself to argue your own case.  As I have said, that is your decision.  Equally, it is your decision whether you wish to proceed with your case at all.

2. I therefore intend to give each of you your hearing dates.  These dates will be in September of this year.  When your dates arrive, I will hear your case.  If you have Legal Aid counsel because you have been successful in your appeals, then I will hear the case presented by your counsel.  If you have not been successful, I will hear the case presented by you personally or by any lawyer that you or your families may have employed.

3. If you appear on your own to argue your case, I will assist you in order to help you understand the proceedings and what you can or cannot do during those proceedings.  But remember, I will not be able to act as your lawyer.  I am the judge and I must be impartial. 

4. If you are going to appear on your own to argue your case, you may have somebody with you – a friend or a family member – to give you assistance.  That person cannot speak for you but that person may perhaps help you with necessary papers that you have and may be able to remind you of questions to ask : things of that kind. 

5. If you do not appear on the dates that I’m going to give each of you for your trials, I will assume either that you are not interested in proceeding further or that you are happy for the matter to be determined in your absence and I will proceed to deal with your case in your absence.  In that case, I will, of course, do my best to look at all the evidence as fairly as I can.  But if you are not present, of course, I will not have the benefit of your side of the story to assist me. 

6. Accordingly, if, for any reason, you will not be able to appear to argue your case and you will not have a lawyer to argue it for you, you must let me know as soon as possible, that is, as well ahead of your hearing date as possible.   Then, if you have a good reason – and it must be a good reason – for not appearing at that particular time, we will try and arrange for you to appear at another more suitable time.  But you must understand that I will require a good reason why I should not proceed to hear your case on the dates I’m going to give you.

7. I think that it would be advisable for you to take precautions in case your Legal Aid appeals are not successful.  By that I mean you must ask yourselves : “What do I do if my appeal fails?  Do I get a lawyer?  Do I appear on my own?”  Because it is not going to help you to say, when you come before me in September : “I only learnt about my Legal Aid appeal in July and I haven't had time since then to get my papers in order.”  Because the fact is that you have from today to start getting your papers in order.  A wise person – it doesn't matter what field of business they are in – always makes plans in case things do not go as they hope, and I am telling you to act wisely. 

8. There is one final thing I must mention to you before I give each of you your hearing dates.  I, as a judge of this court, am answerable to the Court of Final Appeal.  The Court of Final Appeal will be hearing submissions from the lawyers on 28 June concerning earlier cases that have been heard.  During that hearing, it is possible that something will be said about applicants in your situation, that is, applicants who have had their legal aid removed because the Legal Aid Department considers that their cases lack merit.   If the Court of Final Appeal gives any directions concerning applicants like you, that is, applicants who have lost their legal aid, then obviously I will have to obey those directions.  If this results in any change to the hearing of your cases, you will be informed as soon as possible. 

9. I will now give you your dates for hearing. 

[Brief discussion with counsel as to the time to be allocated for each case]

10. Applicant 904, I’ll deal with your matter last, for a reason to which I’ll come when I speak to you.

11. The first applicant is Applicant 1771.  Your case will be heard on Monday and Tuesday, 10 and 11 September. 

12. I now go on to Applicant 2979.  Your case will be heard on 12 and 13 September.  That’s the Wednesday and Thursday.

13. I now move on to Applicant 4138.  Your case will be heard on Friday, 14 September and Monday, 17 September. 

14. I now move on to 5075.  Your case will be heard on Tuesday, 18 and Wednesday, 19 September. 

15. I move on to the applicant 5440.  Your case will be heard on Thursday, 20 and Friday, 21 September.

16. I emphasise to all of you again, those dates are, if I can explain it by using an image, cut into stone.  All all of you to whom I have just given dates, I am told, are on recognisance.  As I understand it, that means you have no difficulty in remaining in Hong Kong until your cases are heard. 

17. I now move to the last applicant, that is, Applicant 904.  Your case will be heard on Monday, 24 and Tuesday, 25 September.  Those two days for you also are cut in stone.  As far as Applicant 904 is concerned, I am told that you are here on a limit of stay until about 7 July.  It will therefore be for you to make application to come back to Hong Kong for the hearing of your case. 

18. The Director of Immigration in Hong Kong, I am told, will do his best to assist you.  But the Director, of course, has no control or influence over the independent actions of the Mainland authorities.  Your hearing has been put last in case there are any delays with the Mainland authorities. 

19. So that all of you understand what I have said – because I have told you a lot of things – I am going to have my words reduced to in print and translated into Chinese characters.  A copy, in English and Chinese characters, will be posted to each of you to the address which we have or to the address which you will give to my clerk. 

20. So it is your responsibility this morning to make sure you give to my clerk a postal address where this document will reach you.  Mr Chung, will come outside with you and will confirm these addresses with you.

21. So please go outside now; please wait for him and deal with him one by one. 

 

 

 (M.J. Hartmann)
Judge of the Court of First Instance,
High Court

 

Applicants, in person

Mr Joseph Fok, SC, and Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for Respondent

 

中譯本

HCAL 81/1999

香港特別行政區

高等法院

原訟法庭

憲法及行政訴訟案件1999年第81號

 

申請人吳小彤及其他人士 
 訴 
答辯人入境事務處處長 

 

在夏正民法官席前

指示日期:2007年5月3日

 

指 示

 

1. 在我們的法律體系內,你怎樣準備你的案是你的事。如果你們哪一位上訴成功, 那麼他或她的案自然會由法律援助律師提出。如果你們上訴不成功,那麼你們打算怎樣處理是你們各人的事。你可以去找你自己的私人律師,而你也可以到庭自己就你的案進行爭辯。正如本席所說,那是由你決定。同樣地,你是否繼續進行你的案也是由你決定。

2. 因此,本席打算給你們各人的聆訊日期。這些全都是今年九月份的日期。本席會在你的聆訊日期聆訊你的案。如果你上訴成功因而有法律援助律師,那麼本席會聆訊由你的大律師提出的案。如果你(上訴)不成功,那麼本席會聆訊由你自己提出的案或由不管是你還是你家人聘請的律師所提出的案。

3. 如果你出庭自己就你的案進行爭辯,本席會協助你了解法律程序和在這些法律程序中,甚麼事你可以做與甚麼事你不可以做。但是記住,本席不能以你的律師的身分行事。本席是法官。本席一定要公正無私。

4. 如果你打算出庭自己就你的案進行爭辯,你一位朋友或家人可以在旁邊協助你。雖然這個人不能代表你發言,但這個人可以幫助你打理你手上的文件而且也許能夠提醒你問甚麼問題之類。

5. 你們各人的審訊本席稍後會個別安排審訊日期。如果你在該日期沒有出庭,本席會假設是你沒有興趣再繼續進行下去,或者是你樂意讓你的事項在你缺席時獲得裁定,而本席會在你缺席的情況下著手處理你的案。在這種情況下,本席當然會盡力公正地考慮所有證據。但是如果你沒有出席,本席自然沒有機會讓你的說法協助本席。

6. 因此,如果你不會出庭就你的案進行爭辯,也不會有律師代表你進行爭辯,無論原因是甚麼,你必須盡快通知本席,也就是在你的聆訊日期之前盡早通知本席。那麼,如果你不會在那特定時間出庭是有好的理由 — 而這必須是好的理由,我們會嘗試為你安排另一個更合適的時間讓你出庭。但是你必須明白,本席不應在本席將會給你的日期內著手聆訊你的案的理由一定要是好的本席才會接納。

7. 本席認為,你去防備你法律援助上訴不成功才是明智的做法。本席的意思是,你必須問自己:「如果我上訴失敗,我怎樣?我找律師嗎?我出庭自己處理嗎?」因為假使你在九月來到本席席前說:「我在七月才知道我法律援助上訴的結果,我從此沒有時間整理好我的文件。」,這樣是幫不了你的。而事實就是,從今日起你可以開始整理你的文件。無論從事哪一行業,聰明人恐防事與願違而必會早有準備。本席指示你們採取明智的行動。

8. 在本席給你們各人的聆訊日期之前,本席一定要提及的最後一件事就是:身為本庭的法官,本席須向終審法院負責。終審法院將會在6月28日就較早前已聆訊的案件聆聽律師的陳詞。在該聆訊陳詞的過程中,有可能會談及你們這種處境的申請人,也就是由於法律援助署認為他們的案缺乏充分理據或成功機會不大而撤回或取消法律援助的申請人。如果終審法院就像你們一樣失去法律援助的申請人作出指示,那麼很明顯本席一定會遵循這些指示。如果因此令你們案件的聆訊有所改變,會盡快通知你們。

9. 現在本席給你們各人的聆訊日期。

[與大律師就分配給各案的時間簡短地進行討論]

10. 904號申請人,本席最後才處理你的事項。本席稍後對你說話時會告訴你這是甚麼原因。

11. 第一位申請人是1771號申請人。在9月10日(星期一)和11日(星期二)會聆訊你的案。

12. 現在本席轉到2979號申請人。在9月12日和13日會聆訊你的案。那是星期三和星期四。

13. 現在本席談到4138號申請人。在9月14日(星期五)和9月17日(星期一)會聆訊你的案。

14. 現在本席談到5075號申請人。在9月18日(星期二)和19日(星期三)會聆訊你的案。

15. 本席談到5440號申請人。在9月20日(星期四) 和21日(星期五)會聆訊你的案。

16. 本席向各位再次強調,(也許本席用一個生動方法來說明)這些日期是已經刻在石頭上。本席獲知,本席剛給予日期的各位是自簽擔保的。據本席理解,這就表示你們在香港逗留直到你們各案的聆訊是沒有困難的。

17. 現在本席談到最後一位申請人,即904號申請人。在9月24日(星期一)和25日(星期二)會聆訊你的案。你這兩日也是已經刻在石頭上。就904號申請人而言,本席獲知你在香港的逗留期限大約在7月7日到期。故此,為了你案的聆訊,要由你去申請回來香港。

18. 本席獲知,香港入境事務處處長會盡力協助你。但是,處長不能控制或影響大陸當局獨立自主的行動。你的聆訊安排在最後以防大陸當局有任何延誤。

19. 為了使你們各位都了解本席所說過的話— 因為本席對你們說了很多 —  本席會(委派人)把本席說過的話錄成文字然後譯成中文。中英文各一份會寄去我們手上各位的地址或稍後你們給本席的書記的地址。

20. 故此,今早是你們負責確保你們各自給本席的書記一個這份文件會寄達你們的郵遞地址。鍾先生會與你們到庭外,和你們確定這些地址。

21. 現在請到庭外,等候鍾先生逐一處理你們的事。

 

 

 (夏正民)
高等法院原訟法庭法官

 

申請人(無律師代表)

律政司委託霍兆剛資深大律師和溫孝庭大律師

 

 

HCAL 81/1999

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO.81 OF 1999

---------------------

BETWEEN

 NG SIU TUNG AND OTHERSApplicants
 and 
 DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATIONRespondent

----------------------

 

Before : Hon Hartmann J in Court

Date of Directions : 25 May 2007

 

---------------------------

D I R E C T I O N S

---------------------------

 

1. In our system of law, how you prepare for your cases is a matter for you.  If you are successful in your appeals, or some of you are successful in your appeals, then, of course, your case will be presented by your Legal Aid lawyer.  If you are not successful in your appeals, then it will be a matter for each of you how you wish to proceed.  You may wish to get your own private lawyer, or you may wish to come to court yourself to argue your own case.  As I have said, that is your decision.  Equally, it is your decision whether you wish to proceed with your case at all.

2. I therefore intend to give each of you your hearing dates.  These dates will be in September of this year.  When your dates arrive, I will hear your case.  If you have Legal Aid counsel because you have been successful in your appeals, then I will hear the case presented by your counsel.  If you have not been successful, I will hear the case presented by you personally or by any lawyer that you or your families may have employed.

3. If you appear on your own to argue your case, I will assist you in order to help you understand the proceedings and what you can or cannot do during those proceedings.  But remember, I will not be able to act as your lawyer.  I am the judge and I must be impartial. 

4. If you are going to appear on your own to argue your case, you may have somebody with you – a friend or a family member – to give you assistance.  That person cannot speak for you but that person may perhaps help you with necessary papers that you have and may be able to remind you of questions to ask : things of that kind. 

5. If you do not appear on the dates that I’m going to give each of you for your trials, I will assume either that you are not interested in proceeding further or that you are happy for the matter to be determined in your absence and I will proceed to deal with your case in your absence.  In that case, I will, of course, do my best to look at all the evidence as fairly as I can.  But if you are not present, of course, I will not have the benefit of your side of the story to assist me. 

6. Accordingly, if, for any reason, you will not be able to appear to argue your case and you will not have a lawyer to argue it for you, you must let me know as soon as possible, that is, as well ahead of your hearing date as possible.   Then, if you have a good reason – and it must be a good reason – for not appearing at that particular time, we will try and arrange for you to appear at another more suitable time.  But you must understand that I will require a good reason why I should not proceed to hear your case on the dates I’m going to give you.

7. I think that it would be advisable for you to take precautions in case your Legal Aid appeals are not successful.  By that I mean you must ask yourselves : “What do I do if my appeal fails?  Do I get a lawyer?  Do I appear on my own?”  Because it is not going to help you to say, when you come before me in September : “I only learnt about my Legal Aid appeal in July and I haven't had time since then to get my papers in order.”  Because the fact is that you have from today to start getting your papers in order.  A wise person – it doesn't matter what field of business they are in – always makes plans in case things do not go as they hope, and I am telling you to act wisely. 

8. There is one final thing I must mention to you before I give each of you your hearing dates.  I, as a judge of this court, am answerable to the Court of Final Appeal.  The Court of Final Appeal will be hearing submissions from the lawyers on 28 June concerning earlier cases that have been heard.  During that hearing, it is possible that something will be said about applicants in your situation, that is, applicants who have had their legal aid removed because the Legal Aid Department considers that their cases lack merit.   If the Court of Final Appeal gives any directions concerning applicants like you, that is, applicants who have lost their legal aid, then obviously I will have to obey those directions.  If this results in any change to the hearing of your cases, you will be informed as soon as possible. 

9. What is set out above is what, a couple of days ago, I told a number of other applicants who have had their legal aid removed.

10. So that you do not forget what has been said, I will send you my directions in written form.  I will also send a translation in Chinese characters.  To ensure you receive these papers, it is your responsibility to make sure that you give to my clerk a postal address where you can be reached.  My clerk will meet you outside the court immediately after this.

11. I now move to your dates of hearing.

12. The first person is applicant 4682.  Your case will be heard on Thursday, 27 and Friday, 28 of September of this year.

13. The second person is applicant 2300.  As not all of your case has been reduced to writing, your case may take a little longer.  I am therefore giving you three days.  So your case will be heard on Tuesday, 2, Wednesday, 3 and Thursday, 4 of October of this year.

14. I now move to the third applicant, applicant 4625.  Your case will be heard on Friday, 5 and Monday, 8 of October.

15. Applicant 4625, I understand that you are not here on recognizance but on a limited stay.  You have to go back tomorrow or the next day.  I am told, however, that, if you speak to the immigration authorities, they will do the best they can to assist you to get an extension of stay or something similar.

16. So please go outside now.  Please wait for my clerk and deal with him one by one.  As for applicant 4625, an immigration officer will also come and speak to you.

 

 

 (M.J. Hartmann)
Judge of the Court of First Instance,
High Court

 

Applicants, in person

Mr Joseph Fok, SC, and Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for Respondent

 

56008-EN-2007-02-07

NG SIU TUNG AND OTHERS v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

HTML content

HCAL 81/1999

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO.81 OF 1999

---------------------

BETWEEN

NG SIU TUNG AND OTHERSApplicants
and
DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATIONRespondent

----------------------

 

Before : Hon Hartmann J in Court

Dates of Hearing : 20-24, 27-30 November; 1, 4-8, 11-12 and 20 December 2006

Date of Handing Down Report : 7 February 2007

---------------------------------------

FOURTH REPORT TO THE
COURT OF FINAL APPEAL

---------------------------------------

Introduction

1. This fourth report determines just seven applications.

2. While contested applications are taking up to three days to be heard, excluding final submissions, a far greater number of applications are being disposed of by consent without the need for a hearing.  By way of illustration, between my third report and the commencement of this last tranche of hearings I am told that 21 applications were allowed or dismissed by consent.  Of those 21 applications, four were dismissed.  In each case, the applicants had received one-way permits, securing the right to settle in Hong Kong by that route.  The remaining 17 applications were allowed by the Director.

3. Assuming a similar rate of consent orders in respect of outstanding applications, counsel for the applicants and the Director both are confident that all outstanding applications – with the exception of one, to which I refer below – can be determined at this first instance level before the end of this year.

4. There will be two hearings this year :

(i) 2-31 May;

(ii) 10 September – 31 December.

5. All being well, it is anticipated that the second hearing will not need to run its full four-month course.

The one exception

6. I have earlier referred to one application which, it seems, it will not be possible to determine this year.  It is the application of Mr Leung Wai Keung, applicant 2144.  It appears that Mr Leung has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment in the Mainland.  His father has said that the term is one of five to six years.  While no indication has been given as to when Mr Leung can expect to be released, it would seem rational to work on the basis that it is unlikely to be for at least another two to three years.  This raises the question of what is to be done with Mr Leung’s application.

The present applications

7. In respect of the seven applications which are the subject of this report, I have not been able to come to a positive determination in respect of any.

8. I have reviewed my conclusions with some anxiety.  I have taken into account that, in long-enduring matters of this kind, there is the threat of scepticism colouring the exercise of the judicial function.  But I am drawn to say that none of the seven applications gave me any real cause for concern; to put it another way, in all seven applications I reached my conclusions with confidence.

9. It is, of course, utterly irrelevant to me that the seven applications I have had to determine are ones which the Director was not prepared to concede.  However, as more certainty of approach has resulted from the CFA’s consideration of my earlier reports, it is apparent that the Director has been prepared to work within the parameters of that certainty to allow a greater number of applications.  That, of course, is all to the good.  It is, in my view, the way it should be.  It does mean, however, that those applications which are not allowed are, at first blush at least, often less likely to display patent merit and therefore to require deeper consideration at the hearing.

The absence of record : estoppel

10. In respect of a number of the present applications, it was accepted at the outset that there was no record of any claim as required by the concession policy.  In respect of these applications, however, it was submitted that a claim would have been recorded if it had not been for the oppressive conduct of the Director’s officers or for some other material failing on their part such as, in one case, the failure to provide adequate interpretation.  This culpability, it was said, estopped the Director from denying the existence of any record.

11. This submission flowed from certain observations made by me in my first report to the Court of Final Appeal (the ‘CFA’), specifically in paras.48-50 of that report :

“48.    Accordingly, if, due to ‘deficient practices’, a claim made by an applicant was not recorded, that failure does not estop the Director from relying on the lack of a record.

49.      But what if the lack of a record was occasioned by actions which went beyond ‘deficient practices’?  What if an applicant was by means of some form of pressure — by threats, intimidation or oppressive conduct — actively prevented from recording his or her claim?  In its January judgment, the CFA made reference to assertions made by applicants of being pressured into writing standard answers that suited immigration procedures rather than what they wished to write.  In its January judgment (para.225), the CFA said :

‘There is a suggestion by counsel that in some cases applicants who wanted to have an extension of stay or to resist removal were ‘pressurised’ into putting down in their application forms or interview reports standard answers prompted by the Immigration staff which did not contain an assertion or claim of right of abode.  This is a matter of evidence to be dealt with in individual cases.”  [my emphasis]

In addition, in referring to the cases of two representative applicants, the CFA spoke to the same effect.  For example, in respect of a Ms Chau Yin Ping (para.270), the following was said :

‘… she is put forward as an illustration of the treatment some applicants received when they were interviewed.  She alleges that when she was interviewed (outside the Concession period), she was pressurised into inserting in the interview report standard answers given by the Immigration staff.  If relevant,we consider that this is a matter of evidence to be dealt with in individual cases.”  [my emphasis]

50.  On a reading of the January and July judgments, in my view, ‘deficient practices’ and the wrongful exercise of ‘pressure’ are therefore to be distinguished.  In the first instance, the Director is not estopped.  In the second instance, however, if wrongful pressure is established, then the Director is estopped.”

12. As I understand it, the CFA did not find it necessary to determine the correctness of my observations as I did not on any occasion come to a conclusion that an applicant would have made a record of a claim if not prevented from doing so by the oppressive conduct of the Director’s officers.

13. On behalf of the Director, leading counsel, Mr Fok SC, suggested that, whether the principle of estoppel (or anything allied to it) was applicable was not a matter for this court but was rather a matter for the CFA.  The authority conferred on this court, said Mr Fok, was to make factual findings not to interpret the concession policy.  As such, perhaps the better way forward, is to make two findings only; first, whether there is a record of a claim and, second, if not, whether that has resulted from the oppressive conduct of the Director’s officers or some other material failure on their part.

14. In respect of the potential issue of estoppel, I think Mr Fok made a valid point.  However, as it has transpired, I did not, in respect of any application, come to the conclusion that the lack of a record was a matter for which the Director bore culpability.

The individual applications

Madam Sze Lai Ha (3085, a ‘group one’ applicant)

15. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in February 1941.  At the time of the hearing, she was 65 years old.  The applicant’s mother came from Fujian Province to settle in Hong Kong in 1972.  Two of the applicant’s daughters married Hong Kong residents, being able themselves to come and settle in Hong Kong.

16. The applicant first visited Hong Kong in September 1995.  She was by then a widow.  She came with one of her daughters.  Both overstayed, eventually surrendering themselves in January 1996.  According to the applicant, her mother was not well at that time and she was forced to overstay in order to care for her.  However, by January 1996, with the Lunar New Year approaching, the applicant thought it best to return to her home village in Fujian.  She therefore surrendered herself to the Immigration authorities.

17. The applicant was prosecuted for overstaying.  She pleaded guilty and was fined.  She was repatriated on 15 February 1996.

18. Within months of her return to Fujian, the applicant said that she learnt of rumours circulating among her clansmen that, when the change of sovereignty took place in Hong Kong, the children of permanent residents would be entitled to settle there.  It was her understanding that, in order to benefit from this amnesty, she would have to be in Hong Kong when the change of sovereignty took place.  She therefore applied for a new two-way permit.

19. The applicant returned to Hong Kong on 13 March 1997, being permitted to remain until 3 June 1997.  

20. Again, however, she overstayed.  On this occasion too, said the applicant, her mother was in bad health and it was necessary for her to remain to care for her.  In addition, of course, the applicant was anticipating the amnesty that would come about when the change of sovereignty took place, that being the primary purpose for her return.

21. The applicant said that, in the days following the change of sovereignty, she came to learn that many people who had gone to the immigration authorities to benefit from the amnesty had been arrested and repatriated.  She understood, however, that a number of people were nevertheless obtaining permits to remain in Hong Kong.

22. She therefore suggested to her son-in-law, a Hong Kong resident, that they should go to the Immigration Tower to make enquiries.  This visit, she said, was made some time during the course of July 1997.  Her evidence as to whether it was in the early, middle or later part of the month was inconsistent.  But, in my view, it being so long ago, nothing turns on it.

23. It was the applicant’s testimony that she and her son-in-law went to the enquiries office on the 2nd floor of the Immigration Tower.  As her Cantonese was limited, her son-in-law spoke to the officer at the counter, asking if it would be possible for her to settle in Hong Kong.  As she understood it, her son-in-law was told that it was not possible and that any claim to settle permanently in Hong Kong would have to be processed on the Mainland.

24. Although the advice was unambiguous, the applicant testified that she still held out ‘some hope’ that she might be allowed to remain permanently in Hong Kong.  Many people in her position, she said, were unwilling to go back to the Mainland.  Many wanted to wait in the hope of favourable developments.

25. According to the applicant, however, after the passing of just a few more weeks, she found the continued overstaying simply too stressful.  As a person who had already been prosecuted for overstaying, the applicant – by no means a simple or stupid woman – would have appreciated that the longer she remained the greater the probable punishment to which she would be submitted. 

26. In the result, said the applicant, on 12 August 1997, just a few weeks after her first visit, she and her son-in-law returned to the Immigration Tower.  It was the applicant’s evidence that she wanted to know one way or the other : must she be repatriated or was there a way she could remain?  She wanted to ‘try again’, she said, but was prepared for the worst.

27. As to what happened on arrival at the Immigration Tower, in her affirmation of 3 October 2006, the applicant expressed herself in the following terms :

“From the earlier enquiry at the Immigration Department I realized that there really was no chance of being able to apply for my right of abode in Hong Kong.  I decided that I had better surrender.  I went, again with my son-in-law, to the Immigration Department 13th Floor.  I knew that the place I should go was 13th Floor from a previous visit when I had overstayed.”

28. Although it was, in my view, somewhat unclear, it appears to have been the applicant’s testimony that, in the process of surrendering herself, she would seek right of abode and see if, by reason of that claim, there was some way she could remain.  I accept, of course, that some overstayers who surrendered themselves no doubt hoped nevertheless to be able to make a request to remain in Hong Kong, either on compassionate grounds or because they believed they had a right based on their parents’ residential status.

29. It was the applicant’s case that, when she went to the 13th floor and was being interviewed, she made a claim for right of abode – an oral claim – to two officers who were interviewing her.  She was, however, despite her protest, prevented from recording her claim on her ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  It was, in short, the applicant’s case that she was, during the interview, a victim of oppressive conduct, the result of that conduct resonating now to her disadvantage.

30. In considering the applicant’s case, I was troubled by three fairly fundamental matters.

31. First, on her own evidence, in the days following the change of sovereignty, the applicant had come to realise that there would be no amnesty.  She and her son-in-law had made direct enquiries with the Immigration Department and had been told that no claim for right or abode could be processed in Hong Kong.  What really drove her to go to the Immigration Tower to surrender was the stress of being an overstayer not any hope of being able to successfully remain in Hong Kong. 

32. Second, in early 2000, two and a half years after her surrender, the applicant was interviewed by the Removal Special Project Sub-Division of the Immigration Department in order to ascertain whether she was entitled to benefit under the concession policy.  The applicant remembered going to her interview with a relative but also – of some significance – with Ms Ma, an employee of Pam Baker & Co.

33. Before the interview, the applicant was given the opportunity, at her leisure, to state why it was that she believed she was entitled to benefit under the concession policy.  In this regard, in part C of her form, she recorded that she had made a visit to the Immigration Tower ‘around early August 1997’.  In respect of that visit she wrote the following :

“I went to the enquiry desk on 2/F of the Immigration Department in Wan Chai in about early August … 1997.  When enquiring with the officer, I said that I came to Hong Kong to take care of my elderly mother, and I asked if I could stay in Hong Kong or would be granted general pardon.  The officer said that there would not be a general pardon in Hong Kong and that the application for stay in Hong Kong should be filed in the Mainland.  Afterwards, I went to the office on 13/F of the Immigration Department to surrender myself.”

34. In this statement, the applicant wrote of going to the ‘enquiry desk’.  She gave details of the advice she received at that desk.  However, she chose to write nothing of what took place on the 13th floor even though it was her case before me that it was on that floor that she attempted for the first time to make an actual claim for right of abode and, in oppressive circumstances, was denied the ability to record the basis of that claim.

35. Third, it was the applicant’s testimony that she appreciated that any claim for right of abode she wished to make would have to be based on her mother’s permanent residence.  She went to the Immigration Tower on 12 August 1997, she said, intending to make that claim.  However, she took no documentation with her to proof her mother’s residential status.  Her explanation as to why she failed to do so was, in my opinion, unconvincing. 

36. In respect of this failure to take with her evidence of her mother’s status, the applicant said that, upon arrival at the offices of the General Investigation Section (‘GIS’) on the 13th floor, she was given an ID 457 form.  She completed much of the form, she said, while her son-in-law completed the balance.  She specifically identified her own handwriting in completing the details of her mother.  In doing so, she gave her mother’s name; stated that her mother was 80 years of age and gave her mother’s address.  She did not, however, put anything into the column which required a statement of her mother’s Hong Kong identity card number.  Nor was there any evidence that she attempted to contact her mother.  In this regard, it must be remembered that she was accompanied by her son-in-law, a Hong Kong resident, who may well have been able to find out the information for her.

37. I accept of course that there was no reason for the applicant to accord any significance to the ID 457.  The point I make is that, if the applicant intended to make a claim based on her mother’s residential status, it is puzzling that she took no evidence of that status.

38. As to events at the offices of GIS, more particularly the interview itself, the applicant said that she went into the interview alone.  Two immigration officers interviewed her, she said, a male and a female.  To the best of her memory, they were the only officers in the room.  She could not recall any other interview being conducted in that room at the same time.

39. When it was put to the applicant that she had been interviewed by one officer only; namely, Ms Chow Wing Man; that this had been the invariable procedure and, in addition, that there was no record of any other interviewing officer, the applicant was still not prepared to concede that her memory may have failed her. 

40. The applicant said that, being unable to speak sufficient Cantonese, she expressed herself in heavily accented Putonghua.  However, the officers appeared to understand her.

41. The applicant testified that one of the officers asked why she had overstayed.  She replied to the following effect : ‘I overstayed because my mother is old and not in good health.  She has also had Meuniere’s disease.’  The applicant said that she continued by saying : ‘I heard people say that the children of Hong Kong residents can settle in Hong Kong.  Is that the case?’  According to the applicant, the two officers told her that there was no such ‘matter’; that is, no such procedure.

42. The applicant said that she was handed a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form together with another paper on which were written certain characters.  She was told to copy the characters onto the form.

43. The applicant testified that she was not willing to do this.  She said that she told the interviewing officers that the characters did not represent what she wished to say.  The male officer, however, told her not to complicate matters and simply to copy.

44. The applicant said that she was frightened.  She did not dare contradict the interviewing officers, she said, for fear of a heavier punishment being visited on her.  In the circumstances, she simply copied the characters.  The contents of the applicant’s ‘grounds for non-removal’ form are to the following effect :

“I have overstayed because of keeping company with my family. I now want to go back to China.”

45. This is, of course, a familiar litany.  Character for character, it follows what many other overstayers wrote.  As such, in my view, it is beyond argument that the characters were either copied or suggested to her.

46. But what must be remembered, of course, is that the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form was intended to be used for administrative purposes only.  It was not seen, not by immigration officers anyway, as being quasi judicial, the process of writing on it being akin, for example, to writing out a cautioned statement.  On all the evidence that has been placed before me in a great number of hearings, it is plain, from the perspective of the great majority of immigration officers, that two questions needed to be canvassed : why had the interviewee overstayed and was he or she prepared to be repatriated?

47. The essential question, therefore, is whether, in completing this administrative document, the applicant at the time wished in fact to write something else but was actively prevented from doing so or whether, having explained that she had overstayed in order to care for her mother, and recognising that her surrender was inevitable, she was content, as a convenient form of ‘shorthand’, to write out the characters either placed before her or suggested to her.

48. In her testimony, the applicant said that, if she had been given the opportunity to write what she wished to write, she would have written much more.  She would have written characters to the following effect; namely, that she wished to stay ‘because my mother is old and she needs me to take care of her.  She suffers from Meuniere’s disease and as a result she has fallen down.’  The applicant said that she would also have written characters to the following effect : ‘Why can I not stay in Hong Kong despite the fact that after 1 July 1997 children of Hong Kong residents are allowed to stay here?’

49. This question presumably was to be understood in context not to be simply an enquiry but rather a stated claim for right of abode.  That itself, I consider, uncertain.

50. But that the applicant – at the time of her interview – had wished to say those words, and could still remember them, was, in my judgment, an exercise in wishful thinking.  If those words had remained with her over all the years, why had she made no mention of them in her interview with the Removal Special Project Sub-Division in the year 2000?

51. The applicant’s evidence generally was unconvincing, smacking constantly of invention.  By way of illustration, in cross-examination she was referred to a statement she had made in 1996 when she had been subject to essentially the same administrative process as an overstayer.  On that occasion characters to the following effect had been written by her on her ‘grounds for non-removal’ form :

“I joined Huamin Tour Group to travel to Hong Kong on 8 September 1995.  I knew that I could stay in Hong Kong until 17 September 1995.  However, I like Hong Kong and wanted to stay in Hong Kong for some time longer.  That’s why I overstayed.  Now I wish to return to China as soon as possible.”

52. When questioned on this, the applicant said that this detailed, very specific statement had been written against her will; in effect that it was made up by the interviewing officer.  On this occasion, she said, she had told the interviewing officer that she had overstayed in order to care for her mother.  The officer, however, had ignored her statement and dictated to her what she must write.  On this first occasion too, she said, she told the officer that this was not her true reason.  But she did not dare protest further.  On this first occasion, she said, she had been so frightened she ‘almost shivered’.

53. I accept of course that on both occasions the applicant would have been in a state of some anxiety.  She was after all subject to the risk of prosecution.  I do not accept her contention, however, that on the first occasion also she was forced against her will to write characters.  What would have been the purpose?  It was not as if on that occasion she was claiming a right to remain in Hong Kong.  No such right attached to her prior to 1997.  It was plain to me that the applicant felt – for some misguided reason – that it would not fit with her complaint as to the later interview process if she accepted that the earlier interview process had been regular. 

54. In light of the applicant’s assertion that she had been interviewed by two officers, her counsel suggested to Ms Chow, the officer who was recorded as being the single interviewer, that she had not in fact been the interviewing officer.  It was suggested that she had instead been called in towards the end of the interview in order to witness documents and thereafter – as a female officer was always required to fingerprint a female overstayer – to take the applicant away for fingerprinting.  It was put to Ms Chow that, with the pressure of numbers in August 1997, it may have been more convenient for her to be called in towards the conclusion of the interview process before taking the applicant away for fingerprinting.  Ms Chow disputed this.  

55. To my memory, this was the first time that it was put to a member of GIS that, if pressures were great, interviews would have been conducted on some sought of ‘tag team’ basis with one officer starting them and another finishing, no record being kept of the first officer’s involvement.  In my judgment, outside of the applicant’s assertion, which I do not accept, there was simply no basis for putting such a suggestion.

56. For the reasons given, I have had no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the applicant did not make a claim for right of abode on 12 August 1997.  In my judgment, the probabilities lead very much to the conclusion that the applicant’s surrender was simply that and no more.

57. As to the matter of a record, it was accepted that there was no record.  It was submitted, however, that, as the applicant had been prevented from recording her claim by the oppressive conduct of the Director’s officers, the Director was estopped from denying the existence of any record.

58. While I accept that the applicant must have been guided in the completion of her ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, I reject the assertion that she wished to write something else – and would have done so – if she had not been the subject of oppression.  That, in my judgment, is at best a gross post-rationalisation, effectively an invention.

59. Accordingly, my determinations are as follows :

(i)      The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;

(ii)     the Director has no record of any claim.

Madam Yang Xiu Hua (4058, a ‘group one’ applicant)

60. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in 1963, one of four children.  Her father settled in Hong Kong in 1973, her mother following him in 1984.  When the mother came to settle in Hong Kong, she was only able to bring one child with her.  The applicant was not chosen.

61. The applicant visited her parents in Hong Kong in 1987 and 1992.  She came for a third time in March 1997, being permitted to remain until 27 April 1997.  When she made the third visit she was a married woman with a child.  On this third occasion, she overstayed.  Like so many others from Fujian Province, the applicant had heard rumours that, when the change of sovereignty took place, children of Hong Kong permanent residents would be given the right to settle here.

62. In the days following the change of sovereignty, the applicant said that she came to appreciate (by watching the news on television) that the rumours of a general amnesty had proved false.  But that being said, she also heard that some people from Fujian had received permission to remain.

63. In early August, she said, her father, Mr Yeung Tun Lang, went to the Immigration Tower to make enquiries on her behalf.  He reported to her that it was not possible to apply for right of abode here in Hong Kong. 

64. When, during cross-examination, the father himself was read the standard response given by officers at the enquiries counter at that time to questions concerning right of abode, he indicated that he remembered that words to that same effect had been said to him; namely, that all claims to obtain the right to live permanently in Hong Kong had to be processed on the Mainland. 

65. Despite what must have been a clear report from her father that, if she wished to seek the right to live permanently in Hong Kong, she would have to return to the Mainland to process her claim, the applicant said that she remained uncertain of the true position.  This was because she was receiving conflicting reports from other sources, more optimistic ones.  In the days following the change of sovereignty there were, of course, a good many rumours circulating.

66. In the result, said the applicant, on 12 August 1997, she and her father went to the Immigration Tower to see if it was now, in fact, possible to pursue a claim for right of abode in Hong Kong.  As the applicant put it in her affirmation of 28 September 2006, if the worst come to the worst, she would just have to return to the Mainland.

67. The applicant said that she and her father went initially to the enquiries office on the 2nd floor from where they were directed to the offices of the General Investigation Section (‘GIS’) on the 13th floor.  If fresh enquiries had been made at the enquiries office as to claiming right of abode, then, of course, the applicant would have learnt that there was no change in immigration policy.

68. The applicant, as I have said, was directed to the offices of GIS.  Upon arrival at those offices on the 13th floor, she said that she and her father approached the reception counter.  The applicant said that, as her Cantonese at that time was rudimentary, her father spoke on her behalf.

69. In the case summary prepared for the applicant in 2000 by Pam Baker & Co., the exchange at the reception counter of GIS was described in the following manner :

“      Ms Yang [The applicant], accompanied by her father, surrendered to the Immigration Department on 12/8/97.  There they were told to complete the form setting out Ms Yang’s ‘natural’ family members.  Ms Yang’s father asked specifically whether there was or might in future be an amnesty for the likes of Ms Yang, his daughter.  The Immigration Officer said no.”

70. In his affirmation made on 28 September 2006, relatively shortly before the hearing, the father described what happened in the following terms :

“I spoke in Cantonese to the officer at the counter there.  I said I had heard of an amnesty and that some children of Hong Kong parents had been allowed to stay.  I said I had brought my daughter there to make an application for right of abode.  I said that my daughter was in Hong Kong to look after her parents.  The officer replied that this was the office for surrendering.”

71. The applicant adopted this statement by her father as being in accordance with her recollection of events.  In her affirmation (of the same date as the father’s) she added :

“Although in 1997 I could speak only a little Cantonese I had a fairly good understanding of it.  During the conversation the officer asked me why I had surrendered, to which I replied that we had heard applications could be made at Immigration Tower for staying in Hong Kong.  The officer’s reply was a simple ‘No’.”

72. In his testimony, the father was not as certain as to events as appeared in his affirmation.  When he testified, although in the first instance he said that he told the officer at the counter that he was a permanent Hong Kong resident and was requesting right of abode for his daughter, later, during the course of cross-examination, he appeared to suggest that in fact he did not speak at all or, if he did, did not say much, letting his daughter speak instead.

73. The father came across as an apologetic witness, easily confused.  Understandably, the father had difficulty recalling events from so long ago.  Indeed, towards the end of his cross-examination, he was asked if the events in question had happened so long ago that he could not remember what, if anything, he had said that day.  He replied to the effect : ‘That’s right.  Really, I cannot remember.”

74. The applicant confirmed that at the reception counter she was given an ID 457 form to complete.  In respect of this form, she said, she recorded some details before she was interviewed and added extra details during the course of the interview itself.  In this regard, the ID 457 shows that two pens were used, a felt-tip and a biro.

75. As to the personal data included in the ID 457, while the names of the applicant’s father and mother, together with their Hong Kong address, were recorded, there was no record of their residential status.  The father’s ID card number was not entered even though it was the applicant’s case that he was there with her.

76. Towards the very end of her testimony, when questioned on the point, the applicant asserted that during her interview at the offices of GIS, she had asked to go outside to her father to obtain his ID number so that it could be recorded on the form but had been refused permission.

77. As to the interview itself, the applicant testified that she was asked by the interviewing officer, Ms Chow Wing Man, why she had overstayed.  She replied, she said, to the effect that she had overstayed in order to look after her mother and father and had also waited because she wanted an amnesty, one which she had hoped would materialise on 1 July 1997.

78. Initially, I had some difficulty in understanding whether the applicant was saying that the context of her answer had been historical only; that is, an explanation of why she had overstayed, or whether she was saying also that during the interview she made a claim to remain in Hong Kong.  In her affirmation of 28 September 2006, the matter was left unclear.  The applicant wrote : ‘When it came to filling out the ‘grounds for non-removal’, I told the officer that I wanted to put down that I remained staying in Hong Kong because I intended to wait for an amnesty.’

79. In the course of her examination-in-chief, however, the applicant asserted that she told the officer she wanted to apply for right of abode.  The officer, she said, replied to the effect that there was no such thing and that she must go back to the Mainland to apply.  In short, in the final analysis, as I understood the applicant’s evidence, it was to the effect that she not only explained to the officer that she had overstayed hoping to be able to claim right of abode but told the officer that she still wished to make that claim.

80. The applicant testified that the interviewing officer, Ms Chow, prevented her from writing what she wanted to write on the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  The interviewing officer, said the applicant, had a stern and abrupt way about her.  In her affirmation, she compared the interviewing officer’s manner with that of a Mainland police officer giving orders.  The interviewing officer reproached her, said the applicant, saying words to the effect that she had overstayed and breached the law and that she could not apply for right of abode and that she must return to the Mainland.

81. According to the applicant, the interviewing officer then instructed her to complete a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form by copying characters from a paper which she provided.  The applicant said that the officer told her that, if she did not copy as she was instructed, she would be sent to jail.

82. The applicant testified that, if she had been free to write what she wished, she would not have written the characters she was directed to copy.  However, she was very frightened at the time and believed that she had no alternative.  In the result, said the applicant, she copied the characters, those characters being to the following effect :

“I overstayed because I kept company with my family and now I wish to return to China.”

83. The characters written by the applicant followed a familiar format.  Clearly, they were dictated to the applicant or copied by her.  But as I have made clear in a number of reports, it does not follow that the applicant was, by that fact alone, forced to write against her will.  The process was administrative.  Many interviews were conducted each day, invariably in an office with other officers conducting other interviews.  A great many persons were doing no more than surrendering themselves and quite prepared at the time, especially if not highly educated, to receive assistance from the interviewing officers.

84. According to the applicant, however, she was not simply surrendering herself.  She (like many others at that time) wanted to claim right of abode and would have written that down if she had not actively been prevented from doing so by the oppressive conduct of the interviewing officer.  If the applicant is believed, her experience transcended natural anxiety or uncertainty.

85. Yet, only some three years later, in the case summary prepared for her by Pam Baker & Co., the matter was left ambiguous.  The case summary was to the following effect :

“Ms Yang [The applicant] was taken into a room without her father where she was told to complete the ‘grounds for non-removal’ in the manner described above [i.e. by writing the characters that appear on the form].  She was then placed on recognisance pending her prosecution.”

86. While I appreciate that the case summaries prepared by Pam Baker & Co. were in no way exhaustive, what makes the lack of any direct mention puzzling is that the applicant testified that the interviewing officer made her so angry that, when she rejoined her father, she immediately complained to him.

87. If in fact the interviewing officer acted as the applicant testified, her anger would be understandable.  Injustice rankles.  It is also understandable perhaps that the case summary – a superficial document – made no mention of her mistreatment.  But in June 2000, the applicant was interviewed by the Removal Special Project Sub-Division of the Immigration Department in order to assess whether she qualified under the concession policy and nothing was said in those interviews of her desire to claim right of abode or the oppressive manner of its frustration.

88. It is clear that persons attending the interviews had as much time as they wished before attending to frame the nature of their claim in detail.  The applicant testified that at the time she was aware of the importance of the opportunity given to her.  She said that she had written out the characters herself and that a friend had copied those characters onto the interview form.  However, all that was recorded was the following :

“I surrendered to the Immigration Department on 12 August 1997 and was repatriated on 21 August 1997.  I am entitled to the right of abode according to the decision of the Government regarding the issue.  I earnestly asked the Immigration Department to verify my status.”

89. As I understand it, therefore, the first direct written assertion of oppressive conduct was made in the applicant’s affirmation made a few weeks before the hearing.

90. In my judgment, the probabilities clearly indicate that the short statement appearing in the interview form reflects the truth of the matter.  On 12 August 1997, knowing that there was no way of claiming right of abode through official immigration channels in Hong Kong, the applicant did no more than surrender herself in order to return home.

91. It is to be remembered that, when she went to the Immigration Tower that day, the applicant knew that the rumours of an amnesty had almost certainly proved false.  Her father had made enquiries for her and would have reported that any claim for right abode would have to be made back on the Mainland.

92. In addition, it must not be forgotten that the applicant had a husband and young child waiting for her on the Mainland.

93. As for the allegations of misconduct on the part of the interviewing officer, I am satisfied that the misconduct described was at worst an invention, at best a gross exaggeration.  

94. It is true that, when the father testified, he remembered that the applicant had complained to him about the way in which she had been treated in her interview.  He said he thought of complaining but did not know where to do so.  In the result, he did nothing.  The father’s evidence, in my judgment, was an invention made to harmonise with his daughter’s testimony.   

95. On a consideration of all the evidence, therefore, I have had little hesitation in concluding that neither the applicant nor her father had claimed right of abode.  No doubt they greatly wished they had claimed.  But I am satisfied they did not.

96. As to the issue of a record, it was accepted on behalf of the applicant that there was no record.  However, as with applicant 3085, Madam Sze Lai Ha, whose report appears before this, it was submitted that, as the applicant had been prevented from recording her claim by the oppressive conduct of Ms Chow, the Director was estopped from denying the existence of any record.

97. I accept that the applicant was guided in the completion of her ‘grounds for non-removal’ statement.  That guidance no doubt consisted of being asked to copy what was written.  I also accept that the applicant would have been in a state of some anxiety; nervous of official power.  It may well be that Ms Chow, dealing with a short, administrative interview, was a little curt.  But I do not accept that there was the oppressive conduct of the kind described.  If the applicant had been determined to write what amounted to a claim for right of abode, with a modicum of courage, I am satisfied she would have been able to do so.

98. The applicant – like others – spoke of a determination to claim right of abode and yet nothing, direct or indirect, is recorded.  The melting away of the determination is blamed entirely on the bullying, over-bearing manner of the interviewing officer.  That, on the evidence in this case, I do not accept.

99. Accordingly, my determinations are as follows :

(i)     The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;

(ii)     the Director has no record of any claim.

Madam Tse Lai Yuk (3350, a ‘group one’ applicant)

100. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in 1959, one of seven children.  The family were from a rural background.  The applicant’s mother came to Hong Kong in 1980, being joined by the applicant’s father in 1984.  At the change of sovereignty both the parents enjoyed permanent residence.

101. It was the applicant’s case that, having been arrested on 28 November 1997 as an overstayer, she claimed right of abode on two occasions.  The first occasion was at a police station when being interviewed under caution.  The second occasion was at the Victoria Immigration Centre when she was again being interviewed.  As it was, only the second asserted claim was formally made the subject of the application.

102. On behalf of the applicant, it was accepted at the outset of the hearing that there was no record of any claim made by her.  It was submitted, however, that the Director was estopped from denying the existence of a record.  Estoppel on this occasion was not founded on the assertion that the Director’s officers had, by their oppressive conduct, prevented an applicant from creating a record.  On this occasion, it was said that the applicant was illiterate and at all times only able to converse in the Fuquing dialect.  She could not understand any other tongue.  It was submitted that, by not supplying an interpreter with an understanding of Fuquing, the Director had prevented the applicant’s claim not only from being properly understood to be a claim but, critically, from being recorded at all as a claim.  The fact that there was not a record was due entirely to the omission of the Director.  As such, the Director could not seek now to rely on the lack of a record to exclude the applicant from benefiting under the concession policy.

103. In response, on behalf of the Director, it was submitted that it was wrong to say that the applicant spoke only Fuquing.  The evidence showed that she could converse adequately enough in Putonghua – certainly for the purposes of a relatively short administrative interview – and, in so far as it was relevant, had some basic knowledge of Cantonese too.

104. The language ability of the applicant was therefore the central issue in dispute.  In the result, a good deal of time was spent focusing on the applicant’s various dealings with the Hong Kong authorities and the degree to which those dealings revealed the extent to which the applicant was able to make herself understood in Putonghua and/or Cantonese.

105. The applicant first came to Hong Kong to visit her parents in October 1992.  By then she was a married woman.  The applicant’s two-way permit allowed her to remain until late December of that year but she overstayed.  She did so, she said, to look after her father who was not in good health.  Her father was, in fact, to die some eight years later in the year 2000.

106. The applicant did not overstay for just a few months.  She remained in Hong Kong until November 1996 when she was arrested.  Although she had lived for four years in a city where the predominant language was Cantonese, the applicant said that she spoke only Fuquing with her parents and, as she spent nearly all her time in their home looking after them, she learnt no Cantonese of any significance.

107. It should be mentioned that in 1994 the applicant’s husband also came to Hong Kong.  He overstayed too, being sent back to the Mainland in August 1997.  I shall refer to the (peripheral) significance of this fact later.

108. It was the applicant’s testimony therefore that, when she was arrested here in Hong Kong in November 1996, she spoke only the Fuquing dialect and understood only that dialect.

109. A record shows, however, that after the applicant’s arrest; when she was prosecuted at Western Magistracy, being fined $3,000 and given a prison sentence of four months suspended for two years, the court proceedings were interpreted to her in Putonghua. 

110. The prosecuting officer in the 1996 court proceedings was an Immigration Officer, Mr Dominic Au Yeung.  Mr Au Yeung said that, on his reading of the relevant documentation, it was apparent that the court proceedings had been conducted in Putonghua.  The Form 19, he said, was typed with the endorsement ‘speaks Mandarin’.  If, in fact, that had been wrong and another interpreter had been required, he would have made a handwritten change to that endorsement.  In that regard, Mr Au Yeung was referred to just such a handwritten change, this being in respect of a prosecution which took place on 21 November 1996.

111. Mr Au Yeung said that, if the applicant had not understood Putonghua, the language used in the proceedings, that would have become apparent to the interpreter who would have informed the magistrate and the matter would certainly have been stood down until a Fuquing interpreter could be obtained.  That evidence – going to regularity of process – was, in my view, of some relevance.

112. After her prosecution and repatriation, it was the applicant’s testimony that she was able to return to Hong Kong a year later.  That return, she said, was originally motivated by rumours that, upon the change of sovereignty, there would be amnesty permitting the children of Hong Kong permanent residents to settle here.  Later, she said, she learnt that her father’s health was deteriorating.

113. In the result, the applicant returned to Hong Kong on 27 October 1997, her two-way permit allowing her to remain until 24 November 1997.

114. When the applicant arrived in Hong Kong in October 1997, she could not have been too hopeful of being able to claim right of abode.  She admitted that before her arrival her father had made enquiries on her behalf with the Hong Kong authorities and had been informed that any claim for right of abode would have to be processed on the Mainland not in Hong Kong.

115. It was nevertheless the applicant’s case that several days after her arrival, she went with her mother and her father to the enquiry office on the 2nd floor of the Immigration Tower to enquire if she could be given right of abode.  Her parents, she said, showed their permanent identity cards.  They were informed, however, that any application for right of abode would have to be processed on the Mainland. 

116. The applicant, however, did not return to the Mainland.  She overstayed again.  On this occasion, however, she was arrested just four days after her two-way permit had expired.

117. After her arrest on 28 November 1997, the applicant was taken to a police station where she was interviewed under caution.  The police officer who interviewed the applicant testified that he did not speak or understand Fuquing.  If he had been unable to communicate with the applicant, he said, he would have sought some assistance but did not do so.  I have no reason to disbelieve the officer. 

118. The applicant testified that she could not make herself understood in Cantonese.  Insofar as there was any dialogue between herself and the interviewing officer, she said, she spoke in Fuquing.  She had no idea whether the interviewing officer understood her and, being illiterate, was unable to read the characters which he recorded on the record of interview form.

119. If the interviewing officer spoke no Fuquing and the applicant, as she asserted, spoke nothing other than Fuquing there would of course have been almost total mutual incomprehension.  In such circumstances it is still feasible, I suppose, that some sort of statement, general in its content, may have been put together.  But it is difficult to see how anything of any particularity could have resulted.  Yet the cautioned statement is particular.  It records a detailed set of events, one which it is difficult to imagine the interviewing officer simply making up, especially knowing that the applicant would be passed on to the Immigration Department for further processing.  In part, the record is to the following effect :

“On 27 October 97, I rode alone on a coach and entered Hong Kong through Lo Wu Customs and obtained approval from the Immigration Department of Hong Kong to stay in Hong Kong for tour from 27 October 97 to 24 November 97.

After I came to Hong Kong, I stayed at the flat of my younger cousin and toured in Hong Kong till 24 November 97 when I planned to go back to China, but I found that I had lost my two-way permit.  As I had lost my two-way permit, I did not know how to go back to China, I continued to stay in Hong Kong.  I now only have a photocopy of my two-way permit.”

120. In respect of this interview, in the case summary prepared by Pam Baker & Co. for the applicant in 2000, the following was said :

“Ms Tse [The applicant] is illiterate.  At the time of making her statement at the Tsuen Wan police station she spoke very little Cantonese, and an interpreter was not used.  When her solicitors read ‘her’ statement to Ms Tse in April 2002 she was taken by surprise, for it barely resembles anything she said.  First, she lived with her parents, not her cousins, and this is what she told police.  It is her parents’ address on the Overstayer Referral Form, not the address of her cousins.  Second, she was never asked whether she has any cousins living in HK.  Third, she told police she wants to stay with her parents in Hong Kong, not that she was getting ready to return to the Mainland.  The statement was not read back to her.  She signed in the places instructed by police.  She and the police could barely understand anything the other was saying.”  [my emphasis]

121. It was the applicant’s case that these gross errors in the cautioned statement evidenced the fact that the interviewing officer and the applicant had been unable to understand each other.

122. On behalf of the Director, however, it was argued that, if there were any factual errors, they had not arisen out of a lack of understanding but would have been intended by the applicant.  Put simply, that she would have purposefully told a false story to reduce her moral culpability in overstaying and, if possible, to ensure that her parents remained uninvolved.  This the applicant denied.  Other evidence, however, revealed that she was prepared to make false statements.  I will look to that other evidence shortly.

123. As I indicated earlier, the applicant testified that during the interview she made a claim for right of abode.  Although she did not state exactly when this occurred, she said that, speaking in the Fuquing dialect, she told the arresting officer that it was now 1997, that she had right of abode and that she hoped to be able to stay in Hong Kong in order to look after her mother and father.  This asserted claim, however, was never made part of the applicant’s case.

124. The applicant was kept in custody at the police station overnight and the following day was transferred to the Victoria Immigration Centre (‘VIC’).  It appears that the applicant spent two nights at the VIC, being interviewed on the second day; that is, on 30 November 1997.

125. In the course of that interview a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form was completed together with a form giving her family details.  The interviewing officer was Mr David Yeung Chi Wai, an Immigration Officer attached to the processing unit at the Centre.  Mr Yeung was assisted by an interpreter, Mr Sae Lim Po Lin who was qualified to interpret in Putonghua, Minan, Chiu Chow and Hoklo.

126. Both Mr Yeung and Mr Sae said that they could not speak Fuquing nor could they understand it.

127. According to the applicant, when the interview took place, she made a clear, almost formal claim for right of abode.  On more than one occasion during the course of her testimony she recited – on each occasion almost word for word – what she had said.  She gave the interviewing officer her parents’ names, their years of birth and when they came to settle in Hong Kong, stating that they were now permanent residents.  She told the interviewing officer, she said, that now that Hong Kong was united under Chinese rule and she had right of abode, she wished to remain in Hong Kong in order to look after her parents.

128. The contents of the ‘grounds for non-removal’ from, however, bear no resemblance to this asserted statement.  The form is endorsed to the effect that the contents were given by the applicant orally and recorded by the interpreter, Mr Sae.  The contents are to the following effect :

“I, Tse Lai Yuk, have overstayed in Hong Kong and have not taken any job nor have I obtained any extension.  I lost my Chinese two-way permit in the Tsuen Wan area a few days ago.  I hoped to be sent back to China on an early date after the investigation is completed.”

129. It will be seen that this statement asserts the loss of the applicant’s two-way permit, the earlier cautioned statement also asserting a loss.

130. It was the applicant’s case that the reason why she must have been so completely misunderstood lay in the fact that she and the interpreter had barely been able to understand each other.  According to the applicant, the interpreter had spoken to her in the Fuquing dialect but so heavily accented that she could barely understand him.  When it was put to the applicant that the interpreter, Mr Sae, had in fact spoken to her in Putonghua and had obtained her answers in that language, she denied that it would have been possible.  If he had spoken Putonghua, she said, she would not have understood him, except perhaps for a phrase or two.

131. As to the manner in which the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form was compiled, Mr Yeung, the officer who conducted the interview, readily accepted that, when he acted as the interviewing officer, he would rarely recite word for word what an interviewee told him.  The process was a fairly quick and simple one, he said.  Questions would be asked and from the ‘overall content’ of what was said in reply, a relevant statement would be recorded.  The form, he said, was not intended to be a record of interview.  It was simple in scope and intended only for administrative purposes.  Of course, if an interviewee wished to say something in particular he would be allowed to do so.  Whatever was written on the form, said Mr Yeung, would either be read by the interviewee or read to him.  If the interviewee required changes, then changes would be made.  When the interviewee was satisfied with the contents of the document he would be asked to sign it. 

132. Mr Yeung said that he himself spoke Putonghua.  However, if an interviewee was illiterate, it was his custom to have an interpreter present, the interpreter being a third party who would not only interpret but would write for the interviewee.

133. I found Mr Yeung to be an entirely credible witness; sensible, reasonable, in no way defensive under cross-examination.

134. The interpreter, Mr Sae, was also called to testify.  I found him also to be a credible.  He was far more talkative, clearly keen to expound on the nature of his profession and his knowledge of languages.  It was suggested by counsel for the applicant that he was arrogant.  I did not find that to be the case.  Yes, he reacted with some emotion.  He was plainly stung by any allegation that, as an independent interpreter, he would have compromised his professional integrity in the manner alleged by the applicant.

135. Mr Sae testified that he had worked as a self-employed interpreter for 30 years or more, offering his services to a number of government departments.  He said that he spoke the Minan dialect, a dialect spoken in Fujian Province.  But that did not mean, he said, that he had any competence in Fuquing, a dialect spoken in a different part of the same province.  The one dialect, he said, was not simply a variation of the other.  He rejected any suggestion that Minan, the dialect he spoke, was just a ‘heavily accented’ version of Fuquing, the applicant’s dialect.

136. Mr Sae said that if the applicant, as she asserted, could only speak Fuquing, he would not have acted as interpreter. 

137. Mr Sae said that, if he was not able to interpret the native dialect of an interviewee, he would check to see if the interviewee could speak Putonghua.  If so – as in the present case – the interview would be conducted in that language.

138. The ‘grounds for non-removal’ form bears an endorsement in Mr Sae’s writing to the following effect : ‘Speaker of Fuquing dialect.’  That endorsement, said Mr Sae, did not mean that the interview had been conducted in Fuquing dialect.  The endorsement, he said, was part of his practice at the time to advise the prosecuting authorities who would thereafter be dealing with the applicant that the applicant’s native dialect was Fuquing and that she may, in any criminal proceedings, wish to have an interpreter in that dialect.  Mr Sae explained that in the magistracies Putonghua interpreters could always be found but not necessarily interpreters of dialects such as Fuquing.  The endorsement was therefore no more than a warning note.

139. During the course of his testimony, Mr Sae spoke of travelling in Fujian Province and being aware that, even in the rural areas, Putonghua was widely spoken.  While that was, of course, of some relevance, it did not follow that the applicant herself must have spoken Putonghua.

140. During the course of the interview process, a personal data form was also completed.  The applicant said that this form contained a number of errors – proof again of the communication difficulties that must have resulted from the lack of a common language.

141. The applicant insisted, for example, that she told the interviewing officer that she had four children, three daughters and one son.  However, only two children were recorded on the personal particulars form.  On behalf of the Director, it was put to the applicant that this had not been an error but had been an intentional omission on her part to avoid any risk of the Mainland authorities discovering that she and her husband had not adhered fully to the one child policy.  This was denied.

142. In my judgment, however, the probabilities suggest that the applicant was careful, when giving her personal and family particulars, not to divulge information which may perhaps cause her difficulties in future. 

143. Although, of course, the actions of the husband cannot be attributed to the wife, it is of some oblique relevance, I think, that the husband, when he completed a similar form in 1997, only gave the name of one child although all four would have been born by then.

144. Of direct relevance, when the applicant herself returned to Hong Kong in July 1999 and completed an ID 457 form, she mentioned the names only of two children, not four.

145. The applicant herself accepted that she was prepared to put false information on a form.  For example, one of the forms in the archives of the Immigration Department contained an endorsement written on her behalf to the effect that she had primary education.  This, she admitted, was not true.  She had no education.  She had asserted primary education, she said, to save face.

146. After her arrest on 28 November 1997, the applicant was not prosecuted.  I am told that the policy at the time provided that those who had overstayed for less than a month would not have to endure court proceedings.

147. In my judgment, considering the evidence as a whole, the probabilities strongly suggested that in November 1997 the applicant had a sufficient working knowledge of Putonghua to be able to make herself understood.  I was satisfied that the interview conducted at the VIC was conducted in Putonghua and that the applicant was able to make herself understood in that language.  I rejected the assertion that the applicant had made a formal claim for right of abode in the Fuquing dialect.  I am satisfied no such claim was made.

148. As for the applicant herself, it was plain to me that, while she was uneducated and struggled to comprehend conceptual issues, this was not to say that, at a practical level, she was devoid of wit.  The applicant knew full well that her case rested on the allegation that she had been denied the right to have her representations accurately and fully recorded.  No matter what evidence was placed before her, she would not therefore be budged from her assertion that, apart from a phrase or two, she had no understanding of Putonghua or Cantonese.  That refusal, in my judgment, was manifestly tactical and did not reflect the truth.

149. Accordingly, my determinations are as follows :

(i)       The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;

(ii)       the Director has no record of any claim.

Mr Tse Chung Ching (3343, a ‘group one’ applicant)

150. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in 1969, one of five children.  His father came to Hong Kong in 1978, remaining here until his death in 1994.  His mother was permitted to settle in Hong Kong in 1989, bringing the two youngest children of the family.  At the change of sovereignty she was a permanent resident.

151. It was the applicant’s testimony that he had applied on two occasions to the Mainland authorities for permission to join his parents in Hong Kong but both applications had been unsuccessful.

152. Like so many others, the applicant said that, several months before the change of sovereignty, he heard rumours that, after the change of sovereignty, an amnesty would be granted to the children of Hong Kong residents, enabling them to settle here.  That was why, he said, he applied for a two-way permit.  He arrived in Hong Kong with his wife on 2 March 1997, being permitted to remain for three weeks.

153. Both overstayed.  His purpose in overstaying, said the applicant, was to ensure that he was in Hong Kong when the handover took place so that he could benefit from the rumoured amnesty.

154. The applicant testified that in May, several weeks before the change of sovereignty, his wife, who was not the child of a Hong Kong permanent resident, decided to surrender herself to the authorities and was returned to the Mainland after payment of a fine.  The applicant remained.  As he put it, he wished to ‘fight for the right of abode’.  In fact, the applicant’s memory as to when his wife surrendered herself was not correct.  The records show that wife did not surrender herself until July 1997, after the handover.  However, nothing, in my opinion, turned on that.

155. It was the applicant’s case that on two occasions prior to the handover, while he remained in hiding as an overstayer, his mother and younger sister made enquiries with the immigration authorities as to his entitlement to settle in Hong Kong once the change of sovereignty had taken place.  On both occasions they were advised that the applicant possessed no such entitlement.

156. In the days following the change of sovereignty, the applicant said that he learned (from television and the newspapers) that there had been demonstrations by people in his position.  This, he said, spurred his own desire to ‘fight for right of abode’.

157. He said that he asked his mother and his sister to make further inquiries with the immigration authorities.  Although the mother did not recall making any inquiries after the change of sovereignty, it was the testimony of both the applicant and his sister that the mother and the sister together went to the Immigration Tower where they were informed that no application to settle in Hong Kong could be made by the applicant and that no further extension of permitted stay in Hong Kong would be granted to him.

158. The applicant further recalled that, either shortly before or shortly after the change of sovereignty – he could not be entirely sure as to when it was – he read a notice in a newspaper published by a firm of solicitors offering advice on the right of abode issue.  He said that he telephoned the lawyers but was informed that no claim to settle in Hong Kong could be made ‘for the time being’.

159. On 3 September 1997, the applicant surrendered himself to the General Investigation Section (‘GIS’) on the 13th floor of the Immigration Tower.  It was on this occasion, he said, that he made a ‘last ditch’ attempt to claim right of abode.

160. I am satisfied, as I have recognised in a number of other applications, that ‘last ditch’ claims were no doubt made.  But in the applicant’s case, his assertion that he intended to make a claim, as opposed to merely surrendering himself so that he could go home, must be viewed, I think, with some hesitation.  I say that for the following reasons :

(i)      By the date of his surrender, on his own evidence, the applicant was aware that there was no realistic possibility of being able to obtain right of abode when he surrendered himself.  His family had made inquiries on his behalf on three occasions and had been told that it was not possible.  A personal inquiry with a firm of solicitors had had the same result.  In his affirmation of 22 March 1996, the applicant conceded that in the days following the change of sovereignty, he realised that earlier rumours of an amnesty had been false.  In that affirmation he also accepted that at the time he knew that the right of abode issue was not going to be quickly resolved.

(ii)      While hiding as an overstayer, the applicant’s living conditions were miserable.  He said that he had been living on the roof of some industrial building.

(iii)     It must also be remembered that the applicant’s wife had already been repatriated and was now with their children in the Mainland.

161. This evidence, in my view, tends to suggest that, in truth, in September 1997 the applicant had accepted what he then saw as the inevitable and surrendered himself so that he could return home to a normal life.  He had every reason to do so.  His living conditions were dire, he was separated from his wife and children and he knew that the right of abode issue was not going to be quickly resolved.

162. It was the applicant’s case that, when he surrendered himself at the offices of GIS on 3 September 1997, he did so in the company of both his mother and his younger sister.  He was supported in this contention by the testimony of these two women.

163. However, the case summary prepared for the applicant in the year 2000 by Pam Baker & Co. describes an entirely different scenario, one in which the applicant was alone when he surrendered himself.  In this regard, the relevant portion of the case summary reads :

“On 3 September 1997, Kwun Tong police arrested Mr Tse [the applicant] for overstaying.  He appears to have had established a good relationship with the officers who arrested him.  They ‘delivered’ him to ID Wanchai, 13th Floor, and left him there to surrender.  He was required to complete a ‘natural-born’ family details form.”

164. I appreciate that caution must be exercised when looking to the accuracy of these summaries.  Pam Baker & Co. were under pressure at the time to compile a large number of summaries.  The contents of these summaries were not checked with their authors.  In any event, the summaries were not meant to be exhaustive.  However, in the present case, both the applicant and his sister recalled a visit to Ms Ma at Pam Baker & Co. for the specific purpose of giving instructions in respect of the case summary.  The applicant’s sister said that she sat with the applicant when instructions were given.  She said that, if anything had been said which she knew to be wrong, she would have intervened.

165. In such circumstances, it is difficult to imagine how the case summary could speak of the applicant being arrested and then delivered by the police to the Immigration Tower if in fact there was no involvement at all on the part of the police and the applicant made a planned visit in the company of his mother and sister.

166. During the course of the hearing, it was put to the sister that neither she nor the applicant’s mother had accompanied the applicant that day.  This she denied.  However, I confess to having considerable doubts as to whether they did in fact go with the applicant.

167. The sister, for example, when she was questioned on matters that fell outside of her witness statement, and therefore outside of the narrow confines of her supporting written evidence, asserted at least one matter of some importance that was inconsistent with the testimony of the applicant.

168. It was the applicant’s testimony that, having undergone processing at the offices of GIS on 3 September 1997 he was given a recognizance form which enabled him to return home in the company of his sister and mother.  Indeed, at one stage the applicant went so far as to suggest that his understanding at the time was that this recognizance acted as some kind of official recognition that he did have right of abode, a matter which – naturally enough – pleased him.  However, when the sister gave her evidence, she was specific in the assertion that she and her mother returned home alone that day and that her brother was taken immediately into custody by the immigration authorities.  I appreciate that over a period of years memories do fade.  However, the difference in recollection in this instance was stark.

169. At this juncture, it should also be said that I had considerable doubts as to the credibility of the applicant himself.  The applicant gave his evidence in a calm, almost dull fashion.  However, as his cross-examination progressed it became apparent that he was prepared to say almost anything which he believed would advance his case. 

170. By way of example, admittedly in respect of a collateral matter only, it was put to the applicant that in 2001 he had been found working in an apartment and had been arrested.  The applicant’s immediate reaction was to deny this.  He had not been working, he said.  He had done no more than go up to the apartment with his younger brother.  The applicant however was then shown his cautioned statement made in 2001 in which he had admitted to working in the apartment, saying that he had been sent there by his brother who was not well and who had agreed a rate of pay with him.  When confronted with this evidence by cross-examining counsel, the applicant could do no more than say that, in making his earlier denial, he had been ‘muddle-headed’. 

171. As to events at the office of GIS on 3 September 1997, the applicant testified that he went to the reception counter in the company of both his mother and his sister.  He produced his expired two-way permit and asked the officer on duty ‘if there would (or could) be an extension’.  In his affirmation of 22 March 2006, he recalled saying words to similar effect; namely :

“I asked the officer at the counter whether it would be possible to obtain an extension of stay.” 

172. The applicant did not testify to any immediate exchange between himself and the officer.  It was the thrust of his evidence, as I understood it, that he could not remember if there was any direct response.

173. Neither in his affirmation nor his testimony did the applicant assert that he had explained to the officer why he sought an extension of stay.  As I understood the applicant’s testimony, it was to the effect that his purpose in making his request was to remain in Hong Kong until the right of abode issues had finally been clarified.  I am aware, of course, that persons who applied for extensions of stay on the ground that they wished to await the outcome of the right of abode litigation have been included in the concession policy.  But any application for an extension must have been on that ground.  The applicant, as I have said, did not spell out to the officer why he was seeking an extension.  The purpose for the request – if it is accepted that he made it – was not revealed.  In the circumstances, I do not see how the request simpliciter can be classified as any sort of claim for right of abode.

174. It was the applicant’s testimony that the officer took his two-way permit and asked him to wait.  She returned a few minutes later and gave him a form to complete, saying nothing as to the nature or purpose of the form.  The form, it appears, was an ID 457, a form given to all persons surrendering themselves at GIS.

175. It was the applicant’s evidence that he filled out the ID 457 form at the reception counter itself.  The applicant remembered that, while he was completing the form, his mother, who had not been well, complained that the air-conditioning in the reception area was too cold.  The applicant’s younger sister therefore took his mother out into the corridor.  The mother herself, when she testified, clearly remembered this incident.

176. According to the applicant, when he came to recording his mother’s personal details, as she was not present, he asked the officer at reception if it was necessary to record the details of her Hong Kong identity card.  The officer replied that it was not necessary.  In the circumstances, instead of going out into the corridor to ask his mother for her identity card, which would have been a relatively quick and easy thing to do, he merely recorded on the form that the details of her identity card were ‘unknown’.

177. I accept, of course, that the applicant could have had no idea of the later importance of the data contained in the ID 457.  At the time it would have been filled out as a standard administrative form.  I raise the issue, however, for two reasons.  First, the applicant accepted that at the time he knew that any claim for right of abode rested on his mother’s residential status.  In such circumstances, if his mother was with him at the time – and if he was determined to try to claim right of abode that day – it is puzzling why he would not have recorded evidence of her residential status.  Second, the evidence given to the effect that, as he was filling out the form, his mother found it necessary to move away into the corridor, struck me as being simply too convenient to be true.  In my judgment, it was evidence created to try and divert criticism that, if he really was seeking to claim right of abode, and if his mother was with him, surely he would have recorded the details of her identity card.

178. As for the requirement to record the mother’s Hong Kong address, the applicant put down only that it was ‘Hong Kong’.  Earlier in the form, he had given his ‘communication address’ in Hong Kong but in doing so had recorded the address of an apartment in which his mother had lived earlier but no longer lived.

179. In short, nothing appeared on the face of the ID 457 form to indicate that the applicant’s mother – the applicant’s sole surviving parent – was a Hong Kong permanent resident or that the applicant hoped for an extension of stay because, as the child of a permanent resident, he had a legitimate interest in awaiting the determination of the right of abode issue.

180. After he had completed the ID 457 form, the applicant said that he was taken into an interview room.  In this room, he said, a female interviewing officer, Ms Chow Wing Man, placed two forms in front of him.  The first was a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  The second was a card upon which were printed characters.  The applicant testified that he was told to copy the characters on the card onto the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  The interviewing officer said nothing to him before the instruction to copy was given and he said nothing to her. 

181. The applicant said that he copied as instructed.  He remembered that the words he copied were to the effect that he had overstayed in Hong Kong in order to remain with his family but that he now wished to return to the Mainland.  Having copied these characters the applicant said that he then went on to write something extra, namely : “I want to stay in Hong Kong to look after my mother”.

182. When the interviewing officer read these extra characters, said the applicant, she became angry.  She told him that he could not write this.  If the applicant was to be believed, the statement he wrote would of course have been contradictory.  On the one hand he would have written that he wished to return to the Mainland and on the other hand he would have written that he wished to remain to look after his mother. 

183. According to the applicant, however, the interviewing officer, Ms Chow, did not ask him what it was that he wished to do, to go or remain.  She did not explain the ramifications either way.  She simply tore up the form and threw it into a waste paper basket.  She then gave the applicant a new form, warning him not to add any words of his own.  She told him that, if he did so, he would be held in custody until he had to appear in the magistrates court.         

184. The applicant testified that, when it came to copying onto the second ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, he was not prepared to defy the immigration officer.  He was afraid of the consequences.  That form bears the following statement, a common form of words :

“I have overstayed to keep company with my family.  I now want to return to the Mainland.”

185. It was accepted that this second ‘grounds for non-removal’ form was not of itself capable of constituting a record of any claim for right of abode.

186. As I understand it, it was part of the applicant’s case that the form which was torn up and discarded was capable, under the concession policy, of constituting a record.  The applicant could not be prejudiced by the fact that an officer in the Department, having received it, had chosen to destroy that record.

187. In my judgment, however, the allegation that the form was destroyed – in the circumstances asserted by the applicant – was an invention.  I have little hesitation in rejecting it.

188. In any event, no claim for right of abode, even on the applicant’s evidence, was recorded on what was said to be the first form.  What was recorded was a request to remain on compassionate grounds.

189. Towards the end of his testimony, when questioned by myself, although he had not earlier spoken of the matter, the applicant said that there had been an exchange between himself and the interviewing officer in which he had specifically raised the issue of right of abode.  This exchange, he said, had taken place somewhere about, or between, the writing of the first form and its tearing up.

190. According to the applicant, Ms Chow, the interviewing officer, did, in fact, instruct him to record not only his birth date but why he had overstayed in Hong Kong.  The applicant said that he replied that his main reason for wishing to stay in Hong Kong was to ‘fight for right of abode’.

191. If, in fact, Ms Chow did ask the applicant why he had overstayed, that would fly in the face of the applicant’s initial testimony that he was at the outset simply instructed to copy characters from a pre-written form.

192. The fact is that in the case summary prepared for the applicant in the year 2000 by Pam Baker & Co. it was recorded that Ms Wong did ask the applicant why he had overstayed :

“An officer asked Mr Tse why he overstayed.  He told the officer that he had hoped there would be amnesty after the Handover and had been waiting for that, and wanted to apply for right of abode.  Also that he had helped to look after his mother who will ill.  The officer replied there is no RoA for which to apply.  The officer gave him a card half the size of A4 and sealed in plastic with the ‘Grounds for Non-Removal’ written on it and told him to copy the words down.  Mr Tse protested, but was told that he either writes as instructed or he will be detained rather than released on recognizance.”

193. It will be seen that the summary does not speak of Ms Chow, the interviewing officer, throwing any form into the waste paper basket.

194. In this respect, the applicant’s sister, in the course of her testimony, said that she knew – well before the visit to Pam Baker & Co. – that the first ‘grounds for non-removal’ form completed by her brother had been torn up and thrown into a waste paper basket.  Her brother had told her about the incident.  She said that she was with her brother when he gave his instructions for the preparation of his summary.  She said that, if her brother had said something wrong, she would have corrected him.  Yet there is no mention in the summary of Ms Chow discarding an already completed form.

195. In my judgment, much of the applicant’s case was invented or, if not invented, grossly distorted in order to create a substantive application.

196. On balance, I am satisfied that the applicant made no attempt to claim right of abode on the day of his surrender nor to make any other claim falling within the concession policy.  What took place was a routine surrender.

197. Yes, I am sure that Ms Chow assisted the applicant in completing his ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  She may well have dictated the characters to be written or have provided some pre-written paper from which to copy.  Perhaps even she may have acted in a waspish fashion.  With standard interviews all day politeness can become worn.  However, I emphasise again that these interviews were administrative in nature.  Suggesting what to write or recording summaries were not of themselves wrong.  Indeed at the time they may have been of genuine assistance.  Of course, oppressive conduct (in all its forms) is another matter.  In the present case, however, I do not think it has been shown that Ms Chow was in any way guilty of such conduct.

198. Accordingly, my determinations are as follows :

(i) The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;

(ii) the Director has no record of any claim.

Madam Ng Mei Ling (2658, a ‘group one’ applicant)

199. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in 1967, one of five children.  Her father came to Hong Kong in 1979, her mother following in 1991.  When the change of sovereignty took place, only her father enjoyed permanent residence.

200. As with many other applicants from Fujian Province, it was the applicant’s testimony that in the months leading up to the change of sovereignty she learnt of rumours that, when the change took place, the children of Hong Kong permanent residents would be entitled to settle in Hong Kong.

201. It was the applicant’s case that, upon the urging of her parents, she applied for a two-way permit.  She arrived in Hong Kong on 18 February 1997 with her family; that is, her husband and two children.  They were permitted to remain until 12 April 1997.  It was, however, their intention to remain until after the change of sovereignty in order to benefit from the rumoured amnesty.

202. In the days following the change, the applicant said that she saw on television that many people – adults and children – were queuing at the Immigration Tower in order, as she understood it, to pursue their claims for right of abode.  Accordingly, said the applicant, on 8 July 1997 she and her husband went to the Immigration Tower to make their own claims.

203. On that day, she said, they went in the company of her father and her father-in-law.  The two children were left at home.  By 8 July 1997, the applicant and her husband had overstayed for a period of just under three months.

204. It was the applicant’s testimony that, enquiries having been made, they all went to the 13th floor to the offices of the General Investigation Section (‘GIS’).  The offices were crowded.  The applicant said that she and her husband were separated.  She made her way to the reception counter with her father while her husband and his father reached the counter a short distance from them.

205. At the reception counter, said the applicant, her father took out his Hong Kong identity card – proof that he was a permanent resident – and showed it to the officer on duty.  The applicant recalled her father saying words to the effect : “My daughter wants to remain”.  Her father, when he testified, said that he asked the officer on duty if his daughter could stay in Hong Kong on a long-term basis.  The applicant said that she took out her expired two-way permit and showed it to the officer.

206. According to the applicant and her father, the officer did not answer their request that the applicant be allowed to stay in Hong Kong on a long-term basis.  Instead she studied the two documents given to her.

207. Although the applicant’s two children had their own two-way permits, it appears that the applicant’s document contained a notation to the effect that she was accompanied by her children.  When the officer saw this notation, said the applicant, she asked where the children were.  The applicant replied that they were at home.  The officer then told her to go home and fetch them.

208. The applicant said she was handed back her expired two-way permit and she and her father made their way home, intending to return later that same day with the children.

209. However, while at home, the applicant said that she received a telephone call from her father-in-law to inform her that her husband, who had separately sought to remain in Hong Kong, had been arrested and was being repatriated.  The news came as a shock.  The applicant said that she decided not to return to the Immigration Tower that day with her children in case they suffered the same fate.

210. During the course of cross-examination, it was put to the applicant that her version of events could not be correct.  If she had surrendered her expired two-way permit for inspection it would never simply have been handed back to her.  It would have been kept and she would instead have been issued with documentation giving her temporary permission to remain in Hong Kong.

211. Evidence to this effect was given by the officer on duty at the reception counter, Ms Ko Wan Fung, an Immigration Assistant.  Ms Ko had no independent recollection of events.  She was only able to testify on the basis of her invariable practice.  If an overstayer in the position of the applicant surrendered herself, said Ms Ko, and it appeared from her expired two-way permit that she was accompanied by children, and if those children were not with her, the matter would be referred to a superior officer.  These were unusual cases and, as such, had to be referred to such an officer.

212. An overstayer such as the applicant might be given back her expired permit to go to another floor to have it photocopied, said Ms Ko, but no overstayer would be sent back onto the streets in possession only of an expired permit.  As Ms Ko explained it, if an overstayer was sent away still in possession of an expired permit and was arrested by the police there would be no record that the overstayer had already attempted to surrender; no record, that is, in the possession of the overstayer or with the Immigration Department itself.

213. I had no difficulty accepting Ms Ko’s evidence as to the general practice.  However, on or about 8 July 1997, so soon after the handover, officers of the GIS were still working under very considerable pressure.  For example, many people who surrendered themselves at that time could not be processed the same day and had to be called back to be dealt with on another day.  May it therefore have been the case that, under such pressure, Ms Ko chose to take what would have seemed to her at the time to be a practical shortcut and just sent the applicant home in possession of her expired permit to fetch her children?

214. Procedures are compromised.  That is common enough.  But, as Ms Ko made clear, releasing a person in the position of the applicant without regularising her residential status would have been no small matter.  On a consideration of the evidence, I am not prepared to come to a finding that, having received the applicant’s expired two-way permit and studied it, Ms Ko simply gave it back, breaching what she would have known was a fundamental rule of procedure.

215. It was put to the applicant and her father that they had not gone to the Immigration Tower that day.  Both denied the allegation.

216. The applicant was an emotionally fragile witness, one of the most emotional I have come across in the various hearings.  At times she was verging on hysteria.  I did not accept that her high emotion was evidence that she was telling the truth.  There was evidence, to which I shall refer later, that the applicant was prepared to give evidence that was not accurate.  But in respect of the visit on 8 July 1997, I detected a certain sincerity in the evidence of both the applicant and her father.  In my judgment, while I could not come to any firm conclusion, I believe that the applicant and her father may well have been at the Immigration Tower that day.

217. As to whether or not the applicant and her father had a conversation with Ms Ko, perhaps even some form of guarded enquiry, is a more different question.  The applicant has persisted in her version of events since at least 2000.  It cannot be attacked as a recent invention.  For example, the case summary prepared for the applicant by Pam Baker & Co. is to the following effect :

“My purpose in surrendering to the Immigration Department on 8 July 1997 was to ask for right of abode for myself and my 2 children.  [My husband also went and claimed …]  I went with my father to the Immigration Department at Wanchai.  When I got to the 13th floor I showed my own and my children’s documents to the officer.  He said I should bring my children along with me.  I said to the officer I want to stay in HK to be reunited with my family, and my father has lived in Hong Kong for many years.  The officer said there was no way, and I had to bring my children along with me.”

218. Why the applicant was present that day I cannot say.  Perhaps it was just to be with the husband to see what would happen to him.  Perhaps, as it turned out, she did make some guarded enquiry.  I am satisfied on balance, however, that the applicant did not surrender her expired two-way permit and did not seek permission through her father to remain on a long-term basis in Hong Kong.

219. In any event, even if I am wrong in this regard, clearly there is no record of any claim made at the reception counter that day.

220. The applicant said that she returned to the Immigration Tower on 12 August 1997.  This was approximately a month after her husband had been repatriated.  During that month, said the applicant, her parents had tried to find out if there was any way in which people in her position could stay in Hong Kong.  A friend, she said, informed them that it was possible to obtain an extension of stay.

221. On that basis, said the applicant, she went to the Immigration Tower in the company of her father, her father-in-law and her two children.  They returned to the offices of GIS.  Her father, she said, once again showed his identity card to the officer at reception while she again handed over her expired two-way permit.  Both she and her father told the officer that she wished to remain in Hong Kong on a long-term basis.  However, the applicant’s father testified to the effect, at least as I understood him, that the claim was not made with high expectations.  “We just intended to go there to give it a try”, he said.

222. Neither the applicant nor her father spoke of any exchange with the officer at the reception counter concerning their claim.  The applicant spoke of the officer studying the documents.  She then spoke of being told to go to another floor to obtain photographs and have papers photostated.

223. While they had been at the reception counter, said the applicant, an ID 457 form had been given to her.  This was left with her father-in-law to complete.  When she and her father returned to the 13th floor, said the applicant, her father-in-law had completed the form.  The applicant professed to having no understanding of the significance of the form.  Neither she nor her father checked it.

224. The ID 457 form completed by the father-in-law gave no details whatsoever of the applicant’s parents.  Instead, the father-in-law recorded his own details including his Hong Kong identity card number and his Hong Kong address.  In the ‘instruction column’ on the left hand side of the form, he had written over the description ‘father and mother’ by putting the characters for ‘father-in-law’. 

225. When the father-in-law, Mr Yeung Yan Hai, gave evidence, he confirmed that the purpose of the visit on 12 August 1997 was to see if it was possible for the applicant to settle in Hong Kong.  If any such application was to be successful, he admitted, it had to flow from the fact that one of the applicant’s natural parents was a Hong Kong permanent resident.  But if the purpose of the visit was as the father-in-law asserted; namely, to claim right of abode, and if he understood that any such claim had to be based on the residential status of a natural parent, it made no sense for him to fill in his own personal details. 

226. When tested on the issue, the father-in-law retreated into excuses that he had been confused and vague as to how best to proceed.  But the father-in-law struck me as a sensible enough man.  He said that he filled in his own details because it was the custom in his home village that, upon marriage, a bride became a member of the groom’s family.  That may be so.  But he understood well enough that the basis for claiming right of abode could not spring from any loose, customary connection. 

227. I am satisfied that the father-in-law did not wait for the applicant and her father to return in order to accurately complete the personal details form because he saw no need that day to put forward any evidence of the residential status of the applicant’s father.

228. Was a claim made by the applicant and her father that day?  I am satisfied no claim was made.  The applicant was not there to seek right of abode.  She was there to surrender herself so that she and the children could return to the Mainland to be with her husband.

229. On 12 August 1997, however, because of the pressure of numbers, the applicant could not be interviewed that day.  She was directed to return the following day, her expired permit being taken and a form of receipt being issued to her in its place : this, as Ms Ko had testified, being the set procedure.

230. The applicant said that she returned to the Immigration Tower the following day with her father, her father-in-law and her two children.  Upon arrival, she said, she was taken into a room with her two children to be interviewed.  Her father and father-in-law remained outside.

231. The applicant testified that she was asked by the interviewing officer why she had overstayed.  As to her answer, there was some question of whether it consisted of a historical recitation only or whether, either in whole or in part, it consisted of a statement of present intent.  The applicant’s evidence was ambiguous.  In fairness to the applicant, however, not a woman of much education, I believe her evidence had to be taken as an assertion that she told the interviewing officer not only why she had overstayed but also attempted to say why she desired to remain in Hong Kong.

232. In her testimony, the applicant said that she told the interviewing officer that she wanted to live here in Hong Kong to look after her parents on a long-term basis.  The officer, she said, replied that she could not remain in Hong Kong and that by overstaying she had breached the law.  According to the applicant, the officer told her that she would be prosecuted.  When she heard this, said the applicant, she became very frightened.  Her father-in-law had described to her how her husband had been placed in handcuffs and she did not want this to happen to her.  She was afraid, she said, that both she and her children might be placed in jail.

233. That the applicant should have been so frightened did not strike me as incongruous.  It was plain from the moment the applicant commenced her testimony that she was a very timid person, verging on what I have earlier described as a state of hysteria.  On several occasions she broke down in tears. 

234. The applicant testified that she was handed a sheet of paper, a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  She was also given a separate sheet of paper, she said, on which characters were written.  She was told to copy these characters onto the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  Afraid of the consequences if she objected, the applicant complied.  The ‘grounds for non-removal’ form written by the applicant and signed by her is to the following effect :

“My name is Ng Mei Ling.  I came with my two children, Yeung Yin Sze and Yeung Hong Hing, to Hong Kong via China HK Ferry Terminal on 18 February 1997.  I know that I am allowed to stay till 12 April 1997 but overstayed because of keeping company with my family.  I now want to go back to China with my two children as soon as possible.”

235. This statement was, at the very least, prepared with the guidance of the interviewing officer, Ms Chow Wing Man.  Not only does it bear a very close resemblance to another ‘grounds for non-removal’ statement made about a month earlier by another GIS officer but, seen on its own, it is simply too well composed, far too ‘official’.  It also contains, of course, the familiar litany that the applicant overstayed ‘because of keeping company with my family’.

236. That being said, Ms Chow, the interviewing officer, did not suggest that this statement was the independent creation of the applicant.  As Ms Chow put it, while the applicant would have been free to write what she wished, if she did not know how to express herself and sought assistance, then she would give that assistance, even if it meant suggesting particular characters to write.

237. While I think it is more likely than not that the applicant was asked to copy the characters making up her statement, it does not follow that she did so under protest.  Indeed, during her testimony the applicant did not suggest that she made any form of protest or that she expressed a desire to the interviewing officer to write characters to a different effect.

238. The applicant protested, however, that she was still ‘forced’ to copy the characters.  But, apart from informing the applicant that she would (or could) be prosecuted for overstaying, on the evidence it is apparent that any factor of fear which influenced the applicant was self-induced. 

239. The applicant accepted that, after the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form had been completed, she was presented with a ‘no loss, no complaint’ form which she signed to the effect that she had no complaint.  This document, she said, was simply placed in front of her and again she was instructed to sign.  She complied without query.

240. With the various forms signed, the applicant said that she then attempted to show the interviewing officer, Ms Chow, photostat copies of her parents’ Hong Kong identity cards and also a photostat copy of the permit which enables her father to come to Hong Kong in October 1979.  The purpose was to show that, through her father, she was entitled to right of abode.  As I understood her evidence, the applicant suggested that these photostat copies had been prepared earlier that same day, the intention being to use them in support of her claim to remain in Hong Kong.  The applicant said that she took the papers out of her handbag, wishing to give them to the interviewing officer.  The officer, however, said that it was not necessary and refused to look at them.

241. In the result, said the applicant, she put the photostat copies back into her handbag.  She went on to say that, when she returned to the Mainland, she took those same papers back to her home village.  They were kept there together with other documents dating from about that time.  It was the applicant’s evidence that she brought the photostat copies back to Hong Kong and gave them to her legal representatives.  In short, it was her evidence that the same photostat copies which she had attempted to give to Ms Chow on 13 August 1997 were now available as exhibits for study by the court.  

242. The applicant in her affirmation of 12 October 2006, made just a few weeks before the hearing, spoke of the attempted production of these documents to the interviewing officer.  There had, however, been no earlier mention of them.  For example, in the case summary prepared by Pam Baker & Co. the following only was said as to the interview on 13 August 1997 :

“When I went to Immigration Department on 13 August 1997 my father went with me then too.  Once again I told the officer I wanted to stay in Hong Kong to be reunited with my parents, and that my father has lived here for many years.  The officer, a female, said there was no way for me to stay in Hong Kong because my father was not a permanent resident at the time I was born.  She said we could be released but that we would have to leave Hong Kong.  She told me to copy down some information on one form … [that being the contents of the ‘grounds for non-removal form].”

243. Equally, when the applicant was interviewed in May 2000 by the Removal Special Project Sub-Division of the Immigration Department, being given the opportunity to prepare her statement in advance, she only wrote the following :

“As I had to take care of my parents of advanced age and be reunited with my family, by 13 August 97, accompanied by my father, I went together with my children to the Immigration Department to make application and declare that I have the status of Hong Kong permanent resident and enjoy right of abode.  I was granted an extension for seven days.  By 24 August 97, the Immigration Department told me to return to the Mainland when the term expired.  Unwillingly, I returned to the Mainland.”

244. When she testified, the applicant clearly was unaware of the fact that Hong Kong identity cards bear the date of issue.  The photostat copy of her mother’s identity card which she said she produced to Ms Chow bore the date of issue of 29 July 1998, the photostat copy of her father’s identity card bore the date of issue of 10 November 1998.  In short, these two documents at least were not even in existence in August 1997. 

245. In my judgment, the applicant’s assertion that she attempted to produce various photostat copies proving residential status was an invention.  It was put to the applicant during cross-examination that she had come up with this piece of evidence late in the day in an attempt to try and fill what she must have understood was missing from her case; namely, evidence of some record of an asserted claim for right of abode.  This the applicant denied.

246. It is not for me to infer any particular motive for the manufacture of this evidence.  But it is apparent that, without it, there was no evidence of any record in the possession of the Director.

247. Accordingly, my determinations are as follows:

(i)       The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;

(ii)      the Director has no record of any claim.

Madam Chong Lai Wa (914, a ‘group five’ applicant)

248. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in 1957.  Her mother came to live in Hong Kong in 1980, being followed by her father in 1993.  At the change of sovereignty, therefore, her mother was a permanent resident.

249. The applicant’s first visit to Hong Kong was in November 1994.  The applicant at that time was a married woman with three children, two daughters and a son.  Her two-way permit authorised her to remain in Hong Kong until early January 1995.  The applicant overstayed.  Indeed, she remained living with her parents until she was arrested by police on 22 November 1998, almost four years after the expiration of her visitor’s permit.

250. The applicant said that she overstayed because her mother was not well and required her care.  In addition, she said, she had heard rumours that, when the change of sovereignty took place, persons in her position – the children of Hong Kong permanent residents – would be granted an amnesty allowing them to settle in Hong Kong.  It was her hope, said the applicant, that when the amnesty came she would be able to convert her illegal residence into a lawful one.

251. The applicant said that in the days following the change of sovereignty she learnt that there would be no amnesty.  Watching television, she said, she saw that many people who went to claim right of abode were arrested and repatriated.  However, in her affirmation made several weeks before the hearing; that is, on 3 October 2006, she said that she was also aware at this time of ‘controversies’ concerning the right of abode issue.  While she knew that many claimants had been arrested and repatriated, she also heard that ‘young children’ of Hong Kong permanent residents were allowed to remain while the same applications made by ‘adults’ were refused.  The applicant, of course, was very much an adult : a married woman with three children of her own.

252. It was the applicant’s evidence that, being aware that overstayers like herself would be arrested and repatriated, she did not come forward to claim right of abode.  Instead, she remained in hiding.

253. On 22 November 1998, while on the street, the applicant was stopped by the police and arrested as an overstayer.

254. At the time of her arrest, at least as I understood her evidence, the applicant said that the arresting officer, having studied her expired two-way permit, told her that she had overstayed for a long time and asked why she had done so.  She replied to the effect that she had overstayed to look after her mother.  The applicant remembered giving her mother’s name.

255. Either at the scene of arrest, or later at the police station, it was the applicant’s evidence that she asked if she could remain in Hong Kong to look after her mother.  She was told that she could not.  When questioned as to what else, if anything, she had said at this time, the applicant testified that it went through her mind that her mother was a permanent resident but she did not articulate this.  In the result, it was her specific evidence that she asked just the one question : ‘Can I stay in Hong Kong to look after my mother?’

256. Whatever qualifications or reservations were in the applicant’s mind at the time, that single question, in my view, was not capable, even on the most generous interpretation, of amounting to a claim for right of abode; that is, a claim based on her mother’s residential status.  Read in context, it could amount to no more than a plea based on compassion.

257. In her affirmation of 3 October 2006, the applicant said that, when interviewed at the police station and asked why she had overstayed, she answered that she had done so to take care of her mother.  She said that she remembered writing down her mother’s name.  She then went on to say the following : ‘I reiterated that I wanted to stay in Hong Kong to be with my mother who was a permanent resident and I asked whether this was possible.  The officer replied that it was not and said that I had overstayed.’

258. In the course of her testimony, however, the applicant made no assertion to the effect that she explained to the police that her mother was a permanent resident.  Indeed, as I have mentioned above, when the issue was raised, she specifically said that she had not mentioned that fact although it had been in her mind.

259. The applicant, like so many others, was originally represented in her attempt to benefit from the concession policy by Pam Baker & Co.  In the case summary prepared for the applicant by her then solicitors, the following was written :

“In light of the applicant’s testimony, it was not possible for me to come to a determination that, on the balance of probabilities, she had asserted a claim for right of abode based on her mother’s residency.”

260. That the applicant made reference to her mother while in police custody is not disputed.  In his notebook, the arresting officer, constable Ng King Hei, wrote the following :

“I announced to her that she was arrested for the crime of overstaying.  At 0958 hrs, I took the woman back to the Police Station for processing together with PC34727 and WPC56868.  The woman resides at Room 633, Fai Wah House, Lok Wah South Estate, Ngau Tau Kok.  She stayed in Hong Kong because she is in Hong Kong to take care of her mother.”  [my emphasis]

261. It was submitted that this entry in the arresting officer’s notebook constituted a sufficient record in terms of the concession policy.  I did not agree.

262. First, in my judgment, there was no evidence that the applicant made a claim for right of abode to the police.  In the course of her testimony the applicant made it plain that she did not.  As to her statement in her affirmation, the applicant qualified this in her testimony by saying that, while her mother’s residential status had been in her mind at the time, she had not spoken of that matter.

263. In any event, the notebook entry itself makes no reference at all to the residential status of the applicant’s mother.

264. Some time was spent debating whether the police notebook was, in the circumstances of this case, capable of constituting a record at all under the concession policy.  In my judgment, however, there being no claim for right of abode made by the applicant to the police, it followed there could be no record of a claim.  The issue of whether the notebook was capable of constituting a record therefore did not arise.

265. Having spent a night in police custody, the applicant was transferred to the Victoria Immigration Centre (‘VIC’) where she was interviewed.  The interview was conducted with the assistance of Mr Sae Lim Po Lin who acted as interpreter.  It is to be noted that Mr Sae was a witness called on behalf of the Director in the application of Madam Tse Lai Yuk (number 3350), having also acted as an interpreter when that applicant was interviewed at the VIC.

266. During the course of the applicant’s interview at the VIC, a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form was completed.  That form was written out by Mr Sae on behalf of the applicant.  The following was written :

“I, Chong Lai Wa, am a native of Quanzhou City, Fujian Province, and speak South Fujian Dialect.  I have overstayed in Hong Kong and have not taken any job against the law nor have I got any extension of my stay.  I am not a civil servant nor a cadre in the Mainland.  My current travel to Hong Kong is only for tourism in nature.  I cannot find anybody as surety for me.  I want to go back to the Mainland as soon as possible.  (The above contents were given by Chong Lai Wa orally, interpreted by Lam Po Lin and written down by Lam Po Lin on her behalf)”

267. The applicant disputed the accuracy of this statement.  She could nor remember saying anything about ‘tourism’.  But she did recall saying that she had overstayed in order to look after her mother.  However, during the course of her testimony, she said nothing that could be interpreted as constituting her recollection of making any sort of claim for right of abode. 

268. During the course of the interview at the VIC, a personal particulars form was also filled out.  This form too bears the same endorsement as the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form; namely, that the applicant gave the details orally and they were then written down on the form by the interpreter. 

269. Concerning the applicant’s parents, nothing was written in the form concerning their Hong Kong residential status.  Their names were given together with their dates and places of birth.  Nothing appears in the form to even suggest that the parents lived in Hong Kong.  To the contrary, one address only is given on the form, that being a village in Fujian Province.  A long bracket is written alongside the names of the individuals described on the form to suggest that all of them – including the applicant’s mother and father – lived in the same village.  The applicant protested that this was clearly wrong.  No doubt it was.  A number of objective errors were shown.  But it does not necessarily follow that the fault lay with the interpreter or the interviewing officer.  The applicant may have been the author of her own errors, either intentionally or unintentionally.  Indeed, it was put to her during the course of cross-examination that she had reason to intentionally distort the family particulars to avoid her immediate family members from encountering any difficulties on her behalf.  This she denied.

270. I would emphasise that no suggestion was made that the applicant was subjected to harsh or oppressive treatment either by the police or officials of the Immigration Department.

271. The applicant struck me as an essentially gentle person not prepared to manifestly exaggerate her evidence or invent portions of it.  That, of course, was to her credit.  But when her case in the first instance was so meagre; indeed, in my view, no real case at all, her application was one which could never expect to be successful.

272. For the reasons given, I am satisfied that she made no claim for right of abode at the time she was arrested by the police. 

273. In respect of the interview at the VIC, a professional interpreter was used, that interpreter being conversant in the applicant’s dialect.  The applicant said that there were errors in the two interview records.  There may well have been some misunderstanding.  But, even on the applicant’s own case, no claim for right of abode was made by her during the interview process at the VIC.  Indeed in this last respect, it is important to return to the case summary prepared in 2000 for the applicant.  This summary, of course, was created only some two years after the events in question.  The summary reads :

“Ms Chong [The applicant] was subsequently taken to the Immigration Department.  She does not say that she made any claim here – she was never given an opportunity to do so.”

274. Accordingly, my determinations are as follows :

(i)       The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;

(ii)      the Director has no record of any claim.

Mr Siu Ting Kwong (2999, a ‘group one’ applicant)

275. The applicant was born in Guangdong Province in 1972, one of five children.  His father came to Hong Kong in 1978, his mother being permitted to do so in 1989. 

276. Like many others, the applicant said that, in the months leading up to the change of sovereignty, he heard rumours of an amnesty that would permit the children of Hong Kong permanent residents to settle in Hong Kong.  However, he did not give the rumours much credence.  His father, he said, had more belief in them.

277. As it was, the applicant did not come to Hong Kong until 1998, arriving here on a two-way permit on 3 July 1998, being permitted to stay until 27 August of that year.  During the course of testimony, it was not suggested that the purpose of the visit was specifically designed for the purpose of claiming right of abode.  The applicant was by then a married man, his wife remaining in the Mainland.

278. It was the evidence, however, that the applicant had always wished to settle and his family had wished him to join them.  According to the applicant, when his mother applied for a one-way permit to settle in Hong Kong in the 1980s, she had included him as an accompanying child.  However, as time passed, she had grown anxious that, if her application was granted, he may then be too old in terms of the policy to accompany her.  She had therefore amended her application by removing the applicant and including his younger brother.  As it happened, said the applicant, he was still of the right age to accompany his mother when her one-way permit had been granted in 1989.  A miscalculation had therefore denied him right of abode under the one-way permit policy.

279. On 13 August 1998, the applicant and his father, Mr Siu Charn Kou, were arrested at a building site in Tseung Kwan O.  The applicant’s father was a self-employed bricklayer and the applicant, it appears, was working with him.

280. The applicant and his father were taken first to Tseung Kwan O Police Station and from there were given into the custody of the Immigration Task Force at Central Government Pier.

281. Both were interviewed by Task Force officers later that day.  The interview process took place in a large room, the applicant and his father being interviewed at separate desks a distance from each other.  The interview process was not completed until the evening.

282. According to the applicant, although he could see his father across the room during the interview process, he could not hear what was being said between his father and the interviewing officer.  The room, he said, was heavily air-conditioned and at some stage he noticed that his father was suffering badly from the cold.  He therefore went across to his father and gave him his own shirt to wear.

283. By way of broad summary, the case presented by the applicant and his father was to the effect that, although no claim for right of abode was made during the course of the interview process, at the conclusion of that process the father, speaking on behalf of his son, addressed an immigration officer, telling the officer that his son, had – or should have – right of abode and that his arrest was therefore unreasonable.  As for any record of that claim, while this exchange had not in any way been recorded, it was submitted that there was ample evidence in the interview documents themselves that the father was a permanent resident and that the applicant was his natural son.  That evidence, in the circumstances, constituted a sufficient record.

284. At the outset, I record that, in the main, the applicant impressed me as a credible witness.  He spoke slowly, even ponderously, taking time to consider his answers.  In the course of his testimony, however, he conceded that he could not now remember much of what happened during the course of the interviewing process and immediately thereafter.  Although entirely understandable, in the result, in respect of substantive issues, the applicant’s testimony was marked more by what he could not remember than what he could. 

285. As to the fact that he had been illegally working in Hong Kong, in his cautioned statement made on the day of his arrest, the applicant admitted that he had been working as a bricklayer with his father.  He signed his name to the following answer in the record of interview :

“In fact, I come to Hong Kong this time to visit my parents.  By this month, seeing that I had been in Hong Kong to play for such a long time, my father asked me whether I would go to the construction site to help doing work.  Being a little bored and in addition seeing that my father was so old, I agreed to my father that I would go to the construction site to help in laying bricks.”

286. The father too, in his cautioned statement made at about the same time, put his signature to the following confirmation :

“After my son came to Hong Kong to visit me at the beginning of July this year, I found him bored staying at home.  I want him to be skilful in one field and therefore told him to come to the construction site to help me in laying bricks so that he, in addition can learn something.”

287. Both the father and son made affirmations in preparation for the hearing.  These affirmations were made on 10 October 2006, just weeks before the hearing itself.

288. Although, in my view, nothing really turns on it, in his affirmation, the applicant explained in slightly different terms how he had come to be arrested.  He accepted however that he had been working in breach of his conditions of stay.  In his affirmation the following was said :

“Since he came to Hong Kong, my father has worked as a bricklayer.  He began his own sub-contracting business in 1980 and was still operating this when I came to Hong Kong in 1998.  During my stay between July and August 1998, he had a contract on a site in Tseung Kwan O.  I went there to learn his trade … It was my hope that I would be able to come to Hong Kong to live and inherit my father’s business.”

289. During the course of his testimony, the applicant appeared to suggest – and I would put it no higher than that – that he had not willingly put his signature to some of the statements appearing in his 1998 cautioned statement.  He indicated that he had been ‘taught’ some of what appeared.  The applicant was given time to read through the statement to try and identify those extracts which he indicated had not been freely made.  Indeed, I adjourned to give him time to do so.  When I returned, however, the applicant said that he could not now identify those extracts.  Thereafter, during the course of cross-examination, when taken through the cautioned statement, for all intents and purposes, the applicant conceded that, in fact, he had not been ‘taught’ anything and that the statement was an accurate record of the admissions made by him that day.  

290. Having completed his cautioned statement, the applicant was asked by his interviewing officer, Mr Shum Ho Hang, to complete a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  The characters he wrote on that form were to the following effect :

“I, Siu Ting Kwong, do not have right of abode in Hong Kong.  Please send me back to China as soon as possible.”

291. In respect of these characters, the applicant said that at the time he did not know what he should write and therefore followed the guidance of Mr Shum.  He did not testify that he had actively wished to write something else but had been prevented from doing so.  He merely complied with the guidance given.

292. Mr Shum himself readily accepted that the characters appearing on the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form would have been written under his guidance.  He said that he had standard instructions in cases of this kind to make a ‘preliminary’ investigation as to the residential status of interviewees to ensure that people who were lawfully in Hong Kong were not wrongly repatriated and, of course, to ensure that those who had the right to work in Hong Kong were not wrongly prosecuted.

293. To that end, he said, having checked relevant documents and come to a preliminary assessment, he would ask the interviewee – in this case, the applicant – to confirm his assessment : hence the applicant’s statement appearing on the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form to the effect that he did not have right of abode.  Mr Shum went on to say that, as a matter of practice, he would also ask whether the interviewee was prepared to be repatriated.  If the interviewee agreed, he would ask that person to record that fact too : hence the second sentence on the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.

294. As to any claim for right of abode, as I have said earlier, it was not suggested that the applicant himself had made any such claim.  It was instead the applicant’s case that the claim had been made on his behalf by his father as an act, seemingly, independent of any joint intention.

295. In the case summary prepared for the applicant in or about 2000 by Pam Baker & Co., it was recorded that the father had posted bail for the applicant.  The father had informed an officer – whether he was the bail officer or another officer was not made clear – that he was a permanent resident and accordingly his son should not in any event have been arrested.  The father had asked the officer why his son could not remain in Hong Kong as a permanent resident.  He was told that his son would have to leave Hong Kong when his permit expired.

296. In his affirmation made some six years later, the applicant remembered matters somewhat differently.  He said :

“After my father’s interview was concluded, my father spoke to the officer who had interviewed him and told him that I should have the right of abode in Hong Kong and that therefore my arrest was unreasonable.  The interviewing officer replied to him: ‘Your son can make an application in the Mainland.  He cannot apply for it in Hong Kong.’”  [my emphasis]

297. When testifying, the applicant said that, after his own interview was completed, he went across to his father.  The implication appeared to be that it was at this time that he heard his father claim right of abode on his behalf.  But, during the course of cross-examination, he admitted that his memory of what, if anything, was said was now so vague that he could remember almost nothing.

298. Despite the details set down in his affirmation, it was apparent to me that the applicant – understandably perhaps after so many years – really had no recollection of what, if anything, had been said by his father on his behalf and, when tested in cross-examination, was not prepared to commit himself to matters which he could not now remember.  His testimony therefore as to the making of any claim on his behalf did not advance his case.

299. The father, in his affirmation of 10 October 2006, said the following in respect of how he came to claim right of abode for his son :

“I recall that at the conclusion of the interview, I told the interviewing officer that I am a Hong Kong permanent resident and therefore my son should have right of abode in Hong Kong.  The interviewing officer just smiled at me and did not reply to me.”

300. The father went on to say in his affirmation that he ‘repeated this assertion’ to the officer who was interviewing his son.

301. However, the father gave a different version of events when he testified.  He was very clear in saying that, despite what had been recorded in his affirmation, he did not make any claim for right of abode to the officer who took a statement from him under caution.  The claim, he said, had been made after his interview had been completed and when he had moved away from the interview desk to another spot in the room. 

302. As to the nature of the claim, the father testified that he was venting his anger at the time, annoyed at the fact that his son should have been arrested.  He said words to the following effect : ‘My son has right of abode.  In 1997, people said that children would have right of abode but now you have arrested him.’  The father said that the officer replied to the following effect; namely : ‘It has nothing to do with me.  If your son wants to live in Hong Kong, he must go back to the Mainland to deal with it.’

303. In his affirmation, of course, the father had not spoken of receiving any response to his statement.  In his affirmation, he had said that the interviewing officer had just smiled at him.

304. According to the father’s testimony, therefore, the claim was made in the course of a short, isolated conversation with a member of the Immigration Department who could no longer be identified. 

305. I accept, of course, that claims for right of abode may be made in different circumstances.  There is no required litany of words nor any formulistic context. 

306. In the present case, as I have said, the applicant himself had virtually no recollection of the claim being made, certainly no recollection upon which any reliance could be placed.

307. His memory, of course, would have been that much better in the year 2000 when he gave his case summary to his then solicitors.  Finding him to be a credible witness, I believe that some limited assistance can be obtained from that summary.

308. But it was, of course, the father who was asserted to have made the claim and, in my judgment, unless I could rely on the essential truthfulness of the father’s testimony, the applicant faced considerable difficulties.  Regrettably, I could place no reliance on the truthfulness of what the father told me.

309. The father’s fairly radical departure from his affirmation meant that I had to consider his testimony with considerable care.  In that departure the father appeared – in a broad sense at least – to be returning to the version of events set out in the case summary of 2000.  But there was other departures equally concerning.

310. It seemed to be the father’s understanding that, if I concluded that his son had been working illegally, that finding would somehow fatally undermine the application.  Accordingly, despite his son’s own admissions, and the admissions made in 1998 in the two cautioned statements, the father insisted that his son had not been working.  His son, he said, had come to the building site that day for the single purpose of bringing him lunch.

311. When questioned as to why he had not said something very different in his cautioned statement, it was effectively the father’s testimony that a false statement had been placed before him and he had signed it because he had not dared to protest.  In any event, said the father, the air-conditioning that day had made him so cold during the course of the interview that he could ‘hardly bear it’.  It was the clear import of his testimony that the air-conditioning had been turned up in order to place pressure on him : this of course in a large room with other people present.

312. Although of very limited relevance, I cannot help observing that the father struck me as a weather-beaten individual used to working outdoors in all sorts of weather : hardly a pale and cloistered clerk.

313. As to the oppressive nature of the air-conditioning, the father testified that it was only when his son gave him his shirt that he was better able to bear the cold.  However, when the father was asked why, if the interviewer was attempting to oppress him, his son should have been allowed to give him his shirt, the father then changed tack, protesting that no issue of ‘allowing’ had arisen.  His son, he then said, had given him his shirt much earlier, indeed at the Tseung Kwan O Police Station.

314. This assertion flew in the face of the father’s earlier testimony and also the testimony of his son.  It was also contradicted by the case summary prepared for the applicant in or about the year 2000.  In that summary, it was said that the applicant and the father had been working shirtless at the building site when they were arrested and had been taken away by the police without being allowed to put on their shirts.

315. Could there, however, despite the father’s wayward testimony, be some truth in the allegation first made in the applicant’s case summary in the year 2000; namely, that there had been a conversation between the father and an unidentified immigration officer in which a protest had made by the father, a protest to the effect that, as a person entitled to right of abode, his son should not have been arrested and treated in the way he was treated?  It was, in the circumstances, a plausible enough assertion.  It is easy to imagine the father making just such a complaint on behalf of his son; doing so, as the father himself testified, while venting his annoyance at their treatment.

316. As I have said, in giving his testimony, the father appeared to abandon the contents of his affirmation and return instead to the assertions made in the much earlier case summary.  In the result, even though the applicant’s case at the end appeared to be in tatters, it was not one that I could easily dismiss.

317. In a number of applications I have concluded that lies have been intended more to ‘gild the lilly’ rather than to disguise the fact that there is in truth no case at all.

318. In the present case, however, I could not bring myself to a finding that the father’s wayward testimony may have been mere ‘gilding of the lilly’.  It was for the applicant to satisfy me on a balance of probabilities that a claim had been made.  On a consideration of all the evidence, however, I could not be so satisfied.

319. As for the existence of a record of a claim, it follows that I was satisfied there was no such record.

320. It was submitted that the interview documents themselves were an ample record.  They showed that the father was a permanent resident and that the applicant was his son.  However, while I am not obliged to determine that submission, I have my doubts as to its merits.  The documents related solely to an enquiry into possible criminal conduct on the part of the father and son.  Any matters going to the applicant’s residential status concerned that enquiry.  The asserted claim for right of abode was entirely independent, coming essentially as an afterthought.  It could not be said that any of the data contained in the interview documents was obtained, directly or indirectly, as part of any sort of process in terms of which the applicant and/or his father were seeking to claim right of abode.  To qualify as a record of a claim there must surely be some nexus between the claim and the record.

321. In the circumstances, therefore, my determinations are as follows :

(i)       neither the applicant, nor his father on his behalf, made a claim for right of abode;

(ii)      the director has no record of any claim.

Conclusion

322. My determinations may therefore be stated again (in summary) as follows :

1. Madam Sze Lai Ha (3085) :

“(i) The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;

 (ii) the Director has no record of any claim.”

2. Madam Yang Xiu Hua (4058) :

“(i) The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;

 (ii) the Director has no record of any claim.”

3. Madam Tse Lai Yuk (3350) :

“(i) The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;

(ii) the Director has no record of any claim.”

4. Mr Tse Chung Ching (3343) :

“(i) The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;

(ii) the Director has no record of any claim.”

5. Madam Ng Mei Ling (2658) :

“(i) The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;

 (ii) the Director has no record of any claim.”

6. Madam Chong Lai Wa (914) :

“(i) The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;

 (ii) the Director has no record of any claim.”

7. Mr Siu Ting Kwong (2999) :

“(i) Neither the applicant, nor his father on his behalf, made a claim for right of abode;

 (ii) The director has no record of any claim.”

(M.J. Hartmann)
Judge of the Court of First Instance,
High Court

20-23, 27-30 November, 1, 6-12 December 2006

Mr Kwok Sui Hay and Mr Sean Fang, instructed by Messrs Barnes & Daly, for the Applicants

Mr Joseph Fok, SC leading Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

24 November 2006

Both parties were absent

4 and 5 December 2006

Ms Gladys Li, SC and Mr Sean Fang, instructed by Messrs Barnes & Daly, for the Applicants

Mr Joseph Fok, SC leading Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

20 December 2006

Ms Gladys Li, SC leading Mr Kwok Sui Hay and Mr Sean Fang, instructed by Messrs Barnes & Daly, for the Applicants

Mr Joseph Fok, SC leading Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

53837-EN-2006-08-23

NG SIU TUNG AND OTHERS v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

HTML content

HCAL 81/1999

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO.81 OF 1999

---------------------

BETWEEN

 NG SIU TUNG AND OTHERSApplicants
 and 
 DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATIONRespondent

----------------------

 

Before : Hon Hartmann J in Court

Dates of Hearing : 16-17 January; 20-24, 27-28 February; 1-3, 6-10, 13-15, 20-24, 27-29 March; 24-28 April; 2-4, 8-12 and 22-23 May 2006

Date of Handing Down Report : 23 August 2006

 

---------------------------------------

THIRD REPORT TO THE
COURT OF FINAL APPEAL

---------------------------------------

 

Introduction

1. This third report determines 19 individual applications.  To date, therefore, in all three reports, 65 applications have been determined.

2. While the disposal of cases by way of contested hearings has been steady, if often hard fought, the accrued resolution of disputed issues of principle and fact has led to the settlement of 91 applications without the need for a hearing.

3. In addition, 10 applications have been withdrawn.

4. In the result, as I understand it, there are now only 68 cases outstanding.

5. As at the end of May of this year, the applicants in the great majority of these outstanding cases, over 60 of them, had not yet filed their evidence.  However, assuming, once their evidence is filed, that a settlement rate is obtained similar to the rate obtained so far, there is no reason why those remaining cases which must go to trial cannot be dealt with by the end of 2007.

6. In this regard, the following ‘hearing periods’ have been set :

(i)20 November – 20 December 2006,
(ii)2 – 31 May 2007, and
(iii)3 September – 31 December 2007.

7. For convenience, this third report has been divided into parts.  They are as follows :

Part One : Two applications by applicants from whom legal aid was withdrawn 
Part Two :Two ‘group six’ applications
Part Three :One ‘group four’ application
Part Four :Eight ‘group one’ applications
Part Five :Six ‘group two’ applications

Part One

8. When the second tranche of hearings commenced, I was informed that a number of applicants, previously granted legal aid, had now had their legal aid withdrawn.

9. In Part Five of my second report, I described the steps taken to assist those applicants and, in addition, set out my determinations in respect of all but two of them.

10. My determinations in respect of those remaining two are set out below.

Madam Li Lu Ye, also known as Li Luk Yip (2233 : a ‘group one and group two’ applicant)

11. This applicant’s case was not heard in time to be contained in my second report.  This was because the applicant, having first obtained a short adjournment of approximately one month, then sought a much longer adjournment in order, she said, to attempt to raise sufficient funds to obtain private legal representation.  Her case was therefore adjourned to January of this year, an adjournment in excess of six months.

12. Shortly before the hearing on 16 January of this year, the applicant sought a further adjournment of at least three months.  She did so on the basis that she still needed time to be able to attempt to borrow money to pay for legal representation and also, as she put it, ‘to gather further evidence’.  However, having heard submissions, I was satisfied, first, that, if she had not already been able to raise sufficient funds, there was no realistic prospect of her being able to do so in the next three months and, second, that, in fact, there was no clearly identifiable further evidence to be gathered.  The applicant’s case therefore proceeded, being heard on 16 and 17 January 2006.

13. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in 1955.  Her father came to Hong Kong in 1974, her mother following in 1983.  At all material times, both her parents were permanent residents.

14. The applicant testified that she claimed right of abode on four separate occasions during the concession period.

15. The relevant history of her matter, however, commenced in 1989, well before the concession policy began.  In May 1989, the applicant, who at that time was a married woman with four children, came to Hong Kong to visit her parents.  Her two-way permit obliged her to return to the Mainland in July.  The applicant, however, overstayed.  She was eventually arrested in October 1989 and charged with two criminal offences; first, with breaching her conditions of stay and, second, with altering her two-way permit.  The applicant pleaded guilty to the charges and was sentenced to a total of three months’ imprisonment suspended for a year.

16. In a cautioned statement made in October 1989, the applicant explained why she had committed the offences for which she was convicted :

“The (reason) is, I wanted to live with my parents so much.  In addition, I wanted to take care of my mother who was in poor health.  So, after my limit of stay in Hong Kong expired, I did not leave Hong Kong and overstayed in Hong Kong.  However, I feared that my residential status would be disclosed easily, so I bought a bottle of correction fluid and altered the information on the Two-way Exit Permit.”

17. In September 1992, the applicant returned to Hong Kong, her two-way permit allowing her to remain until October.  Again, however, she overstayed.  Indeed, she remained in Hong Kong until March 1997 – a few months before the change of sovereignty – when she was arrested.  She was again charged with two offences; this time with breaching her conditions of stay and with being in possession of another person’s Hong Kong identity card.  She pleaded guilty to both charges and was sentenced to imprisonment for nine months.

18. During the course of the hearing, when questioned about her conviction in March 1997, the applicant protested that she had not, in fact, been in possession of another person’s identity card.  The applicant said that, at the time of her arrest, the police had acted ‘fiercely’ towards her.  She had been assaulted.  In addition, the identity card had been planted on her; in short, the police had fabricated a case against her.  She had made no protest in court, she said, and had pleaded guilty because she had been afraid of further assaults.

19. This explanation, in my view, was not credible.  It struck me as a spontaneous invention, one which she was then forced to embroider.  It was clear, I think, that she invented this explanation because she was well aware of the suggestion being put by counsel for the Director that she was the sort of person who in the past (in 1989 and 1992) had been prepared to try and deceive the authorities by using manufactured, altered or illicitly obtained evidence and was attempting to do the same in the hearing before me.

20. The applicant was clearly a woman of limited education but it in no way followed that she was mentally dull.  She was never impolite nor aggressive.  But nevertheless she could be very persistent.  Rulings sometimes had to be repeated several times before she would accept them.  She clearly understood the burdens she faced and did her best to overcome them.  It became obvious to me, however, that all too often she was prepared to enlarge upon incidents, or invent them entirely, if she thought it would advance her case. 

21. During the course of her evidence, the applicant stressed that, when she had been arrested by the police in March 1997, she had made a statement in which she had made a claim for right of abode.  She said that, in preparing for her case, she had attempted to obtain a copy of her statement but had been informed that it had been destroyed.  In the result, she said, she had been deprived of important written evidence of her claim.  However, even if such a claim was made, written evidence of it, while it would go to issues of credibility, would not otherwise have advanced her case.  This is because the claim was not made in the period encompassed by the concession policy (from 1 July 1997 to 29 January 1999) and nor does the Immigration Department have a record of it.

22. According to the applicant, her first claim for right of abode made within the concession period was made on 1 September 1997.  The claim was made, she said, after she had served her prison sentence and was being interviewed by an immigration officer for the purposes of her repatriation to the Mainland.

23. When the interview took place, said the applicant, she told the interviewing officer, Immigration Officer Chan Hok Man, that she had come to Hong Kong to care for her father who had broken his leg.  She protested, she said, that she did not wish to go back to the Mainland.  She told the officer, she said, that both her parents were permanent residents and, through them, she was also a permanent resident.  She had heard, she told the officer, that others had been released on bail so that they could remain in Hong Kong as permanent residents.  She sought to benefit from the same scheme.  She was told, however, that there was no such scheme and that she would have to return to the Mainland.  Only then, said the applicant, did she reluctantly write down the words on the interview form that the officer demanded she copy from a text.  The English translation of what is written on the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form is to the following effect :

“I, Lee Luk Yip, on 1 Sep 1992 came to HK with permission from Lo Wu.  In HK, from 23 Oct 1992.  I overstayed from 24 Oct 92 until 1 March 1997 was arrested by police.  Later the court sentenced me to prison for 9 months.  I have finished imprisonment, want to return to Mainland China as soon as possible, but my two-way permit had already expired, please help me to arrange everything.”

24. In my view, what is written on the form is too well composed, too well structured in its flow of information, to have been written by the applicant without any assistance by the interviewing officer.  That being said, Mr Chan, the interviewing officer, accepted that, if an interviewee consented, he would assist, if necessary, in completing the form.

25. The characters written on the form are in the applicant’s own hand.  According to Mr Chan they are in simplified characters, a form of writing with which he had limited familiarity.  There are apparently a number of mistakes in the writing.  Mr Chan said that, if an interviewee wrote the characters, he would not correct any mistakes.  It would be different, of course, if he wrote on behalf of the interviewee.

26. The applicant testified that, being semi-literate, she made the mistakes when she was forced to copy what Mr Chan had written on a separate piece of paper.  As to the use of simplified characters, the applicant said that she asked if she could use these characters and was given permission.

27. On the balance of probabilities, for the reasons I have given, I am satisfied that the applicant must, to a material degree, have written at the dictation of the interviewing officer or copied what he had written for her.  The more difficult question is whether the characters were written after the applicant had made on oral claim for right of abode and had, as she asserted, been told she could not make such a claim.

28. The applicant’s oral testimony was unambiguous.  On the basis of that testimony, if it is accepted, she made a claim.  However, when the applicant set out her case to her first set of solicitors, Pam Baker & Co., the summary of her case was far less direct.  The summary said the following :

“Ms Li told the interviewing officer she does not want to go back yet, she wanted to get bail to stay in HK to look after her father (who had just broken his leg).  The officer said, you cannot refuse to return, you have overstayed for so long (since 1992).  You have broken the law, you are not allowed to stay.  The officer then wrote out on a separate piece of paper these Grounds for Non Removal for her to copy.”

29. When I suggested to the applicant that her case summary had not contained any of the direct language she testified she had used in the interview – a direct claim, for example, that through her parents she too was a permanent resident – the applicant responded by asserting that her then solicitors had somehow acted in a way which prevented her from giving her full story.  I took this to mean that the solicitors had dealt with her perfunctorily and did not accurately record the details of her claim.  It is a fact, of course, that Pam Baker & Co. at that time were working under very considerable pressure.  Accuracy in such circumstances cannot always be assured.

30. However, in the applicant’s affirmation of 19 November 2002, a much fuller document, nothing was said there either of any direct claim for right of permanent residence through her parents.  The affirmation, in so far as it is relevant, reads :

“When I was asked to copy words down on the Grounds for Non-Removal, I again told the officer I did not know how to write.  Nevertheless, I was told to copy something written by the officer.  I repeated that I did want to stay in Hong Kong.  The officer replied, harshly: ‘If you do not know how to write how dare you come to Hong Kong?  You want to be a beggar?  Aren’t you afraid you will end up a beggar?’  I told the officer ‘My parents are here, how can I become a beggar?’  I told her again I wanted to stay to take care of my parents.”

31. I do accept on the probabilities that the applicant, in the course of the interview, may well have expressed a desire to remain in Hong Kong with her parents.  As far back as 1989 she had made such a request.  But just as in 1989 (in her cautioned statement), her stated desire was based on compassionate grounds and not, even indirectly, on any asserted right.

32. There is nothing in the case summary or the affirmation to suggest, directly or indirectly, that the applicant was seeking to stay in Hong Kong because she believed that through her parents she had a lawful right to do so.  It was only in the course of her oral testimony, when she was asked by myself to state what she remembered saying, that the applicant made direct reference to rights of permanent residence and the like.  I appreciate, of course, that testimony is intended to create a fuller, more detailed story.  In the present case, however, it struck me that the applicant’s testimony was tailored to what she now knew she had to prove and did not reflect an attempt in good faith to remember what had in fact been said.

33. On the day the applicant was interviewed, and two days before on 30 August 1997, she completed a number of forms other than her ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  One of these forms bore the heading ‘My Personal Particulars’.  In that form, the applicant filled in all the required details of both her parents : their names, ages, places of birth, occupations and address in Hong Kong.  However, no details of their identity cards or residential status was sought and none was given.  In my judgment, therefore, this form is not itself evidence of a claim for right of abode nor does it contain information which may be said to support any oral claim.

34. On 30 August 1997, the applicant had filled out another information sheet, this one entitled : ‘Information on Detainee’.  That form, however, gives no information as to her parents and their status in Hong Kong.  The only information sought and given concerning the parents is their place of birth : in each case, Fujian.

35. In summary, therefore, while I accept that on 1 September 1997 the applicant may well have asked if it was possible to remain in Hong Kong in order to be with and care for her parents, I am unable to accept that any such request was capable of amounting to a claim for right of abode.

36. Even if I am wrong in that regard, the difficulty still arises of attempting to discover any record of a claim resting with the Director.  In my view, none of the documents completed by the applicant upon her discharge from prison in 1997 are capable, directly or indirectly, read singularly or together, of constituting such a record.

37. As I have said, however, it was the applicant’s case that she had claimed right of abode on four separate occasions during the concession period.  What then of the remaining three alleged claims?

38. It was the applicant’s case that she made these three claims in July 1998 when she returned to Hong Kong to visit her parents.  On this occasion the applicant arrived in Hong Kong on 2 July and departed on 9 July.

39. On 8 July, said the applicant, she and her father went to the Chinese Visitors Office in order to claim right of abode.  The applicant testified that she took a piece of paper with her on which she had written to the following effect :

“I, Li Luk Yip, want to apply for right of abode in Hong Kong, claiming to have right of abode, born on 1 December 1955.”

40. The applicant produced what she said was this piece of paper.  It bore her signature and the date : ‘1998.7.8’.  In addition, on a Immigration Department label, was written the address of the Chinese Visitors Office.  Attached to the paper are photostat copies of her parents’ identity cards.  According to the applicant, she had only recently located these papers again.

41. The applicant’s father testified that he went with his daughter to the Chinese Visitors Office and said he was able to remember his daughter taking a piece of paper with her.  He identified the paper produced by his daughter as the one in question.

42. As to the events that day, the applicant said that she showed the paper to an officer at the counter who told her that she could make no claim.  The applicant accepted that the officer took no papers from her and, to the best of her memory, made no record in any book or ledger.  Being unable to take the matter further, the applicant said that she and her father then left.

43. During this visit to Hong Kong in July 1998, the applicant said that she also went to the Immigration Tower, to the offices of the General Investigation Section on the 13th floor, in order to claim right of abode.  However, on this occasion too she was informed that she could not make any claim and left without being able to leave any papers or, to the best of her knowledge, without the officer at the counter making any sort of record.

44. On 9 July 1998, the applicant returned to the Mainland.  She said that she went with her father to Lo Wu.  However, she did not wish to return to the Mainland, she was desperate to remain with her parents in Hong Kong.  Accordingly, she said, she informed an officer at the immigration counter that she wished to remain in Hong Kong.  She was then referred to another officer.  In her view, he (or she) was probably a more senior officer.  She was taken to a room, she said, where she was interviewed for some 30 to 40 minutes.  During this interview process, she said, she was asked to fill out a lengthy interview form written on A4 paper and signed the document.  She was told, however, that as her two-way permit was expiring that day she would have to return to the Mainland immediately and she was escorted back to the counter where her passport was stamped for purposes of her return.  

45. According to the applicant, therefore, her three claims were made at three different locations : the Chinese Visitors Office, the 13th floor of the Immigration Tower and Lo Wu.

46. However, when the applicant gave her case summary to Pam Baker & Co. nothing appears to have been said of any of these attempts to claim right of abode.  Nor was anything said in the applicant’s affirmation made in November 2002.  While this is understandable in respect of the first two attempts, where no papers were handed over or forms filled out, it raises concerns in respect of the asserted attempt made at Lo Wu.  After all, on this last occasion, according to the applicant, she was interviewed for half an hour or more and completed a lengthy interview form, putting her signature to it.

47. The only mention made in any pre-hearing document of any of these attempts to claim right of abode appears in a document submitted to the immigration authorities to enable them to consider any alleged claims.  That document is dated 30 May 2000 and gives direct details of only one occasion on which a claim was made.  Under the heading ‘How did you declare that you had right of abode in Hong Kong at that time?’, the following is written :

“I went to the Immigration Department at Wanchai on 8 July 1998 to assert right of abode.  I requested to extend my stay to remain in Hong Kong for application.  I was refused.  I went back to the Mainland on 9 July 1998.”

Nothing is said in that document of the Lo Wu interview and the completion of an interview form.  Indeed, the first indication that the applicant claimed to have been interviewed at length at Lo Wu arose in mid-2005 when she wrote to the Immigration Department requesting copies of all relevant papers.  No relevant papers have been located.

48. In March 2002, the applicant’s father wrote to the Director of Immigration on behalf of his daughter, seeking permission for the applicant to remain in Hong Kong ‘under the concession policy’.  The letter consists essentially of a plea based on compassionate grounds and not too much can made of the fact that it does not detail any occasions when the applicant was said to have claimed right of abode.  But, in so far as it is relevant, the following only is said :

“My daughter came to Hong Kong to visit relatives in September 1992.  It was because I, Li Ching Chuen, fell and broke my leg and was inconvenient to move about.  My daughter remained in Hong Kong to take care of my daily living until she was arrested by the Police.  She was put in jail and was repatriated to the Mainland in March 1997.  In July 1998, she came to Hong Kong to visit her relatives and returned to the Mainland in the same month.  She came to Hong Kong again in March 1999 till today to claim right of abode.”

49. In respect of the three claims that the applicant said she made in July 1998, evidence was given by the Director that no documentary evidence could be found of any of the three occasions having taken place.  Importantly, there was no evidence of any interview having taken place at Lo Wu.  It was the Director’s case that all three asserted claims were inventions.

50. I confess to being concerned as to the genuineness of the piece of paper that the applicant testified she signed on 8 July 1998 and took with her to the Chinese Visitors Office.  When the applicant gave evidence, she said she had only recently located the document after mislaying it presumably for over seven years.  The probabilities, I believe, support this being an invention.

51. I do accept, however, that the applicant may have gone either to the Chinese Visitors Office or to the Immigration Tower at some time during her visit in July 1998 to enquire as to an extension of stay and also perhaps to enquire if it was possible to claim right of abode.  That possibility cannot be rejected.  It has not been shown to me, however, that any claim as such; that is, a claim for right of abode, was made on those occasions.  But even if I am wrong in that regard, the applicant herself has accepted that there would be no record of any claim.

52. As for the applicant’s testimony that she claimed right of abode at Lo Wu in the course of a lengthy interview there, I am satisfied this was a recent invention.  During the course of her testimony, the applicant emphasised how important this interview was to her case.  Yet none of the early papers prepared on her behalf or completed by her makes mention of it.

53. While, of course, entry and exit forms are destroyed after a relatively short period of time, it seems unlikely to me that, if the interview process had been as the applicant described it, that there would be no record of it at all in the archives of the Immigration Department. 

54. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)The applicant did not make any claim for right of abode, either in 1997 or 1998;
(ii)the Director has no record of any claim.

Madam Ngan Pui Yuk (2785 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

55. At or about the time this applicant’s legal aid was discharged, she returned to the Mainland.  Since returning, she has married and now has a child.

56. Early attempts to contact the applicant were unsuccessful.  Eventually, however, contact was made with her and, in a letter dated 21 April 2006 written from Fujian Province, she confirmed that, although she herself would not be able to attend court to give evidence, she still wished her application to be considered.  In this regard, her letter said the following :

“I originally planned to attend the hearing in Hong Kong but it is a pity that I cannot go due to practical family obligations and economic constraints.  I have no choice but to stay in the Mainland to wait for the outcome of the hearing.  I am sorry that I haven’t informed you any earlier by mail that I am agreeable to have an ex parte hearing, and I am sorry for having caused you all the inconvenience at your work.”

57. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in 1974.  She was one of four children.  Her father came to live in Hong Kong in 1986, her mother joining him in 1994.  Two of the applicant’s siblings later joined their parents. 

58. In her affirmation of 29 November 2002, the applicant said that she came to Hong Kong in 1995 in order to visit her family.  Her two-way permit authorised her to remain until 8 December of that same year.

59. It was the applicant’s case that, while she was here, she learnt of rumours that, when the change of sovereignty took place, the children of Hong Kong permanent residents – people in exactly her position – would be entitled to claim the right themselves to live permanently in Hong Kong.  In anticipation of being able to secure that right, the applicant said that she did not return to the Mainland but remained in Hong Kong waiting for the change of sovereignty.

60. When the change of sovereignty took place, of course, the Hong Kong Government did not recognise any such entitlement.  No amnesty was granted to persons in the position of the applicant.  Tired of having to live in hiding, the applicant said that she felt she had no option but to surrender herself in order to return to the Mainland.  In this regard, in her affirmation of 29 November 2002 (para.11), she said the following :

“On 15 September 1997, I went to the Immigration Department with a friend for the purpose of surrendering and finally seeking direct answers about how to assert my right of abode.  My parents did not accompany me because they were both working. I decided to surrender because I had been living a clandestine life for more than 2 years.  I lived in Tseung Kwan O Temporary Housing Area with my parents during my stay in 1995 to 1997. Immigration Task Force officers frequently patrolled the area, sometimes with dogs, and often arrested illegal immigrants close by to where I was living with my mother and father. I did not want to stay in Hong Kong any more living under cover. My father’s enquiries with Immigration had established one thing – that there would not be any amnesty for people like me.  I felt I had no option but to return to mainland, notwithstanding that I had spent two years in Hong Kong waiting for the Handover, and the change of the law towards children of local parents.”

61. When she surrendered herself on 15 September 1997, the applicant went to the offices of the General Investigation Section (‘GIS’) on the 13th floor of the Immigration Tower.  She was not in the company of either of her parents.

62. What must be noted, of course, is that the applicant went to the office of GIS for the specific purpose of surrendering herself and being returned to the Mainland.  She did so in the knowledge, as she believed it to be, that people in her position were not able successfully to claim right of abode and that no purpose was served in continuing to live in hiding in Hong Kong.

63. Upon her arrival, in all probability while she waited in the reception area, the applicant completed an ID 457 form.  On that form, in respect of her mother and father, she recorded thef birth, the fact that they were married and in addition gave their Hong Kong address.  However, she wrote nothing in the column reserved for the details of their Hong Kong identity cards.  Similarly, the applicant gave the names of her brother and sister, confirming that they lived with her parents, but gave no details whatsoever of their Hong Kong identity cards.  Accordingly, nothing appears on the face of the ID 457, directly or indirectly, to record the fact that either of the applicant’s parents were, at the time the form was completed, persons who enjoyed right of abode in Hong Kong. 

64. That no proof of her parent’s rights of residence was recorded was to be expected if the applicant’s intention (and expectation) was only to be repatriated.

65. In her affirmation of 29 November 2002, the applicant said that, when she was called in for her interview, the interviewing officer asked her why she had overstayed for so long.  She explained, she said, that her father was a permanent resident and that she had decided to remain with her family in Hong Kong in the hope that, upon the change of sovereignty, she would finally be able to live permanently with her parents in Hong Kong. 

66. I have little difficulty in concluding on the probabilities that such a statement was made by the applicant.  She had overstayed for a considerable period of time and I am satisfied that no doubt her principal reason for doing so was the expectation of obtaining right of abode upon the change of sovereignty. 

67. However, I do not see that any such statement can be said to constitute a claim for right of abode; that is, some sort of assertion, direct or indirect, that she was entitled to the right to live permanently in Hong Kong by reason of her parentage.  The statement spoken of by the applicant in her papers is simply an explanation of an historical set of circumstances, a set of circumstances which at the time, so her own evidence indicates, she no longer believed to be applicable.

68. The applicant said that, when she was given the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, she understood from what was printed on the form that she was required to state why it was that she objected to being removed from Hong Kong.  The printed English endorsement on the form (in bold print) reads : “Please state your grounds for non-removal.’  The applicant said that accordingly she started to explain in writing why she had remained so long in Hong Kong, that her father was not well and needed to be cared for and that her whole family was in Hong Kong.  However, according to the applicant, the interviewing officer warned her that, having overstayed so long, when she was taken to court (to be prosecuted for overstaying), if she wrote too much on the form she may find herself in trouble with the court.  According to the applicant, the interviewing officer then took away the form on which she had been writing and replaced it with a fresh form.  He then dictated to her what she should write on this fresh form. 

69. It was the applicant’s case that this fresh form was the one found in her GIS file and exhibited in evidence.  This form contained, she said, the dictated characters which, in translation, read :

“I overstayed because I was with family members.  I now want to return to China.”

70. On the papers, and of course I am obliged to go only by what appears on the papers, not having had the advantage of hearing the applicant give testimony, her case appears to have been fairly consistently pleaded. 

71. When the applicant’s first solicitors, Pam Baker & Co., recorded the summary of her case, the following was said in respect of the initial conversation with the interviewing officer :

“The officer asked why she had overstayed so long.  Ms Ngan [the applicant] explained that her father is a permanent resident, that she wanted to stay with her whole family who are in Hong Kong but the Immigration Department does not permit it.  So I am surrendering to go back to the Mainland.”

72. As to the manner in which the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form came to be completed, the following is said in the Pam Baker & Co. summary :

“Ms Ngan [the applicant] began writing her own humanitarian-oriented justifications for having overstayed so long.  She began to write that her father had twisted his back and needed to be cared for, and that her whole family was in Hong Kong.  The officer said, however, there is no need to say so much, it will only cause you trouble.  The officer disposed of that sheet and dictated what she should write instead.”

73. In her much later affirmation of 29 November 2002, the applicant supplemented her earlier case summary by saying the following :

“… I thought for a moment, and then proceeded, as the Summary [prepared by Pam Baker & Co.] states, to put down reasons for having remained for so long, i.e. the need for my father to be supported, the fact that my entire family lives in Hong Kong.  The officer took this away and suggested that I could get into trouble for writing so much down.  He said I had overstayed for two years.  If I put too many reasons down, the court might not like them.”

74. The Immigration Assistant who interviewed the applicant, Mr Tam Kwok Ho, testified that, although he had no independent memory of the interview, he would never have prevented an applicant from writing what he or she wished on a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form and would certainly not have destroyed any such form, forcing an interviewee to complete a new form in accordance with his dictation.  Interviewees, he said, were free to write what they liked.

75. When questioned by myself, Mr Tam accepted that there might be occasions, albeit rarely, when he would do away with a partially completed ‘grounds for non-removal’ form and replace it with a fresh one.  This may have happened, he said, if, for example, the form contained a great many mistakes, too many to be corrected in any decipherable way. 

76. In answer to questions by myself, Mr Tam said that he would never have destroyed a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form simply because he was not happy with what was written on the form.  He said that, if, for example, he considered what was written on the form to be utterly irrelevant, or to go to matters beyond his competence, he would simply have referred the matter to his senior officer. 

77. In this aspect of his evidence, I have no reason to disbelieve Mr Tam.  Why would he wish to prevent the applicant from writing too much, warning her that it may cause her trouble in court?  It is not as if the applicant, in her papers has asserted that she wrote anything that, on an objective assessment, could be said to have raised alarm bells, perhaps putting the ordinary administrative process of her case in danger of being derailed.  In both her case summary and her affirmation, the applicant spoke only of writing of compassionate matters : that her father was not well and needed care, and her whole family was in Hong Kong.  These were everyday statements.  On the evidence, it is apparent that they were written in similar form by many hundreds of persons who surrendered themselves to the GIS.

78. In my opinion, such statements would not on any reasonable assessment have put the applicant at increased risk when she appeared in the magistrates’ court.  Indeed, the opposite is the case.  They constitute litigation.  In addition, Mr Tam, the interviewing officer, would have known that the contents of the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form would be highly unlikely to ever see the light of day – as direct evidence – in any court proceedings.  The ‘grounds of non-removal’ form was a purely internal document.

79. According to the applicant, Mr Tam clearly did not like her writing so much.  But if that was the case, the most obvious course for Mr Tam to take would surely have been to tell the applicant that she need not write any more rather than taking and discarding the form – with its attendant risk that the applicant may raise a complaint – and starting all over again with a new form.

80. In summary, having heard Mr Tam give evidence, and looking to all the evidence available to me, I cannot accept on the probabilities that, in the light of what the applicant said she was writing on the form, Mr Tam would have removed that form from her and presented her with a fresh form, then dictating to her exactly what she should write.  

81. In coming to this conclusion, I have not ignored the fact that the words that appear on the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form exhibited in evidence do follow a familiar format; indeed, they are almost, character for character, the same as many endorsements made by many other applicants interviewed at GIS.  I am sure that, in filling out the form, the applicant received some assistance from Mr Tam.  It was accepted by Mr Tam that, if it was required, he would give some assistance.  But that finding does not mean that the applicant was not permitted to write as she wished if she wished.

82. In any event, even if I am wrong in this regard, assuming that the applicant did write on an earlier ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, I fail to see how it can be said that what she wrote was capable of constituting a claim and/or a record in accordance with the concession policy.  The applicant, on her own evidence, wrote nothing to indicate that either of her parents have right of abode.  Her assertion that she wrote on the form that one of the reasons for overstaying was to be with her whole family is not an assertion, even indirectly, that one or more of her parents enjoyed right of permanent residence.

83. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)The applicant did not make any claim for right of abode;
(ii)the Director has no record of any claim.

Part Two

Madam Law Yuet King (2448, a ‘group six’ applicant)

84. This applicant’s claim is based on the assertion that in December 1998, while she was in Hong Kong, her father wrote a letter on her behalf to the Director of Immigration in which he claimed that she was entitled to right of abode.

85. The Director has been unable to locate any such letter.  It is the Director’s case that the letter was not written and posted in December 1998 as alleged but was written at a much later time; in short, that it was an artifice created in an attempt to make a case where no case had previously existed.

86. The applicant was born in Guangdong Province in December 1977, the eldest of four children.  The applicant’s father came to live and work in Hong Kong in 1979, her mother being granted permission to join him here in 1991.  All of the children of the family – with the exception of the applicant – now have right of abode in Hong Kong.

87. Although the applicant regularly visited Hong Kong, she was raised and educated in the Mainland and, having graduated in accountancy, was married in 2002.  She and her husband run a hardware store in the Mainland.  They have two children.

88. Prior to the change of sovereignty, the applicant, still a student, sought a one-way permit so that she could join her family in Hong Kong.  She was informed that she did not qualify under the scheme.

89. With the change of sovereignty approaching, the applicant said that her father spoke to her about the provisions of the Basic Law which he believed would enable the applicant to claim right of abode.  In addition, he sent her newspaper clippings on the subject. 

90. In light of what she had learnt from her father, the applicant testified that she made enquiries concerning the issue to her of a two-way permit so that she could be in Hong Kong when the change of sovereignty took place.  She was informed by the Mainland authorities, however, that no more permits were being issued for that period of time. 

91. In the result, said the applicant, wishing in any event to finish her studies, it was only in late 1998 that she applied for and was granted a two-way permit.  She arrived in Hong Kong on 11 December 1998, being permitted to remain until 8 January 1999.

92. Although the applicant testified to having little recollection (after all of these years) of specific events, she was able to recall that, when she came to Hong Kong in December 1998, it was her desire at that time to join her family here on a permanent basis.  I found the applicant to be a credible witness, speaking without embellishment to what she remembered and no more.  Having regard to the migratory history of her family, I have no reason to doubt that in late 1998 the applicant did hope to settle here, that hope being shared by her parents.

93. After she had arrived in Hong Kong, the applicant testified that she and her father made several visits to the Immigration Department – it appears to the Immigration Tower itself – to try and discover how to obtain the right to live permanently in Hong Kong.  These visits, however, ended in frustration.

94. The applicant had very little memory of what was said during these visits.  Her father, however, had a better memory of them.  He recalled being told that, if his daughter wished to live permanently in Hong Kong, she had to return to the Mainland to make an application there. 

95. During cross-examination, when asked by counsel why he had not, in the circumstances, encouraged his daughter to return to the Mainland and make a further application for a one-way permit, the father replied that making such applications on the Mainland required personal connections and money.  The implication was that he and his daughter had neither.

96. The father struck me as an inherently decent man and a credible witness.  He felt strongly that he had somehow let his daughter down in not securing right of abode for her.  This led him on occasions to become quite emotional and defensive.  It led him also to being drawn into making statements of certainty when initially in his testimony he had admitted that his memory was not good.  The father was far from being a disinterested witness.  But, as I have said, I found him to be fundamentally credible and was drawn, on the probabilities, to accept much of what he said.

97. The father was the proprietor of a business selling traditional herbal remedies.  He opened his shop in 1985 in Hung Hom and, although he has moved premises from time to time, has always remained in the same street.  The father testified that he spent a great deal of time at the shop, so much so that there was a small cockloft area above the shop which he used as living quarters.  For a single trader, attempting to make a living in Hong Kong in a competitive business, that did not strike me as unusual.

98. As a businessman, the father said that it was necessary for him to correspond on a regular basis with various government departments.  He said he had a drawer in his shop in which he kept all such correspondence; that is, copies of letters sent by him together with the replies.

99. The father testified that on 19 December 1998, frustrated at the lack of headway made visiting the Immigration Department, he sat down in his shop and wrote a letter to the Director of Immigration.  The letter was written in Chinese characters in his own hand.  When it was completed, the father said that he went to a nearby stationery shop and made a photostat copy of the letter.  He then posted it that same day.

100. The photostat copy of the letter was produced into evidence.  In translation, it read :

“Dear Sir, 
 I, Law Nam Chuen, holder of ID Card No. … came to Hong Kong in early’79 while my wife Tang Siu Ling, holder of ID Card No. … came to Hong Kong in early’91.  We have now left our daughter Law Yue King (born on 27 December 77) in the countryside without anybody to take care of her for many years, which makes our entire family in Hong Kong very much worried.  However, according to the Basic Law, children born by Hong Kong people in the Mainland have automatically become entitled to right of abode in Hong Kong since the reunification.  Now, my daughter has come to Hong Kong by a two-way permit to visit her relatives.  May I ask in what manner and by what formalities a certification on residence in Hong Kong can be obtained?  Would you, Immigration Director, make allowance for the actual situation we are in and spare some time to give us instruction in spite of being fully engaged.  I hereby express many thanks for that!!!
  Yours faithfully,
  Applicants
  Law Nam Chuen
  Tang Siu Ling
  Date: 19 December 1998
 Address: G/F., 84 Baker Street, Hung Hom, Kowloon  Tel 26329093”

101. The father could not remember if he had discussed writing the letter with his daughter.  The applicant herself had no memory of the circumstances surrounding its writing and dispatch.  It was clear that anything she knew of the letter had come from her father.  Her case, therefore, rested almost entirely on his testimony and any evidence he was able to produce in support of that testimony.

102. The contents of the letter quite clearly, in my view, do constitute a claim for right of abode.  The issue, as I have said earlier, is whether the photostat copy produced into evidence is a copy of a letter written and posted in December 1998 or whether it is a copy of a much later creation, a false document.

103. In his affirmation of 20 September 2004, the father said the following as to how he came to write the letter :

“My daughter has referred to the many enquiries we had made with Immigration.  Her limit of stay was approaching, and we did not seem to be getting anywhere, so I decided that I would write to Immigration …
As was my usual practice, I kept a copy of the letter.  I always keep copies of letters and other documents submitted to the Government, for example relating to my business.  A few doors down from my Chinese medicine shop in Baker Street, Hung Hom (which I still own) there was a stationers and a copy machine inside, and I copied the letter there.
I affixed a stamp on the envelope, which had the address of the Director of Immigration thus: Director of Immigration, Wanchai Tower, Gloucester Road, Wanchai.  I also wrote on the envelope my return address.  I posted the letter in a mailbox near my home within a short walk from our building.  There was no response to the letter.”  [my emphasis]

104. During the course of cross-examination, the father was asked to recall more exact details of how he came to write the letter.  He said that the letter would have been written at about two o’clock in the afternoon when business was fairly quiet.  As I understood his testimony, this was based more on what he recalled he would have done rather than what he clearly remembered doing.  The father continued by saying that, bearing in mind that the writing would no doubt have been interrupted from time to time by customers, he estimated that it would have taken him a minimum of an hour and a half to write the letter.  On that basis, the letter would not have been finished until about 3.30 in the afternoon.  The father said that he then went to the nearby stationery shop to get a photostat copy of the letter before returning to his shop to address an envelope and stamp it.  That, he said, would have taken an extra 15 minutes.  Having addressed and stamped the envelope, the father said that he went to the nearby post box; that is, in Hung Hom.  On the basis of his various estimates, the father said that he would, therefore, have posted the letter a little while before 4 o’clock in the afternoon.  I record his actual words (in translation) being : “I did so, I suppose, at almost 4 o’clock but not yet.”

105. According to the father, the letter was addressed to the Director of Immigration, Wanchai Immigration Tower, Gloucester Road, Wanchai, Hong Kong.  The address was therefore, on the basis of his evidence, both specific and accurate.

106. Having been drawn to this series of time estimates, the father was then shown a computer record which revealed that on the same afternoon; that is, on the afternoon of 19 December 1998, he had passed through immigration control at Lo Wu on his way to the Mainland, the time of clearance being 4.46 that afternoon.

107. If the father’s time chronology as to the writing and posting of the letter was correct, it would mean that he must have been able to make the journey from Hung Hom to Lo Wu in less than an hour.  This was not impossible but nevertheless would have been cutting it very fine.  On behalf of the Director, it was submitted that this was one of the telling factors which went to demonstrate the falsity of the father’s testimony.

108. However, counsel for the father pointed out that the KCR’s own website averaged the journey from Hung Hom to Lo Wu at ‘just 40 minutes’.  More importantly, to cite counsels’ submissions, “the father would have had ample time to travel to Lo Wu even if he started writing the letter at around 2 p.m. and completed it at 3:30 p.m.”  Counsel continued : “The Court should of course bear in mind that these were just very rough estimates of the father.  He could have started at, say, 1:45 p.m. and finished by 3:15 p.m.  His estimate of 1.5 hours for writing a 12-liner is … on the generous side.”

109. In my judgment, there is substance in the submissions of counsel for the applicant.  Even if the father, in his anxiety to assist his daughter, was drawn to a series of firm time estimates, after more than seven years and without any written record to assist him, I think it would be unfair to hold him exactly to those estimates without allowing him some leeway based on the fact that clearly, in giving those estimates, he was working more on what he believed would have been the position rather than what he remembered clearly had been the position.

110. During cross-examination, the father was referred to the fact that in his evidence-in-chief he had said he had posted the letter near his shop in Hong Kong while in his affirmation of 20 September 2004 he had said he had posted it ‘near my home within a short walk from our building’.  In this regard, the father was pointed to the fact that his wife had declared that she lived in a public housing unit in Tsz Ching Estate in the Wong Tai Sin area.

111. It was put to the father that there was a material discrepancy therefore between his testimony that he posted the letter near his shop in Hung Hom and his affirmation in which he said he posted it near his home, that home being in Wong Tai Sin.

112. The father accepted that he and his wife lived in a public housing unit at Tsz Ching Estate in the Wong Tai Sin area.  He explained the suggested inconsistency, however, by saying that he spent so much time at his shop, sometimes staying overnight in the shop’s cramped living quarters, that he often – inadvertently – referred to his shop as ‘home’.  The father was not prepared to accept that he may have posted the letter in the Tsz Ching Estate (which may have involved a longer journey to get to Lo Wu).  The wording in the affirmation, he said, had simply been a misuse of language, no more than that.

113. This apparent inconsistency in the father’s evidence caused me concern.  In one paragraph of his affirmation, when he spoke of obtaining a copy of the letter, he described his shop in clear terms as a ‘Chinese medicine shop in Baker Street’.  Yet, in the next paragraph, when describing the posting of the letter, he said that he posted it ‘near my home within a short walk from our building’.  All too often, when evidence has been invented, the proof of the invention lies in inconsistencies of this kind. 

114. However, that being said, I found myself unable to reject the father’s testimony that what had been said in his affirmation was simply a misuse of language, a misunderstanding perhaps between the drafter of the affirmation and the father, one which was not picked up at the time of signing.  In his testimony, the father spoke of using his shop as his home.  In addition, as the applicant’s counsel pointed out, he gave his Hung Hom address in his affirmation and also gave it in the disputed letter of 19 December 1998 as well as a later undisputed letter sent to the Director.

115. In the result, although, as I have said, the issue caused me some concern, it did not, either on its own or considered with other issues, draw me to conclude that the father’s evidence must be rejected.

116. One of the other matters put to the father during the course of cross-examination was that, not having received a reply to his letter of 19 December 1998, he had never bothered to query why there had been no acknowledgement.  That, it was said, was not consistent with the actions of a concerned father.

117. This submission, it seemed to me, put the father in a state of some panic.  After some equivocation, he said that he believed that he had, in fact, sent a follow up letter to the Director and may still have a record of this.  The lunch adjournment was therefore extended to give him time to look for records.

118. When the father returned, he produced the photostat copy of what he said was a statement written in his own hand and signed by him.  The statement bore the date : 23 July 1999.  This statement, said the father, had been sent to his daughter’s then solicitors, Pam Baker & Co.  The statement spoke of a number of matters related to the attempt to secure right of abode for the daughter.  It opened, however, by saying the following : “On 19 December 1998, a letter was sent to the Immigration Department to ask about the matter of Law Yuet King’s staying to live in Hong Kong.  However, up to now there has been no reply.  I attach of a copy of that letter.”

119. There was nothing to suggest that this was not a genuine statement sent to Pam Baker & Co. in July 1999.  To that extent, in my view, it gave general support to the father’s evidence, showing at least that the existence of the letter was raised as early as mid-1999.

120. The father, however, testified that to his memory, he had sent a copy of the statement to the Director.  That, in my view, was an invention.  Leaving aside the unusual step of copying confidential instructions to a firm of solicitors to the Government Department against whom the solicitors were to act, the father did not produce any covering letter or anything of that kind which in the circumstances may reasonably have been expected to enable the Department of Immigration to understand the purpose of having such a statement copied to it. 

121. But even if I was wrong in rejecting the father’s evidence, the statement, if it was copied to the Director, was only sent some seven months after the letter of 19 December 1998 had been sent.  As such, at a time when the father and his daughter were receiving legal advice as to the daughter’s claim, it could hardly be called a follow up letter.

122. As I have indicated, the question of whether a letter was or was not posted on 19 December 1998 was not an easy matter to determine.  In my judgment, the father was on occasions guilty of exaggeration and, in respect of the one matter I have mentioned, of lying to the court.  On balance, however, as I have said earlier, I found the father to be an essentially credible witness.  I was of the view that, where he departed from a plain recitation of what he remembered, he did so in an attempt to ‘gild the lilly’ rather than shore up fundamentally false evidence.  Accordingly, I believe that the letter may well have been written on 19 December 1998 and posted to the Director on that day.  On the probabilities, therefore, that is my finding.

123. In its judgment of 5 January 2006, the CFA held that, when it is found that a claim to right of abode has been made by the posting of a letter but the Director has no record of receiving the letter, then the rebuttable presumption applies that a letter posted will be received in the ordinary course of post by the person to whom it is addressed.  As to the operation of that presumption within the concession policy, the CFA said (paras.19 and 20) :

“The question then is whether the presumed fact of receipt of the letter claiming right of abode is sufficient to satisfy the record requirement of the concession policy. It is not disputed that if the original letter making the claim was in the files of the Department, it would constitute a sufficient record. Nor is it disputed that, if there was a notation in the files that such a letter had been received, though the letter was subsequently lost or mislaid, there would be a sufficient record. The Director argues, however, that, if a letter claiming right of abode has been lost or mislaid and no notation of its receipt has been made in the Department’s records, there is no compliance with the record requirement of the concession policy.
We do not accept this argument.  The context is the determination of the existence or otherwise of a constitutional right, namely the right of abode, and it cannot be supposed that the existence of what was, at one time, a sufficient record to authenticate the right could be lost or destroyed simply because the relevant document went astray after its receipt by the Department.” 

124. In the present case, nothing was put before me which, in my view, rebutted the presumption that, the letter having been adequately addressed and posted by the father, it was received by the Director and was somehow thereafter mislaid.

125. By way of a footnote, it should be mentioned that during the hearing the question was canvassed of what should be the correct transliteration of the applicant’s surname.  It could be ‘Lo’, ‘Luo’ or ‘Law’.  Indeed, as counsel for the applicant noted, in one of the Director’s movement records the applicant’s name was transliterated as ‘Luo’ and not ‘Law’.  Elsewhere, the records show that ‘Lo’ was used.  In the absence of evidence as to the exact methodology of the record searches conducted by the Immigration Department, said counsel, was it not possible that a search was conducted under the wrong transliteration?  As counsel put it, “one would never find an apple in a box of oranges and, likewise, one would never find a letter from ‘Law’ if it was registered as a letter from ‘Luo’ or ‘Lo’.

126. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)The applicant, while she was in Hong Kong, and through her father, did make a claim for right of abode; 
(ii)the Director does have a record of that claim. 

Madam O Ngan Mui (2789, a ‘group six’ applicant)

127. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in 1966.  She is one of seven children.

128. The applicant’s father came to Hong Kong in 1973.  Two years later, in 1975, the applicant’s mother joined him.  Two of the applicant’s sisters and a brother were permitted to accompany the mother in order to settle here.  The applicant, however, was denied permission.

129. In September 1998, the applicant came to Hong Kong, her two-way permit authorising her to remain until 12 October of that year.  Although she was married with two children, the applicant said that the essential purpose of her visit was to look after her mother who suffered from heart disease.  Her father too was frail.  She said that her parents hoped she could remain permanently in Hong Kong to care for them and, if it was possible, she hoped to be able to remain too.

130. In the result, the applicant did not return to the Mainland.  She stayed with her parents.  But caution had to be exercised, she said.  She was told by her family that she should not go out for fear of arrest.

131. It was the applicant’s evidence that on 26 October 1998, about two weeks after her two-way permit had expired, she wrote a letter to the Director of Immigration.  The envelope, she said, was addressed to the Director ‘at Immigration Tower’.  Also written on the envelope, she said, as a return address, was the address of her parents’ apartment.

132. The applicant said that she did not keep a copy of the letter.  She remembered, however, that the letter was to the following effect :

“My mother suffers from heart disease.  I want to stay in Hong Kong to take care of my mother.  I want to settle here and obtain an ID card.” 

133. In the case summary prepared for the applicant by Pam Baker & Co. it is recorded that the applicant also wrote in the letter that she wished to be placed ‘on recognisance’.  In her affirmation of 14 August 2004, however, the applicant corrected that.

134. As to how, if she did not keep a copy of the letter, the applicant was able to remember its date, in her affirmation of 18 January 2006 she said the following :

“I can simply say that the date did stick in my mind as the date on which I wrote and sent the letter.  I have remembered (without prompting from my solicitors) that the day of the week was a Monday.” 

135. The applicant said that she did not confide in her parents that she was writing the letter.  However, she wrote it in their apartment.  She posted it, she said, when her mother was asleep and when she was able to slip out of the apartment for a short time.  The post box was in the near vicinity.

136. On behalf of the applicant, it was said that, in the circumstances, it was understandable that she had not confided in her parents.  After all, she had come to Hong Kong to take care of them not to cause them worry.  The applicant herself expressed her concern as follows :

“I did not tell my mother about writing to Immigration as I thought that it was quite possible that Immigration might come to arrest me as I had overstayed.  I did not want her to worry.” 

137. As to why at that time she should decide to write to the Director seeking permission to settle in Hong Kong, the applicant said that a friend, Madam Lee Chun Chun, had told her that a few months earlier – in or about the summer of 1998 – her brother had been placed on recognisance and able to move freely around Hong Kong.  As I understood the applicant’s testimony, while she did not pretend to understand the true nature of a recognisance it was in her mind evidence that successful applications to the Director were still possible.

138. Suffice to say that, despite a number of other letters from the applicant and/or her family being found in the records of the Immigration Department, the letter of 26 October 1998 has not been located.

139. In the course of submissions, counsel for the Director said that particular caution should be exercised when dealing with a ‘phantom’ letter of the kind testified to by the applicant; that is, a letter of which no copy has been kept and in respect of which there is really no independent evidence of its existence.  As counsel put it, the scope for embellishment is all the greater where there is not even a copy of an alleged letter.

140. Those, of course, are common sense submissions and I have approached the applicant’s evidence with caution.  But that being said, one of the matters that impressed me about the applicant’s testimony was its marked absence of embellishment.  The applicant’s account of how she came to write the letter and dispatch it was unusual but not inherently improbable.  The applicant, not well educated nor sophisticated, gave her evidence in a plain, unvarnished fashion.  She was not shaken in cross-examination.  In the course of submissions I was urged by her counsel to take account of the manner in which she gave her evidence and, in my opinion, for good reason.  She was a credible witness.

141. Demeanour, of course, must itself be approached with care.  But in my judgment the applicant’s evidence was not undermined by the objective evidence.

142. For example, the applicant was cross-examined as to why, if she had not received a reply to her letter of 26 October 1998, she had not written a follow-up letter.  Attempting as best she could to remember her thought processes back in late 1998, the applicant said that the idea of a follow-up letter was not something she thought of.  That in itself, depending of course on the factual circumstances, is not inherently unlikely.  A failure to reply may be taken as a refusal, a sign perhaps that the application was not worthy of a response.

143. In addition, however, her counsel pointed to the evidence that in November 1998, some two to three weeks after the letter of 26 October 1998 had been posted, the applicant’s parents had gone to the Immigration Department to ask whether their daughter could settle in Hong Kong and be given an identity card.  They were told it was not possible and that any application must be made in the Mainland.  As counsel put it, in light of this, there was no reason to write a follow-up letter.

144. The concern that the applicant had simply invented her letter was, of course, central to the hearing.  But if it was an invention, it was not a late invention.  To the contrary, in a letter to Pam Baker & Co. dated 23 July 1999 – some nine months after the event – the following is written :

“On 26 October 1998, I wrote to the Immigration Department to claim that I had right of abode, but have not received any reply from the Immigration Department.” 

145. At the end of 1999, a letter was sent to the Immigration Department and received by it.  As with many of the applicant’s letters, this one was written on her behalf by her sister.  It read, in part, as follows :

“On 16 September 1998, I came to Hong Kong for social visit again and have stayed until now because my mother suffers from heart attacks often and needs someone by her side to take care of her. 
…
On 26 October 1998 I wrote a letter to the Immigration Department to make the claim that I had the right of abode but no reply has been received.”

146. There were, of course, a number of inconsistencies in the applicant’s evidence.  No purpose is served in a laborious examination of all those that were hi-lighted by counsel for the Director.  Inconsistencies are to be expected.  Considered in the full context of an applicant’s evidence, they may undermine or even strengthen that evidence.

147. In the present case, I have been unable to dismiss what, in my opinion, is the very real likelihood that the applicant did write the letter of 26 October 1998, that she did post it and that it was received.

148. But that still leaves a fundamental question; that is, whether the letter itself constituted a claim in terms of the concession policy.  To repeat, according to the applicant, the letter said no more than the following :

“My mother suffers from heart disease.  I want to take care of my mother.  I want to settle here and obtain an ID card.” 

149. In my judgment, regrettably, those words do not, and cannot, amount to a claim for right of abode.  On any ordinary reading, the letter is no more than a plea to be allowed to settle in Hong Kong on humanitarian grounds; namely, to care for a sick parent.  Yes, there is a request made for the issue of an identity card but that, of itself, cannot be read as a claim founded on any asserted right by the applicant.  The issue of an identity card, in the context of the letter, is, in my view, no more than a requested consequence of permitting the applicant to remain in Hong Kong to care for her mother.

150. I am aware, of course, that the words must be considered in the context not necessarily of what is actually said but what is clearly intended to be said.  But regrettably, no matter how generously I approach what was written, I am unable to come to the conclusion that, on any ordinary reading, what is to be drawn from the underlying meaning of the words is consistent with a claim for right of abode in terms of the concession policy.

151. While I am satisfied therefore that the letter was written, posted and, on the probabilities, no doubt received by the Director, I am unable to find that it constituted a claim for right of abode.  My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode; 
(ii)the Director does not have a record of a claim. 

Part Three

Ms Tsui Siu Fung (3525 : a ‘group four’ applicant)

152. This application was dealt with on the papers only.  No witnesses were called to give testimony.  The application was based on the assertion that the applicant made a claim for right of abode when she appeared before a magistrate on 6 March 1998 in answer to a charge of overstaying; that is, of breaching her conditions of stay.  The record of that claim, it was asserted, was to be found in various documents produced in evidence.

153. As a group four claim, it was necessary for me to determine the following three matters :

(a)whether the applicant, when she appeared before the magistrate, made a claim for right of abode; 
(b)if so, whether, having regard to the circumstances in which the claim was made, it was made to the Immigration Department; and 
(c)if so, whether the Director has a record of that claim as required by the concession policy. 

154. The applicant was born in Guangdong Province in December 1977.  Her father came to settle in Hong Kong five years after her birth, in 1982.  Her mother was able to join him in 1994, coming to Hong Kong on the strength of a one-way permit. 

155. When the applicant’s mother applied for her permit, she applied to include all her children; that is, the applicant and her two brothers.  However, only one child, the youngest, was allowed to accompany the mother.  In the result, the applicant and her elder brother remained in the Mainland.

156. In her affirmation of 30 December 2005, the applicant said that in 1996, the year she completed her studies, she was persuaded by her father to apply for a one-way permit.  However, when she did so, said the applicant, she was informed that she was not eligible to make such an application.  As the applicant understood it, she was found to be ineligible, first, because her mother had not yet lived in Hong Kong for seven years (presumably the time required for her to obtain permanent residence) and, second, because the applicant herself was more than 14 years old.  In the result, said the applicant, she applied for a two-way permit and was able to visit her family at the end of that year.

157. In her affirmation, the applicant said that a few months later; that is, in April 1997, her father came to the Mainland.  During his visit, she said, they discussed the right of abode issue.  Believing that, after the change of sovereignty, she would be able to settle permanently in Hong Kong with her family, the applicant said that she resigned from her job and submitted an application to the Mainland authorities for a two-way permit.

158. Her application was still pending, said the applicant, when the change of sovereignty took place.  In the days following the change, she said, her father told her about the large number of ‘Mainland children’ – people in the same position as herself – who had gone to the Immigration Tower in Wanchai to pursue their claims for right of abode.  In light of this, said the applicant, she went to the Mainland authorities to try a second time to obtain a one-way permit.  She was told, however, that no instructions as to any change of policy concerning the issue of one-way permits had been received and that her application could not be processed.

159. Shortly thereafter, said the applicant, her application for a two-way permit was approved.  This enabled her to come to Hong Kong on 18 August 1997, her permit permitting her to remain until 3 October 1997.

160. After her arrival, said the applicant, she learnt that a large number of ‘Mainland children’ had commenced legal proceedings against the Government to pursue their rights under the Basic Law.  Believing that, if these litigants were successful, she would be able to share in their success, the applicant said that she remained with her family in Hong Kong to await the outcome of the litigation.

161. By March 1998, however, it being apparent that the litigation would take a considerable period of time, the applicant said that she and her parents agreed that it was best if she returned to the Mainland to await the outcome there.  Accordingly, said the applicant, on 1 March 1998 she went to Lo Wu with her father in order to return to the Mainland.

162. However, having breached her conditions of stay by overstaying for a period of some five months, the applicant was not permitted to return to the Mainland.  Her two-way permit was taken from her and she was directed to report to the headquarters of the Immigration Department in Wanchai.  The evidence shows that she did so on 3 March 1998, reporting to the offices of GIS.

163. In processing her case, the decision was made by officers of the Director that she should be prosecuted for breaching her conditions of stay.  Accordingly, on 6 March 1998 the applicant appeared before Mr Peter White, a magistrate, at the Western Magistracy.

164. The applicant pleaded guilty to the charge of breaching her conditions of stay.  At the hearing before me, however, it was submitted that what was said by her during the course of mitigation amounted to a claim for right of abode.

165. In this regard, the transcript of proceedings records the opening exchange between the magistrate and the applicant as follows :

“Court :Yes, go ahead, miss.
 Applicant :My parents are here.  We are separated.  I am ill myself.  I have bronchitis.
 Court : Yes, … 
 Applicant : Life is difficult for me in China, very lonely back in China. 
 Court : Miss, I am sympathetic.  I understand it is difficult to be separated from your parents and other loved ones.  But I am afraid you, like everyone else, has to wait until your chance to come to Hong Kong arrives.  It is not permissible for you simply to stay on without permission.  You are fined $1,000. 

166. In my judgment, there is nothing in this brief exchange that can reasonably be interpreted as a claim for right of abode.  The applicant has said no more than that her parents are in Hong Kong while she must live in the Mainland and the separation was causing her distress.

167. This brief exchange, however, did not end matters.  The applicant spoke further, the transcript recording the following exchange :

“Applicant :My father has been in Hong Kong for over 10 years but my application for coming to Hong Kong hasn’t been permitted. 
 Court :Well, is it being considered or is it still waiting for consideration? 
 Applicant :I was not allowed to get an application form. 
 Court :Well, why weren’t you allowed to get an application form? 
 Applicant :I was told that my mother had not stayed for seven years. 
 Court :Well, I’m not quite sure what the criteria are in China because - - in relation to when you’re permitted to come into Hong Kong.  Is it because you’re a young woman that you’re not being given an application?  Is that what you’re suggesting? 
 Applicant :The Chinese authorities said to me that my mother has not lived for seven years so … 
 Court :Lived for seven years in Hong Kong? 
 Applicant :Yes, correct, so I was denied application.” 

168. Again, I can find nothing in this exchange which can reasonably be interpreted as a claim for right of abode.  Yes, the applicant has spoken of her father being in Hong Kong for more than ten years, and that statement, I think, may be read as an assertion that he was a Hong Kong permanent resident.  But, neither directly nor indirectly, does the applicant assert that, as a result of her father’s residential status, she should be entitled to live in Hong Kong.

169. The exchange, on an ordinary reading, is not focused on what the applicant perceives should be her entitlement in Hong Kong.  To the contrary, it is focused on the complaint that, despite the length of time her father has lived in Hong Kong, the Mainland authorities have not been prepared to issue her a one-way permit, the apparent reason being that her mother herself has not lived in Hong Kong for a required period of seven years.

170. When the applicant said that she had been denied the right to come and settle in Hong Kong by the Mainland authorities, the magistrate made a number of enquiries as to her personal circumstances, concluding with some brief advice.  This final portion of the exchange is recorded as follows :

“Court :Well, whereabouts do you live in China? 
 Applicant :I am already working in Guangzhou. 
 Court :Which company do you work for? 
 Applicant :I already resigned because I have come here for several months. 
 Court :Right, and you’re married or single? 
 Applicant :Single. 
 Court :Right, and how old is your father? 
 Applicant :50. 
 Court :And what does he do for a living? 
 Applicant :A warehouse worker. 
 Court :Well, perhaps - - I’m not quite sure what the conditions are that apply to your application, but perhaps it might be helpful if he goes back with you and helps you make the application.  But you’re not permitted simply to ignore our rules because you’re unhappy with the treatment you’re getting in China.  That’s no way to sort the trouble out.  That will only get you into more trouble.  I think you’ve just got to keep hoping and keep trying.”  [my emphasis] 

171. As the magistrate noted, she was unhappy with the treatment she was getting in the Mainland.  There is no focus, direct or reflected, on what the applicant believes should be her position, as the child of a permanent resident, under Hong Kong law.

172. I have so far broken down the exchange between the magistrate and the applicant into three sections, looking at each section individually.  But, in my judgment, even when the exchange is read as a whole, it cannot amount to a claim for right of abode.

173. Counsel for the applicant, Mr Kwok Sui Hay, submitted that what clearly came across in the opening exchange was the stated desire of the applicant to be able to live permanently in Hong Kong with her parents.  Her father, it then emerged, had lived in Hong Kong more than ten years. Thereafter, said Mr Kwok, what was said focused on the applicant’s ‘application’, to settle in Hong Kong.  As Mr Kwok put it, “on the basis that the magistrate understood and responded to the applicant’s wish to settle in Hong Kong, and that the applicant gave details in relation to her own immigration status and her parents’ status (including but not limited to the fact her father had been in Hong Kong for over 10 years), the applicant’s claim for right of abode was complete.”

174. Mr Kwok submitted that, by analogy, I should consider whether the same exchange, if it had taken place between the applicant and an immigration officer at GIS, would have constituted a claim for right of abode.  The answer, suggested Mr Kwok, was obviously yes.

175. But that analogy, in my view, is of little assistance.  In the many applications that I have dealt with to date I have attempted to understand the true meaning of conversations not only by looking to the words themselves but, importantly, to the context in which they were spoken and, equally important, by having regard to what I believe the applicant was attempting to say at the time.

176. In the present case, the applicant was not sitting across a desk from an immigration officer dealing with issues concerning her immigrant status.  In the present case, she was speaking in a criminal court in mitigation of her offence.  Her words cannot be divorced from that context.  What she was attempting to do was to convey to the magistrate the pity of her situation.  The applicant described a situation in which she was separated from her parents because she had been denied permission by the Mainland authorities to come and live with them in Hong Kong.  That, in my view, cannot be equated to any kind of assertion, no matter how oblique, that she believed she had a right under Hong Kong law, as the child of a permanent resident, to settle here. 

177. Being satisfied that no claim for right of abode was made by the applicant, it follows that I am satisfied no claim was made to the Immigration Department and nor is there a record of any such claim.  But what if I am wrong in respect of the purported claim?

178. If I am wrong and it is held that a claim was made, I am satisfied that the claim was made to the Immigration Department and thereby satisfies the second requirement of the concession policy.  I say that because it is apparent that the exchange took place in the presence of a representative of the Director; that is, the prosecuting officer, Immigration Officer Wong Ho Yin.  Mr Ho, as an authorised representative of the Director, was not only present but made brief notes of the exchange.  In this regard, he wrote :

“Parents separated, ill myself (bronchitis), live in China, not happy, very lonely in China, 1K.” 

179. The third requirement of the concession policy; namely, demonstration of the fact that the Director has a record of the claim, is, at first approach at least, not so easy to resolve.

180. But it seems to me that, if the applicant’s address in mitigation is held to constitute a claim, it must follow that the prosecuting officer’s short, hand-written notes on that address must constitute a record.  The notes, which I have cited above, may not speak, directly or indirectly, of any claim for right of abode or of any right of residence held by the father.  But, on its face, the notes constitute a record of the address in mitigation and that address is itself the claim.

181. In this regard, the CFA, in its judgment of January 2004, in considering the record requirement, said the following (para.28) :

“The purpose of the requirement that there be a written record of a claim in the possession of the Director was to provide a form of verification to enable the Director to implement the concession policy (see January judgment, para.210).  The existence of this purpose does not mean that the Director should disregard the fact that an applicant has claimed right of abode when considering whether documentary materials constitute evidence of the making of such a claim.  On the contrary, as far as the Director is concerned, he knew that each applicant asserted that a claim for right of abode was made and he is now aware of the Judge’s findings.  If, viewing the relevant documentary material in that light, it may, on its face, fairly be said to constitute evidence corroborating the fact that a claim for right of abode had been made, the concession policy requirement for a record is satisfied.” 

182. In the circumstances, if I am wrong and it is held that the applicant did make a claim for right of abode, I am of the view that the remaining two requirements of the concession policy have been met.

183. However, my findings as they stand, are as follows :

(i)The applicant did not make any claim for right of abode; 
(ii)no claim was made to the Immigration Department, and 
(iii)the Director has no record of any claim. 

Part Four

Madam Lui King Fong (2471, a ‘group one’ applicant)

184. The applicant claims to be entitled to benefit under the concession policy on the basis of statements made by her at the offices of the General Investigation Section (‘GIS’) on 5 November 1998.

185. The applicant was born in Guangdong Province in August 1968.  At the time of her birth, her father had been living and working in Hong Kong for several years.  In 1983, the applicant’s mother was permitted to come to Hong Kong to join her husband.  The applicant, however, had to remain in the Mainland.

186. Prior to the change of sovereignty, the applicant married a Hong Kong permanent resident.  A child was born of the marriage, a son.  He was born in Hong Kong.  When the change of sovereignty took place, therefore, the applicant’s parents, husband and son all enjoyed right of abode.  Her desire to share that same privilege, at all material times, on the evidence given, was obvious. 

187. As it transpired, in 2003 the applicant was granted a one-way permit to settle in Hong Kong.  She has now lived in Hong Kong for three years.  However, while she has resident status, she does not have right of abode.  That is why she proceeded with her application.

188. Two moths after the change of sovereignty, on 1 September 1997, the applicant entered Hong Kong to be with her husband and son.  Her two-way permit allowed her to remain until 23 November 1997.

189. At about that time, said the applicant, she was suffering from severe menstrual bleeding.  She consulted a doctor and, to her understanding, was diagnosed as having a tumour in her uterus.  The doctor who diagnosed her condition, she said, wanted to conduct a further examination in January 1998, several weeks after her two-way permit was due to expire.

190. In light of this, said the applicant, she went with her husband to the CVO to seek an extension of stay.  The visit was made on 18 November 1997.  Although her application was supported by a letter from her doctor saying that she was suffering from ‘menorrhagia and adenomyosis’, a decision was made at the CVO that she was not suffering from any ‘major medical problem’ and she was given only a two-day extension.

191. The applicant declined to accept the extension, choosing instead to remain in Hong Kong as an overstayer.  Indeed, on the evidence, it is apparent that the applicant remained in Hong Kong as an overstayer for the balance of 1997 and the whole of 1998.  She did so, she said, because, aside from her ill health, she had to care for her husband and her infant son.

192. It appears that in or about October 1998 the doctor who had been monitoring the applicant’s gynaecological condition, became concerned that she may be suffering from further medical complications.  In the result, the applicant was referred to the Kwong Wah Hospital.  The applicant was admitted to that hospital on 20 October 1998 for a series of tests.  Seemingly, a thyroid condition was diagnosed. 

193. In an affirmation made on 21 January 2006, the applicant said that, after her discharge from the hospital on 24 October 1998, she was told to return a few days later in order to make an appointment for a follow-up examination.  When she did so, and produced her two-way permit, she was denied an appointment.  According to the applicant, the receptionist who dealt with her said that her two-way permit had expired, that she was not permitted to remain in Hong Kong and that an appointment could not therefore be fixed.

194. Initially, at least as I understood it, the applicant’s testimony appeared to be to the effect that the follow-up appointment was in respect of the diagnosed thyroid condition.  However, when it was put to the applicant that, at the time of her discharge, she was given a follow-up appointment for that condition, she said that she had in fact been seeking an appointment in respect of her gynaecological condition.  

195. After such a long lapse of time, it is understandable that there were vagaries in the applicant’s evidence.  What appears to be clear, however, is that, after her discharge from the Kwong Wah Hospital, the applicant did return a few days later and did attempt to make an appointment resulting in an altercation of some kind.  In the result, the applicant was left with the impression – rightly or wrongly – that she was being denied treatment.

196. That being the case, the evidence indicated that a few days later, on 3 November 1998, the applicant attempted to cross the border at Lo Wu in order to obtain medical treatment in the Mainland.  However, as an overstayer she was stopped and interviewed. 

197. The applicant accepted that, in broad terms, the record of the Lo Wu interview was accurate.  As to why the applicant was seeking to return to the Mainland, the record contained the following statement : ‘Since she was an overstayer in Hong Kong, the Hospital Authority failed to provide treatment for her.’

198. Nothing appears on the face of that record to suggest that the applicant made any assertion that, because of her parents’ residential status, she was entitled to right of abode.  The record makes no reference at all to the applicant’s parents, speaking only of her husband and her son.  The applicant, however, did not suggest that she had made any claim for right of abode at Lo Wu.  To the contrary, it was her evidence that at that time she did not appreciate that she could even make a claim for right of abode.  Although she knew of the on-going right of abode issue, she said that it was her understanding at the time that only ‘children’, as that word is defined by age and not parentage, could seek right of abode.

199. It was her evidence, however, that during the day or so between being stopped at Lo Wu and being referred for further processing to the offices of GIS, she had had a conversation with a friend.  During this conversation the subject of claims for right of abode was raised and, according to the applicant, her friend informed her that all Mainland ‘children’, whatever their age, were entitled to seek right of abode.  It was as a result of this conversation, said the applicant, that she decided to raise the issue of her own right to claim right of abode when she reported to the Immigration Tower.

200. It does not seem improbable to me that, having been refused permission to leave Hong Kong, and no doubt being in a state of considerable anxiety, the applicant may well have discussed her predicament with a friend, matters turning to what many at the time perceived to be the entitlement of people such as the applicant under the Basic Law to settle in Hong Kong.

201. While perhaps not an epiphany, this conversation with a friend was of material importance to the applicant’s case.  It explained, for example, why, on her evidence, she made no claim for abode at Lo Wu but did so a couple of days later at the offices of GIS.

202. The conversation, however, was recorded in the applicant’s affirmation made in June 2004 but was not recorded in her case summary prepared much earlier by her solicitors, Pam Baker & Co.  The applicant said that she was surprised that there was no mention of this conversation in the summary as she was sure that she had mentioned it.  She denied any suggestion that the conversation was a later invention on her part.

203. When cross-examined on the making of the summary, the applicant said that it had been a confused affair.  There had been too many people seeking to register their claims and, to her memory, there had not been a one-on-one interview.  It seemed to be the applicant’s evidence that the summaries were, because of the overwhelming pressures on the solicitors at the time, almost ‘production line’ entities.

204. I have not, to my memory, heard detailed evidence as to how the summaries were prepared.  But it does seem that they were not the produce of careful interview sessions.  They are not detailed.  That being the case, while their value remains, I believe they must be approached with some caution.

205. In the present case, I found the applicant, although often emotional and overwrought, to be an essentially credible witness and I am prepared to accept, on the probabilities, that her case summary may not have included everything she attempted at the time to tell her solicitors.

206. On the morning of 5 November 1998, the applicant, together with her husband and son, went to the offices of GIS on the 13th Floor of the Immigration Tower.  The applicant was given an ID 457 form to complete.  In doing so, she gave the details of both of her parents including their identity card numbers. 

207. When the ID 457 form had been completed, the applicant said that she was then called in to an office to be interviewed.  The interviewing officer was Ms Lindy Yu Man Yan, an Immigration Assistant.

208. At an early stage of the interview, said the applicant, a male officer, seemingly of more senior rank, came over to say that there was some doubt as to the accuracy of her father’s identity card number which she had written down on the ID 457 form.  To ensure that the correct number was obtained, the applicant said that she telephoned her father.  The officer then went away but returned to query the mother’s identity card number.  In the result, she said, she made a second call, this time to her mother.

209. In cross-examination, the applicant accepted that there were no doubt inconsistencies in her evidence.  For example, she admitted that she could not now remember with confidence if she had made two telephone calls to confirm her parent’s identity card numbers or whether she had made one call, dealing with both identity card numbers in that call.  She was adamant, however, that she had been asked to contact her parents in order to confirm the accuracy of their identity card numbers.

210. The evidence of the immigration officers, including Mr Ho Kin Chung, an immigration officer who worked in the same room, was to the effect that, as a matter of invariable practice, the task of checking the accuracy of identity card numbers appearing on an ID 457, if it was necessary at all, was not done until the interview with the Immigration Assistant was completed.  It was not the practice for a check to be conducted simultaneously with the interview.

211. It was central to the applicant’s evidence that she was asked to check on the correctness of her parents’ identity card numbers.  Her testimony in this regard was out of the ordinary.  An examination of the ID 457, however, shows that both identity card numbers have in fact been corrected, the father’s number being struck through and replaced in altogether different handwriting with the correct number.  That, in my view, must lend some support for the applicant’s assertion.

212. In addition, the interviewing officer, Ms Yu, said in her affirmation of 18 February 2005 that, if an interviewee indicated that his or her parents were Hong Kong residents, it was her usual practice to check whether the identity card numbers written on the ID 457 form were legible.  If those numbers were unclear, Ms Yu said that she would invite the interviewee to make a call to confirm the correct number.  

213. In the circumstances, I do not think it is possible to reject the applicant’s contention that, for whatever reason, and whatever the normal practice, on this occasion some sort of simultaneous check was made.  What must always be remembered is that standard practice is not always slavishly adhered to and does give way, to a greater or lesser extent, to the pressures of the moment.

214. For example, Mr Ho Kin Chung, the immigration officer who worked in the interview room, said that he would not himself become involved in the interview of persons such as the applicant.  However, as the senior officer, and therefore to some extent the supervising officer, I find it difficult to believe that he might not, from time to time, have felt it necessary to quite properly exercise supervisory powers by assisting in the successful conclusion of an interview.

215. When the interview with Ms Yu continued, said the applicant, she asked Ms Yu if it would be possible to obtain an extension of stay so that her medical problems could be treated in Hong Kong.  The applicant said that she had a number of her medical papers in her possession at that time.  According to the applicant, Ms Yu said that she had already overstayed and must return.  The applicant said that she told Ms Yu that a nurse at the Kwong Wah Hospital had told her that, if she was able to secure some valid travel document, then she would be given an appointment.  This statement, however, according to the applicant, earned a rebuke from Ms Yu who asked if she accepted at face value what everybody told her.  Ms Yu said : “If they told you to jump off a building, would you do so?”

216. This display of sarcasm, said the applicant, upset her greatly.  She replied that Mainland people like herself had tried very hard over a long period of time to secure reunion with their families.  Her own parents had been in Hong Kong for many years and, as their child, she should have the right to remain in Hong Kong with them, that is, the right to become a Hong Kong permanent resident.  The applicant said that she spoke of the hardship that many families suffered trying to secure right of abode for one of their members. 

217. In her emotional state, the applicant said that she then spoke of the tragic circumstances of the ‘Chan Kin Hong’ case.  This was a case which concerned the suicide in October 1998 of a woman traumatised by her husband’s cross-boarder extra-marital affairs who threw herself and her two children from a building, all three being killed.

218. Whether the applicant’s analogy was apt or not, I am of the view that, in her distress, the applicant may well have spoken of the case.  It was shown to be a case which had attracted considerable publicity in the weeks before the applicant visited the GIS.  That it fitted appropriately into the time sequence of events was, in my view, support for the fact that it was not a much later invention by the applicant.

219. What was said during this emotional outburst by the applicant was central to her claim.  On the basis of her evidence, this was the only occasion on which she asserted her entitlement to right of abode; that is, to live permanently in Hong Kong by reason of her parents’ residential status.

220. During cross-examination it was put to the applicant that her emotional outburst was so important to her case that, if true, it would surely have been spoken of in some unambiguous manner in her original case summary.  As it was, her case summary only said the following :

“Later she was taken into a room and interviewed.  There she explained to the officer about her medical problem and denial of medical care in Hong Kong because of her immigration status as an overstayer.  She said that the children without permits have an on-going court case and she wants to be placed on recognizance.” 

221. The applicant, as I have indicated earlier, spoke of the difficulties encountered in ensuring that an accurate and detailed case summary was prepared.  She went on to stress that with Barnes & Daley, her later solicitors, there had been the opportunity for a one-on-one interview and she had been able to state her case more clearly.  In her affirmation made with the assistance of Barnes & Daley, the applicant said the following :

“I remember that at one point I said to the officer that I wanted a recognizance, referring to the fact that I was sick and needed to go to Kwong Wah hospital.  Another officer who was standing by, and overheard me say this then said this to me: ‘Even if you have a recognizance, you cannot go to hospital.  Who told you could do this?  If someone tells you that you should jump out of the building – do you do so?  If someone says you will win Mark 6 tomorrow, do you believe them?’ 
I felt very angry at this point, and argue with this other officer.  I said that mainlanders such as I had expended a lot of effort to come to Hong Kong.  I told him that my parents had lived in Hong Kong for many years and that ‘we want family reunion’.  I said ‘Mainlanders should have right of abode’.  I mentioned the despair of some families fighting for right of abode, and referred to Chan Kin Hong, who was driven to suicide.  I remember that I became extremely emotional and cried loudly.” 

222. While obviously the absence from the case summary of unambiguous details concerning the applicant’s outburst is a matter that must be given due weight, in my judgment it would be wrong in the present case to make too much of the fact.  It seems to me that the applicant’s description of the manner in which her case summary was prepared may have some accuracy.  I repeat the obvious fact that the case summaries were only intended to be brief documents, fairly general in nature in most instances, albeit ones identifying the essentials of claims.

223. As I have said earlier, during the course of cross-examination, the applicant had to accept that there were a number of inconsistencies in her testimony when compared with what had been said in her case summary and her affirmations.  By way of example, in her affirmation (cited above) the applicant had attributed the sarcastic comments which gave rise to her emotional outburst not to Ms Yu, the interviewing officer, but to ‘another officer’ who overheard what was being said.

224. For the Director, it has been submitted that they point to the fact that the applicant’s case, while perhaps founded on some central core of truth, was essentially invented.  I have approached the applicant’s evidence with considerable caution.  That being said, however, I reiterate that she struck me as an essentially credible witness.  That the exact sequence of events should become confused is not, in my view, surprising.  Memory is fallible.  This is so over a period of months let alone years.

225. As to the balance of her interview with Ms Yu, the applicant said that, when she had finished her emotional outburst, it must have been obvious that she was very upset.  The applicant said she remembered a male officer suggesting to Ms Yu that the interview should be completed in another room.

226. The applicant testified that she was taken to another room.  She was in tears.  She said that she took out her medical papers for Ms Yu to examine.  Ms Yu advised her that, having regard to the seriousness of her medical condition, she should return to the Mainland as quickly as possible.  Ms Yu, said the applicant, gave her a lot of advice.  

227. Realising that any objection on her part was hopeless, the applicant said that she agreed to return to the Mainland and was persuaded to record her agreement on a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  Not certain what to write, the applicant said that Ms Yu wrote out a series of characters on piece of paper and she copied these characters, partially in traditional and partially in simplified form.  In translation, the characters are to the following effect :

“I have overstayed because of sickness which is not supported by any proof.  I now want to return to China.” 

228. In respect of the applicant’s assertion that she was removed to another room, it is a fact that there were other interview rooms on the same floor.  As Ms Yu herself accepted, if an interviewee was causing a scene, disturbing others in the main interviewing room, then common sense perhaps dictated that the interviewee be removed to another room.

229. On the evidence, there was no suggestion that the applicant had been to the offices of GIS other than on this one occasion.  She could not have been certain, therefore, that there were in fact other rooms available for conducting interviews. 

230. In summary, I am satisfied on the probabilities that the applicant did make an oral claim for right of abode, the record of that claim being found in the ID 457.  As for the ID 457, it is apparent that care was taken at the time, albeit by members of the GIS, to ensure the accurate recording of the parents’ identity card numbers.

231. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i) The applicant did make a claim for right of abode;

(ii) the Director does have a record of that claim.

Mr Chong Wing Suen (1003, a ‘group one’ applicant)

232. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in 1971, one of four children.  At this time, as I understand it, he is the only child of the family still living in the Mainland.

233. The applicant’s father came to Hong Kong in 1979, the applicant’s mother being permitted to join him in 1990.  She became a permanent resident in December 1997.

234. By 1997, the applicant’s sister and younger brother had obtained permission to settle in Hong Kong.  That left just the applicant and his elder brother still living in the Mainland.

235. The applicant said that in 1997, several months before the change of sovereignty, he and his elder brother were contacted by their father who urged them to come to Hong Kong so that they would be here on 1 July.  The father, having been in Hong Kong for so long, had experience of earlier amnesties and believed that an amnesty would be granted when the change of sovereignty took place.

236. The applicant said that he, his elder brother and his elder brother’s wife were able to obtain two-way permits.  The three of them came to Hong Kong in May 1997, the applicant being permitted to remain until 4 June of that year.  However, as the three of them wished to be in Hong Kong when the change of sovereignty took place, and as their two-way permits all expired before 1 July 1997, all three overstayed.

237. The applicant said that he waited to see what would happen after the change of sovereignty.  On the first working day after the change, he said he recalled that several thousand people had gathered outside the Immigration Tower in Wanchai.  He learnt that some of these people were repatriated but others obtained ‘walking permits’ which, as he understood it, allowed them to remain in Hong Kong.  His hopes, he said, were not therefore dashed.

238. According to the applicant, it was on 14 July 1997 – just two weeks after the change of sovereignty – that he, his elder brother and his brother’s wife decided that they should go together to the Immigration Tower to claim the right to live permanently in Hong Kong.

239. In the course of submissions, it was emphasised on behalf of the applicant that by mid-July 1997 matters concerning right of abode remained very much in a state of flux.  I was, for example, referred to a headline in the South China Morning Post of 13 July 1997 which said :

“Lawyers join children in abode fight”.

240. In my judgment, the probabilities support the applicant’s contention that he went to the Immigration Tower on 14 July 1997 not simply to surrender himself as an overstayer but to seek to claim the right to live permanently in Hong Kong. 

241. According to the applicant, when he arrived at the ground floor of the Immigration Tower together with his brother and sister-in-law, there were many people there.  The atmosphere appeared to be tense.  The applicant said that a large number of immigration officers were present.

242. The applicant said that he noticed many people waiting in a queue.  In cross-examination, it was put to him that he must have been mistaken as the last day of the queuing system on the ground floor had been 5 July 1997, some nine days earlier.  The applicant, however, insisted that there had been a queue.  In this regard, it was emphasised on behalf of the applicant that he did not say there was a queuing system in place – which was adopted in the days following the handover to separate claimants and non-claimants – only that he saw a long queue.

243. The applicant said that, on the ground floor, the three of them gave their two-way permits to an immigration officer.  The officer who examined their permits was told that they wished to stay in Hong Kong in order to live here and that they wished to know how to obtain a ‘walking permit’.

244. The applicant said that, after their permits had been examined, they were told to join the queue.  They did so and were escorted up to the 13th floor; namely, to the offices of GIS.

245. It was put to the applicant that, when the three of them first spoke to an immigration officer concerning the right to live in Hong Kong, that exchange would not have been on the ground floor but would have been on the second floor at the information office.  It was suggested that, if an enquiry had been made as to right of abode, they would all have been told at the information office that they must process their claims back on the Mainland.  Their permits having expired, they would then have been referred to the offices of GIS.  The applicant, however, rejected this suggested sequence of events.  His memory of events on the ground floor, he said, was still clear.

246. As to the location of this initial conversation, the applicant’s brother testified that, when they arrived at the Immigration Tower, they did not take an escalator, an escalator being the means by which people are conveyed from the ground floor to the second floor.

247. On arrival at the 13th floor, the applicant said that they went into a large, crowded office.  The applicant said he went to the counter.  As to what was said by him to the counter officer, in his affirmation of 2 September 2005, the applicant recalled the following :

“I submitted my two-way permit and asked the Immigration Department official whether I could have a walkabout paper.  I was told that such document was only given to children and I was an adult so I would not have one.  I then told the Immigration Department official that I wanted to stay in Hong Kong.”

248. The applicant testified that at the counter the three of them were given ID 457 forms to complete.  In completing his ID 457 form, the applicant gave all relevant information concerning his mother and father; their ages, place of birth and Hong Kong address.  He did not, however, give details of their Hong Kong identity card numbers, his father at that time being a permanent resident.  He did not do so, said the applicant, because he did not remember the numbers.

249. The applicant said that when he handed back his form, the immigration officer drew a circle around the area where the identity card numbers of his parents should have been inserted.  The circle appears on the original document produced in evidence.  As to his reaction when he saw the circle drawn, in his affirmation of 2 September 2005 the applicant said the following :

“I did ask the Immigration Department official whether it was necessary to call my parents to find out the numbers for their Hong Kong permanent resident identity cards.  However, that official said there was no need for me to do so, and I could leave it blank.  If he said it was necessary to make a phone call, I would have called and checked with my parents.”

250. It was put to the applicant that he had never spoken of this conversation in any early documentation.  For example, nothing had been said of it in his interview in April 2000 with the Removal Special Project Sub-Division when he was required to give details of all claims made.  In that interview document, the following had been written :

“On 14 July 1997, I went to the Immigration Department at Wan Chai.  I was instructed to fill in a form the following words ‘I overstayed because I like Hong Kong and have been watching Hong Kong’s reunification with the motherland’.  I got an appointment with the Immigration Department to go back one week later.”

251. As it is, that statement confuses two visits which the applicant made to GIS, reducing them into a single occurrence, the first being the visit on 14 July and the second being a return visit made on 23 July 1997.  In addition, as is obvious, the interview notes are not in any way a detailed recitation of what occurred.  Elsewhere in his interview documents, however, the applicant did go on to say the following :

“At that time, I would have returned directly to the Mainland through Lo Wu on time if I had not had the intention to find a way for right of abode in Hong Kong.  Why should I have gone to the Immigration Department at Wan Chai?”

252. The circle on the applicant’s ID 457 is in some ways an enigma.  I have no recollection of other ID 457 forms which have omitted to record details of parents’ ID cards being circled in this way.  It is therefore unusual.  Why in this instance would the omission of the ID card details of the applicant’s parents have been circled?  Clearly the omission must have been considered relevant at the time. 

253. As to what else took place at that time, the evidence shows that the applicant, his brother and his brother’s wife were given receipts for their expired two-way permits and told to report back to the Immigration Department on 1 August 1997, some two weeks hence.

254. In cross-examination, the applicant was reminded that in neither his testimony nor his affirmation of 2 September 2005, had he said anything to suggest that on 14 July 1997, either on the ground floor or at the offices of GIS, had he claimed that this father was a permanent resident, that, of course, being the foundation upon which any claim for right of abode had to be made.

255. In his case summary prepared by Pam Baker & Co. the applicant had, however, given the following instruction :

“We queued up on the 13th floor.  There was a big queue.  When I spoke to the immigration officer I said our father was a permanent resident and asked if we could be put on recognizance.  The officer said no, we were too old.”

256. A reading of this summary indicates that the applicant had again reduced two visits to the Immigration Department to a single visit.  So whether the conversation the applicant spoke of in the case summary took place on 14 July 1997 or the later date; that is, on 23 July 1997, is not certain.

257. Matters were made no clearer during the course of cross-examination when the applicant, having first said that, yes, he did tell the counter officer his father was a permanent resident, went on to accept that he could not remember clearly if he had in fact done so.  As the applicant put it, he could not now be clear on the matter but he believed he had done so.

258. It is, in my view, understandable after so many years that the applicant could not remember clearly what, if anything, he had said in respect of his father.  But if, as I have found, he had gone to the Immigration Tower in an attempt to seek right of abode, it seems likely to me that something would have been said of his father’s residential status.

259. I would add that, in my view, the applicant was essentially a credible witness.  He gave his evidence in a plain, straightforward fashion.  I detected little evidence of invention.  In cross-examination, he allowed himself to become tetchy and argumentative but, while that gave me pause, it did not undermine my finding that the applicant, battling with the confusion of several events all of them now many years old, was attempting to speak of events as he best remembered them.

260. To support the applicant’s evidence, two primary matters were raised by his counsel.  First, was the unusual circling of that portion of the applicant’s ID 457 where he had omitted to record the details of his parents’ ID cards.  The second was the fact that the applicant had not been ‘processed’ that day but had instead been told to report back to the Immigration Department on 1 August 1997, some two weeks later.

261. As to the second matter; namely, that the applicant had been told to return some two weeks later, in my second report (paras.32 and 33) I said the following :

“… on a more general basis, the evidence revealed that in the days following the change of sovereignty, because of the large number of people either seeking to claim right of abode or simply surrendering themselves in order to be repatriated, the Immigration Department was forced to set up an administrative system to deal with the pressure of numbers.  In this regard, the CFA in its judgment of January 2004 (para.45) observed :

‘Ms Gladys Li SC [counsel for the applicant] submits that the Director’s own system was such that he could distinguish between those who had made a claim from those who had not by the manner in which they were handled by the Department.  It is said that the receipts for documents and other departmental records showing the dates on which the applicants attended the Immigration Department are themselves evidence that a claim for right of abode was made.’

The Director, however, claimed that it was not necessarily possible in this way to distinguish between those who had made a claim and those who had not.  In this regard, the CFA noted (para.46) :

‘The Director submits that there are … difficulties with this argument.  One is that it seems that some non-claimants were asked to return on a subsequent date for processing.’

However, the CFA went on to say :

‘Nonetheless, the circumstances may well give rise to the probable inference that an applicant returned to the Department for further processing.  In the case of applicant no. 3122, the Departmental file contains two copies of receipts dated 4 and 24 July 1997 for documents.  The question is whether the copy receipts in the Director’s possession give rise to an inference, based on the Department’s procedures for processing claims, that the applicant made a claim for right of abode.  If so, the receipts would constitute evidence of a claim for right of abode having been made.’”

262. On behalf of the Director, it was submitted that the applicant, together with his brother and sister-in-law, were asked to return later simply because the pressure of numbers did not enable the Immigration Department to process their surrenders that same day.

263. Counsel for the applicant, however, argued that the programming of the applicant to return on a much later date was critical.  In this regard, counsel relied on the evidence of a senior Immigration Officer, Tam Lee Man, who in respect of a number of other applicants had said that routine cases (i.e. standard surrenders) were invariably scheduled for the next day, perhaps to another unit.  Non-routine cases, however, which required a longer time to process would be scheduled for a later date and were always referred back to GIS.

264. In my second report, in respect of this form of scheduling, I said the following (paras.41 and 42) :

“The difficulty, however, is that, as Mr Pang [Mr Pang Kin Mo, a Senior Immigration Officer] made clear, on 4 July 1997 a significant number of two-way permit overstayers who were not claiming right of abode were dealt with in essentially the same way.

There was, however, as I understood the practice at that time, one important difference.  As Mr Pang accepted, overstayers who were not claiming right of abode, if they could not be interviewed that same day, were told to return as soon as possible, invariably within a few days, perhaps just two or three.  Right of abode claimants, however, were not processed with such urgency.  To put it simply, for what are self-evidently rational reasons, non-claimants were given priority so that they could be processed and repatriated with the minimum of delay.  Claimants, however – those whose claims would have to be investigated – could be dealt with at more leisure.”

265. In the passages I have just cited, Mr Pang Kin Mo was referring to a system in place in the days immediately following the change of sovereignty.  But, as counsel for the applicant pointed out, there was evidence that the same system remained essentially in place some ten days later.

266. The applicant, as I have said, was not requested to return the next day, or two or three days later, but some 16 days later.  Clearly, the applicant was not given priority.

267. That brings me back to the enigmatic circle on the applicant’s completed ID 457 form.

268. As I have said, the circling of that portion of the form where the applicant should have recorded the ID card details of his parents indicates that on 14 July 1997 the counter officer (or some other officer who arranged for the applicant to return at a later date) considered the omission to be of some importance.  But why?  The obvious inference, one to which the applicant testified, was because the applicant had, in one way or the other, made it plain that, through his father, he wished to remain permanently in Hong Kong, but had not written down evidence of his father’s residential status.

269. Considered in that light, the circling of the ID 457 may also explain why the applicant was only asked to return more than two weeks later.  His case – that day – was not considered to be a routine case, it was considered instead to be a non-routine case, one that would take longer to process and was not a priority.

270. Non-routine cases, of course, included cases in which applicants did not wish to be repatriated; cases, for example, in which applicants asserted a right to remain permanently in Hong Kong.  Non-routine cases were always referred back to GIS.

271. In summary, therefore, while this has not been the strongest case, I am nevertheless satisfied on the probabilities that on 14 July 1997 the applicant did make it known that, through his father, he wished to remain permanently in Hong Kong and that, in all circumstances, it amounted to, and was understood to be, a claim for right of abode.

272. As for a record of that claim, I am satisfied that the record is to be found in the circling of the ID 457 and in those documents which show (in light of the administrative practice at the time) that the applicant had a receipt given to him for his expired two-way permit and was told to return for further consideration of his case only some two weeks later.

273. I appreciate that neither the circling of the ID 457 nor the administrative documentation related to the applicant being told to return some two weeks later, considered in isolation, on their face, constitutes a claim.  But, considered in context, in my judgment, they do however constitute evidence that a claim had been made.  In this regard, in its judgment of January 2004 – (2004) 7 HKCFAR 24, paras.27 and 28 – the CFA said :

“The critical question is whether the relevant documentary material constitutes, on its face, either a claim for right of abode or evidence that a claim for right of abode has been made.  But that does not mean that it is impermissible to have regard to other circumstances in determining whether the documentary material constitutes, on its face, evidence that such a claim is, or has been, made.  It is permissible, for example, to characterize the documentary material as constituting such evidence in the light of the circumstances in which it was brought into existence, for example, by reference to the fact that the applicant has made a claim for right of abode, so long as one is doing no more than characterizing what appears on the face of the documentary material.

28. The purpose of the requirement that there be a written record of a claim in the possession of the Director was to provide a form of verification to enable the Director to implement the concession policy (see January judgment, para. 210).  The existence of this purpose does not mean that the Director should disregard the fact that an applicant has claimed right of abode when considering whether documentary materials constitute evidence of the making of such a claim.  On the contrary, as far as the Director is concerned, he knew that each applicant asserted that a claim for right of abode was made and he is now aware of the Judge’s findings.  If, viewing the relevant documentary material in that light, it may, on its face, fairly be said to constitute evidence corroborating the fact that a claim for right of abode had been made, the concession policy requirement for a record is satisfied.”

274. Before concluding with the events of 14 July 1997, it should be mentioned that the applicant’s elder brother, Chong Wong Yi, also testified as to what took place on that day.  His evidence followed that of the applicant closely – too closely in my view.

275. The elder brother accepted that he had not been obliged to reduce his memory of events to writing until a few weeks before the hearing.  In light of that, when it was suggested to him that he must have discussed the matter with the applicant, especially bearing in mind the importance of the matter to the applicant, the brother denied that he had done so.  Although he and the applicant had been living in Hong Kong for the past several years, the brother said that they had each been too busy getting as with their own lives to ever have the opportunity to discuss the applicant’s case.  I did not believe a word of it.

276. I am satisfied that there must have been discussions between the applicant and his elder brother.  Sadly, I am also satisfied that the brother based his testimony very largely on those discussions.  In the result, I could place little, if any, reliance on what the brother had to say.

277. That does not mean, however, that I disbelieved the applicant.  As I have said, I found him to be an essentially credible witness.

278. Although the applicant, his brother and his sister-in-law were originally scheduled to return to GIS on 1 August 1997, they were in fact contacted and asked to return on an earlier date; namely, on 23 July 1997.  All three went in on that date.

279. After they had arrived at the offices of GIS, the evidence shows that the applicant, his brother and his brother’s wife were each interviewed by the same officer.

280. The applicant was confused as to who had interviewed the three of them, one officer or more, and in what sequence.  However, the applicant said that he recalled telling the officer who interviewed him that he wished to stay permanently in Hong Kong and wanted a ‘walking permit’.  The officer told him, however, that he was not eligible for a ‘walking permit’ and that, if he wished to claim the right to live in Hong Kong, he must return to the Mainland and make the application there.

281. The applicant said that he was then given a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  He said that the interviewing officer showed him a piece of paper with characters on it and told him to copy them.  The applicant in his testimony accepted that he knew he could refuse to write what the officer had told him to write.  He said he was afraid, however, that if he did so it might somehow constitute a breach of the law.  He was uncertain as to what was or was not permissible.  In the circumstances, he said, he complied with the officer’s demand.  The characters he wrote were to the following effect :

“I overstayed because I like Hong Kong.  Now I wish to return to China.”

282. In whatever sequence the applicant, his brother and sister-in-law were interviewed, it is apparent in my view that they were effectively treated in the same manner.  It can be no coincidence that each of them wrote exactly the same characters on their ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.

283. A good deal of evidence was given and tested as to events on 23 July 1997.  In my judgment, however, a detailed recitation of that evidence will not take matters further.

284. What is crucial, I think, is that, having considered that evidence at length, I have found nothing in it to detract from or undermine my finding that on 14 July 1997 a claim in terms of the concession policy had been made by the applicant.

285. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i) The applicant did make a claim for right of abode;

(ii) the Director does have a record of that claim.

Madam Lee Yuan Ling (4703, a ‘group one’ applicant)

286. The applicant was born in Guangdong Province in November 1977.  She is one of three children.  She has two younger brothers.

287. The applicant’s family has a reasonably long connection with Hong Kong.  The applicant’s grandfather was the first to come to Hong Kong.  He was followed by the applicant’s father in 1982.  Accordingly, when the change of sovereignty took place, both the applicant’s father and her parental grandfather enjoyed right of permanent residence.

288. It should also be noted that in 1993 the applicant’s mother was granted permission to come to Hong Kong to join her husband.  By July 1997, although she was not yet a permanent resident, she too had clearly made Hong Kong her home.

289. The applicant herself struck me as a fairly timid character.  The evidence revealed that in late 1997 she was not a well person, suffering from a thyroid problem.  However, in contrast to his daughter, the father, Mr Lee Yip Kuen, who was a principal witness, struck me as a bolder character, a man prepared to speak his mind, even in adverse circumstances.

290. The father testified that, shortly before the change of sovereignty, he read reports in the media that, when the change took place, the children of Hong Kong permanent residents would be entitled (in terms of the Basic Law) to settle in Hong Kong.  The father said that he kept a copy of one of the articles.  This was produced into evidence.  In light of this, the father said that he contacted his daughter, telling her to obtain a notarial certificate verifying that she was his biological daughter.  This was done.  The certificate was dated 22 July 1997.

291. In her testimony, the applicant said that she obtained the notarial certificate in the hope that it would assist her in claiming right of abode.  As it was, the applicant came to Hong Kong on 24 July 1997 in the company of one of her brothers.  Both of them, she said, were intending to secure the right to settle in Hong Kong with their parents.  On the evidence, I do not think there can be any doubt that the applicant and brother did come to Hong Kong for that purpose.

292. The applicant and her father testified that on 31 July 1997 they went together to the Immigration Tower.  They were accompanied by the brother who had come with the applicant to Hong Kong.  They made their way, they said, to the 2nd floor of the building where the information counter was situated.  The father, it was said, spoke on behalf of his children.  He spoke first to an officer at the counter, telling him that his two children were from the Mainland and asking if it was possible to process an application for them to remain permanently in Hong Kong.  He was told that it was not possible.  If an application to live permanently in Hong Kong was to be made, it had to be made back in the Mainland.  Not to be deterred, the father joined the queue again, making an enquiry of another officer at the counter.  However, he received the same advice.

293. The visit to the Immigration Tower having been unsuccessful, the applicant and her father testified that they took a taxi that same day to the offices of the Legal Aid Department.  The father said he had heard that people were taking legal action against the Government to enforce the right to settle in Hong Kong and he wanted his children to join in that action.

294. It was not disputed that a visit was made to the Legal Aid Department on that day.  The applicant’s brother was considered for the granting of legal aid and there is a record to that effect.  The applicant herself, however, was held not to be eligible for consideration.

295. In the result, in respect of the applicant, neither the visit to the Immigration Tower nor the visit made later that same day to the Legal Aid Department formed the basis of her claim for right of abode. 

296. The applicant’s claim was based instead on what she and her father testified happened at the offices of GIS when the applicant surrendered herself for repatriation some five months later, on 11 February 1998.

297. It was the applicant’s evidence that, although her brother returned to the Mainland when his two-way permit expired, she remained in Hong Kong to await developments in the on-going right of abode matter.  There were also, it was said, pressing personal reasons for her remaining.  She needed to look after her grandfather here and, in addition, she was afraid for her safety if she was forced to return to the Mainland.  Before coming to Hong Kong, her home apparently had been burgled by a gang, a traumatic event for her.

298. By early 1998, however, according to both the applicant and her father, it was apparent that remaining in Hong Kong as an overstayer served no purpose.  The applicant spent almost all her time in the family home, afraid to go out.  She was bored.  More fundamentally, there appeared to be few, if any, developments in the right of abode matter.

299. The father testified that he had first learnt of the existence of the GIS office from a friend.  This was the office where overstayers, like his daughter, were processed.  That was why, he said, he and his daughter went to the offices of GIS at the Immigration Tower on 11 February 1998.

300. The applicant, as I have said earlier, struck me as a timid, unassertive person.  In my view, her testimony revealed that by 11 February1998 she had become resigned to being repatriated and went to the offices of GIS to submit herself to the necessary bureaucratic process for achieving that end.

301. When she was interviewed at GIS, in the absence of her father, the applicant said that, when given the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, she told the interviewing officer : ‘My parents are in Hong Kong.  I want to live with them and also take care of my grandfather.’  The applicant accepted, however, that, when given a sample card to copy she did so on the basis that what was written on the card was more or less the same as she had said. 

302. She appears to have written what she was asked to write without demur.  The characters she wrote made up a standard litany, clearly dictated to her in some way :

“I have overstayed because of keeping company with my family.  I now want to return to the Mainland.”

303. The applicant’s father – in my view, a far more assertive person – testified however that he had a dual purpose in accompanying his daughter that day.  Although he appreciated that she would no doubt have to be repatriated, he believed that the visit to the GIS presented one last chance to see if there was some way he could have his daughter ‘registered’ as a permanent resident.  Believing that justice had deserted his family, said the father, he wished to make one last attempt on behalf of his daughter.

304. In the course of submissions, counsel for the applicant said that, having regard to the father’s knowledge of the issues, his determination and insistence, to conclude that he would simply have given up without at least making one final attempt was unlikely.  In my judgment, there was merit in this submission.

305. As to what occurred at the offices of GIS, the father said that he went with his daughter to the reception counter.  He said that the officer were shown his daughter’s expired two-way permit, his own Hong Kong identity card and the notarial certificate which had been obtained in July 1997, the document that proved that the applicant was the daughter of a Hong Kong permanent resident.

306. According to the father, he told the counter officer that he was a permanent resident of Hong Kong.  The father told the court that, at or about the time of the change of sovereignty, he had learnt the importance of the phrase ‘permanent resident’.  He said that he then asked the counter officer if there was any way that his daughter could register the fact that she was the child of a Hong Kong resident so that she could come to live permanently in Hong Kong.  The counter officer, having examined his daughter’s expired two-way permit, said that his daughter had overstayed and she must therefore be sent back to the Mainland.  It was the father’s evidence that he spoke again, asking a second time if there was any way in which his daughter could register the fact that she was entitled to live in Hong Kong.  He received the same negative response.

307. Standard procedures adopted in the reception area of GIS meant that all persons surrendering themselves were given an ID 457 form by the counter officer which they then filled out in the reception area itself or somewhere nearby.  The applicant and her father, however, recalled collecting the form from another office and filling it out in that other office.  In that regard, I am satisfied that their memories simply failed them.  After so many years, it was an understandable lapse.

308. The ID 457 was completed by the applicant while her father sat next to her.

309. The father said that, although he did not know the true purpose of the ID 457 form, he believed at the time that it may have a function to play as a record of a claim for right of abode.  For that reason, he said, he ensured that, when his daughter was required to give details of her family, she gave not only his own details, including details of his Hong Kong identity card, but details also of her paternal grandfather, including details of her grandfather’s Hong Kong identity card.

310. An examination of the ID 457 form shows that details of grandparents are not specifically requested (although there is a column for ‘other close relatives’).  The insertion of the grandfather’s details, especially the giving of his identity card number, was an unusual feature which, in my judgment, supported the father’s evidence.

311. It is also to be noted that, while the details of the applicant’s mother were entered on the ID 457, her identity card number was not given.  The father explained that this was because at that time his wife, who came to settle in Hong Kong in 1993, was still not a permanent resident and he therefore did not consider it necessary or important to have her identity card number recorded.

312. It was put to the father during cross-examination that the true reason why the name and relevant details of the grandfather were given was to ensure that the applicant was able to plead in mitigation that she had been required to overstay in Hong Kong to help care for him.  This was denied.

313. In my judgment, if the father is to be believed, a claim for right of abode was made by him on behalf of his daughter at the counter of the GIS.  The conversation at the reception counter, considered in context and taking into account the documents that were shown to the counter officer, was more than a mere enquiry.

314. As for a record of the claim, if the father is believed, that record is the ID 457 which contains full details of both the applicant’s father and grandfather, two men having right of abode.

315. On behalf of the applicant, it was submitted that, on close study, the ID 457 acts both as a claim and the record of it.  I am unable to go that far.

316. The core issue, of course, is whether, on the probabilities, the evidence of the father (and the applicant) is to be accepted.

317. On behalf of the Director, it was put to the father and the applicant that no claim for right of abode was made on 11 February 1998.  The purpose of the visit had been simply to surrender and to be repatriated with the minimum possible penalty.  Counsel for the Director emphasised that the father himself had agreed in his evidence-in-chief that there was no real possibility of successfully claiming right of permanent residence for his daughter.  As he said : ‘The Legal Aid Department did not allow us to go into a lawsuit and the Immigration Department did not allow us to register.  All the relevant registration avenues in Hong Kong had been tried.”

318. The counter officer at the time was Ms Chow Wing Man, an Immigration Assistant.  Understandably, she had no independent recollection of any conversation at the counter with the father.  She could only say that, if a claim for right of abode had been made, she would have asked the applicant to make copies of supporting documents and would have referred the matter to a senior officer.

319. I do not reject Ms Chow’s testimony – in so far as it goes.  In my judgment, however, bearing in mind the numbers of people going to the reception counter at about that time, I do not accept that every request or assertion that could be interpreted as a claim for right of abode would have been dealt with according to what has been alleged to be standard practice.  Standard practice, as I have said elsewhere, must have been subject to the imperatives of the moment.

320. Nor do I accept that counter officers, although junior in rank, would have been entirely ignorant of prevailing immigration policy that claims to settle in Hong Kong must be made on the Mainland.  In the plainest of cases, in the event of the matter being raised by an applicant who came to the counter, I believe it is possible, perhaps even probable, depending on the circumstances of each case, that such a person may have been told simply : ‘No, it is not possible, you must return to the Mainland to make an application.’

321. It was put to the father and the applicant that their assertion that a claim had been made on 11 February 1998 was a late invention.  In this regard, they were taken to the interview bundle prepared by the applicant, apparently with the help of her father, in the year 2000.  This was the bundle submitted to the Removal Special Project Sub-Division.  It was pointed out that, although other alleged claims were described in detail, nothing was said of any claim made on 11 February 1998.  A study of the interview bundle shows this to be the case.  While the applicant went into considerable detail in describing the visit to the Immigration Tower on 31 July 1997 and the later visit that same day to the Legal Aid Department, no details of a claim for right of abode were given in respect of the applicant’s surrender to GIS.

322. Both the applicant and her father accepted that, in the year 2000, when the interview forms were given to them by Pam Baker & Co., they were told to record details – each on a separate sheet – of each and every time that right of abode had been claimed.  The applicant’s forms, when completed, consisted of a bundle of 62 pages.  The forms were divided into different parts, Part C being for the recording of the details of actual claims made and Part D being for the recording of any additional material.

323. In Part C, as to what took place at the offices of GIS, the applicant wrote the following :

“I entered Hong Kong on the strength of Permit for Travelling to and from Hong Kong and Macau on 24 July 2004.  I overstayed until a certain day in February 1998 and asked my father to accompany me to the Immigration Department on the 13/F to register for returning to my home town.  An officer checked my documents and then gave me a form to fill out, together with a Notice of Court Hearing, and took ten fingerprints of mine.”  [my emphasis]

324. At the top of the page on which this is written, a ‘Yes/No’ box was required to be ticked to indicate whether, in respect of the incident described, it was alleged that a claim for right of abode was made.  Rather strangely, the ‘No’ was ticked.  However, in another box directly beneath it, the date of making any claim was to be inserted and a date was given in that box. 

325. On balance, I am satisfied therefore that the applicant’s description was intended to record a claim for right of abode.  But what is written, of course, asserts no actual claim, certainly not one made by the father on behalf of his daughter.

326. Equally, Part D is silent on any actual claim.  The following only is written :

“I came to Hong Kong on 24 July 1997 and overstayed until February 1998.  During that period of time, I lived with my parents, my elder brother and my grandfather, enjoying family happiness.  But good times didn’t last long.  After the Two-Way Permit had expired, I dared not go out and stayed in a small room every day.  Approximately on 8 February 1998, I asked my father to take me to the 13/F of the ImmigrationDepartment to register for returning to my native place.  After the officer had gone through my documents, I was given a form to fill out.  10 fingerprints were taken.  I was given a Notice for Attendance at Court.”  [my emphasis]

327. Both the father and the applicant denied that their version of what took place at the offices of GIS was a late invention.

328. In the course of her testimony, the applicant said that initially she and her father had been of the view that the most powerful basis for her claim rested on events which had taken place on 31 July 1997, first at the Immigration Tower and, second, at the office of Legal Aid.  As the applicant’s counsel pointed out, knowing that there was a record requirement, it was understandable that the applicant and her father would have thought that their strongest claim was the one supported by the Legal Aid pink card given to the father on 31 July 1997 and which he still possessed.  

329. At that time, said the applicant, neither she nor her father had fully appreciated the significance of what had taken place at the offices of GIS on 11 February 1998.  It was only much later, she said, that she and her father sat down together to attempt to recall what had in fact happened at the offices of GIS.

330. In the course of his testimony, the father said that it was only after his son, a representative plaintiff in one of the right of abode cases, had lost his case before the CFA that he and the applicant had discussed matters with Pam Baker & Co. and had come to appreciate the importance of the GIS visit.  That was when details of the claim were recorded in the case summary prepared by his daughter’s solicitors.  That would have been in or about April 2002.  In that summary, inter alia, the following was written :

“They were given a form to complete giving Ms Lee’s and her ‘natural’ family members details.  This form does not include a space for grandparents, however Ms Lee and her father specifically included her grandfather on the form, stating his HKPR identity card number, to show that they were a family of two-generations of permanent residents….”

331. Depending on the circumstances, it may of course be understandable that lay persons, such as the applicant and her father, may not have fully understood the significance of events in the context of the concession policy until more fully advised.  The fundamental purpose of the visit to GIS in February 1998 was after all to enable the applicant to surrender herself and be repatriated and that is what transpired.  While the lack of an early record is therefore a cause for concern, that concern, in my view, cannot in this case be determinative.

332. In order to try and explain further why there had been no early written assertion of a claim being made at the offices of GIS, the father said that he was concerned that his daughter’s status as an overstayer may somehow have vitiated the legal validity of any claim he had attempted to make on her behalf.

333. There was nothing in this contention by the father.  This assertion, in my view, was an obvious exercise in post-rationalisation. 

334. That being said, however, while certainly there were failings in the father’s evidence, I believe that he may well have made a last ditch attempt to seek right of abode for his daughter at the offices of GIS.  Although this was not the easiest case to determine, I could not escape from the conclusion that, if I was to find that there had been no claim made, I might, on the facts, be doing the applicant an injustice.

335. In the result, therefore, albeit with some hesitation, I have come to the following conclusions :

(i) The applicant did make a claim for right of abode, the claim being made on her behalf by her father;

(ii) the Director does have a record of the claim.

Mr Lau Chun Chung (1884, a ‘group one’ applicant)

336. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in 1971, one of four children.  In 1984, his mother settled in Hong Kong.  In 1994, ten years later, his father was able to settle here too.  When the change of sovereignty took place, the only members of the immediate family remaining in the Mainland were the applicant and a younger sister.

337. It was the applicant’s case that in early 1997 his mother told him that rumours were circulating that, when the Basic Law came into effect, the Mainland born children of Hong Kong permanent residents would be able to settle in Hong Kong.  Although he had been on previous visits to Hong Kong, said the applicant, when he arrived here in April 1997 his primary purpose was therefore to wait until the change of sovereignty took place so that he could benefit under the Basic Law.

338. The applicant’s two-way permit authorised him to remain in Hong Kong until 13 May 1997.  He remained, however, until after the change of sovereignty.  It is evident, in my view, that he did so in order to be able to claim right of abode.

339. In the days following 1 July 1997, the applicant said that he knew that many people – people in his position – had gone to the Immigration Tower in order to claim right of abode.  He learnt to his surprise, he said, that many of them were arrested and repatriated.  This was a surprise, he said, because he felt the meaning of the relevant article in the Basic Law was clear.

340. In this respect, it was emphasised by the applicant’s counsel that in the days and weeks following the change of sovereignty, notwithstanding the attitude adopted by Government, there was real concern – and debate – as to the true meaning of the relevant provisions of the Basic Law.  For example, the South China Morning Post of 13 July 1997 ran a story on its front page headed : “Lawyers join children in abode fight”.

341. The applicant said that on 16 July 1997 he went to the Immigration Tower in order to claim right of abode.  He said that he did not hold much hope that he would be successful.  He knew that he may be arrested and subjected to punishment as an overstayer.  But he felt he still had to try to register his claim.

342. The applicant accepted that his memory of many matters had faded.  Indeed, he accepted that for a time he forgot that he went to the Immigration Tower on both 16 and 17 July 1997, telescoping the events of two days into one.

343. But, in giving his evidence, the applicant remembered that he and his mother went to the 13th floor of the offices of GIS for the first time on 16 July 1997.  They went to that particular floor, said the applicant, because, as he remembered it, they spoke to some other people who had also overstayed and followed them.

344. The applicant said that he went to a counter and spoke to an officer.  He told the officer that, in terms of the Basic Law, the children of permanent residents should be entitled to right of abode.  The officer asked him whether he had been born before or after his parents became permanent residents.  When he replied that he had been born before, the officer told him that only those born after were entitled to apply for right of abode.

345. According to the applicant, he was then given a personal particulars form to complete, an ID 457.

346. In completing the form, details of the applicant’s parents were given including both their identity card numbers.  The applicant was able to record the identity card details, he said, because his mother was with him.  She, of course, carried her own identity card but in addition carried a card with details of all the family’s members.  That was her habit.

347. After he had completed the form, said the applicant, he gave it to the officer at the counter together with his two-way permit.  He was then told to wait.

348. According to the applicant, after a time had passed, a second officer came out.  This officer gave him a receipt for his two-way permit plus a photocopy of it and asked the applicant to return the next day.

349. The applicant said that, during the conversation with the second officer, he again raised the issue of the rights accruing under the Basic Law to the children of permanent residents.  He was also asked by this second officer whether he had been born before or after his parents had become permanent residents and, when he said he had been born before, was again told that only those born after could claim right of abode.

350. The applicant recalled saying to the second officer that, on his reading of the Chinese text of art.24 of the Basic Law, he should be entitled to live in Hong Kong.  He could not remember if the second officer replied to this but he did not think so.

351. In summary, therefore, it was the applicant’s case that on 16 July 1997 he made two assertions that he was entitled to right of abode; the first to a counter officer when he arrived at the offices of GIS, the second to the officer who told him that he must return the following day.  The reply to both assertions was that, as he was born before his parents became permanent residents, he was not entitled to make any such claim.

352. As for the record of the applicant’s claims, that, in my view, was to be found in the ID 457 form completed after the first claim but before the second, that form containing both identity card numbers of the applicant’s parents.

353. I must say that, in respect of events on 16 July 1997, the applicant impressed me as a credible witness.  He answered questions calmly and thoughtfully.

354. The fact that he should put the same assertion to two officers, one after the other, did not surprise me.  His evidence was that he had read the relevant article of the Basic Law and believed it spoke plainly of his rights.  He had come to Hong Kong for the specific purpose of claiming right of abode and it is entirely plausible that he should push the point.

355. The applicant’s evidence as to what took place on 16 July 1997 was, in general, supported by the testimony of his mother who accompanied him.  The mother was personable but clearly very anxious not to say anything that might undermine her son’s case.  In the result, while I did not dismiss her evidence, because it was so clearly – and understandably – partisan, I approached it with considerable caution and in the final analysis was able to come to my determinations with only the barest reference to it.

356. The probabilities indicate that the counter officer who dealt with the applicant was an Immigration Assistant, Mr Chan Tse Hong.  On 16 July 1997, Mr Chan was working in the offices of GIS as a temporary ‘reinforcement’, that being just his third day.  He was at the time a very junior officer.

357. After such a long lapse of time, Mr Chan said that he had no independent recollection of dealing with the applicant.  Mr Chan said that if anybody wished to make a claim of any kind it was his standard procedure (during his period of secondment) to do no more than give the person an ID 457 form to complete and to ask the person to obtain photostat copies of any documents that would be used in support of the claim.  Mr Chan said that it was not his function to consider the merits of any claim.  He would tell the person that the claim should be dealt with when the next step in the process took place; namely, the interview.

358. At that time, said Mr Chan, to the best of his memory, he was not too clear himself as to the right of abode issue.  In the short period of time that he worked at GIS, he said, he had too many people to deal with to spend time with any individual giving advice.

359. Mr Chan struck me as being an honest witness who gave his evidence in a straightforward manner.  But, of course, he could only talk of what his general practice had been at the time.

360. The evidence shows that the second officer who dealt with the applicant on 16 July 1997 was Senior Immigration Assistant, Tam Lee Man.  Mr Tam said that he was the officer who gave the applicant the receipt for the surrender of his two-way permit and who told him to come back to the offices of GIS the next day.

361. It was Mr Tam’s evidence that, in the days following the change of sovereignty, GIS was often not in a position to process all the persons who came to the office on any given day.  Persons who could not be processed were asked to return another day.  Mr Tam said that it was part of his duty to screen the cases of such persons to decide whether they should be dealt with on their return by GIS on some other section.

362. Mr Tam said that cases would only be referred to other sections when GIS could not handle them.  While all difficult or complex cases were referred back to GIS, it meant that, if there was still sufficient capacity, run-of-the-mill surrender cases would also be referred back.

363. Overstayers who claimed right of abode were treated as difficult or complex cases, said Mr Tam, and were therefore always referred back to GIS.

364. Mr Tam accepted – as a general proposition – that if a claim for right of abode was made at the counter, the matter may have been referred to him by the counter officer.  He would then have come out to speak with the person.  Mr Tam accepted, however, that no record of any such instance would (necessarily) be retained.

365. Mr Tam accepted that by 16 July 1997 he would have had some knowledge of the Immigration (Amendment) (No.3) Ordinance which had come into force on 1 July 1997.  This was the legislation which differentiated between those born before and after one of their parents had acquired permanent residence.  Nevertheless, said Mr Tam, he would not have had a sufficiently good knowledge of it to be able to give the advice described by the applicant.  Nor was it his function to do so.

366. But, with respect to both Mr Tam and Mr Chan, the essential nature and intent of the Ordinance was simple enough.  I find it difficult to accept that – at that time – Mr Tam at least would not have felt confident enough, if the need arose, to give some straightforward advice in respect of it.

367. Mr Tam struck me as an honest witness doing his best to recall how matters had been those many years earlier.  But Mr Tam, like Mr Chan, had no independent recollection of individual cases and could only describe what he remembered was his general practice.

368. General practice, however, is all too often punctuated with exceptions.  Officers in the position of both Mr Chan and Mr Tam did not work as automatons.  Help, I am sure, would have been given when needed and from time to time that would have included advice.

369. What must also be taken into account is that the giving of advice in appropriate cases – counselling – was part of the Immigration Department’s policy at the time.  In this regard, for example, as the applicant’s counsel emphasised, the following evidence was given by the Immigration Department as general evidence :

“After the enactment of the Immigration (Amendment) (No. 3) Ordinance on 10 July 1997 which had introduced the Certificate of Entitlement Scheme and the Director’s formulation of the notice on 11 July 1997 (which was formally published in the Gazette on 16 July 1997), all IIs and TWP overstayers who turned up on 13/F to claim ROA, whether it was a fresh attendance or an attendance previously scheduled by way of recognizance or ID359 … would be counselled for departure, irrespective of whether they were Group A and Group B persons.”

370. During the course of his testimony, Mr Tam said that cases involving claims for right of abode, which were likely to be more complex and time-consuming, would not be referred back the following day for processing, they would be referred back several days later.  In the present case, of course, the applicant was asked to return the following day.

371. But this was not an absolute rule.  It depended on the pressure of numbers and, the evidence suggested that from about 15 July 1997 onwards there was a decrease in that pressure.  In addition, of course, ‘counselling’ by Mr Chan and/or Mr Tam may have resulted in the belief that the applicant would no longer press his claim.  Indeed, in this regard, the applicant did say that, after the advice, he believed he must have misunderstood the true position under the Basic Law.

372. The following day, as requested, the applicant returned to the offices of GIS.  His mother accompanied him.

373. He was interviewed by Ms Pauline Cheng Po Lin, an Immigration Assistant.  In the course of that interview, the applicant completed a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, the English translation of the Chinese characters being to the following effect :

“I have overstayed because of keeping company with my family.  I now want to return to China.”

374. It was the applicant’s testimony that these characters – which make up a familiar litany – were written on a card or piece of paper and he was told to copy them onto the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.

375. The applicant said that he had earlier been given a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form on which, to the best of his memory, he had written to the effect that he wished to live in Hong Kong to look after his mother who was ill and other ‘things like that’.  At this time, he said, he asked Ms Cheng if he had right of abode under the Basic Law.  She too asked if he had been born before or after his parents had become permanent residents and, when he said it had been before, she too told him that he could not claim.

376. It was then, said the applicant, that Ms Cheng took his partially completed ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, discarded it and replaced it with a fresh form, telling the applicant what to write on that form.

377. The applicant said that, when he queried this, an officer who happened to be behind Ms Cheng at the time warned him that he had better do as instructed or he would be in trouble.

378. While, in my judgment, the applicant was certainly given assistance in completing the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, and may well have copied the characters, I do not accept that he was threatened in the way he described.  When he testified in respect of this matter, the applicant did so tentatively, almost lamely.  I gained the impression that he felt he had to find some way to explain why he had not claimed right of abode in writing when he completed the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form and was prepared to invent evidence to do so.

379. As for the applicant’s mother, her evidence in respect of the interview on 17 July 1997 was so fractured and poor that effectively it disintegrated.

380. As for the applicant’s assertion that, during his interview with Ms Cheng, he asked yet again about his rights under the Basic Law, I doubt very much whether that was a truthful recollection.

381. That being said, however, the fact that I rejected much of the applicant’s evidence as to what happened on 17 July 1997 does not mean that I rejected his evidence as to the events of the day before.  A witness may fabricate or exaggerate part of his evidence while telling the truth in respect of another part.  Indeed, in the long series of hearings before me, one of my most difficult tasks has been to sift articles of truth from articles of tactical embellishment.

382. At the end of the day, although this was one of the more difficult cases for me to decide, I could not dismiss the very real possibility that on 16 July 1997 the applicant may have claimed right of abode in the manner he described.  In short, despite a number of concerns, I was drawn to the conclusion that the probabilities did favour the applicant as to the events of 16 July 1997.

383. As a postscript, it should be said that, in coming to my determinations, I did take into account two letters written by the mother in 1999 on behalf of her son.  On behalf of the Director, it was emphasised that in neither of these letters was it said that the applicant had claimed right of abode.  For example, in a latter dated 23 June 1999 the following only was said of the applicant’s surrender in July 1997 :

“… what happened later on greatly disappointed me.  The government of Hong Kong not only did not implement the ‘One Country Two Systems’ policy but also repeated put pressure on us, (i.e.) those who wished to stay with (their) parents.  The terms such as ‘imprisonment’ and ‘repatriation upon arrest’ were seen in the media continuously.  Out of anxiety, I had to surrender myself to the Immigration Department uneasily, unwilling and reluctantly.  On 24 July 1997, (I) was sentence to two months’ imprisonment suspended for two years and fined three thousand dollars at the Western Magistracy.  (I) had to leave Hong Kong upon the time limit.  I really didn’t expect such punishment would be imposed (because I) surrendered myself.  (I) was compelled to leave (my) parents and return to the Mainland.”

384. In a second letter dated 28 June 1999, the mother wrote (on behalf of the applicant) :

“I came to Hong Kong in April 1997 and stayed until 28 July 1997.  At that time, as I didn’t know how to seek legal aid or apply for the Hong Kong Permanent Identity Card and the right of abode, I was compelled to return to the Mainland.”

385. But, as was pointed out by the applicant’s counsel, these two letters were not letters that were specifically focused on the concession policy and any entitlement under it.  Nor were they letters which purported to describe events in detail.

386. In December 2001, however, although the applicant was acting under the misapprehension that he had only visited the offices of GIS on one occasion, that is, on 17 July 1997, he said the following in an interview with the Removal Special Project Sub-Division :

“On 17 July 1997, I … went to the Investigation Division at the 13th floor of the Immigration Department in Wan Chai along with my mother, Hung Yuet Wah, to inquire into matters with respect to Article 24(3) of the Basic Law and claimed that I had right of abode in Hong Kong.  However, as soon as the staff member of the Immigration Department learnt that at the time of my birth, neither of my parents was a Hong Kong permanent resident, he told me that Article 24(3) of the Basic Law did no apply to me.”

387. My determinations, in respect of 16 July 1997, are therefore as follows :

(i) The applicant did make a claim for right of abode;

(ii) the Director does have a record of the claim.

Madam Kwok Chung Lam (1590 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

388. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in November 1963, the youngest of five children.  Her father came to Hong Kong in 1979, her mother joining him in 1981.  Although the applicant’s mother applied to take all her children to Hong Kong, only one child was allowed to accompany her.  The applicant was one of the children forced to remain in the Mainland.

389. In June 1996, the applicant, who had now been married and had children of her own, came to Hong Kong to visit her parents.  She testified that it was at about this time that she learnt that, when the change of sovereignty took place, the Mainland-born children of Hong Kong permanent residents would be entitled to settle here.  With that expectation, she said, she decided not to return to the Mainland but rather to stay with her family to await developments.  It should be said that at this time the applicant was estranged from her husband.

390. In the days following the change of sovereignty the applicant did not herself attempt to claim right of abode.  However, she paid close attention to media reports.  She learnt, she said, that many people like her had gone out to ‘register’ but she also learnt that many of them had been arrested and repatriated.

391. At about this time, she said, she also learnt that a number of people in her position had commenced litigation against the Hong Kong Government to try and secure their right to settle here.  Her father told her, she said, that, if this litigation was successful, her own right to remain in Hong Kong would be secured.

392. The applicant said she therefore remained at home with her parents – effectively in hiding for fear of arrest – awaiting developments in the litigation.  She soon came to realise, however, that the litigation would take a long time to be resolved.  The decision was then made, she said, almost by way of a sudden impulse, that she would return to the Mainland and await developments there and at the same time apply for a one-way permit.

393. As to the obtaining of a one-way permit, the applicant admitted that she was aware at the time; that is, in October 1997, that the Hong Kong Government was requesting people in her situation to return to the Mainland in order to process their applications to settle in Hong Kong through the Mainland authorities.  Counsel for the Director submitted that this was no doubt a principal reason for wishing to surrender herself and be repatriated.  As counsel put it in their submissions :

“On 9 October 1997, Keith J gave judgment in the original right of abode test cases upholding the ‘Certificate of Entitlement’ scheme.  At that time, persons (such as the applicant) who were born before their parents became Hong Kong permanent residents were not even being granted legal aid.  The position for someone like the applicant was therefore quite clear : she did not qualify for right of abode but, even if she did, an application to establish that status had to be pursued on the Mainland.”

394. Among the reasons given by the applicant for wishing to return to the Mainland, was the fact, she said, that she had personal matters to attend to.  Her parents-in-law, for example, who were looking after her children, were anxious for her to return.

395. The applicant said it was her intention to go direct to Lo Wu but her father said that she could not return to the Mainland without first surrendering herself to the Hong Kong immigration authorities.  For this reason, she said, on 17 October 1997 she went to the Immigration Tower with her brother and was referred to the offices of GIS on the 13th floor.

396. Against this background, with nothing else being said, the probabilities would suggest that, when the applicant went to the offices of GIS, she was seeking to do no more than secure her repatriation with a minimum of fuss and, hopefully, a minimal penalty for having breached her conditions of stay.  It was the applicant’s case, however, that she had an additional reason for surrendering herself and that was to ‘register’ the fact that she had overstayed in Hong Kong in order to claim right of abode.  Such ‘registration’, she believed, would assist her if the litigation against the Hong Kong Government was eventually successful.

397. The applicant’s brother, Mr Kwok Chun Pak, testified that he accompanied the applicant to the offices of GIS.  He said it was, however, the applicant who dealt with all the formalities.  He sat some distance away.  In the result, although he had some recollection of the applicant arranging for a photograph of herself, his evidence did not advance matters.

398. The applicant herself testified that she first went to the reception counter and told the officer that she was there to surrender.  She gave the officer her expired two-way permit.  She was then given an ID 457 form to complete.

399. The ID 457 records the names of the applicant’s parents.  It gives their birth dates, the fact that both were born in China and gives their Hong Kong address in Tsuen Wan.  The form, however, gives no details of their Hong Kong identity card numbers.  Nor, a little surprisingly, does the form, which asks for details of natural brothers and sisters, give any details of the applicant’s brother who was physically in her company at the time.

400. During the course of cross-examination, it was put to the applicant that, if she had that day been seeking not only to surrender herself but also to ‘register’ her right to settle in Hong Kong by reason of her parents’ residential status, surely she would have ensured that she had some evidence of that status with her, for example, photostat copies of her parents’ Hong Kong identity cards.  The applicant answered this by saying that when she went to surrender herself she had no idea what documents or other proof would be required of her.

401. It was the applicant’s evidence that, having completed the ID 457 form, she was called across to speak to a female immigration officer.  That officer, she said, identified herself as a Ms Lau.  The Immigration Assistant who interviewed the applicant that day was in fact Ms Lau Sze Mun.

402. It was the applicant’s evidence that Ms Lau asked her if she had brought a photograph of herself and a photostat copy of her two-way permit.  When she replied that she had not, she was told that she must do so and then report back.  However, Ms Lau, when she testified, said that, when an overstayer approached the reception counter to surrender, it would be the officer at the counter who would ask the overstayer to obtain a photograph and a copy of their two-way permit.  She said she had no recollection, as an interviewing officer, of attending to that task herself.

403. Although normally, with the parties attempting to recall events many years old, nothing much would turn on such a small matter, I mention it because in the present case it is the first conflict in radically different versions of events given by the applicant and Ms Lau.

404. Returning to the applicant’s chronology of events, she said that, when she returned with a photograph and a copy of her two-way permit, Ms Lau took her into a room and an interview began.

405. Considering that events had taken place more than eight years earlier, the applicant’s purported memory of what was said and done in the interview was extraordinarily structured and detailed.  In my judgment, it smacked of contrivance. 

406. In her affirmation of 14 February 2006, the applicant said she recalled Ms Lau asking her why she had overstayed for so long and there being a conversation to the effect that she had overstayed in anticipation of being able to claim right of abode after the change of sovereignty had taken place.  In this regard, in her affirmation, the applicant said the following :

“The officer asked me where I had heard that I would have the right of abode in Hong Kong after 1 July 1997.  I replied that when I was in the Mainland I went to the Public Security Bureau to apply for my two-way permit and there I had met a friend, and she told me about the right of abode.  Furthermore, I said that my parents had also urged me to stay to wait for the Handover.  The officer asked me why I had surrendered now, and I replied that I came to the Immigration Department because I wanted to return to the Mainland and I wanted to register my name as a right of abode claimant.”

407. According to the applicant, the conversation then turned to her parents.  In this regard, she said the following in her affirmation :

“She asked me whether I had come alone.  I said that originally my father wanted to come with me but he was not familiar with the roads, and so my brother had come with me.  She asked me whether he [my brother] had left or was waiting for me.  I said he was waiting outside.  She asked me to bring him into the interview room.  I did so.  He was asked to produce his ID card to the officer and did so.  She looked at the card and told him to wait outside.  At this point I said that if Ms Lau wanted to have my parents’ ID cards, I could ask my brother to go home to obtain them.  She then asked where they lived, and whether it was nearby.  I said they were living in Tsuen Wan.  She said that this was too far away and was not necessary, as it was too late.”

408. Ms Lau, the interviewing officer, said that she had no memory of any interviewee seeking to settle in Hong Kong or seeking somehow to register the fact that he or she was a right of abode claimant.  In her affirmation of 10 April 2006, Ms Lau said that —

“… if there were indeed such a case, I would have asked the overstayer about the basis of his claim and requested him to produce copies of the supporting documents, if any.  I would then stop the interview and refer the matter to my supervisor for further instructions on the handling of the case.”

409. At this juncture, I pause to observe that, in my judgment, Ms Lau came across as a credible witness.  I had no difficulty in concluding that, having regard to her level of experience at the time and that apparently she was on temporary deployment, if indeed she had come across a complex case such as the one described by the applicant, she would have followed standard procedure and referred it to a senior officer.  The evidence shows that she did not do so.

410. By contrast, the applicant, in my judgment, was not a credible witness.  Indeed, the deeper she went into her evidence and the more it was analysed in cross-examination, the more convinced I became that she had invented material portions of her case.

411. One of the more daring inventions, in my judgment, was the applicant’s evidence that during the course of the interview she was given a special form to complete, a form on which she was required to give yet more details of herself and her family.  It was on this form, said the applicant, a form completed under the gaze of Ms Lau, that she recorded the fact that both of her parents were Hong Kong permanent residents.

412. This particular form, said the applicant, was the first form given to her by Ms Lau.  It was a printed form and in her affirmation the applicant was still able to recall in exacting detail the information demanded.  It was as follows :

“Name: ….

Place of birth: ….

Educational level, address of school: ….

Siblings in Hong Kong: ….

Siblings in Mainland China: ….

Father’s name: ….

Father’s arrival date in Hong Kong: ….

Father a permanent resident: Yes/No

Mother’s name: ….

Mother’s arrival date in Hong Kong: ….

Mother a permanent resident: Yes/No

Mainland address/telephone number: ….

Hong Kong address/telephone number: ….

Reason for overstaying: ….”

[my emphasis]

413. As to what information she had recorded on this form, the applicant was again detailed in her memory.  In her affirmation, she said :

“I gave the names of my siblings.  Although I had not done so on the form ID457, this time there was an immigration officer looking over me when I was completing the document.  I gave information about my siblings including their location i.e. one in Hong Kong, one in the US and two in Australia.  I stated the names of my parents, the number of years they had each been living in Hong Kong and the fact that they were each Hong Kong permanent residents.  I gave my mainland and Hong Kong addresses.”  [my emphasis]

414. The applicant said that on the form she also wrote about her mother’s ill health, how it had been caused and why it was that she therefore needed to look after her.

415. Ms Lau, she said, then handed her several pieces of paper on which were printed statements.  Ms Lau asked her to choose one and to copy it onto the foot of the form.  The applicant said that she wanted to copy the character for ‘amnesty’ but it was too difficult and so she wrote instead that she wished to settle in Hong Kong to take care of her parents.

416. The applicant said that she turned the form over and saw that there was printing in English and Chinese characters on the reverse side.  However, when Ms Lau saw she was looking at the reverse side, she told her that she was not to write on it and took the form from her.  

417. As to the existence of this form, Ms Lau testified that she had no knowledge of any such form being used by the GIS at that time.  Indeed, it was the Director’s assertion that there was no such form.  Certainly, no such form has been found in the applicant’s GIS records.  I would add that, having considered a large number of applications related to claims made at the offices of GIS, this is the first time such a hybrid form has been described to me.  Mr Kwok, the applicant’s counsel, was himself constrained to admit that this was an ‘unusual feature’ of the case.

418. Could the applicant simply have been confused?  I think not.  She specifically acknowledged completing the ID 457 and a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  The hybrid form was, on the basis of her evidence, an additional form, one which she purported to remember with great clarity.

419. In my judgment, as I have indicated earlier, I am satisfied that there never was such a form.  It was an invention of the applicant.  Through that invention she sought to make the assertion that somewhere in the archives of the Immigration Department there had to be a record of her claim for right of abode.

420. Returning to the applicant’s chronology of events, she said that after she had completed the first form Ms Lau gave her a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form to complete.  On that form, the applicant accepted that she had written characters to the following effect :

“I have overstayed because of keeping company with my family and now want to go back to China.”

421. The applicant said that she only wrote what she did because Ms Lau gave her another printed slip of paper and told her to copy from it.  The applicant said she queried whether she could choose to write something else and was told no, that she must copy what was written.  The applicant said she felt she had no option other than to comply.

422. This reasonably detailed recollection of how she came to complete the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form is to be contrasted with the summary of the applicant’s case prepared by her solicitors, Pam Baker & Co. :

“[The applicant] does not remember clearly the circumstances in which she completed this form this way (which she accepts to be in her own hand-writing).  She thinks she remembers the Immigration Officer might have at least dictated the last phrase.”

423. In this regard, during the course of cross-examination, when asked why her case summary had contained little, if any, of the detail contained in her much later affirmation, the applicant said words to the following effect : “At that time my memory was very bad.  I could not recall clearly … in 2003 and 2004 my memory gradually became better and better.”  While, of course, with contemplation, memory can improve, in regard to this applicant I had little hesitation in rejecting the contention.

424. As to the contents of the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, Ms Lau accepted that the characters written by the applicant followed a common theme but she said most people said something along these lines; namely, that a family member had been sick and required care or that they had overstayed in order to be with their families.  Ms Lau accepted that, if asked, she (and other officers) would suggest suitable – simple – wording, often general in nature.

425. When the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form was completed, said the applicant, she was taken for fingerprinting.  When that was done, she returned to the interview room with Ms Lau.  It was the applicant’s case that she then witnessed Ms Lau putting all the papers into order.  As for the hybrid form, the applicant said that she was informed by Ms Lau that it had been placed in the file ‘at page 3’ and that she should remember this fact.

426. According to the applicant, Ms Lau offered to give her copies of the documents.  Surprisingly, however, the applicant – if she is believed – declined this offer.  She said there was no need for her to be given a copy because Ms Lau had already told her that, when the right of abode litigation was finalised, the Director would contact her.  This, in my view, was further invention on the part of the applicant.  ‘Registering’ the fact that she was a right of abode claimant was important to her.  Why then would she decline documentary evidence of the fact that she had now been ‘registered’ when it was offered to her?

427. According to the applicant, that however was not the end of matters that day.

428. Having been given a form telling her to report to the Prosecution Section of the Department on 22 October 1997 and to bring $8,000 with her, the applicant said that she then left the offices of GIS with her brother and returned home.  However, when she reached home, she said, her mother was speaking on the telephone to Ms Lau.  She took the call from her mother and was told by Ms Lau that there were some ‘trivial matters’ that had to be dealt with and that she should return to the offices of GIS and should do so that same day, not the following morning.

429. It was the applicant’s case that she therefore returned to the offices of GIS, this time with her father.  When they reached the offices of GIS, said the applicant, her father gave Ms Lau both his identity card and that of the applicant’s mother.  These, she believed, were photostated and handed back.

430. The applicant’s father testified that he had accompanied his daughter and although he said his memory was not good, he recalled handing over his Hong Kong identity card to an officer.  He could not, however, recall handing over his wife’s card.

431. It was put to the father that there had been no visit on the late afternoon or evening of 17 October 1997 and that he had confused this with a visit made almost two years later; that is, on 2 June 1999, when he had gone with his daughter to GIS and on that occasion had handed over his identity card for copying.  The father did not accept this.  In my judgment, however, considering the evidence as a whole, I believe the father, whose evidence (understandably) was at best vague had confused the dates.

432. According to the applicant, after copies of her parents’ cards had been copied, Ms Lau then gave her a ‘no loss, no complaint’ form to complete.  That, it appears, if the applicant is believed, was the sole reason why she was called back to the offices of GIS that same day.

433. For her part, Ms Lau denied that the applicant would have been called back that same day.  She pointed to the fact that the time recorded on the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form was 1635 hours while the time recorded on the ‘no loss, no complaint’ form was just five minutes later : 1640.  More than that, the daily attendance register recorded that she had signed off duty just 45 minutes later at 1715.  Certainly, therefore, the timings appearing in the relevant documents tell against the applicant’s assertion that there was a return visit.

434. Some two and a half years after she had surrendered herself at the offices of GIS, the applicant was interviewed by Ms Ho Kit Man, an officer of the Removal Special Project Sub-Division, a unit set up to record and consider claims made under the concession policy.  The interview took place on 26 April 2000.

435. Prior to the interview, the applicant accepted that she received printed interview forms from her solicitors (Pam Baker & Co.) and had the purpose of the forms explained to her.  In particular, the applicant acknowledged being told that the particulars of each individual claim for right of abode under Part C were to be recorded on a separate sheet of paper.  If there was more than one claim then the Part C sheet of paper was to be copied : one copy for each extra claim.  A study of the original bundle shows that some eight copies of the Part C page were photostated by the applicant.

436. For reasons which will shortly become obvious, I stress at this point that a study of the original bundle makes it plain that photostat copies were all made on the same machine.  I say that because, while the original printed page is uniform, crisp and unblemished, all of the photostated pages have the same faded areas (where the copying ink has not been as thickly applied) and the same small blemish (similar to a hair mark on a camera lense).

437. It was on these photostated pages, said the applicant, that she herself recorded the details of her claims, including details of the events that she said took place on 17 October 1997 at the offices of GIS.  She did so at home, she said, before attending the interview.

438. According to the applicant, however, when the interview took place and Ms Ho read what had been written in respect of 17 October 1997, she protested that there had been no written record made of any claim for right of abode on that date.  Ms Ho told the applicant that she could write that an oral claim had been made but could not write that a record had been made of the claim.  The applicant said she protested.  Ms Ho, however, would hear none of it and tore up the paper on which the applicant had detailed her claim.  If this happened, of course, it would have been a grossly improper act on the part of the interviewing officer.

439. According to the applicant, with the page torn up, Ms Ho then brought her a fresh Part C page and instructed her to write characters to the effect that, although the applicant had made an oral claim on 17 October 1997, no record of that claim had been made.  That, said the applicant, was why the claim recorded on the interview sheet was not accurate.  The claim as recorded, in translation, is as follows :

“In October 1997, in the company of my father, I went to Room 1307 on 13/F of the Immigration Department to surrender myself.  I also declared that my parents had arrived in Hong Kong ten odd years ago and that they were Hong Kong permanent residents.  As they were old and sickly, I hoped to settle in Hong Kong to keep my parents company and take care of them.  The officer said no in reply.  The officer went through some formalities for me and then gave me a “walking permit” and a letter telling me to report to the Immigration Department a few days later.  However, when I reported again (to the Immigration Department) I was sent to court.  I was fined 1,000 Hong Kong dollars by the court before returning to the Mainland ..

I remember that I had only made a verbal declaration at that time, so now I have no documents of proof.”

440. On the basis of the applicant’s evidence, of course, the sheet of paper on which this amended claim was written would be different from the pages on which the other claims were recorded.  This is because each sheet, according to the applicant, was written on by her at home on copied paper and those copies, as I have said earlier, were clearly, on objective analysis, made on the same photostat machine.

441. It is apparent, however, from studying the original bundle of interview forms, that the amended claim is written on the same photostated paper as the other claims.  It bears the same faded areas and the same hair mark.  That, of course, would not be possible if the original claim had been torn up and a new sheet given by Ms Ho to the applicant.  That new sheet would have been an original printed sheet or a copy made on an Immigration Department photostat machine.

442. In short, forensically it was demonstrated that the applicant’s allegations against Ms Ho were false.  There was no tearing up of the original form.  It was an additional demonstration, in my view, that little, if any, reliance could be placed on the applicant’s credibility.

443. In any event, the applicant’s own actions gave the lie to her testimony before me.  I say that because in a letter written by her to the Immigration Department less than a month after the interview, she mentioned nothing of her claim being destroyed.  To the contrary, she wrote that, owing to a headache and nerves, she had made some mistakes in her statements and wished to replace them with three fresh statements.  In that letter (detailed 24 May 2000) the applicant wrote :

“I attended an interview at your Department on 26-4-2000.  Owing to a headache and nervousness, I made some mistakes during the interview on that day.  Since I fell seriously ill after the interview, I did not write to your Department until now in the hope of making some alterations and additions to the parts of the information that I had erroneously given during the interview.  I recall that when I surrendered in 1997, I did write in the form that I wished to settle in Hong Kong so as to keep long term company of and look after my elderly and sickly parents.  I would be grateful for your careful examination.”

444. In all the circumstances, the architecture of the applicant’s case being so undermined by falsehoods, I have had little difficulty in coming to the following determinations :

(i) The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;

(ii) the Director has no record of any claim.

Mr Chung Wai Kin (4537, a ‘group one’ applicant)

445. The applicant is a farmer and a native of Guangdong Province.  He was born in November 1951, the second of four brothers.  The applicant’s father, Mr Chung Shik Yin, came to live and work in Hong Kong in 1962 and has lived here since that time.  The applicant’s mother remained in the home village, only joining her husband in late 2002. 

446. In 1990, the applicant’s youngest brother obtained a one-way permit and settled in Hong Kong.  I am told that he subsequently married and has at all material times lived with his wife and children separately from his father.  

447. In 1995, the applicant applied for a one-way permit to come to Hong Kong.  He sought the permit, he said, so that he could care for his father who was then 72 years old and suffering from the frailties of old age.  The application was refused.

448. The applicant testified that shortly before the change of sovereignty he then applied for a two-way permit to come to Hong Kong.  When he did so, he said, he was aware of rumours to the effect that, upon the change of sovereignty, an amnesty would be granted to people like himself; that is, Mainland children of Hong Kong permanent residents, allowing them to settle in Hong Kong.  He was not therefore ignorant of the right of abode issue.

449. As it was, said the applicant, he did not receive his two-way permit until after the change of sovereignty.  It was issued to him on 19 September 1997 and he arrived in Hong Kong on 27 September.  Upon arrival, he said, he lived with his father, cooking and caring for him.

450. When he came to Hong Kong in September 1997, the applicant was a married man with three children.  His wife, he said, who was a farmer like himself, remained with the children in the home village.

451. The applicant said that his intention, once he was in Hong Kong, was to care for his father, to obtain a Hong Kong identity card and to find work so that he could support both himself and his father.  The applicant said that in 1997 when he came to Hong Kong his father was receiving social security.

452. The applicant’s two-way permit expired on 26 October 1997 but the applicant did not return to the Mainland.  As he put it, he was still taking care of his father.

453. However, on 28 January 1998, at the time of the Lunar New Year, the applicant attempted to return to the Mainland.  He was in the company of his father at the time, both of them apparently intending to return to the home village to celebrate the new year.

454. At this juncture, I record that the applicant impressed me as a plain, straightforward individual, unsophisticated and lacking in guile.  He answered questions without hesitation, rarely giving himself time to consider the best tactical response.  Unlike so many applicants, there appeared to be no attempt on his part to exaggerate his evidence.  Put shortly, I found him to be an entirely credible witness.

455. As to events on 28 January 1998, the applicant said that, while, as an overstayer, he expected to be fined, he did not expect to be prevented from leaving Hong Kong.  He readily accepted that, if he had not been stopped at Lo Wu, he would have returned to his home village with his father.  In order to come back to Hong Kong, he accepted, he would then have had to seek a further two-way permit.

456. No suggestion was made by the applicant that, at any time before 28 January 1998 he had attempted to claim right of abode or that, in travelling to Lo Wu, it had, even in part, been his intention to make a formal claim for right of abode.

457. When stopped at Lo Wu and interviewed, the applicant said that he informed the interviewing officer, Mr Law Kin Cheung, that he had overstayed in order to care for his sick father.  The record of interview is to that exact effect.  In short, the professed reason for overstaying was a compassionate one; that is, to care for an ailing parent.  Nothing was said about overstaying in order to benefit from an amnesty or in some way to claim right of abode by reason of his father’s residential status.

458. Having been prevented from leaving, both the applicant and his father returned to the father’s apartment.  A few days later, on 3 February 1998, the two of them went to the Immigration Tower, to the offices of GIS.  According to the applicant, he asked his father to accompany him as he was afraid that he would run into trouble with the immigration authorities. 

459. It was the applicant’s evidence that, when he entered the offices of GIS, he submitted his papers to the officer at the counter.  He was then given a form to complete, an ID 457.  He said that he wrote down the information known to him on the form; for example, details of his family and of his home village, and then passed the form to his father who inserted the remaining information.

460. The father was also called to give evidence.  Like his son, he was a plain-speaking, straightforward individual.  However, after a lapse of some eight years, the father admitted that he had almost no memory of what had happened on 3 February 1998.  He even had difficulty recognising what was or was not his handwriting on the ID 457.  It appears, however, that the father did write down details of his own name, his Hong Kong address and also his Hong Kong identity card number.

461. The applicant said that, when the form was completed, he handed it back to the officer at the counter.  At the time of doing so, he said that he asked the officer if he could remain in Hong Kong in order to look after his father.  The officer, he said, looked at his papers and asked to look at his father’s identity card.  Having done so, the officer said that the applicant was not eligible to remain in Hong Kong.

462. Understandably, the immigrations officers who were called to testify had no independent recollection of their dealings with the applicant on 3 February 1998.  They were therefore obliged to restrict their answers to what their normal practice would have been.

463. The counter officer on duty at the time when the applicant came to the 13th Floor of the Immigration Tower, Mr Yeung Wai Kwong, an Immigration Assistant, said that, if an overstayer asked to remain in Hong Kong in order to take care of his parents, he would, as a matter of practice, seek all necessary supporting documents from him (birth certificates, copies of identity card and the like) together with a completed form ID 457 and would then submit the documents to a more senior officer for consideration.

464. Mr Yeung said that he only worked from time to time at the reception counter.  When he did so, while he was responsible for responding to enquiries made by visitors to the 13th Floor, it was not his responsibility, he said, to advise whether such persons were or were not be permitting to remain in Hong Kong.  It would not have been his practice, he said, to give advice of the kind suggested by the applicant.

465. That being said, however, even fairly junior officers such as Mr Yeung who was at the reception counter and Mr Hui Wing Chung, the interviewing officer, could not have been entirely ignorant of relevant matters of practice and procedure.  It is therefore feasible, I think, that from time to time – and in entirely good faith – junior officers such as Mr Yeung, in what appeared at the time to be simple cases, may have provided answers to enquiries which amounted in substance to advice of the kind which the applicant sought.  

466. Common sense dictates that general practice is subject to day-to-day circumstances.  No doubt, with many questions asked and statements made, from time to time, junior officers would have thought it easiest simply to give a reply rather than elevate what they believed to be a simple issue into a more serious one by referring the matter to a senior officer.  It is natural enough for junior officers, in appropriate circumstances, to use their own initiative.

467. I do not say that this is, in fact, what happened on this occasion.  I go no further than saying that, in this case, it may well have happened.

468. The applicant said that he was then called into a room for an interview.  His father waited outside.  The interview, on the applicant’s evidence, was short.  The applicant said he was asked if wished to return to the Mainland and replied that, yes, he did.  He was then told that if he wished to return he would have to give reasons.  The officer, he said, wrote something on a piece of paper and asked him to copy it onto a form.  The applicant said that he copied the characters onto the form.  The form was a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, the characters, in translation, being to the following effect :

“I overstayed in order to keep company with my family.  I now want to return to China.”

469. In respect of the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, the evidence shows that in another interview conducted by Mr Hui exactly the same characters were written, those characters being marked by exactly the same punctuation.  But assistance of that kind, although invariably denied by individual officers, is not, in my opinion, improper if it is given with the consent of an interviewee and accords with the wishes of that interviewee.  In the present case, during cross-examination, the applicant accepted that the characters he copied into his ‘grounds for non-removal’ form accorded in fact with his wishes at the time.  The applicant went on to say that he signed the ‘no loss, no complaint’ form because at the time he had no complaint; in short, he was not being forced to act against his true wishes.

470. At or about the time he signed the ‘no loss, no complaint’ form, the applicant said that he asked the officer the following question : ‘Can I stay here to look after my father?’  The officer, he said, told him that he was not eligible to remain.

471. In summary, it was the case for the applicant that he claimed right of abode on two occasions that day at the offices of GIS.  He did so on the first occasion when he asked the officer at the reception counter if he could remain in Hong Kong in order to look after his father.  He did so on the second occasion when he put the same question to the interviewing officer. 

472. It was the Director’s case that the applicant had never asked these questions.  In my judgment, however, on the probabilities, I am satisfied that the applicant may well have asked one or both.

473. The difficulty the applicant has faced, however, is that neither of his questions, in my view, are capable of amounting to a claim for right of abode.  In my judgment, both questions, considered objectively, can be read as constituting no more than an enquiry to discover if, on compassionate grounds, it may be possible for the applicant to remain in Hong Kong.

474. During the course of submissions, I was reminded by the applicant’s counsel that I had earlier found that a question may amount to a statement.  In this regard, in my second report, in respect of applicant 4860, I had said (at para. 673) :

“While I agree that the applicant couched much of his evidence in the form of asking questions, it would, I think, if his evidence is believed, be unrealistic to hold that, when read in a common sense fashion, all that the applicant did was to make inquiries.  Questions may, depending on their context, constitute quite clearly in the ear of a listener a statement or a demand.”

475. In the present case, however, it is apparent, when all the evidence is considered, that the applicant did not make a claim, he did not utter a statement of right, he did no more (on both occasions) other than make an enquiry.

476. Equally important, it was an enquiry founded on grounds of compassion; namely, a desire to care for an ailing, aged parent.  No matter how the evidence is read I fail to see how the applicant’s words can be linked, directly or by inference, to the fact that his father was a Hong Kong permanent resident which, by that fact, gave the applicant certain rights.

477. I accept that, after a lapse of eight years, it would be harsh to hold a witness to a particular form of words.  But in the present case, at no time during the course of giving his evidence did the applicant suggest that he did anything more than ask if it would be possible to remain in Hong Kong on the compassionate basis that he needed to care for his father.  His evidence in this regard accorded with the case summary prepared for him by his first solicitors (Pam Baker & Co.), the summary reading :

“Mr Chung volunteered that he had overstayed and asked whether he could stay to take care of his father.  On considering the documents they presented, the officer said, ‘you do not qualify, so you can’t.’”  [my emphasis]

478. In his second affirmation made on 3 February 2006, the applicant said the following in respect of the incident at the reception counter :

“I produced the Lo Wu letter, my two-way permit.  I was asked by the reception counter to produce my father’s ID card, which I did.  I asked the officer whether I could stay to take care of my father.  The officer looked at the documents, and responded that I could not.”  [my emphasis]

479. In that affirmation, in respect of the interview, the applicant said the following :

“The officer then said that if I wanted to return to the Mainland, I needed to complete a form.  He then wrote down some words on a piece of paper and instructed me to copy this statement on to the Grounds for Non-removal form.  After signing this and at least one other document, I asked him whether I could stay in Hong Kong to take care of my father.  He responded in the same way as the officer at the reception counter, namely that I was ‘not qualified’…”  [my emphasis]

480. It will be seen, therefore, that the applicant was entirely consistent in how it was, he said, he asked if he could remain in Hong Kong to care for his father.  In the circumstances, regrettably, I have had to come to the factual finding that, first, no assertion of right of abode was made, on both occasions an enquiry only being made, and, second, that the enquiries were not in any event related to any assertion of a right under law to live in Hong Kong but were, on any objective analysis, founded on compassionate grounds only.

481. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i) The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;

(ii) the Director does not have a record of any claim.

Mr Yang Ren Zhong (4055, a ‘group one’ applicant)

482. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in August 1970.  He was one of four children in the family.

483. The applicant’s father came to live and work in Hong Kong in 1978.  The applicant’s mother was granted a one-way permit in 1987 and came to settle in Hong Kong with the youngest child of the family, a girl.  The applicant’s elder brother was granted a one-way permit several years later, in 1995.

484. At the change of sovereignty, therefore, only the applicant and one sibling, a brother, continued to live in the Mainland.

485. In 1994, the applicant obtained a two-way permit in order to visit his parents.  At that time, he was married and had two children.  Although only permitted to remain in Hong Kong for about a month, he remained here for more than a year, eventually surrendering himself to the immigration authorities.

486. According to the applicant, his principal reason for overstaying was in order to care for his mother who was in poor health.  He was the only one who could assist her, he said, as his father had to work and his sister had to go to school.

487. A few months after his return to the Mainland, the applicant said that he applied for another two-way permit to visit Hong Kong.  This was refused.  The applicant therefore came across the border as an illegal immigrant.  He did so, he said, because his mother’s health was deteriorating and he wanted to be with her.  After a month or two he was arrested and repatriated.

488. It was the applicant’s case that in early 1997 his father told him that, if he could be in Hong Kong when the change of sovereignty took place, he would be entitled to settle here.

489. The applicant said that he wanted very much to be here in order to care for his parents, especially his mother who in 1996, while apparently at work, had suffered a bad fall.

490. According to the applicant, he was advised by a travel agent in the Mainland that he may have difficulty in getting a two-way permit and that it would be easier to obtain a passport.  A passport was obtained together with a visa authorising the applicant to visit Malaysia.  Hong Kong, it seems, was intended to be a transit point.

491. The applicant readily accepted that the Malaysian visa was a device, a means by which he could enter Hong Kong.  He did not therefore continue on to Malaysia but remained here.

492. The applicant said that he returned to Hong Kong in order to care for his parents, particularly his mother, and also, hopefully, to secure the right to live here permanently. 

493. As to a claim for right of abode being made, the applicant’s case was based on one incident only.  This incident, he said, took place at the Victoria Immigration Centre on 21 July 1997.  The Centre at the time formed part of the old Victoria Prison complex.  The applicant on that date was held there in custody pending his removal to the Mainland.

494. However, before moving to the events of 21 July 1997, something needs to be said of what took place prior to that date.

495. It was the applicant’s case that, on 3 July 1997 he and his father went to the Immigration Tower.  They went apparently to the 2nd floor where they made enquiries of a man who appeared to be an immigration officer.  The man told them that there was no process for obtaining permanent residence.  It was the applicant’s case that, fearing arrest, he and his father took the matter no further and left the building.

496. About two weeks later, on 19 July 1997, the applicant was arrested by police in the Yau Ma Tei area.  He spent that night in police custody.  As to what transpired while he was in police custody, the case summary prepared by the applicant’s first solicitors, Pam Baker & Co., says the following :

“At the time, he thought he had lost his passport.  He told police who arrested him that his parents are Hong Kong permanent residents and that he needed to stay with them in Hong Kong, in particular to care for his mother.  The police affidavit shows that the notebook statement was destroyed …”  [my emphasis]

497. It was, of course, fundamental to the applicant’s case that, although married in the Mainland with two children there, he wished to be in Hong Kong to fulfil his filial duty of caring for his parents.  If the applicant is to be believed in this, it would not have been surprising for him to detail the compassionate basis for his unlawful presence in Hong Kong.  Indeed, in a June 2000 interview with the Removal Special Project Sub-Division, a unit set up to record and consider claims made under the concession policy, the applicant, in a prepared statement, is recorded as saying :

“When I went out on 19 July 1997, the police checked my documents.  As my limitation of stay had expired, I was taken to Yau Ma Tei Police Station.  At that time, I also requested to stay in Hong Kong to take care of my parents but the police took no notice of it.  After that, I was sent to the Victoria Prison … and I was forcefully repatriated to the Mainland on 22 July 1997.”  [my emphasis]

498. But, while the notebook entry made when the applicant was arrested, may later have been destroyed (as part of standard procedure), it transpired that, when in police custody, the applicant had made a cautioned statement.  That statement was not destroyed and was produced in evidence.  It was recorded at about nine o’clock on the night of his arrest, only a matter of hours after any notebook entry would have been made. 

499. Surprisingly, nothing at all is said in this cautioned statement about the applicant’s desire to remain in Hong Kong to care for his parents.  Indeed, his parents are not even mentioned.  In the cautioned statement, the applicant said that he had come to Hong Kong for the purpose of ‘travelling’.  He had however lost his passport and did not know how to apply for a replacement.  During his stay in Hong Kong, he said, he and his ‘friends’ had gone sight-seeing.  When asked where he had stayed, the applicant replied that he had stayed in a ‘friend’s place’, not knowing the address.  All of this was patently false.  He had not, for example, lost his passport.

500. When cross-examined, the applicant had difficulty in explaining how it was that his cautioned statement contradicted what he had otherwise asserted, and what especially he had asserted in the case summary prepared for him by Pam Baker & Co.

501. Initially, the applicant said he told his solicitors what he then remembered but the whole process was rushed and he could not be clear as to how his instructions were recorded.  However, he then went on to say – in a somewhat puzzling, ambiguous way – that, at the time of giving his instructions, there were many other applicants also giving instructions and, not being sure what to write, he saw ‘how other people wrote it’ and followed their example because it appeared to be similar to his own story.  It was a strange admission, one that suggested that the details of his original claim were somehow, to some degree, influenced by what others had written in respect of their own claims rather than what, rightly or wrongly, he remembered in respect of his own claim.

502. I have observed on a number of occasions that the majority of applicant’s, in my view, exaggerated their claims.  Bearing in mind the importance to them of the outcome of their hearings and the fact that the events under examination happened so long ago, the temptation to ‘gild the lilly’ is obvious.  I have always reminded myself that exaggerated evidence may nevertheless have a foundation of truth and that, even if part of an applicant’s testimony is rejected, the balance may well, on the probabilities, be accepted as an attempt made honestly to recall what did happen.

503. The applicant for the most part gave his evidence in a slow, seemingly careful manner.  There was no bluster.  However, by the end of the hearing, I was regrettably drawn to the conclusion that he had had little regard for the truth and that he had been prepared to make almost any assertion that he felt would advance his case.  In short, he had not been guilty merely of ‘gilding the lilly’.

504. As for the balance of the applicant’s case summary prepared by Pam Baker & Co., it said the following in respect of what happened after he was transferred from Yau Ma Tei Police Station to the Victoria Immigration Centre :

“Mr Yang [the applicant] was transferred to the Victoria Immigration Centre custody on 20 July 1997 and interviewed by one of the respondent’s officers there on 21 July 1997.  Mr Yang explained to the officer that his parents were Hong Kong permanent residents, that his mother’s back had been seriously injured in 1996.  He said he wanted to stay to assist in caring for her.  Mr Yang’s father was able to locate Mr Yang’s passport and attended the Victoria Immigration Centre to provide it to the officers concerned.  The Immigration Department’s records show that they took a copy of the father’s permanent resident identity card.  Mr Yang was told to complete a ‘family background’ form giving details of his family members including his Hong Kong permanent resident parents.”

505. In his affirmation of 24 August 2005, the applicant confirmed the accuracy of this portion of his case summary by saying :

“At Victoria Immigration Centre, I was interviewed by an immigration officer.  I told the officer that my parents were permanent residents of Hong Kong.  I told him about my mother’s 1996 injury.  I said I had to stay to take care of her.  I cannot recall clearly whether the officer replied …”

506. While at the Victoria Immigration Centre, the applicant had completed a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  In translation, what he wrote on that form is to the following effect :

“I, Yang Ren Zhong, have overstayed in Hong Kong.

I have neither worked here nor extended the stay.

I wish to return to China as soon as possible.”

507. Again, nothing appears in writing to support the applicant’s assertion that he spoke of being in Hong Kong for the purpose of caring for his parents.

508. It was the applicant’s evidence that, when presented with the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, he did not know what to write and sought the assistance of the interviewing officer, Mr Wu Wai Kee.  I am sure that is the case.  What is written has a standard, bureaucratic ring.  Mr Wu readily accepted that, if an interviewee was not sure how to express himself, he would show him a number of samples.  In many cases, said Mr Wu, the interviewee would copy the exact wording from a sample or else simply use the samples as a reference.  Mr Wu emphasised, however, that, if an interviewee wished to write anything not contained in the samples, he would of course be free to do so.  One of the most common explanations given for overstaying was the desire to be with and to care for parents.  If the applicant had wished to write something like that there is no reason to think that Mr Wu would have withheld his assistance.  But, as I have said, nothing concerning the parents appears on the face of the document.

509. In respect of the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, it is to be noted that the applicant did not at any time suggest that the characters he copied, or used for guidance, did not accord with his general wishes at the time.  To the contrary, he accepted that they did accord with his general wishes.

510. In any event, the applicant’s case was not founded on anything said or written when he was interviewed at the Victoria Immigration Centre or when he was being administratively processed for repatriation.  The applicant’s case was founded instead on an asserted verbal claim for right of abode made by his father (in his presence) on 21 July 1997 when the father came to the Centre to deliver the applicant’s passport.  The record of that claim, it was said, was the photostat copy of the father’s Hong Kong identity card made at that time and placed into the applicant’s file.

511. The principal evidence as to the making of the claim was given by the father himself, Mr Yang Shih Ching.

512. The father said that on 20 July 1997 he was telephoned by his son.  His son told him that he was being held in custody as an overstayer and asked him to look for his passport.  According to the father, the applicant told him that it may be found among certain books in the family apartment and this was where it was found.

513. The next day; that is, on 21 July 1997, the father said that he took the passport to the Victoria Immigration Centre.

514. It was the father’s evidence that, upon his arrival, he dealt with immigration officers not officers of the Correctional Services Department.  There was no suggestion, for example, that, in order to see his son, who was a detainee, he went to the main gate and made a request to the Correctional Services officers to see him.  Indeed, on the father’s evidence, it appears that his primary purpose that day was to deliver his son’s passport and see if bail could be arranged for him.  It was not to visit his son. 

515. As to what took place at the Victoria Immigration Centre, the father said the following in his affirmation of 24 August 2005 :

“Upon my arrival at Immigration, I produced my son’s passport and my ID card to an officer.  The officer then led me to a room and gave these two documents to another officer.  The second officer told me to wait in the room and he then took the passport and my ID card away.  After a short while he came back with my son.  At this point I told him that I had come to bail out my son, that my wife and I were permanent residents of Hong Kong and that my son had the right to live in Hong Kong.  The reply from the officer was ‘there is no such thing’ which I took to mean that there was no policy allowing him to stay.”

516. In his testimony, the father said that it was at this time that he saw his son being removed from the office.  He said that there was no conversation between himself and his son.  The father said that, after his son had been removed, the immigration officer handed him back his identity card, explaining to him that his son would not be given bail as he would be repatriated within the next day or so.

517. When he testified, the applicant said that on the morning of 21 July 1997 he was collected from his cell and escorted to an office where he saw his father.  He was not escorted into the office but remained in the vicinity of the door.  The applicant said that his escorting officer asked him if that was his father and he replied that it was.  He said that an officer then produced his passport and asked him to identify it.

518. The applicant said that he then heard his father say to an immigration officer that, as he and his wife had Hong Kong identity cards, his son; that is, the applicant, should be entitled to stay in Hong Kong.  The applicant said that he could not hear clearly but he remembered his father saying words to that effect.  He had no recollection of anything else his father said, only this.

519. The applicant said that he was then taken back to his cell.  On the applicant’s evidence, therefore, the reason why he was taken out of his cell that morning would have been only to identify his father and identify the passport which his father had brought.

520. If the applicant and his father are believed, a claim for right of abode was quite clearly made by the father on behalf of the applicant, made indeed in the hearing of the applicant.  That being said, whether the applicant was or was not present at the time is not, in terms of the concession policy, a relevant factor.

521. On behalf of the Director, however, it was asserted that no such meeting between father and son had taken place and that the evidence of a claim for right of abode made during that a meeting was an invention.

522. In support of the Director’s case, evidence was led that persons detained at Victoria Prison – persons kept overnight in cells, as the applicant said he was – were not under the management of the Immigration Department but were instead under the management of the Correctional Services Department.  Although the Victoria Immigration Centre was part of the prison complex, it was not part of the prison itself.  That being the case, immigration officers had no independent authority to bring detainees out of the prison into the Centre or to take relatives into the prison from the Centre.  If a detainee was brought out of the prison (for example, to be interviewed), a formal request had to be submitted to the Correctional Services Department.  In short, immigration officers had no power independently to go in and out of the prison area taking detainees backwards and forwards as they wished.

523. Evidence was further led that, if a family member wished to see a detainee, he or she would be referred to the main gate of the prison so that the matter could be dealt with by officers of the Correctional Services Department.

524. As to the standard procedure that was adopted when a family member brought a detainee’s travel document or other relevant paper, Mr Wu Wai Kee, who in July 1997 had been an Assistant Immigration Officer at the Centre and had been the applicant’s case officer, testified that the following was the practice :

a. The family member would be directed to the reception of the Centre which was outside the prison.

b. The immigration officer at reception would notify the Processing Unit (which was well within the prison precincts) and the case officer would then go to the reception to interview the family member.  The public had no access to the offices of the Processing Unit itself.

c. During the interview, conducted in an office in the reception area, the case officer would collect the travel document or other paper.  In addition, he would make a photostat copy of the family member’s identity card to be kept on file and would also obtain details not only of the family relationship but of contact telephone numbers and the like in case further communication was necessary.

d. The detainee himself would not be brought to the interview, that being a process which would involve formal transfer of custody from the Correctional Services Department to the Immigration Department.

e. Only at a later stage would the detainee be asked to identify the travel document or other paper.

525. Mr Wu explained that at the time it was not the policy to prosecute holders of PRC passports.  That was why the applicant escaped prosecution. 

526. By referring to the applicant’s file, Mr Wu was able to identify a number of minutes in his handwriting.  One minute (M4) was as follows :

“Subject’s PRC passport was retrieved from his father, Mr [Chinese characters].  Subject had been called in the afternoon and he verified that it was his claimed lost travel document.”  [my emphasis]

527. A photostat copy of the passport itself was found in the file signed by the applicant.

528. In addition, Mr Wu was able to identify a photostat copy of the father’s Hong Kong identity card that was found in the file.  Two telephone numbers were written on it, one being the father’s own number, the other being the number of the applicant’s sister who lived in Hong Kong.

529. Mr Wu said that, on all the evidence, including the file minutes, it was plain that standard procedure had been followed.  He would have gone to the reception office to collect the passport and to make a photostat copy of the father’s identity card.  He would have obtained contact telephone numbers from the father.  Then at a later time – in this case in the afternoon – he would have asked the applicant to verify the passport and that would have been done by the applicant signing a file copy of the document.

530. In such circumstances, said Mr Wu, there would simply have been no reason for the applicant to be brought to the father.  If there had been such a reason, a record of it would have appeared in the file.  There was, however, no such record.

531. It was put to Mr Wu by the applicant’s counsel that the applicant may have been brought by Correctional Services officers to a gate which led from the prison into an open compound outside the Centre’s reception.  Mr Wu said he could never remember such a thing happening.  In addition, of course, neither the applicant nor his father had spoken of the incident taking place in such an area.  Both spoke of it taking place in an office.

532. In my judgment, the probabilities indicate strongly that there was no incident in an office of the kind described by the applicant and his father.  As Mr Wu testified, both the minutes in the file and the documents found there indicate that routine procedures were adopted and the applicant was not brought from his cell in the manner alleged.

533. I am supported in this finding by the fact that I found the applicant not to be a truthful witness.  As for the father, his evidence was in the main unconvincing.

534. I have also taken into account, although it has not been determinative, that the alleged incident of 21 July 1997 was not referred to in the applicant’s case summary (prepared for him by Pam Baker & Co.) nor in the interview forms prepared by the applicant for his meeting in the year 2000 with an officer of the Removal Special Project Sub-Division, a unit, as I have earlier said, set up to record and consider claims alleged to have been made under the concession policy.

535. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i) The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;

(ii) the Director does not have a record of any claim.

Mr Lau Man Lung (1940, a ‘group one’ applicant)

536. The applicant was born in Guangdong Province in 1970, much of his childhood being spent in Shenzhen.

537. The applicant’s father came to Hong Kong in 1951, obtaining the status of a permanent resident before the applicant was born.

538. The applicant’s mother came to live in Hong Kong in 1984, the applicant’s younger brother being the only child of the family allowed to accompany her.

539. In March 1997, three months or so before the change of sovereignty, the applicant came on a visit to Hong Kong.  During this visit he made enquiries with the immigration authorities about joining his family here.  He was told that he would have to make his application in the Mainland.  According to the applicant, when he returned home he made an application for a one-way permit.  The application, however, was refused.

540. On 23 November 1998, the applicant came to Hong Kong on another visit, his two-way permit authorising him to remain for just a week, that is, until the last day of the month.

541. The applicant said that on 29 November 1998, the day before the expiry of his permit, he went to the Chinese Visitors Office (‘the CVO’) to see if it would be possible to extend his stay in order to look after his parents.  If his evidence in this regard is believed, he must have made a mistake as to the day.  That is because the day he identified – 29 November 1998 – was a Sunday when the CVO was closed. 

542. Whatever day it was, when he sought an extension of stay at the CVO, said the applicant, he was told that he would have to come up with a better reason than simply a desire to care for his parents.  In the circumstances, he said, he did not persist but decided to overstay in order to be with his father and mother.

543. On 14 December 1998, having overstayed for about two weeks, the applicant was arrested by police.  He was referred to the Immigration Department.  After he had been interviewed, a decision was made not to prosecute him and, after his travel papers had been put in order, he was returned to the Mainland that same day.

544. It was the applicant’s case that, while being interviewed by an immigration officer, he made a verbal assertion that he was entitled to right of abode on the basis that both of his parents were permanent residents.

545. It was submitted on the applicant’s behalf that the record of the claim lay in the evidence in the Director’s files that – in accordance with the prevailing policy – the applicant was not prosecuted but was immediately repatriated.  It was submitted that the prevailing policy dictated that, if either of an overstayer’s parents were permanent residents at the date of the overstayer’s birth, the overstayer would not be prosecuted.  The applicant was dealt with in accordance with the policy because he had made it known that his parents were permanent residents and his father, of course, had been so at the date of the applicant’s birth.

546. On behalf of the Director, it was submitted that this was a straightforward case.  The applicant had been arrested on a building site.  He admitted that he was there to look for work but denied that he was actually working.  The prevailing policy at the time was that, if an overstayer had overstayed for less than a month and was willing to be repatriated, there would be no prosecution and he would be returned to the Mainland without delay.  The applicant was a beneficiary of that policy.

547. There was no question of checking the residential status of the applicant’s parents, it was said, because the applicant at no time recorded the fact that his parents were even living in Hong Kong.  Indeed, the evidence showed that he was at pains for some reason to avoid saying that his parents were Hong Kong residents and he had been staying with them.

548. In my judgment, the applicant’s case was never demonstrated.  I did not find him to be a credible witness.  To the contrary, by the time the hearing was completed, I was satisfied that the applicant had been prepared to say almost anything which he believed at the time would advance his case.

549. I am satisfied on the probabilities that this was, as it was submitted on behalf of the Director, an essentially straightforward case, one in which the applicant’s actions pointed to a single purpose; namely, to be repatriated with the minimum of adverse consequences.

550. As to the circumstances of the applicant’s arrest, the evidence revealed that he was found on one of the upper floors of a construction site in the Fanling area.  When the applicant testified, he denied that he had been on the site looking for work.  He had gone to the site, he said, hoping to borrow money off a friend.  That friend was named Chan.  The applicant could not remember his other names.  As it turned out, he said, he was still looking for his friend when he was arrested.

551. Several hours after his arrest, the applicant was transferred by the police to the Central Government Pier where he was interviewed by an officer of the Task Force Section of the Immigration Department.  That officer was Senior Immigration Assistant Tam Yiu Tak.

552. During the course of the interview, the applicant completed a number of forms.  These included a personal information form, an ID 457, and a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.

553. It was, as I understand it, the applicant’s testimony that he filled out the ID 457, the personal particulars form, and, in conversation with the interviewing officer, then made the verbal assertion that he had right of abode.  As the applicant put it, he spoke to Mr Tam, the interviewing officer, telling him that both his father and mother were permanent residents.  He asked if he therefore had right of abode in Hong Kong.

554. It was the applicant’s case that, after he had claimed right of abode, he was then instructed to complete a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  In that form, he accepted that he wrote characters to the following effect —

“I, Lau Man Lung, know that I have begun to overstay in Hong Kong since 1 December 1998 for the reason that I wanted to stay in Hong Kong to find a job.  Today I appeared at the construction site of Dawning Views because I wanted to find a job.  But I failed to find any. …”

555. As I have said, it was the applicant’s testimony that, despite being found on one of the upper floors of the construction site, he had not been looking for work at all.  He had only been there looking for a friend in order to borrow money.  Why then write down what was not true?

556. The applicant said that he was simply given a sheet of paper and told to copy from it.  He accepted that he had not been threatened or pressured in any way.  He copied, he said, simply because he dared not do otherwise.  He did not even raise a query or suggest that something more accurate might be written.

557. The evidence further revealed that later that day at Lo Wu, shortly before he was repatriated, the applicant completed another form.  This was an ID 91 form, an application for an extension of stay.  It was completed to regularise his travel papers.  In that form, the applicant wrote the following as why he had overstayed :

“Overstayed because of finding job in Hong Kong.”

558. It was the applicant’s testimony that again he wrote these characters because he was instructed to do so.  Seemingly, again, no query was raised by him even though it did not, according to the applicant, reflect the true situation.

559. I accept, of course, that the applicant may have written whatever was placed in front of him if he believed it would avoid his prosecution.  But what he was instructed to write was that he was at the construction site in order to look for work, an admission that, according to him, was not only wrong but, objectively, was clearly against his interests.

560. At no time did the applicant say that he wrote this admission because he had been promised he would not be prosecuted.  Objectively, the evidence indicates that the decision whether or not to prosecute him was not made until later.

561. It was, of course, the applicant’s case that he had overstayed in Hong Kong in order to care for his aged parents and was staying with them in their apartment in Upper Ngau Tau Kok Estate in the eastern Kowloon area, a considerable distance from the construction site in Fanling.

562. When he was arrested, said the applicant, the police examined his expired two-way permit and asked him where he was living.  He told them he was living with his parents.       On that basis, the police documentation would perhaps be expected to make mention of the Ngau Tau Kok address.  But it does not.  Instead, it gives as the applicant’s address an address in Guangdong Province.

563. Later that day, when interviewed by Mr Tam, the applicant completed an ID 457 form.  That form sought details of the applicant’s parents.  In completing that section of the form, the applicant gave their names and their dates and places of birth.  The column reserved for his parents’ identity card details was left blank.  The applicant said he did not have those details on him.  That was understandable.  His arrest and transfer to the immigration authorities had not been expected.  

564. What I found more difficult to understand, however, was the fact that in the column headed ‘HK/Overseas Address’ the applicant did not give his parents Hong Kong address but instead gave what was apparently their home address in the Mainland.  When asked why he had not given their Hong Kong address – the place after all where his parents lived on a day-to-day basis and where he himself had been living with them – the applicant said he thought at the time that he should only give Mainland addresses.  That was, in my view, an entirely unconvincing answer.

565. Later that day at Lo Wu, when the applicant completed his ID 91 form, he was asked to enter particulars in a column marked ‘address in Hong Kong’.  The information required left no room for ambiguity.  Yet the applicant did not write down the Ngau Tau Kok address, instead he wrote : “Fanling”.  He did not therefore give the address of his parents with whom he had been staying but instead gave as his Hong Kong address the area of the construction site where he had been arrested earlier that day.

566. On 14 December 1998, therefore, on three official forms – a police referral form, an ID 457 and an ID 91 – not once was the address in Upper Ngau Tau Kok Estate recorded.

567. I accept, of course, that, on the basis of the applicant’s testimony, the ID 457 form was completed before he made his claim for right of abode.  But if that claim alerted Mr Tam, the interviewing officer, to the residential status of the applicant’s parents, and if that was investigated in order to determine whether the applicant should or should not be prosecuted, it was puzzling, in my view, why the ID 457 was not amended or a new one written out or some addendum or other form included in the applicant’s file.

568. When Mr Tam gave his evidence, he said that there was no reason for him to investigate the residential status of the applicant’s parents because nothing was put before him to show that the parents even lived in Hong Kong.  That, on the face of the documents put into evidence, is correct.

569. The ‘grounds for non-removal’ form was completed after the applicant said he claimed right of abode.  Yet the last two sentences of what was written by the applicant on that form were to the following effect :

“I also know that I have no right of abode in Hong Kong.  Please send me back to the Mainland as soon as possible.”

570. It was the applicant’s own case, therefore, that, having claimed right of abode, he wrote the characters I have just cited, albeit, according to him, because he was told to do so, but equally, according to him, without any question or complaint.

571. On behalf of the applicant, it was argued that the written acknowledgement that the applicant had no right of abode was evidence that the issue must at least have been raised, and raised of course by the applicant.  What was written therefore was itself a record of a claim having been made.

572. But that does not necessarily follow.  In his affirmation of 24 March 2006, Mr Tam, the interviewing officer, said that it was the general practice of the Task Force Section at that time to make a preliminary assessment of an interviewee’s immigration status.  This was to ensure that persons who had the right to remain permanently in Hong Kong were not wrongly repatriated.  When it was confirmed that an interviewee did not have right of abode, said Mr Tam, he would be informed of that conclusion and told that he would be repatriated immediately or after prosecution.  Mr Tam continued : “If the interviewee did not have a prima facie claim to right of abode according to my preliminary assessment … it was my own practice to ask the person … if he agreed with my assessment.”  Mr Tam concluded : “If the interviewee was in agreement, I would invite him to write down ‘I know I don’t have right of abode’ on the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form and to state whether he was willing to be voluntarily repatriated to the Mainland.”

573. That this procedure was a standard procedure is given some support in my first report, in particular in my determination of the application of Mr Chan Kin Piu, applicant 204 : see pars.145-161 of the report.

574. Mr Chan was arrested on a building site in November 1998, some six weeks before the applicant, and was also referred to the Task Force Section and interviewed.  The interviewing officer on that occasion was not Mr Tam but the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form contains almost a mirror of the last two sentences of the applicant’s own form, Mr Chan writing :

“I know I am without right of abode in Hong Kong.  Please will your Department arrange for my return to the Mainland as soon as possible.”

575. In the circumstances, accepting, as I do, that the sentence “I also know that I have no right of abode in Hong Kong” was written at the request of the interviewing officer as part of a standard procedure, I am satisfied that the sentence is not evidence that the applicant must have earlier claimed right of abode.

576. On behalf of the applicant, it was argued, however, that the statement in the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form was clearly copied and could not therefore be taken, as reflecting the applicant’s own thoughts and expressions of desire.  In support of this argument, it was pointed out that most of the characters were in traditional form, not the simplified form used on the Mainland.

577. It is evident, of course, that the applicant was guided in respect of a good deal of what he wrote in the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  Mr Tam, the interviewing officer, effectively accepted as much.  But I do not accept that the applicant was ,without any consultation, simply presented with a  form to copy believing that he had no ability to question any of it.  I am satisfied, for example, that the applicant wrote that he was only looking for work at the construction site because that is what he wished to have recorded.

578. As for the use of traditional characters, that itself was not a clear cut issue, there being some evidence that in other documents the applicant used a mix of traditional and simplified characters.

579. In summary, I am satisfied that the applicant did not make a claim for right of abode when being interviewed by Mr Tam.  I am further satisfied that no record of any claim is to be found in the files of the Immigration Department.

580. On 17 December 1998, five days after the applicant had been repatriated, a covering report was written.  The author of that report was Mr Lo Wei On.  In his report, Mr Lo effectively stated what had already been done and decided.  Under the heading ‘Conclusion and recommendation’, Mr Lo wrote :

“despite of the fact that subject was only allowed to stay in HK as a visitor up to 30-11-1998 and he failed to leave the territories since 01-12-1998, he falls into non-prosecution category in accordance with the prevailing policy.  Thus [no further action] on subject is recommended.”

581. Mr Lo testified that, having checked into the matter when he wrote his report, he understood the ‘non-prosecution category’ to be the one based on how long an overstayer had overstayed and not as whether he had a parent who was a permanent resident at the date of his birth.

582. In my view, looking to the probabilities, if the policy referred to had been the one advocated by the applicant’s counsel, it is strange that no mention was made of any sort of parental nexus, indeed of any parents.

583. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i) The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;

(ii) the Director does not have a record of a claim.

Part Five

Mr Chow Wing Wai (4387 : a ‘group two’ applicant)

584. The applicant was born in Shanghai in 1951, the eldest of five children.  His father came to live in Hong Kong in 1958.  His mother joined his father in 1979.

585. As for the children of the family, only the youngest child, the applicant’s sister, was permitted to settle in Hong Kong with her parents.  One of the applicant’s brothers, however, emigrated and is now living in Australia. 

586. At all material times, the applicant was a married man, having one child.  It is apparent, however, that he has over a considerable period of time sought to find a way to settle in Hong Kong. 

587. In particular, in 1996 the applicant applied to the Mainland authorities for a one-way permit.  His application was refused.  As the applicant understood it, this was because his younger sister was already settled in Hong Kong and was in a position therefore to care for his parents.

588. The applicant testified that shortly after the change of sovereignty, believing that he may now at last be eligible to settle in Hong Kong, he made a further application for a one-way permit.  On this occasion, he said, he supported his application with a letter from his mother.  In part, that letter read :

“It is stipulated by the Hong Kong Government that if a couple has no son by their side to take care of them, one of their sons on the Mainland can apply for coming to Hong Kong.”

589. The applicant said that this second application was unsuccessful too.  However, in conversation with officers of the Public Security Bureau, he was told that, if he could obtain confirmation from the Hong Kong authorities that he was eligible to settle in Hong Kong, he would no doubt be able to obtain a one-way permit.  In the result, said the applicant, he applied for a two-way permit so that he could come to Hong Kong to obtain the necessary verification of his right to settle here.

590. His two-way permit was granted and he arrived in Hong Kong on 6 November 1997, being permitted to remain for a period of nearly three months; that is, until 29 January 1998.

591. It was the applicant’s case that it was during this visit that he made his claim for right of abode.  The claim was made at the Chinese Visitors Office (“the CVO”) on 21 January 1998.

592. At that time, the CVO dealt essentially with applications by the holders of two-way permits for extensions of stay in Hong Kong.  Absent special circumstances, the standard extension that was granted was one of two days only.  That being said, the evidence indicates that from time to time officers at the CVO did have to deal with claims for right of abode or, at least, with enquiries made by Mainland visitors as to how to make such claims.  It was accepted, for example, that posters were displayed in the office advising would-be right of abode claimants that they must return to the Mainland in order to process their claims. 

593. In the present case, I believe the probabilities support the applicant’s contention that he did not visit the CVO on 21 January 1998 simply to obtain an extension of his stay, even though that may have been the end result of his visit.  He did so instead for the purpose of processing an application to settle permanently in Hong Kong.

594. It is significant, in my view, that fairly shortly after he arrived in Hong Kong the applicant applied to the Prince of Wales Hospital for a formal medical report in respect of his mother’s condition of health.  The report – dated 8 January 1998 – was obtained at a cost of $400.  It spoke of the mother’s history of gallstones and rheumatism and also of her chronic dyspepsia.  The applicant testified that his mother had suffered from ill health for a number of years.  He believed, he said, that proof of her medical condition would support his application for the right to settle in Hong Kong.

595. Leaving aside the fact that the applicant impressed me as an essentially credible witness, a matter to which I shall return, I do not see why he would have gone to the trouble of obtaining a formal medical report as to his mother’s condition well before his two-way permit was due to expire if all he was seeking was a limited extension of his stay.

596. As to why the applicant went to the CVO, he said that, with the medical report secured, he and his mother went originally to the Shatin District Office to find out where an application for the right to settle in Hong Kong should be made.  According to the applicant (and his mother) they were referred by that office to the CVO.

597. Before visiting the CVO, said the applicant, he wrote a letter in support of his application to settle in Hong Kong.  No copy of the letter was kept.  The applicant, therefore, had to rely on his memory of its contents, a memory which, after some nine years, could not be expected to be word perfect.  He recalled, however, saying that his mother was now 65 years old and, as the medical certificate evidenced, was not in good health.  He recalled writing that he wished to settle in Hong Kong; that is, to live here permanently, in order to take care of his mother.  He also recalled writing words to the effect that, if he could not be granted the right to live permanently in Hong Kong, then he asked for an extension of stay of three to six months. 

598. As to the visit itself, the applicant testified that, upon his arrival, leaving his mother to one side, he spoke to an officer at the enquiry counter.  The objective evidence indicates that the officer would have been Mr Lok Hing Tung, an Immigration Assistant.  The applicant said that he handed the officer a number of documents.  These were : his mother’s identity card, evidencing her right of permanent residence; his own two-way permit, which still had a week or more to run; the medical certificate obtained from the Prince of Wales Hospital and what he described as his letter of application.

599. According to the applicant, he informed the officer; that is, Mr Lok, that he wished to apply to live in Hong Kong and asked if he could apply for a certificate verifying his eligibility.  However, he was informed, he said, that there was no such procedure and that he would have to return to the Mainland to process an application there.

600. The applicant said that he was then given a number tag and told to wait until his name was called.  To the best of his memory, he was not at that time given any form to complete.

601. When his name was called, the applicant said that he was seen by a second officer.  On the objective evidence, this officer would have then Mr Lai Ka Sum, also an Immigration Assistant.

602. According to the applicant, this officer; that is, Mr Lai, looked at the medical report obtained from the Prince of Wales and suggested to the applicant that, as his mother appeared to be chronically ill, it would be better perhaps if the applicant simply took her bag to the Mainland.  During their conversation, said the applicant, the officer told him that he could not apply in Hong Kong for the right to settle here and that he would have to return to the Mainland to process his claim.  According to the applicant, therefore, he received the same advice from both officers; that is from Mr Lok and Mr Lai.

603. The applicant testified that he was told that the best that could be done for him was to grant him a two-day extension to his permit.  The applicant said that he was then given an ID 91 form to complete.  This form, he said, had already been partly filled out : specifically, details as to his name had been written on the form and what he took to be the numeral ‘2’ had been entered in the box in which he was to indicate the length of extension of stay that he wished to seek.  In addition, the boxes in the ID 91 form which he was obliged to complete, said the applicant, were drawn to his attention by hand-written arrows.  It was not disputed that these arrows were written by Mr Lai, the interviewing officer.

604. The applicant said that he completed the form, asking only for what he was told he could have; namely, a two-day extension.  He said that he then returned the form to the officer; that is, to Mr Lai.  At that time, he said, the officer returned all his papers to him, these being the papers which he had handed earlier to Mr Lok, the officer at the enquiry counter.  The applicant said that he accepted the return of all the papers with the exception only of his letter of application.  At that time, he said, he did not believe that the letter would be of any further use to him and he asked the officer to keep it.  The officer therefore retained possession of the letter.  The applicant was unable to say what happened to the letter thereafter. 

605. Having obtained his two-day extension and paid the relevant fee, the applicant said that he left the CVO with his mother and, when his permitted stay came to an end, he returned to Shanghai.  Within a few days of doing so, he said, essentially on the basis of what he had been told at the CVO, he returned to the local Public Security Bureau to pursue yet another application for a one-way permit.  This final application was also refused.

606. As to a claim for right of abode being made by the applicant, it was submitted on his behalf that he made an oral claim to the officer at the enquiry counter, Mr Lok.  On the basis of the evidence, however, it would seem that the assertion of a claim is to be considered not only in the light of what was said to Mr Lok but also, albeit to a lesser degree, what was said a little later to Mr Lai.  

607. As to whether an oral claim was made, I am satisfied that the probabilities support the applicant’s contention. 

608. As I have said earlier, I am satisfied that the applicant went to the CVO on 21 January 1998 in order to try and process an application to live permanently in Hong Kong.  I am satisfied that the basis of that application was the fact that he was the child of Hong Kong permanent residents and that, in respect particularly of his mother, there was a compassionate need for him to remain in Hong Kong to care for her.  Having regard to the preparations made for the visit and to the applicant’s clear purpose, I think it more likely than not that, upon arrival at the CVO, he would have done his best to articulate that purpose.

609. Importantly, I am satisfied that the applicant, in giving his testimony, attempted to tell the truth as he remembered it.  As I have indicated earlier, the applicant impressed me as an essentially credible witness.  He gave his evidence in a calm, straightforward manner.  On a number of occasions, after considering a question, he was prepared to concede that his memory of events may have been at fault.  There appeared to be little, if any, attempt to exaggerate or ‘dress’ his evidence so that it fitted neatly with what he must have come to learn were the essentials that had to be proved in order to satisfy the requirements of the concession policy.

610. I accept that, on the evidence, the applicant placed a good deal of emphasis on the need to remain in Hong Kong to care for his mother.  The applicant did not speak of making any direct assertion that, as the son of Hong Kong permanent residents, he was constitutionally entitled to right of abode.  Having regard to just how uncertain, at least in the minds of many lay persons from the Mainland, the true position was at that time, it is understandable that special emphasis may have been placed on compassionate grounds for wishing to settle in Hong Kong.  But, considering the applicant’s evidence in the round, taking into account, for example, that he gave the officer at the enquiry counter his mother’s Hong Kong identity card and spoke of some sort of certificate of eligibility, I am satisfied that his claim at the time must have been understood not merely as a claim based on compassionate grounds (which would not have brought him within the terms of the concession policy) but a claim that had its essential foundation in the fact that he was the son of permanent residents or at least one permanent resident; namely, his mother.

611. On behalf of the Director, it was emphasised that, on the applicant’s testimony, he was dealt with in a wholly unorthodox way by the officers at the CVO and, in light of that, caution had to be exercised in determining what weight, if any, to give to his evidence.

612. There was no strict manual of procedure that had to be followed at the CVO.  I accept, however, that on all the evidence, certainly in or about late 1997 and early 1998, a general form of procedure had emerged.  In his submissions, Mr Fok, on behalf of the Director, succinctly set out that procedure as follows :

(i) An applicant collected a number tag.

(ii) He waited to be called to the enquiry counter where the prevailing two-way permit policy would be explained to him.

(iii) If the applicant was willing to accept a standard two-day extension, he would be given an ID 91 form to complete.  If he wanted longer, he would also be asked to complete a family background form as well as a standard pro-forma.

(iv) The applicant would complete the required forms, submitting them for consideration.

(v) The applicant would then be called for an interview with the interviewing officer.

(vi) He would be given the result of his application, he would pay the necessary fee and then be given back his amended two-way permit.

613. The applicant’s testimony, said Mr Fok, was to the effect that he handed over his documents before he was even given a number tag and that he was not given an ID 91 form at the enquiry counter but appears only to have been given that form during the course of an interview with an interviewing officer.

614. I accept that the applicant may well have been confused as to the exact order of events at the CVO.  He was attempting to remember administrative procedures that he experienced on only one occasion and which had taken place some nine years earlier.  But, even on the evidence of the immigration officers, the process does not appear to have been entirely routine.  The interviewing officer, Mr Lai, accepted that when he received the ID 91 form, it was blank save for a date which had been filled in by Mr Lok at the enquiry counter in that part of the form reserved for official use.  It was for that reason that Mr Lai had to indicate with arrows the various parts of the document that had to be completed by the document.  But, if routine procedure had been followed, the applicant would have completed the form and handed it back before seeing the interviewing officer.  It may well be, of course, that applicants who were illiterate or confused would fail to fill in the form.  But there was no evidence to suggest that this applicant was illiterate nor anything to suggest that he would have had difficulty completing the form.

615. It is fruitless to speculate what may or may not have happened.  It is sufficient, I think, to come to the conclusion that the evidence, even allowing for the fact that the applicant may to some degree have been confused as to the sequence of events, is equivocal as to the degree to which standard procedure was in fact followed on this occasion. 

616. In the course of his testimony, the applicant pointed to what he remembered was a numeral ‘2’ written on the form to indicate that he would only be able to obtain a two-day extension.  It was put to him (upon a study of the original document) that this was just a smudge.  The applicant accepted that this may be the case.  For myself, however, absent any forensic evidence, I found it difficult to come to a firm conclusion one-way or the other.  It could well have been a smudge only but it may also have been a very small endorsement, the biro barely touching the page.  Whichever way, however, I do not believe that much hangs on it. 

617. On the balance of probabilities, therefore, as I have already said, I am satisfied that the applicant did make an oral claim for right of abode at the CVO.  The more difficult issue, however, concerns the second limb of the concession policy; namely, the demonstration that there exists a record of that claim.

618. As I understood it, it was conceded on behalf of the applicant that neither the ID 91 form nor the standard immigration documents found in the applicant’s file were capable of constituting a record.  It was submitted that I should find nevertheless that there was a record in the possession of the Director.  That record was the letter which the applicant wrote before going to the CVO, the letter which he described as his letter of application.  That was the letter which the applicant said he gave to the officer at the enquiry counter.  It was the letter which the interviewing officer later offered to return to him together with other documents but which, according to the applicant, he declined to accept on the basis that it was no longer of any use to him.

619. No such letter was found in the applicant’s CVO file.  On behalf of the Director, it was submitted that there had never been such a letter, that this was an invention of the applicant created after he had learnt that the concession policy demanded not only that there should have been a claim but that there should be a record of that claim.

620. On behalf of the Director, it was pointed out that in an interview with the Immigration Department on 17 June 2000, when the applicant explained in detail how he came to make a claim, no mention was made of a letter of application.  In translation, what was written by the applicant on that occasion was as follows :

“On 21 January 1998, I went to the [CVO] to apply for a resident permit for settling in Hong Kong to take care of my old parents.  In addition to filling in a settlement application form … I submitted hospital proof and a certificate which stated my mother’s illnesses.  An officer … accepted my form after looking at it and told me that I needed to return to the Mainland to apply for the one-way exit permit.”

621. This record of interview, it was said by Mr Fok, was to be contrasted with the later case summary prepared for the applicant by his then solicitors, Pam Baker & Co., after the CFA had confirmed the record requirement of the concession policy.  This case summary not only mentioned the letter, said Mr Fok, but placed considerable emphasis on it :

“I went … with my mother and said that my mother is sick here so I want to ‘settle’ in HK (I used that word).  I was given a form to complete.  I did this, and attached a letter to the form.  I wrote the letter before I arrived there.  In the letter I said that my parents are sick and old and I want to settle in HK and get the ‘certificate of staying’.  That was the content of the letter.”

622. This inconsistency has caused me concern.  However, at the end of the day, taking all matters into account, I do not think it is decisive.

623. As I have said, I found the applicant be an essentially credible witness.  I found nothing unusual in the fact that, having made preparations for his visit to the CVO, the applicant should write a supporting letter.  Evidence was led during the hearing that he had written a brief supporting letter for one of his applications made in Shanghai for the issue of a one-way permit. 

624. The earlier interview record, on an ordinary reading, speaks not simply of an application for an extension of stay but of an application to settle in Hong Kong. 

625. What must also be taken into account, I believe, is that, until applicants understood the exact requirements of the concession policy, they were unable, as lay persons, to know exactly what should or should not be written down in the recording of their claims.  What may have been considered unimportant in the original instance may, when the requirements to the concession policy were better understood, have become of central importance.  In each instance, therefore, the question is to be asked : is the new information an invention to accord with the requirements of the concession policy or does it simply reflect the fact that an applicant may not earlier have appreciated the importance of a particular document or event or utterance?  In the present case, I believe that the applicant, in completing his interview record, may simply not have understood the importance of mentioning his application letter, the importance of that letter only being appreciated at a later stage.

626. On behalf of the applicant, it was said that, in respect of the letter, his evidence was not incompatible with that of the interviewing officer, Mr Lai.  During the hearing, Mr Lai said that, if a standard extension of two days was granted, there was no need for any supporting documents.  Accordingly, any supporting documents would be returned.  This, of course, fits entirely with the applicant’s own evidence, evidence given before that of Mr Lai.

627. Why then, if all the documents were returned to him, would the applicant have chosen to accept them back with the exception only of the letter of application?  The answer to that, in my view, may well lie in a consideration of the documents which were accepted back.  Clearly, the mother’s original Hong Kong identity card had to be given back to the mother.  Equally, the applicant’s two-way permit had to be retained by him.  According to the applicant, the only other document which he accepted back was the medical report obtained from the Prince of Wales Hospital.  That report, it must be remembered, was a formal, typed document which had cost the applicant $400.  It was a document which could well be of future use; for example, in support of an application made back in the Mainland for the issue of a one-way permit.  The letter of application, however, was directed to the Hong Kong Immigration Department only and had no apparent value otherwise.

628. In all the circumstances, therefore, I am satisfied on the probabilities that the applicant did write a supporting letter, leaving that letter in the possession of the interviewing officer, Mr Lai.

629. Mr Lai testified that, if he had retained a document made in support of an application for an extension of stay, he would have stapled it to the interview record sheet along with other relevant papers so that it could be found in the file.  However, Mr Lai also accepted that documents that were of no possible relevance would not be kept by him.  For example, no purpose would be served in keeping a spoiled application form which had been replaced by a second form correctly filled out.  Such a form, he said, would be discarded by him. 

630. The letter, having been left in the possession of Mr Lai by the applicant, it is unlikely, I think, that Mr Lai would simply have mislaid it, the document perhaps being placed into some other file.

631. In the present case, however, a two-day extension having been granted to the applicant, his letter of application would have had no value.  If, as I have found, it is probable that the letter was left with Mr Lai, there would be no reason for Mr Lai to retain it.  

632. In my view, therefore, the probabilities support the fact that, acting entirely in good faith, and no criticism whatsoever being levelled at him, Mr Lai would have done the sensible thing at the time and simply discarded that letter of application.  That, I am satisfied, is why the letter is not to be found in the applicant’s CVO file.

633. If, as I have found, Mr Lai discarded the letter of application, the probabilities suggest that he would have done so almost immediately.  By this I mean that he would have done so before his responsibilities in respect of the file were completed.  No suggestion was made that he would have returned to the file at some later stage, disposing of it is part of some weeding out exercise.

634. The final issue, of course, is whether, on the facts as I have found them, the applicant has been able to satisfy the second requirement of the concession policy; that is, whether the Director has a record of his claim as required by the concession policy?

635. On behalf of the applicant, Ms Li submitted that, once it was found on the probabilities that the letter of application was submitted by the applicant to the Immigration Department and that the Department took possession of it, then the record requirement was satisfied.  As she expressed it, it is beyond the applicant’s ability to demonstrate what might or might not have happened to the letter.  In this regard, Ms Li relied on the principle enunciated by the CFA in its judgment dated 5 January 2006 and cited earlier in this report in respect of applicant 2448, Law Yuet King; namely —

“It is not disputed that if the original letter making the claim was in the files of the Department, it would constitute a sufficient record.  Nor is it disputed that, if there was a notation in the files that such a letter had been received, though the letter was subsequently lost or mislaid, there would be a sufficient record.  The Director argues, however, that, if a letter claiming right of abode has been lost or mislaid and no notation of its receipt has been made in the Department’s records, there is no compliance with the record requirement of the concession policy.

20.  We do not accept this argument.  The context is the determination of the existence or otherwise of a constitutional right, namely the right of abode, and it cannot be supposed that the existence of what was, at one time, a sufficient record to authenticate the right could be lost or destroyed simply because the relevant document went astray after its receipt by the Department.”

636. On this basis, it must follow I think that, if I am satisfied on the probabilities that the applicant’s letter, constituting a sufficient record, was given into the possession of the Immigration Department, then the second requirement of the concession policy is met.  It matters not that, after being received into the possession of the Department, the letter was mislaid or destroyed nor whether the loss or destruction of the letter took place shortly after it was received or at some later stage.  It must also follow, I think, that it is irrelevant that the letter was discarded because it was at the time considered to be of no relevance or value.

637. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i) The applicant did make a claim for right of abode;

(ii) the Director has, or did have, a record of that claim.

Ms Kong Yuet Ha (1558, a ‘group two’ applicant)

638. The applicant was born in Guangdong Province in May 1979.  She is one of three children, the only girl.  When the change of sovereignty took place, she was eighteen years of age and still a student.

639. The applicant’s father came to Hong Kong in 1980, her mother being granted permission to join him in 1988.  By July 1997 both were permanent residents.  Prior to the change of sovereignty, one of the children of the family, the eldest, a boy, was granted a one-way permit and was able to settle in Hong Kong.  In the circumstances, it is understandable that the applicant’s parents would have been anxious to try and find a way for the applicant, their only daughter, to be able to come to Hong Kong to settle here too.

640. As it was, the applicant’s father, Mr Kong Kam Wah, said that, prior to the change of sovereignty, he read various articles on the right of abode issue.  At that time, however, it appeared to him to be very uncertain, he said, and so he did not discuss the matter with his daughter until after the change of sovereignty had taken place.

641. The applicant herself testified that, although she was at a boarding school in a rural area of Guangdong, in the summer months of 1996, 1997 and 1998 she was able to come to Hong Kong to spend most of her school holidays with her parents.

642. The applicant said that in the 1997 summer holidays, after the change of sovereignty, hoping to be able to secure the right to live in Hong Kong, she and her father went to the Immigration Tower in Wanchai.  The applicant had only the sketchiest memory of what took place, her father had even less memory.  The applicant remembered being told that she was not eligible.

643. It was the father’s evidence that this unsuccessful visit to the Immigration Department did not result in him losing interest in the right of abode issue.  In his affirmation of 21 October 2004, he said he remembered the Court of First Instance handing down a judgment in January 1998 declaring that it did not matter when the child of a Hong Kong permanent resident was born, whether before or after his parent, that child would still be entitled to right of abode.  He went on to qualify this by saying that, while he was aware that the Court of Appeal had delivered a judgment in May 1998 overturning the January 1998 judgment, he had also heard that the lawyers for the right of abode claimants would be taking the matter to the Court of Final Appeal.

644. In the summer of 1998, the applicant returned to Hong Kong to spend most of her holidays here.  She arrived on 12 July, being permitted to remain until 7 August.  She testified that, although she had come to be with her parents, it was also her intention to attempt a second time to claim the right to live here permanently.

645. To this end, said the applicant, on 30 July 1998, approximately a week before the expiration of her two-way permit, she went to the CVO together with her father and her elder brother.

646. The father testified that he did not go back to the Immigration Tower, which he and his daughter had visited the year before in order to enquire about right of abode, but chose instead the CVO.  This was because it was the closest Immigration Department office to his home.  In addition, he had been there previously to renew his identity card.  He was mistaken as to this second matter.  His identity card had been renewed in 1994 in Yuen Long and not Yau Ma Tei where the CVO was situated.

647. After arrival at the CVO, when they were called to the counter, the father said that he spoke to the officer on duty.  He told the officer that his daughter, the applicant, wished to apply for right of abode.  The officer, having looked at the applicant’s two-way permit, said that she was not eligible and in any event the CVO only handled applications for extensions of stay.

648. On behalf of the applicant, it was submitted that this brief conversation constituted an oral claim made by the father on the applicant’s behalf.  If the father and the applicant are believed, whether the conversation was brief or not, clearly, in my view, it did amount to such a claim.

649. Having been told that his daughter was not eligible to claim right of abode, the father said that he then asked the officer if his daughter would be eligible for an extension of stay.  He was told that, yes, she was eligible provided a reason was given.  The father said that he was then given forms to complete and was told to write a letter explaining why an extension was required.

650. The forms given to the father consisted of an application for an extension of stay; that is, an ID 91 form, and a ‘family background’ form.  The counter register for 30 July, 1998 shows that the applicant’s name was endorsed with a star, a symbol to reflect the fact that an extension of more than two days was sought : hence, the requirement that a ‘family background’ form be completed.

651. The father said that, as he did not know English, he asked his son to complete the ID 91 form.  His instruction to his son, he said, was to leave blank the box that was endorsed : “I now apply to extend my stay until …”  He gave this instruction, he said, because he was hoping to obtain an indefinite extension of stay for his daughter.

652. The father said that he personally completed the family background form and also wrote a supporting letter.  I will refer to that letter as ‘the first letter’.

653. When the forms had been completed, both the applicant and her father said that they returned to the counter.  The following documents, they said, were given to the officer : the applicant’s two-way permit, a photostat copy of the father’s Hong Kong identity card, the ID 91 form, the first letter and the family background form.  The evidence as to when this last document was handed over was a little confused.  But little turned on it.

654. The applicant herself was vague as to what happened at the counter.  The general thrust of her testimony and that of her father, however, appeared to be to the following effect.  The officer said that a date had to be inserted in the box on the ID 91 endorsed : “I now apply to extend my stay until …”  He also said that the letter in support, the first letter, was inadequate.  It did not state in specific terms the length of extension required and, in addition, the reasons given would not support an application for an extension.

655. The father testified that the documents were returned to him and he and his two children went away from the counter again.  He said that he then wrote another letter in support – I will call it ‘the second letter’ – and directed his son to put a date on the ID 91 form, that date being 29 August.  An extension of approximately three weeks was therefore sought.

656. As for the first letter, the father said that he must have given it to his daughter.  As it was of no further value, he said, he assumed she must have thrown it away.

657. It was the applicant’s evidence that her father did give her the first letter.  She said, however, that she did not throw it away.  Instead, she folded up the letter and put it into a knapsack she was carrying.  By this action, she said, although the first letter was mislaid for several years, it was eventually recovered.  That was why, she said, she was able to produce it into evidence.

658. It was the Director’s case that this first letter was not written on 30 July 1998 at the CVO but was concocted at a much later time.

659. In many ways, whether the letter was or was not genuine became the central issue in the hearing.

660. At this juncture, however, it is sufficient to record that the first letter (in translation) was to the following effect :

“My father Kong Kam Wah and my mother Lai Sui Ying are both Hong Kong permanent residents.  My brother Kong Chi Kwan also lives with my parents at Flat 1036, Block 11, Shek Lei Estate II, Kwai Chung, New Territories, Telephone:239196.  I came to Hong Kong to visit my family members on the strength of a Chinese Travel Permit.  As I have no relative in my hometown and am still young and hence need to be taken care by my parents, I request you, the Director, to grant me an approval for extension of my stay to facilitate my parents to take care of me.”

661. Although, as I have said, the genuineness of the first letter was disputed, there was no dispute that a letter was submitted that day in support of the application for an extension of stay.  That letter – the second letter – was found in the applicant’s CVO file.  It was dated 30 July 1998 and (in translation) was to the following effect :

“I, Kong Yuet Ha, holder of a Chinese Travel Permit, Hong Kong address at Flat 1036, Block 11, Shek Lei Estate II, Kwai Chung, New Territories and Telephone No.23919650, hereby apply for extension of stay till 29 August 1998 for the following reasons:

As all my family members live in Hong Kong, leaving me alone in my hometown, I have to live away from home with my seventh grandaunt.  Since (1986 corrected) 1996, I have been studying at Zhaoqing Secondary Technical School and living at the school dormitory.  During the vacation every year, I applied to come to Hong Kong to reunite with my parents.  This year, however, I have to go back on 7 August due to expiration of my travel permit, and as school has not begun and my seventh grandaunt died last year at the age of 80, I have nowhere to live if I return to my hometown in such circumstances.  On one hand it is not yet time for the new term to start at school, on the other hand I do not have a single relative in the hometown.  As a young girl with nobody to rely upon, I hereby apply to you, the Director, and ask for your sympathy to grant me an extension to 29 August so that I may go directly back to school to live in the dormitory.  I hope that you will understand and allow me to stay till 29 August 98.”

662. It was the Director’s case that this letter – the second letter – was the only letter presented by the applicant and/or her father that day and, as the letter itself makes clear, was no more than a request for an extension of stay, albeit a lengthy extension.

663. The father testified that the amended ID 91 form and the second letter were submitted to the officer at the counter.  After a time, they were informed that a two-day extension only could be granted.  This was not accepted.  The father and his two children then left the CVO.

664. In the course of submissions, counsel for the applicant emphasised that, while much attention may have been focused on the genuineness of the first letter, it was important to appreciate that this was not a ‘letter claim’ case.  It was noted that, when he came to write the first letter, the father was aware of the advice just given to him that his daughter was not eligible to claim right of abode and accordingly the letter was essentially an application for an extension of stay.  But counsel for the applicant did not discount the importance of the first letter.  It was sought instead to put the letter into context.  As counsel said : ‘the first letter is not the sole basis of the claim’.

665. In my judgment, quite clearly, the genuineness of the first letter was an issue of central importance.

666. I accept that the first letter is equivocal in many ways.  But it commences with an assertion that both of the applicant’s parents are permanent residents and, in addition, on the basis that the applicant needs to be looked after by her parents, seeks an indefinite extension of stay.  That could be read, especially in light of the fact that the father’s Hong Kong identity card was handed over with the letter, as being in effect a form of claim for right of abode.  It would not have been the first suggested claim couched in language that seeks sympathy for separated parents and children.

667. On behalf of the applicant, it was said that the first letter did not add anything to the applicant’s claim.  That may be so but potentially, if its provenance was not disputed, it was capable of adding a good deal.

668. It should also be said that, if the first letter is rejected as fabrication, it not only undermines the credibility of the applicant and her father but takes away a supporting document of some strength.

669. A copy of the father’s identity card was given to the officers at the CVO and retained but, as counsel for Director explained, the copy of the father’s identity card and the family background form were obtained as a matter of course because of the unusual length of the requested extension.  In the circumstances, it was submitted, there was no basis for finding that these documents were either given or obtained in any way to evidence an oral claim for right of abode.

670. At this time I should make it clear that, on a consideration of all the evidence, while the issues were far from straightforward, I was at the end of the day drawn to the following firm conclusions.  First, that no oral claim for right of abode was made by the father; that the purpose of the visit to the CVO was, as the second letter revealed, simply to obtain an extension of stay, albeit a lengthy one.  Second, that the first letter was not a genuine document written on 30 July 1998 in the circumstances attested to by the applicant and her father.

671. In explaining my reasons, I should start by saying that I did not find either the applicant or her father to be witnesses worthy of belief.

672. The applicant herself, although cheerful, was vague and inconsistent.  Vagueness, of course, may be an entirely understandable result of the fading of memory.  To that extent, it may even support the credibility of a witness.  But vagueness may also be a method to avoid having to explain an invented story in too much detail.  The applicant’s vagueness, in my judgment, fell into the latter category.

673. In her affirmation of 21 October 2004, the applicant said that, in preparation for the visit to the CVO, photostat copies of both her parents’ identity cards were made.  If a claim for right of abode was going to be made, that would be sensible and expected.  However, in her evidence-in-chief the applicant said that only her father’s identity card was copied.  In cross-examination, however, she vacillated between the two versions until finally she said she could not be sure.

674. If, in fact, as the applicant said in her affirmation, her mother’s identity card had been copied too she would then have had to explain why it was not given to the officers at the CVO as a copy of her father’s identity card had been.

675. In my judgment, however, it was the applicant’s testimony in respect of the first letter – how it was mislaid and later recovered – that demonstrated that much of what she said could simply not be accepted as a genuine attempt to tell the truth.

676. In respect of that letter and its history, it was the father’s evidence that, thinking it was no longer of any relevance, he believed he must simply have discarded it.  The truth however was that he had handed it to his daughter.

677. The applicant herself said that she did not throw the letter away.  She folded it up and put it into her knapsack.  A week or so later, she said, she was forced to return to the Mainland.  When, sometime later, she returned to her school, she said that she stored a number of items in a suitcase which she kept there.  Included among those items was the first letter.

678. At a later stage, said the applicant, she was able to return to Hong Kong, living here for a period of some three years while she awaited the final determination of the right of abode litigation.  At the end of that time, she said, she returned to the Mainland.  This would have been in 2002.  By then, however, she had finished her schooling.  It was necessary, of course, to return to the school to collect her belongings stored in her suitcase.  When she did so, she said, and examined the contents, she discovered the letter.

679. The applicant said that, when the discovery was made, she was by then fairly well informed as to matters concerning right of abode.  She was, she said, a client of Pam Baker & Co. and had received a detailed document of legal advice.  For that reason, she said, she was aware of the importance of her discovery.

680. The story of how the letter was recovered, while out of the ordinary, could not be rejected out of hand as ‘too convenient’ or ‘two implausible’.  From time to time evidence does come to light in such unusual ways.  It was rather the applicant’s testimony concerning the matter which, in my view, was unworthy of being given any credit, giving the lie to her account.

681. It is understandable that the applicant was not able to remember how it was exactly that her father came to give her the letter, how it came to be placed, neatly folded, in her knapsack and how from there it found its way into her school suitcase.  The discovery of the letter, however, would have been a different matter especially as the applicant accepted that she was aware of the importance of her discovery.  As to the discovery, however, the applicant found herself in all sorts of difficulties.

682. When originally questioned, the applicant could not remember whether the knapsack itself had been found in the suitcase, the letter still inside it, or whether it was simply the letter which had been found in the suitcase.  After more questions, she came to the view that she had used the knapsack from time to time and accordingly it must just have been the letter which was discovered in the suitcase.  The next day, however, she said again that she could not remember the exact circumstances of the discovery.  When the questioning on the issue of the discovery became a little too pointed, the applicant, a bright young woman, often laughing, looked flushed.  It was patently clear that she was doing her best to avoid giving a straight answer to a straight question. 

683. As I have said, it was the applicant’s evidence that, when the letter was discovered, she appreciated its significance.  Later, however, when asked if she had immediately informed her father of her discovery, she said that she had not done so.  When asked why she had not done so, she said that she had not appreciated the significance of the letter at the time of its discovery.  This was, of course, a contradiction of her earlier testimony.  In the end result, as I understood the applicant’s evidence, she said she did not tell her father of the discovery of the letter until the end of 2002.  That, in my view, was unconvincing.

684. It was the father’s testimony that he himself did not appreciate the importance of the letter when he was first told of its discovery by his daughter.  This I also found difficult to accept.  I say so because it is apparent that in 2002, several months at least before he learnt of the discovery of the letter, the father gave a summary of his daughter’s case to Pam Baker & Co.  That summary was recorded in the first person, as if it came from the mouth of the applicant, but in fact it came from the father.  In part, it read :

“In 1998 I came to HK to visit my parents with a 2-way permit in July 1998.  Father and I went to the Yau Ma Tei China Visitors Section and applied for RoA and recognizance on 30 July 1998.  At that time I spoke to an officer and the officer said to me, I am not qualified to apply for right of abode.  He said we will not deal with this, only extensions.

In these circumstances I submitted the application for extension.  At that time the statement that I made was like this.  My father [his name] and mother [her name] are HK PRs.  I have no relatives in the village.  I am very young.  I request that the DoI can grant me extension [so that my parents can take care of me].

When I submitted the application to the officer, the officer returned it to me and said the content is not appropriate for an application to extend.  You need to submit another application.  The officer also told me how to write it, as follows: (1) Give a reason for application to extend.  (2) How long you are applying for an extension.  This first letter I wrote was returned to me.  (And I threw it away)”  [my emphasis]

685. In terms of that summary, the second letter – rightly or wrongly – was of central importance.  Its contents were explained, including (importantly) the assertion that the applicant’s parents were Hong Kong permanent residents.  In addition, the assertion was made that the letter had been thrown away.  The second letter (and its fate) was not therefore of mere peripheral value in the case summary.  It was, as I have said, of central importance.  It defies common sense to think that the father, who had dictated the case summary, would not therefore have understood, at least in a general sense, the importance of the letter when it was discovered. 

686. As for the case summary, in her affirmation of 21 October 2004, the applicant said the following :

“There is one very important change to the Summary, which was not read to me before it was submitted by Pam Baker & Co to the Respondent or the Court in 2002.  The third paragraph on page 2 states that I threw away the first letter I wrote for my extension at the CVO.

My current solicitors have advised me that the detailed instructions upon which the Summary was prepared were provided by my father in mid 2002.  I was at the time in the Mainland.  My father assumed that the first letter  had been thrown away, however unbeknown to him I had kept it, with the other documents relating to my case.”  [my emphasis]

687. During the course of his testimony, the father accepted that, while at the CVO, he had personally written three documents : the first and second letters and the family background form.  The family background form and the second letter appeared quite plainly to have been written with the same biro pen.  However, the first letter – the letter that the Director said was a later invention – was written with a different pen.  On a direct comparison, the contrast was plain, the colour of the ink in the one instance being far darker than in the other.  The father himself, when asked to examine the documents, accepted that clearly a different pen had been used.

688. The father attempted to explain this difference by saying that his daughter had been carrying several pens that day and must have given him different pens with which to write.  I found it difficult to accept that – over a span of some eight years – the father was able to remember this as being the reason for the different inks.  It was clearly, in my view, the first explanation that came to his mind.  I have to say that by the time the father had completed his testimony, he looked quite defeated.

689. In respect of the father’s testimony, by way of a footnote, I record that I found it puzzling that he made no mention of making a second claim for right of abode when his daughter was interviewed.  In his affirmation of 21 October 2004, the father said the following in this regard :

“After the submission of these documents we were interviewed.  My daughter has exhibited the interview record and the Family Background sheet which we were requested by the interviewing officer to complete.  During the interview I reiterated that my daughter should be able to claim right of abode.  The officer explained to us that the policy of the Department was that Two-way Permit holders had to return at the expiration of their limit of stay …”  [my emphasis]

690. I accept, of course, that in the stress of giving testimony important matters can be forgotten.  But it did not advance the father’s credibility.

691. As to the genuineness of the first letter, counsel for the applicant pointed to a number of reasons why, on the probabilities, it should be accepted as a true document.  The contents, it was said, did not suggest fabrication, it was far too equivocal.  The history of how it came to be lost and then discovered, it was said, while unusual was nevertheless coherent.  It was also said that it was ‘inconceivable’ that the applicant and her father would have been sufficiently sophisticated to invent this first letter but naive enough not to have prepared a plausible explanation for the different inks.

692. These were all matters which I took into account.  But not all attempts to manufacture evidence are clever.  Something as obvious as the failure to match inks or explain the failure to match inks may happen and may in later cross-examination be the means by which the truth is laid bare.

693. In the result, while I can sympathise with the desperation shown by people like the applicant and her father, my determinations are as follows :

(i) Neither the applicant, nor her father on her behalf, made a claim for right of abode;

(ii) the Director has no record of any claim.

Mr Chan Kin Kong (208, a ‘group two’ applicant)

694. The applicant was born in Guangdong Province in February 1978.  He is one of two sons.  The applicant’s father came to Hong Kong in 1978, making it his permanent home.  The applicant’s mother was granted a one-way permit in 1993 and came to Hong Kong that year.  She was not permitted, however, to bring either of her two sons with her.

695. The applicant and his brother subsequently lodged their own applications for one-way permits but apparently were never notified of the result of their applications.

696. It is apparent, however, that in the months leading up to the change of sovereignty the applicant learnt of rumours that, when the change took place, he may be able to claim – through his parents – the right to live in Hong Kong.  To this end, in March 1997, the applicant obtained a notarial certificate confirming his relationship with his parents.

697. It was the applicant’s evidence that he could not come to Hong Kong immediately after the transfer of sovereignty.  He had to earn a living as a driver.  In the result, he came to Hong Kong on 16 May 1998, his two-way permit allowing him to remain until 12 June 1998.  By then, of course, as far as the right of abode issue was concerned, there had been a number of publicised developments.

698. The applicant testified that one of his principal reasons for coming to Hong Kong in May 1998 was to seek permission to remain here permanently.  The applicant struck me as being an unsophisticated man.  He made it plain that he had little, if any, real knowledge of the right of abode complexities.  On the evidence, however, it is plain that he must have appreciated that his entitlement to make a claim would have come through one or both of his parents.  Why else, for example, would he originally have obtained the notarial certificate?

699. As to the residential status of the applicant’s parents in 1998, it is important to note that, while his father at that time was a permanent resident, his mother was not.  Having come to Hong Kong in 1993, the mother only obtained right of permanent residence in 2000.  Any claim for right of abode therefore – whether the applicant was aware of that fact or not – was going to have to be based solely on his father’s status.

700. It was the applicant’s case that his claim for right of abode was made at the CVO in Yau Ma Tei on 9 June 1998.

701. On that day, said the applicant – just four days before the expiration of his two-way permit – he and his mother went first to the Immigration Tower in Wanchai and from there were referred to the offices of the CVO.  The applicant said that his father was unable to accompany them as he had to go to work.

702. Before considering the substance of the applicant’s case, it must be mentioned that in late 2004 the applicant was diagnosed to be suffering from paranoid psychosis.  He was prescribed a regime of medication but apparently did not always follow that regime.  He said that, despite his condition, he was able to recall the events of 1998 and he did testify.  In considering his testimony, however, I could not ignore the fact of his condition which, to a greater or lesser degree, would have compounded the entirely understandable difficulties the applicant must have encountered in attempting to recall events that were some eight years old.

703. The applicant’s testimony was supported by that of his mother.  It was, as I have said, the applicant’s case that his mother had been with him on 9 June 1998.  While I found the applicant to be slow, vague and sometimes confused, the mother allowed herself very little room for equivocation.  She was a determined witness, often aggressive and argumentative.  In my judgment, however, her testimony was designed more to ensure her son’s success than to accurately recall events.

704. The mother testified that her sole purpose on 9 June 1998 was to ensure that her son was able to claim the right to live permanently in Hong Kong.  With that purpose in mind, she said, on the night of 8 June she had written a letter addressed to the Immigration Department.  She wrote the letter on red paper, she said, drafting it to suggest that her son was the author.  Although she did not keep a copy of the letter, the mother testified that the letter was to the following effect : “My mother has had a stomach ailment for many years and I wish to stay permanently in Hong Kong to look after her and my father.”

705. When the mother was questioned, she was drawn to accept that she knew at the time that her son’s right to live permanently in Hong Kong was based not on any right of residence that she possessed but on the fact that her husband was a permanent resident.  On 9 June itself, she said, her purpose was to secure her son’s right to live in Hong Kong through her husband.  But as it was, her husband had to be at work and could not accompany them.

706. That her husband had to be at work was understandable.  What was not so understandable was why, appreciating the importance of her husband’s residential status, the mother did not make any mention of it in the letter she said she wrote.  It is also puzzling that she did not think of taking a copy of her husband’s identity card with her the next day.  Indeed, on the evidence it is apparent that not even the details of her husband’s identity card number were available to her or her son that day.

707. The mother may not have been an educated woman but she was no dullard.  The manner in which she anticipated questions during cross-examination, often deflecting their thrust to her own advantage, revealed that she remained mentally agile.  If, as she said, her firm intent on 9 June 1998 was to secure her son’s right to remain in Hong Kong, I find it difficult to accept that she would not in any way have turned her mind to the need to offer some evidence of her husband’s residential status.

708. As to the events of 9 June 1998, the applicant and his mother testified that they went first to the Immigration Tower in Wanchai, specifically to the second floor where the enquiry counter was situated.  It was their joint testimony that they spoke to an officer, saying that they wished to make an application for the applicant to live permanently in Hong Kong.  They were informed that it was not possible to make such an application in Hong Kong and that the applicant would have to return to the Mainland to process his claim there.

709. According to the applicant and his mother, they were told, however, that they could seek an extension of stay if they went to the CVO.  In the result, they did not press the matter further at the Immigration Tower and made their way instead to the CVO.

710. On behalf of the applicant, it was submitted that I must assess what the applicant and his mother would have understood by the advice they received in respect of the CVO.  It was submitted that in all likelihood the applicant and his mother would simply have thought that the CVO was another office in which (perhaps with more success) they could press their claim for the applicant to remain permanently in Hong Kong.  Counsel said that to an average listener, and to the applicant and his mother particularly, the term ‘extension’ would not have connoted the idea of a short-term, temporary result.  Counsel emphasised the fact that applications for extension of stay are used for applications by temporary residents, workers, students and the like.

711. In the present case, however, as I understood his evidence, the applicant admitted in cross-examination that at the time he understood that an extension of stay would be for a limited term only.

712. The mother, to my understanding, was equally clear in her mind.  It was her testimony that, when she was given this information at the enquiry counter, she answered the officer with a defiant sense of purpose by saying that she would not go to the CVO simply to obtain an extension but would go there in order to make a claim.

713. The probabilities, therefore, indicate that both the applicant and his mother made their way to the CVO in the knowledge that they had been referred there for purposes of obtaining a limited, as opposed to a permanent, extension of the applicant’s two-way permit.

714. That, of course, does not mean that they could not have intended to make a claim for right of abode at the CVO.  In the course of his testimony, when dealing with this issue, the applicant said that he was “not satisfied in my heart” about what he had been told at the Immigration Tower and “wanted to ask again”.

715. The applicant’s evidence as to the sequence of events at the CVO itself was, understandably after such a long lapse of time, somewhat confused.  As I understood his evidence, it was essentially to the following effect.  Upon arrival at the CVO, the applicant, with his mother at his shoulder, went to the enquiry counter.  At the enquiry counter, he told the officer that he wished to apply to stay in Hong Kong in order to take care of his parents and that he wanted a Hong Kong identity card.

716. As to events at the CVO, in the applicant’s case summary prepared by his first solicitors, Pam Baker & Co., the following is said :

“I went to the Hong Kong Immigration Department, Wanchai to claim right of abode.  I was told to go to the Yau Ma Tei Immigration Department, which I did and made a claim stating my father is a permanent resident who came to Hong Kong in 1978.  I took with me copies of my parents Hong Kong identity cards and my two-way permit.  I showed these to the immigration officer at Yau Ma Tei.  I cannot recall whether the immigration officer handed them back to me after looking at them.  He said here is not the place to make a claim, we only deal with extensions.  He gave me two days.”

717. In that summary the applicant is recorded as telling the officer at the counter that his father was a permanent resident who had come to Hong Kong in 1978.  In his testimony, however, the applicant asserted nothing of this kind.  In his testimony he spoke only of saying that he wished to stay in Hong Kong, obtaining an ID card, in order to care for his parents.

718. In his affirmation of 26 September 2005, the applicant spoke of his visit in the following terms :

“Upon arrival at the CVO, we obtained a docket, waited for our number to be called, and when it was, approached the counter and spoke to the officer there.  I told the officer that my mother had stomach ache and that I wanted to stay in Hong Kong to take care of my parents.  I told the officer that my parents were very old.  I said that I should be granted a Hong Kong ID card.  The officer replied that I could not have right of abode and the most I could get was a 2-day extension of stay.  He handed to me an application form.”

719. No mention is made in this affirmation of any assertion that the father had come to Hong Kong in 1978 and was a permanent resident.

720. On the applicant’s evidence, therefore, while he remembered telling the officer at the counter that he wanted an ID card, he did not say why he believed he should be given an ID card.  His claim, on its face, was one founded on compassionate grounds not on any asserted right flowing to him through his father.

721. When the mother testified, she recalled saying to the officer at the counter words to the following effect : “Brother, I have stomach ache for many years.  Can my son stay to care for me?”  This also is essentially a plea based on compassionate grounds rather than any asserted right vested in her son.

722. In my judgment, therefore, even if I accept that there was a conversation at the counter broadly in line with what the applicant and his mother testified was said, it is debatable whether it amounted to a claim for right of abode.

723. On the applicant’s evidence, of course, the officer at the counter clearly understood that a claim was being made.  He told the applicant that it was not possible to make a claim and that he could only get an extension of two days.  The issue, of course, is what sort of claim did the officer understand was being made : was one based on an asserted right or one based on compassionate grounds?  On the evidence, in my view, there was no basis for the officer to understand that a claim based on any asserted right was being made.

724. It was the applicant’s evidence that, having been told that he could only apply for a two day extension, he was given an ID 91 form which he completed.  In the box marked “Give full reason for your request”, the applicant wrote the following :

“Look after my father.  Stay for two days.”

725. As for the particulars of his parents, a study of the ID 91 form shows that, in the part of the form intended for particulars of spouses and children, the applicant first wrote down the name of his father, giving a birth date and then the characters for ‘father, mother, son’.  However, he then crossed out this entry.  He did so, he said, because his father was not there with him.  Beneath the deleted entry, in the same part of the form, the applicant then gave his mother’s name, her Hong Kong identity card number and her date of birth.  He then put down the characters for ‘mother, son’. 

726. In the result, neither the name of the father nor his identity card number appear on the form.  In short, nothing appears on the face of the document to show that at that time the applicant had a parent who was a Hong Kong permanent resident.  The mother herself, as I have emphasised, was not then a permanent resident.

727. I confess to having had the greatest difficulty in determining on the probabilities whether a conversation of the kind testified to by the applicant and his mother took place at the counter of the CVO.  While I am satisfied that the testimony of both the applicant and his mother was in many ways exaggerated, and on occasions entirely untruthful, I have nevertheless been drawn to the conclusion that a conversation essentially of the kind they described may have taken place.

728. But what was the nature of that conversation?  I have taken into account that a narrow or rigid approach should not be adopted, no set litany of words is required.  But that being said, some indication, direct or implied, that a claim was based on a parent’s residential status must surely be present.  Otherwise all expressions of desire to remain in Hong Kong on a permanent basis; for example, those based solely on a natural desire to remain with loved ones, would fall into the category of claims made under the concession policy.  That, to my understanding, has never been the interpretation of the concession policy by the CFA.

729. In the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the conversation can be classified as a claim for right of abode.

730. As for the completed ID 91 form, I fail to see how, on its face, that can be described as the record of a claim.  Nothing appears on the form to suggest that the father, the only parent through whom the applicant could make a claim, had a right of permanent residence.  Indeed, even his name is deleted from the form.

731. On behalf of the applicant, it was submitted that the ID 91 form sufficed as a record even in the absence of anything in it indicating that the father was a permanent resident.  The reasoning why this was so was extended and somewhat complex.  It is sufficient for me to say that I do not accept the reasoning.  I am satisfied its logic is flawed.

732. That, however, does not end the matter.  I say that because it was the applicant’s evidence that, when he submitted the completed ID 91 form, he also submitted the letter his mother had written on red paper the previous night.  That letter, it was argued, constituted a sufficient record.

733. Suffice to say that a search of the applicant’s CVO file has failed to locate the letter in that file.

734. The first issue to be determined is whether the letter itself constituted a record of a claim.  As I have said earlier, according to the mother, the purported author of the letter, she wrote characters to the following effect : “My mother has had a stomach ailment for many years and I wish to stay in Hong Kong to look after her and my father.”  In my judgment, if the letter is considered standing on its own, it does not constitute a claim for right of abode.  It cannot be read as anything more than a plea to be allowed to live in Hong Kong in order to care for immediate family members.  As such, it is a claim based on compassionate grounds only and not a claim under the concession policy.  Equally, in my judgment, taken as a document supporting the conversation at the counter of the CVO, the letter does not transform that conversation into what – in substance – must be recognised to be a claim for right of abode.

735. In summary, even if I accept that the letter was submitted at the CVO, I do not see that it advances the applicant’s case.

736. That being said, however, I must record that I have the gravest doubts that a letter was submitted.

737. When the applicant was interviewed in March 2000 by the Removal Special Project Sub-Division, a unit, as I have said earlier in this report, set up to record and consider claims made under the concession policy, no mention was made of any supporting letter.  Yet surely, if there had been a letter, it would have been a matter of some importance.  The mother testified that she, in fact, wrote the interview claim for her son.  She said she just forgot to mention the letter.  I did not find that to be a convincing explanation.  The mother was able to write out the interview form in her own time at home.  As it was, in translation, she wrote only the following :

“On that very day, I went to Yau Ma Tei Immigration Office to make a verbal claim to my right of abode in Hong Kong, but was again refused by a staff member, who said that theirs was not a place to handle claims but to handle extension.  Later, he only allowed me to get two days of extension.  When the extension expired, I returned to the Mainland.”  [my emphasis]

738. Later – after the CFA had upheld the record requirement of the concession policy – the case summary prepared for the applicant by Pam Baker & Co. does make mention of a letter.  The summary, however, speaks of the letter being written by the applicant and not his mother :

“Mr Chan instructs he also wrote a letter and submitted it with the form, in which he said he needed to stay in HK to take care of his parents.  Apparently not on the Immigration Department’s file.”

739. In his affirmation of 26 September 2005, the applicant still asserted that the letter had been written by him :

“The Summary exhibited hereto refers to a letter I wrote.  To the best of my recollection this letter stated that my mother suffered from stomach pains and that I wanted to stay in Hong Kong permanently to take care of her …”

740. As I understand it, it was only when he came to testify that, for the first time, the applicant said that his mother had written the letter and not him.

741. I have, of course, taken into account the applicant’s condition which may have contributed to his confusion.  But even so, in respect of such an important document, it is a troubling inconsistency.

742. Of course, the question may be put : ‘Well, why would they bother to invent such an equivocal document?’  But that suggests that, from the first mention of the contents of the letter, the applicant and his mother understood not only the need for a record but also what information a claim and a record must contain.

743. In all the circumstances, my determinations are as follows :

(i)          Neither the applicant, nor his mother on his behalf, made a claim for right of abode;

(ii)         the director has no record of any claim.

Madam Chan Shui Chun (4432, a ‘group two’ applicant)

744. The applicant was born in Fujian province in 1957, the eldest of ten children.  Her father came to Hong Kong in 1984, her mother following in 1993.  Accordingly, when the change of sovereignty took place, only the father enjoyed right of abode.

745. The applicant was raised in the Mainland.  She married there, three children being born of her marriage. 

746. Some considerable time before the change of sovereignty, it appears that the applicant had applied for a one-way permit to settle in Hong Kong.  Her application, however, had been refused.

747. The applicant’s father, Mr Chan Nang Ming, testified that, at or about the time of the change of sovereignty, he heard reports to the effect that, with the change, the children of Hong Kong permanent residents were now entitled to settle in Hong Kong.  Armed with that information, he said that he contacted three of his daughters in the Mainland, urging them to come to Hong Kong.  One of those three was the applicant.

748. As to why he had approached three of his daughters, the father said that at the time he was well into his sixties and neither he nor his wife were in good health.  Although several of their sons were living in Hong Kong, they hoped that a daughter would be able to acquire the right to live here in order to look after them in their old age.

749. The father testified that over the period of the 1998 Lunar New Year, he and his wife travelled to the Mainland to assist the applicant in obtaining a permit to come to Hong Kong.  Records of the Immigration Department, however, reveal that neither the father nor the mother travelled to the Mainland at that time.

750. For reasons to which I shall refer, the extent to which the evidence of the father could be relied upon as truthful evidence was one of the fundamental issues in this application.  That being the case, the error in his testimony as to his return to the Mainland over the 1998 Lunar New Year holiday was a matter of relevance.  Taken on its own, however, it was not a matter, in my view, to which much weight could be given.  Importantly, it was accepted that the applicant’s parents had travelled to the Mainland on a number of other occasions.  Equally importantly, it must be appreciated that the father – when he recorded his evidence in an affirmation dated 25 September 2004 – was looking back over a period of six years or more.  It was understandable, therefore, that there would be errors of memory as to the exact timing and sequence of events.

751. As it was, the applicant herself came to Hong Kong in the second half of 1998.  She apparently encountered some bureaucratic difficulties in obtaining a two-way permit but eventually arrived on 25 August, being permitted to remain until 22 September of that year.  As to the essential purpose of that visit, both the applicant and her father, when they testified, left no room for doubt.  The purpose was to claim right of abode; that is, to bring about a permanent family reunion.

752. But if that was the essential purpose of the visit, in my view it is – in the circumstances of this case – puzzling that no approach was made to the immigration authorities until 22 September 1998, the very last day on which the applicant was permitted to remain in Hong Kong.

753. The applicant’s father explained this eleventh-hour action by saying that until that time there had been no restriction on his daughter’s movements in Hong Kong and therefore (presumably) no urgency in processing her application.  Considered in context, I did not consider that to be a convincing explanation.  While the applicant herself was an unsophisticated person, illiterate and a stranger to the ways of Hong Kong, her father at the time had been living and working here for well over 10 years and must have appreciated that leaving a matter of such profound importance to the very last day of his daughter’s visit could well bring about difficulties.

754. It is apparent that on 22 September 1998, the day the applicant was due to return to the Mainland, she had fallen so ill that she was simply not in a good enough physical state to make the journey.  Not only had the applicant sprained her ankle but she was suffering from a gastric condition that was so severe that the very next day she was admitted into hospital and put on a drip.  On behalf of the Director, it was submitted that the applicant’s medical condition on 22 September 1998 made it imperative that her father seek an extension of stay on her behalf and that on all the evidence it was apparent that the father’s single purpose for visiting the CVO on that day was to obtain an extension.  Equally, it was submitted that, when the father returned to the CVO two days later, on 24 September 1998, when his daughter was still ill, his single purpose then was to obtain a further extension.  All the contemporary documentary evidence, it was submitted, indicated that the two visits had been made only because of the applicant’s illness and for the sole purpose of allowing her to remain in Hong Kong until she was fit to travel.

755. On behalf of the applicant, however, it was submitted that during both attendances at the CVO the father made statements to the staff which, when fairly interpreted, amounted to claims made on behalf of the applicant within the terms of the concession policy.  The record of those claims, it was said, was to be found in the copies of the father’s identity card filed with the CVO and the recording of his identity card details on the face of documents filed at the same time.

756. In her affirmation of 25 September 2004, the applicant summarised her entitlement to benefit under the concession policy by saying that her claim was founded on —

“… statements made during my attendance at the Chinese Visitors Office of Immigration Department on 22nd and 24th September 1998.  My father, who came with me, is making a separate affirmation as to the events on those two days.”

757. In his affirmation made on the same day, the applicant’s father confirmed that his daughter had gone with him to the Chinese Visitors Office on both 22 and 24 September 1998.

758. During the hearing, however, it was accepted that on 24 September 1998 the applicant had not accompanied her father to the CVO.  On that day she remained in hospital.  To that extent, both she and her father had been mistaken in their affirmations.

759. More than that, it was a matter of contention during the hearing whether the applicant had even accompanied her father to the CVO on his first visit; that is, on 22 September 1998.

760. For example, the ID 91 form completed by the father on 22 September 1998 and signed by him bears the annotation ‘W/A’, a piece of Immigration Department shorthand, meaning ‘without attendance’, an indication that the applicant herself was not present but was being represented.

761. In addition, counsel for the Director pointed to a concession made by the applicant’s counsel before the CFA on 29 January 2004 that the applicant had been too sick to attend the CVO on 22 September 1998 and her father had gone in her place.

762. While the father was adamant that his daughter had been with him on the first occasion, the daughter herself – who confessed to having only the vaguest memory of events – was far less certain. 

763. However, even if the applicant did go to the CVO with her father on 22 September 1998, it was effectively conceded that she would not have gone up to the counter or participated in what was said and done.  In an early case summary, the applicant had admitted to being very sick that day, vomiting to the point that she could hardly walk.  To that must be added the fact that she was illiterate and spoke no Cantonese.

764. I would add that the applicant did not impress me as the most vital of persons.  Much of her evidence was confused and dull.  In short, her testimony provided little, if any, assistance in determining whether her father had made claims on her behalf.

765. As for the father, he accepted that his own memory was fragile.  As he put it : “I am an elderly person so my brain does not quite function.”

766. Weakness of memory, however, is one thing, the invention of memory is another.  Regrettably, in my view, the father was guilty of the latter.  During the course of the father’s testimony, I gained the impression that much of what he said was not based on any genuine attempt to remember what had taken place but was founded rather on what he now wished had taken place.  On occasions, when it was shown that he had not acted in accordance with his professed purpose, he castigated himself, blaming his age and lack of education for somehow failing his daughter.  I confess to a degree of sympathy for the father.  He was clearly desperate somehow to secure his daughter’s right to remain in Hong Kong.  But, in my judgment, his protestations of past incompetence did not hide the fact that his evidence was, certainly in its crucial aspects, an invention.

767. As to what occurred on the first visit to the CVO on 22 September 1998, as I best understood the father’s somewhat confused testimony, it appeared to be to the following effect.

768. He went with his daughter to the CVO, he said, for two reasons; first, to obtain an extension of stay for her and, second, to explore a way in which to secure right of abode for her.

769. With his daughter staying to one side, he said that he went up to the counter.  It appeared to be his evidence that at this early stage he showed the officer his identity card as well as his daughter’s two-way permit, and that a photostat copy of his identity card was made.  He said that he told the officer his daughter was sick and that she needed an extension of stay.  He said he was then given an ID 91 form to complete.  After he had completed the form, he was told that an extension of two days would be granted.  He accepted this, he said, because at least it was a start.  He said he paid the fee for the extension.  Thereafter, he said, he returned to the officer at the counter and told him that he had ‘an urgent request’.  He informed the officer that his daughter had right of abode in Hong Kong and asked that permission be granted for family reunion so that his daughter could remain permanently in Hong Kong.  According to the father, the officer replied to the effect that there was ‘no way’ that the CVO could assist him to process any such claim.

770. On that basis, it appeared that the father only raised the issue of his daughter’s right to live in Hong Kong after he had completed the necessary administrative steps in securing an extension.  However, as his evidence developed, at least as I understood it, he appeared to suggest that he sought the right of his daughter to enjoy ‘family reunion’ when he first went up to the counter.

771. As I understood it, it was the father’s evidence that, when he completed the ID 91 form, he had two matters in mind; first, to seek an extension and, second, to seek his daughter’s right to settle in Hong Kong.

772. The ID 91 form contains the father’s identity card number, only the letter ‘K’ missing.  The father said he did not know how to write this letter.  It was the father’s testimony that he put down the details of his identity card in order to ‘insist’ that his daughter be given her right to live in Hong Kong.

773. When he completed the ID 91 form, the father wrote as the reason for seeking an extension : “Because of sickness [in the waist?] and inability to walk”.  The short interview record generated on such occasions said simply : “Sick”.  Nothing appears on the face of the form related to any claim to settle in Hong Kong.

774. But if the father was expressing an insistence that his daughter had the right to live in Hong Kong, why was nothing written on the face of the ID 91 form or on a separate piece of paper?  The father appeared to suggest – at least as I understood it – that he was somewhat confused and that there was nobody there to help him.  He said that he really did not understand the process and thought only of putting down the big things.  But the big things, of course, would have included his daughter’s right to settle in Hong Kong.

775. It is this first ID 91 form which bears the annotation ‘W/A’ to record the fact that, at least as the immigration officers understood it, the applicant was not present and was represented by her father.

776. But what of the fact that the father did give details of his identity card number on the ID 91 form and, in addition, that the counter staff saw fit to make and retain a photostat copy of that card?

777. It was the Director’s case that, if an applicant did not appear in person, then a record of the identity of his or her representative would be obtained.  The annotation of ‘W/A’ on the ID 91 form makes it plain that the applicant herself was not believed to be present at the time and hence the need for proof of the father’s identity.

778. It was further the Director’s case that, as the father had said that his daughter was sick, he was given a blank ID 91 form and a family background form to fill in should he wish to return to the CVO to make a further application for an extension of stay, perhaps more than the standard two days.

779. The evidence showed that this procedure was adopted in respect of the father.  He completed the family background sheet on 23 September 1998, the day before returning, and it appears completed at least part of the second ID 91 form at about the same time.  Correcting fluid was used, that fluid being kept at his home.

780. As to the second visit to the CVO on 24 September 1998, the father said that he handed in a medical letter plus the completed ID 91 form and family background forms.  He was informed, he said, that his daughter would only be given a further six day extension.

781. The father said that he was aggrieved at this and told the officer that, as a child of a Hong Kong permanent resident, his daughter was entitled to enjoy ‘family reunion’ and to be issued with a Hong Kong identity card.

782. As I then understood it, it was the father’s testimony that he was informed that, if he wished to make an application for a longer extension and/or his daughter’s right to live in Hong Kong, he could do so in writing.  He said that it was made clear to him, however, that the staff would not be able to assist him and that he would have to draft any written claim himself.

783. The father testified that, in respect of his daughter’s claim for right of abode, he was told that, although the CVO was not able to ‘implement’ any application, there was no objection to him making that application.  He therefore wrote out an application on a separate sheet of paper, signing it and dating it.  That he wrote out a statement was not disputed.  The document was produced into evidence.  In English, it read :

“Dear Director of Immigration,

My daughter, Chan Shui Chun has come to Hong Kong to visit her relatives.  Her parents are in Hong Kong at the address of No.8, Chun Heung Yuen, On Yuk Road, Nine Miles, Castle Peak Road, Tsuen Wan and telephone no. 24115517.  We request and apply for extension to 10 October 1998 because her foot has been seriously wounded.”

784. As can be seen, that statement, however, does no more than seek a longer extension of stay based on the applicant’s ill health.  Nothing is said, directly or indirectly, of any right of reunion or right to settle in Hong Kong.

785. When questioned on this omission, the father castigated himself for having lost the opportunity to record his daughter’s claim.  If he had done so, he said, there would have been no need for this hearing.  He attempted to explain his failure by saying that, while he had wished to record the claim, there must have been ‘a ghost’ which ‘covered’ his eyes and prevented him from doing so.  He also blamed the fact – so he said – that he was only semi-literate.  Although he had wished to record his daughter’s claim, he said, he did not know how to write the necessary Chinese characters.

786. I did not accept that the father’s inadequate literacy skills – if they were so – would have prevented him from recording a claim.  Apart from the fact that part of the form at least was completed before coming to the CVO, I do not accept that he would not have been able to seek and obtain some help from other people in the CVO to write at least one or two pertinent phrases.

787. The ID 91 form completed by the father on that second visit contains no reference to any desire to enjoy family reunion in Hong Kong.  In the box in which the reason for an extension is recorded, the Chinese characters say only ‘not feeling well’.  Those characters, it appears, may have been written on behalf of the father rather by himself.

788. I would add that the father’s testimony was not helped by the fact that, when the summary of the applicant’s case was first given to Pam Baker & Co., far from being left to his own devices, it was recorded that the father was told what to write.  In this regard, the summary was as follows :

“Father returned to ID Yau Ma Tei on 24/9/98 and again requested to the officer that his daughter be allowed to remain in HK to get identity card.  He explained the family did not want her to leave.  The officer refused to allow her to remain however they were given a one week extension until 30/9/98.  The officer told Mr Chan what to write in his letter in support of his application.”  [my emphasis]

789. In summary, I was satisfied on the probabilities that, for the reasons given, I could place no reliance on the testimony of either the applicant or her father.

790. In my view, the probabilities clearly indicated that on 22 and 24 September 1998 the father had done no more than seek extensions of stay because of his daughter’s ill health.  The evidence that, on both occasions, attempts were also made to claim right of abode were, in my judgment, subsequent inventions.

791. As for the particulars of the father’s residential status found in the CVO file, I agree with counsel for the Director that these were for the purpose only of identifying the father as a representative of the applicant and were not at the time related to any claim for right of abode.

792. Accordingly, my determinations are as follows :

(i)          Neither the applicant, nor her father on her behalf, made a claim for right of abode;

(ii)         the Director has no record of any claim.

Mr Chuang Shu Lau and Madam Ng Kwan Hung (923 and 2641, both ‘group two’ applicants)

793. The applicants are husband and wife.  They married in the Mainland in 1993.  They came to Hong Kong together in late October 1997, being permitted to remain for approximately one month.  It was their assertion that during this period, at all times acting together, they claimed right of abode.  Their applications were therefore heard together.

794. Mr Chuang (‘the husband’) was born in Fujian Province in June 1966, one of six children.  His father came to Hong Kong in 1978.  His mother, however, died in 1983 while still resident in the Mainland. 

795. It appears that in or about 1979, before her death, the mother had sought permission from the Mainland authorities for the applicant to accompany her in settling in Hong Kong.  However, as two of the applicants’ siblings had already being given permission to settle here, that application was refused.

796. Madam Ng (‘the wife’) was also born in Fujian Province, being some four years younger than her husband.  Her father too came to Hong Kong in 1978, her mother joining him in 1990.  When the mother came to Hong Kong, she was permitted to bring two of the children of the family with her.  The wife, however, was not one of the chosen two.

797. When the change of sovereignty took place, therefore, both the husband and the wife, who by then had been married to each other for some four years, had close family connections in Hong Kong. 

798. It was the husband’s testimony that in the months leading up to the change of sovereignty he heard rumours that, if the children of Hong Kong permanent residents came to Hong Kong after the change, they would be entitled to right of abode.  On the strength of these rumours, said the husband, in or about May 1997, he and his wife applied for two-way permits to visit Hong Kong.  They were unable to obtain these permits before the change of sovereignty.  The permits were only granted to them after the change.  Accordingly, they arrived in Hong Kong on 28 October 1997 with their three-year-old son.  The family was permitted to remain until 24 November of that year.

799. According to both the husband and the wife, the principle reason for the visit to Hong Kong was to enable them to claim right of abode.

800. In their testimony, the husband and wife said that a couple of days after their arrival, they went with their son to the Immigration Tower in order to seek the right to live here permanently.  They said that the three of them went to the information office on the 2nd floor of the building.  

801. The husband said that he spoke to an officer at the information office, asking him where and how, as the children of permanent residents, they could apply to settle permanently in Hong Kong.  Although the evidence on this issue became somewhat confused, according to the husband the officer informed him that it was not possible to make any such application here but if they wished to stay longer in Hong Kong they should go to the Chinese Visitors Office – the CVO – two days before their permits expired and make application there.

802. It was his understanding of these words, said the husband, that, although he and his family could not make an application to settle in Hong Kong at the Immigration Tower, they could do so if they went to the CVO.  The wife testified that her understanding was to the same effect.

803. As to why – if that was their true understanding – they did not go immediately to the CVO to process their applications for permanent residence, the husband explained that he had been told that they should only go to the CVO two days before the expiry of their two-way permits.  Their attendance at the CVO was therefore in accordance with this instruction.

804. On behalf of the applicants it was submitted that, if there was a misunderstanding, it was, in all the circumstances, one that was perfectly possible.  The husband and wife were new to Hong Kong.  Cantonese was not their home tongue.

805. I accept, of course, that such misunderstandings can and do arise.  But in the present case I have real doubts that there was any such genuine misunderstanding, certainly by the time the husband and wife arrived at the CVO on the morning of 22 November 1997 when, they say, they claimed right of abode.

806. In coming to this conclusion, I have taken into account that before going to the CVO on 22 November 1997, the husband and wife said that they returned to the information office in the Immigration Tower.  At the office they made essentially the same enquiry and left under essentially the same misunderstanding; namely, that, if they went to the CVO, they could make an application for right of abode.

807. In my judgment, although neither the husband nor the wife were sophisticated or urbane, both were intelligent, thinking people.  During cross-examination, they quickly caught the drift of questions, fashioning answers in anticipation of what they knew the concluding point would be.  There was nothing dull about them.

808. One misunderstanding I could accept but, in the context of this case, I find it difficult to accept two.  Both the husband and wife knew the importance of their applications.  That would have led naturally enough to a desire – as intelligent people – to ensure they understood what they were told.  More than that, the husband and wife went back to the information office because they were told by their relatives that the CVO was not the right office to which to make application.  On their own evidence, therefore, the very basis for their return visit was to clarify matters.  Albeit the classification sought was not related to the ability to claim right of abode but rather where it should be claimed.  However, the latter would in this case include the former.

809. Any suggestion that the officers at the information counter would simply have given them the wrong advice on two separate occasions must be discounted.  At that time the standard advice to be given had been reduced to writing.  That advice has been cited in earlier reports but it bears repeating :

“Mainland residents coming to Hong Kong on strength of Two Way Permit for visiting relatives or sightseeing must leave Hong Kong before the expiry of their limit of stay.  According to the Certificate of Entitlement Scheme, Mainland residents entitled to the right of abode in Hong Kong under Article 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law should first apply for a One Way Permit from the Public Security Bureau in the Mainland.  On completion of the preliminary assessment, the Public Security Bureau will pass the relevant information to the Hong Kong Immigration Department for verification and issue of ‘Certificate of Entitlement’ in those qualified cases.  The Public Security Bureau will affix the ‘Certificate of Entitlement’ onto the One Way Permit on issuing the permit to the applicants to facilitate their entry into Hong Kong for settlement.”

810. In my view, the husband’s evidence that he accepted without query that they must wait until two days before the expiration of their two-way permits before going to the CVO to apply for right of abode was unconvincing.  Why wait until two days before they must all return to the Mainland?  Surely, an anxious, intelligent man would have made some sort of enquiry on that issue.

811. Looking at the evidence as a whole, I think it is highly unlikely that the husband and wife misunderstood the advice they received at the information office. 

812. As to the visit made to the CVO on the morning of 22 November 1997, the husband said that he had been advised by clansmen that the presence of family members may be of considerable assistance in processing a claim for right of abode.  For that reason, he said, his family was accompanied by his father, his wife’s parents and one of his sisters-in-law.

813. The standard procedure adopted at the CVO was that all applicants had first to collect a number tag and then wait for their number to be called.  The log book kept at the counter revealed that the husband and wife went up to the counter at around 10.03 that morning.

814. According to the husband, he and his wife told the officer that they wished to apply to live permanently in Hong Kong, both having a parent who was a permanent resident.  It was the husband’s testimony that the officer made no comment, at least no comment that could now be remembered.  The officer, he said, simply handed over three ID 91 forms (applications for extension of stay) and three family background forms.

815. If the husband and wife had, in fact, made it plain to the officer that they were seeking right of abode, I find it unlikely that the officer would simply have handed over the ID 91 and family background forms without some form of questioning or advice.  Officers at the counter knew that claims for right of abode could not be made at the CVO.  There were signs on the wall proclaiming that Mainland residents who wished to settle in Hong Kong had to apply to the Mainland authorities for one-way permits.  In addition, the evidence revealed that it was the standard duty of the officer at the counter to explain the two-way permit policy as far as seeking extensions of stay were concerned.

816. It was nevertheless the husband’s evidence that, when he left the counter in order to fill out the forms, he still believed that he was at the correct office to claim right of abode.  Nobody in authority, to his understanding, had told him otherwise.

817. The husband said that he did not understand the true nature of the forms that he had been given to him but assumed they had to be completed in order to formally seek right of abode.  He and his wife therefore completed the forms to this effect, there being one set for the husband, one for the wife and one for the son.

818. The husband said that, in completing his own ID 91 form, he wrote that his father was a permanent Hong Kong resident and he; that is, the husband himself, wished to stay permanently in Hong Kong.  He wrote to the same effect on his wife’s ID 91 form.

819. In addition, said the applicant, he thought it would assist if he wrote one letter on his own behalf and one on behalf of his wife seeking right of abode.  The two letters, he said, were addressed to the Director of Immigration.  Both were signed and dated.  When asked what each letter contained, the husband said that they repeated, almost to the word, what had been written on the face of the two ID 91 forms.  They contained no extra information.

820. In respect of his young son’s ID 91 form, said the husband, he remembered writing to the following effect : “To follow my parents to stay permanently in Hong Kong.”

821. When the forms were completed, said the husband, they were submitted to the counter officer.  The forms, he said, were accompanied by necessary supporting documents such as copies of his and his wife’s birth certificates and the identity cards of his father and his wife’s parents.  The copies had been made prior to the visit to the CVO, said the wife.

822. In summary, therefore, it was the evidence of the husband and the wife that the completed forms and copy documents constituted a full and unambiguous claim for right of abode, a right based on the residential status of the husband’s father and the wife’s parents. 

823. The husband said that after all the papers had been submitted, and after a period of waiting, he and his wife were called back to the counter.  Only then were they told by an officer that they could not apply for right of abode at the CVO.  They were told that the only application they could make was one for an extension of stay.  They were further told that, if they wished to apply for an extension of stay, they would have to state why they sought an extension.  The officer made it plain, said the husband, that the reasons already given by them; namely, that they wanted to apply to live permanently in Hong Kong, would not be sufficient.

824. There was a conversation with the officer, said the husband, in which he asked what could be given as a reason for seeking an extension of stay.  The officer agreed that illness would constitute a reason.

825. In the circumstances, said the husband, he was given three fresh sets of forms to complete.  Although he had no proof of anybody’s illness, he said, he wrote on his form that his father was not well.  On his wife’s form it was suggested that she was not well.  On the son’s form it was said that his grandfather was not well.

826. The husband said that he applied for an extension of about a month.  This was because the officer had told him it was possible to do so but only subject to a more senior officer’s approval.

827. As for the original three sets of forms and their accompanying documents, the husband said that he did not know what became of them.  They were left in the possession of the counter officer.  They were not handed back.  The only documents that were handed back were the original two-way permits.

828. Having submitted the second set of forms, said the husband, they had to wait again.  When they were called back to the counter, he said, he and his wife were told that they had been given a two-day extension only.  They were told, however, that if they wanted longer they should come back in another two days.

829. It was asserted that a return visit to the CVO was, in fact, made on 24 November, two days later.  The husband said he made a further claim for right of abode on that occasion too but did not fill out any forms or submit any documents.  It was common cause therefore that there was no record of this visit or what was said during it.

830. Returning to the first visit, that of 22 November, the husband said that he paid the necessary fees for the two-day extensions and then he, his family and their relatives departed.  The whole process on that morning, said the husband, had taken “two odd hours”.  Indeed, in the case summary prepared for the husband and wife in or about mid-2002 by Pam Baker & Co. mention was made of the process taking at least that long.

831. At it was, however, the objective evidence indicated that the husband received his receipt for his extension fee from the CVO shroff at just 10.26 a.m., less than half an hour after his name had been entered in the CVO log book at 10.03 a.m.  The wife and the son’s receipts, on the evidence, were (for some reason) issued later at 10.40 a.m.  Records of these times were available because the cashier machine in the shroff’s office was governed by a computerised system that made a record of the time each receipt was issued.

832. The husband spoke of making two applications that morning, the first application including two letters, albeit both of them fairly brief.  He spoke of waiting on two occasions for the results of those applications.  Yet, on the evidence (which I accept as being essentially accurate) the processing of both of those applications would have been completed in less than half an hour, something like quarter of the time that he had estimated the process had taken.

833. But what of the critically important first set of documents?  Those documents, as described, manifestly constituted a claim for right of abode by the husband and the wife.  According to the husband, those documents were left in the possession of the officer at the counter.  On his evidence, it could reasonably be assumed therefore that they could be found in the CVO file.  But they were not found there.  The only documents found in the file were the second set of forms, the forms applying for extensions of stay.

834. During the course of the hearing, Mr Lai Ka Sum, one of the immigration officers who dealt with the husband and wife on 22 November 1997, said that if an application form was badly spoilt or in some material way was incorrect so that it was necessary to fill out a fresh form, there would be no purpose in retaining the original spoilt or incorrect form and it might simply be shredded.  Mr Lai doubted, however, that copies of birth certificates and the like would be shredded.  These, he said, would be handed back.

835. The effect of Mr Lai’s evidence was that, if it was accepted that the husband and wife had initially submitted applications for right of abode by way of the first set of documents and these had been rejected, fresh forms being given out, then the first set itself, although not necessarily all the supporting documents, may well have been shredded.

836. That raised the issue of whether, having been briefly in the possession of the immigration officers, although as redundant papers, the first set of documents nevertheless was capable of constituting a record in terms of the concession policy.

837. I did not, however, find it necessary to resolve this issue.  I did not find it necessary because I was satisfied on all the evidence that the first set of documents never existed.  They were an invention on the part of the husband and the wife.

838. In my judgment, that first set of documents constituted, on the evidence of the husband and the wife, such a full, purposive and unambiguous claim for right of abode, indeed the only such application in 1997, that it could not later have been simply overlooked.

839. Yet in a letter to the Director of Immigration dated 21 December 1999, written just over two years later, nothing was mentioned of this first set of documents.  In so far as relevant, the application’s letter was instead to the following effect :

“Two days before the expiry of the limit of stay granted, I went to the third floor of Immigration Department in Wan Chai to make a claim that I had the right of abode in Hong Kong and requested for making the application for the right of abode and for an extension of stay.  However, my request was denied.  Staff of the Immigration Department told me to make enquiries at the Immigration Office in Yau Ma Tei.  Therefore, I hurried to the office of the Immigration Department in Yau Ma Tei and stated to staff there that my father was old, and also stated the related information and circumstances.  I requested them to let me stay in Hong Kong to take care of my father.  However, my request was refused.  Staff there stated clearly that two days would be allowed only in the case of sickness or under special circumstances.  Therefore, I just gave a ground for claim casually and paid the fee of 135 dollars and an extension of two days was granted.”

840. The husband’s letter makes it plain that, at the time he wrote it, he understood the need to demonstrate that he had made a claim for right of abode.  To illustrate, towards the end of the letter he wrote :

“According to Article 24(3) of the Basic Law and the judgment made by the Court of Final Appeal on 29 January 1999, I have the right of abode.  I came to Hong Kong before 29 January 1999 and have made a claim.  I am one of the 3 700 people who have the right of abode in Hong Kong.”  [my emphasis]

841. Why then was no mention made of a separate and distinct claim made by the husband and his wife, the record of which, as far as the husband knew, was no doubt still in the records of the CVO?  The probabilities, as I have said, suggest only one answer.

842. The following year, in April 2000, the husband was interviewed by the Removal Special Project Sub-Division to enable him specifically to detail the claims for right of abode that he had made.  In Part C of the papers completed by him, the husband was asked to describe how he had declared he had right of abode.  In respect of 22 November 1997, he wrote :

“Two days before the expiry of the limit of stay granted, I went to the Immigration Department in Wan Chai and requested to settle in Hong Kong permanently, but my request was refused.  Staff of the Immigration Department told me to visit their Yau Ma Tei immigration office.  So I hurried to the office of the Immigration Department in Yau Ma Tei and told the staff there the circumstances related to my old and sick father, and also requested long-term settlement in Hong Kong in order to take care of my father.  The staff there said that only under special circumstances would the request be acceded to.  Finally I gave a reason for making my claim in writing, and my stay was then extended for two days only.”  [my emphasis]

843. Both the husband’s letter of 21 December 1999 and his interview statement state that he sought to remain in Hong Kong to care for his “old and sick” father.  In giving evidence, however, in respect of his preparation of the first set of documents, the husband made no mention of basing his claim, even in part, on the physical health of his father.  The first set of documents, he said, made a simple claim based on his rights as the Mainland-born child of a Hong Kong permanent resident.

844. More than that, when he gave his evidence, the husband said that it was effectively the counter officer who suggested that illness could be used as a ground for seeking an extension.  The inference was that it was not a ground upon which he had intended to rely at all.  Indeed, he said he had no proof with him of any illness.

845. The wife was also interviewed in the year 2000 by the Removal Special Project Sub-Division.  In respect of events on 22 November 1997, she wrote the following :

“Two days before my limit of stay expired, I went to the Immigration Department in Wan Chai to request to stay in Hong Kong permanently for settlement.  However, the officer working there rejected my request and told me to go to the Immigration Department office in Yau Ma Tei.  So, I hurried to the Immigration Department in Yau Ma Tei and requested to stay in Hong Kong permanently for settlement from the officer working there so as to reunite with and take care of my parents.  The officer working there stated that my case would be considered only under special circumstances.  At last, I was granted a two-day extension only after I put down a reason.”

846. It is pertinent also to note that in this early letter and the statements neither the husband nor the wife mentioned that, in order to add weight to their claims for right of abode, they had gone to the CVO accompanied by a number of their relatives.

847. What must be remembered is that both the husband and wife were given time to consider and then write down the details of their claims before going to the interviews with the Removal Special Project Sub-Division.  For both of them, therefore, these were considered descriptions. 

848. When the wife was asked why she had not mentioned the submission of the first set of documents in her interview with the Removal Special Project Sub-Division, she said she did not mention it because she presumed that the Immigration Department already had all the documents on file and would therefore have been aware of them.  It was an answer which showed a quick mind but it was not an answer that I accepted as a truthful one.

849. The first time that the first set of documents was referred to, together with the assertion that a large family group went to the CVO, was in the case summary prepared by Pam Baker & Co. in or about mid-2002.  The summary read :

“Two days before the expiration of my stay, my wife and I went to the Immigration Department at Wanchai to apply for long-term stay in Hong Kong but was rejected.  The immigration officer asked us to go to Yau Ma Tei Immigration Department.

In fact, I and my family went in a large group to Yau Ma Tei Immigration Department to apply for extension for my wife and I.  My wife went, our children, my wife’s parents and her brother.  On my side of the family there was my father and elder brother’s wife.

We were each given a form to complete requesting an extension.  We wrote as the reason: ‘want long term stay’.  Both our parents are HK residents.  My husband also wrote a letter attached to the form setting out our reasons.  We also provided copies of our parents’ identity cards, our two-way permits, copies of birth certificates, marriage certificate of my parents (but not my husband’s because his mother has died and they do not have one available).  We submitted our forms and documents together and the immigration officer took them away and gave them to another officer.  After about 2 hours the immigration officer came out and said that we cannot write our application as we had or we will not get an extension.  He told my husband to write that his father is not in good health and that I should write that I am feeling unwell.  Then we will be able to get a 2 day extension and that’s all.  The original forms we submitted with supporting documents were not returned to us.  We wrote on the new forms the reasons given by the immigration officer.”

850. However, as counsel for the Director pointed out, the summary was prepared several months after the record requirement of the concession policy had been upheld by a judgment of the CFA.

851. The evidence of the husband and wife as to what took place at the CVO on 22 November 1997 was supported by the testimony of Madam Hui San San, the husband’s sister-in-law.  She said that she was one of the relatives who accompanied them to the CVO that day.

852. Madam Hui’s affirmation was made in March of this year, some eight and a half years after the events of which she spoke.  Madam Hui asserted that, prior to becoming a witness, she had not spoken to the husband and the wife about her recollection of events.  As she put it, the husband must have just tried his luck.  Despite the long lapse of time, Madam Hui was nevertheless able, she said, to remember a good deal about the preparation and submission of the first set of documents including the two letters that were filed in support.  Despite Madam Hui’s denials, her testimony, in my view, had quite patently been very much the product of discussions with the husband and/or the wife.  I could give it no credit at all.

853. Regrettably, by the conclusion of the hearing it was obvious to me that the case put forward by the husband and wife (and their witness) was, in its most material elements, a manufactured one.

854. In all the circumstances, therefore, my determinations are as follows :

(i) Neither the husband nor the wife made a claim for right of abode;

(ii) the Director has no record of any claim.

Conclusion

855. My determinations may therefore be stated again (in summary) as follows :

Part One

1. Madam Li Lu Ye, also known as Li Luk Yip (2233) :

“(i) The applicant did not make any claim for right of abode, either in 1997 or 1998;

(ii) the Director has no record of any claim.”

2. Madam Ngan Pui Yuk (2785) :

“(i) The applicant did not make any claim for right of abode;

(ii) the Director has no record of any claim.”

Part Two

3. Madam Law Yuet King (2448) :

“(i)  The applicant, while she was in Hong Kong, and through her father, did make a claim for right of abode;

(ii)   the Director does have a record of that claim.”

4. Madam O Ngan Mui (2789) :

“(i) The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;

(ii) the Director does not have a record of a claim.”

Part Three

5. Ms Tsui Siu Fung (3525) :

“(i) The applicant did not make any claim for right of abode;

(ii) no claim was made to the Immigration Department, and

(iii) the Director has no record of any claim.”

Part Four

6. Madam Lui King Fong (2471) :

“(i) The applicant did make a claim for right of abode;

(ii) the Director does have a record of that claim.”

7. Mr Chong Wing Suen (1003) :

“(i) The applicant did make a claim for right of abode;

(ii) the Director does have a record of that claim.”

8. Madam Lee Yuan Ling (4703) :

“(i)   The applicant did make a claim for right of abode, the claim being made on her behalf by her father;

(ii)   the Director does have a record of the claim.”

9.       Mr Lau Chun Chung (1884) :

“(i)   The applicant did make a claim for right of abode;

(ii)   the Director does have a record of the claim.”

10. Madam Kwok Chung Lam (1590) :

(ii)   the Director has no record of any claim.”

11. Mr Chung Wai Kin (4537) :

“(i)   The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;

(ii)   the Director does not have a record of any claim.”

12. Mr Yang Ren Zhong (4055) :

“(i) The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;

(ii) the Director does not have a record of any claim.”

13. Mr Lau Man Lung (1940) :

“(i) The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;

(ii)   the Director does not have a record of a claim.”

Part Five

14. Mr Chow Wing Wai (4387) :

“(i) The applicant did make a claim for right of abode;

(ii) the Director has, or did have, a record of that claim.”

15. Ms Kong Yuet Ha (1558) :

“(i) Neither the applicant, nor her father on her behalf, made a claim for right of abode;

(ii) the Director has no record of any claim.”

16. Mr Chan Kin Kong (208) :

“(i) Neither the applicant, nor his mother on his behalf, made a claim for right of abode;

(ii) the director has no record of any claim.”

17. Madam Chan Shui Chun (4432) :

“(i) Neither the applicant, nor her father on her behalf, made a claim for right of abode;

(ii) the Director has no record of any claim.”

18. Mr Chuang Shu Lau and Madam Ng Kwan Hung (923 and 2641) :

“(i) Neither the husband nor the wife made a claim for right of abode;

(ii) the Director has no record of any claim.”

 

 

(M.J. Hartmann)
Judge of the Court of First Instance,
High Court

 

16 and 17 January 2006

Applicant (legal aid discharged), Li Luk Yip, in person, present

Mr Joseph Fok, SC leading Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

20-24, 27-28 February, 1-3, 6-10, 13-15, 20-24, 27-29 March and 3 May 2006

Mr Kwok Sui Hay and Mr Sean Fang, instructed by Messrs Barnes & Daly, for the Applicants

Mr Joseph Fok, SC leading Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

24-28 April, 2 and 8 May 2006

Ms Gladys Li, SC leading Mr Sean Fang, instructed by Messrs Barnes & Daly, for the Applicants

Mr Joseph Fok, SC leading Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

4, 22 and 23 May 2006

Ms Gladys Li, SC leading Mr Kwok Sui Hay and Mr Sean Fang, instructed by Messrs Barnes & Daly, for the Applicants

Mr Joseph Fok, SC leading Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

9 May 2006

Ms Gladys Li, SC (present before morning break) leading Mr Kwok Sui Hay (present after morning break) and Mr Sean Fang, instructed by Messrs Barnes & Daly, for the Applicants

Mr Joseph Fok, SC leading Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

10-12 May 2006

Mr Kwok Sui Hay, instructed by Messrs Barnes & Daly, for the Applicants

Mr Joseph Fok, SC leading Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

 

46348-EN-2005-09-16

NG SIU TUNG AND OTHERS v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

HTML content

HCAL 81/1999

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO.81 OF 1999

---------------------

BETWEEN

 NG SIU TUNG AND OTHERSApplicants
 and 
 DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATIONRespondent

----------------------

 

Before : Hon Hartmann J in Court

Dates of Hearing :21 December 2004; 7 – 11, 14 – 18 and 29 – 31 March; 1, 2, 4, 6 – 8 and 12 – 15, 18 – 22, 25 – 29 April; 3 – 6, 9, 11 – 13 and 17 May; 1, 3, 4, 6, 13 – 14 and 30 June 2005

Date of Handing Down Report : 16 September 2005

 

---------------------------------------

SECOND REPORT TO THE
COURT OF FINAL APPEAL

---------------------------------------

 

Introduction

1. In a judgment dated 30 July 2002, the Court of Final Appeal (‘the CFA’) remitted certain issues – entirely factual in nature – to this court for determination.

2. On 3 October 2003, I submitted a report (‘the first report’) in respect of the cases of 22 applicants.  In that report, I observed that it had taken a considerable period of time to determine those 22 cases, far longer than I would have wished.  As to why progress had been slow, I said that the reason lay in —

“… the polarised approach of the parties as to whether, factually, oral claims had or had not been made and, of greater difficulty, what, in terms of the January and July judgments, was capable of constituting a record of any claim made for right of abode.”

3. I continued by saying that, in my opinion, an early resolution —

“… of that latter issue will enable the remainder of the cases to be determined with far greater speed and financial economy than has hitherto been the norm. I have therefore deemed it prudent to submit a report at this relatively early stage of the disposal of the outstanding cases so that, in respect of the cases already finalised, I am able to state what, in my judgment … is or is not capable of constituting a record under the concession policy.”

4. Having considered the first report, the CFA gave further directions as to what was or was not capable of constituting a record for the purposes of the concession policy.  This has enabled matters to proceed at a brisker pace.

5. That being said, however, any attempt to dispose of each applicant’s case in a day or less has proved to be impossible.  There is, I now accept, legitimate reason for that.  Each applicant has his or her own story to tell, some of them complex.  There is sometimes the need for double translations.  Each applicant is entitled to have his or her case substantively advocated and this, of course, involves cross-examination of relevant witnesses for the Director of Immigration (‘the Director’).  In addition, from time to time new issues arise, those issues invariably demanding evidence of a general nature concerning the Director’s administrative practices and procedures.  In light of this, some cases can take three days or more to be determined.

6. In the result, this second report concerns only 26 cases.  This leaves – at this time – 121 more cases still to be determined.

7. On the basis that it has not been possible to engineer a brisk, summary-like procedure to deal with the remaining cases, it has been agreed that at least a broad timetable should be drawn up so that within the next 18 to 24 months those remaining cases may hopefully be resolved.  The provisional timetable contemplates three more periods of sitting :

(i)From about 20 February to the end of May 2006;
  
(ii)From about 15 November to the end of December 2006; and
  
(iii)One final period in the first half of 2007.

8. After each of these periods, subject to any direction from the CFA, a report will be prepared.  Three more reports are therefore anticipated which will make for a total of five reports in all.

9. For convenience, this second report has been divided into parts.  They are as follows :

Part One :Two applications remitted by the CFA for reconsideration.
Part Two :One application to determine whether, at the date of the applicant’s birth, her father was a permanent resident.
Part Three :Twelve applications, by ‘group one’, ‘group two’ and ‘group four’ applicants.
Part Four :Two applications based on legitimate expectation.
Part Five :Four applications by applicants from whom legal aid was withdrawn.
Part Six :Five ‘group six’ applications.

Group six applications

10. Before moving to consider individual applications, something must be said by way of general observation in respect of ‘group six’ applications.  Of particular importance, I anticipate, is the fact that, when evidence was being given in respect of these applications, it was discovered that in or about early 1999 a large number of letters addressed to the Immigration Department by members of the public were destroyed.  Counsel for the applicants have indicated that submissions will be made to the CFA in respect of this matter, the submissions being to the effect that the destruction of letters undermines the validity of the requirement in the concession policy – as a fair requirement – that the Director should always have a record of a claim made for right of abode.

11. However, as I confirmed in the first paragraph of this report, my function has been (and remains) limited to the determination of factual matters only.  It is not for me, directly or indirectly, by way of my findings to limit or extend the terms of the concession policy, and the principles that underline it.

12. ‘Group six’ applicants are those who allege that they made claims for right of abode by sending letters to the Immigration Department.  In respect of these applicants, in its judgment of 30 July 2002, the CFA said the following (pars.45 and 46) :

“… In some cases, it is said that the Director accepts the letter as a claim in this context but remains to be satisfied as to whether the relevant applicants were present in Hong Kong when such claims were made. In other cases, the Director is said to deny possession of claim letters allegedly sent. The applicants contend that they are able to establish through secondary sources that they made such claims and that records thereof were held by the Immigration Department. Finally, in two cases, the Director is said to dispute the contention that the letters in question constitute claims for right of abode.
  
 The Director has not had the opportunity of making his position known to the Court on any of these cases. We accordingly remit for determination by the Court of First Instance the following issues raised in this sixth group :-
   
 (a)whether, in each case, the applicant made a claim for right of abode;
   
 (b)if so, whether the Director has a record of that claim as required by the Concession; and,
   
 (c)insofar as necessary, whether the applicant concerned was present in Hong Kong at the time of making his alleged claim for right of abode.”

13. In determining ‘group six’ applications, the court must therefore be satisfied that an applicant actually wrote a letter or had one written on his behalf and that the contents of the letter constituted more than a complaint or an enquiry and, read in context, constituted a claim for right of abode.

14. The court must further be satisfied that the letter was actually sent to the Immigration Department, either posted or delivered by hand, and was received by the Department.  Counsel for the applicants never disputed that, unless the court could be satisfied that the letter was received, an applicant could not succeed in showing that a claim had been made to the Director.

15. In respect of the majority of ‘group six’ applicants, it was the Director’s case that the letters were either never written or not written within the concession period, the letters being a later invention by those applicants.  This was based substantially, although not entirely, on the contention that none of the letters had been received by the Director, this contention itself being based on the assertion that, if the letters had been received, the system operated by the Director would in some manner have registered their receipt or noted it, even if the letters themselves had been misplaced or destroyed.

16. In reply, it was said on behalf of the applicants that letters could, to use my own phrase, ‘slip through the cracks’ without being registered or noted in any way.  Accordingly, any record check conducted by the Director could not exclude the possibility that letters may have been received but mislaid or misfiled, those letters still lying somewhere in the Director’s archives, undiscovered as yet but nevertheless constituting a record of an applicant’s claim.

17. All of this led to a good deal of evidence as to the systems employed by the Director to ensure the efficient receipt, distribution and storage of letters.

18. In my judgment, on the evidence, I am satisfied that at all material times the Director managed an effective system for the receipt of letters and their distribution, that system incorporating the acknowledgement of receipt of those letters and their storage.  Of course it was possible that from time to time letters would not in any way be noted as having been received or would be mislaid.  That must be possible with any large organisation.  However, such a failure would be the exception.  It must be remembered that the work of the Immigration Department is focused almost entirely on the receipt, creation and management of documents, be they in hard copy or soft.  That being so, if a letter was addressed to the Director in some rational manner, the probabilities would support not only its receipt but some record of that receipt, a record which would be recoverable upon logical search.

19. I am further of the view, on the evidence, that the record checks conducted by the Director to attempt to locate some record of the receipt of ‘missing’ letters, while not necessarily exhaustive, were nevertheless conducted in good faith and were reasonably thorough. 

20. During the course of evidence being led as to the Director’s systems for the receipt and distribution of mail, as I have earlier indicated, it was revealed that in or about early 1999 one unit in the Immigration Department, the Eligible Children Verification Unit (‘the ECVU’), had destroyed a considerable number of files containing correspondence from the public.  This had been done, in accordance with internal guidelines, as part of a weeding policy.  The correspondence that was destroyed was apparently received in the latter part of 1997.  In this respect, counsel for the applicants observed —

“… during this time the volume of such correspondence was greater than normal. It is very likely that the letters were enquiries about the right of abode from potential applicants or family members. Mr. Tam Siu Cheong, who gave evidence about the destruction, confirmed that letters from Mainland residents referring to a permanent resident parent and asking about entitlement to the right of abode would be dealt with by the ECVU and not, for example, returned to the R&D [Receipt and Despatch] Unit
  
 …
  
 During the weeding exercise it is likely that at the very least several hundred letters (Mr. Fung estimated as many as 2,000) from persons in similar situations to the Applicants would have been destroyed. Amazingly, not only were the letters destroyed, but also the register recording the receipt of the letters.”

21. Counsel for the applicants argued that this was a profoundly disturbing revelation, coming so late in the day, as it undermined the Director’s long-standing assertion that the requirement of a record was an essential component of the concession policy because it was the fairest way of treating those persons who had not been parties to the right of abode litigation but who deserved to have the benefit of the judgments in that litigation.

22. Counsel for the applicants concluded their observations by saying :

“In the light of this new information, the Applicants will be submitting to the CFA that the Court’s conclusion that the record requirement is reasonable and rational interpretation of the policy cannot stand at least insofar as it relates to those Applicants who allege that they sent letters to the Director of Immigration in 1997. The group includes several current and former Applicants in these proceedings. To the extent that the cases of those former Applicants cases were dismissed on the basis that there was no record of the letters they sent, it may well be that a grave injustice has occurred, because of the Director’s non-disclosure of the destruction of the files.”

PART 1

23. In its judgments of 9 January and 26 March 2004, the CFA remitted two applications to me for reconsideration, those of Madam Sze Sau Kan (3122) and Mr Fu Kwong (1084).  In respect of these applications no new evidence was led.  It was agreed that submissions would be sufficient.  My determinations are set out below.

Madam Sze Sau Kan (3122 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

24. In my first report, I found that, while I was satisfied on the probabilities that this applicant had made a claim for right of abode, I was unable to identify any record of a claim.  Her matter has been remitted to me to consider whether there might not in fact be a form of record.

25. The evidence revealed that on either 4 or 14 July 1997 – the exact date was uncertain –the applicant presented herself at the Immigration Tower.  On that occasion, she was accompanied by her husband, her two children and her father-in-law.  It was the applicant’s case that both she and her husband presented themselves in order to claim right of abode and did make such a claim.

26. For the avoidance of doubt, having reviewed the evidence and my earlier notes, I am satisfied that the applicant made oral claims for right of abode on two occasions : on her first visit to the Immigration Tower and on her second.

27. On the first occasion, the applicant said that she and her family members went to the 13th floor to the offices of the General Investigation Section (‘the GIS’) where she and her husband asserted their claim to right of abode.  They were both then given ID 457 forms on which to enter their personal particulars.  The applicant did not have details of her parents’ identity cards with her and was unable therefore to have them recorded on the form.  However, her father-in-law’s identity card number was recorded, he being with them.

28. Although given ID 457 forms to complete, the applicant said that, due to the great number of persons who had to be dealt with by the immigration authorities at that time, they were asked to return at a later date; that is, on 24 July 1997.

29. It was never disputed that the applicant and her husband did return on 24 July 1997 when they were interviewed and the process put in hand for repatriation.

30. While, as I have said, I found that the applicant did make claims for right of abode, I was unable to identify any single document which, on its face, I considered to be capable of constituting a record of either or both of those claims.  For example, the ID 457 form to which I have referred, as it contained no reference to the identity cards of her own parents, was not therefore, in my opinion, a sufficient record.

31. During the course of the new hearings (which make up the bulk of this report) it was submitted on behalf of certain of the applicants that an ID 457 form was capable of constituting a record of a claim even though it did not give the actual identity card details of an applicant’s mother or father or other specific details showing that a parent had right of abode.  It was said that what mattered essentially was that, an oral claim having been demonstrated, the ID 457 contained sufficient information to enable an investigation to take place which was capable of confirming the basis of the claim.  I reject that contention.  My reasons are given in my report on Madam Kwok Siu Wan, applicant 1624, that report commencing on page 25.

32. I have concluded therefore that in respect of this applicant, her ID 457 form was not capable – on its own – of constituting a sufficient record.  However, on a more general basis, the evidence revealed that in the days following the change of sovereignty, because of the large number of people either seeking to claim right of abode or simply surrendering themselves in order to be repatriated, the Immigration Department was forced to set up an administrative system to deal with the pressure of numbers.  In this regard, the CFA in its judgment of January 2004 (para.45) observed :

“Ms Gladys Li SC [counsel for the applicant] submits that the Director’s own system was such that he could distinguish between those who had made a claim from those who had not by the manner in which they were handled by the Department. It is said that the receipts for documents and other departmental records showing the dates on which the applicants attended the Immigration Department are themselves evidence that a claim for right of abode was made.”

33. The Director, however, claimed that it was not necessarily possible in this way to distinguish between those who had made a claim and those who had not.  In this regard, the CFA noted (para.46) :

“The Director submits that there are … difficulties with this argument. One is that it seems that some non-claimants were asked to return on a subsequent date for processing.” 

However, the CFA went on to say :

“Nonetheless, the circumstances may well give rise to the probable inference that an applicant returned to the Department for further processing. In the case of applicant no. 3122, the Departmental file contains two copies of receipts dated 4 and 24 July 1997 for documents. The question is whether the copy receipts in the Director’s possession give rise to an inference, based on the Department’s procedures for processing claims, that the applicant made a claim for right of abode. If so, the receipts would constitute evidence of a claim for right of abode having been made.”

34. In seeking in the present case to determine whether a probable inference can be drawn, it is essential, as a first step, to attempt to determine on what date the applicant and her family first presented themselves at the Immigration Tower, whether on 4 or 14 July 1997.  I say that because, on my understanding of the Director’s evidence, different systems were in place on those days.

35. Counsel for the Director conceded that it was not possible to verify with certainty whether the applicant and her family first went to the Immigration Tower on 4 or 14 July 1997.  Although certain documents bore the date of 4 July, counsel said there was some doubt as to their accuracy.  This difficulty, said counsel, was compounded by the fact that in a number of respects the applicant’s description of events tended to suggest that she had first gone to the Immigration Tower on the later date and not the earlier.

36. In my judgment, however, greater reliance can be placed on the documentary material than on the fallible memory of the applicant.  After so many years it is understandable that the applicant may have forgotten or confused certain sequences of events on what must have been a busy, probably hectic occasion or may have forgotten the exact nature of various documents that were given to her.

37. What is evident, however, is that on her first visit the applicant surrendered her expired two-way permit for which she was given a formal receipt : an ID 328 form.  That formal receipt bears the clear rubber-stamped date : 4 July 1997.  In addition to this, in respect of the applicant’s husband, there was a notation in a file minute dated 11 January 2000 that he had arrived in Hong Kong on a two-way permit in March 1997, had overstayed and had then surrendered himself on 4 July 2005.  That information must have been obtained from some earlier endorsement in the husband’s file.  Both the applicant and her husband therefore are recorded in the Director’s own files as first presenting themselves on 4 July 1997.  While the accuracy of that date gave rise to some questions, nothing was put before me to show that the date was patently and unarguably wrong.

38. Doing the best I can, I am satisfied therefore that the probabilities show that the applicant first presented herself on 4 July 1997.

39. But what was the system in place at that time?  In his affirmation of 15 March 2003, Mr Pang Kin Mo, a Senior Immigration Officer, said that from the afternoon of 3 July through until 10 July 1997 right of abode claimants in the category of the applicant and her husband; that is, overstayers who had been born before their parents had acquired permanent residence (‘Group B’ claimants), would be dealt with in accordance with the following broad procedures :

(a)they would be taken to the 13th floor;
  
(b)on that floor their two-way permits would be taken from them and they would be given a formal receipt, an ID 328 form;
  
(c)a form ID 359 would also be given – although importantly a copy of that form would not be kept in the Immigration Department file – and that form would have on it a space for setting an appointment date;
  
(d)no formal recognisance would be required.

40. In respect of the applicant, it is not contested that she did go to the 13th floor.  There is also evidence that her two-way permit was taken from her and that she was given a receipt in the form of an ID 328.  There is further evidence that she returned on a specific date; namely, 24 July 1997, and, on the evidence, it seems probable that in this regard she was given an ID 359 appointment card.  Finally, there is no evidence that the applicant entered into any form of recognisance.  Accordingly, in my judgment, the manner in which the applicant was processed on 4 July 1997 fits with the manner in which Group B claimants generally were processed.

41. The difficulty, however, is that, as Mr Pang made clear, on 4 July 1997 a significant number of two-way permit overstayers who were not claiming right of abode were dealt with in essentially the same way.

42. There was, however, as I understood the practice at that time, one important difference.  As Mr Pang accepted, overstayers who were not claiming right of abode, if they could not be interviewed that same day, were told to return as soon as possible, invariably within a few days, perhaps just two or three.  Right of abode claimants, however, were not processed with such urgency.  To put it simply, for what are self-evidently rational reasons, non-claimants were given priority so that they could be processed and repatriated with the minimum of delay.  Claimants, however – those whose claims would have to be investigated – could be dealt with at more leisure.

43. Having regard to that practice, I believe that the only reasonable inference to be drawn is that the applicant was not given priority.  After all, she and her husband were only asked to return some 20 days later.  That being the case, having regard to the documents in the Director’s possession, those documents being considered in the light of the Director’s own practice, it must be inferred that the applicant was treated on 4 July 1997 as a Group B claimant and not simply as an overstayer surrendering herself for repatriation.

44. In summary, having reviewed my earlier determination, I am satisfied that :

(i)the applicant did make a claim for right of abode;
  
(ii)the Director does have a record of the claim.

Mr Fu Kwong (1084 : a ‘group one’, ‘group two’ and ‘group four’ applicant)

45. In my first report, I concluded that the applicant had not made a claim for right of abode on any of the three occasions alleged by him.  Having reviewed my decision in light of the matters raised by the CFA, I remain satisfied that my first determination was correct.

46. One of the matters that concerned the CFA was that the applicant had taken the trouble to obtain a notarial certificate proving his relationship with his parents before coming to Hong Kong and had gone to the considerable extra trouble of obtaining an English translation of the document.  As the CFA put it :

“If he had not been serious about his claim, why would he have taken so much trouble? And if he anticipated making a claim, is it not likely that he would have made a claim for right of abode on the many occasions he visited the Immigration Department?”

47. In my first report (para.433) I recognised that obtaining of a notarial certificate, together with its translation, was evidence of the applicant’s intention to claim right of abode.  I said :

“The plaintiff testified that he went to considerable trouble to obtain an English translation of the notarial certificate. He did so, he said, because he mistakenly believed that the Hong Kong authorities would demand a document in the English language. Although the applicant was subject to cross-examination on the question of why he thought it necessary to obtain an English translation, I accept the submissions made by the applicant’s counsel that the important point is that the evidence demonstrates that he did go to the trouble to obtain a notarial certificate. There can only be one reason for so doing : a belief that it was a necessary document to advance his claim for right of abode.” [my emphasis]

48. It follows, of course that, being armed with a notarial certificate, the applicant would be expected to attempt to use it to claim right of abode.  What must be remembered, however, is that the first visit to the Immigration Department that the applicant spoke of in any detail was a visit (in the company of his mother) to the Immigration Tower.  On that occasion, he said, they were referred to the Information Office and it was here that he first displayed his notarial certificate and other supporting papers.

49. In my judgment, on that first occasion, in presenting himself at the Information Office, the applicant did not make a claim for right of abode.  More correctly described, he was, as he would have realised, making only an enquiry as to how and where he could make a claim.  An enquiry, it has been held, is not capable of constituting a claim.  In my first report, as to events at the Information Office, I said the following (para.435) :

“He said that he went to the Immigration Tower and was referred to the Information Office.  Having shown his various documents, including his notarial certificate, he said that the staff at the office advised him that he must process his claim on the Mainland and could not do so in Hong Kong.”

50. The applicant’s next visit to the Immigration Department was when he had already breached his conditions of stay, having overstayed by more than two months.  On this occasion, he said, he went in the company of both his parents for the single and specific purpose of claiming right of abode.  But that visit, I said, had to be considered in context.  In this regard, I said (para.437) :

“On his own evidence, of course, the applicant had just a month or two earlier been advised by the immigration authorities that he could not make a claim for right of abode in Hong Kong and would have to return to the Mainland to do so.  Indeed, evidence demonstrated that at the relevant time staff of the Information Office were instructed to give a standard response to enquiries of the kind made by the applicant, the response to be in the standard form cited earlier in this report : see paragraph 373.”

51. The evidence, I think, is incontrovertible that at or about the time of the change of sovereignty a great many people wishing to claim right of abode found one way or anther of coming to Hong Kong for that purpose.  From time to time rumours sparked an increased influx.  But it is also indisputable, I believe, that, once in Hong Kong, many (indeed, most) would be claimants discovered that the authorities would not accept a claim for right of abode and claimants who overstayed were being detained and often prosecuted before being repatriated.  In light of that, and invariably knowing that the longer a person overstayed the greater the possible criminal punishment, there is no doubt that many would be claimants bowed to the inevitable as they saw it at the time and surrendered themselves so that they could be ‘processed’ and repatriated.  Nobody at that time would have known that the simple act of making a claim would at a later time be given the standing it now has.

52. But many would be claimants, of course, even though they appreciated that they stood little, if any, chance of successfully remaining in Hong Kong and being given a local identity card, nevertheless, at the time they surrendered themselves, sought to emphasise their right to remain in Hong Kong.  They may have done so perhaps hoping against hope, or as an assertion, doomed as it probably was, of what they saw to be a constitutional right due to them.

53. One of the profound difficulties that I have encountered in determining the cases of the many applicants who have testified is to distinguish (on the probabilities) which of those at the time simply bowed to the inevitable as they saw it, and have testified before me as to what they wished they had done, from those who either at the time still believed they had the right to make a claim and did so or those who, whatever the odds against them, still insisted, when they surrendered themselves, on asserting their right.

54. In the present case, however, I had little difficulty in concluding that the applicant was one of the many who, having learnt that the Hong Kong authorities would not process a claim for right of abode, however disappointed he was, went through the process of surrender without attempting to make a claim.  I am therefore satisfied that his evidence was an invention; evidence, in short, of what he wished he had done at the time rather than what in fact was done.

55. One of a number of matters that I took into account in making my determination was referred to in my first report when I observed (para.434) :

“While, due to the lapse of time, many applicants had difficulty recalling events, this applicant appeared to have a detailed recollection, speaking with force of matters even of the most peripheral significance.  During the course of his testimony the applicant was easily raised to anger.  He spoke with an air of righteous indignation, stating that he had on a number of occasions attempted to assert his belief that he was entitled to right of abode.  Clearly, the applicant felt that he had been dealt with unfairly by the Hong Kong authorities.  In my judgment, however, having portrayed himself as a man of such forceful character, it is puzzling that no record was made by him of his alleged claims.”

56. In giving his evidence, it struck me that the applicant attempted to portray himself as a man of forceful character, a man not easily dissuaded, one who had been determined to make his claim and to deliver documentary evidence of it.  Others admitted to uncertainty.  But the applicant admitted to no sense of being intimidated by authority.  That was why I found it unlikely that, if he was as he professed to be, there was nevertheless no record of any of his asserted claims.

57. It is true that the ID 457 form contains details of his parents’ identity cards.  But the applicant that day was in the company, he said, of both his parents.  It would not therefore have been a difficult matter for him to obtain their identity card details when he completed the form.  They would have been standing next to him.  Many overstayers who surrendered themselves were accompanied by family members, often as not for purposes of moral support or so that final farewells could be made.  In the present case, I did not find that the information contained in the ID 457 form materially advanced the applicant’s case.

58. I emphasise, of course, that each case has to be determined on its own facts as I have found them to be and not on any form of generalisation.

59. In referring this application back to me, the CFA raised the following concern :

“… the judge said in paragraph 438 of the Report that he was unable to accept that Mr Fu surrendered himself on 27 March 1998 solely to process a claim for right of abode.  This might be interpreted to mean that the judge did not rule out the possibility that one of the purposes of that visit could have been to make a claim for right of abode.”

60. The relevant paragraph of my first report was as follows :

“While I accept that the applicant may have had his difficulties with the Mainland authorities in trying to process a claim for a one-way permit and while he may have been uncertain as to the exact state of the law, I am unable to accept that he surrendered himself on 27 March 1998 in such sure knowledge, as he wished to portray, that he was there solely to process a claim for right of abode.” [my emphasis]

61. In coming to my determination of the applicant’s case, I was satisfied on the probabilities that, when he surrendered himself at the offices of the GIS on the 13th floor of the Immigration Tower, he did not make a claim for right of abode.  My use of the word ‘solely’ – an unfortunately ambiguous use of the word – is to be read in light of the applicant’s own evidence that on that day he had had only one purpose – a sole purpose – for going to the Immigration Tower and that was to claim right of abode.  That assertion of his single or sole purpose was rejected by me.  I was satisfied that his purpose was not to claim right of abode but, as an overstayer who knew at the time that he had no option but to return to the Mainland, was simply to surrender himself.

62. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the correct determination must remain as follows :

(i)the applicant did not claim right of abode;
  
(ii)there is no record of any claim.*

PART TWO

Madam Wong Fai Fong (3873)

63. This case was heard in December 2004, several months ahead of the others.  This was because of the advanced age of a crucial witness, Mr Wong Mai Mui (‘Mr Wong’), who, at the time of giving his testimony, was 85 years of age.  Accordingly, this application was heard on 21 December 2004.  On 12 January 2005, for the information of the parties, I gave them a copy of my determination, saying that it would be included in this second report.  That determination is reproduced below, altered only so that it may be read as one portion of a larger report.

64. The application was remitted for the determination of two issues.  First, whether the applicant’s alleged father, Mr Wong, is her natural father.  Second, if he is the natural father, whether having been born outside of Hong Kong, he was at the date of the applicant’s birth nevertheless a permanent resident by virtue of paragraph 2(b) of Schedule 1 of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap.115.  Paragraph 2(b) reads :

“A person who is within one of the following categories is a permanent resident of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region—
   
 (a)…
   
 (b)A Chinese citizen who has ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a continuous period of not less than 7 years before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.”

65. The first issue, that of biological parenthood, was determined by means of a genetic test carried out in January 2004.  That test supported the overwhelming probability that Mr Wong is the applicant’s natural father.

66. The second issue is of narrow compass and may be expressed in the following question.  Had Mr Wong ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a continuous period of not less than seven years by 10 July 1952, that being the date of the applicant’s birth?  The second issue fell to be determined by considering the evidence of Mr Wong himself.

67. Mr Wong was born in rural Guangdong on 17 July 1919.  Although his memory was failing him and he was at times confused, I am satisfied that Mr Wong was an honest witness; a simple man, largely uneducated, doing his best to remember events that had occurred more than half a century ago.

68. Mr Wong testified that shortly before he turned 16 years of age, which would have been in or about mid 1935, he came to Hong Kong.  He gave two principal reasons for coming here.  First, he wished to avoid being conscripted into the Kuomintang armed forces, conscription applying to all males of 16 or older.  Second, he belonged to one of the lesser families in his home place and, within the rigid hierarchy of those days, this made life difficult for him.

69. Once in Hong Kong, Mr Wong took up a number of jobs.  He worked as a dish washer in a restaurant, he sold firewood and then, to use his own expression, took up work as a coolie at the docks.  By mid 1941, Mr Wong had been in Hong Kong for a period of six years.  Unsurprisingly, having regard to the humble nature of his jobs, Mr Wong had not been able to gather any material possessions of substance.  But I am satisfied that by mid 1941, on any objective assessment, he had been habitually and normally resident here for that period of six years.  Hong Kong was the place where he lived and worked and where, if fate allowed, he intended to remain for the foreseeable future.

70. Towards the end of 1941, however, Mr Wong said that rumours began spreading that Hong Kong would be invaded by Japanese forces.  His ‘colleagues’, he said, warned him that he should leave Hong Kong and, fearing for his safety, he took that advice.

71. When asked to state why he fled the Colony, Mr Wong explained that there was a real fear of what the Japanese forces would do to persons like himself - Chinese men – found in Hong Kong.  I am sure that would have been a very real fear.  The history of those times speaks not only of bombing of urban areas by the imperial airforce but also of recurring massacres of civilians by invading ground forces.  A village in the countryside of southern China, while not immune from the savageries of war, may well have seemed a far safer place.

72. On the balance of the evidence, doing the best I can, I would say that the probabilities support the time of Mr Wong’s departure from Hong Kong as being shortly before the actual attack on Hong Kong by Japanese forces in December 1941, perhaps a month or two before that event.

73. When he fled Hong Kong, Mr Wong had been ordinarily resident here for some six years and four months, a few months short of the required seven years.

74. In his testimony, Mr Wong said that he would never have left Hong Kong if it had not been for the Japanese threat.  As it was, he said, within a month or two of hearing that the Japanese had surrendered, he had left his village and had returned to Hong Kong to live and work here again.  The Japanese forces in Hong Kong surrendered in August 1945.  On that factual basis it may legitimately be inferred, I think, that Mr Wong returned to Hong Kong in the autumn of 1945, about October or November of that year.

75. Once he was back in Hong Kong in late 1945, Mr Wong worked for a time as a coolie and then, having learnt the skill of making tofu, was employed in a series of businesses that made and sold the product.  While working in one of those tofu businesses, Mr Wong was able to bring his wife to Hong Kong.  The two of them then lived here together, Hong Kong being their settled place of residence.

76. Mr Wong’s daughter, the applicant, was, however, born in the Mainland not in Hong Kong.  This came about because in or about late 1951 or early 1952 both Mr Wong and his wife returned to his native place. Mr Wong recalled that his wife was pregnant when they made the return journey although he did not say, or was unable to recall, how advanced her pregnancy was.  The couple returned to the Mainland because they had heard that the Central People’s Government had instituted land reforms and that those reforms were now being implemented in Guangdong.  The reforms included the allocation of land to peasants, said Mr Wong, and they wished to be allocated their portion.

77. It was either while waiting for that allocation, or initially working the land allocated to them, that Mr Wong’s daughter, the applicant, was born.  The date of her birth, to give it again, was 10 July 1952.

78. On the basis that Mr Wong had returned to live and work in Hong Kong after the Japanese surrender in or about October 1945, he had therefore been ordinarily resident in the Colony for a period of some six years and three or four months before returning to take advantage of the land reform programme in his native place.  Even if that period is extended to the date of the applicant’s birth it still falls short of the required seven years.

79. In summary, therefore, the position is as follows.  Prior to the Japanese occupation, Mr Wong had lived and worked in Hong Kong and had been ordinarily resident here for more than six years but less than seven.  After the end of the occupation, he had again lived and worked in Hong Kong and had been ordinarily resident here for more than six years but less than seven.  Neither of those periods therefore, taken on their own, constitute the required seven years.

80. Accordingly, as was agreed, the single issue that fell for determination, was whether, in law, Mr Wong’s absence from Hong Kong during the Japanese occupation had or had not broken the continuance of his ordinary residence here.

81. The phrase ‘ordinarily resident’ (appearing in paragraph 2(b) of Schedule 1 of the Immigration Ordinance) was considered by Lord Scarman, albeit within a different statutory context, in Akbarali v. Brent London Borough Council ex parte Shah [1983] 2 AC 309.  His explanation of the phrase was adopted by Ribeiro PJ in Prem Singh v. Director of Immigration (2003) 6 HKCFAR 26, 51C-52C.

82. Lord Scarman said that the phrase was not a term of art and was to be construed according to its natural and ordinary meaning.  He agreed with the definition given by Lord Denning M.R. when the appeal had been before the court below, the Master of the Rolls saying, [1982] QB 688, 720 :

“Traditionally we ought simply to apply the natural and ordinary meaning of the two words ‘ordinarily resident’ in the context of [the Education Act 1962] … If we were to do that here, I feel I would apply the test submitted by Mr Lester. The words ‘ordinarily resident’ mean that the person must be habitually and normally resident here, apart from temporary or occasional absences of long or short duration.” [my emphasis]

83. Lord Scarman emphasised that the significance of the adverb ‘habitually’ is that it encompasses two necessary features; namely, that residence must be adopted voluntarily and must be for a settled purpose.  In this regard, he said (344C) :

“The residence must be voluntarily adopted. Enforced presence by reason of kidnapping or imprisonment, or a Robinson Crusoe existence on a desert island with no opportunity of escape, may be so overwhelming a factor as to negative the will to be where one is.
  
 And there must be a degree of settled purpose. The purpose may be one; or there may be several. It may be specific or general. All that the law requires is that there is a settled purpose. This is not to say that the ‘propositus’ intends to stay where he is indefinitely; indeed his purpose, while settled, may be for a limited period. Education, business or profession, employment, health, family, or merely love of the place spring to mind as common reasons for a choice of regular abode. And there may well be many others. All that is necessary is that the purpose of living where one does has a sufficient degree of continuity to be properly described as settled.”

84. Lord Scarman confirmed that, ordinary residence being distinguished from domicile, a person could be ordinarily resident in two countries at the same time.

85. The advantage of adopting the natural and ordinary meaning of the phrase ‘ordinarily resident’, said Lord Scarman (at 344E), was that :

“… it results in the proof of ordinary residence, which is ultimately a question of fact, depending more upon the evidence of matters susceptible of objective proof than upon evidence as to state of mind.”

86. As I have said earlier, I am satisfied that up until the time when Mr Wong fled in late 1941 to avoid the dangers that a Japanese invasion of the Colony presented, he had been habitually and normally resident in Hong Kong for a period of over six years.  He had come voluntarily to Hong Kong and had remained here voluntarily.  He had come to Hong Kong for a settled purpose, that is, to live and work here.  If it was not for the impending invasion, Mr Wong would not have left Hong Kong.

87. Ordinary residence is not automatically broken by a departure.  Depending on the facts of each case, ‘temporary or occasional absences of long or short duration’ are not inconsistent with ordinary residence.

88. Mr Wong’s purpose in leaving Hong Kong, a purpose proved by his later actions, was to stay away for only so long as Hong Kong was subject to Japanese invasion and occupation.  In reality, therefore, he left as a refugee, fleeing the dangers of war.  As soon as those dangers had passed, he returned to Hong Kong and took up his settled way of life here again.  After his return he even brought his wife to Hong Kong.

89. It is, of course, true that Mr Wong remained in his native place for about four years.  But, of course, there was no way he could know how long the war would last.  All he could do was see out the hostilities, waiting for peace and the opportunity to return to Hong Kong.  If hostilities had only lasted a few months, I am satisfied that Mr Wong would have returned to Hong Kong within a few months.

90. It is, of course, also true that Mr Wong returned to his native place – his ancestral home, if you like – and, while the war lasted, lived a settled life there.  But ordinary residence is not to be equated with domicile and, depending on the facts, a person may be ordinarily resident in two countries at the same time.  Accordingly, even if for the period of the war Mr Wong was ordinarily resident in his native place, that does not of itself prevent him from also being ordinarily resident in Hong Kong.

91. Indeed, having regard to all the facts, I am satisfied that Mr Wong did remain ordinarily resident in Hong Kong between late 1941 and the autumn of 1945 when he returned to the Colony and resumed his ordinary and settled life here again.

92. In the circumstances I am satisfied that by 10 July 1952, the date of his daughter’s birth, Mr Wong had ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a continuous period of not less than seven years and was therefore a permanent resident.

PART THREE

Madam Kwok Siu Wan (1624 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

93. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in 1959.  Her native dialect is the fuqing dialect.  I am told that at all times material to her application she was a married woman with a husband and children living in the Mainland.

94. The applicant’s parents came to Hong Kong in the early 1980s.  Attempts were made to obtain a one-way permit so that the applicant could join them but they were unsuccessful.

95. In March 1997, the applicant came to Hong Kong as a visitor.  She overstayed.  It is clear that the applicant – like so many others – overstayed in the hope that, with the change of sovereignty, she would be able to claim right of abode through her parents.

96. A few days after the change of sovereignty, on 8 July 1997, the applicant went to the Immigration Tower to enquire whether it would be possible to ‘register’ herself as a permanent resident.  She went in the company of her brother who was a Hong Kong resident.  The brother’s understanding of Cantonese was superior to that of the applicant who appears at the time to have had only a rudimentary grasp of that dialect.

97. The applicant testified that the two of them went to the information office on the 2nd floor.  Realising that, as an overstayer, she was liable to apprehension, the applicant said that she remained silent, letting her brother do the talking.  Her brother was informed – in her presence – that it was not possible to ‘register’ in the manner desired.  In the circumstances, leaving aside whatever relevant information the applicant may have discovered from family, friends and the media, she would have left the Immigration Tower that day with her expectations disappointed.

98. At about that time, the applicant’s sister, Kwok Siu Ping, was also in Hong Kong.  She too had overstayed in the hope of obtaining right of abode.  In the early part of her testimony, the applicant said that she and her sister discussed their shared desire to remain permanently in Hong Kong.

99. The evidence revealed that the sister surrendered herself to the immigration authorities at the Immigration Tower on 2 January 1998.  Some five days later, on 7 January 1998, she was prosecuted for overstaying and received a suspended prison sentence together with her fine of $3,000.  On 12 January 1998, she was repatriated.

100. The applicant herself went to the Immigration Tower on 12 January 1998, the same day that her sister was repatriated.  She accepted that she went that day because she had been told that the longer she overstayed the more severe her likely punishment.  In her testimony, she insisted however that she made the visit that day in the expectation that she could successfully claim right of abode.

101. On any objective consideration, it is difficult to accept that the applicant could still have held that expectation.  Her initial enquiry in July 1997 had led to disappointment.  Almost contemporaneously with her surrender, her sister was being prosecuted for overstaying and was being repatriated.  Nor was there any evidence of the applicant being informed of anything between her first visit to the Immigration Tower and the date of her surrender that might encourage her to expect that she could successfully make a claim.

102. The applicant quite clearly understood that the sister’s almost contemporaneous prosecution and repatriation did not help her case.  In the result, she was at pains to avoid admitting any discussion with her sister between 2 January 1998, when her sister had gone to the Immigration Tower, and 12 January 1998, when her sister had been repatriated, or even to knowing at the time that her sister had been prosecuted.  Nor would she admit to any family discussion about the matter.  Her testimony in this respect was manifestly tactical.

103. I accept that the applicant was not an astute witness.  She was often confused and nervous.  It was not disputed that she was also almost illiterate.  In her case, however, I am satisfied that her illiteracy was a result of a lack of education not a lack of wit.

104. As to the applicant’s surrender on 12 January 1998, it should be noted that, while the applicant had gone with her brother to make enquiries on 8 July 1997, despite her apparently profound difficulties with Cantonese, she went this time alone.  Nor did she take any documents with her, for example, copies of her parents’ Hong Kong identity cards.

105. In my judgment, the probabilities indicate that the applicant’s purpose on 12 January 1998 was to surrender herself so that she would be returned to the Mainland without any criminal consequences or with the minimum of such consequences, a purpose which she herself admitted was a – if not the – primary motivation.

106. I have found in other cases that applicants have asserted their right to claim permanent resident status in Hong Kong even though they knew such a claim would be rejected.  They have done so for many reasons; out of defiance, for example, or out of a deeply-held resolve that they had a constitutional right.  In respect of this applicant, however, I am satisfied that she surrendered herself that day for the single purpose of being repatriated with minimum adverse consequence.

107. On her arrival at the Immigration Tower, the applicant went to the offices of the GIS on the 13th floor.  At the counter, she was given an ID 457 form to complete.  However – alone, illiterate and with only a rudimentary understanding of Cantonese – she said that she could not fill out the form herself.  She therefore waited until she found somebody speaking her dialect and asked that person to complete the form for her.

108. The ID 457 that was completed states the names and gives details of birth of the applicant’s parents.  However, it does not state their Hong Kong address nor, importantly, does it give any details of their Hong Kong identity cards.  In the column reserved for identity card details, the characters for the English phrase ‘not clear’ are written.

109. The ID 457 form, however, does give the name of the applicant’s sister-in-law (her husband’s sister) who was a Hong Kong permanent resident.  That person’s Hong Kong address is given but not the identity card details.

110. Concerning the sister-in-law’s details, it was urged upon me by the applicant’s counsel that I should accept this as documentary evidence of the fact that the applicant, handicapped by her illiteracy, nevertheless attempted to record details of a family member who was a Hong Kong permanent resident : her sister-in-law.  That attempt, it was said, should be read in context as part of the applicant’s attempt that day to make a claim for right of abode.

111. I do not agree.  I do not think it takes the matter further.  The applicant must have known that any claim she made for right of abode had to come through her parents and not other family members who happened to live in Hong Kong.  In any event, the applicant did not give the details of the sister-in-law’s Hong Kong identity card and, on the evidence, did not attempt to obtain such details either in respect of the sister-in-law or, more importantly, her own parents.

112. After the ID 457 had been completed, the applicant returned it to the counter and waited her turn for an interview.  She was interviewed by Ms Leung Wing Yee, an Immigration Assistant.

113. The applicant testified that it was difficult to recall with any certainty what happened during the interview as the officer spoke Cantonese, of which her knowledge was minimal, and there was no interpreter provided.  She was also very nervous.

114. The applicant understood, however, that she was asked why she had overstayed.  She replied in the fuqing dialect that she had not overstayed on previous visits to Hong Kong but on this occasion, with the change of sovereignty, she had come waiting for an amnesty to allow her to claim right of abode.  She said she told the interviewing officer that she wanted right of abode and wanted a Hong Kong identification card.

115. The applicant did not testify to attempting in her rudimentary Cantonese to state a claim for right of abode, strange perhaps if she wanted to make sure she got her meaning across.  Nor did she testify to asking for an interpreter.  On the evidence, therefore, if she made a claim in fuqing, without any use of Cantonese, it would not have been understood by the interviewing officer.  Ms Leung, the interviewing officer, said that she had no knowledge of the fuqing dialect.  Anything said to her in that dialect would therefore have been incomprehensible.

116. However, as I have said, whether in a language the interviewing officer understood or not, I am satisfied that the applicant did not make a claim in the manner alleged or in similar terms.  In my judgment, the applicant’s testimony in this regard is an invention.

117. Ms Leung accepted that there had been no interpreter present during the interview.  If an interpreter had been called that fact would have been recorded.  If, however, she had been unable to understand the applicant, she said, she would have called for an interpreter.  Although she had no independent recollection of the interview, the implication of Ms Leung’s testimony was clear; namely, that somehow the applicant must have made herself at least sufficiently understood in her limited Cantonese.

118. On behalf of the applicant, it was submitted that the failure to call an interpreter worked a material unfairness on the applicant.  Interviewing officers, it was said, had an obligation to take reasonable steps to ensure that persons being interviewed could make themselves understood.  Interviewing officers also had an obligation to ensure that persons being interviewed understood the purpose of it all.  If this obligation was not reasonably discharged then what was recorded during the interview could not be accepted as a reflection of any informed action.

119. I do not contest these submissions.  Even if the applicant’s interview with Ms Leung was fairly peremptory – as I am sure most interviews were – Ms Leung was still obliged to ensure she could understand the applicant and the applicant could understand her.

120. But in the present case – ignoring entirely what was written on the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form – I am unable to come to a conclusion on the probabilities that the applicant may have attempted to claim right of abode, albeit in fuqing.

121. As to the progress of the interview, the applicant recalled that she was handed a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  She told the officer that she was illiterate.  She was then handed a paper on which were written Chinese characters.  She said that she was told to copy these characters.  She obeyed, having little, if any, understanding of what she was writing.  In translation, the characters on the document read :

“I have overstayed because of keeping company with my family. I now want to go back to China.”

122. In respect of this familiar litany, Ms Leung denied that it had ever been her practice to produce pre-written characters, instructing interviewees to copy them.  If an interviewee was illiterate, she said, she would write the characters for them.  The writing, in the present case, however, was not her writing.

123. It being uncontested that the applicant was effectively illiterate, it must follow, in my view, that, being unable to write the characters of her own volition, she must have copied.  In this regard, therefore, I accept the applicant’s evidence and reject that of Ms Leung.

124. This finding, of course, is material.  It must colour how I consider events.  I have asked myself whether, the applicant being found to be truthful in this one regard, it may not follow that, on balance, she should be found to be truthful in other regards too.  In other matters, however, as I have made clear, I have been unable to place any trust in her evidence.  I have found it to be overtly tactical and contrived.

125. But even if I am wrong to reject the applicant’s contention that she made a claim for right of abode, I am satisfied that there is no record of any such claim.

126. The only document capable of constituting a record is the ID 457 completed that day for the applicant by a third party.  That document, however, does not give the Hong Kong identity card details of the applicant’s parents nor even their Hong Kong address.

127. On behalf of the applicant, it was submitted that the failure to give those details was not fatal.  The applicant ensured that the names of her parents, their dates and places of birth and their marital status were recorded on the form.  That, it was said, was sufficient to constitute a record for the purpose of the concession policy.  In support of this submission, reference was made to the CFA’s judgment of 9 January 2004 (given in respect of this court’s first report), particularly paras.28 and 36 :

“The purpose of the requirement that there be a written record of a claim in the possession of the Director was to provide a form of verification to enable the Director to implement the concession policy. The existence of this purpose does not mean that the Director should disregard the fact that an applicant has claimed right of abode when considering whether documentary materials constitute evidence of the making of such a claim. On the contrary, as far as the Director is concerned, he knew that each applicant asserted that a claim for right of abode was made and he is now aware of the Judge’s findings. If, viewing the relevant documentary material in that light, it may, on its face, fairly be said to constitute evidence corroborating the fact that a claim for right of abode had been made, the concession policy requirement for a record is satisfied.
  
 …
  
 However, once it is accepted that the form should be viewed in the light of the fact that a claim for right of abode has been made by the relevant applicant, the insertion of the particulars of a parent who has permanent residence in Hong Kong, including the parent’s identity card number, takes on new significance. When the applicant inserts particulars of a parent’s identity card number and the applicant has claimed or is claiming right of abode, the form does not have a merely neutral character. The particulars point in the direction of a claim for right of abode, no matter that the form is regarded by the Department as having an essentially neutral character.” [my emphasis]

128. As I understand the submissions made on behalf of the applicant, they were to this effect.  While the giving of the parents’ identity card details is the most obvious way of constituting a record, it is not the only way.  In light of the fact that the Director knows that an oral claim has been made, if enough details are recorded to enable a successful train of inquiry to be instituted then that of itself is sufficient.

129. But in terms of the policy, as I read it, the documentary material must – on its face – constitute evidence that corroborates the making of a claim.  The phrase ‘on its face’, when given its plain English meaning, implies that the material must essentially, considered in context, speak for itself.  That must therefore exclude material which does not speak for itself in any direct way but simply offers up information which, if investigated, may lead to corroborating proof.

130. That also begs the question of just how thorough the investigating process must be.  Although I have heard no evidence on the matter, it may rationally be assumed, I think, that a bare name may be sufficient to enable the Director (if enough man hours are given to the task) to institute a successful train of investigation.  Does it follow therefore that a bare name put on a form is sufficient?  How can a bare name – on its face – constitute corroborating evidence of an oral claim?

131. On behalf of the Director, it was also pointed out that, in its judgment of 9 January 2004, the CFA held that two ID 457 forms which contained the name of a parent (or parents) but gave no details of the relevant identity cards were not capable of constituting a record : see paras.41 and 44 of the judgment, concerning applicants 713 and 3122.

132. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;
  
(ii)The Director has no record of any claim.

Madam Tang Wai Ying (3234 : a ‘group one’ and ‘group four’ applicant)

133. The applicant was born in Guangdong Province in late 1972.  Her father came to Hong Kong in 1979, her mother following in 1993.  It was the applicant’s evidence that she had attempted to obtain a one-way permit to settle in Hong Kong with her parents but had been unsuccessful.  She said that in or about late 1996, however, rumours circulated that, upon the change of sovereignty, children of Hong Kong permanent residents would themselves be permitted to take up permanent residence.  Her parents learnt of this rumour too, she said, and urged her to come to Hong Kong.

134. In the result, the applicant obtained a two-way permit, arriving in Hong Kong in December 1996.  She overstayed, she said, hoping to obtain right of abode after the change of sovereignty.  In respect of this evidence, I am satisfied that the applicant, along with a great many other children of Hong Kong permanent residents, did come to Hong Kong before the change of sovereignty for the specific purpose of claiming right of abode when the change took place.

135. As a general observation, I would say that, although there were a number of inconsistencies in the applicant’s evidence and although on occasions, in an attempt to bolster her case, I believe she was guilty of making assertions based more on what she wished had been the case rather than what her memory truly dictated had been the case, I nevertheless found her to be an essentially credible witness.  In most things, she impressed me as a quiet, thoughtful witness.  When she strayed into areas of evidence tainted by wishful thinking, she had a tendency to become tentative, her testimony being confused.

136. It was the applicant’s evidence that a few days after the handover – there was some inconsistency as to the exact date – she went with her mother to the Immigration Tower to enquire how she could be ‘registered’ for right of abode.  They were informed, however, that no such process was available in Hong Kong.  The applicant remembered her mother telling her that, as there was nobody there to help them, they would try again at a later time.

137. The applicant and her mother only returned to the Immigration Tower on 5 November 1997.  It was the applicant’s testimony that in the intervening period she had paid close attention to news reports but by November 1997, with nothing having been fully resolved – in her mind at least – as to the right of abode question, her mother suggested that they make the visit in order to ‘ask for a clear answer’. 

138. The applicant testified that she and her mother went first to the information counter on the 2nd floor.  Having shown her expired two-way permit, she and her mother were then referred to the 13th floor to the offices of the GIS. 

139. When they arrived at the reception counter of the GIS, the applicant said that she spoke to an officer, asserting in substance that she, as a child of Hong Kong permanent residents, should be able to come to live in Hong Kong.  She asked if this was possible.  She was told, however, that it was not possible and that she would have to return to the Mainland to process any such application.  According to the applicant, she protested that she would not be able to do so as she was already too old to qualify in terms of the Mainland scheme.  She said that she also told the officer that her father had been injured at work and that she needed to remain in Hong Kong to look after him.

140. In or about 2002, when she gave a summary of her case to her then solicitors, Pam Baker & Co., it is recorded that it was her mother who spoke to the officer at the counter.  Her mother, it was said, showed the officer the applicant’s two-way permit and her own Hong Kong Identity Card, saying that her daughter should be able to settle in Hong Kong now that the handover had taken place.

141. During submissions, the applicant was criticised for the apparent inconsistency of attributing statements to her mother on one occasion and attributing them to herself on another.  While this was clearly a matter to be given consideration, it did not in this case undermine my belief that the applicant was, as I have said, an essentially credible witness.  First, the case summaries prepared by Pam Baker & Co. had never pretended to be exhaustive in detail.  It must be remembered that a great many summaries were being prepared at the time and were intended to give the general thrust of an applicant’s case rather than set out in intricate detail each and every aspect of it.  Second, it is understandable, I believe, that with the mother and daughter going to the Immigration Tower together, both no doubt being anxious, both may well have repeated what the other had said and in various ways supported each other’s claims.  The applicant herself was a reasonably educated woman – not loud but not mute either – and during cross-examination said that both she and her mother had spoken.

142. During the course of the hearings, general evidence was led that, if a person made an application for right of abode at the GIS reception counter, that person’s relevant documents would be copied and he or she would then be referred to a more senior officer to be interviewed.  While that may have been the recommended practice, everything, of course, must be seen in context.  On the 2nd floor of the Immigration Tower, at the information office, persons making enquiries about claims for right of abode were not recommended for an interview, they were told that they would have to return to the Mainland to process any such claims there.  At other offices of the Immigration Department, there were notices to similar effect.  It is apparent that at the time advice of this nature was generally being given to persons who spoke of a right to permanent residence.  I accept, therefore, that if a determined application for right of abode was made at the GIS reception counter, one that would brook no advice to the contrary, then no doubt the matter would have been dealt with according to the recommended practice.  However, the evidence, I believe, has shown that many less determined applications were deflected by what was entirely proper advice at the time; namely, that there was no mechanism for processing a right of abode application in Hong Kong and that any such application must be made on the Mainland.  In the present case, it was, as I understand it, the applicant’s testimony that she and her mother were given this advice and that their claim was similarly deflected.

143. The applicant testified that at the conclusion of the conversation at the reception counter she was given an ID457 form to complete.  On that form, she wrote down the name of her parents, gave their Hong Kong address and in addition gave details of their Hong Kong identity cards.  The applicant said that she obtained details of her mother’s identity card directly from her but had to telephone her father in order to obtain details of his card.

144. As to why she went to the trouble of obtaining details of her father’s card, the applicant said that, as she wished to obtain a Hong Kong identity card herself, she believed that a clear statement of the details of her parents’ cards may help her.

145. In the course of submissions, the applicant’s counsel noted that, while details of her brother were given on the form, the applicant had clearly not deemed it necessary to contact her brother to obtain details of his identity card.  This ‘selective provision of information’, it was said, was consistent with the applicant putting down the information not simply because it was required on the face of the form but because she believed it may support her application.  I believe there was substance in this submission.

146. In summary, although it has not been the easiest matter to decide, on the probabilities I am satisfied that, when the applicant and her mother were at the reception counter of the GIS, they did together make a claim for right of abode.  I am further satisfied that a record of that claim is to be found in the completed ID457.

147. That essentially determines this matter.  There were, however, other asserted instances of a claim being made for right of abode by the applicant and something briefly should be said of them.

148. After completing the ID457, the applicant said that she was taken to a room where she was interviewed alone.  The interviewing officer was Ms Wong Lai Fong, an Immigration Assistant.  In the course of the interview, said the applicant, she said that she wished to remain in Hong Kong and recalled telling Ms Wong that her father had been injured and that she wished to stay to look after him.  However the words which she wrote on the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form are to different effect.  In translation, they read :

“I have overstayed because of keeping company with my family.  I now want to go back to China.”

149. As to why she wrote those characters, the applicant’s evidence was, in my view, very tentative, an indication that she was straying into areas of wishful thinking.  The applicant recalled being asked why she had overstayed and speaking of her father’s indisposition.  She was told by Ms Wong, she said, that she would have to be returned to the Mainland, that there were formalities that had to be complied with and that she should therefore copy the characters from a piece of paper which was placed in front of her.  The applicant said that she complied without question and did not contemplate complaining even though she appreciated at the time that it was wrong to be made to copy the characters.

150. The applicant’s testimony in this regard must, however, be contrasted with the summary of her case prepared by Pam Baker & Co.  In that summary, she is recorded as having no memory at all of the circumstances in which she came to complete the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  She later qualified this in an affidavit by saying that she did in fact have a memory of what occurred.  Nevertheless, in light of her unconvincing testimony and the unequivocal statement appearing in her case summary, I am unable to give any real credence to her evidence as to what was said and done during the interview.  I think it far more probable that by that time, alone with the interviewing officer, the applicant had accepted that she had no choice other than to co-operate with the authorities in the process of her repatriation.

151. In coming to this finding, I have recognised the fact that the characters written by the applicant on her ‘grounds for non-removal’ form were exactly the same, including the punctuation, as those appearing on another ‘grounds for non-removal’ from completed by another surrendered person in the presence of Ms Wong; more than that, the characters were the same as those appearing on ‘grounds for non-removal’ forms completed in the presence of other immigration officers.  Quite patently, the wording used was a well-worn formula.  It was submitted by counsel for the applicant that this could only lead to one conclusion; namely, that some form of standard form containing this formula of wording must have been used by immigration officers including Ms Wong.

152. In respect of this matter, Ms Wong, as I understood her evidence, denied the use of any such standard form.  She accepted, however, that if an interviewee was not sure how to complete the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, having heard what the interviewee wished to say, she would suggest a summarised version that could be written down in a few characters.  Many interviewees, she said, would tell her that they had overstayed in order to spend time with their families.  In reducing that to a short sentence or too, she said, it was not unexpected that over a period of time she may have suggested the use of exactly same characters to different interviewees.  This practice, she made clear, was not the same as dictating an answer to an unwilling subject.

153. In my view, the probabilities suggest that standard forms may have been used by some officers.  I believe it is equally probable, however, that, with simple, one or two sentence statements, just as Ms Wong testified, some officers may have become so accustomed to suggesting the same formula of words to surrendered persons that they were able to do so by rote without the need for any pre-written guide.

154. In the present case, I am not convinced that Ms Wong, contrary to her evidence, made use of any standard form.  I believe, just as she said, that she may simply have suggested the wording to the applicant.  But the issue is not critical.  As I have made clear, I am not satisfied on the evidence that during the course of the interview the applicant made any claim for right of abode.

155. The applicant was prosecuted for overstaying.  She pleaded guilty.  Having been convicted, the following exchange is recorded between herself and the magistrate :

“Court :You are convicted. Do you want to say anything?
   
 Defendant :My father was injured at work. I have to look after him.
   
 Court :You are sentenced to 1 month imprisonment, suspended for 2 years. Do you understand?
   
 Defendant :Understand.”

156. Nothing appears in that exchange to the effect that the applicant believed herself to be entitled to right of abode in Hong Kong.  Her words constitute no more than a fairly common plea in mitigation that the applicant’s breach of the law had been occasioned by an illness in the family.

157. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)the applicant and/or her mother on her behalf did make a claim for right of abode at the offices of the GIS;
  
(ii)the Director does have a record of the claim for right of abode made by the applicant and/or her mother on her behalf at the offices of the GIS.

Madam Cheung Choi Ngo (641 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

158. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in 1969.  Both her parents settled in Hong Kong, her father in 1973, her mother in 1978.  Although the applicant’s siblings were able to settle in Hong Kong, she was unable to obtain a one-way permit.  She was therefore raised on the Mainland and was married there.  Three children have been born of the marriage.

159. The applicant came to Hong Kong on 19 April 1996, her two-way permit allowing her to remain for approximately one month.  The applicant overstayed.  This was not the first time she had breached her conditions of stay.  She had overstayed on two previous occasions.  On one of these earlier occasions, to avoid detection, she had altered the date on her two-way permit.  By honest means or otherwise, the applicant had clearly been determined to spend as long as possible in Hong Kong.

160. On this occasion in 1996, it was the applicant’s evidence that she overstayed for two principal reasons.  First, she wished to help care for her father who had had major surgery.  Second, once she had learnt of a possible amnesty for the children of Hong Kong permanent residents, she wished to remain until the change of sovereignty to see whether it would be granted and whether she could benefit from it.

161. It was the applicant’s case that a few days after the change of sovereignty she and her mother went to the Immigration Tower to see if an application for right of abode could be made.  The applicant said that she remained outside the building while her mother went up to the 13th floor to enquire about the process.  Her mother reported to her that she had been told that adults had to process their claims on the Mainland and could not do so in Hong Kong.  Her mother told her, she said, that she should not go up to the 13th floor as she would be arrested and repatriated.  From that time on, of course, the applicant would have had no doubts as to the policy of the Hong Kong immigration authorities.

162. As it turned out, the applicant was arrested less than two weeks later.  During the hearing before me, the circumstances of her arrest were disputed.  It is clear, however, that she was arrested when it was discovered that she was an overstayer.

163. As to the arrest, the police records indicate that the applicant was arrested on the 12th floor of a commercial building outside or close to the premises of a company called the Wah Chun Polybag Company, the arrest being the result of an ‘overstay raid’.  It was the applicant’s evidence, however, that she and her father were stopped outside the building.  Her father did not have his identity card on him and the party had to make their way up to the 12th floor to retrieve the card from the applicant’s mother who worked as a cleaner in the Wah Chun Polybag Company.

164. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that the applicant’s version of events was simply not believable.  Why, for example, would the mother be holding the father’s card?  It was submitted that the applicant should be disbelieved in respect of the incident and that this should colour my opinion generally of the applicant’s reliability as a witness of the truth.

165. But while I accept that certain of the probabilities may have told against the applicant, I could not say that her version of events was plainly untrue.  So often in matters of this kind, if the matter had been subject to full investigation, I believe a credible middle version may have been found.  For example, the applicant and her father may have been escorted up to the 12th floor and, after enquiries, the arrest made there.  It is to be noted that no suggestion was ever made that the applicant was working in the Wah Chun Polybag Company.  Nor, as I understood it, was it contested that her father, an unwell man, was, as she said, present at the time of her arrest.

166. While I accept that the applicant’s past willingness to act dishonestly in order to stay in Hong Kong was a matter which weighed against her, I was nevertheless impressed by the manner in which she gave her evidence and the generally balanced content of it.  In short, I found her to be essentially credible.  She gave her evidence of events in a clear, straight-forward manner.  Too many applicants were patently selective in their testimony.  I do not believe this is a criticism that could justly be levelled at the applicant.

167. In respect of the incident of her arrest, for example, despite the fact that certain documentary evidence seemed to tell against her, she did not become aggressive or evasive.  She simply explained as best she could what she remembered.  I cannot say that the police documents were inaccurate but nor can I say that the applicant gave a false story in respect of her arrest.  Indeed, as I have indicated, I felt confident that, if it had been possible to fully explore the matter, the applicant’s version of events may well have been confirmed.

168. At the time of her arrest, the applicant said that both of her parents spoke to the police saying that all the family, with the exception only of the applicant, were Hong Kong residents and that she wished to stay and live here too, surely having the right to do so.  The applicant said that she backed her parents in this.  I do not discount the fact that in desperation, knowing that their daughter was likely to be prosecuted and repatriated, the applicant’s parents may have pleaded with the police in the manner described, the applicant joining them.  But there is no record of what was said and done at the time, the police notebooks having been destroyed.

169. The day after her arrest, the applicant was transferred to the Victoria Immigration Centre.  Upon her arrival, she was interviewed by Ms Rosina Ho Suet Han, a Senior Immigration Assistant who was responsible for assessing whether immigration offenders referred by the police should be given their liberty on the strength of a recognisance.  It was Ms Ho’s evidence that at that time she was conducting up to 20 interviews a day.  Not surprisingly, she had no independent recollection of the applicant’s interview.

170. It was the applicant’s evidence that in the course of the interview she told Ms Ho that her father was not well, that she would like to be able to stay to look after him and that, as the child of Hong Kong permanent residents, she would like to be granted a ‘walking permit’ which would allow her to remain in Hong Kong.  Ms Ho, she said, said little in reply, just taking out various forms for completion.

171. One of the forms was a consolidated document, the top half being for personal data, the bottom half being a declaration made in respect of an application for recognisance.  As the applicant was effectively illiterate, she said that Ms Ho completed the document while she supplied the relevant information.

172. The information recorded on the form includes the name, date of birth and identity card number of the applicant’s father, he being the person to provide the recognisance.  It was the applicant’s testimony that she supplied these details including the number of her father’s identity card.  On her evidence this excluded the possibility that they were supplied at a later date by the father himself.  When asked if she could still remember the identity card number, the applicant was unable to recite it in full.  However, she was able to recall the beginning letter and certain of the numbers – evidence, in my view, that, at one time at least, she may well have known the full number.

173. The bottom half of the form, the declaration, contains the printed words : “I understand that I must return to China when the trial is over”.  The applicant said that initially she was unwilling to sign the form.  She said that she was told, however, that if she did not do so, she would not be permitted to leave in order to care for her father and nothing could be done about any ‘walking permit’.  She therefore signed.

174. Ms Ho, who, as I have said, had no independent recollection of the interview, said that the applicant was made the subject of a streamlined procedure, this being for persons willing to be returned to the Mainland.  If the applicant had demanded the right to claim permanent residence or had been unwilling to be repatriated, she would not have been dealt with in the manner she was.

175. But, of course, as another witness, Mr Hui Pit Lim, an Immigration Officer at the Centre, accepted, whether overstayers wished to remain or not, absent compelling reasons otherwise, they were all destined to be repatriated.  It is plain, I think, that inevitable choice at the time for immigration offenders was whether to go back voluntarily, often with the benefit of a few days on bail, or involuntarily, perhaps without that benefit.

176. I have no doubt that from time to time it was necessary for immigration officers – acting in good faith in the ordinary course of their duties – to explain to immigration offenders that if they wished to obtain bail and be allowed back to their families, they would have to supply certain information and sign certain forms.

177. I have no doubt also that from time to time immigration offenders would have expressed a wish not to be taken from their families, or to be allowed to remain, before being advised, or coming to understand, that a temporary period of bail was the best that could be expected.  Again, this is not to suggest bad faith on the part of the immigration officers.  But at the time it was a plain fact.

178. Of course, requests for right of abode did not have to be asserted in a forceful manner.  They could be quietly (or even timidly) made, and no doubt quickly forgotten by interviewing officers in the general bustle of the day.

179. Claims, I believe, may also have been made in the face of knowledge that they would no doubt be rejected.  Desperation, and perhaps despair, have their own imperatives.

180. In the present case, while it has not been the easiest decision to reach and while I suspect that the applicant may have been guilty – in this part of her evidence – of some overstatement, I am satisfied, nevertheless, making allowances for any ‘gilding of the lilly’, that it is more likely than not that the applicant did speak to Ms Ho in a manner that constituted a request, as the child of a Hong Kong permanent resident, to be allowed to stay with her family here, caring for her father.  I am satisfied that the request constituted a claim in terms of the concession policy.

181. The remaining issue is whether, considered in context, there is any record of that claim.  On behalf of the applicant, it was submitted that the form containing personal data and a declaration in respect of bail constitutes that record, the form giving clear evidence that the applicant’s father was a Hong Kong permanent residence.

182. For the respondent, it was submitted that the form was manifestly intended for one specific purpose; namely, to enable consideration to be given to an application for bail.  The inclusion of the father’s details therefore was clearly intended, not as a record of any claim, but so that he could act as a surety.

183. That may be so but the applicant was given no other form, such as a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, upon which to record her wishes and, as I understood her evidence, she said that she supplied the information concerning her father for two reasons : to demonstrate that he was a Hong Kong permanent resident – an essential prerequisite for obtaining what she described to be a ‘walking permit’ – and, in order to obtain bail.  I do not believe that evidence can be rejected.

184. In my judgment, if an ID 457 form may constitute a record of a claim, it would be wrong in principle to hold that the form signed by this applicant could not.

185. Bay way of a postscript it should be noted that the applicant had asserted that, when prosecuted in the magistracy, she had claimed right of abode.  This was never advanced by her counsel : sensibly so, I believe.  I have read the transcript.  Nothing appears to suggest any form of such claim.

186. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)The applicant did make a claim for right of abode; and
  
(ii)The Director has a record of the claim.

Mr So Yik Lung (3028 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

187. This was a curious application, one founded on an unusual set of circumstances.

188. The applicant was born in December 1969 in Fujian Province.  His father came to settle in Hong Kong in 1975, his mother following in 1984.  The applicant had applied for a one-way permit to join his parents but had been unsuccessful.

189. In 1998, believing that, if he was able to enter Hong Kong, he would be able to claim right of abode, the applicant set about obtaining documentation to support his claim.  From the Mainland authorities he obtained a notarial certificate verifying his relationship with his parents and a census record giving his name, date and place of birth, address and occupation.  In addition, his father obtained a certificate of registered particulars from the Immigration Department in Hong Kong and sent it to him. 

190. On 31 December 1998, having obtained a two-way permit and with these documents in his possession, the applicant attempted to enter Hong Kong.  At Lo Wu, however, the applicant was interviewed by an Immigration Officer, Mr Lui Siu Cheung, and refused entry.

191. To understand why he was refused the entry, it is necessary to look first to an ‘internal message’ dated 17 December 1998 sent to officers at the Lo Wu Control Point.  In part, the message read :

“Recently, a large number of Fujian residents, after landing Hong Kong on their Two-way Permits, have approached the Chinese Visitors Office for extension of stay in order to go through procedures for the right of abode in Hong Kong. Some of them have also sought assistance from the Legal Aid Department for this purpose. …
  
 In order to prevent these people from abusing the Two-way Permit channel, with immediate effect, the immigration control officers, when examining Two-way Permit holders from Fujian, should enquire of them about their purpose of visiting Hong Kong and whether either of their parents is a Hong Kong resident. The relatives they claim to visit and their intended period of stay in Hong Kong should also be recorded on the copy of their Two-way Permit. If anyone is suspected to have come to Hong Kong in the capacity of a visitor to apply for the right of abode, the case should be referred to supervisory staff for further enquiry. Entry of such people should be refused …” [my emphasis]

192. When the applicant – himself a Fujian resident – was interviewed by Mr Lui on 31 December 1998, his luggage was searched and the documents which he had intended to use in support of his application for right of abode were discovered.

193. The applicant testified that he did not admit that his true purpose for coming to Hong Kong was to claim right of abode.  He was aware, it seems, that if he made any such admission he may be denied entry.  Instead, according to the applicant he said that he had come to Hong Kong “to care for his parents”.  Mr Lui’s interview notes were more specific, recording that the applicant had come to visit his parents and to look after his father who would be having an operation.  On balance, it seems to me that the interview record in this respect is more reliable than the applicant’s memory, more especially as the applicant did himself speak of his father having an operation.

194. Mr Lui did not accept the applicant’s explanation.  He concluded (correctly) that the applicant did not wish to come to Hong Kong simply to spend time with his family.  To use Mr Lui’s words, he suspected that the applicant was attempting to take up residence in Hong Kong “without the prior approval of the Director of Immigration”, the chosen method being a claim for right of abode.

195. The interview notes prepared on 31 December 1998 are detailed.  They give the identity card number of the applicant’s father, making it plain that both the applicant’s mother and father were Hong Kong permanent residents.  The notes also make it plain that the applicant was suspected of wishing to enter Hong Kong to seek the right to reside here permanently.  The interview notes, it was submitted, constitute the required record of a claim.  The central question, however, the first question to be determined, was whether the applicant in fact made a claim.

196. On all the evidence, it was quite clear that the applicant came to Hong Kong with the intention of claiming right of abode.  The necessary supporting documents were found in his possession.  But, in my judgment, a mere intention to make a claim is not capable of constituting the actual making of it.

197. It was never suggested by the applicant that, when interviewed, he used clear and outright language to make a claim.  To the contrary, he testified that he did his best to deny any intention of wishing to enter Hong Kong in order to seek right of abode.  In the circumstances, no matter what suspicions Mr Lui may have had as to the applicant’s true intentions, I do not see how it can be held that the applicant asserted a claim for right of abode by denying that he had any intention to make any such claim.  In this regard, in its judgment of 10 January 2002, the CFA made it plain that if a person wished to seek the right to remain permanently in Hong Kong, it was for him to assert that right.  The judgment reads (paragraph 224) :

“Where a person did not indicate in his application for extension of stay or in his interview with Immigration staff that he was claiming a right of abode or that he wanted to await the judgments, but instead relied on other grounds, the Director of Immigration was entitled to regard the application or statement in the interview report as not amounting to a claim for the purpose of the policy decision.  There is no question of unfair or differential treatment.  If a person wanted to continue to stay in Hong Kong, it was for him to indicate his real reason for doing so and that he was asserting a right of abode.”

198. As I have said earlier, it was the applicant’s evidence that in the course of his interview he said that he wished to come to Hong Kong to “care for his parents”.  Even if I accept that the applicant said those words, I am unable to accept that they were capable, even on a generous interpretation, of constituting a claim within the meaning of the concession.  If it was a claim, it was one based solely on a desire for his case to be considered on compassionate grounds.

199. During the course of submissions, it was argued on behalf of the applicant that his claim for right of abode was made by way of conduct, that conduct being the attempt to bring his documents into Hong Kong.  While I do not reject the contention that a claim may perhaps be made by way of conduct, in the present case I am satisfied that the applicant’s gathering of documents constituted nothing more than an act preparatory to the making of a claim.  It must be remembered that in his interview, when asked about the documents, the applicant testified that he gave a fictitious reason for having them.

200. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)the applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;
  
(ii)the Director has no record of any claim.

Madam Tsang Kwai Ngan (3299 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

201. The applicant was born in 1955 in Guangdong Province.  Both her parents settled in Hong Kong, her father arriving in 1962, her mother some 19 years later in 1981.  The applicant was raised on the Mainland and married there, two children being born of that union.  The marriage, however, ended in separation and divorce.

202. In his opening submissions, Mr Kwok, counsel for the applicant, said that the applicant would testify that she had made three claims for right of abode.  The first claim, she would say, had been made in November 1997 when she had attempted to leave Hong Kong but had been stopped and interviewed for overstaying.  The second had been made the following day at the offices of the GIS in the Immigration Tower.  The third had been made a year later when, having returned to Hong Kong, she was arrested for having overstayed again.

203. As it was, however, when the applicant came to testify, she asserted that she had claimed right of abode not only on those three occasions but on other occasions too, particularly in the presence of the magistrates who convicted her of the offences of breaching her conditions of stay.  The assertions that she had claimed right of abode in court were disproved by the verbation transcripts.  The applicant nevertheless persisted in those assertions.

204. As a witness, the applicant was slow and dull.  She claimed to be virtually illiterate.  But that does not mean she was totally lacking wit.  During the course of her testimony I gained the strong impression that in her mind she believed that, if she could just make as many assertions as the evidence would allow, then somehow she would be successful.  During the course of his closing submissions, Mr Fok, for the respondent, described the applicant’s recitation of continued assertions as a ‘mantra’.  It was, I think, apt.  

205. In the result, viewing her evidence in the round and in respect of the circumstances of each individual claim, I could place no reliance on the applicant’s testimony as to her claims.  I concluded with little hesitation that, being desperate to remain in Hong Kong with her aged and sickly father, the applicant had testified on the basis of what she had wished she had said rather than what she honestly remembered had been said.  Put shortly, despite the sympathy I felt for her predicament, the applicant did not satisfy me that, on the probabilities, she had made any claim that would entitle her to the benefits of the concession policy.

206. The applicant came to Hong Kong on 31 July 1997, her two-way permit permitting her to remain until the end of August of that year.  It was the applicant’s case that she had two reasons for coming here.  First, she had to look after her father who at that time was suffering from high blood pressure and heart disease, her mother having died a year or so earlier.  Second, she wished to seek right of abode here.

207. In this latter respect, the applicant said that shortly after her arrival she went to the Immigration Tower and made enquiries at the information counter on the 2nd floor.  She was told, however, that it was not possible to claim right of abode in Hong Kong and that she must return to the Mainland in order to process her application there.  From that early time, therefore, she would have known the official view of the immigration authorities.

208. On 17 November 1997, the applicant attempted to leave Hong Kong via Lo Wu.  It was her testimony that she needed to return to the Mainland to visit her mother’s grave.  Despite being in breach of her conditions of stay, it was her evidence that, having paid her respects to the memory of her late mother, she hoped to be able to return to Hong Kong within a short span of time.

209. Between her initial enquiry at the Immigration Tower and her attempt to leave Hong Kong in November, the applicant had had no further contact, direct or indirect, with the immigration authorities.  When asked if she had thought of making a claim during this time, she answered in general terms that “all along I have been fighting for it”.  Later in cross-examination, when asked why, if she believed she had right of abode and wished to fight for it, she had not sought to claim it during this period, she could only answer : “I did not know how it would work”.

210. When she was interviewed at Lo Wu, the applicant testified that she explained that she was leaving to visit her mother’s grave and explained that she had overstayed in order to look after her father.  She then told the officer, she said, that, as a daughter of permanent residents, she should be allowed to stay in Hong Kong and should be given right of abode.  She was told, however, that it was not possible and that if her father needed her care he could always move to her home on the Mainland.  She was again told that if she wished to seek right of abode she must process her application on the Mainland.  She replied, she said, that she could not do that as she was too old to be included in the Mainland scheme.

211. The applicant’s testimony as to what she said during the interview was, however, at variance with what appears on the face of the interview record even in respect of what at the time would not have been contentious issues :

(i)No mention is made of the applicant’s apparent intention to return to the Mainland to visit her mother’s grave. To the contrary, the interview sheet records that both of the applicant’s parents were at that time living in Hong Kong. More than that, the interview sheet records that the applicant had overstayed in order to care for her sick mother not her father.
  
(ii)The interview sheet also records that the applicant’s husband was dead. This was not true, a fact admitted by the applicant during the course of her testimony. She said, however, that as he had had affairs with other woman, she considered him, in her eyes, to be dead.

212. No mention, direct or indirect, is made on the face of the record of the applicant’s desire to reside in Hong Kong, either by way of a constitutional right or in order to care for a family member.

213. As I have indicated earlier, I am satisfied that the applicant did not make a claim for right of abode while at Lo Wu.  As for the errors in the interview record, while these could no doubt have come about because of a lack of understanding on the part of the applicant or a difficulty in making herself fully understood, it should be noted that a data form completed by the applicant the next day was also shot through with errors, some so fundamental that, in my opinion, they were more likely to have been intentional than accidental.

214. The following day, 18 November 1979, the applicant reported to the offices of the GIS in the Immigration Tower so that she could be interviewed and a decision made whether she should be prosecuted for breaching her conditions of stay.  She attended with a male companion, Mr Fan Tak Chung.

215. The applicant said that when she presented herself at the counter, she was handed an ID 457 form to complete.  It was her testimony that she said to the officer that she had right of abode and that she wanted to obtain a Hong Kong identity card.  The officer told her that she would have to go back to the Mainland to process her claim.

216. It was the applicant’s case that she was uncertain as to the true nature of the ID 457 form but nevertheless – despite what she had just been told by the officer at the counter – she filled it in believing that it may well be a form for claiming right of abode.  She said she spoke to her companion, Mr Fan, asking if this was a claim form and he replied : “Try your luck.”  According to the applicant, both she and Mr Fan therefore believed the ID 457 form to be a document of considerable importance.  But if that was so, the applicant was less than scrupulous in completing the form.  A number of fundamental errors appeared.  In particular :

(i)Mr Fan is wrongly cited as the applicant’s husband – the applicant’s husband at that time living on the Mainland – and Mr Fan’s Hong Kong address and identity card details are given.
  
(ii)The names given for the applicant’s two children are in fact the names of Mr Fan’s children.
  
(iii)According to the form, the applicant had no siblings. She admitted, however, that she did in fact have a sister and also a ‘sworn brother’, albeit that both of them were estranged.
  
(iv)The name of the applicant’s father and mother are given. But curiously it appears that the mother’s place of birth is given as Hong Kong and her residence as Hong Kong. Nothing is said of the mother being deceased.

217. The applicant did give the details of her mother’s identity card but, in my view, that is not to be taken as supporting her evidence that she filled out the ID 457 form believing that she may be filling out a claim for right of abode.  She was able to give her late mother’s identity card details, she said, because she had kept the card as a keep-sake.  She did not attempt to contact her father to obtain his details.

218. In respect of the ID 457 form, the applicant claimed that Mr Fan wrote out most of the characters and she copied them onto the form.  The two of them, she said, were both almost illiterate.  But that, in my judgment, would not explain how Mr Fan came to be described as her husband and his children as her children.  As I have said earlier, the inclusion of those details smacked very much of a tactical decision, one, I believe, that may have been made in the hope of reducing her culpability for overstaying.

219. When the applicant was interviewed that day, she completed a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  On this she wrote :

“I overstayed because I was with family, now I want to return to China.”

220. It was the applicant’s case that she had no desire to return to China.  But, because she was virtually illiterate, she was given a form by the interviewing officer and told simply to copy the characters from that form.  She was content to do so, she said, because, being illiterate, she did not understand what she was writing and believed she may even have been claiming right of abode.

221. The characters written by the applicant were (in substance) in accordance with a standard formula.  Having regard to the applicant’s level of literacy, the probabilities suggest that she was assisted by the interviewing officer.  But that is not to say that she was deceived as to what she was writing or wrote the characters against her will : on the evidence, I do not think either was the case.

222. On 26 November 1997, the applicant appeared in the Western Magistracy, pleading guilty to breaching her conditions of stay.  According to the applicant, when speaking to the magistrate she asserted her right to live in Hong Kong and asked him if, having been fined, she would then be able to obtain a Hong Kong identity card.  When challenged on this, she shifted her ground, saying that, to the best of her memory, she spoke these words to the court staff and not directly to the magistrate.  However, later she appeared to return to her earlier version.  The transcript of the court proceedings proved that she made no representations to the magistrate of any kind :

“Court :Convicted.  Do you want to say anything?
   
 Defendant :No.
   
 Court :You’re fined $2,000.”

223. In April 1998 the applicant returned to Hong Kong, again on the strength of a two-way permit.  Again she breached her conditions of stay, remaining longer than her permit allowed. 

224. The evidence reveals that in February 1998, before the applicant returned to Hong Kong, her father made an application to the Immigration Department for a ‘Certificate of Registered Particulars’ in respect of himself.  This, it was said, was significant in supporting the applicant’s contention that she wished to come to Hong Kong to claim right of abode here.  The difficulty faced by the applicant, however, is that in the original case summary prepared by her first solicitors, it was said that the father had obtained the certificate on the advice of an immigration officer in order to apply for a one-way permit in the Mainland.  Indeed, the summary contains the following statement :

“After receiving the Certificate, her father went to the Mainland and tried but failed to apply for a one-way permit for Ms Tsang on the basis of their relationship and him being a PR [permanent resident].”

225. On 6 December 1998 the applicant was arrested by police.  Initially, hoping to avoid prosecution, she pretended to be her late mother.  It took a day or so to discover the applicant’s true identity.  During that time she was in custody and, so she said, becoming worried about her father at home in his Tseung Kwan O flat.  The applicant was shown her father’s movement records which demonstrated that he was not even in Hong Kong at the time.

226. While in police custody, the applicant said that she was interviewed and told the police that one of her primary reasons for coming to Hong Kong was to claim right of abode.  However, the police referral proforma (completed as part of the process of transferring the applicant into the custody of the Immigration Department) states only that she had come to Hong Kong to receive an operation.  In cross-examination, the applicant admitted that she had said this as well, even though it was not true, in order to elicit sympathy.

227. Having been transferred to the Victoria Immigration Centre, the applicant was subjected to the standard administrative procedures in respect of bail and investigative procedures to ascertain whether she was prepared to be repatriated and/or should be the subject of criminal prosecution for overstaying.

228. In her affirmation of 3 December 2002, the applicant said that it had been her father who had obtained bail for her.  That was wrong.  Contemporaneous documents show that it was Mr Fan.

229. The applicant was firm, however, in her assertion that, while at the centre, she had made it clear that she was unwilling to return to the Mainland and that despite all the earlier rebuffs, she had sought to claim right of abode.  This claim, she said, had been made during her interview with Ms Candy Wong Ying Fong, a Senior Immigration Assistant, who at the time had been responsible for assessing whether immigration offenders who had been referred by the police to the Victoria Immigration Centre should be given their liberty on the strength of a recognisance.

230. Ms Wong had no independent recollection of dealing with the applicant but testified that if the applicant had not been willing to be repatriated she would not have invited her to sign the proforma ‘grounds for non-removal’ form which, leaving space for the name, was printed :

“I …… voluntarily want to go back to the Mainland of China as soon as possible.”

231. As to any claim for right of abode, Ms Wong said that if the applicant had made such a claim she would have been free to record that claim in writing.  This was not done.

232. As to why she had put her signature on the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, the applicant said that, when she was told to sign the form, being illiterate, she asked what she was signing and whether – yet again – it was a form enabling her to claim right of abode.  In reply, she said, she was told that she must simply sign or go to jail.  She signed, she said, in the hope of avoiding prosecution.

233. On a consideration of the evidence, I reject any suggestion that the applicant was threatened in the manner suggested by her.  I accept that the applicant may well have signed the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form in the hope of avoiding prosecution but, if she did so, it was a self-induced hope.

234. Upon her arrival at the Victoria Immigration Centre, the applicant had been given a form headed ‘My Personal Data’ and had done her best to complete it.  In that form she again gave the name of her husband as Mr Fan.  But she also gave details of her father and mother, saying both were Hong Kong residents.  At the foot of the form there is a printed request for copies of the identity cards of the parents of the person completing the form.  Against this, the applicant wrote that she could not provide a copy of her mother’s identity card.  She testified that by then she had in fact lost the card.  On another form, however, the applicant undertook to bring a copy of her father’s identity card to the Immigration Department on 10 December 1998.

235. The applicant testified that she had no idea of the purpose of completing the personal data form.  On behalf of the Immigration Department, it was said that information on resident parents and the like was required in connection with the possible granting of recognisances and, if necessary, to facilitate further investigations.

236. There is no doubt, in my mind, that the forms completed on 8 December 1998 are capable of constituting a record of a claim if one was made.  But, as I have said, I do not accept that any claim was made.  Nor, in my view, can the documents themselves be said to constitute a claim.  They are – on their face – standard documents for use by the Victoria Immigration Centre in all kinds of cases.

237. On 23 December 1998, before her repatriation, the applicant was convicted on her own plea of breaching her conditions of stay.  The applicant testified that she was asked if she had anything to say and remembered telling the magistrate that she had right of abode.  The transcript, however, records that all she told the court was that she had overstayed in order to seek treatment for a kidney problem.  Nothing appears on the face of the record to suggest that she made any assertion to the effect that she was entitled to right of abode.

238. As I said earlier, by the conclusion of the applicant’s testimony it was apparent that without any real regard for the accuracy of her memory, if an opportunity presented itself in the chronology of her evidence, she would say that she had claimed right of abode.  To employ Mr Fok’s description, it became a mantra, one sadly without any substance.

239. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)the applicant did not make a claim for right of abode; and
  
(ii)the Director has no record of any claim.

Madam Sze Shuk Fan (3126 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

240. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in 1972.  Her father settled in Hong Kong in 1978 and in 1990 was joined by the applicant’s mother and her two younger siblings.  The applicant, however, the oldest child, was not granted a one-way permit.

241. The applicant remained on the Mainland, qualifying as a primary school teacher.  I am informed that in 2002 she married a Hong Kong permanent resident and that there is now a child of the union.

242. In 1994, the applicant came to Hong Kong as a visitor but overstayed and was prosecuted before being repatriated.

243. In March 1996 the applicant returned to Hong Kong as a visitor and overstayed a second time.  On this occasion she overstayed, she said, because, having no family on the Mainland, she hoped that she would be able to benefit from a rumoured amnesty that would come into effect on the change of sovereignty and would enable people like her to live permanently in Hong Kong.

244. It was the applicant’s testimony that she therefore remained in hiding until after the change of sovereignty.  However, when the handover took place, she was dismayed to discover that the rumoured amnesty did not materialize.  To the contrary, she learnt that people in her position were being repatriated.

245. The applicant said that, in the hope that more positive developments would take place, she resolved to remain in hiding with her family.  While in hiding, she said, she learnt that a number of abode seekers had instituted legal action in order to enforce what they believed to be their right to remain in Hong Kong.  Still too timid to come out of hiding, the applicant said that she hoped to be able to benefit from any successful result of this litigation.

246. It was the applicant’s evidence that she later learnt from her mother (who had herself learnt it from “fellow villagers”) that apparently the Hong Kong immigration authorities had devised some scheme in terms of which people like her could apply to live permanently in Hong Kong.  She was buoyed up by this news, believing that perhaps it was linked with the right of abode litigation.

247. In the result, she said, on 28 February 1998 she and her mother, together with her younger sister, went to the Immigration Tower hoping to benefit from this new scheme.  The purpose of the visit was therefore to seek the right of the applicant to remain permanently in Hong Kong.

248. The applicant said that her younger sister acted as an interpreter, her own Cantonese still being rudimentary.  The applicant said that she was very nervous and essentially followed the lead given by her mother and her sister.  She recalled some sort of conversation on the 2nd floor at the information counter and then all three of them going up to the 13th floor to the offices of the GIS.

249. As to what took place at the offices of the GIS, the applicant accepted that her memory was not good.  She was, as I have already said, very nervous and that made her muddle-headed.  She recalled, however, that her mother went to the reception counter where she spoke to two officers.  Her mother, she said, asked the officers for the forms which would enable the applicant to remain permanently in Hong Kong.  At this time, said the applicant, she was called up to the counter to be identified.  The applicant accepted that she did not have too clear a recollection of what then ensued but she remembered her mother showing her Hong Kong identity card to the officers and also displaying the applicant’s long-expired two-way permit.

250. Although the applicant did not testify directly to the issue, it must be that, on her version of events, she and her mother were then informed that it was not possible for the applicant to apply for right of abode.  I say this because, in a frank admission, the applicant said that, when she came to complete the ID 457 form given to her at the counter, she knew she was not filling out an application for right of abode.  She knew this, she said, because she had been told that, because she had overstayed, she could not remain permanently.

251. But as to the issue of whether on the evidence given, it could be said that the applicant’s mother made a claim for right of abode on behalf of the applicant, I am satisfied that, if the evidence is accepted, it would constitute a claim.  No special litany is prescribed.  The essence of what the mother is asserted to have said and done at the counter could only have been understood as an attempt to make an application for the applicant to be given the right to remain permanently in Hong Kong.

252. But do I accept the applicant’s evidence as to what took place at the counter?  Only the applicant was able to speak to the matter.  Her sister, who also testified during the hearing, appears not to have been close enough to have been privy to what took place at the counter.  I am satisfied, however, that I am able to rely on the applicant’s testimony as being both truthful and, in its broad way, accurate too.

253. The applicant impressed me as an essentially credible witness.  Her demeanour was impressive.  Despite searching cross-examination, she remained calm, almost gentle, and did not, in my view, at any time fall into the trap of attempting to enhance her case by exaggeration.

254. I am satisfied that the applicant had compelling reason to wish to live permanently in Hong Kong.  I am satisfied that she remained here in hiding for so long, hoping somehow to be able to secure that benefit.  I am also satisfied that she and her mother and her younger sister went to the Immigration Tower on 28 February 1998 not simply for the purposes of her repatriation but in the hope that she could apply for right of abode.  I am satisfied that, in the applicant’s presence, her mother made a claim for right of abode to the officers at the reception counter on the 13th floor.  The mother showed her Hong Kong Identity Card to those officers and the details of that card were recorded on the ID457 form.

255. As to the ID 457 form itself, the applicant said that she was to nervous to complete it all herself and her sister therefore completed it for her.  As I have said, the mother’s Hong Kong identity card details were recorded on the form, showing that she had right of abode.  The applicant said that she was unable to obtain details of her father’s identity card as, to use her words, mobile phones were not so common in those days and she was unable to contact her father.

256. On behalf of the Director, two matters were emphasised.  First, that the applicant herself accepted that, to her knowledge at the time, she was not filling out the ID 457 form in order to apply for right of abode.  Second, that clearly the mother’s details were only recorded on the form because the mother happened to be there at the time and would have had her identity card with her.  Accordingly, the ID 457 form was not capable, in this case, of constituting the record of a claim.

257. I do not agree.  While the admission by the applicant that she knew she was not filling out an actual application form for right of abode is certainly relevant, I do not see that it is determinative.  In the present case, as I have said, I am satisfied on the probabilities that the mother did make a claim on behalf of the applicant and in the applicant’s presence took out and displayed her own Hong Kong identity card as evidence that, through her, the applicant was entitled to reside permanently in Hong Kong.  The details of that same card were then recorded on the ID 457 form.

258. In its judgment of 9 January 2004, the CFA said :

“28.The purpose of the requirement that there be a written record of a claim in the possession of the Director was to provide a form of verification to enable the Director to implement the concession policy (see January judgment, para. 210). The existence of this purpose does not mean that the Director should disregard the fact that an applicant has claimed right of abode when considering whether documentary materials constitute evidence of the making of such a claim. On the contrary, as far as the Director is concerned, he knew that each applicant asserted that a claim for right of abode was made and he is now aware of the Judge’s findings. If, viewing the relevant documentary material in that light, it may, on its face, fairly be said to constitute evidence corroborating the fact that a claim for right of abode had been made, the concession policy requirement for a record is satisfied.
   
  …
   
 36.However, once it is accepted that the form should be viewed in the light of the fact that a claim for right of abode has been made by the relevant applicant, the insertion of the particulars of a parent who has permanent residence in Hong Kong, including the parent’s identity card number, takes on new significance. When the applicant inserts particulars of a parent's identity card number and the applicant has claimed or is claiming right of abode, the form does not have a merely neutral character. The particulars point in the direction of a claim for right of abode, no matter that the form is regarded by the Department as having an essentially neutral character.”

259. On the basis of these directions, I am satisfied that in the present case the ID 457 form is capable of – and does – constitute a record of the claim made by the mother on behalf of her daughter.

260. That, in my view, is sufficient to enable me to determine the two issues that I am required to determine.  There was, however, other evidence given, some of it contentious, and some brief mention should be made of it.

261. After the ID 457 form had been completed, it was the applicant’s testimony, supported by her sister, that she and her sister were taken to some sort of interview room.  The mother, however, was told to wait outside.  To the best of her memory, said the applicant, the officer who was to interview her appeared to be busy.  She and her sister were therefore told to wait to one side by the escorting officer while that officer gave her what she believes was a blank piece of paper and told her to write on it why she had overstayed.  To the best of her memory, she said, she wrote characters to the effect that she had wanted to stay to be with her family; that is, to have a family reunion.  It was the applicant’s evidence that this piece of paper was then taken by the escorting officer and was never seen by her again.

262. The applicant said that when the interview itself commenced, she was given a new form, a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, and asked to complete it, again being asked to state why she had overstayed.  On this occasion, however, she said she recalled being shown a piece of paper on which were written a number of options and was told to copy one of these options.  She said that she asked she could use her own words.  She could not now remember the officer’s exact reply, she said, but she understood that she had no choice in the matter and therefore chose what she considered to be an unsatisfactory but nevertheless most appropriate option.  In the result, the applicant wrote the familiar format of characters :

“I have overstayed because of keeping company with my family. I now want to return to China.”

263. The applicant’s sister gave evidence which supported the applicant.  Specifically, the sister recalled the applicant being handed a piece of paper by an officer before the commencement of the interview, and writing on that piece of paper words to the effect that the applicant had wished to stay in Hong Kong to be with her family.  That paper, said the sister, was handed back to the officer who had given it to the applicant.

264. As for the interview itself, the sister said, that in acting as an informal interpreter, she recalled the applicant being asked to copy characters from a sheet placed in front of her by the interviewing officer.

265. The evidence given by the applicant and her sister to the effect that the applicant was given a piece of paper before the interview commenced and asked to state on it why she had overstayed was puzzling.  There had been no earlier evidence given of such a procedure either by applicants or by immigration officers.  On behalf of the applicant, it was suggested that officers in the GIS, being very busy, may sometimes have asked for such statements ahead of the interviews as a method of speeding up matters.  But it was the evidence of Ms Chow Wing Man, the interviewing officer, that it would not speed up anything.  The ‘grounds for non-removal’ form would still have had to be completed during the course of the interview.

266. In my judgment, it was equally possible that, after such a long lapse of time, the applicant and her sister were mistaken or that, in fact, whether it helped good administration or not, that the applicant may in fact have been asked to complete such a document.  Variations of a system are sometimes attempted but never incorporated into the system itself.  On the probabilities, therefore, I have not been able to come to a finding either way.  As for the interview itself, while the evidence of the applicant and her sister was not on all fours, I think it probable that the applicant was assisted in what to write on the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  From all of this, however, in my view, the only important finding is that nothing said by the applicant (or her sister) led me to doubt their general credibility such as would undermine my findings that the applicant visited the offices of the GIS that day to seek right of abode and a claim for that right was made at the reception counter.

267. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)The applicant did make a claim for right of abode, that claim being made by her mother on her behalf and in her presence;
  
(ii)The Director has a record of the claim.

Mr Yim Shing Cheung (4232 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

268. The applicant’s father entered Hong Kong illegally in 1979 but, by reason of an amnesty, was granted right of residence.  The applicant’s mother joined him in 1988.  By 1997 all three of the applicants’ siblings had obtained right of abode.  The applicant was the only member of the family denied the right to live here.

269. The applicant, who was born in 1972, said that a few months before the change of sovereignty his father visited him on the Mainland.  They discussed the possibility of an amnesty being granted when the change of sovereignty took place.  In the expectation of being able to benefit from this amnesty, the applicant testified that he obtained a two-way permit which allowed him to come to Hong Kong in March 1997, remaining until early June .  The applicant, however, overstayed.  He did so, he said, because his father was ‘betting’ on the granting of the amnesty.

270. However, at or about the time of the change of sovereignty, the applicant testified that he heard news that people in his position were being arrested.  He realised, therefore, that the amnesty described by his father was unlikely to be granted.  The applicant said that shortly after the handover his mother first telephoned and then made two visits to the Immigration Department to see if there was a means by which he could obtain right of abode.  His mother reported that there was no mechanism available to him in Hong Kong and that, on the basis of what she had been told, he would have to return to the Mainland to make a claim there.  The applicant said that, knowing there would be no amnesty, he decided to return to the Mainland.  He had a girlfriend there and wished to be united with her.

271. In the result, he said, on 14 August 1997 he attempted to return to the Mainland via Lo Wu.  However, having overstayed, he was stopped and interviewed.  The applicant’s memory of events of what took place at Lo Wu, he admitted, was now hazy.  He did recall, however, being asked by an interviewing officer why he had overstayed and giving an answer to the effect that his parents were Hong Kong residents and he wished to have a family reunion with them, overstaying in the hope of obtaining a Hong Kong identity card.

272. Whether such a statement would amount to a claim for right of abode as opposed to a statement simply of past purpose is not clear.  In the event, however, the issue does not require determination.  I say that because I am satisfied, on the probabilities, that the applicant did not make a statement of the kind to which he testified.

273. While the applicant was not a plainly incredible witness, being prepared to admit that his memory was fallible and never pushing matters to the point of absurdity, there were a number of reasons why I could place little, if any, reliance on this part of his testimony :

(a)The applicant was returning to the Mainland that day in the belief that there was no way he could claim right of abode in Hong Kong; he was returning, therefore, to commence his life again with his girlfriend. More than that, as he admitted, his memory of what was said and done that day was hazy.
   
(b)The record of interview recorded only that the applicant’s reason for overstaying was ‘to stay longer with parents’. In this regard, the interviewing officer stated on the record that, in his opinion, the applicant had been cooperative during the interview. On the basis that the interview process was a cooperative one, there is little reason to doubt that at least the gist of what the applicant had said would have been recorded.
   
(c)Of particular importance, in my view, is that in the summary of his claim prepared by his first solicitors, Pam Baker & Co., nothing was said to the effect that the applicant claimed right of abode at Lo Wu – to the contrary, what was recorded fits in with the substance of the Lo Wu interview record. The summary by Pam Baker & Co. said :
   
 “He tried to leave via Lo Wu, but when officers saw from his two-way permit that had overstayed since 7 June 1997, they prevented him leaving. Mr Yim was interviewed where he explained that his parents are permanent residents and that he had overstayed because he wanted to be with them. He was told to report to Wanchai ID on 19 August 1997.”
   
(d)Also of importance, in my view, is the fact that, when interviewed by the Immigration Department in June 2000 so that he could state the basis of his claims for right of abode, even though he had had the opportunity to prepare his statement, the applicant again said nothing of making a claim at Lo Wu. At that time, he relied solely on apparent claims to right of abode made earlier by his mother on his behalf. The translation of what he wrote on 15 June 2000 is as follows :
   
 “I came to Hong Kong on a Permit for Travelling to and from Hong Kong and Macau [(No.)2368895] on 26 March 1997 and returned to my hometown on 25 August 1997. During the period in between, my mother went to the 13/F and the Information Counter of the Immigration Department on 28 July and 12 August 1997 to lay claim to the right of abode in Hong Kong on my behalf. However, she was told ‘Our Department does not have such a mechanism for the time being. Your son must make the application back on the Mainland.’ I therefore surrendered myself to the Immigration Department on 20 August. After a ruling was made by the Western Magistracy on 25 August, I returned to the Mainland.”

274. During the course of the hearing, it transpired that there may have been more than one officer involved in the interview of the applicant at Lo Wu.  That second officer was not called to testify.  That is a matter which I took into account but, in my judgment, the record of interview materials essentially speak for themselves.  In any event, they are only one of the factors which I have considered in reaching my determination.

275. During the hearing, the applicant was asked why, in June 2000, when he had been given an opportunity to detail all his claims, he had made no mention of a claim for right of abode made at Lo Wu.  The applicant said that, before his interview, he had not been given specific legal advice concerning his own case and had had to rely on a circular letter from his solicitors.  At that time, he said, being guided only by the circular letter, he believed that the emphasis should be placed on the claims made on his behalf by his mother.  This was where, he said, he believed he had the strongest proof.  But if the applicant, as he asserted, had made personal claims – matters also referred to in the letter of guidance – it seems strange to me that some mention at least would not have been made of them, especially as, on his own evidence, the applicant had been anxious to obtain right of residence in Hong Kong.

276. On 19 August 1997, the applicant went with his father to the offices of the GIS on the 13th floor of the Immigration Tower.  The applicant testified that at the reception counter he was asked by an officer why he had overstayed and recalled replying that he had overstayed for the purposes of family reunion and in order to obtain a Hong Kong identity card.  It was put to the applicant during cross-examination that he would only have been asked this question during the course of the later interview and not at the counter.  The applicant, however, insisted that his recollection of events in this regard was accurate.  But if so, his testimony was at variance with the summary of his case prepared by Pam Baker & Co. which read :

“He went up to the 13th floor and showed the officer his two-way permit and the letter from Lo Wu. He was given a form to complete in which he had to set out his ‘natural’ family members in HK. He specifically asked the officer if there was any way he could stay in HK, which received a dusty, negative response.” [my emphasis]

277. Ms Chan Ka Man, an Immigration Assistant on duty that day, testified that, if she understood that a claim for right of abode was being made by a person coming to the counter, she would ask that person to provide supporting documents and would arrange for copies of those documents to be supplied to a superior officer together with a completed ID 457 form.  On the applicant’s own evidence, this had not happened.

278. It is possible, of course, that Ms Chan may not have dealt with this applicant.  On behalf of the applicant, it was also suggested that there was no firm evidence that Ms Chan had even been on duty that day, there being no direct evidence as to the duty roster records.  But even discounting Ms Chan’s evidence, I have been unable to place any reliance on the applicant’s version of events.  In the case summary prepared by his first solicitors, the one to which I have just referred, he is recorded as saying that it was he who asked if there was any way he could stay in Hong Kong.  During the course of the hearing before me, however, he said that he was first asked why he had overstayed and only in answer made what (in substance) was a claim for right of abode.  The two versions are substantially different.

279. The applicant testified that the officer at the counter gave him an ID 457 form to complete.  The form gives details of his father’s Hong Kong identity card.  These details were put onto the form, said the applicant, by his father.

280. As to his interview that day, the applicant accepted that he did not have much recollection of it.  He recalled however that the interviewing officer told him that, as he had overstayed, he would be prosecuted.  The applicant recalled being given a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form to complete and being asked to complete it in accordance with a sample answer.  The applicant said that he duly copied the words.  He did so, he said, because he felt he had no choice in the matter.  Quite why he felt he had no choice was never clearly explained.  The applicant, who would have been 23 years old at the time, said that he did feel a little afraid even though he accepted that he had not in any way been threatened by the officer or treated badly.  In the event, he wrote the following :

“I have overstayed to keep company with my family. I now want to return to China.”

281. In his testimony, the applicant did not appear to suggest that during the interview process he made any claim for right of abode.  He recalled some conversation but could no longer remember its contents.

282. The interviewing officer, Ms Chow Wing Man, did not accept that she gave sample forms to any interviewee.  I do not accept that.  The applicant’s written words are very much in a standard format, one patently either dictated or copied from a sample.  Ms Chow had testified in respect of other applications and, as counsel for the applicant pointed out, her other interview records also contained standard format statements.  But whether or not a dictated or written answer was provided to the applicant does not, in my opinion, take the matter much further.  The applicant accepted that he had not been subject to any undue pressure.  On his own evidence, therefore, if he had been determined to put down that he sought right of abode he would have been able to do so.

283. In summary, therefore, as to the making of a claim for right of abode, it was the applicant’s case that he had made oral claims on two occasions; first, at Lo Wu and, second, at the reception counter of the GIS.  But, for the reasons given, I do not accept that he made a claim on either occasion.

284. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;
  
(ii)The Director does not have a record of any claim.

Mr Leung Tak Kwan (2137 : a ‘group two’ applicant)

285. The applicant was born in Guangdong Province in October 1970, one of four siblings.  His father came to live and work in Hong Kong in 1981, his mother joining him in 1986.  Only one of the applicant’s siblings, the youngest child of the family, was permitted to come to Hong Kong to settle permanently with the parents.

286. In 1986, the applicant applied for a one-way permit to join his parents in Hong Kong.  That application was refused.  The written refusal makes it plain that the applicant was not eligible under the one-way permit scheme and should not apply again.

287. The applicant, a quietly confident young man, testified that he still hoped to find some way of coming to settle permanently in Hong Kong.  In August 1997, he said that his father came to the Mainland and the two of them visited the local Public Security Bureau in order to obtain application forms for inclusion in the ‘Certificate of Entitlement’ scheme.  According to the applicant, however, the staff at the Bureau knew nothing of the scheme.

288. The applicant came to Hong Kong as a visitor in January 1998, his two-way permit permitting him to remain until April of that year.  It was the applicant’s testimony that he hoped somehow to be able to further his claim for right of abode during this visit.

289. The applicant said that about 10 days after his arrival, he went to the information counter on the 2nd floor of the Immigration Tower to ask whether he could apply for right of abode, benefiting perhaps from a successful conclusion to the ongoing right of abode litigation being conducted by ‘the children’ of Hong Kong permanent residents.  It was the applicant’s recollection that he was told that this litigation would only apply to minor children and that, as an adult, there was no way that he could benefit from the litigation even if it was successful.

290. The applicant testified that on 4 April 1998, the last day that he was permitted to remain in Hong Kong, he went back to the information counter on the 2nd floor of the Immigration Tower.  This time he went with his father.  His father was with him, he said, in order to prove the fact that the applicant was entitled to right of abode through him.

291. The applicant said that he informed the counter staff that both his parents were permanent Hong Kong residents and that he would like to apply to remain permanently in Hong Kong.  He said that he was again informed that there was no such mechanism available to him and that, if he wished to live permanently in Hong Kong, he must apply on the Mainland for a one-way permit.  According to the applicant he then enquired if he could be allowed to stay in Hong Kong in order to help care for his mother who was not in good health.  He was informed that this would not allow him to remain permanently in Hong Kong but the staff at the Chinese Visitors Office may agree to an extension of stay.

292. The applicant went forthwith, with his father, to the Chinese Visitors Office.  He showed an officer at the counter a medical slip relating to his mother’s illness and said that he was then given a form to complete.  This form clearly bears the heading : ‘Application for an extension of stay’.

293. It was the applicant’s case that, having put down certain details on the form, he went back to the counter and spoke briefly to an officer.  He asked the officer if he could put down on the form that he had right of abode.  He was told that he could not do so as the form was only concerned with the applications for extensions of stay.  In the result, said the applicant, in that section of the form which requires a statement of his reasons for wishing to remain longer in Hong Kong, he wrote the words : ‘Because my mother does not feel well’.

294. However, beneath that endorsement, in a box bearing the direction : ‘Particulars of spouse and/or children if included in your travel document’, the applicant gave his mother’s name.  In addition, he gave the full details of her Hong Kong identity card number and both her place and date of birth.

295. As to why he should give these details when they did not appear to be required, the applicant said that he wished to apply for right of abode but there were simply no forms available.  There was here, however, some space for him to put down the details of his mother.  His mother was the person whom he wished to help care for in Hong Kong.  He wished to make it plain, he said, that she was a permanent resident and that he had the right, through her, to remain permanently in Hong Kong.

296. The applicant said that when he took the completed form to the counter, the officer who examined the form put a line through the details of his mother’s identity card and place of birth, indicating that it was not relevant.  The applicant was granted a two-day extension and, it appears, left Hong Kong at the end of that extension.

297. The father was called to give evidence concerning the events of 4 April 1998.  I have given little, if any, weight to his evidence.  While I expected the father to be partisan, his evidence was tailored entirely to support what the son said.  Frankly, I doubt whether the father had any real recollection of events that day so many years earlier.

298. However, my assessment of the applicant’s credibility was altogether different.  I found him to be a credible witness.  There were many occasions, especially during cross-examination, when he could have exaggerated his evidence or coloured it to try and enhance his case.  He did not do so.

299. In light of the fact that the applicant had apparently gone to the information office on the 2nd floor of the Immigration Tower some 10 days after his arrival in Hong Kong and had been informed at that time that he could not seek right of abode in Hong Kong, he was asked why, on 4 April 1998, both at the Immigration Tower and that the Chinese Visitors Office he purported to make the same claim.  As I understood it, it was the essential thrust of the applicant’s answer that, while he expected to get the same answers, he knew policies were changing and was of the view that, if he did not at least press the issue, he would never know if there had perhaps been a change of either policy or procedure that worked to his advantage.

300. Listening to the applicant’s evidence, I was satisfied that in 1998 he was looking for some way to secure residence here and was frustrated at the inability to do so.  It is plain that the applicant (and his father) had been attempting for some time to secure the right to live in Hong Kong.  The applicant himself, as I have said earlier, struck me as a confident young man, one quite capable of pressing a claim if he felt strongly enough about it even if he knew that it was inevitably going to be rejected.

301. The applicant, of course, knew, when he went to the Chinese Visitors Office, that it was an office which dealt only with extensions of stay.  But that of itself, in my view, is not determinative.  Evidence was led that there were large notices placed on the walls of the office telling people that, if they wished to settle in Hong Kong, they must make their applications on the Mainland.  The notices were there to discourage people making claims, the reasonable inference being that this was because there had at least been some history of claims being made at that office.

302. In my judgment, the applicant’s brief conversation with a counter officer during which he asked if he could write on his form that he had right of abode was, when viewed in the round, capable of constituting an oral claim for such right.  Certainly, in my view, it would have been well understood by the officer involved in that conversation that the applicant was asserting a right of abode and was merely asking whether he could endorse the form with that assertion.

303. The crucial issue, of course, is whether on the probabilities I can be satisfied that such a conversation took place.  It has not been the easiest of issues to decide.  At the end of the day, however, I am satisfied that the probabilities do support the applicant.  I am satisfied therefore that he did make an oral claim for right of abode that day at the Chinese Visitors Office.

304. I am further satisfied that a record evidencing that claim is in the possession of the Director, that record being the form completed by the applicant which bears his mother’s name, identity card details, place and date of birth.

305. I accept, of course, that in all probability the applicant did not bring his mother’s identity card with him nor did he telephone his mother for the details.  The number appears on a medical slip which the applicant had in his possession that day to prove that his mother was infirm.  I have also taken into account that it would have been very easy for the applicant to give details of his father’s identity card as well, his father being with him at that time.

306. On behalf of the Director, it was submitted that the probabilities plainly show that the details appearing on the application form were not related in any way to a claim for right of abode but were there only to support an application for a brief extension of stay based on the illness of the mother.  In my judgment, however, the applicant had two reasons for putting down the details of his mother, the one integral to the other.  The applicant was seeking an extension of stay based on his mother’s ill health but at the same time he was putting down on the form evidence of the fact that, as he saw it, he did have the right to remain in Hong Kong, that right coming through his mother, the very person whose ill health was his concern.  The details of his mother were not required in order to obtain his extension.  The form did not seek such particulars.  Nevertheless, they were given.

307. The completed form has to be viewed in light of the fact that, on my finding, a claim for right of abode had been made.  The insertion of the particulars of the mother accompanied by evidence that she had permanent right of residence in Hong Kong therefore took on a new significance notwithstanding the fact that the form itself was never intended as a vehicle for claiming right of abode.

308. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)The applicant did make a claim for right of abode;
  
(ii)The Director has a record of the claim.

Mr Tsoi Ching Chung (3387 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

309. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in February 1986.  He is the eldest of three brothers.  I am told that one brother lives in Hong Kong, the other in the Philippines.  The applicant’s father came to live and work in Hong Kong in 1978, his mother following in 1986.  By the change of sovereignty, both were permanent residents.

310. The applicant came to Hong Kong on 1 April 1997 as a member of a tourist group.  He was scheduled to return two weeks later.  However, he remained in Hong Kong with his parents.  The probabilities indicate that the applicant came to Hong Kong with the intention of seeking right of abode.  He gave evidence that, prior to his arrival, rumours had circulated among his clansmen that after the change of sovereignty an amnesty would be granted to the children of Hong Kong residents.  He also gave evidence that he had read pamphlets to the same effect.  It appears that a deliberate decision was made by the applicant and his family that he should seek to come to Hong Kong as a member of a tour group rather than on a two-way permit, the fear being that, in the months before the change of sovereignty, the Mainland authorities may put a clamp on the issue of two-way permits.

311. Apparently, within a week or so of his arrival, the applicant and his mother – the mother taking an active role in representing her son’s interests – went to the Chinese Visitors Office to enquire whether an extension of stay could be granted so that the applicant could apply for right of abode.  They were told, however, that the applicant would have to return to the Mainland to process any claim there.

312. As to what happened after the change of sovereignty, it was the mother’s evidence that she was well-aware that many people would be seeking right of abode in the days following the handover and that if she and her son delayed there was a real risk that the Hong Kong authorities would move to prevent too large an influx of immigrants from the Mainland.  In the result, she said, as soon as the change of sovereignty took place she made a number of enquiries with the Immigration Department.  She was informed, however, that there would be no amnesty.  She admitted that she had also read media reports at the time to the effect that claimants for right of abode were being arrested.  As I understood the mother’s evidence, however, although it was asserted in a defensive, guarded way, it was to the effect that in July 1997 issues concerning right of abode remained uncertain.  She said that she heard different versions.  There was, for example, she said, some talk about people obtaining right of abode if they claimed it between 1 and 10 July 1997.  As the mother expressed it, the Government appeared to have one version of events, others had other versions; by this, I presume she meant that the Government was believed by some to be wrong in law.

313. I have referred to the mother’s evidence because, in my view, her evidence was the defining evidence.  I mean no disrespect when I say that the applicant himself struck me forcefully as being a man, not simply uneducated, but of limited intelligence.  It appears he never progressed further than junior primary school and, before coming to Hong Kong, had been unemployed.  After so many years, it was debatable, I think, whether he really had any memory of events in the days following the change of sovereignty.  In assessing the applicant’s evidence, I had little hesitation in concluding that he had been coached, certainly as to the broad outline of his case.  The mother, Madam Cheng, was therefore the critical witness.  She was of a very different character to her son; very protective of him, strong-willed and forceful to the point often of being argumentative.

314. It was the evidence of both the applicant and his mother that a claim for right of abode was made at the Immigration Tower on 23 July 1997.

315. During cross-examination, it was put to the mother that by that date both she and her son knew full well that there was simply no hope of any form of amnesty and that the longer the applicant remained in Hong Kong the more stringent the likely punishment when he was eventually forced to surrender.  The mother, however, denied that the purpose of the visit that day had been simply to surrender for purposes of her son’s repatriation.  She was firm in her evidence that on 23 July 1997 she and her son still wished to ‘clarify’ whether there was any way he could claim right of abode.

316. The mother testified that she and her son went first to the information counter at the 2nd floor.  She asked if people in the position of her son had the right to claim right of abode.  She admitted that she was told that her son must return to the Mainland.  Yet again, therefore, she received negative advice, the position being ‘clarified’ that her son could not obtain right of abode in Hong Kong.

317. The mother could not remember clearly whether she and her son were referred to the offices of the GIS on the 13th floor or to other offices on the floor above.  Her evidence in this regard was confused.  It is clear, however, that, as a member of a tour group party who had overstayed, the applicant was referred to the offices of the Outside Investigation Section (‘the OIS’) on the 14th floor.

318. It was the mother’s testimony that, on arrival at the upper floor, she and her son spoke to the officer at the reception counter.  She spoke on behalf of her son, saying that he was seeking right of abode in order to stay permanently in Hong Kong with his parents.  According to the mother, the officer replied to the effect that there was no such thing as an application process of that kind.  The mother testified that her son’s travel papers were then examined and at the reception counter itself they were given an ID 457 form to complete.

319. It was, however, the evidence of the Director that in the OIS it was the practice for the ID 457 to be completed during the course of the interview and not before it commenced.  Whichever way – and I do not think a great deal turns on it – the form, it appears, was completed by the mother, the son placing his signature upon it.  The form gives the names of the applicant’s parents, their correspondence address in Hong Kong and the mother’s identity card number.  The form also contains particulars of the applicant’s brother, a Hong Kong resident.

320. During the course of submissions, it was emphasised on behalf of the applicant that the form contains no details of the applicant’s brother in the Philippines nor any details of the applicant’s wife and child on the Mainland.  This ‘selective provision of particulars’, it was submitted, indicated that the mother was emphasising only the applicant’s Hong Kong connection, that itself being evidence that she was at that time seeking to claim right of abode on his behalf.  Against that, however, the mother herself accepted during the course of cross­-examination that, when she completed the ID 457, she really had no idea of its nature or purpose.

321. The officer on duty at the reception counter that day was Ms Lam Mei Kuen.  It was her evidence that all ‘package tour overstayers’ were subject to investigation and would be referred to Team One of the OIS.  Ms Lam had no independent recollection of dealing with the applicant and his mother but said that, if a claim for right of abode had been made, she was at that time under standard instructions to refer such a claim to her superior.  The register book for that day shows however that the applicant and his mother were referred to Team One only, there being no record of any referral to a senior officer.  Ms Lam, who impressed me as a credible witness, accepted that, whether a claim for right of abode was or was not made, an overstayer would still have to be the subject of investigation.  However, she was firm in her evidence that, if what she understood to be a claim for right of abode had been made, she would in the first instance at least have referred the matter to a senior officer.

322. While I accept that Ms Lam was only able to rely on what she believed she would have done as a matter of standard practice and while I accept that perhaps enquiries as to right of abode – as opposed to unambiguous claims – may have been deflected with a simple answer that they could not be made in Hong Kong, on the probabilities I am satisfied that neither the mother nor her son made a claim for right of abode at the reception counter that day.

323. It must be remembered that the applicant’s mother had already made enquiries concerning right of abode at the information counter on the 2nd floor and had been informed that it was not possible to make such a claim in Hong Kong.  She had therefore obtained her ‘clarification’.  That advice accorded with earlier advice obtained as a result of a number of enquiries.  When she went to the 14th floor she could therefore have been in no doubt as to the existing policy.  On behalf of the Director, it was submitted that the mother’s evidence that she made a claim for right of abode on the upper floor of the Immigration Tower was, when viewed objectively, clearly the product of wishful thinking.  I have regrettably being drawn to the same conclusion.

324. It was, however, the mother’s testimony that she made a further claim for right of abode that day, this time when she and her son were interviewed by a member of Team One.

325. The mother said that she accompanied her son into the interview.  Her son was asked to write on a form why he had overstayed.  The mother said that she then spoke to the officer, indicating that her son wished to write down that he had come to Hong Kong believing that there was a possibility of uniting with his parents after the change of sovereignty, remaining here with the security of an issued identity card.  According to the mother, she was informed by the interviewing officer that it was not possible to write this onto the form and that instead the applicant should write something to the effect that he wished to return to the Mainland as soon as possible.  The mother recalls the interviewing officer speaking of the possibility of her son being fined or jailed.  When she heard this, she said, she became frightened and told her son that, as they now had no alternative, they should write whatever was required in order to avoid further trouble.  It was for that reason, said the mother, that she wrote onto the form the characters suggested to her by the interviewing officer.  The English translation of what she wrote is to the following effect :

“I, Tsoi Ching Chung came to Hong Kong as a tourist on 1 April 1997 and was originally scheduled to return along with the tourist group to Fujian on 14 April 1997. However, as I wanted to stay longer in Hong Kong to keep company with my parents, I overstayed in Hong Kong. I know that it was wrong and now request the authority to make arrangement for my return to Fujian as soon as possible.”

326. The interviewing officer, Mr Lee Chung Yeung, said that, while he had no independent recollection of the interview, he had no recollection of ever interviewing a person who had sought to claim right of abode.  But if such a claim had been made, he said, he would have followed standard practice, letting the party record the claim, collecting all necessary documents and then referring the entire file to a superior officer.

327. Mr Lee denied that he would have prevented the applicant’s mother from writing down that her son had come to Hong Kong believing he had right of abode or would in any way have raised the threat of imprisonment.  The applicant’s mother, he said, had been free to write what she wished.  But that being said, the characters written by the mother bear a striking resemblance to a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form completed by another applicant interviewed by OIS.  The probabilities, therefore, clearly indicate that the mother was guided, almost character by character, as to what to write.

328. However, that being said, on careful reflection I do not accept that the mother was guided in this matter because she had earlier attempted to assert a claim for right of abode and was being deterred from that path.  In my judgment, viewing the evidence as a whole, I am satisfied that, by the time the mother and her son presented themselves at the reception counter on the 14th floor, the mother had come to accept that there was no way her son could seek to claim right of abode in Hong Kong and wished, insofar as it was possible, to manage the process of his return to the Mainland with the minimum of prejudice to him.  That meant cooperating with the authorities and, insofar as it would be to her son’s advantage, writing down matters of mitigatory value.

329. The mother’s allegation that the interviewing officer, Mr Lee, used intimidating tactics simply did not ring true.  It was coloured by desperation, the mother, in my view, being prepared to say almost anything that would secure for her son the right to reside permanently in Hong Kong.

330. A number of applicants, having completed their testimony, would make pleas, asking the court to exercise its discretion on compassionate grounds.  The mother did the same.  She said that a number of her son’s friends had obtained right of residence; they had been here for many years and had earned a lot of money.  In my view, that statement was telling.  As it was submitted on behalf of the Director, it revealed that the mother resented that her son had not himself been successful.  It also suggested, I believe, that the mother was prepared to say whatever was necessary to ensure he was successful.

331. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode, either directly or through his mother;
  
(ii)The Director does not have a record of any claim.

Madam Wong Sau Chu (3794 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

332. Both of the applicant’s parents came to Hong Kong in the early 1980s.  Over the years they had been joined by a number of the applicant’s siblings.  The applicant herself had twice applied for a one-way permit to join her family in Hong Kong.  Neither application had been granted.  By 1997 the applicant was married and had two children, one very young.

333. It was the applicant’s case that in early 1997 she was told by her father that, in terms of the Basic Law, when the change of sovereignty took place, if she was in Hong Kong she would be entitled to claim right of abode.  The applicant applied for a two-way permit, hoping that she would be entitled to stay for three months, that period straddling the change of sovereignty.  Unfortunately, she said, she was only granted a two-month permit which meant that, in order to seek right of abode, she was forced to breach the restrictions of her stay.

334. The applicant testified that a few weeks before the change of sovereignty her mother was diagnosed with heart disease, giving her an additional reason – a compelling emotional one – to wish to remain in Hong Kong.

335. On all the evidence, it is clear, I think, that the applicant did come to Hong Kong for the purpose of claiming right of abode.  The more difficult issue is whether, in light of events that took place in the days following the change of sovereignty, when she presented herself to the immigration authorities, the applicant still believed she could seek right of abode or whether, as the Director submitted, she had by then come to understand that it was not possible to claim right of abode in Hong Kong and that, having overstayed, she had no option other than to surrender herself so that she could return to the Mainland in order to be with her husband and children.

336. The applicant went to the Immigration Tower with her father on 19 July 1997, two weeks or so after the change of sovereignty.  She went that day, she said, to claim right of abode.  She said that she had planned to go earlier in the company of her father but, as her father was unwell, she had been forced to delay the visit.

337. The applicant admitted that in the days following the change of sovereignty, she had learned that a number of people who had gone to the Immigration Tower claiming to be the children of Hong Kong permanent residents had been arrested.  However, as I understood it, she said that she did not know exactly why they had been arrested.  The media stories were confusing.  The applicant was not a sophisticated person.  Indeed, in one of the forms that she completed in July 1997, she described herself as a ‘peasant’.  But while she might not have comprehended the details, in the guarded manner in which she gave her evidence, it was revealed, I believe, that she nevertheless had a good idea at the time that claims were being turned away and people in her position – overstayers – were being repatriated.

338. The applicant testified that, when she and her father arrived at the Immigration Tower on 19 July 1997, they were uncertain what to do.  The applicant said that she did not, however, go to the information counter or seek directions.  Instead, she said, she and her father saw a person with a two-way permit going into a lift.  They followed.  They went with that person to the 13th floor, seemingly without any conversation, and continued to follow him or her into the offices of the GIS.

339. The applicant’s testimony in this regard was unconvincing, the more so as she said she was there only to seek right of abode and presumably therefore looking for the office where that would be arranged.  Yet, on her evidence, she made no enquiry downstairs.  She simply followed a person with a two-way permit and, as an overstayer, found herself in the very office that processed overstayers.

340. Upon arrival on the 13th floor, the applicant said that she went to the reception counter of the GIS and – copying the person whom she had followed – handed her two-way permit to the officer at the counter.  She could not recall if she spoke to that officer.  All she could remember, she said, was that she was handed an ID 457 form to complete.  The applicant admitted that she did not know the purpose of that form.  All she knew, she said, was that she should fill out whatever details were requested of her.  During the course of questioning, the applicant went on to say that she believed the ID 457 was some sort of preliminary personal data form which she had to complete before she was given a form to claim right of abode.  How she had come to this conclusion at the time she did not say.  As to this piece of testimony, I gained the impression that it was invented on the spur of the moment to try and bolster the applicant’s case.

341. As to the completion of the ID 457, the applicant wrote down the names of both her parents, their places and dates of birth and their shared Hong Kong address.  The applicant said that, as her father was with her, she was able to obtain his Hong Kong identity card number and entered it on the form.  However, as to her mother’s identity card details, although she said that she had specifically brought along a copy of her mother’s identity card, she said that, although she intended to use it as a reference, she in fact forgot to do so.  Again, I found this unconvincing.  The ID 457, it must be remembered, was the first form she was asked to fill out, on her evidence therefore the first step in what she thought was an application process for right of abode.

342. It was put to the applicant that she did not, in fact, have a copy of her mother’s identity card with her that day nor did she have a hospital receipt related to her mother – a second document which the applicant said she had with her.  She did not need to have a copy of her mother’s identity card with her because she had not come that day to claim right of abode, she had come instead to surrender herself so that she could be returned to the Mainland to join her family.  Indeed, that was why she had gone to the offices of the GIS, the very office responsible for repatriating overstayers.  All of these suggestions were denied by the applicant.

343. The applicant said that after waiting for a while, she was called into a room for an interview.  Her father, she said, remained outside.  The applicant said that, to the best of her memory, she and the officer spoke in Putonghua.

344. The applicant said that the interviewing officer handed her a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  The officer, she said, asked her why she had overstayed in Hong Kong and told her to write down her reasons on the form.  The applicant said she told the officer that she had been waiting in Hong Kong in order to claim right of abode, both her parents being permanent residents.  She told him that, being the child of Hong Kong permanent residents, she was entitled to remain with them in Hong Kong, especially to look after her mother who was not well.  The applicant said that she had the copy of her mother’s identity card and the hospital receipt in her hand so that she could show them to the officer.  She said that she then asked the officer for help to apply for right of abode.

345. According to the applicant, however, she was told by the officer that she could not claim right of abode in Hong Kong and must return to the Mainland in order to process any such application.

346. The applicant said that she was thinking how best she could express her thoughts on the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form; namely, how best she could express the fact that she had overstayed in order to claim right of abode; when, she said, the officer drew her attention to certain characters written on a piece of paper and suggested that she copy these characters onto the form.  The applicant said that she did so.  She did so without any protest or query.  The characters that appear on the form are, in translation, a very standard form of wording :

“I have overstayed because of keeping company with my family. I now want to return to China.”

347. During the course of cross-examination, the applicant was asked if she had asked the interviewing officer if she could write something else.  The applicant replied that she could not now remember.  As to why she should so immediately and obediently write what was suggested by the interviewing officer, the applicant said that as an overstayer she was afraid she might go to jail.

348. The applicant had in fact overstayed on a previous visit to Hong Kong in 1995.  On that occasion, although she not been prosecuted, the applicant said she had been put in a detention cell.

349. The interviewing officer was Ms Chow Po Chun.  It was her evidence that, as an Immigration Assistant, she only processed routine cases.  If she encountered unusual cases, she would obtain whatever relevant documents were available and refer the case to a more senior officer.  Ms Chow said that a claim for right of abode would have constituted an unusual case.  She said that if a person wished to record such a claim on a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, she would not try to prevent it happening.  That form would be among the papers referred to the senior officer.

350. Ms Chow said that if the applicant had made a claim for right of abode and, in support of it, had taken out a copy of her mother’s identity card, she would have kept the copy and recorded it on the file index – together with the hospital receipt – before referring the matter to a senior officer.  No such record appears on the file index.

351. Ms Chow impressed me as a credible witness, open, calm and not argumentative.  I am satisfied on the evidence that Ms Chow would not have persuaded the applicant to write particular characters onto the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form if she knew that this was against the wishes of the applicant.

352. But, of course, in this case the applicant said that she did not raise any objection.  Any reservations she had were kept to herself.

353. Would Ms Chow have followed the routine she testified she would have followed if the applicant had made a claim for right of abode or would she, as other officers had no doubt done, have told the applicant that no claim could be made in Hong Kong and then suggest a routine set of characters to facilitate repatriation?

354. It has not been an easy issue to determine, especially in light of the fact that the applicant did come to Hong Kong for the purpose of obtaining right of abode.

355. In my judgment, however, it was not possible to place any reliance on the essential truth of the applicant’s assertions.  It was apparent to me that much of the applicant’s professed vagueness was a tactic to avoid difficult issues.

356. In my view, the probabilities indicate that the applicant fell into that category of persons who had come to Hong Kong with the intent of claiming right of abode but who, after the change of sovereignty, having discovered – through the media or by making enquiries with the Immigration Department – that it was not possible to do so, had accepted the position and cooperated in the matter of their own repatriation, seeking only to reduce the severity of any criminal penalty they may be visited on them.

357. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;
  
(ii)The Director does not have a record of any claim.

Madam Yeung Lai Fong (4149 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

358. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in 1971.  Her father came to Hong Kong in 1978, her mother following in 1986.  The applicant is one of six children.  In 1986, four of her siblings were able to settle in Hong Kong, a fifth being able to do so in 1990.  Only the applicant was unable to obtain the right to live in Hong Kong.

359. In 1991, in an attempt to secure permanent residence, the applicant and her father resorted to criminal means.  In March of that year, the applicant came to Hong Kong in possession of a one-way permit.  The document bore the applicant’s photograph but not her name.  The permit, in fact, had been obtained by one of the applicant’s younger sisters but, as the sister had secured residence in Hong Kong by other means, it became superfluous to her needs.  That was when the applicant and the father altered the document.  Their criminal conduct was discovered in April 1991 when the applicant attempted to obtain a Hong Kong identity card.  Both were prosecuted.

360. Despite the applicant’s conviction, representations were made to the Director not to repatriate her.  When he declined to exercise his discretion in her favour on compassionate grounds, his decision was appealed.  That appeal was unsuccessful.

361. In January 1997, the applicant returned to Hong Kong as a visitor.  By then she was married and had a daughter who was five months old.  The applicant overstayed.  It is clear that she did so in the hope of being able to claim right of abode after the change of sovereignty.  The applicant testified that, before coming to Hong Kong, she had spoken to her husband about her plans and he had been in agreement.

362. During the course of submissions, it was argued on behalf of the applicant that I should take into account this strong desire on her part, and on the part of her father, to secure right of abode.  On behalf of the Director, however, I was asked to bear in mind that both had been prepared to resort to criminal means to obtain right of abode and that I should view their evidence with considerable caution.  In my judgment, both submissions were valid and, in coming to my determination, I adopted them.

363. The applicant accepted that in the days following the change of sovereignty she learned that a number of people who had claimed right of abode had been sent back to the Mainland.  However, it was her belief, she said, that these people could not have had the strong family connections in Hong Kong that she enjoyed.  Her father, she said, had also heard rumours that some people had been able to register their names with the Immigration authorities and had been given extensions of stay.  Accordingly, when she herself went to the Immigration Tower, she said, she was still hopeful of benefiting from an amnesty.  In July 1997, when matters were in a state of flux and rumours were rife, I am unable to reject the applicant’s evidence in this regard.

364. It was on 8 July 1997 that the applicant made her visit to the Immigration Tower.  She did so in the company of her father and a sister.  She also had her baby daughter with her.  The applicant testified that she went to the Immigration Tower that day in order to claim her right of residence under the amnesty which she believed should have been in place.  She knew there was a risk that she would be arrested and repatriated.  However, she said, she was prepared to take that risk.

365. Although she was (understandably) vague as to the question of time, the applicant remembered going to the Immigration Tower in the morning.  She said that her father made enquiries with an immigration officer, speaking of amnesty, and they were directed to the offices of the GIS on the 13th floor.

366. In early July 1997, the immigration authorities were expecting a large number of claimants for right of abode and had special procedures in place at the Immigration Tower.  On 8 July 1997 – the day when the applicant went to the building – all those claiming right of abode were being programmed to return to the GIS at a later date for further processing.  The processing of claimants who fell into the category of the applicant was, I am told, conducted on the ground floor.  That being the case, it was submitted on behalf of the Director that, if the applicant had been referred direct to the 13th floor, it had to be inferred that she had not indicated a desire to claim right of abode but simply, as an overstayer, a desire to be processed for the purposes of repatriation.  I was reminded that the applicant at this time had a husband waiting for her in the Mainland and there was good reason therefore for her to desire repatriation.

367. However, just how fool-proof the system for programming claimants was on 8 July 1997 is uncertain.  Ms Olivia Ko, the officer on duty at the reception counter of the GIS on that day testified that immediately after the handover she had been briefed to expect people to approach her reception counter claiming right of abode.

368. It was the applicant’s testimony that, when they got to the offices of the GIS on the 13th floor, there was a queue.  They joined the queue.  When they got to the counter, said the applicant, she was asked for her two-way permit.  Her father, she said, raised the issue of amnesty with the officer who was examining the permit.  The officer said that there was no amnesty and that the applicant would have to return to the Mainland.  According to the applicant, she then told the officer that both her parents were permanent residents of Hong Kong and that she understood that, with the change of sovereignty, she could claim the right to live in Hong Kong.  The applicant said that her father was asked to produce his Hong Kong identity card.  This he did, speaking again of an amnesty.  The applicant said that the officer became irritated, saying that the applicant would have to return to the Mainland to make an application for a one-way permit.

369. That the officer at the reception counter may have wished to see the father’s identity card is not, in my opinion, inherently unlikely.  The evidence shows that in early July, as a result of the Immigration (Amendment) (No.2) Ordinance, a distinction was being drawn between claimants who were born after their parents acquired Hong Kong permanent residence and those who were born before.  There was also evidence that, to check whether a claimant had been born before or after his or her parents had acquired permanent resident status, the parents’ identity cards would be examined.

370. It was the applicant’s testimony that, after this exchange at the counter, she was handed an ID 457 form to complete.  The form, she said, was completed by her sister.  She said that she was so pre-occupied with her child that she did not recall seeing the written contents of the form.  Unsurprisingly, the form gives the details of the father and the sister.  The details include the number of the father’s identity card.

371. When the father testified, it appeared to be the gist of his evidence that he assumed somehow that the completion of the ID 457 was a ‘registration’ process.  He expected, he said, to learn in due course that his daughter had been duly ‘registered’.  He said that he did not himself read the form as he did not have his glasses with him.  On its face, this appeared to be outlandish evidence.  But the father explained it by reference to his personal experience.  He said he had three children who had come into Hong Kong illegally in the past and, as a result of amnesties, had been able to make some kind of ‘registration’ with the Government which resulted in them being granted rights of residence.  As he put it : ‘at that time my mentality was that I relied on the Government’. 

372. As witnesses, the applicant and her father were a study in contrasts.  The applicant, who gave her evidence in a calm, quiet fashion, impressed me as essentially credible, at least most of the time.  Her father, however, was aggressive and patently prepared to exaggerate whenever he thought it would assist his daughter’s cause.  I viewed his evidence with extreme caution, rejecting a great deal of it.  But that being said, there were core areas of his testimony which could not be dismissed. 

373. The applicant that day surrendered her two-way permit.  She was given a receipt (an ID 328) with a copy of the two-way permit attached.  This was standard procedure.  However, on the face of the photostat copy of the permit, somebody in the Immigration Department wrote the words ‘by letter’.  A line was then put through those words.  It was not possible to identify the officer who had written those words or, if different, the officer who had deleted them.

374. What is known, however, is that at about that time right of abode claimants were being told to go home and wait for letters informing them of their new appointment dates.  Non-claimants, however, were in the main being interviewed on the same day or told to come back within a short period of time, usually the following day.  The writing of the words ‘by letter’ may suggest, therefore, that, at some stage that day, the applicant was treated as a claimant who would be sent home and who would be informed by letter when to return.  Nothing was put before me which would easily explain the endorsement of those words in some other context.

375. The applicant, it appears, was interviewed at about 4:30 that afternoon.  She said that her father, a man who understood Hong Kong, was not allowed to be with her at the time of the interview.  But, as counsel for the Director put it, she was an adult and capable of speaking for herself.

376. The applicant said that the interviewing officer gave her a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  She was asked why she had overstayed.  She said she had overstayed waiting for the amnesty.  The applicant said that she was told that she should not write this on the form. 

377. The applicant said that it was her habit, if she had to write anything formally, to draft it out first.  She asked if she could have some papers to do this.  She was told, however, that she should simply write what she was told to write and do so directly onto the form.  She said that she therefore wrote at the dictation of the officer.  When asked what was going through her mind at the time, she said that she was not thinking of anything, simply listening to what the officer dictated.  The English translation of what she wrote is to the following effect :

“My name is Yeung Lai Fong. I came to Hong Kong through Lo Wu on 29 January 1997 together with my daughter Cheuk Yee That. I know that my daughter and I can stay up to 25 February 1997, but have overstayed because of keeping company with my family. Now, I want to return to China as soon as possible together with my daughter.” [my emphasis]

378. In my judgment, the applicant exaggerated, indeed invented, much of her evidence in respect of the interview.  The purpose of the exaggeration was to try and justify why she had not recorded her claim for right of abode on the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  But I do not think her evidence can be rejected entirely.  The phrase ‘have overstayed because of keeping company with my family’ is a standard phrase that appeared regularly on these forms.  I am satisfied it was a form of phrase regularly suggested to interviewees who would often not be sure what to write.  As I have said in respect of other matters, on all the evidence, I am satisfied that these interviews were (in the main) peremptory affairs; essentially just another step in the processing mechanism.

379. The interviewing officer was Mr So Tsz Chung, an Immigration Assistant.  He said that if a claim for right of abode was made during the course of an interview, he would seek all supporting documents, have copies made and refer them for consideration to a senior officer.  He had no independent recollection of the interview with the applicant and could, of course, only speak to what his normal practice would have been.

380. Mr So said that, if a parent and child were to be dealt with, normally the same officer dealt with them at the same time.  In the present case, however, the file reference numbers for the applicant and her child were not sequential.  Indeed they were numerically some distance apart.  Mr So could not explain why this had happened.

381. On behalf of the applicant, it was suggested that, while matters were obviously confused, it was entirely feasible that :

(i)A decision had initially been made to send the applicant home and notify her by letter when she should return to be interviewed; this being a procedure adopted for claimants.
  
(ii)The applicant, however, had eventually been interviewed that same day because she had been required to remain so that her baby daughter could be processed too.
  
(iii)That, with the number of people coming to the GIS decreasing on 8 July 1997, upon completion of her child’s formalities, it then became possible – that same day – for her own interview to take place late in the afternoon.

382. Is this a feasible scenario?  Bearing in mind the pressures on the immigration authorities at that time and that in early July 1997 they must still have been in the process of perfecting their systems, I am unable to say it is not feasible.  In short, I think it may have happened.

383. This has not been the easiest of matters to resolve.  However, although I am satisfied that both the applicant and her father were prepared to exaggerate their evidence when they thought it would benefit them, I am unable to reject as untruthful their evidence that at the reception counter a conversation did take place which, when viewed objectively, constituted an assertion by (and on behalf of) the applicant that she was entitled to right of abode.

384. There is also certain evidence – slim, I agree – that suggests that at some time that day the staff at the GIS may indeed have acted on the basis that the applicant was claiming right of abode. 

385. Underlying this, despite the caution with which I have approached the father’s evidence, I have had to accept – on the probabilities at least – that it was unlikely that the applicant and her father would meekly have submitted to her repatriation at a time when many others were actively seeking to claim right of abode, indeed were queuing up to do so, without at least in making some attempt to do so themselves.

386. On the probabilities, therefore, I have been drawn to the conclusion that the applicant, together with her father, did make a claim for right of abode on 8 July 1997.

387. As to the existence of a record, that is to be found in the ID 457 form.  The fact that the applicant herself did not fill out the form nor take any real interest in it at the time is not, in my judgment, a factor which destroys its corroborative value for the Director in the management of the concession policy.

388. During the hearing, evidence was led of the applicant attending the Chinese Visitors Office in October 1998.  The applicant did not rely on this visit as proving her right to benefit under the concession policy.  While she said that she sought to claim right of abode that day, it was accepted that there was no record of her claim.  As to that matter, I am satisfied that no reliance can be placed on the applicant’s contention that she made an oral claim for right of abode that day.  In considering the applicant’s credibility generally, I have, of course, taken into account her evidence of what allegedly happened at the Chinese Visitors Office.  But it has not convinced me to reject the essential substance of the applicant’s testimony concerning her visit to the Immigration Tower in July 1997.  In their desperation to prove their cases, virtually all applicants have, to some degree or another, gilded their testimony.

389. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)The applicant did make a claim for right of abode;
  
(ii)The Director does have a record of the claim.

Madam Lau Man Chu (1936 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

390. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in 1956.  Her father died in 1970.  Eight years later, her mother came to Hong Kong to settle.  The mother was able to bring the applicant’s two brothers but the applicant herself was denied a one-way permit.

391. In December 1993, the applicant came as a visitor to Hong Kong.  She overstayed.  She did so, she said, because she wanted to take care of her mother who suffered from hypertension.  When the change of sovereignty got closer, however, she said she heard rumours of a possible amnesty and hoped that she would be able to benefit from that amnesty.

392. When the change of sovereignty took place, she said, she read the newspapers and watched television, anxious to discover what had happened in respect of the amnesty.

393. It was the applicant’s testimony that on 23 July 1997 she went with her brother to the Immigration Tower.  She went there, she said, in order to apply for right of abode.

394. It was the applicant’s evidence that she approached an officer on the ground floor, telling him that she had come to claim right of abode.  She was referred to the offices of the GIS on the 13th floor and went there immediately.

395. At the reception counter, the applicant said that she had a conversation with an officer, telling him that she was seeking right of abode.  It was, however, very close to the lunch hour, she said, and she was told to return after lunch.  When she returned, she said that she spoke to the officer on duty, saying that her mother was a permanent resident, that she was her natural daughter and that she should be allowed to apply for right of abode.  According to the applicant, she was told that no such application could be processed in Hong Kong and that she would have to return to the Mainland to apply for a one-way permit.

396. The applicant testified that the officer studied her long-expired two-way permit, showing surprise at how long she had overstayed.  The officer then gave her two forms, an ID 457 and a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.

397. As to the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, although both the applicant and her brother testified to completing the form that day, I am satisfied that is a mistake of memory, natural enough after such a long lapse of time.  The applicant was not interviewed that day but was instead instructed to go the following day to the offices of a unit called the Task Force.  On that following day she was interviewed and, in the course of that interview, completed a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.

398. It was not disputed that the applicant was, however, given an ID 457 form that day; that is, on 23 July 1997.  The applicant said that her brother completed the form and that between the two of them it was agreed that a telephone call should be made to the mother to obtain accurate personal details, specifically in respect of the mother’s identity card.  The mother’s name, date of birth and identity card number were entered on the ID 457 together with the personal details of the brother himself, including details of his identity card.

399. The following day, said the applicant, she was interviewed by an officer of the Task Force.  She was given a second ‘grounds for non-removal’ form – as I have said, I am satisfied it was, in fact, the first – and completed it, ‘as instructed’, in the same manner as the one of the previous day.  In translation, she wrote :

“I, Lau Man Chu, came from Xiamen to Hong Kong to visit relatives by boat by a two-way permit on 7 December 1993. I knew that commencing on 28 Feb. 1994, I overstayed. However, as my mother suffered from hypertension, I was required to stay to take care of her. I now want to return to China.”

400. On 30 July 1997, the applicant was sentenced to imprisonment for ten weeks and upon completion of that sentence was repatriated.

401. It was the applicant’s evidence that on 23 July 1997, at the offices of the GIS, she had twice claimed right of abode in the clearest of terms, the record of that claim resting in the ID 457 form.

402. In my judgment, however, the probabilities very strongly suggest that no claim was made on 23 July 1997 and that the applicant that day had only one intention; namely, to secure her repatriation so that she could join her husband and children in the Mainland.  Indeed, in a number of documents, the applicant admitted that on 23 July 1997 her sole intention had been to secure her repatriation.

403. In September 1999, on a return to Hong Kong, the applicant made a cautioned statement in respect of possible criminal offences.  The offences related to intentionally entering a wrong date of birth on certain Hong Kong immigration documents.  In her testimony, the applicant did not suggest that the statement had been made involuntarily.  Yet in the statement she said the following :

“But I overstayed because I wanted to look after my mother and I thought hat there would be an amnesty after the return (of Hong Kong to China) in 1997 to enable me to have the right of abode. However, seeing that there was no amnesty when Hong Kong was returned (to China), I turned myself in and returned to the Mainland.”

404. Some eight months after she had made this cautioned statement – in May 2000 – the applicant was given the opportunity to present her case for right of abode to the immigration authorities.  She was given time to prepare what she wished to say.  At the interview – in answer to the written question : ‘How did you claim that you had the right of abode in Hong Kong?’ – the applicant began by saying :

“The form did not have such words as ‘claim’ and the like.  I claimed verbally to have it but was refused.”

405. When asked in the course of her testimony what she had meant by this sentence, the applicant answered to the following effect : ‘I meant that there were no characters equivalent to ‘claim’.  To me, surrender was the same as a claim’.

406. Later in the interview of May 2000, the applicant wrote :

“During 1-10 July 1997, when Hong Kong returned to the Mainland, I was in Hong Kong celebrating the return. I was waiting for amnesty upon Hong Kong going back to China so that I could have the right of abode. Seeing that there was no amnesty after the return, I went to 13/F, Immigration Tower on 22 July with my Two-way Exit Permit and surrendered myself. … An arrangement was made for me to attend Court on the 28th. The Judge sentenced me to imprisonment for 10 weeks. There was no claim made at that time, I surrendered myself.”

407. When confronted with these and other documents during the course of cross-examination, the applicant appeared to concede that she had not, in any direct sense, made a claim for right of abode on 23 July 1997 but that the act of surrendering was to be taken as making a claim.

408. In re-examination, she confirmed that what she had said had not been misunderstood, her answer to counsel’s question being to the following effect : “At that time I surrendered and to me surrender was the same as making a claim”.

409. In submissions, the applicant’s counsel argued that the applicant’s evidence, when considered as a whole, should be taken to mean that she knew there was no amnesty and that she had no choice other than to surrender herself.  However, even in the knowledge that it was hopeless, she was one of the ‘courageous’ ones who nevertheless made her claim.

410. I reject that submission.  By the time the applicant concluded her testimony, I think even she silently acknowledged that any earlier assertion on her part to unambiguous oral claims had no value and she was left only with the assertion that the act of surrender itself, when a person had been in Hong Kong hoping for an amnesty, should be taken as a claim.

411. But the act of surrender itself, bare of any assertion to the right to live in Hong Kong, is simply not sufficient.

412. I conclude by observing that, in so far as general evidence as to processing may have been relevant, some weight, I think, had to be given to the Director’s evidence that (at about that time) overstayers who at the offices of the GIS claimed right of abode would always be asked to return to the GIS for further processing.  Such persons would not be referred to the Task Force.  The applicant, of course, was referred to the Task Force.

413. My determinations therefore are as follows :

(i)The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;
  
(ii)The Director does not have a record of any claim.

PART FOUR

Mr Wong Sai Chak (5006 : a ‘group two’ applicant and, in addition, an applicant who relies on a legitimate expectation arising from a visit to the Legal Aid Department)

414. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in 1961.  His father settled in Hong Kong in 1979, his mother following in 1991.  Both the applicant and his sister were held to be too old to accompany the mother and both were denied a one-way permit.

415. The applicant testified that he learnt of the right of abode issue in early 1997.  He discussed the matter with his father who made enquiries and obtained a certificate of registered particulars from the Hong Kong immigration authorities.  This document certified that the father was a Hong Kong permanent resident.  The certificate was posted to the applicant who said that he used it to try and obtain a one-way permit from the Mainland authorities.  He was told for a second time, however, that he was too old to benefit under the one-way permit scheme.

416. The applicant said that he then applied for and obtained a two-way permit, arriving in Hong Kong as a visitor in May 1998.  The applicant said that the primary purpose of his visit was, to use his expression, ‘to fight for amnesty’.  He said that it was common knowledge in Fujian Province at the time that many people from the area were in Hong Kong fighting for right of abode.

417. On the evidence, it was, I think, plain that the applicant came to Hong Kong hoping to secure permanent residence here.

418. It was the applicant’s testimony that he decided to make his claim for right of abode at the Chinese Visitors Office (‘the CVO’) in Yau Ma Tei.  He chose this office, he said, because he had heard that extensions of stay were dealt with there and understood that the office may also issue Hong Kong identity cards.  ‘Anyway’ he said, ‘I went to give it a try’.

419. On the first occasion, the applicant said, he went to the CVO simply to see how matters were dealt with there.  Put simply, it was a scouting expedition.

420. The applicant’s choice of the CVO appears to have been a choice adopted by a number of right of abode seekers.  The evidence revealed that there were notices on the walls of the CVO at about this time intended specifically for such people.  The notices were to the following effect :

“2-way Permit holders coming to Hong Kong are remaining in Hong Kong as visitors, they need to return within the validity of stay in Hong Kong. Secondly, Mainland residents who wish to settle in Hong Kong need to apply for One-way Permits.”

421. On behalf of the Director, it was said that, if the applicant had gone to the CVO to see how matters were dealt with there, he would surely have seen one of the posters and learnt that he could not apply for right of abode.  I do not think that necessarily follows.  Some people are more perceptive than others.  But, as I have said, what it does show is that, if there was a need for the posters, it was because claims for right of abode had been made, and were being made, in those offices.

422. The applicant said that he returned to the CVO on 3 June 1998 in order to make a claim for right of abode.

423. The applicant said that he went to a counter where he was given a number tag and a blank ‘application for extension of stay’ form.  Just after he received his number tag, said the applicant, he spoke to the officer at the counter, informing him that he wished to apply for a local identity card so that he could remain in Hong Kong.  He told the officer that he wished to remain in Hong Kong in order to give long-term care to his father who had had an operation on his leg.

424. According to the applicant, the officer told him that it was not possible to process claims for Hong Kong identity cards.  The applicant said that he tried to reason with the officer but it was made clear to him that he could not obtain an identity card.

425. To the best of his memory, said the applicant, he was then handed the blank ‘application for an extension of stay’ form.  In all the circumstances, said the applicant, his request having been refused, he decided to apply for a ten-day extension of stay in Hong Kong, giving him time to think how best to proceed further.

426. The applicant testified that, when he made his visit to the CVO on 3 June 1998, he took his parents’ identity cards with him.  To my recollection, however, he did not say that he actually showed these cards to the officer at the counter in order to support his claim for the issue of a Hong Kong identity card.

427. On behalf of the Director, evidence was led to show that in June 1998 the applicant’s mother was not entitled to a card that identified her as a permanent resident.  It was suggested that the applicant would not have taken his mother’s identity card to the CVO unless it confirmed that she was permanent resident.  But, of course, the father’s card identified him as a permanent resident while the mother’s card showed that she was also legally resident in Hong Kong.  I can understand the applicant deciding to take both cards with him.

428. On behalf of the Director, evidence was also led that, if a person asked about right of abode, the counter officers were briefed to refer that person to the information office on the 2nd floor of the Immigration Tower.  The applicant did not testify to being referred to the information office.  But the applicant, after such a long period of time, did not say that he had a perfect memory of everything that was said at the counter.

429. The applicant was criticised for being argumentative and petulant.  This was, in respect of some parts of the applicant’s evidence, a valid criticism, especially when the applicant was cross-examined as to a later visit made by him to the offices of Legal Aid.  But in respect of this conversation at the counter, I am unable to say, on the probabilities, that it did not take place.  I think that it may well have taken place and that, in substance, it constituted a claim for right of abode.

430. But, while on the balance of probabilities, I am satisfied that the applicant did make an oral claim for right of abode, I am not satisfied that the Director has a record of any such claim.

431. The only form completed by the applicant that day was the ‘application for an extension of stay’.  In stating why he sought an extension, the applicant wrote Chinese characters to the following effect :

“My father had an operation on his leg and is now unable to take care of his daily life. My mother is old and has asked me to say for a few days more to help him. I now apply for extension of 10 days.”

432. It was the applicant’s own testimony, as I understood it, that, after his claim for a Hong Kong identity card had been refused, he then decided to apply for an extension of stay in order to give him time to decide what to do next.  On his own evidence, therefore, he did not fill out the form intending to make it known that he was seeking right of abode.  He filled it out for the limited purpose of applying for an extension.  That, in my view, is how the form reads.

433. While the applicant gave his Hong Kong address; by implication, the address in Hong Kong of his mother and father, he did not give the names of either of his parents nor any details of their identity cards.

434. The form on its own therefore cannot, in my judgment, constitute a record for the purposes of the concession policy.

435. On behalf of the applicant, however, it was submitted that all the records made that day, if read together and in context, were sufficient to constitute a record.  It was put this way :

(i)At the counter the applicant asked to stay in Hong Kong on a long-term basis, being given a Hong Kong identity card.  At that time that would not have been recognised as a claim for right of abode.  Hence the notation ‘ENQ’ in the counter register, meaning ‘enquiry’.
  
(ii)The applicant thereafter sought an extension of 10 days.  Hence the deletion of the notation ‘ENQ’.
  
(iii)An extension of 10 days, however, was more than was invariably permitted, the invariable extension being only two days.
  
(iv)The terse record of interview shows that 10 days was being sought, the reason being the sickness of the father.
  
(v)These records, when read together, show that the applicant’s case was not a ‘routine’ one.  It commenced with an ‘enquiry’ – which the Director now knows was in substance a claim for right of abode – and then became an application to remain in Hong Kong for a longer period than was permissible.
  
(vi)In all the circumstances, the records, together, are capable of amounting to evidence that a claim for right of abode was made.

436. These submissions were superficially persuasive.  But regrettably I do not see that records which only go to show that a particular case was not ‘routine’ are capable, on their face, of constituting a record.

437. In my first report (para.37), I said that it is for the court, viewing matters in context and abandoning a narrow or technical approach, to judge, on the balance of probabilities, whether in substance the documentary material – on its face – constitutes evidence that a claim for right of abode has been made.  I do not believe that that basic approach has been disapproved.

438. The records in the present case, however, even when read together, show nothing of the basis upon which the applicant has sought to claim right of abode.  There is no evidence of the identity of either parent nor, critically, of the fact that either of them has right of permanent residence in Hong Kong.  In fact, the applicant’s mother, who was described by the applicant in his application form as being ‘old’, was shown not to have right of permanent residence at that time.  A bald statement of the age or frailty of a parent, with nothing more, is not capable of constituting evidence of that parent’s right of permanent residence in Hong Kong.

439. In the circumstances, therefore, not without difficulty, I have been drawn to the conclusion that the Director has no record of the applicant’s claim made at the CVO.

440. It was the applicant’s evidence that after his visit to the CVO, and after his extension had expired, he did not return to the Mainland.  He overstayed.  He was aware of the on-going litigation, he said, and he wanted to remain in Hong Kong to see if that litigation would, as he put it, ‘give him a chance’.

441. It was the applicant’s testimony that he read the newspapers and spoke to friends and in or about September 1998 he decided to become a litigant himself.

442. The applicant said he visited the Legal Aid Department in or around September 1998.  He could not remember the exact date.  He said that, having been given a number tag, he was interviewed.  He told the legal aid officer that he wished to apply to stay in Hong Kong and to obtain a Hong Kong identity card.  He was told by the officer, he said, that, as litigation was underway, it was not necessary for him to be formally joined to the litigation.  If the litigation was successful, he could return with his number tag and he would benefit in the same manner as the litigants themselves.

443. The applicant, however, was not able to produce the number tag which had been given to him at the offices of the Legal Aid Department.  He said that the tag had been lost.  In my judgment, his evidence in this regard was, however, entirely unsatisfactory.

444. The applicant at one time seemed to say that he placed no value in keeping the number tag because he felt he could not trust the Legal Aid officer.  The officer, he said, had not asked to see copies of his parents’ identity cards and had not recorded any pertinent details.  That, he said, was the cause for his distrust.  At another time, however, the applicant appeared to accept that he knew at the time that the number tag was very important.

445. In the result, there was no independent evidence to support the applicant’s contention that he had gone to the Legal Aid Department in or about September 1998.  The applicant could not produce the number tag.  He could not remember the number itself.  There was no record of his particulars in any form of register at the Legal Aid Department.

446. When cross-examined as to his visit, the applicant became very argumentative, his testimony rambling. 

447. In the case summary prepared for him by his first solicitors, Pam Baker & Co., the applicant made no mention of his visit to the Legal Aid Department.  He ended the summary by saying that he decided to overstay in Hong Kong ‘to await the next development’ in the right of abode litigation.  When questioned on this, he replied with very little conviction that, as the number tag had been lost, he simply saw no reason at the time to even mention the visit.

448. On behalf of the Director, it was submitted that the alleged visit to the Legal Aid Department in or about September 1998 had never happened.  I think that is correct.  It is, in my view, highly unlikely that, if the applicant had been given a number and interviewed in the manner he described that the Legal Aid Department would have had no record of any kind of his attendance.

449. On behalf of the applicant it was said that, if I was prepared to accept his evidence as to what had happened at the CVO, I should also accept his evidence in respect of his visit to the Legal Aid Department.  That does not follow.  Many of the applicants who have testified – perhaps fearing that what actually happened would not be convincing –

have embellished the truth or invented additional pieces of evidence.

450. The Legal Aid Department did have a record of the applicant but that record shows that he first registered with the Department in February 1999.  That, I am satisfied, was his first registration.  I am convinced that the alleged visit in or about September 1998 did not take place.

451. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)The applicant did make a claim;
  
(ii)The Director, however, has no record of any claim;
  
(iii)The applicant is not entitled to benefit from any legitimate expectation.

Madam Chong Chui Ching (1015 : a ‘group one’ applicant and, in addition, an applicant who relies on a legitimate expectation arising from a visit to the Legal Aid Department)

452. The applicant was born and raised in Fujian Province.  Her father settled in Hong Kong in 1978.  Four years later he was joined by the applicant’s mother and her two siblings.  However, the applicant herself – as the oldest child – was not granted permission to settle in Hong Kong.

453. The applicant came to Hong Kong in April 1995 as a visitor.  She overstayed.  She said that she did so in anticipation of being able to claim right of abode after the change of sovereignty.  When the change came, she paid close attention to the news and saw that many people in her position were being repatriated.  She therefore remained in hiding.  She was arrested on 23 December 2997, prosecuted for overstaying and, after serving a short term of imprisonment, was repatriated.

454. The applicant returned to Hong Kong on 4 October 1998, her two-way permit permitting her to remain until 25 December of that year.  The applicant testified that, when she returned to Hong Kong in late 1998, she did so with the specific intention of attempting to claim right of abode.  There is evidence to support her in this regard :

(i)Before her arrival in Hong Kong, she applied for a notarial certificate from the Mainland authorities in order to prove her blood relationship to her parents. This document was collected by her husband and posted to her after she had arrived in Hong Kong. There could only be one reason for obtaining for this document : as support for a claim for right of abode.
   
(ii)After she had arrived in Hong Kong, her parents obtained a declaration from a Hong Kong firm of solicitors. This declaration again stated the relationship between the applicant and her parents, giving the Hong Kong identity card details of both parents. This declaration, however, appears to have been addressed to the Mainland authorities, not to the Hong Kong immigration authorities. In this regard, for example, having set out a brief family history, the parents declared the following :
   
 “Therefore, we [the applicant’s parents] hereby apply to the relevant authority in China for our daughter, Chong Chui Ching, to come to settle down in Hong Kong so that, in addition to reuniting our family, our daughter may take care of and keep company with her parents so that the elderly may have someone to rely on.”

455. The applicant, in her testimony, appeared to suggest that the declaration prepared by the Hong Kong solicitors was intended, in part at least, to support any claim she made in Hong Kong.  On the evidence, it has not been possible to come to any finding of fact as to exactly why the declaration was obtained, whether it was intended purely to support an application for a one-way permit if and when the applicant returned to the Mainland or whether, in the eyes of the applicant and her family at least, it was intended also to support a claim made in Hong Kong.  But it does prove one thing; that is, a determination by the applicant (and her parents) to secure her right of residence in Hong Kong.

456. The applicant testified that on 17 December 1998 she went with her mother and father to the Immigration Tower.  The purpose of the visit was to seek right of residence in Hong Kong.  The applicant said that on that day she had three documents in her possession; her two-way permit, her notarial certificate and the declaration prepared by the Hong Kong solicitors.

457. The applicant said that her knowledge of Cantonese at that time was limited.  While she could understand a fair amount, she had more difficulty speaking it.  Accordingly, she said, at the entrance to the Tower, to avoid any difficulties arising out of her limited knowledge of Cantonese, she wrote out on a piece of paper the nature of her intended request.  That piece of paper, she said, was still in her possession.  In translation, the note read as follows :

“Dear person in charge of the Immigration Department, Hong Kong:
  
 My father Chong Man Tak (sic) and my mother Lok Lai Chu are both Hong Kong permanent residents. I have right of abode in Hong Kong. Please allow me to undergo formalities for applying for residence. Thanks!”

458. If the note was, in fact, written that day and was, in fact, presented to an immigration officer, it would clearly have constituted a claim.  However, for reasons to which I refer later, I have grave doubts as to the authenticity of this document.

459. After the note was written, the applicant testified that she and her parents went to the 2nd floor of the building, to the information office.  The applicant said that, when her turn came to be served, she produced all her papers and showed the officer her written request.  The officer studied the papers, shook his head and, with a smile, told her that she would have to return to the Mainland in order to make an application for right of abode.

460. The applicant said that her mother then stepped forward to ask if the applicant could at least be given an extension of stay.  The officer said that any application would have to be made at the CVO.  According to the applicant, the officer then took out a printed sheet of paper which bore a list of addresses.  He circled the address of the CVO.  The applicant said that she had retained this document too.

461. It was a standard immigration form, bearing the serial number ID 91 (3/99).  The document, however, could not have been given to the applicant that day.  I say that because it was not in print at that time.  Evidence showed that the final draft of that document did not go to the Government Printer until February 1999, more than two months later.

462. It was a damning piece of evidence against the applicant and, in my judgment, proved that, in order to better support her case, she had been prepared to create false evidence.

463. On her behalf, it was submitted that she may have collected the form from the CVO in July 1999 when she made an application for an extension of stay and may simply have confused the order of things.  That may have been how the applicant came into possession of the document.  I do not accept, however, that she may have confused the order of things.  It was not a question of confusion, it was a matter of a deliberate concoction.

464. On behalf of the Director, it was said that, in light of this false testimony, it would be an affront to common sense for the applicant to be believed in any material respect in her evidence.  However, while this piece of false testimony has made me approach the applicant’s evidence with extreme caution, it would be wrong, I think, to hold that a single falsehood must thereby destroy all of the applicant’s evidence.  A witness may lie in one part of his or her evidence but tell the truth in respect of another.  Nor is a lie to be used against a witness as some form of punishment.

465. On behalf of the Director, it was submitted that the applicant’s evidence that she made a visit to the Immigration Tower on 17 December 1998 was in all respects a fabrication.  I do not go that far.  In my view, the probabilities support the fact that a visit was made that day.  I have grave doubts, however, that the applicant wrote the note which she exhibited, the one she said she had written before going into the building.  On the probabilities that I think was also a piece of false evidence.  

466. I do accept, however, that in all probability an enquiry was made at the information office.  An enquiry, of course, does not amount to a claim for right of abode.

467. But, even if I am wrong in that regard and what was said at the information office did constitute a claim, I do not see that there is any evidential record of that claim in the possession of the Director as required by the concession policy.

468. However, the matter does not end there.  The applicant testified that, when she and her parents left the Immigration Tower, they met a clansman from Fujian Province.  They spoke with this man who suggested that the applicant go to the Legal Aid Department to register herself as a litigant in the on-going right of abode litigation.

469. The applicant said that she and her parents took his advice and went immediately to the Legal Aid Department.  She testified that when they got to the Legal Aid Department it was crowded.  When her turn came to be served, said the applicant, she produced all of her documents for the legal aid officer to read.  To the best of her memory, however, the officer was only really interested in her two-way permit.  The officer told her that, as her permit had not yet expired, there was no urgency in her case and she should return at a later date for a formal appointment.

470. According to the applicant, the legal aid officer did confirm, however, that right of abode litigation was underway and also confirmed that the eventual judgment would apply to the applicant as well as to the litigants themselves.

471. As evidence of the fact that she was at the Legal Aid Department that day, the applicant exhibited a paper tag and also a standard form of notice, both documents bearing the seal of the Legal Aid Department :

(i)The paper tag, which had on it the number ‘22’, also bore the handwritten endorsement : ‘21 December, 11 a.m.’. This, said the applicant, was the date and time given to her to return to the Legal Aid Department for a formal appointment.
    
(ii)The notice was in Chinese characters.  In translation, it read :
    
 “Attention, please:
    
  For the application, please bring along with the following documents for verification and provide with copies for retention by this Department :
    
  (1)Birth certificate or Notary certificate of birth,
    
  (2)Applicant’s travel permit, census record or census book,
    
  (3)Applicant’s travel document, and
    
  (4)Identity cards of applicant’s parents (Father or mother is required to attend in person).”

472. As it was, said the applicant, she was not able to return to the Legal Aid Department on 21 December 1998.  A day or so after her visit, she received news that her father-in-law had died in the Mainland.  It was therefore necessry for her to return to her home in Fujian Province urgently in order to be with her husband and his family.  The evidence revealed that the applicant did leave Hong Kong on 21 December 1998, five days before the expiration of her two-way permit.

473. It was the applicant’s evidence, as I understood it, that, even though she was unable to keep her appointment with the Legal Aid Department, she did not at the time consider it to be a critical omission.  She expressed herself as follows : “I did not feel that I had to do anything else to protect my position.  I thought about the words of the officer.  I had been told the judgment of the court would be applicable to me.”

474. On the evidence, I am satisfied that the applicant did go to the Legal Aid Department on 17 December 1998.  I am satisfied that she was given the number tag and also the formal notice, being told to return on 21 December 1998.  The applicant had only one reason for going to the Legal Aid Department; namely, her desire to be counted as one of the litigants in the on-going right of abode litigation.  Although she was not ‘processed’ by way of a full interview that afternoon, having heard her evidence, I am satisfied that she did make some form of enquiry with the legal aid officer with whom she dealt and was informed by the officer – albeit, no doubt, in general terms only – that the eventual judgment would apply as equally to her as to the litigants themselves.

475. It must be remembered that the applicant’s parents were with her that day.  It must also be remembered that the applicant had her notarial certificate issued by the Mainland authorities and a detailed declaration prepared by the Hong Kong solicitors setting out her relationship with her parents.  These documents were given to the Legal Aid officer.  In such circumstances, even upon a cursory look at these documents, I do not think it would have been unusual for the officer to give some form of assurance.

476. The officer, of course, would have been expecting matters to be formalised at the forthcoming interview.  But, nevertheless, I am satisfied that the oral assurance given was sufficiently clear, unambiguous, and firm in its terms, to create a legitimate expectation on the part of the applicant that she would now be treated as a litigant.

477. When the applicant first gave her instructions to Pam Baker & Co., the summary of her case, written in English was somewhat ambiguous.  But, in my view, it is nevertheless supportive of the applicant’s testimony before me.  The summary read (in part) :

“… in the afternoon Mdm Chong [the applicant] attended the Legal Aid Department and sought to apply for legal aid to assert her claim. LAD was busy at the time with RoA claimants. Mdm Chong does not recall precisely what was said. She remembers she was told quite a lot of things by the officer and in particular, she recalls the officer explained there were representative cases being heard in court and that as her two-way permit had not expired, hers was not an urgent case. ... She was, in any event, told by the LAD officer that which gave her the same legitimate expectation as those to whom the LAD letter was issued.”

478. In her affirmation of 17 August 2004, which the applicant adopted as part of her evidence, her assertion was more clearly defined :

“The officer we saw was a female. She told us that there was a test case proceeding in the courts and that my situation was the same as the applicants in the case. She told me that if those applicants got right of abode then I would too. This reassured me that I did not need to do anything more to protect or pursue my right of abode in the meantime…”

479. As the Legal Aid Department had no record of any particular officer dealing with the applicant on 17 December 1998, it was unable to put forward a witness.  However, a letter dated 29 June 2002 was written to the Director of Immigration.  The letter, insofar as it is relevant, read as follows :

“We are unable to verify that Ms. CHONG Chui-ching had attended our office on 17 December 1998 as we do not have any record to that effect. Having said that, we are not in a position to rule out that Ms. CHONG might have attended our office as she was able to produce to you a copy of a queue number appointment card stamped with our Department chop. Our practice at the time was that once the daily registration quota was used up, individuals who turned up would be given an appointment card to come back on the next available date to undergo the screening and registration process. In this respect, we did not take down the individual’s details before issuing him / her with a queue number appointment card.
  
 We are unable to verify whether the alleged conversation had taken place as we are unable to locate and did not maintain any record to that effect.”

480. In my judgment, there is nothing in the Legal Aid letter to undermine the applicant’s testimony.  No suggestion is made in the letter, for example, that the officers were under strict instructions as to what should or should not be said to applicants.

481. In all the circumstances, I am satisfied on the probabilities that the applicant’s evidence as to events at the Legal Aid Department can be accepted.

482. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)The applicant did not make a claim;
  
(ii)The Director has no record of any claim;
  
(iii)The applicant is, however, entitled to benefit from a legitimate expectation that she would be treated as a litigant in the right of abode litigation and thereby to any benefits accruing to those litigants under the concession policy.

PART FIVE

483. When the second tranche of hearings commenced, I was informed that a number of applicants, previously granted legal aid, had now had that legal aid withdrawn.

484. Arrangements were therefore made to bring those applicants to court so that their altered state could be explained to them and so that they could state whether they wished to proceed with their applications or not.

485. A number of these applicants appealed the discharge of their legal aid but were not successful.

486. The applicants who wished to proceed with their applications were then given the opportunity to prepare their cases.  In this regard, material prepared for them when they were legally aided was given to them and, in so far as it was necessary, interpretation services were rendered by the court interpreter.  The applicants were also advised that, if they wished, they could be accompanied to court and advised by a person in whom they had trust : a ‘McKenzie friend’ (see McKenzie v. McKenzie [1970] 3 All ER 1034).

Madam Cheung Shuk Ching (720)

487. In early 2004, this applicant was granted a one-way permit by the Mainland authorities.  On the strength of that permit, she arrived in Hong Kong to reside with her family on 25 March 2004 and, at the time of writing this report, continues to reside here.

488. On 15 March 2005, shortly after her legal aid had been discharged, the applicant was contacted by the Department of Justice.  I am told that she informed the government counsel who spoke to her that, as she now had the right to live in Hong Kong in terms of her one-way permit, she no longer wished to pursue her application.  In this regard, it is to be noted, for example, that the applicant did not appeal her discharge of legal aid.

489. On the basis, however, that a one-way permit did not give the applicant immediate right of abode but only an expectation of obtaining that right after a period of residence, attempts were made to contact her to obtain an unequivocal statement of her intentions.  On 21 April 2005, my clerk contacted the applicant by telephone.  I am informed she told my clerk that she was at work and would return his call.  However, she failed to do so.  Accordingly, on 14 May 2005, a registered letter was sent to the applicant seeking a statement of her intentions.  By 1 June 2005, however, when her matter came before me, she had still declined to contact the court.

490. In the circumstances, I saw no purpose in commencing an exercise in her absence to determine her application.  I considered it plain, both from what she had told the Department of Justice and from her failure to press her action, that her true intention was to take her application no further.

491. My determination is therefore that the applicant, by her actions, has withdrawn her application.

Madam Lau Kiu Fan (1922 : a ‘group one’ and ‘group four’ applicant)

492. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in December 1959.  Her father came to live and work Hong Kong in 1978, her mother joining him in 1987.  Having failed to obtain a one-way permit to join her parents, the applicant came to Hong Kong on 19 April 1996 as a visitor.  Her two-way permit allowed her to remain until June of that year.  She overstayed, living with her parents.  She did so, she said, in the hope that upon the change of sovereignty she would be able to secure right of abode.

493. The applicant testified that in the days immediately following the change of sovereignty she heard rumours that an amnesty was being offered to people like her to enable them to obtain right of abode.  Buoyed by this expectation, on either 7 or 8 July 1997, the applicant went with her father to the Immigration Tower.  At the information counter on the second floor, she said that she spoke to an officer, telling him she had heard there was an amnesty being offered to those in her position and that she wished to remain in Hong Kong to care for her parents.  She was informed that there was no such amnesty and that, having overstayed for so long, she must now surrender herself for repatriation.

494. Although disappointed, the applicant said that she remained defiant, telling the officer that she would stay and would somehow get a Hong Kong identity card.  Under cross-examination, she protested that she was not at that time frightened of being prosecuted; she said she did not care about such matters.  This, however, was directly at odds with what she had said in her affirmation of 12 December 2002; namely : “I was disappointed but did not pursue the matter because I had already overstayed for more than a year and I was afraid of being prosecuted”.  This was the first (and perhaps least serious) of a number of inconsistencies between the applicant’s oral evidence and that contained in her affirmations and the original case summary prepared in or about 1999 by her then solicitors, Pam Baker & Co.

495. The applicant’s visit to the Immigration Tower in July 1997 did not constitute a basis for any claim.  It was recognised that she made enquiries only that day.  In any event, it was accepted that there was no record of the visit.

496. It was the applicant’s testimony that in the weeks following her visit to the Immigration Tower, she learnt from television that people – seemingly in her same situation – had been arrested and had received heavy fines.  Despite this, she said that on 30 August 1997 she returned to the Immigration Tower, this time alone, hoping “to get a walking permit in order to get an I.D. card”.  At the offices of the GIS on the 13th floor, the applicant said that she approached an officer at the reception counter and told him that she had overstayed in order to benefit from an amnesty.  The officer replied that there was no amnesty and that she must return to the Mainland.  The officer then gave her an ID 457 form to complete.

497. It was plain from her testimony that the applicant had not at the time put her mind to the nature of the form.  She said that she simply watched others filling it out and copied what they were doing.  While the applicant inserted the names of her parents and gave their Hong Kong address, she did not give their dates or places of birth and, importantly, did not complete the column in which their Hong Kong identity card numbers were required to be given.  The applicant explained this failure by saying that she approached the officer at the counter to ask if she could use a telephone to contact her parents to obtain their identity card details but was informed that it was not necessary to do so.

498. The applicant was then interviewed and in the course of that interview completed a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  On that form she wrote in Chinese characters :

“My mother’s eyes cannot see and were operated on. I overstayed because I was with my elderly family, now I want to return to China”.

499. A summary of her case prepared for the applicant in 1999 by her then solicitors was specific in recording that this statement was not “dictated as such” to the applicant.  It was accurate as far as it went.  However, it did not reflect all that the applicant had said during the course of the interview.  As I understood the summary, expressing it as positively as I can, it was to the effect that the applicant said that she wished to be able to settle in Hong Kong to care for her parents but at that time needed to return temporarily to the Mainland to be with her mother when she underwent treatment for her eyes.  In this regard, the summary says :

“Mother wanted to return to the Mainland to see if a doctor there could help with her eyesight. Ms Lau needed to accompany mother to go to the Mainland.”

500. In her affirmation of 12 December 2002, the applicant confirmed this when she said :

“The reason why I wrote I wanted to return to China as soon as possible was that my mother wanted me to accompany her to get treatment in the Mainland. My intention to ‘return’ to China was for this reason and this reason alone, and not to go back to live permanently. My ultimate intention was to come to Hong Kong to live permanently as a child of Hong Kong Permanent Resident parents. That is the reason why I came again on 19 June 1998 on another Two Way Permit.”

501. However, when she testified as to what happened during the interview on 30 August 1997, the applicant gave a version of events of a very different colour.  She said that she did not want to go back to the Mainland, she wished to remain in Hong Kong.  She said that she was, however, intimidated by the interviewing officer, Mr Ng Wai Lun, who told her that she was facing a sentence of imprisonment or a fine of $8,000 if she said she wished to remain in Hong Kong but, if she wrote down that she was willing to return to the Mainland, the court would no doubt treat her more leniently.  It was for that reason, said the applicant that she agreed to write down what the interviewing officer “taught” her to write.

502. When asked to explain the differences in what she had earlier put in her affirmation and what she was now saying in testimony, the applicant could do no more than obfuscate matters, protesting that either there were no contradictions on attempting to reconcile them in an illogical and sadly confused manner.

503. The applicant’s recollection of detail was – understandably after such a long time – often confused.  For example, she said several times that she had been threatened by the interviewing officer with a fine of $8,000, that number being clear in her mind.  But on the written evidence produced, it was clear that the sum of $8,000 was a sum requested to be brought by the applicant on her return to the Immigration Department as possible security for bail : a different matter entirely.

504. When the applicant commenced her testimony, she was plainly anxious, speaking far too much, answering questions before they had been fully asked.  At first, I put this down to an understandable nervousness.  But as her testimony continued and she relaxed, her anxiety translated itself into an argumentative approach.  In the content of what she said and the manner in which she said it, it became increasingly obvious that the applicant, in her desperation, was prepared to say anything that she believed would advance her case.  I confess to feeling sympathy for her; she was emotional and near her wit’s end.  But I could place little or no faith in anything of material relevance asserted by her.

505. The seismic shift in her evidence from not being “dictated to as such” to being intimidated and “taught” what to say in her ‘grounds for non-removal’ form was, I am satisfied, purely tactical because, for whatever reason, she no longer had trust in her original version of events. 

506. No doubt the applicant wished she had said many of the things that she testified she had said.  She gave glimpses of this when, on several occasions, she spoke in an aggrieved tone of “losing out” because she had been law-abiding and had obeyed the immigration authorities while others who had defied them had been successful in obtaining right of residence under the concession policy.

507. In summary, I am satisfied that the applicant did not make any claim for right of abode on 20 August 1997.

508. But even if I am wrong in this regard, I do not see how it can be said that any record of a claim exists.  The ID 457 form does not contain particulars of her parents sufficient on its face to show that they had right of abode in Hong Kong.  For whatever reason, the applicant failed to state particulars of their birth dates, their Hong Kong identity card details or any other information which would show that she was claiming right of abode through them.  As for the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form and the other documents in the applicant’s file, there is nothing in any of them, read alone or in conjunction, which would indicate a record of any claim.

509. It was finally the applicant’s case that, in substance, she claimed right of abode when she appeared at the Magistrates Court on a charge of breaching her conditions of stay.  The transcript of what was said is brief.  It reads :

“Court:Anything to say?
   
 Applicant:My mother has cataracts and she cannot see at all.  My elderly relatives are very old and want me to stay behind.
   
 Court:If your mother has cataracts she should go for an operation, there’s a very easy operation that will cure her cataracts. You’re fined $1,500.”

510. All that can be said on the basis of this exchange is that the applicant’s “elderly relatives” wanted the applicant to remain in Hong Kong.  As to why they wanted her to stay, it can only be inferred from what was said in the exchange between the applicant and the magistrate that it was on compassionate grounds and not because she had asserted any form of a legal right to remain.

511. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;
  
(ii)The Director has no record of any claim.

Mr Tsoi Chak Kong (applicant 3382)

512. The withdrawal of this applicant’s legal aid, while obviously a blow to him in that it withdrew from him the benefit of legal representation, was unfortunately taken by him as meaning something more profound; namely, that in some manner hidden from him, the merits of his claim had been determined against him by the courts.  In short, he understood the withdrawal of legal aid to constitute a dismissal of his claim.

513. The applicant appeared before me at two directions hearings.  On both occasions I did my best to explain the true position to him, impressing upon him that his claim had not yet been determined, that I had made no findings and that I would not do so until I had heard all relevant evidence including his own testimony, if he chose to give it.  The applicant, however, was not persuaded.  He remained deeply disaffected.  On the first occasion (17 March 2005), he said that he had already received his “death sentence” and could do no more about it.  On the second occasion (21 April 2005), when asked if he wished to appear to support his application, he made it plain that he had no intention to appear and hoped to return to the Mainland that same day even though, during my exchanges with him, it was made plain to the applicant that the court would be assisted by hearing his testimony and that his failure to appear would deprive the court of that assistance.  His view, however, was that he had already been deprived of justice.  In the result, the applicant’s matter was heard in his absence on 13 May 2005.

514. At the time of the change of sovereignty, both of the applicant’s parents and his brother had right of abode in Hong Kong.  He was the only member of the family denied a one-way permit.

515. The applicant came to Hong Kong on 26 November 1996 as a visitor, his two-way permit allowing him to remain until early in the new year.  He remained here, however, until his arrest by the police in September 1997, this arrest resulting in his repatriation.

516. It was the applicant’s case that after the change of sovereignty, before he was arrested, he had approached the immigration authorities on two occasions to enquire whether he could process his claim for right of abode in Hong Kong rather than the Mainland.  On neither occasion, however, had any papers been completed.  There was therefore no record of any claim that may have been made during those visits.

517. The applicant’s claim, as I understood it on the papers, was based solely on events that took place after his arrest by the police on 12 September 1997; more particularly, on the day following his arrest when he was removed to and then interviewed at the Victoria Immigration Centre.

518. In his affirmation of 29 January 2003, the applicant said that he was interviewed by two officers, one who spoke Mandarin (who acted as an interpreter) and one officer who spoke only Cantonese.  As to what took place, the applicant said the following :

“I explained that I had remained in Hong Kong to await the amnesty which I believed would be announced after the Handover. The officer told me that I could not post bail and I would be sent back to the Mainland immediately. … I recall being told in Mandarin that I must complete a form explaining the reasons why I had overstayed. I said to the officer that I would not write. The officer said if I did not write, I would be sent into prison. He told me to write what he had shown to me … I was very afraid of the consequences of not doing what I was told (i.e. imprisonment) that I felt I had no choice and copied the words from a piece of paper shown to me by the officer, even though it was the opposite of what I wished to do.”

The applicant was here speaking of the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form upon which he wrote :

“I, Tsoi Chak Kong, overstayed in Hong Kong.  I did not have work nor an extension.  I want to return to China as soon as possible.”

519. As to information concerning himself and his family, the applicant said the following in his affirmation :

“ I was also required to complete a form giving details of my family members … I did not complete the form. The officer asked me questions and he put down the information on the form.”

520. In summary, therefore, it was the applicant’s case :

(i)That he was interviewed by two officers, not one.
  
(ii)That he told the officers that he had overstayed in Hong Kong in order to benefit from an expected amnesty that would enable him to live permanently in Hong Kong, this in substance amounting to a claim for right of abode.
  
(iii)That initially he would not complete the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form in the manner demanded by the officers.
  
(iv)That he was told that if he did not do so he would be imprisoned.
  
(v)That accordingly, fearing incarceration, he did not write down that he had overstayed to claim right of abode but merely wrote what he was told to write.
  
(vi)That he did not complete the personal data form himself; this was completed for him by one of the officers, that officer failing to put down details which would demonstrate that his parents were permanent residents of Hong Kong.

521. It was further the applicant’s case that, although he had family in Hong Kong, he was given no chance to obtain bail and remained in detention until his repatriation nearly a week later.

522. Two immigration officers testified to having interviewed the applicant on 13 September 1997.  They spoke, however, of two separate interviews not a single interview conducted by the two of them or with one of them acting as interpreter for the other.

523. The first officer was Mr Yu Yiu Wing who on 13 September 1997 had been on duty at the Victoria Immigration Centre as the officer responsible for receiving arrested persons.  At about that time, he said, the Centre would expect to receive between 20 and 50 such persons each day.  It was the standard practice of all receiving officers, he said, to ask each arrested person whether he had a fixed abode in Hong Kong or some local connection.  The purpose, he said, was to determine whether the person should be referred to the recognizance office to process possible bail or to the processing unit for detention.

524. In conducting his brief interview with the applicant, said Mr Yu, he completed a standard minute form.  On that form he wrote the following in English : “He claimed to have neither a fixed abode nor L/C [local connection] in Hong Kong”.  On that basis, said Mr Yu, the applicant would have been referred to the processing unit for detention.

525. It is puzzling that Mr Yu should have written what he did when the evidence shows that, while still in the custody of the police, the applicant had given them the address of his parents’ residence in Hong Kong and in his second interview at the Centre conducted that same day had given details of the same address.  Perhaps it was a misunderstanding caused by language difficulties, the applicant apparently speaking little, if any, Cantonese.  But whatever the true reason, the applicant never claimed to have asserted right of abode at any brief, preliminary interview of the kind described by Mr Yu.

526. The second interview that day was the one at which the applicant’s personal details were recorded and at which, a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form was completed.  This interview was conducted by Mr Sin Fu Ming, a member of the Centre’s processing unit.  Mr Sin denied that there would have been two officers present during the interview, the one acting as an interpreter.  He would not have needed an interpreter, he said, as he was able to speak Mandarin.

527. Mr Sin denied threatening the applicant in the manner alleged; that is, by saying that if he did not complete the form in the manner demanded, the applicant would be imprisoned.  He accepted, however, that it was entirely possible that he had presented the applicant with some sample answers in order to assist him in completing the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form and that the applicant may have used one of those samples as a basis upon which to write.  Mr Sin explained that he had come across many interviewees who were content to be repatriated but had difficulty in knowing exactly what to write on the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form.  For those people, he said, having heard what they wished to say, he would provide one or two sample answers.  Mr Sin denied, however, that he compelled anybody to write only what was contained in his samples.  Interviewees could write what they wished, he said, the samples were an aid, no more.

528. In respect of the applicant’s evidence that he had been forced to copy each character, Mr Sin pointed out that his samples had not been written in simplified characters and yet some seven or eight characters written by the applicant had been in simplified characters, the writing being a mix of both forms.

529. As for the applicant’s assertion that the personal data form was written by the interviewing officer; that is, by Mr Sin himself, Mr Sin denied that the writing on the form was his writing.  Although he had no independent recollection of the interview, Mr Sin said that the writing on the form could only have been that of the applicant.

530. While in the absence of expert evidence I must be cautious in comparing the admitted writing of the applicant on the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form with the writing on the personal data form, I am entitled to observe, I believe, that the two styles of writing do not appear to be so markedly different that it must be presumed that the writings on the two forms had to be by different people.  If anything, to the layman, it may perhaps be said that the opposite appears to be the case.

531. In many cases – and this was one of them – so much depends on a careful assessment of the credibility of applicants, that assessment being made in the light of all the evidence and the answers given to explain matters which may stand both for them and against them.  In the present case, the applicant’s determination not to testify has denied me the ability to assess his credibility.  Nor can I in any way take into account how he may have impressed me during the course of our exchanges during the two directions hearings.  In any event, those exchanges were coloured by the applicant’s anger at his loss of legal aid.

532. What then, in so far as I can take it, was my impression of Mr Sin, the officer who conducted the second and more substantive interview with the applicant?  In my judgment, although he was not subjected to cross-examination by counsel and had only to deal with a number of questions from myself, Mr Sin came across as a credible witness.  The gist of his evidence was that he simply had no reason to prevent the applicant from recording, if he wished, that he had overstayed in the hope of obtaining right of residence so that he could remain here to care for his parents.  The writing of such words would not at that time, to his recollection, have caused any bureaucratic difficulties.  The applicant would still have been subject to removal and he would correctly have carried out his duties.

533. Mr Sin was one of the few officers to have admitted preparing sample answers for interviewees who were prepared to be repatriated but weren’t sure what to write on their ‘grounds for non-removal’ form. 

534. In my judgment, on the evidence placed before me, I am unable to come to a finding on the probabilities that the applicant was subjected to the duress of which he has complained that he made any sort of statement to the effect that he had been in Hong Kong in order to claim right of abode.

535. But even if I am wrong in this regard, I am satisfied that there is no record of any claim.  The personal data form, the only possible record, while it records the names and ages of the applicant’s parents and that they are unemployed, does not give details of their Hong Kong identity cards or any other details which, on the face of the document, would suggest that either of them has right of abode.   Nor do I see that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the information given is that the parents, or either one of them, must enjoy right of abode.

536. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;
  
(ii)The Director has no record of any claim.

Madam Wong Siu Ching (3822 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

537. The applicant came to Hong Kong illegally on 25 May 1998, arriving by boat.  When she arrived, she was seven months pregnant.  Many of those in the boat with her were also pregnant.  The applicant had compelling reasons for wishing to be in Hong Kong.  Her mother, who was infirm, was permanently resident here as was her younger brother, her only sibling.  In addition, the applicant’s husband was a permanent resident.  It was the applicant’s uncontested evidence that she had been attempting to obtain a one-way permit for many years but without success.  It is also pertinent to record that before the change of sovereignty the applicant had worked in Hong Kong for an extended period of time as an ‘imported worker’.

538. On 21 July 1998, when she was close to full term, the applicant surrendered herself to the immigration authorities.  On that day, she and her husband went to the offices of the GIS on the 13th floor of the Immigration Tower and over the next few hours the applicant completed a number of forms.  These forms are of particular relevance :

(i)On a form entitled ‘Personal Particulars of pregnant illegal immigrant’, the applicant gave a brief explanation of how it was that she had come to Hong Kong. She gave both her Hong Kong address and her address on the Mainland and, by circling certain printed options, indicated that she had come to Hong Kong to give birth. Of particular importance, in my view, is that one of the printed options is ‘family reunion’ while another allows for general assertions by saying : ‘other reasons’. Neither of these were circled or endorsed in any way.
   
(ii)On a second form entitled ‘My personal particulars’, the applicant was asked to give particulars of family members. The particulars sought were as follows : relationship, name, age, place of birth, occupation, address, whether sick or handicapped. It will be seen that no identity card details or other particulars of residential status were sought and none were given by the applicant.
   
(iii)On the standard ‘grounds for non-removal’ form, the applicant wrote :
   
 “I am Wong Siu Tsing, I cam to Hong Kong illegally on 25 May 1998. I am now 9 months pregnant. I hope that I can stay in HK to give birth to this child. Afterwards, I willingly return to the Mainland.”

539. It was, however, the applicant’s evidence that, despite the indications she had made on the form described in sub-paragraph (i) and the words written on the form in sub-paragraph (iii), she had not surrendered herself that day for the sole purpose of giving birth in Hong Kong, thereby ensuring permanent residence for her child.  It was her evidence that she had originally planned to have her child on the Mainland.  However, when she learnt that her mother was not well, that, and her desire to be with her family, drove her to enter Hong Kong illegally.  She had come to Hong Kong, she said, because she decided to try and remain here permanently – she wanted the right to reside in Hong Kong with her family.

540. It was therefore the applicant’s evidence that a principal reason for surrendering herself on 21 July 1998 was to seek some way of remaining permanently in Hong Kong.  She testified that she would have gone earlier to the Immigration Tower but her journey in a small boat had made her ill.  At her advanced stage of pregnancy that is not surprising.

541. In respect of her desire to seek permanent residence, it was the applicant’s evidence that she had heard news of the on-going right of abode litigation which, to her understanding, offered hope of success.  When her husband testified, however, he recalled that at the time he had been none too hopeful.  It was the gist of his evidence that he personally had expected the worst but, as he said, it had still been “worth the chance”.

542. The applicant testified that, when she and her husband went to the offices of the GIS, they had with them their marriage certificate and the original identity cards of her mother and father.  While being interviewed by Mr Yip Ka Wang, an immigration assistant, both the applicant and her husband testified that they had made what in substance amounted to a claim for right of abode.  It was their evidence that the husband spoke first.  He told the interviewing officer that both of his wife’s parents were Hong Kong residents and he was a resident too.  That, he suggested to the officer, should entitle the applicant to obtain an identity card in Hong Kong.  It was their evidence that the applicant then repeated what her husband had said in order to confirm it and added that she wanted to obtain an identity card.  In reply, however, the officer told them that there was no mechanism in Hong Kong which enabled her to apply for an identity card and that she must return to the Mainland to process any such application.

543. As to their reactions to this advice, the applicant said that they were very disappointed and unhappy.  The husband, in a way that rang true, said more prosaically : “After he said that, we felt we could not apply and arrangements were then made to fill out forms”.

544. The applicant, as I have said, had compelling reasons for wishing to remain permanently in Hong Kong and every reason therefore, in the company of her husband, to a least attempt to make a claim even if she knew the chances of any claim being successful were small.  But more than that, in respect of this core issue, I found both the applicant and her husband to be inherently credible.  I am satisfied, therefore, that the probabilities do support their contention that an assertion to a right to reside permanently in Hong Kong was made on 21 July 1998.

545. But, having had their claim rejected by the interviewing officer, the evidence, in my view, pointed strongly to the fact that both the applicant and her husband then became resigned to what I will describe as the second best option; namely, the formal agreement to her remaining in Hong Kong for the limited purpose of giving birth here.

546. The evidence indicates, I believe, that the ‘grounds for non-removal’ form was completed in this resigned fashion.  In respect of this form, the applicant testified that, when shown the form, she told the interviewing officer that she did not know “how to write it”.  She was then given the characters to write.  The applicant said that she was not happy to write them as they did not express her true wishes.  She only did so, she said, because she was afraid that if she refused she might be immediately repatriated.  I do not accept that.  This evidence was, in my view, at best an exaggeration.  The applicant was with her husband, a Hong Kong resident, a driver by profession and a man who did not in any way strike me as timid.  I do not believe that the applicant would have written anything against her will that day, not at least without considerable protest.  I am satisfied also that at her advanced stage of pregnancy the applicant would have had a reasonable expectation of not being hurried back across the border.  Many women in her position were at that time coming to Hong Kong from the Mainland to give birth and if they went to the Immigration Department at a sufficiently advanced stage were not repatriated until after birth.  Indeed, the practice was so common that the Immigration Department had special forms printed.

547. Be that as it may, as I have said, I am satisfied that a claim for right of abode was made that day.  The difficulty that has faced the applicant, however, has been the identification of a record which is evidence of that claim.

548. The obvious document to which to look is the ‘My personal particulars’ form, a form which appears to have served the same essential purpose as the ID 457 form.  It is an administrative quirk that, unlike the ID 457 form, the ‘My personal particulars’ form does not ask for details of the Hong Kong identity cards of a person’s parents.  That is because, as an illegal immigrant, she was dealt with differently from an overstayer.  As it is, as I have said earlier, the applicant did not record on the face of that form (or any other form that day) any details of her parent’s residential status.  It was, I am satisfied, open to her to do so if she so wished.

549. The applicant, who was assisted in presenting her case by her younger brother, submitted that the ‘My personal particulars’ form nevertheless contained sufficient information to show that her mother, who was still alive, had right of permanent residence in Hong Kong.  The form, it was said, gave information, for example, of the mother’s age and her Hong Kong address.  The age of the mother was given as 54, a sufficiently advanced age, it was suggested, to alert the immigration authorities to the fact that the mother must have been residing in Hong Kong for a long term.  In addition, so it was said, a simple check would have shown that the mother’s apartment was her own property, further evidence of her status.

550. Earlier in this report, in respect of applicant 1624 (Madam Kwok Siu Wan), I was confronted with the same submission.  All that was necessary, it was argued in that case, was sufficient information to enable a successful train of inquiry to be instituted.  I, however, was of the view that —

“… in terms of the policy, as I read it, the documentary material must – on its face – constitute evidence that corroborates the making of a claim. The phrase ‘on its face’, when given its plain English meaning, implies that the material must essentially, considered in context, speak for itself. That must therefore exclude material which does not speak for itself in any direct way but simply offers up information which, if investigated, may lead on corroborating proof.”

551. In this regard, in its July judgment (paragraphs 32 and 33) the CFA said :

“However, it is submitted by the applicants that in some cases … the relevant documents held by the Immigration Department including statements and other documents containing annotations, handwritten or otherwise, fairly read, should be regarded as amounting to the required record of a claim for the right of abode.
  
 We are of the view that if, in the case of any applicant, such annotations or other writing appear on the face of documents held by the Immigration Department which, interpreted fairly, amount, on the balance of probabilities, to a record of a claim for right of abode, the Concession requirement in respect of such record is satisfied. In accordance with the rationale indicated in paragraph 210 of the January Judgment, documentary materials are incapable of constituting the required record of a claim unless on their face they amount to evidence that a claim for right of abode is or has been made.” [my emphasis]

552. The question, I believe, may be put as follows : accepting that an oral claim was made, is there anything on the face of the documents completed that day which may be said to constitute evidence of that claim?  In my view, there is nothing on the face of the papers from which it may be inferred that the applicant’s parents had right of permanent residence.  Age itself is not firm indicator nor, as I understand it, is evidence that a parent resides in a Hong Kong apartment.

553. In any event, the ages of the parents were not accurately stated.  The ages given were different from the ages on their identity cards, copies of which were before me.

554. It was the applicant’s case that on 21 July 1998 she had with her not only her marriage certificate to prove her relationship to her Hong Kong husband but also the identity cards of both her parents, the purpose of these documents being to prove her right to permanent residence.  The applicant said that, during the interview with Mr Yip Ka Wang, she gave the marriage certificate and the identity cards to him for copying.  However, for some unknown reason, Mr Yip only copied the marriage certificate.  Accordingly, no record of the parents’ identity cards was left with the Director.  The suggestion appeared to be made that Mr Yip should somehow be held accountable for deliberately not copying the identity cards and that the Director should therefore be estopped from denying the existence of a record.

555. Mr Yip, who had no personal recollection of the events, said that normally persons surrendering themselves would be asked to obtain their own copies and only rarely would he make the copies himself; for example, if a surrendered person was infirm.  If, however, he did make copies, he said, he would make copies of all the documents given to him and those would include such items as identity cards.  In this regard, Mr Yip impressed me as a witness of the truth.  I do not accept that he would have purposefully failed to copy the identity cards of the applicant’s parents.  At that time he would have had little, if any, reason to do so.

556. In the circumstances, therefore, I have had to conclude that, although an oral application for right of abode was made on 21 July 1998, the Director has no record of that claim.

557. On 21 July 1998, a recognisance was completed permitting the applicant to remain in Hong Kong until late September of that year.  In September, however, the applicant was obliged to report to the Victoria Immigration Centre.  The recognisance form bears the identity card number of the husband, Mr Ng Tang Wai, but nothing is said of the applicant’s parents.

558. On 17 August 1998, the applicant gave birth.

559. On 15 September 1998 she was interviewed at the Joint Recognisance Office to confirm that she still intended to return to the Mainland and was sufficiently healthy to do so.  On this occasion, the applicant was told that she would be repatriated on 22 September 1998.  The applicant testified that she complained that she did not wish to be repatriated.  She said that her mother was ill and that her child was very young; she wished to stay to care for them both.  She was told, however, that, as she had come into Hong Kong illegally, she must expect to be repatriated.  She was then given forms to sign and because of her distress, simply signed them.

560. The officer who dealt with the applicant that day, Mr Wong Kwok-fai, accepted that people did from time to time say that they did not wish to be repatriated.  If they did so, he said, he would, as a matter of practice, ask them to write down their grounds of objection and would then refer the matter to a superior officer.

561. On the evidence, I think it probable that on 15 September 1998 the applicant did express some lack of willingness to return to the Mainland.  But her words, in my view, did not amount to a claim for right of abode.  They constituted a plea, based on the difficulties of her circumstances, to be allowed only to remain for a longer period.

562. But in any event, even if I am wrong in that regard, I am satisfied that there is no record evidencing any claim made that day.  To the contrary, one of the forms which the applicant said that in her distressed state she simply signed is a standard form to the following effect :

“I am WONG Siu-ching. I know I don’t have the right of abode in Hong Kong. I hope to return to Mainland China on 22 September 1998.”

563. On 22 September 1998, the day the applicant was due to report to the Victoria Immigration Centre, she was apparently telephoned in the morning and asked why she had not done so.  According to the applicant, she said that she did not wish to return, especially having regard to the tender age of her child.  She asked if it would be possible to stay.  She was told, however, that this was not possible and if she did not report she was in danger of being arrested.  Being frightened, the applicant said that she asked for an extension of two days and was told to report, bringing a letter of request.

564. In the result, the applicant reported that morning.  As she had the child in her arms, her husband made the request for an extension and in this regard a letter was left with the immigration authorities which read :

“My husband is a permanent Hong Kong resident. I came to Hong Kong unlawfully to give birth because I was pregnant. I am grateful that the Hong Kong Government has allowed me to stay temporarily until 22nd this month. However, my daughter’s Home Visit Permit could only be ready on 24 September and my husband has to work and cannot look after her, I beg that my stay can be extended for two days. Please give me the permission. After that, I am willing to return to the Mainland.”

565. A two-day extension was granted and on 24 September 1998, without incident, the applicant was repatriated.

566. In respect of the events on 22 September 1998, it was never seriously contended by the applicant that she had made a claim for right of abode on that day and certainly, in my view, it was clear on the evidence that both she and her husband were seeking nothing more than a few extra days in Hong Kong.  Certainly, there is no record to evidence any form of claim made at this time.

567. In conclusion, therefore, I have determined :

(i)That the applicant did make a claim for right of abode, but
  
(ii)The Director has no record of any claim.

PART SIX

Madam Chan Chuen Chu (400 : a ‘group one’ and ‘group six’ applicant)

568. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in 1971.  Her father came to live and work in Hong Kong in 1983.  Her mother and younger brother were allowed to join him in 1994.  The applicant and her sister, however, were refused one-way permits.  

569. In February 1996, the applicant, who at the time was unmarried, came to Hong Kong.  Her two-way permit allowed her to remain in Hong Kong until April of that year.  The applicant, however, overstayed.  She did so, she said, for two reasons.  First, to help care for her paternal grandmother and, second, in the hope that she would be able to obtain right of abode when the change of sovereignty took place.

570. Immediately after the change of sovereignty, the applicant said that she paid close attention to media reports on the right of abode issue.  To her disappointment, she learnt that right of abode seekers had been arrested and repatriated.  Indeed, a relative had suffered the same fate, being prosecuted too.

571. The applicant’s father testified that in or about August 1997 he and his wife went to the Immigration Department to enquire whether their daughter could claim right of abode in Hong Kong.  He was informed that there was no such process in Hong Kong and any application would have to be made on the Mainland.

572. In light of all of this – well knowing the realities of the situation – the applicant was advised by her parents not to go out on the streets.  In cross-examination, she admitted that she remained in hiding until early May 1998.  It was her evidence, however, at least I understood it to be such, that she remained in hiding hoping that some good news would emerge from the on-going right of abode saga.

573. In early May 1998, said the applicant, she learnt that her sister, who lived on the Mainland, had fallen ill and required care.  The decision was made that she and her mother would return temporarily to the Mainland.

574. The evidence revealed that on the morning of 6 May 1998 the applicant’s mother passed through Lo Wu without incident.  The applicant herself, however, was prevented from leaving.  By then, of course, she had been unlawfully resident in Hong Kong for some two years.  Having been stopped she was interviewed.

575. It is accepted that in the course of her interview, the applicant produced a number of documents; first, a letter written by her father dated 30 April 1998; second, copies of the Hong Kong identity cards of her father and her paternal grandmother, not her mother; third, medical certificates proving the poor health of her grandmother and, fourth, a letter from the housing manager of the estate in which the grandmother lived giving permission for the grandmother’s family to reside with her in order to care for her.

576. The father’s letter was of central importance to the applicant’s claim.  In translation, the relevant portions of that letter read :

“I am … the father of [the applicant]. Since my daughter cannot speak Cantonese, I have no alternative but to give a brief account of what happened in writing…
  
 My mother … is old and ailing. In 1994, she suffered from gallstones and needed family members to take care of her. However, Hong Kong is a society where people live from hand to mouth. To be honest, I have no special skills. I only do menial work in Hong Kong and earn a wage barely enough to support a living …
  
 My wife and I have worked hard for years, so hard that there is not even a breathing space for us. When our daughter [the applicant] came to Hong Kong for travel, we wanted her to stay here to take care of her grandmother, so that we could go to work without worrying about my elderly mother. I know this is in breach of the laws of Hong Kong. Yet, my daughter is still single. I am filled with mixed feelings and greatly upset. I don’t want to do so but circumstances force me to. No matter what, I must let my daughter go home. As for her future direction, I cannot plan that much for her. I felt so inferior during all these years. I earnestly hope that your department will appreciate my plight. I have more to say than this letter can express. I should be grateful if your department would treat my case with leniency and give me the maximum support.” [my emphasis]

577. It was the father’s evidence that he wrote the letter with the intention of submitting it personally to the Immigration Department.  He said that he was at a loss to know what to do best and wrote the letter hoping that the immigration authorities would let his daughter remain in Hong Kong.  He said that he was too busy at work, however, to deliver the letter immediately and, when he learnt that his daughter would have to return to the Mainland, he gave the letter to her.

578. It appears to have been the applicant’s case that she intended to make a claim for right of abode at the border.  That presumably – in accordance with her case – was why she took her father’s letter with her.  But her evidence in this regard made little sense.  On the one hand she said that she and her mother intended to return temporarily to the Mainland, in short, to leave Hong Kong, on the other hand she said that it was, to her knowledge, inevitable that she would be stopped as an overstayer and prevented from leaving.  Viewing the evidence as a whole, it must be the case, I believe, that the applicant hoped to be able to pass through the border without being stopped.  However, there was a real risk that she would be stopped.  In that event, what was important was to put mitigatory material before the immigration authorities, material that would hopefully avoid a prosecution (and possible imprisonment).

579. On behalf of the Director, it was said that, seen in context, the documents produced by the applicant at Lo Wu were clearly intended to explain and excuse the applicant’s lengthy period of unlawful residence.  They were not intended to form the basis for any claim for right of abode.  That, I believe, must be the case.

580. First, both the applicant and her parents were under no illusion at the time that overstayers, even if they did claim right of abode, were being apprehended, often prosecuted and then repatriated.

581. Second, the father’s letter – dated 30 April 1998, just six days prior to the applicant’s attempted departure – read as a whole, cannot, even with the most generous reading, be said to constitute a claim on behalf of the daughter to remain in Hong Kong by reason of some right in law.  To the contrary, it appears to be a letter which begs the authorities to let the daughter return to the Mainland unimpeded.  The letter begins with the father stating that he must give an account of what has happened in respect of his daughter’s time in Hong Kong and ends with a request that the authorities act leniently.

582. There is a single sentence in the letter – the sentence that I have emphasised – which reads : “No matter what, I must let my daughter go home”.  The father testified that what he meant to convey here was that his daughter must be allowed ‘to come home to Hong Kong’.  This, it was suggested, amounted to an indirect claim for right of abode.  I am unable to agree.  On its face, and read in context, that sentence quite clearly relates to the daughter being allowed to return home to the Mainland.  After all, earlier in the letter the father had spoken of the daughter coming to Hong Kong ‘for travel’ only. 

583. As for the other documents produced at the interview; that is, the two identity cards, the medical reports and the letter from the housing estate, it was submitted on behalf of the Director that these clearly showed that the intention was to demonstrate that the applicant had had to remain in Hong Kong to care for her grandmother.  The probabilities support this.  The identity cards proved a relationship with the grandmother.  Her frail medical condition was proved by the medical letters and also by the recognition by the housing estate authorities that the grandmother’s family could reside with her in order to care for her.

584. It must also be observed that during the course of cross-examination, the applicant’s father conceded that a breach of conditions of stay could result in a criminal prosecution and that the longer the period of overstaying the heavier the likely penalty.  Both the applicant and her father, therefore, had every motive for putting matters before the immigration authorities which would reduce her culpability.

585. I have come to these findings in recognition of the fact that a claim for right of abode may be couched in terms that are read at first blush as a purely humanitarian claim.

586. At Lo Wu, the applicant was interviewed by Ms Ma May Chun, an Immigration Officer.  Ms Ma said that the interview was conducted in Putonghua.  This, of course, was not the applicant’s first language, the Minan dialect being her native tongue, and may perhaps have given rise to some misunderstanding.  Ms Ma, who, on the face of the interview record, described the applicant as being ‘evasive’, wrote down as the applicant’s reason for overstaying that she had to take care of her grandmother who had been suffering from gall stone problems.  Under the heading ‘Remarks’, Ms Ma wrote the following :

“Subject’s parents are Hong Kong resident. As stated by her father in his letter, subject needed to take care of her grandmother as both parents were working. Now she intended to return to China as her mother had no more work to do and she took care of her grandmother.”

587. The applicant, in her testimony, said that, when she gave Ms Ma her father’s letter, she remembered saying that her father was a permanent resident of Hong Kong and that she herself therefore was entitled to a Hong Kong identity card.

588. If accepted, this statement would have constituted a direct claim for right of abode.  However, I had little hesitation in rejecting the applicant’s evidence in this regard as an invention.  No such claim had been recorded previously in her case papers.  The summary of her case prepared by her original solicitors said no more than that she explained to the interviewing officer that her father was a permanent resident and that she had stayed in Hong Kong to be with her family and to care for sick grandmother.  In her later affidavit of 4 November 2002 nothing appears to suggest that she made a claim in the manner she asserted.

589. On behalf of the applicant, it was suggested to Ms Ma that during the course of the Lo Wu interview the applicant had told her that she was entitled to a Hong Kong identity card.  This was denied by Ms Ma.  Although she had no independent recollection of the interview, she said that, if such a claim had been made, there would have been some reference to it.

590. Ms Ma impressed me as a credible witness.  I have no reason to doubt that she recorded at the time what she honestly understood to be the essence of what the applicant said to her.

591. I confess, however, that I did not find the applicant to be a credible witness.  Indeed by the time she had completed her evidence, I had reached the conclusion that I could place no faith in any of the contentious aspects of her evidence.  The applicant, in my judgment, plainly distorted her evidence with exaggeration and, when she thought it suited her, resorted, as I have already indicated, to outright invention.

592. I am satisfied that at Lo Wu on 6 May 2005 no claim for right of abode was made.

593. Two days later, on 8 May 2005, the applicant went with her father to the 13th floor of the Immigration Tower.  The purpose – as the applicant must have known – was to undergo administrative processing for possible criminal prosecution and repatriation.  However, during the course of her testimony the applicant said that she thought the reason for her visit was related to the formality of registering for a Hong Kong identity card.  On behalf of the Director that evidence was criticised as being incredible.  I agree with that description.

594. At the 13th floor, the applicant’s father completed the ID 457 form, giving both his own and his wife’s Hong Kong identity card details.  The father accepted that when he completed the form he was not sure of its nature and therefore its purpose.

595. It was the applicant’s evidence that, when she was called in for her interview, she wanted her father to accompany her.  However, the interviewing officer would not allow it.  The applicant said that she was asked ‘loudly and angrily’ for her reasons for overstaying.  She replied that she had overstayed to look after her sick grandmother and in addition that she had overstayed in order to wait for the change of sovereignty so that she could obtain a Hong Kong identity card.  The applicant said that she was told, however, that there were ‘no such thing’.  She said that the officer took out a ‘grounds for non-removal’ form and again ‘loudly and angrily’ instructed her what to write on the form.  The applicant said that she was so frightened by the aggressive conduct of the interviewing officer that she simply wrote the words dictated to her :

“Overstay because of staying with family.  Now want to return to China.”

596. I do not accept that the applicant made a claim for right of abode during the course of the interview, either in the manner she said or in any other way.  I could place no reliance on her testimony.

597. Although the applicant did not persist with it, it was originally her case that she also claimed right of abode when she appeared before the magistrate on 13 May 1998.  However, the transcript makes it plain that nothing that could be construed to be a claim for right of abode was made on that occasion.  In the course of her testimony before me, however, clearly in an attempt to explain why the transcript contained no evidence of any claim, the applicant said that when she appeared at the magistrate’s court, she was told by the staff that she could say anything she liked except that she wished to remain in Hong Kong.  When it was put to her that this was a recent invention, she insisted that she had instructed both her original and her current solicitors in this regard and could not understand why neither of them had recorded the fact.  Here again, in my view, was evidence that by the end of her testimony the applicant was prepared to say almost anything that she believed might somehow advance her case.

598. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;
  
(ii)The Director has no record of any claim.

Madam Lam Nga Yung (1769 : a ‘group six’ applicant)

599. The applicant was born in Fujian Province in 1975.  In 1982, her father came to Hong Kong.  In 1993, the mother and the applicant’s two siblings were able to join the father.  The applicant, however, as the eldest child, was not permitted to accompany them.  After her family had settled in Hong Kong, the applicant tried to obtain a one-way permit but was informed by the Mainland authorities that she was too old to qualify.

600. Like many others from Fujian Province, in the months leading up to the change of sovereignty the applicant heard rumours that, when the Basic Law came into effect in Hong Kong, there would be an amnesty permitting people in her position to claim permanent residence.  The applicant said that she discussed the matter with her mother.  She then applied for a two-way permit.  The permit was apparently issued but because of postal difficulties she was not informed of its issue.  In the result, she had to make a second application which delayed her arrival in Hong Kong.  The applicant said that she eventually came to Hong Kong as a visitor in late December 1997, being permitted to remain until 21 January 1998.

601. It was the applicant’s testimony that the day before her permit expired, she went to the Immigration Tower with her father and sister to enquire whether it would be possible to obtain an extension of her two-way permit which would permit her to remain permanently in Hong Kong.  She was informed that this was not possible.

602. As I understand it, it was not asserted that a claim for right of abode was made on this occasion.  In any event, there is no suggestion that a record of any such claim is in the Director’s possession.

603. The evidence of the visit was led in order to demonstrate that at all material times both the applicant and her family were intent on securing right of permanent residence for her.  The applicant spoke of her deep reluctance to return to the Mainland where, as an unmarried woman, she lived alone and in fear of unlawful elements in her area.  The applicant’s father, whose testimony was central to the applicant’s case, spoke of his sorrow at the fact that the family had been separated from the applicant.

604. The applicant’s case, as I have said, is not based on any alleged oral claim made to an immigration officer.  It is based instead on a single document, a letter which bears the date of 24 January 1998 and is addressed to the Director.  That letter, it was said, constitutes a claim for right of abode.  It was written by the applicant’s father at a time when the applicant was in Hong Kong and the letter should be held to be (or to have been) in the possession of the Director.  Accordingly, so it was said, all the necessary requirements have been met for the applicant to be a beneficiary under the concession policy.

605. In considering this matter, I have borne in mind that the letter, if it was written at the time alleged, was written in early 1998 and could not therefore have been among those letters destroyed by the ECVU as part of its weeding exercise in or about early 1999 : see para.20 of this report.

606. It was not disputed that, although the applicant was required to return to the Mainland when her two-way permit expired, she did not do so.  She overstayed, remaining with her family.

607. Her father, Mr Lam For Lung, worked as a security guard.  At that time, he said, he was working the night shift at the Central Pier Government Offices with three or four other guards.

608. The father said that, a few nights after his daughter had begun to overstay, he sat down at his place of work and wrote a letter to the Director.  The letter, he said, took him about an hour to write.  He used government paper, cutting off the logo.  He said he wrote it after he had finished patrolling, the time being somewhere between 10 and 11 p.m.  As the father expressed it, he wrote the letter ‘casually’, hoping that his daughter might be able to obtain what he described as an ‘extension’.

609. The father testified that he kept a copy of the letter and it was that copy that was exhibited.  The copy bears the date of 24 January 1998.  It does not give the address of the father nor any other means by which he could be contacted; for example, a telephone number.  The copy, in translation, is to the following effect :

“Dear Sir,
  
 I, Lam For Lung, holder of ID Card No. H466511(4) became a Hong Kong permanent resident in 1989 while my wife Wong Yuen Yu holds ID Card No. P323242(9). Our daughter Lam Nga Yung came to Hong Kong by a two-way permit on 31 December 1997. Lam Nga Yung’s permit number is 2394572. The permit has already expired now. We, the couple of us, are very much worried that she had nobody to rely upon if she goes back to the Mainland and that she, a girl, has to live alone in a house without anybody to take care of her. Therefore, I implore that the Immigration Department would check to verify that my daughter Lam Nga Yung ought to enjoy permanent right of abode in Hong Kong so that my family may live together.”

610. On its face, the letter clearly constituted a claim for right of abode.

611. However, it was the Director’s case that the letter was never received.  More than that, it was his case that the letter must in fact have been a later invention, created in all probability at least two years after the date on which it was purported to have been written.

612. In my judgment, the probabilities strongly support the Director’s contention.  On all the evidence, I have had little hesitation in concluding that the letter was a later invention.  I have concluded that it was not received by the Director in January or February 1998 simply because it was not in existence at that time.

613. I am constrained to say that I found the father to be an entirely unimpressive witness, defensive and vacillating.  I am satisfied that, when testifying as to how he came to write the letter, he did not tell the truth.

614. Although supposedly written reasonably late at night, the letter gives the number of the applicant’s two-way permit, not a number that the father would be likely to remember or have with him.  When asked how he had got the number, the father said that he had telephoned his daughter to ask for the number but then, almost in the same breadth, said that his daughter had written in down and given it to him.

615. If the father had spoken to his daughter on the telephone that night to get the number, it seems likely that there would at least have been some passing discussion as to why it was wanted.  After all, the discussion would have been around 10 o’clock at night and the request for the number itself would surely – at that time of night – have aroused some curiosity on the part of the applicant.  But the father insisted that he never mentioned the letter to his family members until a much later time.  Apparently, this was not because he wanted it kept a secret, simply because, according to him, he did not think at the time that it was significant.  If, however, the father had asked for the number and the daughter had written it down – which must have been before he went to work or the next day before returning to work – surely that too would have resulted in some discussion as to why the number was needed.  If he had asked for the number before going to work, that would suggest he was planning to write the letter and it was not simply done ‘casually’ as he suggested; his evidence in that regard, as I understood it, being that the letter was an idea that just came to him and was not discussed in advance or especially prepared for.

616. Even in respect of keeping the copy of the letter, the father’s evidence was confused.  He spoke at one time of keeping it in a drawer at work but also, as I understood him, spoke of a drawer at home.

617. For an unexplained reason, the father saw fit to write both his and his wife’s name on the letter, presumably signing for both, but said he never confided in his wife that he had sent the letter.  By the time he got home after night shift, he said, his wife had already left for work and they rarely saw each other.  He therefore never mentioned it to her.

618. The father said that he obtained the envelope for the letter, and a stamp, at home.  He said that he wrote the address on the envelope at home but emphasised that it was when he was alone.  He remembered that the envelope was addressed to the Director of Immigration, Immigration Tower, Wanchai.  He remembered posting the letter at North Point.  Yet, although the Director was later to receive two letters from the applicant, this single, critical letter was not received.

619. Where, however, the father had the most difficulty was in trying to explain how it was that the writing and posting of the letter had slipped his mind for so long.

620. It was the father’s evidence that, because he did not at the time think the letter was significant, he did not mention it to any member of his family, not even to the applicant.  Bearing in mind the great concern the family had for the family’s plight, this is perhaps unusual but I do not think can be taken so far as to say it is not credible.

621. However, the history of events shows that over the next year or so there were a number of occasions when, if the letter had been written, the father’s memory would surely have been jogged.  But, according to the father – who tried to give the impression that, because of his working hours, he lived almost in isolation from his family – his memory was not awakened.

622. On 7 July 1999, the CFA having handed down its judgment on 29 January of that year, the applicant wrote to the Director to claim right of abode.  She said that she dictated the letter to her brother at home and admitted that she had probably discussed it with her father.  That, in my view, was likely.  After all, it was a family problem.  That letter was received by the Director the following day and was acknowledged.  The letter, however, said nothing of the father’s letter.

623. Shortly thereafter the applicant admitted receiving a letter from the solicitors, Pam Baker & Co., which set out in considerable detail the circumstances in which persons like the applicant might benefit from the concession policy.  In part, the letter read :

“A person can claim to be a permanent resident himself or the claim can be made by his parents who are of permanent resident status. If you have been to the Immigration Department or Legal Aid Department yourself, or you have raised the matter in writing to government officials, perhaps you fit the definition of having claimed to be a permanent resident. It does not matter even if your claim was not accepted by the Government at that time.”

The letter went on to set out certain examples, one being as follows :

“Another example: If you have written a letter to the Immigration Department but no reply has been received so far …”

624. This letter from the applicant’s solicitors would surely have been discussed in the family.  But when I asked the applicant questions concerning the issue, she became very evasive.  It was obvious she appreciated that, if she admitted that she had spoken to her father about the matter, that would have jogged his memory of the letter he had earlier written.

625. Early the following year, on 7 January 2000, the applicant wrote again to the Director.  This letter, she said, was dictated to her sister and this letter she accepted had been discussed with the whole family.  Yet nothing appears in the letter concerning the father’s letter.  This letter too was received by the Director.

626. On 29 May 2000, the applicant attended an interview with the Immigration Department in order to state why she believed she was entitled to right of abode.  She had been given an opportunity to prepare her grounds.  The applicant confirmed she had completed the form at home.  She confirmed that she had discussed the matter with her family.  Her father even filed out portion of the form.  Yet – again – nothing was said of the father’s letter.

627. Indeed, according to the applicant, she first got to know of her father’s letter in 2000.  This came about, she said, because friends told her that they had earlier written to the Director and were informed that they could now obtain right of abode.  When she mentioned this to her father, she said, he immediately remembered that he too had written a letter.

628. The applicant said that she asked her father why he had not mentioned it earlier.  He had replied that his working hours made him constantly tired and it had slipped his mind.

629. The father claimed that he was able to find the copy of the letter in his drawer at work.  However, according to him, he had not seen it in the drawer at any earlier time so as to be reminded of it.  He said this was because the drawer had always been so full of papers; to use his expression, like a ‘rubbish tip’.  This piece of evidence, like so much of the father’s evidence, was just too convenient, too contrived.  By the end, it was obvious, I believe, that the father was prepared to say anything that came to mind.

630. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)No claim was made;
  
(ii)The Director has no record of any claim.

Mr Chu Shek Kai (5297 : a ‘group six’ applicant)

631. The applicant was born in the Mainland in 1952, seemingly one of eight children.  Long before the applicant’s birth, the evidence revealed that his father had come to Hong Kong to live and work.  The father had arrived in or about 1931 and had remained until about May 1942 when he had been shipped back to the Mainland by the Japanese forces then occupying Hong Kong.  The father had remained in the Mainland for a number of years – his children (or most of them) being born during this time – before returning to live in Hong Kong.

632. By 1993, according to the applicant, all of the family had settled in Hong Kong except for himself and two of his brothers.

633. It was the applicant’s evidence that in February 1993 his father had written a long letter to him and his two brothers in the Mainland.  In that letter, the father had informed them that, according to the draft of the Basic Law, when the change of sovereignty took place, they would be able to claim right of abode through him.  A copy of this letter had been kept by the applicant, or a family member, and was placed into evidence.  The letter concluded, in translation, as follows :

“The above information reflects that since the time when I was a teenager, I have stayed and worked in Hong Kong.  It is provided for the three brothers of you in the Mainland to use when you may have to provide my status and background in submitting application for coming to Hong Kong to reunite with me.  You can give your answer in accordance with the above facts.”

634. The applicant’s mother died in 1990, the father in 1994.

635. In early March 1998, the applicant came to Hong Kong, his two-way permit allowing him to remain until the end of May of that year.  While in Hong Kong, he said, he stayed with a brother who lived in Lockhart Road, Wanchai.  On the evidence, it appears that the apartment was within reasonable walking distance of the Immigration Tower.

636. It was during this visit, said the applicant, that he wrote to the Director claiming right of abode.  It is this letter which formed the basis of the applicant’s claim.

637. In his written instructions to his first solicitors, Pam Baker & Co., the applicant spoke of this letter in the following terms :

“From 6 March 1998 to 30 May 1998, I stayed in Hong Kong by virtue of a two-way permit to visit relatives. The first time, I wrote to the Immigration Department to tell them that according to the provisions of Article 24 of the Basic Law, after 1997 all Chinese children given birth to by Hong Kong residents on the Mainland will automatically become Hong Kong permanent residents. I told the Immigration Department the right I ought to enjoy. At that time, I enclosed in the letter copies of the ID Card and home visit permit (my father’s), but I have received no reply. At that time, I lived in the residence of my younger blood brother who had settled down in Hong Kong. Its address was Flat B, 12/F, 209 Lockhart Road, Wan Chai, Hong Kong. The time was March 1998.”

638. Although the applicant had to make copies of his father’s Hong Kong identity card and ‘home visit permit’ in order to enclose them in the envelope with the letter, he said that he did not think to make a copy of the letter itself.

639. The Director has no record of receiving a letter from the applicant at that time.

640. Accordingly, the applicant’s evidence concerning the letter was based entirely on what he said he could remember of it, his memory – during the course of his testimony – having to be cast back over a period of some seven years.

641. As to what was written in the letter, the applicant’s memory of detail was shown to be fallible.  For example, when testifying, the applicant recalled that in the letter he only mentioned his father, his claim for abode coming through him.  However, in his affirmation of 18 September 2004, made in support of his application, his recollection was materially different.  He said :

“The letter consisted of 1 or 2 pages of handwriting, addressed to the Director of Immigration and was signed by me. I gave both of my parents’ names in the letter.” [my emphasis]

642. As to the delivery of the letter, the applicant testified that he did not hand it in personally at the Immigration Tower.  This was despite the fact that he was legally in Hong Kong (and therefore had no reason to be in hiding) and was within easy walking distance.  The applicant said that he posted the letter at the Hennessey Road Post Office in Wanchai.

643. Although the letter was clearly of some importance to the applicant, and although he said he discussed the matter, to the best of his memory, with Hong Kong family members, if he is to be believed, he did not take steps to ascertain the Director’s full postal address.  The applicant recalled writing only the following on the envelope : ‘The Director of Immigration, Hong Kong’.

644. The applicant recalled, however, that he put his brother’s address on the envelope so that a response could be received.  There was, however, no evidence that the letter was returned as ‘undelivered’ to that address.

645. As to whether the letter was sent by ordinary post or registered mail, it was evident that the applicant was not certain in his memory.  He concluded, however, that, if it had been sent by registered post, he would have kept the slip, the inference from that being that he must have sent it by ordinary post.

646. It was the applicant’s testimony that, in the absence of a reply from the immigration authorities, he did not think at the time to send a further letter.  He commented that perhaps the Director had considered it a matter ‘too trivial’ to warrant a response.

647. The applicant said that shortly before the end of his visit he did make a visit to the Immigration Tower.  In his affirmation of 18 September 2004, he said that he could not remember which floor the office was on but he took his father’s identity card and ‘home visit permit’ and asked for verification of his right of abode.  He was informed, however, that he must return to the Mainland.  On his admission, he knew of no record of that visit.

648. However, in his testimony, pressed on the matter of the letter, the applicant asserted that during his visit to the Immigration Tower he did in fact ask about the letter.  He said that he was told that, if the letter had been received by the Immigration Department, he would have received an acknowledgement.  If his evidence in this regard is believed, he would therefore have been alerted at that early stage that, no acknowledgement being sent to him, his letter must have gone astray.  But even this did not apparently prompt him to send a follow-up letter, one perhaps with a more detailed address.

649. Later, after the CFA had handed down its judgment on 29 January 1999, the applicant did enter into fairly extensive correspondence with different departments of the Government concerning his claim.  In none of those letters, however, did he mention writing an earlier letter in 1998.

650. On behalf of the Director, it was submitted that the applicant had written no letter during his visit to Hong Kong in 1998; that it was an invention made by him.  In my judgment, the probabilities support that submission.

651. Although the absence of any independent record was a material factor, one which, in my judgment, demanded some caution, that by itself did not, in my opinion, preclude me from finding on the evidence of the applicant alone that a letter claiming right of abode had in fact been written.  However, I found the evidence of the applicant to be weak and unconvincing.  When cross-examined, the applicant became highly defensive and evasive, at one stage, for example, protesting that he was being accused of being a ‘counter revolutionary’.  I could place little, if any, faith in what he said concerning the creation and despatch of the letter.

652. But even if I am wrong in finding as a fact that the applicant did not write the letter, I fail to see how the applicant is able to demonstrate on the balance of probabilities – and the burden is on him – that the Director received the letter and thereby has a record of it.  At the beginning of this report I said that, in my judgment, having heard evidence on the matter, I am satisfied that at all material times the Director managed an efficient system for the receipt, distribution and storage of mail.  During the course of the applicant’s hearing, evidence was led that attempts had been made on two occasions to trace some record of the applicant’s letter.  Those attempts, I am satisfied, were conducted in good faith and were reasonably thorough.  No record, however, could be traced.  That, in my view, while it cannot exclude some possibility, a speculative one, that the letter was somehow misplaced without having its receipt registered or noted, is evidence that, on the probabilities, no record of the letter could be traced because the letter was simply never received.

653. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;
  
(ii)The Director has no record of any claim.

Mr Siu Chi Keung (4860 : a ‘group six’ applicant)

654. The applicant was born in Guangzhou in 1956, one of five children.  His mother came to Hong Kong in 1962, his father joining her in 1975.  By the change of sovereignty, it appears that the applicant was the only member of the family still living in the Mainland, his attempts to obtain a one-way permit having been unsuccessful.

655. The applicant came to Hong Kong as a visitor on 15 July 1998, being permitted to remain until the end of that month.

656. It was the applicant’s evidence that he came to Hong Kong determined to find some way to claim right of abode.  Prior to his arrival, he said that he had made active enquiries with the Mainland authorities and, immediately upon his arrival, set about approaching the authorities here.

657. His mother, he said, had been advised by a District Councillor that Legal Aid may be able to assist him.  A visit was therefore made to the Legal Aid Department.  However, according the applicant, he was informed by the officer with whom he spoke that Legal Aid could offer him no assistance and that he would have to deal directly with the immigration authorities.

658. According to the applicant, he went that same day to the Immigration Tower.  He said that he asked for forms to enable him to apply for right of abode or, failing that, forms that would help him to speed up an application for the issue of a one-way permit in the Mainland.  He was told, however, that any application for right of abode would have to be processed by the Mainland authorities.  He said that he was given no guidance on how best to proceed.

659. Disappointed, the applicant said that he returned a few days later to the Immigration Tower to make the same enquiries but was given the same answers.  He returned, he said, on a third occasion, this time not to make enquiries but rather to see how other people were attempting to process their claims.  On this third occasion, he said, he remained in the area of the information office on the 2nd floor of the Immigration Tower until he was asked to leave.

660. While in Hong Kong, the applicant said that he also made a visit to the CVO in Yau Ma Tei, this visit too ending in frustration.

661. It was the applicant’s evidence that he had come to Hong Kong determined to remain here with his family.  All his enquiries, however, had proved fruitless.  He was left in a state of distress.  It was then, he said, that he wrote a letter to the Director, the letter being motivated by his frustration.

662. The applicant testified that he did not keep a copy of the letter.

663. On behalf of the Director, evidence was led that, despite several searches being made, the letter could not be found in the archives of the Immigration Department nor was there any record, direct or indirect, of a letter being received from the applicant in or about July 1998.

664. Neither the letter itself, therefore, nor any kind of copy of it was available for admission into evidence.

665. On behalf of the Director, it was submitted that, on all the evidence, it was highly unlikely that the applicant had ever written a letter to the Director while in Hong Kong in July 1998 and that the probabilities indicated that it was a later invention of the applicant.

666. In a case summary prepared by Pam Baker & Co., the applicant appears to have asserted that his letter was written on 18 July 1998, a week or more before his return to the Mainland on 27 July of that year.  There is a bald heading at the top of the summary ‘Date’ and next to it : ‘18/7/98’.  However, nothing appears in the body of the summary to support that terse piece of information.  In the course of his testimony, the applicant accepted that the letter was probably written much nearer to the date of his departure.  While giving evidence, he said words to the following effect : “I always said that I wrote the letter shortly before I left.  As to how 18 July [in the case summary] came to be written there, I cannot now recall.”

667. As to contents of his letter, in the case summary prepared for him by Pam Baker & Co., while the history of his approach to the immigration authorities was set out in some detail, all that was said in respect of the letter was the following :

“So before I left, I wrote a letter to the Immigration Department but did not receive a reply.”

668. In his affirmation of 21 August 2004 made in support of his application, the applicant said the following in respect of the contents of the letter :

“In the letter to Immigration, I explained my situation. I did not mention my parents by name, but I referred to them as permanent residents of Hong Kong, with whom I wanted to reunite. I asked the questions ‘How can I apply for family reunion?’ and ‘Can I apply in Hong Kong?’ I wrote that my parents had come in 1962 and 1975, and the reasons – my mother had come for medical reasons and my father for family reunion.”

669. In his testimony, the applicant spoke of the contents of his letter in the following manner.  He explained, he said, that his parents have settled in Hong Kong a long time ago and that, of the family, he was the only one not living in Hong Kong.  After the death of his grandmother, he had been left alone in the Mainland.  He had applied for a one-way permit ‘on several tens of occasions’ but without success.  During his visit to Hong Kong, he had approached the Immigration Department to discover how he could come to live in Hong Kong but had met no success.  He therefore asked the Director for instructions on how he could come to live in Hong Kong with his family.

670. On behalf of the Director, it was submitted that, if the applicant was believed, even on the basis of his own evidence, his letter had constituted an enquiry and not an unequivocal claim for right of abode.  Of particular significance, it was submitted, was the applicant’s admission that in his letter he had given neither the names nor the personal details of his parents nor his immediate family members.  There was nothing in the letter therefore capable – on its face – of constituting a record of claim for right of abode based on the assertion that one or both of his parents were permanent residents.  If the letter had been received the Director would have had no idea who the applicant’s parents were so as to be able to verify their status. 

671. Considered in context, it was said, it was clear that the applicant had made a number of approaches to the immigration authorities to enquire how he could claim right of abode and, if the applicant was believed, his letter was no more than another form of enquiry.

672. In support of the Director’s submission, reference was made to a much later letter, one dated 4 July 1999 from the applicant to the Director.  That letter, it was agreed, had been received.  In that letter, in translation, the applicant wrote the following :

“Furthermore, the Immigration officer even refused to provide information or guidelines. Actually, I am at the end of the rope. Last time when I was due to leave, I had no choice but to go back to the Mainland and apply to the local Public Security Bureau as instructed by your staff. Afterwards, I had sent a letter to the Immigration Department by ordinary mail and requested the provision of a guideline, but no reply has been received yet.” [my emphasis]

In that letter, it was said, the applicant spoke of earlier seeking ‘the provision of a guideline’; in short, a request for information as to how to seek right of abode.  He had not spoken of actually making a claim that he was entitled to right of abode.

673. While I agree that the applicant couched much of his evidence in the form of asking questions, it would, I think, if his evidence is believed, be unrealistic to hold that, when read in a common sense fashion, all that the applicant did was to make enquiries.  Questions may, depending on their context, constitute quite clearly in the ear of a listener a statement or a demand.

674. In respect of the letter cited in para.672 above, the applicant spoke of sending his letter ‘afterwards’.  It was submitted on behalf of the Director, although not with great vigour, that this was some evidence that the applicant had not been in Hong Kong when he sent the letter.  Read in context, however, the statement is ambiguous.  No suggestion of a strict chronology is made in the letter.  The word ‘afterwards’, I was told, may also have been translated as ‘later’.  Elsewhere in his various papers the applicant spoken in clearer terms of sending the letter before his departure.  In my view, it would be wrong to put too much weight on the single phrase in the applicant’s letter of 4 July 1999.  I am satisfied, if the applicant is believed, that the probabilities support his contention made in his testimony that he did write the letter before his departure.

675. The lack of any independent evidence of the creation of the letter was a matter which, in my view, meant that I had to approach the applicant’s testimony with caution.  The temptation, absent any other substantive grounds for claiming right of abode, to simply invent a letter and then profess bewilderment as to why it was not received must be considerable for persons in the position of the applicant.  But nevertheless I found the applicant be an essentially credible witness.  While he was guilty of rambling, there was no noticeable attempt by him to improve his evidence; for example, by answering questions with the sole object of saying whatever he believed in that instance would best suit his case.  By way of illustration, he never changed his evidence that he did not name his parents in his letter or give details of their Hong Kong identity cards.  His testimony struck me as being put forward ‘warts and all’.

676. On the evidence, I believe it was plain that the applicant did come to Hong Kong determined to find some way of claiming right of abode and I believe it is probable that, being frustrated in his attempt, he did send the letter to the Director.  I am further satisfied that the letter would have been, as the applicant himself described it, a fairly lengthy document which, when read in full, would have constituted a claim for right of abode and not simply an enquiry as to whether such a claim could be made.  It is one thing to ask : ‘How do I make a claim?’  It is another to say : ‘Provide me with the guidelines concerning my claim.’ 

677. The fact that the applicant did not give the names of his parents in the letter, nor their identity card details, does not, in my view, mean that no claim was made.  The evidence indicated that the applicant gave his own name and it was after all his claim.  The letter clearly was evidence that he was making a claim and setting it in a detailed context of family history.

678. The applicant testified that he addressed the envelope containing his letter to the ‘Director of Hong Kong Immigration Department’ or characters to that effect.  He admitted that he did not give any more details than that.  He said that, to the best of his memory, the letter was posted one or two days before he left Hong Kong on 27 July 1998.  

679. The applicant said that he wrote his home address on the envelope.  I took that to mean the address of his brother in Hong Kong where he was staying.  To his knowledge, said the applicant, the letter had not been returned ‘undelivered’.

680. On the evidence, however, while I have found that the probabilities support the applicant’s contention that he did write and post the letter, it is apparent that the Director, despite attempts to locate the letter, was not able to locate any record, direct or indirect, of the letter having been received.

681. On behalf of the applicant, it was submitted that, where I am otherwise satisfied that the applicant sent a letter containing a claim, I cannot find that there is no record of that letter being received for the plain reason that the letter may well be lying in some file, misplaced, or that there may be some notation proving the receipt of the file which has not yet been discovered. 

682. I accept, of course, that letters, having been received, may then be lost.  However, as I have said earlier in this report – paras.18 and 19 – I am satisfied that the Director at the time was managing an efficient system for the receipt and distribution of letters and that, if a letter went astray without being noted in some way, that would be very much the exception rather than the rule.  If the letter was poorly addressed, as this one was, it is equally probable, I think, that it was lost in the post as it was lost after receipt by the Director with not even a notation in a file or register to record that receipt.  That being the case – and the burden being on the applicant to demonstrate on the balance of probabilities that the Director did receive the letter – I must regrettably conclude that the Director has no record of the applicant’s claim.

683. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)The applicant did make a claim;
  
(ii)The applicant was in Hong Kong when he made his claim;
  
(iii)The Director, however, has no record of any claim.

Mr Wu Chun Choi (3983 : a ‘group six’ applicant)

684. The applicant was born in Guangdong Province in March 1966, one of six children.  His father came to Hong Kong in 1979, his mother in 1995.

685. It was the applicant’s case that in 1996 he heard rumours that after the change of sovereignty the children of Hong Kong permanent residents would themselves be entitled to live in Hong Kong.  The applicant was married with twin boys.  Despite this, he said, he came to Hong Kong in anticipation of the promise contained in those rumours.  .  However, shortly after his arrival the rumours were dispelled by the then Governor and he returned to the Mainland.

686. It was the applicant’s evidence that he remained interested in the possibility of claiming right of abode and purchased a copy of the Basic Law in the Mainland.  In 1998, having learnt that right of abode claimants were pursuing their claims through the Hong Kong courts, he agreed with his wife that he would come to Hong Kong in order to make his own claim.

687. The applicant came to Hong Kong as a visitor on 31 May 1998, his two-way permit allowing him to remain until 22 June of that year.

688. On arrival, the applicant said that he made enquiries about the on-going litigation with relatives and friends.  

689. It was the applicant’s testimony that on 12 June 1998, while doing domestic chores in his parent’s apartment, he discovered a local copy of the Basic Law.  He said that he compared the text with the text of the Basic Law that he had obtained in the Mainland and brought with him to Hong Kong.  He was ‘surprised’, he said, to see that the texts were the same.  That being the case, he was confirmed in his original belief – formed in the Mainland – that he was entitled to claim right of abode under the Basic Law.

690. With this confirmation, said the applicant, he decided to write to the Director and did so that same day.  He said that he dated the letter 13 June 1998 rather than 12 June because he knew that the letter would be posted the following day.

691. It was the applicant’s evidence that his younger brother posted the letter the following morning.  The Director, however, despite attempts to locate the letter, has no record of any kind of receiving the letter, this being a letter bearing a full address and having with it various enclosures.

692. The applicant said that he obtained the address of the Director of Immigration from the telephone book in the apartment.  The address, therefore, was a full address.  Indeed, despite the lapse of some seven years, both the applicant and his younger brother, who apparently posted the letter, were still able to remember the exact address.

693. At this juncture, I should record that, in my view, the applicant’s case was highly contrived.  In the light of all the evidence, I am satisfied that its artifice was an invention, a fairly thorough invention but an invention nevertheless.  The fact that both the applicant and his younger brother were able without prompting to remember the exact address written on the envelope was one small piece of evidence that led me to the determination that the applicant’s case had essentially been ‘put together’ by the two of them.  To expand upon this, in a declaration (prepared either for the purposes of the applicant’s application or in support of a claim made to the Director of Immigration), the younger brother gave the details of the address as follows :

“I, Wu Chun-fuk, sent a letter of my elder brother Wu Chun-choi to Mr Ambrose Lee, Director of Immigration at No. 7 Gloucester Road, Wan Chai, Hong Kong on 13 June 1998.”

There is, however, one problem with the details given in that declaration.  Mr Ambrose Lee was not the Director of Immigration in June 1998.  He was made director at a later date.  The applicant’s younger brother had difficulty in explaining this discrepancy when he was cross-examined.

694. Having written his letter on 12 June 1998, the applicant said that he left the apartment to obtain a photostat copy of it together with copies of documents to be enclosed in the letter.  The copy letter was placed into evidence.  In opening, it reads :

“Respected Director of Immigration,
  
 Greetings!
  
  I, Wu Tsun Choi, came to Hong Kong with a two-way permit on the 31st last month for the purpose of visiting my relatives. I now reside at Flat 2006B, King Yung House, King Lam Estate, Tseung Kwan O, Kowloon, Hong Kong. On the day before yesterday I happened to come across Article 24 of Chapter III ‘Fundamental Rights and Duties of the Residents’ of the ‘Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China’ and the requirements stated thereunder. In my opinion I have fulfilled those requirements and I am eligible to come to reside in Hong Kong. For these reasons, I now apply to Mr. Director. I ask Mr. Director to grant my application.”

695. The letter then gives some family history and concludes with the following paragraph :

“I have made every effort in the Mainland to apply to come to Hong Kong to reunite with my family for almost a decade. However, my application was like a pebble dropped into ocean and I have never received any feedback. Mr. Director, being the guardian official of people, please be sympathetic to my difficulties, approve this application, process the right of abode documents and relevant formalities and issue me with a Hong Kong resident Identity Card. Mr. Director, please excuse me for making this bold and sincere request and please grant approval to my application. Hereby I represent my whole family to express our gratitude to Mr. Director for your great kindness and virtues. Enclosed please find a copy each of my father’s Identity Card, my mother’s Identity Card and my mother’s medical record. Please, Mr. Director, confirm the receipt of them. I look forward to receiving a satisfactory reply from Mr. Director as soon as possible. My contact address: Flat 2006B, King Yung House, King Lam Estate, Tseung Kwan O, Kowloon, Hong Kong.” [my emphasis]

696. The applicant’s younger brother, Mr Wu Chun Fuk, testified that he was given the sealed envelope and posted the letter the following day at the Tseung Kwan O Post Office on his way to work.

697. But the younger brother’s evidence did not end there.  He testified that on 12 June 1998 – when he was 16 years old – he saw the applicant seated at the table in the family apartment.  He said that he went across to the table and saw that his brother had only written one paragraph.  Although he had not refreshed his memory by reading the copy letter, he said that he could still remember – after some seven years – the gist of that first paragraph and was able to demonstrate the accuracy of his memory.

698. The younger brother said that, as he had nothing to do, he sat at the table and watched the applicant write the rest of the letter.  He even said that he could remember the specific date put at the bottom of the letter : 13 June 1998.

699. The younger brother’s evidence as to witnessing the writing of all but the first paragraph of a long letter was, in my view, patently contrived.  Assuming that he was prepared to sit watching his brother write, what would prompt him, after some seven years, to remember the exact date at the foot of the letter?  The utter confidence of the brother’s testimony added to my concern as to its credibility.

700. With the letter posted, the applicant testified that he waited for a reply.  Indeed, it was his evidence that one of the primary reasons why he did not return to the Mainland – to his wife and children – when his two-way permit expired on 22 June 1998 was because he was still waiting for a reply.

701. On his own evidence therefore, the applicant must have been anxious for a reply.  In his letter he had said “Please, Mr. Director, confirm the receipt of them [i.e. the copy documents enclosed in the letter]” and had continued “I look forward to receiving a satisfactory reply from Mr. Director as soon as possible”.

702. Despite this, however, with no reply being sent, he took no action whatsoever to check why the Director had not responded.

703. According to the applicant, on 18 June 1998, he went to the 2nd floor of the Immigration Tower, to the information office, to make enquiries concerning an application for right of abode.  He said he was told there was no mechanism available to him in Hong Kong and he should return to the Mainland to apply there.  This first visit would have been five days after the posting of his letter to the Director but there was no evidence of making any enquiry at the information office as to whether the letter had been received and, if so, which department was dealing with it.

704. Concerning this visit of 18 June 1998, the applicant procured a declaration from a friend, Mr Lam, to support his contention that he made the visit at or about 11 a.m. on 18 June 1998.  However, a record check revealed that Mr Lam was not in Hong Kong that morning and only returned to the Territory near 10 o’clock that night.  The applicant attempted to explain this by saying that both he and his friend were relying roughly on their memories.  But the declaration, of course, does not simply give the date but gives the time too and it is a solemn declaration.  While I did not give this matter great weight, it was in my view, another piece of evidence which went to undermine the credibility of the applicant’s case.

705. The applicant said that, once he was in breach of his two-way permit, he was afraid that any further form of enquiry may lead to his apprehension and repatriation.  But, as counsel for the Director pointed out, the applicant had already given his contact address in Hong Kong and, as an overstayer – a fact which would have been in the records of the Immigration Department – had therefore already supplied an address at which he could be apprehended.

706. More telling, however, was the fact that, on his own admission, the applicant had visited the Immigration Department to apply for right of abode on 6 January 1999; that is, at a time when he was still an overstayer and liable for repatriation (this being before the CFA judgment of 29 January 1999 and the announcement of the concession policy).  This admission was made in a letter dated 28 June 1999 which the applicant wrote to a Mr Ho Hei Wah, seeking his help.  The letter, in translation, begins :

“I, Wu Chun Choi, came to Hong Kong by an exit and entry permit on 31 May 1998 and have all long been fighting for right of abode in Hong Kong.  On 13 June 1998, I wrote to the Director of Immigration to apply for right of abode but have not received any reply.  On 18 June 1998 and 6 January 1999, I personally went to the Immigration Department to apply for right of abode but was politely refused both times by the Immigration Department and told that there was no mechanism for application.”  [my emphasis]

707. It is, in my view, pertinent that it was only shortly after the concession policy came into being, indeed a matter of days after, that the applicant entered into a good deal of correspondence with various people seeking their help to claim right of abode and it was only in this correspondence that the letter of 13 June 1998 became an important issue.  The concession policy was announced on 26 June 1999 but there were no documents of any kind put into evidence by the applicant which predate 26 June 1999 containing mention of the letter of 13 June 1998.

708. As I have said earlier, the Director has no record of the letter of 13 June 1998, no notation of any kind despite the fact that the letter was apparently fully addressed and contained relevant enclosures.  It would therefore have been a letter of some bulk.  I am satisfied that the Director has no record because the letter was not in existence in or about June 1998.  

709. On the evidence, I am further satisfied that the applicant could not pretend to have sent a follow-up letter to the Director when his first letter was not acknowledged because it would be pushing matters too far to suggest that two fully addressed letters, or perhaps more, must all have been mislaid.

710.  My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;
  
(ii)the Director has no record of any claim.

Conclusion

711. My determinations may therefore be stated again (in summary) as follows :

Part One

1.Madam Sze Sau Kan (3122) :
    
 “(i)The applicant did make a claim for right of abode;
    
  (ii)the Director does have a record of the claim.”
    
2.Mr Fu Kwong (1084) :
    
 “(i)The applicant did not claim right of abode;
    
  (ii)there is no record of any claim.”

Part Two

3.Madam Wong Fai Fong (3873) :
   
 “By 10 July 1952, the date of the applicant’s birth, her father had ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a continuous period of not less than seven years and was therefore a permanent resident.”

Part Three

4.Madam Kwok Siu Wan (1624) :
    
 “(i)The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;
    
  (ii)the Director has no record of any claim.”
    
5.Madam Tang Wai Ying (3234) :
    
 “(i)The applicant and/or her mother on her behalf did make a claim for right of abode at the offices of the GIS;
    
  (ii)the Director does have a record of the claim for right of abode made by the applicant and/or her mother on her behalf at the offices of the GIS.”
    
6.Madam Cheung Choi Ngo (641) :
    
 “(i)The applicant did make a claim for right of abode;
    
  (ii)the Director has a record of the claim.”
    
7.Mr So Yik Lung (3028) :
    
 “(i)The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;
    
  (ii)the Director has no record of any claim.”
    
8.Madam Tsang Kwai Ngan (3299) :
    
 “(i)The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;
    
  (ii)the Director has no record of any claim.”
    
9.Madam Sze Shuk Fan (3126) :
    
 “(i)The applicant did make a claim for right of abode, that claim being made by her mother on her behalf and in her presence;
    
  (ii)the Director has a record of the claim.”
    
10.Mr Yim Shing Cheung (4232) :
    
 “(i)The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;
    
  (ii)the Director does not have a record of any claim.”
    
11.Mr Leung Tak Kwan (2137) :
    
 “(i)The applicant did make a claim for right of abode;
    
  (ii)the Director has a record of the claim.”
    
12.Mr Tsoi Ching Chung (3387) :
    
 “(i)The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode, either directly or through his mother;
    
  (ii)the Director does not have a record of any claim.”
    
13.Madam Wong Sau Chu (3794) :
    
 “(i)The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;
    
  (ii)the Director does not have a record of any claim.”
    
14.Madam Yeung Lai Fong (4149) :
    
 “(i)The applicant did make a claim for right of abode;
    
  (ii)the Director does have a record of the claim.”
    
15.Madam Lau Man Chu (1936) :
    
 “(i)The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;
    
  (ii)the Director does not have a record of any claim.”

Part Four

16.Mr Wong Sai Chak (5006) :
    
 “(i)The applicant did make a claim;
    
  (ii)the Director, however, has no record of any claim;
    
  (iii)the applicant is not entitled to benefit from any legitimate expectation.”
    
17.Madam Chong Chui Ching (1015) :
    
 “(i)The applicant did not make a claim;
    
  (ii)the Director has no record of any claim;
    
  (iii)the applicant is, however, entitled to benefit from a legitimate expectation that she would be treated as a litigant in the right of abode litigation and thereby to any benefits accruing to those litigants under the concession policy.”

Part Five

18. Madam Cheung Shuk Ching (720) :
    
 “My determination is therefore that the applicant, by her actions, has withdrawn her application.”
    
19.Madam Lau Kiu Fan (1922) :
    
 “(i)The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;
    
  (ii)the Director has no record of any claim.”
    
20.Mr Tsoi Chak Kong (3382) :
    
 “(i)The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;
    
  (ii)the Director has no record of any claim.”
    
21.Madam Wong Siu Ching (3822) :
    
 “(i)That the applicant did make a claim for right of abode, but
    
  (ii)the Director has no record of any claim.”

Part Six

22.Madam Chan Chuen Chu (400) :
    
 “(i)The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;
    
   (ii) the Director has no record of any claim.”
    
23.Madam Lam Nga Yung (1769) :
    
 “(i)The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;
    
  (ii)the Director has no record of any claim.”
    
24.Mr Chu Shek Kai (5297) :
    
 “(i)The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;
    
  (ii)the Director has no record of any claim.”
    
25.Mr Siu Chi Keung (4860) :
    
 “(i)The applicant did make a claim for right of abode;
    
  (ii)the applicant was in Hong Kong when he made his claim;
    
  (iii)the Director, however, has no record of any claim.”
    
26.Mr Wu Chun Choi (3983) :
    
 “(i)The applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;
    
  (ii)the Director has no record of any claim.”

 (M.J. Hartmann)
Judge of the Court of First Instance,
High Court

 

21 December 2004

 

Ms Gladys Li, SC leading Mr Sean Fang,  instructed by Messrs Barnes & Daly, for the Applicants

Mr Joseph Fok, SC leading Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

7 – 8, 10 – 11, 29 – 31 March, 1, 2, 4, 8, 12 – 14, 19 – 22, 29 April,

3 – 6, 12 May, 13 – 14 June 2005

Ms Gladys Li, SC leading Mr S H Kwok and Mr Sean Fang, instructed by Messrs Barnes & Daly, for the Applicants

Mr Joseph Fok, SC leading Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

9, 14 – 18 March 2005, 6 – 7, 15, 18, 25 – 28 April, 9 and 11 May 2005

Mr S H Kwok and Mr Sean Fang, instructed by Messrs Barnes & Daly,for the Applicants

Mr Joseph Fok, SC leading Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

13 May 2005

Applicant (legal aid discharged), Tsoi Chak Kong, in person, absent

Mr Joseph Fok, SC leading Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

17 May 2005

Applicant (legal aid discharged), Lau Kiu Fan, in person, present

Mr Joseph Fok, SC leading Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

1 June 2005

Applicant (legal aid discharged), Li Luk Yip, in person, present

Mr Joseph Fok, SC leading Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

3, 4 and 6 June 2005

Applicant (legal aid discharged), Wong Siu Ching, in person, present

Mr Joseph Fok, SC leading Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

30 June 2005

Applicant (legal aid discharged), Li Luk Yip, in person, present

Mr Clifford Tavares, GC of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent


* Postscript

A few days before handing down this report, I was informed of the death of this applicant, Mr Fu.  I am not aware, however, of Mr Fu’s family circumstances and as to whether perhaps, through him, children may be seeking right of abode.  In the circumstances, erring on the side of caution, I considered it best not to remove this determination from the report.

 

34728-EN-2003-10-03

NG SIU TUNG AND OTHERS v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

HTML content

HCAL 81/1999

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO.81 OF 1999

---------------------

BETWEEN

NG SIU TUNG AND OTHERS

APPLICANTS

AND
 DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATIONRESPONDENT

----------------------

Before : Hon Hartmann J in Court

Dates of Hearing : 3 March‑2 April; 2 and 3 June; 23 June‑11 July;15 July 2003

Date of Handing Down Report : 3 October 2003

 

---------------------------------------------------------------------

REPORT TO THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL

---------------------------------------------------------------------

 

1. In a judgment dated 30 July 2002, the Court of Final Appeal (‘the CFA’) remitted certain issues, entirely factual in nature, to this Court for determination.  The CFA directed that, after this Court had made its findings, it should submit a report to it.

2. The need for the report arises in the following manner :

(a)      On 10 January 2002, the CFA handed down judgment (‘the January judgment’) in respect of the appeals of more than 5,000 persons who by way of judicial review proceedings had sought to quash decisions of the Director of Immigration (‘the Director’) denying them right of abode in Hong Kong.  All these persons (‘the applicants’) were Chinese nationals born in the Mainland, all having at least one parent who was a permanent resident of Hong Kong.

(b)     The applicants who are the subject of this report claimed that they were entitled to right of abode because they fell within the parameters of a policy decision made by the Chief Executive in Council and announced to the public on 26 June 1999 (‘the concession policy’).  The Director refuted their claims.

(c)     In its January judgment, the CFA upheld the following requirements of the concession policy as being both reasonable and rational; namely, that—

(i)    an applicant must have been present in Hong Kong at some time during the period encompassed by the concession policy; that is, from 1 July 1997 to 29 January 1999;

(ii)    while present in Hong Kong during that period, the applicant must have made a claim for right of abode to an officer or officers of the Immigration Department; and

(iii)   the Immigration Department must have a record of such claim.

(d)     In its January judgment, the CFA directed the parties to consult in order to agree draft orders that would dispose of the appeals in accordance with its judgment.  The great majority of appeals were disposed of in this manner.  However, more than 200 applicants, who had come before the CFA on the basis that they were entitled to right of abode by reason of the concession policy, sought further directions.  They did so on the basis that factually they qualified as beneficiaries of the January judgment, claims that were disputed by the Director.

(e)      In order to resolve these disputes, the CFA in its judgment of 30 July 2002 (‘the July judgment’) directed this Court to hear relevant evidence and to make a determination in respect of each applicant.  The CFA’s directions, to which I shall refer later, were specific as to what matters of fact were to be determined in respect of each of the applicants.

3. In August 2002, when this Court was first seized of the outstanding cases remitted to it, it was estimated that some 216 cases would require resolution.  As I have indicated, all of these cases (with the exception of two which are not the subject of this report) were founded on the assertion that the applicants qualified as beneficiaries of the January judgment by reason of falling within the parameters of the concession policy.

4. With such a large number of cases to prepare, the legal representatives of the applicants were faced with considerable logistical difficulties.  Individual applicants had to be located.  A number of applicants, for example, had already returned to the Mainland.  Thereafter, the cases of the applicants who had been located had to be put into order so that the Director could submit evidence in reply.

5. In a series of directions hearings, it became evident that if the cases of all 216 applicants had to be made ready before any trial took place the delay would be unacceptable.  The direction was therefore given that, as and when a sufficiently manageable number of cases had been made ready for trial, those cases would be brought on for hearing.  In the result, when the first substantive hearing commenced in March 2002, some 40 cases had been made ready.

6. The hearing of these cases, with occasional exceptions, took longer than anticipated.  This Court sat for a total of 40 days in two sessions; that is, in March/April and June/July 2002.  In that period, just 22 cases were finalised.

7. Even accepting that substantial background evidence had to be given by officers of the Immigration Department, in my view the basic reason for the slow progress lay in the polarised approach of the parties as to whether, factually, oral claims had or had not been made and, of greater difficulty, what, in terms of the January and July judgments, was capable of constituting a record of any claim made for right of abode.

8. In my opinion, an early resolution of that that latter issue will enable the remainder of the cases to be determined with far greater speed and financial economy than has hitherto been the norm.  I have therefore deemed it prudent to submit a report at this relatively early stage of the disposal of the outstanding cases so that, in respect of the cases already finalised, I am able to state what, in my judgment, in terms of the January and July judgments, is or is not capable of constituting a record under the concession policy.

9. Accordingly, this report constitutes the first report to the CFA pursuant to the directions given in the July judgment.

The directions given to this Court in the July judgment

10. In its July judgment, in considering the cases of the applicants who claimed that they fell within the parameters of the concession policy, the CFA divided those applicants into seven groups.  For the purposes of this report, reference need only be made to four of these groups; that is, groups one, two, four and five.

11. Group One consisted of ‘overstayers’; that is, persons who had been permitted entry to Hong Kong from the Mainland for a specific period of time on the strength of a two‑way permit but on the expiration of that period of time had remained in Hong Kong.  Persons in this group claimed that they had made claims for right of abode but, under threat of removal, that their claims were not recorded as they had made them, if at all.  The CFA observed that the cause for this—

“      … is alleged to have resulted from a practice adopted by officers of the Immigration Department whereby standard answers were attributed to such applicants and inserted in relevant Immigration Department documents, instead of recording the actual claims made.”

12. I would record that the majority of cases which have been determined in this report have fallen into this first group.

13. Group Two consisted of persons who had also come to Hong Kong from the Mainland for a specific period of time on the strength of a two‑way permit but, before the expiration of that permit, had sought an extension of stay.  Persons in this group claimed that they had put forward a claim for right of abode as their reason for seeking an extension but that their claims had not been recorded as they had made them, if at all.  The CFA recorded that the allegations were to the effect that—

“      They were told by officers of the Immigration Department that a claim for right of abode was not a ground for granting an extension.”

14. In respect of Group One and Group Two, the CFA remitted the following two issues for determination by this Court; namely—

“(a)     whether, in each case, the applicant made a claim for right of abode; and,

(b)     if so, whether the Director has a record of that claim as required by the Concession.”

15. Group Four consisted of persons who had been prosecuted by the Director for overstaying; that is, remaining in Hong Kong beyond the permitted limit of their stay.  Persons in this group claimed that, when brought before a magistrate, they had made statements in mitigation and in those statements had spoken words which amounted to a claim for right of abode.

16. The CFA observed that a record resting solely in a magistrate’s papers was insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the concession policy.  In this regard, in the July judgment (para.38) the following is said :

“      … if such a claim was made to the magistrate alone, it is insufficient for the purposes of the Concession.  In accordance with paragraph 206 of the January Judgment, a claim must be made to the Immigration Department or referred by a government agency to the Immigration Department in the course of its duty.  A magistrate obviously cannot be regarded as the Immigration Department.  Nor can the court transcript of proceedings before the magistrate in itself be regarded as the required recorded of any such claim.”

17. The CFA accepted, however, that it was arguable that, if officers of the Immigration Department had either prosecuted the cases or had been in court at the time and, whatever their role, had made notes of what was said, then such notes were capable of constituting a record for the purposes of the concession policy.

18. In respect of Group Four, the CFA therefore remitted the following three issues for determination by this Court; namely—

“(a)        whether, in each case, the applicant made a claim for right of abode;

(b)       if so, whether on the evidence as to the circumstances in which the claim was alleged to have been made, such claim was made to the Immigration Department; and,

(c)       if so, whether the Director has a record of that claim as required by the Concession.”

19. Group Five consisted of persons who claimed that, when arrested by the police for overstaying, they had made a claim for right of abode.  Such claim, they said, would have been entered into a police notebook and in the ordinary course of events would have found its way into the records of the Immigration Department.

20. In qualifying the right of Group Five applicants to claim that they fell within the parameters of the concession policy, the CFA said the following in the July judgment (paras.41 and 42) :

“      It is however common ground between the parties that, as a matter of routine practice, police notebooks have usually been destroyed after three years so that such notebooks no longer exist to verify such claims or to provide the basis for relevant records in the Immigration Department coming into existence.

       In our judgment, where nothing capable of amounting to the required record of a claim for right of abode exists, the applicant necessarily falls outside the Concession.  The argument that this is or may be the result of the destruction of police notebooks is not an answer.”

21. The CFA recognised, however, that, in respect of certain applicants, police records may still be in existence and that those records, if in some form resting with the Director, were capable of constituting a record under the concession policy.

22. In respect of Group Five, therefore, the CFA remitted the following two issues for determination by this Court; namely—

“(a)        whether, in each case, the applicant made a claim for right of abode; and

(b)       if so, whether the Director has a record of that claim as required by the Concession.”

The administration of the concession policy

23. When the concession policy was made public on 26 June 1999, the press release contained details of the number of persons who it was estimated would be beneficiaries under the policy.  I understand that the list of beneficiaries (‘the concession list’) originally contained about 3,700 names.  Evidence was given that different sections of the Immigration Department were asked to search their files for details of persons who had made claims.  Figures on the list were updated from time to time and by September 1999 the list contained some 3,950 names.  This list included what have been described as ‘possible or doubtful concession cases’ which required further consideration.

24. It was the evidence of the Director’s officers that inclusion at any time on the concession list did not per se imply that the named individual had been formally recognised as a beneficiary.  Inclusion may, for example, have been the result of human error, an error which, when later discovered, resulted in removal from the list.

25. In light of this evidence, which I accepted as being a rational reflection of the necessary difficulties involved in managing the policy, while inclusion on the concession list at any one time was a relevant factor, it was only one factor which assisted me to determine the specific factual issues remitted by the CFA.

The limits of this Court’s jurisdiction

26. Although essentially self‑evident, in my judgment it must nevertheless be emphasised that the jurisdiction of this Court is limited solely to determining the factual issues remitted to it.  It has no jurisdiction, no matter how obliquely, to re‑interpret the nature and scope of the concession policy already determined by the CFA in its January and July judgments.

The requirement that ‘a claim’ for right of abode should be made

27. There is no technical or formalised way nor any set procedure laid down under the concession policy for making a claim for right of abode.  In its January judgment (para.231), the CFA defined the approach to be adopted in the following way :

“      … we take the view that the rational approach should be to judge whether a claim was in substance being made.  So long as the message was clear and could reasonably be understood to constitute a request to be granted the right of abode in Hong Kong, this was enough to constitute a claim.”

The CFA was here speaking of claims contained in letters but, in my judgment, reading both the January and July judgments, that approach is clearly intended to be of general application.  A claim therefore did not have to be couched in any specific terms.  No fixed litany was prescribed.  After all, they were made by lay people not lawyers, they were made by persons who were strangers to Hong Kong’s legal system and the workings of Hong Kong’s bureaucracy.

28. Nor was it necessary for a claim to be in writing.  An oral claim meets the requirements of the concession policy.  As the CFA said in the January judgment (para.212) :

“      The Director of Immigration requires that, to constitute a claim, there must either be something in writing or it was made in such a way that the Immigration Department would have kept a record of it.  In other words, it need not be in writing, but there must be a record of such claim with the Department.  In our view, this requirement is neither a misinterpretation of the policy decision nor misapplication of it.”

29. Purely passive conduct, however, was not capable of constituting a claim.  In this regard, in the January judgment (para.215), the CFA said :

“      The applicants argue that by mere presence or overstaying in Hong Kong (of which the Director of Immigration must have a record), an applicant can be considered as asserting his right of abode here.  This cannot be right.  There can be many reasons, other than assertion of the right of abode, for presence or overstaying in Hong Kong.”

The CFA continued by saying that an applicant cannot—

“      … expect to be recognised as a claimant for the right of abode if he does not come forward and assert his right, if any, to the Immigration Department.”

30. In the January judgment, in respect of Group Two persons who sought an extension of stay, the CFA said (para.224) :

“      Where a person did not indicate in his application for extension of stay or in his interview with Immigration staff that he was claiming a right of abode or that he wanted to await the judgments, but instead relied on other grounds, the Director of Immigration was entitled to regard the application or statement in the interview report as not amounting to a claim for the purpose of the policy decision.  There is no question of unfair or differential treatment.  If a person wanted to continue to stay in Hong Kong, it was for him to indicate his real reason for doing so and that he was asserting a right of abode.  There is no reason why he should not and could not convey this in his application or interview.”  [my emphasis]

Although this was said in respect of persons falling into Group Two, on a reading of the January and July judgments I am satisfied that the observations are of general application.

31. Of central importance, in my view, is the finding of the CFA that an inquiry, however it may have been phrased, does not constitute a claim under the concession policy.  In this regard, the CFA said in its January judgment (paras.226 and 227) :

“      It is alleged that some applicants either personally or by their parents or relatives went to the Immigration Department to make a claim for right of abode.  Some even brought with them documents supporting their claims.  They were however discouraged or dissuaded from doing so.  The standard response by the staff of the Immigration Department was that they should return to the Mainland and apply to the authorities there for one‑way exit permits or certificates of entitlement.  It is submitted that they were wrongly rejected as having only made inquiries and the Director of Immigration had failed to keep any record of such claims.

227.        These complaints must be understood in the light of the prevailing circumstances.  According to the Immigration staff, there were well over one million inquiries a year at the immigration counters or through the telephone.  It is difficult to expect that a record would be kept for all these inquiries.  The Immigration staff’s standard response was indeed stating what the law was or what they understood it to be.  If a person had really wanted to make a claim for right of abode as opposed to making a general inquiry, he should not have been deterred by such response.  The evidence is that where a person attending the Immigration Department wished to make a claim and had brought with him the relevant documents, he would be referred to a senior officer.  He would be interviewed and a record would have been kept of such interview.  The Director of Immigration cannot be criticised for rejecting persons who were merely making inquiries as not qualifying under the policy decision.”

32. While, however, a claim has to be actively asserted, that assertion does not have to be direct.  This is best illustrated, I believe, by the CFA’s classification in the January judgment of certain applicants who had applied for legal aid in order to join thousands of others seeking right of abode by way of a judicial declaration of their rights.  In speaking of this, the CFA (para.220) said :

“      As regards those persons who had applied for legal aid but were referred to the Immigration Department with a letter requesting notification in case a removal order was to be made, it is not clear whether they were cases which the Legal Aid Department did not consider as meritorious cases.  However, the cases within this group, whether meritorious or not, were cases in which the applicants were intending to claim the right of abode in Hong Kong through the courts, hopefully with the assistance of the Legal Aid Department.  If they had not intended to take the government to court, they would not have applied for legal aid.  The steps which they took and the steps taken on their behalf by the Legal Aid Department were steps to lay a claim.  Since their names were notified to the Immigration Department, the Director of Immigration should have a record of their claims.  Persons in this category should rationally be treated as having lodged a claim with the Immigration Department.”

33. In summary, in judging whether a claim for right of abode has been made in accordance with the concession policy, I return to the fundamental principle stated at the beginning of this section : that it is for the court, viewing matters in context and abandoning a narrow or technical approach, to determine, on the balance of probabilities, whether in substance a claim has been made.

The requirement for ‘a record’

34. In finding that the requirement of a record is ‘a reasonable and rational’ application of the concession policy, the CFA made the following observations in its January judgment (para.210) :

“      It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to implement the policy decision, indeed any policy, without a record of some kind to verify whether a person falls within the policy or not.  As the Assistant Director of Immigration, Mr Mak, said in his affidavit, ‘if the Concession Decision was not limited to those persons of whose claims for right of abode the Director of Immigration had a record, there would be no clear, objective or uncontroversial basis on which the Director of Immigration would be able to determine whether a claimant was in Hong Kong and had made a claim for right of abode during the period from 1 July 1997 to 29 January 1999.’ ”

35. The CFA recognised, therefore, that the concession policy was an administrative policy to be managed by the Director and his officers.  A record was required so that the Director and his officers could administer that policy fairly.  The policy is not one to be managed by a judicial board or tribunal where the weight of evidence will decide whether a claim has or has not been made and where a documentary record will be no more than part of the evidence, albeit no doubt persuasive.  That being the case, it is plain from a reading of both the January and July judgments that a record must speak for itself for how else is the policy to be administered on an objective, uncontroversial basis?

36. That a record must speak for itself was stated in unambiguous terms in the July judgment (paras.32 and 33) when the CFA stated that a document is not capable of constituting a record unless — on its face — it provides evidence of a claim :

“      However, it is submitted by the applicants that in some cases … the relevant documents held by the Immigration Department including statements and other documents containing annotations, handwritten or otherwise, fairly read, should be regarded as amounting to the required record of a claim for the right of abode.

       We are of the view that if, in the case of any applicant, such annotations or other writing appear on the face of documents held by the Immigration Department which, interpreted fairly, amount, on the balance of probabilities, to a record of a claim for right of abode, the Concession requirement in respect of such record is satisfied.  In accordance with the rationale indicated in paragraph 210 of the January Judgment, documentary materials are incapable of constituting the required record of a claim unless on their face they amount to evidence that a claim for right of abode is or has been made.”  [my emphasis]

37. A record, therefore, may consist of one document or it may consist of several that have to be read together.  It may be constituted by the contents of a formal document or constituted by a scribbled note incidental to the main intent of the document on which that note appears.  By logical extension, the same basic principle that must be applied to determine whether a claim has been made must be applied to determine whether there is a record of that claim.  It is for the court, viewing matters in context and abandoning a narrow or technical approach, to judge, on the balance of probabilities, whether in substance the documentary material —on its face — constitutes evidence that a claim for right of abode has been made.

38. A claim which is made in written form may of course be both claim and record.  But, in my view, the January and July judgments do not require all records to constitute a claim.  What is required instead is some permanent record that, on its face, is evidence that a claim has been made.

39. That being the case, the essential focus must be the documentary material itself and what appears on the face of that material.  It must follow therefore that documentary material which does not speak for itself or, to put it another way, material which on its face is entirely neutral, is incapable of constituting a record.  This must be so even if credible evidence is given to this Court by an applicant that the creation of the material was intended to be or was believed by that applicant at the time to constitute the record of a claim.

40. Accordingly, documentary material that goes no further than recording the fact of a visit to one of the offices of the Immigration Department or of an interview held there cannot constitute a record for the purposes of the concession policy even if the testimony of various witnesses given before this Court demonstrates on the balance of probabilities that an oral claim for right of abode had been made during that visit or in the course of the interview.  As Mr Fok SC, counsel for the Director, expressed it, that must be so because how else would the Director’s officers in their administration of the policy have a “clear, objective and uncontroversial basis on which … [to] be able to determine whether a claimant was in Hong Kong and had made a claim for right of abode during the [window] period” : see the January judgment, para.210.

41. But having said that, just as a claim need not be direct and may be inferred from all relevant circumstances so, in my judgment, a record need not be direct and may be inferred provided, of course, that the inference is drawn from what appears on the face of the documentary material and is one that can reasonably be drawn by the Director and his officers in respect of a particular applicant in their lawful administration of the policy.  It is necessary in this respect, however, to toll a warning bell.  The drawing of an inference in respect of a particular applicant cannot be stretched to the level of speculation based, for example, only on what a substantial number of other persons were known to be doing or seeking to do at the relevant time.  In this regard, I repeat what was said in the January judgment (para.215) :

“      The applicants argue that by mere presence or overstaying in Hong Kong (of which the Director of Immigration must have a record), an applicant can be considered as asserting his right of abode here.  This cannot be right.  There can be many reasons, other than assertion of the right of abode, for presence or overstaying in Hong Kong.”  [my emphasis]

Absence of a record — the issue of estoppel

42. But what if the evidence given in a case demonstrates on the balance of probabilities that the officers in authority at the time (police or immigration) failed to make a record of a claim?  Does that failure estop the Director from refusing to acknowledge the applicant as a beneficiary of the concession policy by reason of the absence of a record?

43. At the outset, in considering this issue, it must be emphasised that during the period of the concession policy there was no specific administrative process in place in Hong Kong available to persons from the Mainland who had come to Hong Kong and who wished to claim right of abode pursuant to what they saw as their rights under art.24(2)(3) of the Basic Law.

44. On 1 July 1997, the Immigration (Amendment) (No.2) Ordinance 1997 was enacted.  It provided, among other things, that only persons born after at least one of their parents had become a Hong Kong permanent resident were eligible for right of abode under art.24(2)(3).  The Ordinance, however, did not put in place any specific machinery for processing claims by those who were eligible.

45. On 10 July 1997, the Immigration (Amendment) (No.3) Ordinance 1997 was enacted.  In a special briefing session given by the Secretary for Security to the Provisional Legislative Council on 8 July 1997, in advancing the bill, the following was said :

“      In the past week, several hundred mainland children approached the Immigration Department claiming Right of Abode in Hong Kong under Basic Law Article 24(2)(3).  As you all know, the entry of Mainland people into Hong Kong for settlement is through the One‑Way Permit system.  These children who came forward to claim ROA in the past few days had not followed this established route.  For one thing, this is unfair to all those waiting patiently for their turn.  More importantly, this strikes at the heart of our policy on the orderly admission of Mainland people to come and live in Hong Kong.”

46. The Immigration (Amendment) (No.3) Ordinance did put in place an administrative scheme but in terms of this scheme applications for the issue of a certificate of entitlement under art.24(2)(3) of the Basic Law had to be made to the Mainland authorities and thereafter, as I understand it, armed with that certificate, applicants had to wait in a queue in the Mainland for the issue of a one‑way permit.  In practical terms this meant that Mainland residents who were in Hong Kong, whether lawfully or unlawfully, and who wished to seek permanent resident status under art.24(2)(3), had to return to the Mainland in order to process their applications.  There was therefore no requirement to set up an administrative scheme in Hong Kong to deal with those persons who nevertheless wished to make an application to the Hong Kong authorities.

47. It is against this background, I believe, that the following determination of the CFA in its July judgment is to be read :

“      … the Director contends that the applicants do not qualify because he has no record of a claim for right of abode as required by the Concession.

       It is submitted on behalf of the applicants that in all these cases, the absence of a record in the hands of the Immigration Department is due to deficient practices adopted by officers of that department.  The Court is therefore invited to treat these applicants as having met all the requirements of the Concession notwithstanding the absence of a record.

       We cannot accept that this is how the January Judgment is to be applied.  In cases where nothing capable of amounting to the required record of a claim for right of abode exists, the applicant necessarily falls outside the Concession.  The argument that a record ought to have come into existence if the applicants’ claims had duly been noted is not an answer to the requirement that there must be a record of the claim in the possession of the Immigration Department.”

48. Accordingly, if, due to ‘deficient practices’, a claim made by an applicant was not recorded, that failure does not estop the Director from relying on the lack of a record.

49. But what if the lack of a record was occasioned by actions which went beyond ‘deficient practices’?  What if an applicant was by means of some form of pressure — by threats, intimidation or oppressive conduct — actively prevented from recording his or her claim?  In its January judgment, the CFA made reference to assertions made by applicants of being pressured into writing standard answers that suited immigration procedures rather than what they wished to write.  In its January judgment (para.225), the CFA said :

“      There is a suggestion by counsel that in some cases applicants who wanted to have an extension of stay or to resist removal were ‘pressurised’ into putting down in their application forms or interview reports standard answers prompted by the Immigration staff which did not contain an assertion or claim of right of abode.  This is a matter of evidence to be dealt with in individual cases.”  [my emphasis]

In addition, in referring to the cases of two representative applicants, the CFA spoke to the same effect.  For example, in respect of a Ms Chau Yin Ping (para.270), the following was said :

“      … she is put forward as an illustration of the treatment some applicants received when they were interviewed.  She alleges that when she was interviewed (outside the Concession period), she was pressurised into inserting in the interview report standard answers given by the Immigration staff.  If relevant,we consider that this is a matter of evidence to be dealt with in individual cases.”  [my emphasis]

50. On a reading of the January and July judgments, in my view, ‘deficient practices’ and the wrongful exercise of ‘pressure’ are therefore to be distinguished.  In the first instance, the Director is not estopped.  In the second instance, however, if wrongful pressure is established, then the Director is estopped.

The imposition of wrongful pressure : the origins of the applicants’ challenges

51. All of the applicants whose cases have been determined in this report testified that, when they presented themselves to the authorities, they made oral claims for right of abode.  Despite this, however, none of the applicants were able to point to any unambiguous statement recorded on any document — including documents upon which they had written their apparent wishes — that clearly evidenced such oral claims.

52. Each applicant, of course, had his or her own reason for explaining the apparent omission but, if a general theme could be detected, it was to the effect that they were not permitted; that is, not given the freedom, to record the fact of their claims despite their desire to do so.  In short, each in their own way, testified that they had been prevented from recording their claims.  Many of the applicants said that they were effectively directed what to write on the available forms even though it did not meet with their wishes and that such instructions, exercised by persons in authority, amounted in the circumstances to wrongful pressure, a pressure that they, as lay people ignorant of Hong Kong ways, felt powerless to resist.

53. However, few (if any) of the applicants said they registered any form of formal complaint.  It was the general import of their evidence that they found themselves in strange circumstances, that at the time they were not sure of the meaning or import of the documents placed in front of them and that, despite their stated intentions, they rapidly fell victim to the oppressive weight of the authority exercised by the police or immigration officers with whom they had to deal.

54. The authorities, of course, denied any oppression although, in general terms, it was accepted by officers of the Immigration Department that they may well, in accordance with the law at the time, have counselled or advised applicants that if they wished to claim right of abode they must first return to the Mainland in order to do so.

55. Accordingly, in so far as a central conflict could be identified, it focused on that uncertain borderline between permissible counselling or advice to bring about what the authorities considered to be a desired result and the wrongful imposition of pressure to achieve that same result.

A consideration of certain Immigration Department forms

56. Illegal immigrants and holders of two‑way permits who had overstayed were not permitted simply to return to the Mainland through one of the border crossing points.  Prima facie, those persons had committed criminal offences.  It was therefore required that those persons submit to an administrative process, and possibly prosecution in the criminal courts, before being removed from Hong Kong.

57. The administrative process, in its first phase at least, was carried out by the General Investigation Section (‘GIS’), a section of the Immigration Department situated on 13th floor of the Immigration Tower in Wanchai.  Illegal immigrants and two‑way permit overstayers — whatever their intended purposes — were referred to GIS.

58. An applicant going to 13th floor would be met by an immigration officer at the reception desk.  It was the practice of that officer to give to all applicants, whatever the stated purpose of their visit, a personal particulars form called an ID 457 form.

59. After the completion of that form, the applicant would be interviewed by a GIS officer.  The interview would take place in an office occupied by a number of interviewing officers.  The interviews were not therefore conducted in private rooms with the officer and the interviewee being alone.

60. On the evidence, it is apparent that during much of the concession period GIS officers interviewed between 15 to 20 persons a day.  It speaks for itself that the interviews would, in the main, have been fairly short, brisk affairs.  During the course of each interview, the applicant would be given a second form to complete.  This form constituted the only record of the interview.  It is called a ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form.  The GIS officers who conducted the interviews did not make private notes for their files.

61. At the end of the interview, the applicant would be requested to complete a third form described as a ‘no loss, no complaint’ form.

62. Thereafter, matters relevant to the applicant’s possible prosecution and arrangements for the applicant’s repatriation were determined internally by officers of the Immigration Department.

63. In respect of an applicant’s visit to the GIS, therefore, the only records generated during the course of that visit were the three forms to which I have made reference.  As the great majority of the cases determined in this report related to the GIS, these three forms took on very considerable importance.

(a)   The ID 457 form

64. The ID 457 form may be described generically as a personal particulars form.  On behalf of the applicants, it was submitted that the form, seeking not only particulars of an individual applicant but also of that applicant’s parents and other family members, was capable, in context, of constituting a record sufficient to meet the constraints of the concession policy.  In opposition, it was submitted on behalf of the Director that the form was not designed to record any form of petition, claim, right or remedy.  It was an entirely neutral form and was viewed as such by officers of the Immigration Department.  That being the case, unless it was specifically endorsed to reflect a claim, the form was not capable —on its face — of constituting a record in terms of the concession policy.

65. Mr Chun Yiu, a Principal Immigration Officer in charge of the Investigation Division of the Immigration Department, said that the ID 457 form, first introduced in October 1979, is a standard form given out at the reception counter of the GIS to ‘all immigration offenders’ who surrender to or are referred to GIS.  Mr Chun said that the information sought to be obtained in the ID 457 form is obtained ‘for the purpose of facilitating investigation of immigration offences and/or consideration of prosecution’.  Mr Chun said that all immigration offenders who presented themselves to the reception counter of GIS would be handed a copy of the form and asked to fill it in before he or she was interviewed.

66. It is apparent that the ID 457 form (or variations of it) have been used for many years by various sections and/or divisions of the Immigration Department, its purpose being essentially the same; namely, the collection of personal data.  Examples of the use of the data were described by senior immigration officers as including cross checking the authenticity of parentage or deciding whether an individual should or should not be prosecuted.

67. The ID 457 form used by GIS officers during the concession period bore the following heading :

“                       IMMIGRATION DEPARTMENT

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

Investigation Division

Brief History of Applicant”

Beneath the heading, space was provided for entering personal details of the applicant; for example, his or her name, alias, date and place of birth, sex, education, occupation, country of origin and place of permanent residence.  Other details sought included date of entry into Hong Kong, Hong Kong address and details of the travel document used, assuming he or she entered legally.  The bottom half of the page sought information in respect of the applicant’s family.  Indeed the heading of this section was titled : ‘family composition’.  Beneath the heading, details were sought of various family members : age, date of birth, place of birth, marital status, Hong Kong identity card, address in Hong Kong or elsewhere.  The family members in respect of whom information was sought included husband or wife, natural children, parents and natural brothers and sisters.

68. The ID 457 form, while it was concerned with the personal details of an applicant, did not seek to identify the nature of any particular application that was being made by that applicant.  Nor was space provided so that the nature of an application may be stated.  A signature was not required.

69. Mr Chun Yiu said that every member of the Investigation Division, when they took up their post, was instructed that all immigration offenders should be informed — before interviews took place — that they were under investigation for offences relevant to their conduct; for example, for breaching the conditions of their two‑way permit.  However, when the applicants gave evidence, few, if any, recalled being told anything in respect of the ID 457 form other than that they should fill in the necessary details.

70. In my judgment, a plain reading of the ID 457 form makes it clear that it holds itself out as being an essentially neutral paper, nothing more than a receptical for personal particulars which may be used by the immigration authorities for a broad range of purposes.  That was certainly the way in which the immigration authorities viewed the form and they, of course, were responsible for managing the concession policy.

71. That being the case —absent any specific endorsement or notation to the effect that a claim for right of abode is or has been made —I fail to see how the mere completion of particulars can constitute a record in terms of the concession policy.

72. Many of the applicants testified that when they completed the ID 457 form, they believed they were recording their claim for right of abode because the form specifically required details of their parents and, in respect of those applicants, at least one of their parents were Hong Kong permanent residents.  Indeed, a number of applicants testified that, not being in possession of copies of their parents identification documents, they were asked to obtain them and then submit them.  This, they said, reinforced their belief that the form constituted some form of application.

73. In my judgment, however, these applicants were not assisted by evidence of their subjective intent.  Subjective intent is not the test.  The test is whether, on the face of the form, there is evidence that a claim for right of abode has been made.  To repeat the words of the CFA in the July judgment :

“      We are of the view that if, in the case of any applicant, such annotations or other writing appear on the face of documents held by the Immigration Department which, interpreted fairly, amount, on the balance of probabilities, to a record of a claim for right of abode, the Concession requirement in respect of such record is satisfied.”

74. As I understood the submissions made on behalf of the applicants, it was to the effect that an ID 457 form, if it contained particulars of a parent who had permanent residence in Hong Kong, was capable of constituting evidence of the fact that an oral claim for right of abode had been made.  First, of course, it had to be demonstrated that a claim had been made.  But if that was shown then, so it was submitted, a document containing the essential particulars upon which right of abode under art.24(2)(3) was based, had to be capable of constituting evidence of that oral claim.  I do not agree.  What is demanded by the concession policy is a record that evidences the fact that a claim for right of abode was made.  But particulars, even if they do found a right under art.24(2)(3) of the Basic Law, are not of themselves evidence that a claim to exercise that right was made.

75. It cannot be suggested that all two‑way permit holders, who overstayed during the concession period and who qualified under art.24(2)(3), breached their conditions of stay because, without exception, each of them wished to claim right of abode.  Many must have had family, jobs, businesses back in the Mainland, many by reasons of natural ties and pride in their birthplace must have been satisfied to visit Hong Kong without seeking to reside here permanently.  Yet, it appears to me that the logical consequence of accepting the submissions made on behalf of the applicants must be that, in his management of the concession policy, the Director would have had to draw the inference that every ID 457 form which gave particulars of one parent being a permanent resident of Hong Kong was a record of a claim for right of abode.  That proposition needs only to be stated to be refuted.

76. Put succinctly, standing on its own, evidence of an entitlement to a right is not evidence that a claim has been made by reason of that entitlement.

(b)   The ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form

77. As I have said earlier, the ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form constituted the sole record of an applicant’s interview.  The form bore the heading :

                        “IMMIGRATION DEPARTMENT

Interview Report

(Grounds for non‑removal)”

Beneath the heading, space was provided for entering the personal details of the applicant and for stating the case reference number.  Beneath that, there was the following stated invitation :

“Please state your Grounds for non‑removal.”

A space was provided to enable the applicant, in his or her own hand, to write on the form.  Beneath that space provision was made for the signature of the applicant and the interviewing officer.  At the very foot of the form the following notation appeared :

“Note :     This report shall not be construed as constituting an application for permission to remain in Hong Kong.”

78. The ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form provided the ideal vehicle for an applicant to both claim right of abode and in the same action record that claim.  Indeed, the unambiguous invitation appearing in about the middle of the page is one in which the applicant is asked to write down why he or she does not wish to be removed from Hong Kong.  Yet, despite the clearly stated purpose of the form, none of the applicants whose cases have been determined in this report and who wrote on the form did so in a way which, on a fair reading of the words, could be said to constitute a substantive claim for right of abode or a record of the fact that such a claim had earlier been made.  As to the purported reasons for this, I shall refer in more detail shortly.

(c)   The ‘no loss, no complaint’ form

79. At the end of their interview each applicant was asked to complete a short form worded as follows :

“Mr./Miss __________________________________________ .  Do you have any loss, damage or complaint during the period when you are under the supervision/enquiry of the Immigration Officers?

               YES.  (Please specified)

               NO.”

At the foot of the form, space was provided for the applicant’s signature as well as a statement of the time and date.

80. All of the applicants whose cases have been determined in this report endorsed the form to the effect that they had no loss or complaint and placed their signature on the document.

81. Counsel for the Director placed considerable weight on the fact that no record of any form of complaint appears in these forms.  Undoubtedly it does lend weight to the assertions of those who testified for the Director that the interviewing process was for each applicant an orderly, uncontentious affair in respect of which — at the relevant time — the interviewees simply had no cause for complaint.  But it would be wrong, I think, to place too much weight in all instances on the content of these forms.  As I have said, most applicants spoke of complying with what they say they were directed to do because they did not believe they had any choice in the matter.  That being so, it would be too much, in my view, to expect such compliance (if it be so) to be suddenly replaced at the end of each interview with a sudden determination to register a formal complaint in the presence of the interviewing officer.

The role of interviewing officers

82. It was always accepted by senior immigration officers who gave evidence on behalf of the Director that illegal immigrants and overstayers who surrendered to or were referred to the Immigration Department would be counselled to leave Hong Kong voluntarily even if they sought right of abode pursuant to art.24(2)(3) of the Basic Law.

83. In his affirmation of 5 May 2000, Mr Mak Kwai Yun, Assistant Director of Immigration, said that such persons—

“      … would be counselled to leave Hong Kong voluntarily.  If they did not agree to leave Hong Kong voluntarily, their cases would be referred to the Removal Section for the issue of removal orders.”

84. Mr Pang Kin Mo, the Senior Immigration Officer of the GIS between December 1995 and October 1997, in his affirmation of 15 March 2003, referred to a system employed in the days immediately following the change of sovereignty in terms of which officers of the rank of Immigration Officer would counsel overstayers who claimed right of abode.  The counselling, he said, involved advice on the current law; namely, that the person claiming abode had no right to do so in Hong Kong and should return to the Mainland voluntarily or otherwise be removed.  If, after counselling, the overstayer agreed to return voluntarily, Mr Pang said that he or she would be invited to record that fact on a ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form.  Persons who did not agree to return voluntarily would be referred to the relevant unit with the recommendation that immigration offendors be detained pending removal.

85. A great many of the applicants whose cases have been determined in this report testified that when they first asserted their claim for right of abode they were informed that they could not do so in Hong Kong and must return to the Mainland to process their applications.

86. As Mr Fok, for the Director, said in the course of submissions, even if such counselling or advice is characterised as attempting to dissuade persons from seeking to remain in Hong Kong to assert their claim for right of abode here, such counselling or advice was entirely consistent with the law as it stood.  I agree with that submission.  In my judgment, the giving of such advice cannot itself be criticised as somehow being oppressive or a form of wrongful pressure.

87. Applicants who received such counselling or advice, especially those who knew through the news media that others in their position had not been successful in seeking right of abode in Hong Kong and had been repatriated, must by then have been aware of the fact that their own chances of successfully applying were, at best, slim.  This, I am satisfied, in many instances explained the compliant attitude adopted by those applicants thereafter in the processing of their own repatriation.

88. As to the duties of interviewing officers, Mr Pang Kin Mo also testified that GIS officers who carried out interviews were instructed that, in respect of overstayers, there were two important questions to be asked.  First, why had the interviewee overstayed and, second, what was the interviewee’s present intention?  Interviewing officers therefore guided the process of interviews.

89. Importantly, it is clear from the evidence that, as they made no private notes for their files, they had to ensure that the answers to their questions appeared on the face of the ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form.  It follows that, to some degree, that had to mean directing or suggesting at least part of what an interviewee wrote on the form.

90. For the interviewing officers, of course, the desired outcome was an agreement by the interviewee to return voluntarily to the Mainland.  At the time, no doubt, that would have been seen as the only sensible outcome for many of the interviewees too.  At least that way they avoided detention.  As I have said, in respect of many of the applicants, although invariably they protested otherwise, I was satisfied that, even if they had orally asserted their claim for right of abode, or made an inquiry concerning it, having been advised that they must return to the Mainland to process any such application and knowing that a refusal to leave voluntarily meant detention and removal, they then acquiesced in the process of their removal.  In the process, no doubt, all too often the desire to record the fact that right of abode had been claimed was forgotten.  At that time the concession policy was not in existence so recording a claim may at that stage of the removal process have been seen — and rationally so — as an entirely superfluous exercise.

91. The fact that it was, in practical terms, necessary for interviewing officers to direct or suggest, at least in part, what was written by interviewees on their ‘grounds for non‑removal’ forms does not mean that wrongful pressure was placed on those interviewees.  If they were free to write what they wished or to amend what they were asked to write by adding to it or qualifying it then, in my judgment, the interviews constituted a lawful process free of wrongful pressure.  What must be understood is that this was an administrative process, one in which guidance from officers would be expected.

92. In any event, it was for the applicant in each case to assert right of abode and, to benefit under the concession policy, to do so in a sufficiently active manner as to ensure that some record of the assertion was made.  If they were free to do so; that is, if they were not actively prevented from doing so by being threatened or made the victim of oppressive conduct, then it seems to me that no valid criticism of wrongful pressure can be made.  As Mr Fok said, no doubt with the benefit of hindsight many of the applicants wish that they had recorded their claim on the face of the ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form.  But at the time, as I have said earlier, there was no value in doing so.

93. At this juncture, I digress to observe that listening to the evidence given during the hearings before this Court, a casual bystander would perhaps have been forgiven for concluding that between 1 July 1997 and 29 January 1999 when the applicants had had their dealings with officers of the Immigration Department and/or the police they had at that time been determined to meet the requirements of the concession policy while the officers had been equally determined to frustrate those efforts.  But, of course, at that time, as I have said, there was no such thing as the concession policy.  It did not exist.  Indeed, it only came into existence on 26 June 1999, some five months after the concession period (1 July 1997 – 29 January 1999) had come to an end.  Nor can it be said that during the concession period the policy was in any way in contemplation, certainly not so that it would have been known to the public or to rank and file public officers.  As the CFA’s January judgment makes clear, the policy decision by the Chief Executive in Council was only made consequent upon the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress on 26 June 1999 issuing an interpretation of certain articles of the Basic Law pertaining to right of abode.  That being the case, it would be wrong to view the actions of the various witnesses (both applicants and public officers) as in some way intended either to fulfil or frustrate the necessary elements of the concession policy.

94. Finally, I turn to a reaction testified to by a number of applicants; namely, subservience in the face of authority.  When asked why, if they had been so determined to claim right of abode, they had failed to state that wish on the face of their ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form, many of the applicants testified to the effect that they did not believe they could defy authority.  In short, they were afraid to do anything other than comply in strict terms with the directions they received.  They explained this behaviour of subservience by making reference to such matters as their lack of education and what was the norm when dealing with the authorities in their places of origin.  No doubt many of the applicants were nervous.  As overstayers most would have appreciated their vunerability.  I accept too that many would have had an instinctive reluctance to challenge people in authority.  In light of that perhaps, depending on the character of the individual applicant, a suggestion would be taken as an instruction.  But, standing on its own, self‑induced timidity cannot, in my opinion, be translated into oppressive conduct by interviewing officers.  Wrongful pressure is determined, first, by an objective assessment of the actions of the authorities and, second, by its subjective effect.

The use of ‘standard form’ answers

95. On the evidence, it is quite clear, in my judgment, that many of the GIS interviewing officers, assailed as they were each day by the volume of illegal immigrants and overstayers, resorted to the use of what I describe as ‘standard form’ answers.  These may have been answers memorised by the officers or written down by them so that they could be copied.

96. Mr Pang Kin Mo accepted that experience demonstrated to the officers that the reasons for overstaying were invariably similar (for example, the wish to remain with family or to give birth) and the intentions of the interviewees were invariably similar too (for example, the need to return urgently to the Mainland).  The emergence of ‘standard form’ answers is therefore entirely understandable.  Indeed, although not used by GIS, a number of Immigration Department forms were put into evidence in which ‘standard form’ answers were already printed on the page.  I see nothing wrong in principle in the use of ‘standard form’ answers.  For lay persons, often of limited education, ‘standard form’ answers may have been of real assistance provided, of course, as I have said, the answers suggested were in accordance with what they were prepared to record.

97. The issue, therefore, in my judgment, was not whether answers were suggested by interviewing offices but whether applicants were free either to record them or not, whether they were free to add to or supplement those answers.  If they were free in those regards then there could be no criticism.

98. However, although a number of interviewing officers (invariably holding the rank of immigration assistant) accepted that they would suggest answers to applicants concerning the core questions of why they had overstayed and what they now wished to do, none of the officers accepted that any form of ‘standard form’ answers were prepared and/or used by them.  This, in my judgment, went against the great weight of the evidence.

99. On too many occasions, it was shown that answers given to one interviewing officer were identical or almost identical to answers given by other applicants to the same officer.  There was evidence too of answers given at different times by different applicants to different officers having a common source.  In this latter regard, by way of illustration, I refer to the testimony of Mr Leung Ka Cheong, an Immigration Assistant who, on 18 September 1997, interviewed Mr Chan Ching Hoi (applicant 80).  On his ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form, Mr Chan wrote in Chinese characters to the following effect :

“I have overstayed because of keeping company with my family.  I now want to return to China.”

Mr Leung denied any suggestion that he had given Mr Chan a ‘standard form’ answer to copy.  It was his testimony that the words had come entirely from the mind of Mr Chan.  Mr Leung was then shown three other ‘grounds for non‑removal’ forms which had been completed by overstayers.  These forms had been completed in October 1997, May 1998 and September 1998.  In each case the interviewing officers had been different.  In each case it may reasonably assumed, I think, that the interviewees were of different ages and educational level.  In each case, however, exactly the same set of characters was written down.  Including Mr Chan’s form, that was a total of four documents that were identical in respect of each and every character.  But it went further.  On each form in exactly the same place there was a space and then what appeared to be some kind of punctuation mark.  In my judgment, it was apparent that in each instance the characters had been drawn from a common written source; in short, some form of ‘standard form’ answer.  Mr Leung, however, denied that he used any ‘standard form’ answers.  He accepted that he did direct applicants to state why they had overstayed but he rejected any suggestion that he gave any further directions as to exactly what they should write.  Mr Leung said that he recalled several occasions when applicants wrote on their ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form that they wished to remain in Hong Kong to seek right of abode.  That may be the case.  But that does not detract from the fact that, on the evidence, Mr Leung clearly kept some written source material to assist overstayers in completing their ‘grounds for non‑removal’ forms.

100. The obstinate denial of almost all the interviewing officers to the use of ‘standard form’ answers caused me very real concern.  Was it an attempt to disguise concerted efforts by those officers to prevent applicants from recording that they wished to seek right of abode?  It was a question that had to be seriously considered in the light of the disappointing testimony of these officers.  At the end of the day, however, in looking to the facts of each individual case and taking all relevant evidence into account, I was satisfied that, while a good many applicants did have answers suggested to them, they were not wrongfully pressured into recording only those suggested answers.  I am satisfied that in each case if an applicant had wished to add to or supplement a suggested answer or write something else entirely, they would have been free to do so.

Determination of the individual cases

101. Having looked to matters generally, I now move to a determination of the individual cases.  For ease of reference, an index of the cases appears below :

(1)                Chan Pik Shan (307 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

(2)                Wu Kit Nga (4000 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

(3)                Chan Kin Piu (204 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

(4)                Cheung Sau Kam (713 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

(5)                Cheung Suet Kam (733 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

(6) & (7)       Chong Ming Lik (915) and Chong Ming Ngai (916) : both ‘group one’ applicants

(8)                Lau Suet Fa (1970 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

(9)                Lai Siu Fung (1663 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

(10)              Tai Lin Fat (3174 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

(11)              Sze Li Chun (3089 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

(12)              Sze Sau Kan (3122 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

(13)              Leung Kang Kwong (2113 : a ‘group two’ applicant)

(14)              Hui Yuk Heung (1380 : a ‘group one and ‘group four’ applicant)

(15)              Chan Ching Hoi (80 : a ‘group one’ and ‘group four’ applicant)

(16)              Kwok Siu Ping (1623 : a ‘group one and ‘group four’ applicant)

(17)              Ng Li Tung (2646 : a ‘group one’ and ‘group four’ applicant)

(18)              Sze Chiu Chi (3055 : a ‘group one’ and ‘group four’ applicant)

(19)              Lau Wai Kau (1981 : a ‘group one’ and ‘group four’ applicant)

(20)              Wong Yuen Sheung (3910 : a ‘group one’ and ‘group four’ applicant)

(21)              Cheng Siu Yin (593 : a ‘group one’ and ‘group four’ applicant)

(22)              Fu Kwong (1084 : a ‘group one’, ‘group two’ and ‘group four applicant)

(1)     Chan Pik Shan (307 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

102. In June 1998, when the applicant came to Hong Kong as a member of a tourist party, she had strong family connections here.  Both her parents were permanent residents.  Her husband was also a permanent resident as were the two children of her marriage.  The applicant was permitted to remain in Hong Kong for a few days only but overstayed.

103. On 31 October 1998, the applicant went to the Immigration Tower in the company of her husband.  She was heavily pregnant.  She went to the 13th floor, to the offices of GIS, but, as an overstayer who had been a member of a tour group, was referred to the 14th floor.

104. The applicant was given an ID 457 form which, she said, she completed by giving full particulars of her parents, her brother and her husband, all of whom had right of abode.  However, as she had not brought her parents’ identity cards, she was unable to state their numbers on the form.

105. The applicant was then interviewed, her interviewing officer being Immigration Assistant, Mr Ho Yuen Tung.  She said that she told the interviewing officer that both her parents had right of abode and asked if there was an amnesty in place which would give her the right to remain in Hong Kong with her family.  She said that the officer informed her that there was no such policy and she must return to the Mainland.

106. In the course of the interview, the applicant told the officer that she could, if necessary, bring copies of her parents’ identity cards. She also offered to bring a notarial certificate stating her place and date of birth but was told, she said, that this document was not required.  The evidence revealed that she did, in fact, return two days later, on 2 November 1998, with copies of her parents’ identity cards which she delivered into the possession of the Immigration Department.

107. During the interview, said the applicant, she was given a ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form and, being heavily pregnant and wishing to give birth to her child in Hong Kong, was directed to copy the characters which appear on the form.  In English, they are to the following effect :

“I , Chan Pik Shan, came to tour Hong Kong.  Originally set to return to Shenzhen with the tour group on 21 June 1998.  But because I wanted to give birth in HK, so I overstayed.  I know that this is not right and I now ask the authorities to arrange for my return to Shenzhen as soon as possible after the birth of the child.”

108. The applicant accepted that she was not threatened or coerced in any way to write the characters.  She said, however, that she was very nervous. The characters that she wrote did not reflect her full intentions.  But, as she had already expressed a desire to remain in Hong Kong after giving birth and had been told that it was not possible, she said that she simply wrote down what she was asked to write.  Put simply, she agreed to what was suggested to her.

109. When the applicant returned to the Immigration Tower on 2 November 1998 to file the copies of her parents’ identity cards, she said that, on the instructions of her father, she made ‘a strong request’ that she be granted right of abode.

110. The applicant was prosecuted for overstaying and fined $1,000.  She pleaded guilty.  She was asked if she had anything to say in mitigation but recalled that a lot of other accused pleaded that they wanted to be reunited with their families in Hong Kong and were told by the magistrate that they must first return to China.  She said that she saw no purpose in repeating what the others had said and kept her silence.

111. I found the testimony of the applicant to be credible.  She did not exaggerate. Her explanations, in context, were entirely plausible.  Having regard to her close family ties, she certainly had good reason to seek some way to be reunited with her family after giving birth to her child.  The probabilities, of course, point to the fact that her primary concern in October 1998 would have been the obtaining of permission to remain in Hong Kong to give birth.  But that primary concern does not exclude a desire to seek permanent resident for herself as well.

112. I do not dismiss the testimony of the interviewing officer, Mr Ho, as being deliberately untrue.  But, as he accepted, due to the lapse of time (and no doubt the many interviews conducted by him) he had no real recollection of events.

113. On the probabilities, therefore, I am satisfied that, in substance, the applicant did make two oral claims for right of abode, one on 31 October and the other on 2 November 1998.

114. The more difficult question to determine is whether the Director has a record of at least one of those claims as required by the concession policy.

115. The ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form does not and cannot constitute a record.  Nothing, on its face, suggests a clam for right of abode.  In my judgment, no issue of oppressive conduct can arise.

116. Nor, standing on its own, can the ID 457, an essentially neutral document, constitute a record.  However, in this case the ID 457 form is supported by copies of the parents’ identity cards, these being copies that the interviewing officer, Mr Ho, agreed he had asked the applicant to file with the Immigration Department.  These copies, because their filing (on the evidence) was unusual, must at least raise the question of whether they can constitute a record.  But they are not the only documents that an officer, going through the relevant papers for the purposes of managing the concession policy, would come across.  He would also read an internal minute (M2) dated 10 November 1998.  This minute, written by the team leader, Mr William Poon Siu Chuen, is to the following effect :

“      Upon enquiry, she revealed that her parents were HKRs.  However, she did not have birth proof because she was born in village and had not applied for a birth certificate.

       As revealed from her parents’ ROP records (at float), her so claimed father came to HK via Lo Wu on 10‑10‑78 and was granted permanent residence on 07‑10‑85.  On the other hand, her mother came to HK on 10‑10‑85 and acquired permanent residence on 12‑10‑92.  In other words, since subject was born before her either parent acquired permanent residence in HK, she should be deemed to have NO prima facie claim to ROA under the Immigration Ordinance.”  [my emphasis]

117. This minute may have been written for the purposes of facilitating investigation and in respect of a possible prosecution.  But, on a fair reading, the minute is clearly focused on the issue of the applicant’s eligibility for right of abode.  It goes so far as to say that prima facie she has no claim.  In my view, that minute, taken together with the filing of copies of the parents’ identity cards, must constitute a record —on its face — that in substance some sort of claim for right of abode has been made.

118. There was uncertainty as to how information concerning the applicant’s lack of a birth certificate came into the minute (M2).  The purpose of the minute was also explained.  But, as I have said in respect of many applicants, the test is not subjective intent, it looks instead to what appears on the face of relevant records and that record points directly to matters of eligibility.

119. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)      the applicant did make a claim for right of abode; and

(ii)      the Director does have a record of that claim as required by the concession policy.

(2)     Wu Kit Nga (4000 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

120. The applicant came to Hong Kong on 16 June 1998, being permitted to remain for a limited period in terms of her two‑way permit.  The applicant came to Hong Kong to be with both her parents and her husband, all of whom had right of abode in Hong Kong.

121. The applicant, who learnt that she was pregnant shortly before her arrival in Hong Kong, overstayed for two reasons.  First, she said, she wished to give birth to her child in Hong Kong and, second, she wished to seek right of abode.

122. In respect of her second intention, it is telling, I believe, to record that prior to her arrival she obtained a notarial certificate from the Mainland authorities to prove her relationship with her father.  She testified that she obtained this document because she believed it would be required for any application for permanent residence.

123. Although she came to Hong Kong nearly a year after the change of sovereignty, the applicant said that she was not informed of such matters as the certificate of entitlement scheme.  Friends in the Mainland had told her that she could apply for right of abode in Hong Kong, she said, and she proceeded on that advice.

124. The applicant waited until she was some eight months pregnant until she surrendered herself to the immigration authorities as an overstayer.  She was candid in admitting that she waited for so long because she knew that if she surrendered herself too early she may be repatriated in order to give birth in the Mainland.

125. The applicant said that shortly after her arrival in Hong Kong she and her husband made inquiries with the Immigration Department as to right of abode and were told that any application would have to be processed in the Mainland.  The applicant accepted, therefore, that she and her husband had been advised that she could not apply for right of abode in Hong Kong.  However, her testimony, which I accept as truthful in this regard, also revealed that attempting to seek right of abode was important for her and her family.

126. At this juncture, I should say that, while clearly the applicant attempted to put her best case forward, I found her to be an essentially honest witness.  Her evidence, in my opinion, was devoid of the overt attempts at manipulation and plain invention obvious in the testimony of a good many other applicants.  Put shortly, I found her in almost all matters to be essentially credible.

127. As to her surrender on 13 October 1998, the applicant said that she and her husband went direct to the offices of GIS on 13th floor of Immigration Tower.  She did so, she said, because a ‘friend of a friend’ told her that she should do so in order to obtain a recognisance paper there.

128. The applicant said that at the reception counter, she informed the officer on duty that she had come for two reasons : to apply for permission to give birth in Hong Kong and to put in a claim for right of abode.  During cross‑examination, it was put to the applicant that, if she had already been advised that she could not claim right of abode in Hong Kong, no purpose would have been served in attempting to claim abode when she surrendered herself.  She replied to the effect that at that time she was not certain of the position in law.  I accept that that may have been the case.  In any event, earlier negative advice will not always prevent a further request in the hope of more positive advice the second time.

129. The applicant said that she was given an ID 457 form to complete.  She was able to give the identity card numbers of both her parents, she said, because she had brought photostat copies of their identity cards with her : further evidence of her desire to remain permanently in Hong Kong.

130. In the interview, the applicant said that she was asked on two occasions — she remembered this well, she said — how long her father had lived in Hong Kong and whether it was over seven years.  She replied by saying yes, it was more than seven years — it was ten years.  In light of this, she said, she took it that the officer knew that her father had right of residence and that she had the right to claim residence through him.

131. The applicant said that when she was given the ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form, she was told by the interviewing officer that, as she sought permission to remain to give birth, she should write that on the form.  The applicant said that she was shown a set of characters to copy and did so.  Her statement was to the following effect :

“I have been overstaying because I am 8 months pregnant.  I want to go back to China after giving birth to the child in Hong Kong.”

132. The applicant accepted that she did not attempt to add anything to those characters.  She accepted that she was not in any way threatened.  As I understood it, it was the essential thrust of her evidence that, having been told what to write by a person in authority, she simply complied.

133. The applicant was clearly a literate person, reasonably well‑educated.  She said that she had upper secondary education.  On the probabilities, it appears that she did copy the characters.  A couple of the characters are in the simplified form but most are traditional characters.  During her evidence, she said that she had only been in Hong Kong a short time and how therefore would she know how to write traditional characters.  The simplified characters were written by her, she said, when she was copying and were probably written instinctively.

134. In respect of the ‘no loss, no complaint’ form, the applicant said that she understood the nature of the form and signed it to the effect that she had no complaint.

135. In my judgment, the probabilities do support the applicant’s testimony that she did claim right of abode on 13 October 1998 when she surrendered herself.  She may have done so more in hope than realistic expectation but that is not uncommon and cannot undermine the finding that a claim itself was made.

136. However, although the ID 457 form contained details of her parent’s identity cards, in my judgment, neither that form — which otherwise was unendorsed — nor the ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form are on their own capable of constituting the required record under the concession policy.

137. On 22 January 1999, after the birth of her child, the applicant reported to the Joint Recognisance Office where she was served with a notice requiring her to attend at the Prosecution Section of the Immigration Department a week later and thereafter to present herself at Lo Wu on 3 February 1999 for repatriation.

138. However, when the applicant presented herself at the Prosecutions Section on 29 January 1999 — the last day of the window period under the concession policy — the applicant was not prosecuted.  Instead she and a number of other persons who were in her position; that is, children of Hong Kong persons with right of abode, were sent to the Victoria Immigration Centre (‘the VIC’).  The applicant said that she was at this time accompanied by her husband.

139. The reason for this sudden change of procedure — at least in respect of the applicant and certain other overstayers — was because the CFA had that same day handed down important judgments in respect of the right of abode litigation.  The applicant said that she and many others, being aware of this, repeatedly told the officers that they had right of abode and were entitled to remain in Hong Kong.  After a long wait, the applicant said that she had her recognisance papers stamped and was allowed to leave.  In the result, she said, she believed she was now free to remain in Hong Kong and that all that was left was a matter of bureaucratic process.  Did the applicant make a claim for right of abode on that day?  In my judgment, the probabilities support her evidence that she did.  In knowledge of the CFA judgments and in the hope of a sudden change, I can well understand the applicant wishing — at that eleventh hour — to assert her rights.

140. A few days later, however, on 14 February 1999, the applicant said that she was recalled to the VIC and informed that she would have to return to the Mainland.  She objected, she said, but in fear of being detained agreed to a voluntary return on 28 February 1999.

141. After her return to the Mainland, the applicant wrote a letter of complaint to the Director.  It was to the following effect :

“Until soon after I gave birth to my daughter (on 8 December), I received notification from the Immigration Department, telling me to go the Immigration Department on 29 January 1999 to wait for court hearing.  However, the staff of the Department made arrangement for us, children of permanent Hong Kong residents, to go to Victoria Detention Centre on that day to have our status verified.  The staff at Victoria Detention Centre did not handle our cases after stalling for a long time.  They only extended our stay in Hong Kong when we urged them.  Later, I was told by telephone to go to Victoria Detention Centre on 14 February 1999, where I was asked to sign a paper on voluntary removal for returning to the Mainland on 28th this month.  A staff member there said that I would be departed if I did not sign the paper.  I had no alternative but to sign it.  Later, on the 25th of this month, I went to Victor [Center] again to request for verification, but the staff there said that I had not come to Hong Kong before 10 July 1997.”

142. In all the circumstances, as I have said, I am satisfied that the applicant did claim right of abode on two occasions within the window period.  But is there a record of that claim?  I am satisfied that there is.  The record is contained in the ID 457 form when that form is read in conjunction with two internal minutes in the files of the Immigration Department, the first being dated 28 January 1999 (M4), the second being dated 11 February 1999 (M6).  I accept that the second record was compiled after the concession period had elapsed but it is a record of a claim (or claims) made within the period.  The minute, M4 reads :

“Since the Court of Final Appeal is going to deliver its verdict on Right of Abode issue on 29.1.99, (CPD) has agreed to defer prosecution in cases where the overstayers alleged that their parents are HKRs so that we can first study the possible impact of the verdict on these cases.”  [my emphasis]

The minutes, M6, reads :

“      Subject is a keyboard overstayer who claimed that one or both of his/her parents was/were HKPRs.  However subject cannot, for the time being, produce proof to support the claimed relationship, which, if proved, will allow subject a prima facie claim to ROA.  Even so, subject, according to the CFA’s judgment, will still have to apply for C of E before he/she can enjoy the ROA because subject arrived in HK after 09.07.1997.”  [my emphasis]

143. Evidence was led that use of the word ‘claimed’ was misleading and that all the applicant had done was supply information.  But, as I have said, a record is to be judged, either alone or in context, on the basis of what appears on its face.  The minute, M6, on its face, is specific in recording that to all intents and purposes the applicant has claimed right of abode.

144. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)      the applicant did make a claim for right of abode;

(ii)      the Director does have a record of that claim.

(3)     Chan Kin Piu (204 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

145. The applicant came to Hong Kong on the strength of a two‑way permit on 22 August 1998, being permitted to remain until 13 November 1998.

146. On 3 November 1998, while he was still within the limit of his stay, the applicant was found on the 43rd floor of a building under construction.  With some justification, considering where he was found, the police contended that he was working and thus contravening the conditions of his stay in Hong Kong.

147. That same day, the applicant was transferred to the Immigration Department into the custody of a unit called the Task Force.  The applicant was interviewed under caution, a record of the interview being placed into evidence.

148. The applicant, however, contended that the record did not accurately reflect what he had said or attempted to say to his interviewing officer.  Indeed, this was one of the few cases in which allegations were made of overtly oppressive conduct.

149. The face of the record revealed that the applicant said that he had come to Hong Kong to visit his parents, both of whom had right of abode, and for purpose of tourism.  As to the police allegation that he was found working on a construction site, the applicant admitted only that he had been looking for work.  As to why he was looking for work, the applicant was recorded as saying :

“      You know, I am bored to have nothing to do when I have come to Hong Kong.  Therefore, I want to find a job to do to make some money to return to the Mainland.  However, I cannot find any.”

150. According to Mr Wong Kai Nam, the interviewing officer, after completion of the statement the applicant was informed that he would not be prosecuted but would instead be returned to the Mainland for breaching his two‑way permit.  He was then presented with a ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form and wrote characters to the following effect on the form :

“I know I am without right of abode in Hong Kong.  Please will your Department arrange for my return to the Mainland as soon as possible.”

151. It is not disputed that the applicant was returned to the Mainland that same day; that is, on the evening of 3 November 1998.

152. The general thrust of the testimony of the immigration officers was to the effect that this was an entirely unexceptional case.  The applicant was apprehended working at the building site in breach of his two‑way permit.  A decision was made not to prosecute him but rather to return him forthwith to the Mainland.  Having been informed of this, the applicant agreed to be returned to the Mainland, signifying that in writing.

153. The applicant, however, attempted to paint a very different picture.  He testified that during the course of the interview he was threatened and that, far from the interview taking the form of a question and answer process as the record indicates, the interviewing officer simply wrote down what he wished as if ‘writing an essay’.  The applicant said that his limited knowledge of Chinese characters meant that the interviewing officer wrote down his answers too and was thereby given even greater freedom of invention.  From time to time, said the applicant, the interviewing officer would speak to another immigration officer at a computer who was clearly feeding him with appropriate data.  When requested to sign the record of interview, the applicant said that he asked what it was about.  He was assured, he said, that his interests would not be harmed.  The applicant appears to have accepted that the record was read to him but protested that it was read very fast so that he could not hear clearly.

154. As to the contents of the record of interview, the applicant said that he told the interviewing officer that he had come to Hong Kong to be with his grandmother and his parents in order to care for them.  They were still mourning the recent death of one of his siblings.  He denied saying that he had come to Hong Kong for purposes of tourism.  He said that he made a claim for right of abode on the basis that others in his position had received the right to remain in Hong Kong.  In reply, he said he was threatened with imprisonment.

155. When it came to completing the ‘Grounds for non‑removal’ form, the applicant said that initially he wrote in his own hand the words : “I have right of abode”.  When the interviewing officer saw this, however, he took the form and threw it away.  The applicant testified that he was then presented with a second form and was ordered to copy the words that appear on the face of that form.  Initially, said the applicant, in the first sentence he omitted the character which indicated that he had no right of abode, the result being a statement in the affirmative rather than the negative.  However, the interviewing officer demanded that he inserted the negative Chinese character and he duly complied.

156. Despite being so badly treated, the applicant signed the ‘no loss, no complaint’ form.

157. If the applicant is believed, he was the subject of oppressive conduct and was actively prevented from recording the fact that he sought right of abode.  I have no hesitation, however, in rejecting his evidence almost in its entirety.  Mr Fok, for the Director, submitted that his testimony was largely an exercise in invention.  I agree.

158. During the course of cross‑examination, whenever he was faced with difficulties, the applicant’s invariable recourse was to resort to further accusations of ill treatment.  By contrast, the testimony of Mr Wong, the interviewing officer, although tested at length, came across as credible.

159. I have no doubt that, bar one or two ‘clerical’ errors, the statement made under caution correctly reflects what was said by the applicant.  This is a document which bears approximately 40 of his signatures.  I am further satisfied that the ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form was completed by him without any form of duress.  Assuming that the words were suggested by the interviewing officer, I have no doubt that, if he had wished, the applicant could have added to those words or varied them to suit what it was he wished to stay.

160. The ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form contains the sentence : “I know I am without right of abode in Hong Kong”.  In the circumstances of this case, I take that as amounting to no more than an acknowledgment by the applicant that he had no right to work in Hong Kong because he had no right of abode here.  Far from constituting a claim for right of abode, it was a recognition that he had no such claim.

161. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)      the applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;

(ii)      the Director has no record of any claim.

(4)     Cheung Sau Kam (713 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

162. The applicant, a kindergarten teacher by profession, came to Hong Kong with her infant son on 26 January 1997.  She and her son were permitted to remain until mid‑March.  The applicant, however, did not return to the Mainland on due date to rejoin her husband.  She and her son remained in Hong Kong with her family here.  Both her parents lived in Hong Kong.  They had right of abode together with a number of her siblings.  On the evidence, I am satisfied that the applicant overstayed in the hope that she, together with many others, would be able to claim right of abode when the change of sovereignty took place.

163. Upon the change of sovereignty, however, the applicant did not immediately present herself to the authorities to assert right of abode.  She preferred to wait and see what happened to others.  She paid careful attention to the news and was aware that many of those who did present themselves were detained and/or returned to the Mainland.  In light of this, she said that she decided to delay her visit to the Immigration Department.  On 19 July 1997, the applicant and her son went to the offices of GIS on 13th floor of the Immigration Tower.  The applicant was accompanied by her father.

164. The applicant testified that at the GIS reception she told the officer that she had right of abode and wished to remain in Hong Kong.  She appears to have been silent as to the fate of her infant son who had no such right.  In reply, said the applicant, she was told by the officer that she would have to return to the Mainland to process her application.  That advice was, of course, in accordance with the prevailing statutory scheme.

165. At that time, therefore, the applicant must have appreciated that she had little chance, if any, of successfully claiming right of abode herself.

166. On behalf of the Director, it was submitted that the applicant made no such claim for right of abode.  Emphasis was laid on the inherent improbability of the applicant seeking to remain in Hong Kong when her infant son had no claim to any such right.  On the balance of probabilities, however, I am satisfied that the applicant did speak words which went further than a mere inquiry and in substance amounted to a claim for right of abode.  In respect of why she had overstayed and what she hoped to achieve that day when she presented herself at the offices of GIS I found her to be a balanced, credible witness.

167. The applicant testified that she was then given an ID 457 form to complete.  She said that she wrote the necessary details of her parents believing that completion of the form constituted an application for right of abode.  But whatever her subjective belief, she did not in any way endorse the form to the effect that she was seeking right of abode.  That being the case, the completed ID 457 form does not and cannot — on its face — constitute a record of her claim.

168. Thereafter the applicant was interviewed by an Immigration Assistant, Ms Pauline Cheng Po Lin.  Her son remained with her during the interview but her father waited in the reception area.  The applicant testified that she again asserted her claim to right of abode and was again informed that she would have to return to the Mainland in order to process her application.  The applicant said that she was also told that, as she had overstayed for several months, she was liable to be prosecuted.

169. The applicant completed her ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form in her own hand.  The characters have been translated to the following effect :

“I, Zhang Xue Qin [Madam Cheung], and my son Zhong Jun came to Hong Kong through Lo Wu on 26 January, 1997.  I know that we had to go back to the Mainland on 16 March 1997 but overstayed because I liked Hong Kong.  I now want to bring my son back to the Mainland.”

On its face, therefore, the form cannot be read as a record of the applicant’s claim for right of abode.  The applicant testified that she wished to write down what she had already told the interviewing officer; namely, that she claimed right of abode.  However, she was afraid to do so, she said, because she had been told that she was liable to prosecution and with that, to her understanding, came the possibility of imprisonment.  She said that she therefore wrote down what the interviewing officer told her to write.

170. Ms Cheng, the interviewing officer, had no independent recollection of the interview.  She said, however, that it had not been her practice to warn overstayers that they might be prosecuted nor had she dictated what should be written on grounds for non‑removal forms.  I have to say, however, that Ms Cheng, who gave evidence in respect of a number of applicants, was not in general terms a credible witness.  Her memory, even of publicly acknowledged contemporaneous events, was selective while her insistence that she did not suggest or dictate what should be written on interview forms often flew in the face of the written evidence itself.  In the present case, the applicant’s orderly and detailed statement (including relevant dates) lends credence to the applicant’s assertion that it was essentially dictated to her.

171. But it does not follow from that fact alone that the applicant was in any way threatened by Ms Cheng or was the subject of oppressive conduct aimed at preventing her from writing anything on the form to the effect that she had hoped to claim right of abode or still wished to do so.  In my judgment, on the evidence, if the applicant had been determined to write down her assertion she would not have been stopped from doing so.  The applicant herself, albeit obliquely, accepted that, when she came to write on the form, her principal concern was to avoid prosecution.  She therefore co‑operated in the process of her own removal (and that of her infant son) back to her husband in the Mainland.  Her passivity at that time is understandable.  She knew from the news that many overstayers like herself who had sought right of abode had been detained.  She herself had now been informed twice that, in order to claim abode in Hong Kong, she had to return to the Mainland.  It was, in my view, the only reasonable inference to be drawn from her testimony that, perhaps with undue reverence for authority in the form of Ms Cheng, she bowed to what she then believed to be the inevitable.

172. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)      the applicant did make a claim for right of abode;

(ii)      however, the Director has no record of any claim.

(5)       Cheung Suet Kam (733 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

173. The applicant is the sister of the previous applicant; that is, applicant 713.  The applicant came to Hong Kong on 1 April 1997, being permitted to remain until late May.  Both her parents and her husband lived in Hong Kong, all having right of abode.  A number of her siblings lived here.  It is evident, in my view, that this applicant (like her sister) did not return to the Mainland on due date but overstayed in the hope that she would be able to claim right of abode for herself when the change of sovereignty took place.

174. After her arrival in Hong Kong the applicant discovered that she was pregnant.

175. Upon the change of sovereignty, the applicant did not present herself to the authorities to claim right of abode.  She waited.  More specifically, she waited to see what would happen when her sister went to the Immigration Department to claim right of abode.  This event took place on 19 July 1997.  The sister was unsuccessful and shortly thereafter was repatriated.  From 19 July, therefore, the applicant, whose case was no stronger than her sister’s, must have appreciated that, assuming no change in the law, a claim made by herself in Hong Kong would fail.

176. The applicant waited until 24 November 1997 before she went to the offices of GIS on 13th floor of Immigration Tower accompanied by her mother and husband.  These were the same offices to which her sister had gone four months earlier.  By then she was heavily pregnant, near full term.

177. The applicant testified that she informed the officer at the reception desk that both her parents enjoyed right of abode and that she wished to claim the same right through them.  She said that in reply the officer told her that she would have to return to the Mainland to process her application.  That advice was in accordance with the prevailing statutory scheme and was at the time, of course, entirely valid.

178. The applicant was given an ID 457 form to complete.  She entered the necessary details of her parents.  She said that she did not state her permanent address as by that time she considered Hong Kong to be her home.  The applicant, however, did not endorse the form in any way to indicate that she was seeking right of abode.  That being the case, the completed (or partially completed) ID 457 form does not and cannot — on its face — constitute a record of her claim.

179. Thereafter the applicant was interviewed by an Immigration Assistant, Mr Ng Wai Lun.  She said that she again asserted her claim for right of abode and was again informed that she must return to the Mainland in order to process her application.  According to the applicant, she was then given a ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form — although she did not know the nature of the document at that time — and was directed to copy from a laminated card on which were recorded various statements.  The officer directed her to copy one statement to the following effect :

“Overstayed because I am 9 months pregnant, now I want to give birth in Hong Kong then return to China.”

The applicant said that she made one change to the statement.  The characters on the laminated card spoke of being ‘several months pregnant’ but she changed that to give the actual extent of her pregnancy.

180. On its face, of course, the completed ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form cannot constitute a record as required by the concession policy.  Nothing is recorded to suggest any sort of claim for right of abode.

181. The applicant testified that the laminated card from which she had been directed to copy obscured the heading of the form and at the time of writing she did not realise therefore that it was a form on which she could record the fact that she sought right of abode.  She said that if she had been free to write what she wished she would have stated her claim.  I reject that assertion for the reasons that I set out below.

182. I did not find the applicant to be a credible witness.  Indeed, in my judgment, much of her evidence was specifically tailored not to accord with her memory of events but to meet what she saw as the required tactical result.

183. The applicant said that when her sister made her unsuccessful application in July, she did not question her as to details of her experience : what had happened to her and why.  She learnt only that her sister had been unsuccessful.  I find that difficult to accept.  The issue was one of great importance to both sisters and their family members.  It defies common sense to accept that there was no post mortem.  But, of course, an admission that there had been a post mortem would have opened the applicant to questions as to why, even though forewarned, she appears to have passively accepted the same administrative process by officers of the GIS as her sister.

184. I also found it difficult to accept the applicant’s testimony concerning the placing of the laminated card on the ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form so that it obscured the heading.  That evidence, in my view, quite manifestly was manufactured to shield the applicant from awkward questions as to why, if the form invited her to state her grounds for non‑removal, she did not do so.

185. The interviewing officer, Mr Ng, testified that, to the best of his memory, there were three main categories of people who came to the offices of GIS : illegal immigrants, overstayers who wished to return to the Mainland and overstayers who were pregnant and wished to give birth in Hong Kong before being returned.  Mr Ng (and other interviewing officers) was criticised for blindly placing people like the applicant into pigeon holes.  But, remembering that Mr Ng conducted something like 15 to 20 interviews a day, it is hardly surprising that over a period of time he discerned dominant categories of persons.

186. Mr Ng denied that he kept a laminated card with suggested statements on it.  As I have said in the body of the judgment, I am satisfied that a number of officers in GIS did have standard answers available.  It may perhaps be that Mr Ng did present the applicant with a card of some sort.  But I have no need to decide the issue because I am satisfied on the evidence that the applicant waited until she was heavily pregnant before presenting herself to the immigration authorities for one reason only : it was not to claim right of abode, it was so that she could not be repatriated until she had given birth to her child in Hong Kong.

187. By way of postscript, it should be recorded that the applicant was mistakenly placed on the concession list for a period of time.  I am satisfied that this was a result of human error.  There can be no suggestion that any of the minutes written in respect of this concession list issue constitute in themselves, even indirectly, a record of a claim for right of abode.

188. In conclusion, therefore, I have determined :

(i)      that the applicant did not make a claim of right of abode;

(ii)      the Director has no record of any claim.

(6) & (7)   Chong Ming Lik (915) and Chong Ming Ngai (916) :

both ‘group one’ applicants

189. These two applicants are brother and sister.  They visited the Immigration Tower together on two occasions and on the second occasion were interviewed, one after the other, by the same immigration officer.  For ease of management, their cases were heard together and I deal with their cases in the same manner.  While looked at together, the case of each applicant is, of course, determined on its own facts.

190. Applicant 915 (I will call him Mr Chong) came to Hong Kong on 24 April 1997 on the strength of a two‑way permit.  He was permitted to enter Hong Kong with his young son.  Applicant 916 (I will call her Madam Chong) came to Hong Kong on 1 May 1997.  She was also permitted entry on the strength of a two‑way permit and entered with a child, her young daughter.  Both applicants testified that they came to Hong Kong in order to remain until the change of sovereignty took place so that they could then claim right of abode.

191. The applicants’ parents both enjoyed the status of permanent residents in Hong Kong and had unsuccessfully sought the issue of one‑way permits in favour of their children since the mid‑1970s.  Both applicants had an extended history of seeking the right to live in Hong Kong.  As early as 1983, Madam Chong had apparently petitioned the Secretary for Security seeking permission to remain in Hong Kong.  The petition had been unsuccessful.  But when a removal order had been issued, she had appealed that order.  Again she had been unsuccessful.

192. In my view, the probabilities support the applicants’ testimony that each of them came to Hong Kong for the specific purpose of seeking right of abode.  This is supported by the fact that, in the company of their father, both applicants presented themselves at the Immigration Tower on 5 July 1997, the third working day after the change of sovereignty.

193. Mr Chong, who testified first, said that they arrived at the Immigration Tower at about eight o’clock in the morning to discover that there were already a large number of people waiting.  They were placed in a queue on the ground floor of the building.

194. Madam Chong said that, while waiting in the queue, she saw newspaper reporters interviewing others in the queue who informed the reporters that they were there to claim right of abode.  The evidence made it plain that a large number of overstayers converged on the Immigration Tower that day seeking to claim right of abode.  Mr Pang Kin Mo, a Senior Immigration Officer in GIS, in his affirmation dated 15 March 2003, spoke of special arrangements being put in hand at that time to deal with the expected flood of abode seekers.

195. Mr Chong testified that when he reached the head of the queue on the ground floor, he informed the officer on duty at the counter that they wished to obtain right of abode.  He and his sister, he said, were then handed the forms seeking their personal details and those of their families.  These were ID 457 forms.  Mr Chong said that he completed the form himself.  Madam Chong said that, as she was reasonably new to Hong Kong and did not speak Cantonese fluently, she asked her father to complete the form on her behalf.

196. After completion of the forms, the applicants and their father were escorted to the offices of GIS on the 13th floor.  Mr Chong said that he and his sister were asked for their completed ID 457 forms and their expired two‑way permits.  Mr Chong said that he was again asked to state the purpose of their visit and again said that he and his sister were seeking right of abode.  Mr Chong said that he was asked to produce his father’s identity card.  This was inspected by the immigration officer who copied particulars of the card onto a piece of paper.  Discovery of the relevant records, however, revealed no such note.

197. After waiting for some time, the applicants were given receipts for their surrendered two‑way permits together with what they have described as ‘letters of guarantee’; that is, letters which temporarily regularised their stay.

198. The applicants were called back to the Immigration Tower on 14 July 1997, again in the company of their father.  At the offices of GIS receipts for their two‑way permits and their ‘letters of guarantee’ were collected.

199. Mr Chong said that he was interviewed first.  The interviewing officer was Ms Pauline Cheng Po Lin.  Mr Chong testified that he told the interviewing officer that he wished to remain in Hong Kong to apply for right of abode.  The interviewing officer, however, told him that even children of a young age had to return to the Mainland so how could he, an adult, expect to stay.  Having had his claim rejected, Mr Chong said that he was then handed a ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form.  He was asked if he was literate and replied that he was.  According to Mr Chong, the interviewing officer then handed him a paper on which characters were written and told him to copy them onto the form.  He did so.  The Chinese characters written by Mr Chong were to the following effect :

“I, Zhuang Ming Li, and my son Zhuang … Huang came to Hong Kong through Lo Wu on 24 April 1997.  I knew that my son and I might stay till 16 May 1997, but overstayed because I liked Hong Kong.  I now want to go back to China.”

200. Mr Chong accepted that he was not threatened in any way by the interviewing officer nor was he warned of salutary consequences if he failed to follow her instructions.  He said that, although he did not wish to go back to China, at the time he simply did not realise the reason why he was required to write these characters, was not certain how best to object and, in the result, simply obeyed.

201. Madam Chong was next interviewed by Ms Pauline Cheng.  Madam Chong said that she informed the interviewing officer that her parents had right of abode in Hong Kong and she wished to remain in Hong Kong with them.  She was told that she must go back to China and make any claim for right of abode there.  Madam Chong said that a ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form was produced.  The interviewing officer asked her if she knew how to fill out the form.  She shook her head.  The interviewing officer, she said, gave the appearance of being angry and said words to the effect : “you are as stupid as your brother”.  Madam Chong said that the interviewing officer then wrote some characters onto a piece of paper and directed her to copy those characters.  She said that the interviewing officer was acting in a very brusk manner, insisting that she do it quickly.  Madam Chong said that she did not have an opportunity to read all the characters together and she simply copied them one after the other.  When she had done so she was told to sign and duly placed her signature on the document.  The characters which appear on Madam Chong’s ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form are to the following effect :

“I, Zhuang Ming Li, and my daughter Chen … Ying came to Hong Kong through Lo Wu on 1 May, 1997.  I knew that my daughter and I might stay till 16 May 1997, but overstayed because I liked Hong Kong.  I now want to go back to China.”

202. Madam Chong said that she thought of making a complaint that she had not been dealt with fairly.  But, as she put it, she came from a Mainland village, had little knowledge of Cantonese and was fearful of doing so.

203. Both Mr Chong and his sister signed ‘no loss, no complaint’ forms.

204. When questioned, Ms Pauline Cheng said that at about this time she had been interviewing between 15 to 20 people a day.  She accepted that in July 1997 the pressures had been particularly great.  Concerning mistakes, appearing on the applicants’ ‘grounds for non‑removal’ forms, she said that she had been in a hurry that day.

205. Ms Cheng testified that she had not directed the applicants what to write nor given them pre‑written characters from which to copy.  However, when the remarkable similarity of the applicants’ two statements was pointed out, she accepted that she had dictated the first sentence of each statement.  That the balances of each statement were identical she explained on the basis of co‑incidence.  I reject her testimony in that regard.  The two statements, while they give different names and different dates, are in all other respects almost identical to each other.  They give essentially the same information in the same order and in their conclusions express exactly the same desires.

206. But that being said, I am unable to find on the evidence that either applicant was forced to write the words they did or in any way prevented from adding to or supplementing the words with an assertion of a claim for right of abode.

207. I readily accept that the interviews would have been comparatively brisk and, assessing Ms Cheng’s character (on the basis only of her testimony) I also accept that her manner may have been brusk.  But both applicants appear to have acquiesced in agreeing to write what they were asked to write.  Both applicants are literate and must have appreciated the import of the words.  Yet both, one after the other, not only failed to query what they were asked to write but at the end of their interviews signed forms confirming they had no complaint.

208. I found both applicants to be essentially credible although Madam Wong, a somewhat nervy woman, was prone to exaggeration and I am satisfied did exaggerate the alleged oppressiveness of her interview.  On the probabilities I am satisfied that each of them did claim right of abode on their first visit to the Immigration Tower on 5 July 1997.  I am less certain, however, as to claims allegedly made on the second occasion.

209. The difficulty that the applicants faced, however, was the lack of a record of their claim or claims.

210. The ID 457 forms completed by them on their first visit were not endorsed in any way so that, on their face, they were evidence of a claim.  Yes, their father’s name appeared in a top corner but, on its own, I fail to see how that advances matters.

211. I considered the possibility that the manner in which the applicants were processed on 5 July 1997 may have been recorded in such a way as to point to the fact that they had claimed right of abode.  But nothing was shown to me on the face of available documents which would assist in that regard.

212. Quite clearly, the ‘grounds for non‑removal’ forms, on their face, cannot constitute a record of any sort of claim.

213. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)      each applicant did make a claim for right of abode;

(ii)      the Director has no record of any such claims.

(8)     Lau Suet Fa (1970 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

214. The applicant’s father came to Hong Kong in 1973.  Her mother came in 1987.  Since about 1980 the applicant had applied without success for the issue to her of a one‑way permit.

215. In or about December 1993, the applicant was permitted to visit Hong Kong.  She overstayed until she was arrested in September of the following year, prosecuted and repatriated.  Wishing to return to Hong Kong, the applicant obtained another two‑way permit.  But this one was not in her name, it was in the name of a friend, Lau Yin Yuk.  On 26 May 1995, by using that false travel document, the applicant entered Hong Kong.  She then remained in Hong Kong with her parents until the change of sovereignty.

216. The applicant said that, with the change of sovereignty, she hoped to be able to obtain permanent right of residence.  However, in the days following reunification she saw on the television that large numbers of people who had gone to the Immigration Tower to claim right of abode had been repatriated.  She therefore waited, she said, unaware of the legislation that had come into force in respect of people in her position, until 31 July 1997.  On that day she went to the Immigration Tower.  At the offices of GIS on the 13th floor, she informed the officer at reception that she had come to register for right of abode.  The officer told her that there was no system of registration in Hong Kong and that she must return to the Mainland in order to process her application.

217. By then, of course, on her own evidence, the applicant must have appreciated that there was no immediately accessible means of claiming right of abode in Hong Kong and that, as an overstayer, the great likelihood was that she would have to be repatriated.

218. The applicant was, of course, faced with an additional difficulty.  The name on her expired two‑way permit was a false name.  She said that she was interviewed by two immigration officers that day, not just one.  She said that she admitted that the name on her permit was false.  She was then warned, she said, that if that was the case she would find herself in trouble.  Fearful of what may happen, she said that she therefore confirmed that the false name of Lau Yin Yuk was her real name.

219. The applicant completed an ID 457 form.  In it, she gave her false name.  Although she had family — a husband and children — in the Mainland, she did not give their details.  The form did, however, give the correct names and details of her parents.

220. In addition, the applicant lodged a copy of her father’s identity card.  The evidence indicated that she may also have lodged a copy of her mother’s identity card but, if so, that document appears no longer to be part of the Director’s records.

221. A copy document proving that a parent was a permanent resident of Hong Kong was something additional and it may be asked why an overstayer at that time would have brought such a document to the Immigration Tower unless it was to back up a claim for right of abode.  But that supporting document on its own, in my judgment, is not sufficient to constitute a record for the purposes of the concession policy.  A document of that kind could be filed for a number of reasons, for example, to support a sympathetic explanation for overstaying.  The other difficulty which the applicant faced in advocating that the ID 457 form and the copy of the father’s identity card constitutes a record is that the form is completed in a false name.

222. It should also be mentioned that the applicant’s testimony as to asserting a right of abode was somewhat ambiguous.  Although given an opportunity to amplify her evidence, she went no further than saying that she told her interviewing officer that she wished to remain in Hong Kong with her parents.  I took that, however, in substance to be a claim, especially as she had lodged evidence that her parents were permanent residents.

223. In my judgment, the probabilities do support the applicant’s evidence that in substance an oral claim was made.  I accept the force of what was said on her behalf :

“      The fact that Ms. Lau had been so determined in the past and had run so many risks in her endeavours to stay in Hong Kong with her parents makes it unbelievable that she should suddenly give up all and wish to return to the mainland.  Her staunch resistence to the notion that she could have any chance of applying in the mainland was surely the result of bitter familiarity with the procedures for applying for one‑way permits.”

224. The applicant was interviewed by an Immigration Assistant, Ms Clara Cheung King Wai.  In respect of this interview, the applicant said that she was asked why she had overstayed and replied to the effect that she had been with her parents.  She said that she was then handed a ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form.  Although she looked at the form, she said, she did not comprehend what ‘removal’ meant.  She did not know what to write.  In the result, she said, the interviewing officer dictated to her what she should write.  The English translation is to the following effect :

“I have overstayed because of keeping company with my family.  I now wish to go back to China.”

225. The applicant — like so many others — made no claim that she had been actively prevented from writing what she wished to write or forced against her will to write what was dictated to her.  The applicant accepted that she was not sure what to write.  She made no claim of threatening behaviour on the part of Ms Cheung or coercion.  She said that she did not wish to go back to the Mainland, what she wanted to do was to remain in Hong Kong and be issued a Hong Kong identity card.  In attempting to explain why she had failed to state her wish in writing and had only written down what she had been told to write, the applicant (somewhat ambiguously) said that she had only been following ‘the course of nature’ or acting ‘according to nature’.

226. The interviewing officer, Ms Cheung, had no independent recollection of the interview.  However, she denied dictating to the applicant what was written on the ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form.  As she said : “she wrote it herself and not at my dictation.”  I reject that evidence.  The statement is according to a formula.  The evidence revealed that statements in exactly the same format appeared on something like 14 other ‘grounds for non‑removal’ forms.

227. But, as I have said in respect of other cases determined in this report, the fact that words were suggested does not of itself amount to oppressive conduct, certainly not in respect of administrative interviews of this kind.  It is quite clear, in my view, that the applicant in this case willingly acquiesced in writing the words suggested to her.  If she had wished to assert her claim for right of abode, I am satisfied that she would have been able to do so.  The fact is that she did not take advantage of the opportunity given.  Timidity or confusion or, as I have alluded to earlier, a realisation that she would in any event have to be returned to the Mainland dictated her actions.

228. The ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form cannot, on its face, constitute a record in terms of the concession; it does not in any way evidence a claim for right of abode.

229. Accordingly, I have determined this case as follows :

(i)      the applicant did make a claim for right of abode;

(ii)      the Director has no record of any such claim.

(9)     Lai Siu Fung (1663 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

230. On 30 July 1996, being in possession of a two‑way permit, the applicant came to Hong Kong.  She was permitted to remain until late September of that year but overstayed.  The applicant’s father had come to Hong Kong in 1980, her mother in 1986.  The applicant herself had attempted without success to obtain a one‑way permit.  The applicant overstayed, she said, because her father told her after the change of sovereignty she would be able to claim right of abode.

231. The applicant, however, did not present herself to the immigration authorities until almost a year after the change of sovereignty.  In that time she learnt that a large number of people in her position had attempted to claim right of abode but had been repatriated.  The applicant said that she was aware of the ‘time of birth’ limitation and the certificate of entitlement scheme introduced by statute in July 1997.  She was also aware of litigation concerning the right of abode issue.

232. The applicant said that she and her mother went to the Immigration Tower on 19 May 1998.  She said that she chose this date because a court ruling on the right of abode issue was either about to come out or had come out.  With the lapse of time, she was confused on this issue.  Nor was she able to say that the ruling, if already given, supported her claim.

233. Other applicants testified that at the offices of GIS they would first be asked to complete an ID 457 form by an officer at reception and thereafter would be interviewed.  It appeared to be this applicant’s testimony, however, that the two‑stage process was compacted into one interview.

234. The applicant said that initially she and her mother were in the interview room with the interviewing officer.  Both of them told the officer that they were there to claim right of abode for her.  However, according to the applicant, the interviewing officer told them that right of abode could not be claimed in Hong Kong and that to claim such right of abode she would first have to return to the Mainland.  According to the applicant, her mother became upset.  The mother was worried that the applicant, who is of very short stature would not be able to cope for herself back in the Mainland.  With emotions running high, said the applicant, the interviewing officer then directed the mother to leave the interview room and to wait outside.

235. The applicant, who has upper secondary education, said that she was then presented with a ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form. However, she was confused and unhappy and, although she was not prevented from reading the form, she took little notice of what was written on it.  According to her, the officer directed her to write on the form.  The characters that she wrote were to the following effect :

“I have overstayed because of keeping company with my family.  I now want to go back to China.”

236. In respect of these characters, the applicant said that she could not now remember whether the words were dictated to her or whether she was asked to copy them.  The Chinese characters are, as I have said elsewhere, almost a standard formula.  But the applicant accepted that she was not threatened by the interviewing officer.  All she could say was that she was fearful that, if she opposed the interviewing officer or confronted him in any way, she would get into trouble and would not be able to remain with her family.

237. The applicant was later prosecuted for breach of her two‑way permit.  She pleaded guilty.  She made no claim for right of abode at the magistracy.  She explained that she had been educated in the Mainland, that she was not an out‑going person and that she was again afraid of trouble.

238. In my judgment, even if the applicant was in large measure directed what to write on the ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form, there is no evidence of any oppressive conduct on the part of the interviewing officer, Mr Peter Hui Wing Chung.

239. The ID 457 form contains no endorsement or notation that, on its face, could be read as recording a claim for right of abode.  The ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form is not capable of constituting a record either.

240. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)      the applicant did make a claim for right of abode;

(ii)      however, the Director has no record of any such claim.

(10)   Tai Lin Fat (3174 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

241. The applicant came to Hong Kong on 6 April 1997.  His two‑way permit allowed him to remain until early May of that year.  However, he overstayed.  He did so, he said, because he was waiting for the anticipated amnesty which would be granted to persons in his position upon the change of sovereignty.  This is credible.  Both his parents had right of abode and attempts had been made over an extended period of time to obtain a one‑way permit so that he could join his parents.

242. The applicant said that he took a special interest in the fate of persons who presented themselves to the Immigration Department immediately after the change of sovereignty and was aware that they had been arrested and repatriated.  In light of this, the applicant said that he ‘hid himself away’ until 9 December 1997 when he summoned the courage to surrender himself to the immigration authorities.  The applicant said that he surrendered himself in order to claim right of abode.  Despite taking an interest in what was happening to persons in his position, he said that he had no knowledge of the certificate of entitlement scheme then in operation of the time of birth limitation or indeed of the commencement of right of abode litigation.  In the context of his testimony, that did not ring true.

243. In the papers prepared for his case, the applicant is recorded as recounting the following in respect of his visit to the Immigration Tower on 9 December 1997 :

“The family decided he should surrender and claim RoA [right of abode] so on 9/12/97 Mr Tai and both his parents attended ID Wanchai, 13th floor.  There they explained they were surrendering for right of abode.  The officer looked at their documents and told them that only those born after their parents had become a PR have right of abode.”

244. However, when testifying, the applicant said that he approached the officer at the reception desk and said that it was his intention to remain in Hong Kong in order to be with and care for his parents.  He said that he was then handed on ID 457 form for completion.  He denied that the officer at reception had told him that only those persons born after at least one parent had become a permanent residence were able to claim right of abode.

245. Indeed, generally the applicant was vague and uncertain as to what transpired on the day of his surrender.

246. The ID 457 form was, it seems, completed by the applicant’s father.  It contains no endorsement to the effect that a claim for right of abode was being sought.  The form is more notable for its omissions.  It does not record that the applicant was a married man with children in the Mainland.  It does not record that the applicant had two brothers in Hong Kong in addition to the two sisters whose details were given.

247. As to his interview, the applicant recalled virtually nothing except for the single assertion made by him that he was told to copy the characters that appear on his ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form.  The characters are to the following effect :

“      Overstayed because I was with family.  Now I want to return to China”

The applicant made no assertion to the effect that he wished to write something else but was threatened to write only what he was directed.  When asked in cross‑examination why he did not complain about being directed what to write and filled out the ‘no loss, no complaint’ to the effect that he had no complaint, the applicant said that he did not know that he could complain.  Yet, as counsel for the Director pointed out, he was literate and able to understand the documents placed in front of him.

248. The GIS officer who interviewed the applicant was Ms Lindy Yu Man Yan.  She gave evidence in respect of two other applicants (1663 and 3910) who had written the exact same characters on their ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form.  Despite this, Ms Yu persisted in her assertion that she in no way prompted the applicant.  I reject her evidence in that regard.  Manifestly, in my view, some form of assistance was given.

249. But directing a person what to write by way of assistance when that person consents is not the exercise of unlawful pressure.  Indeed, as I have said, in an everyday administrative process interviewees may seek that help.  In my judgment, the balance of probabilities in respect of the applicant indicates that he knew he would have to be repatriated and complied with the process.  I do not accept that he surrendered himself for the specific purpose of claiming right of abode.  While I cannot discount the possibility (I put it no higher) of some query being made as to whether he could remain in Hong Kong with his parents, I am satisfied that no claim for right of abode was made.

250. In my judgment, looked at objectively, neither the ID 457 form nor the ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form, considered alone or together, can possibly be said to constitute a record of any claim.

251. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)      the applicant did not make a claim for right of abode;

(ii)      the Director has no record of any claim.

(11)   Sze Li Chun (3089 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

252. The applicant came to Hong Kong on 6 September 1996, her two‑way permit authorising her to remain until 29 November of that year.  At that time both the applicant’s parents were permanent residents.  In addition, the applicant’s husband was a permanent resident.

253. When the applicant came to Hong Kong, she was pregnant.  She therefore overstayed, hoping to give birth to the child in Hong Kong.  She had given birth to her first child in Hong Kong.

254. On 8 May 1997, in the company of her husband, the applicant surrendered herself to the immigration authorities.  At the offices of GIS she was given an ID 457 form which, she said, was completed by her husband.  The form records details of her family but otherwise contains no endorsement specifically related to a claim for right of abode.

255. When the applicant was interviewed, she was given a ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form on which she wrote characters to the following effect :

“      I overstay because I am pregnant for eight months.  I want to give birth to my child in Hong Kong before returning to China.”

256. According to the applicant, before she wrote on the form she was asked what she wished to do after birth.  She said that she wished to remain in Hong Kong to care for her baby.  The interviewing officer, however, told her that she must return to the Mainland and gave her a piece of paper, saying that she should copy the characters written on that paper.  The applicant said that she complied.  When asked why she had not written what she wanted to write, the applicant smiled and said simply that it was not possible to say no.  The applicant, however, did not speak of any threat or overt oppressive conduct.  She accepted that she signed two forms : the ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form and the ‘no loss, no complaint’ form.  In respect of the second document, she said that it was not her who circled the character to indicate she had no complaint.  But, in my judgment, that takes the matter no further.

257. While I am satisfied that the interviewing officer, Mr Fabian Wong Chi Koon (a man not a woman as the applicant recalled), did give assistance to the applicant in completing her ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form, which may have included directing her as to the characters to write, I do not accept that it constituted oppressive conduct.  The applicant herself accepted that there were no overt threats or anything of that kind.  I am satisfied that, if directions were given, they were given with the applicant’s consent.

258. The applicant gave birth on 3 July 1997 shortly after the change of sovereignty.  She said that she knew of the events that took place at the Immigration Tower in the days following reunification and said that, if she had not just given birth, she would have gone forward to claim right of abode too.

259. On 24 July 1997, the applicant said that she went to the Joint Recognisance Office of the Immigration Department to have her recognisance extended.  On that occasion, she said she informed the officer dealing with her that she wished to remain in Hong Kong to claim right of abode.  The officer replied that there was no mechanism available to her for making such an application in Hong Kong and that she must return to the Mainland to process any such application.

260. The applicant said that she was then asked to place her signature on a form.  The form signed by her is to the following effect :

“      Ms. Sze Lee Chun, I am Senior Immigration Assistant Kong Yiu Ming, currently attached to the Joint Recognizance Office or Removal Sub‑division.  I now notify you to go to the Prosecution Section, Room 1306, 13/F, Immigration Tower, 7 Gloucester Road, Wan Chai at 9:00 a.m. on 4 August 1997 for the necessary formalities and you have to bring along 5000 Hong Kong dollars as bail money.  You must also arrive at Lo Wu Control Point of the Immigration Department with your luggage by train between 1:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m. on 7 August 1997, report to the Immigration Officer on duty and present the receipt for payment of fine, so that arrangements can be made for your repatriation to China on the same day.”

It is this document, taken together with other documents on file, that is put forward as a record of the applicant’s claim.

261. The applicant impressed me as a quiet, gentle, essentially honest witness.  On the probabilities I am satisfied that when she went to Joint Recognisance Office after reunification she did assert the belief that she had right of abode.  The difficulty, however, is that there is simply no record of that assertion.  Even read together with the other documents on file, I fail to see how a standard form advising the applicant of her intended prosecution and repatriation — unendorsed in any way by the applicant — can be said, on its face, to constitute a record of a claim.  It is nothing of the kind.

262. My determinations are therefore :

(i)      the applicant did make a claim for right of abode on 24 July 1997, but

(ii)      the Director has no record of that (or any) claim.

(12)   Sze Sau Kan (3122 : a ‘group one’ applicant)

263. The applicant came to Hong Kong with her husband and two children on 11 March 1997.  Their two‑way permits authorised them to remain in Hong Kong as visitors until 8 April of that year.  The applicant, her husband and children overstayed.

264. The applicant said they overstayed in anticipation of obtaining right of abode upon the change of sovereignty.  Both of the applicant’s parents enjoyed the status of permanent residents.  Although there was some doubt as to the date, the applicant said that she and her family surrendered themselves to the immigration authorities on 14 July 1997.  Certain independent evidence, however, suggests that it was on 4 July 1997.

265. The applicant said that she told the officer with whom she dealt that day that she was there to claim right of abode.

266. The applicant, however, was not interviewed on the day she surrendered.  She was instead sent away, her remaining in Hong Kong being regularised in terms of a recognisance document.  In early July, of course, a very large number of persons were presenting themselves to the immigration authorities and many interviews were postponed.

267. The applicant returned to the Immigration Tower on 24 July 1997 and was told to go to 14th floor.  Persons who had entered Hong Kong as members of tour groups and who overstayed were dealt with on this floor.

268. The applicant said that she was with her husband and two children.  She said that she and her husband were handed forms — ID 457 forms — onto which personal particulars were to be written.  Her husband, she said, completed her form.

269. The applicant said that she and her husband were then interviewed.  She said that she told the interviewing officer that both she and her husband were there to claim right of abode.  In reply, however, according to the applicant, the officer said that the ability to claim right of abode in Hong Kong “was no longer there”.  She was therefore told, she said, to write something different on the ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form which both she and her husband had been given.

270. The applicant said that, in light of this turn of events, she and her husband were at a loss what to write.  The officer therefore sought a number of details from her husband, wrote them down and suggested that her husband copy what had been written.  According to the applicant, the husband protested that he did not want to return, that his father was in poor health and needed his care.  In reply, said the applicant, the officer said that this was just part of his “routine procedures” and that if their case could not be processed that day they would have to be detained overnight.

271. In the result, said the applicant, her husband copied what had been written by the officer and she, in turn, copied what her husband had written.

272. When her turn came to write, said the applicant, she again said that she wished to apply for right of abode and was told that it was not possible.  She was advised, she said, to write that she had been in Hong Kong to look after her father‑in‑law.  The applicant’s statement is to the following effect :

“I, Shi Xiu Jin, came to Hong Kong by a two‑way exit permit through China HK Ferries on 11 March 1997 together with my husband Wu … Xu, my son Wu … Long and my daughter Wu … Xuan.  We may stay in Hong Kong till 7 Apr. 1997.  We have overstayed in Hong Kong because of keeping company with my father‑in‑law.  I now wish to go back to the Mainland as soon as possible.  All my family members are in good health.”

273. The applicant’s statement is effectively a mirror of her husband’s statement.  Ms Ma Suk Kwan, the interviewing officer had no independent recollection of the interview.  That is understandable.  She was interviewing a large number of people each day.  She said that it was not her practice to tell people what to write.

274. In my judgment, however, while it is understandable that the applicant may simply have copied her husband’s statement, it is apparent to me that the husband must have been guided in what to write.  Why else would a sentence be included concerning family health?  The statement of the husband (and through him, the wife) has the clear markings of an orderly composed document, one that meets the requirements of the Immigration Department.

275. But having said that, and while Ms Ma did not impress me as a witness, I am unable to find that either the husband or the applicant (or the two together) were the victims of oppressive conduct.  There may have been some confusion and/or hesitation on their part, the officer may well have offered to assist them.  But I am satisfied that, if the applicant had wished to record the fact that she was claiming (or had hoped to claim) right of abode, she would not have been prevented from doing so.  I reject the suggestion that any threats were made concerning detention.

276. That being the case, while I believe the probabilities support the applicant’s testimony that she did make some form of claim for right of abode, I am not satisfied that there is any record evidencing such claim.  The recognisance form given to her on 4 or 14 July 1997 cannot, on its face, evidence such claim, even by inference in the light of procedures adopted at that time.  Nor can it be said that the applicant’s statement on the ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form constitutes a record; there is nothing on the face of that document, even read in context, that begins to suggest anything in the nature of a claim.

277. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)      the applicant did make a claim for right of abode, but

(ii)      the Director has no record of that claim.

(13)   Leung Kang Kwong (2113 : a ‘group two’ applicant)

278. The applicant came to Hong Kong on 6 January 1998 to visit his mother.  He did not overstay.  Instead, shortly before the expiry of his two‑way permit, he went with his mother to the Chinese Visitors Office (‘the CVO’) in Yau Ma Tei.  The visit was made on 31 January 1998.

279. The applicant testified that the purpose of his visit to the CVO was to seek right of abode; that is, the right to remain permanently in Hong Kong with his mother.

280. At the outset, I should say that the applicant struck me as an essentially credible witness.  He did not manifestly exaggerate or distort his testimony for tactical purposes.  His testimony had the ring of honest recollection.  By way of example, the applicant accepted that there were posters on the walls of the CVO saying that those who wished to seek right of abode in Hong Kong must return to the Mainland in order to process their application.

281. The applicant testified that when he arrived at the CVO, he approached a counter and told the immigration officer at that counter that he wished to remain in Hong Kong on a permanent basis in order to look after his mother.  He said that he showed the officer various papers including a medical certificate attesting to his mother’s frail health.  In reply, he said, the officer informed him that there was no mechanism for processing his claim for right of abode and that he would have to return to the Mainland in order to process his claim.  As to his mother’s state of health, the officer said that his mother’s case did not appear to be a special case, that her condition appeared to be stable and in the circumstances an extension of only two days could be granted.

282. In light of this, said the applicant, he agreed to make an application for an extension of stay and was given a form ID 91 to complete.

283. The form ID 91 is specific as to its purpose.  It bears the heading ‘Application for an Extension of Stay’ and in about the middle of the document contains the words : ‘I now apply to extend my stay until …”.  The applicant completed that portion of the form by inserting a date which amounted to a two day extension.  Directly below that portion, the following words are printed : “Give full reason for your request and submit any documentary evidence that you have in support of your application”.  The applicant completed that portion by writing : “Mother physically not well.  Stay some more time, to take care of her”.  In my judgment, nothing written on the form ID 91 can be read as constituting a claim for right of abode.  What is written is, in the context of the form, nothing more than a request to remain in Hong Kong a few more days.

284. After completion of the form ID 91, the applicant said that he was then interviewed at another counter by another officer.  In this interview, he said, he again said that he wished to remain in Hong Kong on a permanent basis to care for his mother.  The record of interview, however, only bears the short note : “to take care of mother”.  Again, in my judgment, that record, read alone or in conjunction with the form ID 91, cannot be taken as evidence of a claim for right of abode.

285. The officer who interviewed the applicant was Mr Lok Hing Tung.  Mr Lok said that he was approached from time to time by persons seeking right of abode.  His practice, he said, had been to refer such persons to Immigration Headquarters.  He said that during the concession period no journal or register of persons who asked about right of abode claims was maintained.

286. Mr Lok had no independent recollection of the interview with the applicant and (understandably) had to refer to his standard practice at the time.

287. On all the evidence, I am satisfied that the applicant did make a claim for right of abode at the CVO on 31 January 1998.  The difficulty, however, is that, in my opinion, as earlier stated, I am unable to find that there is any record which on its face constitutes evidence that such a claim was made.

288. By way of postscript, it should be said that, having left Hong Kong in February 1998 in accordance with his extended two‑way permit, the applicant returned in January 1999.  In an affirmation dated 18 October 2002, the applicant said the following in respect of his return :

“      I alighted from the train at the terminal in Hung Hom.  When I tried to enter, I was taken to one side and into an interview room, where there were two immigration officers.  My name was written down.  They checked my luggage, and asked the purpose of my visit.  I replied that I wanted to take care of my mother, and I further asserted my right of abode and asked about the means by which I could pursue my claim.  There was no reply to this.”

However, when he testified, the applicant made no mention of asserting a right of abode at Hung Hom station.  Indeed, during cross‑examination he was asked if he had said anything other than the fact that he had come to visit his mother and he confirmed that he had not.

289. Counsel representing the applicant did not submit that the Hung Hom interview should be accepted as a claim that fell into the concession policy.

290. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)      the applicant did make a claim for right of abode but

(ii)      the Director has no record of any such claim.

(14)   Hui Yuk Heung (1380 : a ‘group one’ and ‘group four’ applicant)

291. Both the applicant’s parents are Hong Kong permanent residents.  Her brother was born in Hong Kong.  In or about 1988, an attempt was made to obtain a one‑way permit for the applicant but it was not successful.  At all material times therefore the applicant had compelling reason to seek right of abode.

292. The applicant came to Hong Kong in 1994, her two‑way permit authorising her to remain as a visitor for a limited period.  She overstayed.  Indeed, she remained in Hong Kong until her repatriation in late 1998 after her arrest by police officers on or about 25 September of that year.

293. The applicant said that, with the approach of the change of sovereignty, she and her family anticipated that she would be granted right of abode.  However, after reunification she learnt that large numbers of persons in her position who surrendered themselves were arrested and repatriated.  The anticipated amnesty did not materialise.  The applicant said that in the circumstances she dared not surrender herself.  She did not seek in any way to claim right of abode but it was to be inferred from her evidence that she believed, if she waited long enough, matters would be resolved in favour of persons like herself.

294. On or about 25 September 1998, while out with her mother and brother, the applicant was stopped by police and asked for her identity card.  She said that at the scene her mother told the police that her daughter was entitled to right of abode through herself and her husband as they were both permanent residents.  She said that, when the home was visited, her father made the same protestation.

295. The officers who stopped the applicant had no independent recollection of the event.  They had to rely on notebook entries.  Those entries say nothing of any such assertions.  Police notebooks are, of course, not intended as exhaustive records.  The arresting officer said that such assertions would have been most unusual and, if made, he believed he would have made some record of them in his notebook.

296. But, in my judgment, it is not possible to dismiss the applicant’s evidence in respect of these claims.  They may have been made in desperation, in fear of losing a member of the family, but that does not mean they could not and were not made.  Nor can it be said that an absence of a police notebook entry must be conclusive.  In looking to the evidence, as a whole, especially the applicant’s later recorded assertions, I believe the probabilities support her testimony that such claims were made.

297. After a night in police detention, the applicant was transferred to the Victoria Immigration Centre.  She said that her parents came to the centre to try and obtain a recognisance for her but were unable to do so.

298. The applicant said that she was interviewed twice that day.  On the first occasion, she was asked to complete a form having the same purpose as an ID 457 form, on the second occasion she completed a ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form.

299. In the first interview, said the applicant, she told the officer that both her parents had right of abode and through them she too had right of abode.  She also said that during a telephone conversation between the officer and her father, her father had made the same assertion.

300. The applicant said that the officer who interviewed her endorsed the personal particulars form with the dates when her parents had first been registered in Hong Kong as having permanent residence.  Such an endorsement does appear.  However, the officer concerned, Mr Fung Kam Chun, said that he did not interview the applicant at all and that he made the endorsements after the applicant’s file had been passed to him.

301. Ms Laura Louie Ka Yuk, who did interview the applicant that day, said that she was the one who gave the personal particulars form to the applicant to complete, identifying certain of her handwriting on the form.  Mr Fok, for the Director, in his submissions, commented that “the contention that the personal particulars form was completed in the presence of Mr Fung, the Senior Immigration Officer in the unit, and before Ms Hui was interviewed by Ms Louie, simply makes no sense.  The consistent evidence has been that the more junior officers collect the basic data and the more senior officers consider and make recommendations based on that data.  That the opposite should have happened here is not credible.”  In my judgment, there is strength in that submission.  On the probabilities, I am satisfied that there was no interview with Mr Fung as alleged by the applicant.  In this regard, the applicant’s memory failed her.

302. The applicant’s ‘second’ interview was with Ms Louie.  On that occasion, said the applicant, she was given a ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form.  She wrote on that form in Chinese characters to the following effect :

“My name is Hui Yuk Heung.  I am from Guangdong Province and speak Chiu Chow dialect.  I hold no government position in the Mainland of China and am not a cadre … I came to Hong Kong only for tour/visiting relatives.  My parents are permanent Hong Kong residents, but I do not have documentary evidence to support that.  I have been overstaying in Hong Kong without extension of stay or taking up any employment.  I now wish to go back to the Mainland of China as soon as possible.”

303. The applicant testified that when she was given the ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form, she was also given a second piece of paper.  On this second paper, she said, were words that she was asked to copy.  The applicant said that the purpose of the form was not explained to her.  She started to copy, she said, and then continued in her own characters to write down that her own parents were both Hong Kong permanent residents.  At that juncture, she said, she was asked if she possessed proof of that claim and, when she replied that she did not, was instructed to write that down.  It was the essential thrust of the applicant’s testimony that she had already orally asserted that she had right of abode through her parents and that, if she had not been interrupted, would have specifically asserted that in writing too.  I reject that evidence.  In my judgment, in her anxiety to prove her case, that was an invention by the applicant.

304. But that being said, the recorded assertion by the applicant that both her parents were Hong Kong residents cannot be set to one side as simply a statement made in mitigation, not when read with the other documentary records.

305. In determining how best to deal with the applicant, the records of the Director reveal that certain minutes were written, considered and advised upon.  In particular, one minute, M3, states the following :

“      She [the applicant] had knowingly overstayed in HKSAR since    15‑3‑95    without applying for extension of stay.  She also claimed that she had not taken up employment while staying in HKSAR.  She claimed that her parents were HK residents but could not exhibit documentary proof for the said claim.”

On that minute there appears the following handwritten note :

“Pl. consider O/S charge.  ROP record confirmed that both of her parents were not PR at the time of her birth.  Besides, she could not produce any P of R.”

306. These minutes reveal that an investigation was made into the right of abode status of the applicant’s parents.  That, it would seem, would have been done because of the applicant’s assertion recorded in her ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form.  In my judgment, on the face of the records, it can therefore be said that there is evidence of a claim made by the applicant for right of abode.  I accept, of course, that the applicant did not in direct terms claim that right for herself.  But, as I have said, no set litany of words was required.  Why would a young woman write those words if it was not in substance to seek a right to be with her parents even if it was also an excuse as to why she had been with them for so long?  In my opinion, therefore, when looked at in context, her assertion should be inferred to be a claim in terms of the concession policy.

307. On 30 September 1998, the applicant was prosecuted for breaching a condition of her stay.  She pleaded guilty.  In mitigation, the following exchange is recorded on the transcript :

“COURT:        Yes, I’ve been told you have a clear record.  You’ve overstayed for three years and six months.  Have you anything to say in relation to the matter before I sentence you?

DEFENDANT:        Because my mother is illiterate, I have to teach my younger brother.  I have been applied for the one‑way permit for more than ten years, not yet approved.

COURT:         Anything else?

DEFENDANT :       Nothing else.”

[my emphasis]

308. In my opinion, the words of the applicant that I have placed in italics fall short of constituting a claim.  They simply record the fact that an application for a one‑way permit had been made in the Mainland, so far without success.  The basis for the Mainland claim is not stated nor, importantly, why so far it had not met with success.  There is nothing in that statement to suggest that she wished to remain in Hong Kong because she believed she had a right to do so.  In addition, as I understand it, there was no record of this assertion resting with the Director.

309. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)      the applicant did make a claim for right of abode to the Director but not to the magistrate;

(ii)      the Director does have a record of the claim.

(15)   Chan Ching Hoi (80 : a ‘group one’ and ‘group four’ applicant)

310. The applicant came to Hong Kong on 26 March 1997, being permitted to remain until 22 April.  Both the applicant’s parents and his sister lived in Hong Kong, having right of abode here.  The applicant was the only member of the family living in the Mainland.  The applicant overstayed, he said, because he had been told by a relative in the Mainland that, upon the change of sovereignty, he would be able to obtain right of abode in Hong Kong.

311. The applicant testified that, although he himself did not go to the Immigration Tower in July 1997, he was very interested in developments and knew that a number of abode seekers had been repatriated.  He said that he also knew of the certificate of entitlement scheme.  But his evidence was to the effect that he believed that a certificate could not be obtained on the Mainland.  Such a certificate would have to be obtained in Hong Kong.  Accordingly, on 18 September 1997, together with his mother and sister, he went to the Immigration Tower.  His purpose was to seek right of abode.  Although he knew that earlier applicants had been repatriated, he said that he thought things might be different for him.

312. The applicant said that on the ground floor of the Immigration Tower he informed an officer that he was there to seek right of abode.  The officer looked at his two‑way permit and referred him to 13th floor to the offices of GIS.  At those offices, he told the officer at reception that he wished to seek right of abode.  In reply, he was told that there was no such policy.

313. The applicant said that he was given an ID 457 form to complete.  He did so, giving the full details of his parents but only the ID card number of his mother as his father had not accompanied him that day.  The applicant, however, did not endorse the form in any way to indicate that he was seeking right of abode.  Accordingly, the completed ID 457 form does not and cannot — on its face — constitute a record in terms of the possession policy.

314. The applicant was interviewed by an Immigration Assistant, Mr Leung Ka Cheong.  The applicant testified that he told Mr Leung that he wished to obtain right of abode; that is, the right to remain in Hong Kong with his family.  Mr Leung replied that he did not have any right to remain in Hong Kong.

315. According to the applicant, Mr Leung gave him a ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form and, when he hesitated, not knowing how best to complete the form, also handed him a piece of paper on which Chinese characters were written.  These characters gave him the option to write either that he had overstayed in order to be with his family or that he had overstayed because he liked Hong Kong.  He was told by the interviewing officer that he could choose either.  He therefore wrote down characters which have the following translation :

“I have overstayed because of keeping company with my family.  I now want to return to China.”

316. The applicant accepted that, when presented with the paper containing the suggested answers, he raised no objection.  He said he was afraid that if he did object he might be prosecuted for ‘something more serious’.  But no suggestion was made that he was actively prevented from writing what he wished nor that he was threatened in any way.  On his own evidence, it was his own subjective fear which prompted his compliance rather than anything said or done by the interviewing officer.

317. On the balance of probabilities, I am satisfied that the applicant did go to the offices of GIS hoping that he may be able (in some way) to claim right of abode.  That being the case, the probabilities support his testimony that he did make an oral claim that day.  But there is no record of that claim.  In my judgment, neither the ID 457 form nor the ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form are capable of constituting the required record.

318. Was the applicant given a sheet of paper on which suggested answers were inscribed?  Yes, I believe he may well have been.  Mr Leung, the interviewing officer, said that he never dictated answers nor did he possess material on which suggested answers were inscribed.  In that regard, I reject his evidence.  I have already referred to the evidence of Mr Leung in the body of this judgment when considering the almost universal denial by officers of the GIS to using pre‑written answers despite compelling evidence to the contrary.  There is no need for me to repeat what I have said.  It suffices to say that in the present case the applicant’s answer was in exactly the same format as at least three other answers given by other interviewees to different officers on different dates.  That being so, the only reasonable inference to be drawn is that all those answers, including the applicant’s, must have come from a common source.  But how does that advance matters in favour of the applicant?  I do not see that it does.

319. In his testimony, the applicant made no suggestion that he was made the subject of oppressive conduct.  It was his own timidity in the face of authority that led him to select a pre‑written answer and write it down.  If he had wished to add to that answer, there is nothing to suggest that he would have been prevented from doing so.  It was for the applicant to assert his claim, whether orally or in writing.  He failed to do so.

320. The applicant was prosecuted for contravening a condition of his stay in Hong Kong; namely, overstaying, and appeared in the Magistracy on 25 September 1997.  He pleaded guilty to the charge.  After his conviction, the transcript reveals the following exchange between the applicant and the court :

“      It’s reasonable to be united with my parents.  In that way I break the law.  I don’t think it’s acceptable.

COURT:     You can be reunited with your parents and not break the laws.  You can come and then you can go back during the period of your stay.  There’s nothing unreasonable about that.”

The prosecutor, a member of the Immigration Department made the following cryptic note on his file : “Parents for union break the laws”.

321. The applicant recalled, however, that he spoke more expansively, saying words to the following effect :

“I wished to be united with my family in Hong Kong. I felt that it was reasonable for me to stay with my family in Hong Kong.  The fact that I had applied in China without success over 20 years was a fact not acceptable to me.”

322. That, of course, is not what was translated by the court interpreter to the magistrate, Mr T.S. Jenkins.  Nor is it, reflected in the prosecutor’s note.  In my judgment, I should therefore look to the official transcript not to the applicant’s own evidence as to what — so long after the event — he recalled saying.

323. It was submitted on behalf of the applicant that the words spoken to the magistrate, fairly read, amounted to a claim for right of abode.  I cannot agree.  The applicant said no more than that his natural desire to be with his parents resulted in him breaking the law.  Nothing appears in that brief statement to the effect that the applicant’s parents themselves had right of abode in Hong Kong and that he had come to Hong Kong in order — through them — to secure his claim to right of abode.

324. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)      the applicant did make a claim for right of abode at the Immigration Department;

(ii)      the Director has no record of any such claim;

(iii)     the applicant did not make a claim for right of abode at the magistracy.

(16)   Kwok Siu Ping (1623 : a ‘group one’ and ‘group four’ applicant)

325. The applicant had been attempting to obtain the right to live in Hong Kong since about 1988.  At that time both her parents lived here.  In 1996, however, her father died.

326. The applicant came to Hong Kong on the strength of a two‑way permit on 9 April 1996, being permitted to remain for about a month.  The probabilities support the applicant’s contention that she overstayed in the hope that, upon the change of sovereignty, she would be able at last to obtain the right to live in Hong Kong so that she could care for her ageing mother.

327. On or about 9 July 1997, the applicant went to the 2nd floor of the Immigration Tower to ask if an amnesty was now in place to enable people to seek right of abode.  She was told that there was no amnesty.  She then left the building.

328. The applicant did not return to the Immigration Tower until 2 January 1998, some five months later.  She said that the purpose of her visit on this second occasion was to try to find some means by which she could remain permanently in Hong Kong.  She was referred to the offices of GIS on 13th floor and obtained an ID 457 form from the officer at reception.  She said that she could not remember what conversation took place between her and the officer.  To the best of her memory, however, she was not told why she had to fill out the form.

329. The applicant said that, in so far as she was able, she filled out the ID 457 form.  She did not recall the number of her mother’s identity card but was apparently told by the officer at reception that it was not essential to include this information.  The applicant did not endorse the ID 457 form in any way to indicate that she was seeking right of abode.  That being the case, the form does not and cannot — on its face — constitute any record of a claim for right of abode.

330. The applicant was interviewed by Immigration Assistant, Ms Lindy Yu Man Yan.  The applicant said that she was shown a ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form and asked if she knew how to fill it out.  She said that she did not know how.  In the result, said the applicant, Ms Yu dictated certain words to her and she wrote these on the form.  The words recorded are to the following effect :

“I overstayed because I was with family, now I want to return to China.”

331. Evidence revealed that this same form of words appeared in many other ‘grounds for non‑removal’ forms.  Ms Yu, the interviewing officer, who said that she had no independent recollection of the interview, was asked about the standard wording.  She was one of the few interviewing officers who did not reject outright the suggestion that she had assisted with answers.  Her reply was that, after such a lapse of time, she could not remember.

332. The applicant testified that, when she was asked to write her words on the ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form, she did not fully comprehend what she was writing.  She said that she was very nervous.  She said, however, that she had no wish to return to the Mainland; she wished to remain in Hong Kong to care for her mother.

333. The applicant, a sympathetic witness, was clearly overwhelmed by the ordeal of having to testify.  At one stage she appeared to be in tears.  I can well accept her evidence that, in January 1998 when she visited the Immigration Tower, she was also in a state of distress.

334. Although in her affirmation prepared for the proceedings the applicant stated that she had claimed right of abode, she did not testify to this effect.  When asked by myself whether she had said anything to Ms Yu, the interviewing officer, she answered that she could not remember.

335. Of greater importance perhaps, the applicant made no allegation in her testimony that she was in any way threatened by Ms Yu or prevented from writing what she wished on the ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form.  It appears that she either accepted the inevitability (as an overstayer) of being returned to the Mainland or that, in her state of distress, she acted in an entirely passive manner, keeping her wish to remain to herself.

336. On the probabilities, looking to the evidence as a whole, I am unable to find that the applicant made any claim for right of abode on 2 January 1998.

337. Nor can I find any record of a claim.  On its face, quite clearly, the ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form, either read alone or in conjunction with the ID 457 form, does not constitute a record for the purposes of the concession policy.

338. As a long‑term overstayer, the applicant was prosecuted in the magistracy.  The hearing took place on 7 January 1998.  She pleaded guilty.  The transcript of the proceedings records the following exchange between her and the court :

“COURT:      Anything to say before penalty is imposed?

DEFENDANT:       I have to take care of my sick mother here.”

The applicant was fined $3,000 but was unable to pay this amount.  She returned to court on 9 January 1998.  The transcript of proceedings on this date records her saying the following :

“      I have to take care of my sick mother in Hong Kong.  My father has just died owing to cirrhosis.  I don’t have money, please be lenient.”

339. In my judgment, neither of those statements (assuming a record of them was kept by the Director) are capable of constituting a claim for right of abode.  All that is said is that the applicant has to take care of her sick mother.  That does not go far enough to constitute any sort of claim for right of abode.

340. In conclusion, therefore, I have determined :

(i)      that the applicant did not make a claim for right of abode at the Immigration Department;

(ii)              the Director has no record of any claim;

(iii)            the applicant did not make a claim for right of abode in the magistracy.

(17)   Ng Li Tung (2646 : a ‘group one’ and ‘group four’ applicant)

341. The applicant’s parents came to Hong Kong in 1986.  The applicant himself came to Hong Kong on 30 March 1994, being permitted to remain in terms of his two‑way permit until 21 July of that year.  He overstayed.

342. On 13 September 1997, the applicant attempted to return to the Mainland via Lo Wu.  The applicant gave evidence as to why he made the attempt.  He said that he knew that many people seeking right of abode in Hong Kong had been arrested and repatriated.  He also knew of the right of abode litigation, he said, but believed that it would take two years or more to be resolved.  He therefore resolved to return to the Mainland in order to obtain a one‑way permit there.

343. As an overstayer, the applicant was stopped at Lo Wu by the immigration authorities and interviewed.  The interviewing officer was Mr Ngai Sik Shui.  The applicant testified that he told the officer that he was returning to the Mainland in order to obtain a one‑way permit so that he could return to Hong Kong as a permanent basis to look after his parents.  Assuming that such a statement in substance constituted a claim for right of abode, there is nothing other than the applicant’s testimony as to that statement.  The interviewing officer made no record of such a statement.  A form called a ‘secondary examination sheet’ says only that the applicant had overstayed in order to care for his elderly and sick parents.  The applicant himself wrote a statement which in English, is to the following effect :

“Flat 813, Shui Fung House, Tin Shui Estate, Yuen Long, Hong Kong [Tel:]        26173031        Father: Ng …        73 years old.        Mother: Yeung … Sun    65 years old

My father and mother are both troubled by illness and old age.  My father has got cataracts and is deaf due to old age.  My mother suffered from hyperplasia in her lumber region, etc.  Please forgive me.  I have no brother nor sister in Hong Kong.  Wu Li Dong (signature) 13 Sep. 97

I have been looking after my father and mother in Hong Kong.  That is why I have overstayed.  Please do forgive me.”

Nothing appears in that statement either, even though written by the applicant himself, to support his assertion that he told the interviewing officer of his reason for returning to the Mainland.  On the probabilities, therefore, I am unable to accept that the applicant made any statement to the effect that he was returning to the Mainland to seek a one‑way permit.

344. After his interview, the applicant was not allowed to cross the border but was referred to GIS for further investigation.  The applicant attended the offices of GIS on 18 September 2003.  The applicant said that at the reception he was given an ID 457 form to complete.  He gave particulars in that form of both his parents but did not have the information with him to enable him to enter the numbers of their identity cards to prove their status as permanent residents.  That document is entirely neutral.  On its face, it evidences no claim.

345. In respect of his interview, the applicant said that he was given a ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form but could not remember why.  He said that he told the interviewing officer that he wished to remain in Hong Kong to look after his parents.  It was a statement to this effect that he wished to write on the form, he said.  However, according to his testimony, the interviewing officer gave him a ‘sample’ card from which to copy and he did as instructed.  The characters that he wrote are to the following effect (and are in familiar form) :

“Overstayed because I was with family.  Now want to return to China.”

The applicant accepted that he raised no objection to writing these words.  He explained this by saying : “when staff told us to do anything, we would do it.”  In short, he complied without question, copying only the characters from what he called the ‘sample’ and writing nothing else.  There is no evidence of oppressive conduct, threats or coercion.  If he had wished to assert a claim for right of abode, I am satisfied the applicant would have been able to do so.

346. The applicant was prosecuted for overstaying.  He pleaded guilty.  Having been convicted, the following exchange is recorded between himself and the magistrate :

“COURT:     Anything to say?

DEFENDANT:       My parents have heart problems.  My mother is handicapped.  I hope your Worship can give me a lenient sentence.”

347. Nothing appears in that exchange to the effect that the applicant believed he was entitled to right of abode in Hong Kong.

348. As to the making of an oral claim for right of abode, considering the evidence as a whole, I am satisfied on the probabilities that no such claim was made, not at Lo Wu, the offices of GIS or before the magistrate.

349. None of the records exhibited were capable, on their face, of constituting a record of any claim.

350. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)      the applicant did not make a claim for right of abode at Lo Wu, the offices of GIS or before the magistrate;

(ii)      the Director has no record of any claim.

(18)   Sze Chiu Chi (3055 : a ‘group one’ and ‘group four’ applicant)

351. The applicant entered Hong Kong on the strength of a two‑way permit on 7 October 1997, being permitted to remain until 1 November of that year.  Both her parents enjoyed rights of permanent residence in Hong Kong.  The applicant overstayed.

352. More than a year later, on 23 December 1998, the applicant went with her younger sister and her parents to the Immigration Tower.  The applicant testified that her parents — on the basis of what they had seen on television and read in the newspapers — had told her that she should present herself to the immigration authorities in order to claim right of abode.

353. While the parents remained downstairs, the applicant said that she and her younger sister went to the offices of GIS on the 13th floor.  According to the applicant, her mother had learnt from a clansman that she should go to the officers of GIS and directed her to the 13th floor.  The applicant said that she approached an officer at the reception counter and was asked if she was pregnant.  Officers in GIS, of course, processed overstayers who wished to give birth in Hong Kong before returning to the Mainland.  The question was an insensitive one as the applicant, then a single woman, was not pregnant.  She said that she scolded the officer.

354. In documents prepared for her case, the applicant is recorded as telling the officer that she was there to claim right of abode.  It is further recorded that she took medical documents with her relating to her parents’ ill‑health to support her contention that there was a real need for her to remain in Hong Kong.  However, no mention was made of these matters in the course of her testimony.  I accept, of course, that after such a long period her memory was fallible.

355. The applicant said that she was given an ID 457 form to complete.  This, she said, was completed in her presence by her younger sister.  The form contains no specific endorsement by the younger sister which goes beyond the standard recording of family particulars.

356. The applicant said that her sister was with her when she was interviewed.  She said she was given a ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form but was not sure how best to complete the form.  She sought assistance, she said, because, having been raised on the Mainland, she had difficulty with traditional Chinese characters.  As I understood the applicant’s evidence, the interviewing officer, Mr Yeung Wai Kwong, then directed her what to write on the form.  The applicant said that she could not recall whether the officer wrote out the characters that she should copy or whether he presented her with some kind of standard form on which the words were already written.  The applicant said that she duly copied what she had been directed to write but added characters to the effect that she wished to seek right of abode.  According to the applicant, when the interviewing officer saw this, he took the form and threw it into the wastepaper bin.  He then gave her another form and told her to copy only what he had previously directed her to write.  The characters which appear on the form resting with the Immigration Department are to the following effect :

“I have overstayed because of keeping company with my family.  I now want to go back to China.”

357. If the applicant is to be believed, she was deliberately prevented from recording her claim for right of abode : a clear example of oppressive conduct.  Indeed, during the course of cross‑examination, when it was put to her that she had at all times been free to write what she wished and that her failure to record any form of complaint in her ‘no loss, no complaint’ form gave the lie to her allegations, she said, first, that she had asked the officer to retrieve the form from the wastepaper bin so that she could sign it, a request that was ignored, and, second, that it had been her sister who had told her that she must be quiet.  In my judgment, however, the applicant was not to be believed.  I did not find her to be a credible witness and, in my view, much of her testimony in respect of critical issues was tailored to what she saw as her best tactical advantage with scant regard for the truth of what her memory dictated.  The exchange to which I have referred earlier in this paragraph smacked of invention on her part.

358. The applicant’s sister, who, she said, was with her during the interview, did not give evidence.  In an affirmation prepared for court proceedings the sister is recorded as saying :

“      … the form was placed in front of my sister, and the officer told her what to write, i.e. the words were orally dictated to her.  I was sitting next to my sister when she was writing the form Grounds for Non‑Removal, and I specifically recall seeing my sister write down the extra words ‘and apply for write of abode’ which were not dictated.  At this, the officer took the form, and threw it away.  My sister then asked him to write down on a piece of paper what he wanted her to write, which the officer then did, and my sister then copied the words from this piece of paper.”

Untested in cross‑examination and in light of my very firm findings in respect of the applicant herself, this statement, in so far as it may support the applicant, in my judgment, does not advance her case.  I say that having looked at all the evidence in the round.

359. It must be remembered that this was not the applicant’s first dealings with the Immigration Department as an overstayer.  It was put to her that she had been to the Immigration Tower on two previous occasions, in 1989 and 1994.  At first, she denied this.  Then she said that she had no recollection of why she had been there.  The independent evidence showed that in 1994 she had overstayed for approximately two months before surrendering herself.  On that occasions, she had completed a ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form, her characters being to the following effect :

“I , Sze Chiu Chi, have overstayed in Hong Kong, no extension of stay, now want to return to China as soon as possible.  I do not work in Hong Kong.  My sister, Sze So Yuen, wants to bail me, Chiu Chi, out.”

360. When shown the 1994 form, the applicant said that these words too had been dictated to her.  In a matter of minutes, therefore, she had moved from a denial, to an assertion of a lack of memory to a specific statement that words written on her interview form had been dictated to her.

361. The testimony of Mr Yeung Wai Kwong, who interviewed the applicant in December 1998, was much criticised by counsel for the applicant but I found his testimony to be essentially credible.

362. Along with almost all the other interviewing officers in GIS, Mr Yeung at the time held the rank of immigration assistant.  His attachment to GIS was his first attachment as an officer in the service.  It was clear from his evidence, taken with the evidence of other GIS officers, that these young, inexperienced men and women had little knowledge of their place within the broader administrative process or even, in many cases, of the underlying purpose for conducting interviews.  Briefings were perfunctory and it seemed to me that many picked up the ‘know how’ of the job from their colleagues.

363. Mr Yeung admitted that he had two questions in respect of which he always sought an answer : why had an interviewee overstayed and what was the purpose of his or her surrender?  While several other interviewing officers denied any form of prompting, Mr Yeung accepted that he always sought an answer to these two questions, the answers to be recorded on the ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form.  But outside of this, he said, he would not interfere with an interviewee’s freedom to write what he or she wished.  Mr Yeung, who naturally had little or no recollection of the applicant’s interview, said that he would never have thrown away a form because it contained a reference to seeking right of abode.  If words to that effect were written, he said, he would simply have referred the matter to a senior officer.  I accept his evidence in this regard.

364. On all the evidence, therefore, I am not satisfied that the applicant made a claim for right of abode when she surrendered herself on 23 December 1998.

365. I have come to my finding of fact despite the presence of certain endorsements on the ID 457 form and an internal Immigration Department minute dated 23 December 1998 bearing the heading ‘M1’.  The evidence showed that the endorsements were made by Mr Alan Ho King Chung, an Immigration Officer in GIS.  The endorsements reveal that Mr Ho had checked on the dates when the applicant’s parents had been registered as permanent residents in Hong Kong.

366. The minute, M1, is a standard minute, pre‑printed except for spaces provided for the insertion of relevant dates and is to the following effect :

“             Case concerns a keyboard ovestayer who surrendered to GIS on      23 DEC 1998      for departure arrangements.

2.            Brief enquiries has been conducted and subject is found to be within the prosecution category.  Subject now wants to return to China as soon as possible.

3.            ID 457 and SF/IM/645 are completed at (  4  ) and (  5  ) respectively.  Subject has been informed vide (  6  ) to attend PD [Prosecution Division] at 9:00 a.m. on

31‑12‑98      with bail money for follow‑up action.

4.            As the case now stands, I recommend to pass file to PD for consideration of prosecution.  Submitted for your consideration, please.”

By way of a margin note, Mr Ho has written on the minute :

“Previous record attached.  Parents first reg   HK I/C in 9/80, 4/87, after subject’s birth.”

The ID 457 form contains Mr Ho’s endorsements that the parents were ‘first registered’ in ‘9/80’ and ‘4/87’.

367. Mr Ho explained that he made endorsements by way of standard practice on his part to show his seniors that he had done something in respect of the file.  It is an entirely inadequate answer.  But the important issue, in my view, is whether on their face, read in context, those endorsements could amount to evidence of a claim for right of abode and I do not find, even on the most generous reading, that they are so capable.  The minute, M1, is in any event a minute recording the fact that the applicant had surrendered herself for repatriation and should be prosecuted.  Nothing appears in the margin note to suggest, even indirectly, that a claim for right of abode had been made or is to be implied as having been made.

368. In terms of the recommendation made in the minute, M1, the applicant was prosecuted for overstaying, appearing in the Magistracy on 31 December 1998.  She pleaded guilty and was sentenced to three months imprisonment suspended for 18 months together with a fine of $1,500.  The transcript reveals the following to be the only relevant exchange between the applicant and the court :

“Court:             Do you have anything to say?

Defendant:      Can the fine be lower?  I came to take care of my parents.  They are sick.

Court:             That is rather regrettable.  As you are not a first offender, all I can do is to give you time to pay the fine.”

369. I do not see how anything said there, either read alone or in conjunction with other records resting with the Immigration Department, can be said to constitute evidence of a claim for right of abode.  The words constitute no more than a statement in mitigation.

370. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)      the applicant made no claim for right of abode at the offices of GIS or before the magistrate;

(ii)      the Director has no record of any claim.

(19)   Lau Wai Kau (1981 : a ‘group one’ and ‘group four’ applicant)

371. The applicant came to Hong Kong on 7 April 1997.  His two‑way permit authorised him to remain until 1 June 1997.  However, he overstayed.

372. The applicant, a married man with children on the Mainland, testified that he had made two applications for a one‑way permit but had been unsuccessful on both occasions.  He overstayed in Hong Kong, he said, because he believed that, upon the change of sovereignty, he would be able to claim right of abode.

373. Upon the change of sovereignty, the applicant said that through his father he made various inquiries with the immigration authorities to see if he could obtain right of abode.  He accepted that he was told that he must return to the Mainland to process his application.  During his testimony, the applicant was referred to a standard statement put out at that time by the Immigration Department.  He agreed that the advice he received had been in general accord with this statement which reads :

“      Mainland residents coming to Hong Kong on strength of Two Way Permit for visiting relatives or sightseeing must leave Hong Kong before the expiry of their limit of stay.  According to the Certificate of Entitlement Scheme, Mainland residents entitled to the right of abode in Hong Kong under Article 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law should first apply for a One Way Permit from the Public Security Bureau in the Mainland.  On completion of the preliminary assessment, the Public Security Bureau will pass the relevant information to the Hong Kong Immigration Department for verification and issue of ‘Certificate of Entitlement’ in those qualified cases.  The Public Security Bureau will affix the ‘Certificate of Entitlement’ onto the One Way Permit on issuing the permit to the applicants to facilitate their entry into Hong Kong for settlement.”

374. On 19 July 1997, the applicant testified that he attempted to return to the Mainland to his wife and family in order to make an application for right of abode through the Mainland authorities.  However, as an overstayer, he was stopped by immigration officials at Lo Wu.

375. The applicant said that at the time of being stopped he was asked why he had overstayed.  He said that he replied to the effect that he had been taking care of his parents who enjoyed right of abode in Hong Kong.  He told the officer that he had ‘applied’ to the immigration authorities to remain but had been refused.  The applicant, of course, had made no application for the right to remain in Hong Kong.  On his own evidence, he had done no more than make certain inquiries and had done so through his father so that he himself would not be detained as an overstayer.

376. Although there is no record of what was said when the applicant was first stopped, there is a record of his interview with a second officer to whom he was referred.  This officer was Ms Law Shuk Ha.  At the time she was acting in the post of what is called a channel supervisor.  The record appears on the face of a document called a ‘secondary examination sheet’ (form ID 518).  The form is intended as an internal record only.  It is completed by the interviewing officer.  Ms Law, who conducted the interview with the applicant, did say however that if an interviewee asked to write something down then he or she would be given the opportunity.  I accept her testimony in that regard.  Indeed, she impressed me in all respects as a careful, honest witness.

377. The record of interview records that the applicant gave as his reason for overstaying the need to look after his parents in Hong Kong.  The record contains one other relevant endorsement; namely, the statement : “no other strong ground provided”.

378. The applicant testified that in the course of this interview with Ms Law he repeated that he had ‘applied’ to remain in Hong Kong but without success.

379. The statements made at Lo Wu, submitted the applicant’s counsel, constituted claims for right of abode.  That, in my judgment, is not the case.  The applicant, in fact, had not made any formal application in Hong Kong.  But even if he had, on his own evidence he did no more than inform the interviewing officers at Lo Wu that he had made claims unsuccessfully and now wished to return to China.  That constituted a recitation of history on his part not a claim itself.

380. In any event, even if I am wrong in that regard on the basis that I have taken too narrow a view, I do not see how the ‘secondary examination sheet’ can be said to constitute a record evidencing a claim.  The document simply records why the applicant had overstayed, the principal reason being to care for his parents, the other reasons, in the opinion of the interviewing officer, being of little substance.  There is no guide — on the face of the document — to say what those other reasons where.  To suggest it must have included a claim for right of abode is speculation.

381. So that his return to the Mainland could be formally processed, the applicant was referred to the offices of GIS on 13th floor of Immigration Tower.  He went to those offices on 28 July 1997.

382. In accordance with standard practice, the applicant was given an ID 457 form to complete.  He entered the names of his parents, giving their identity card numbers and of his siblings who lived on the Mainland.  He failed, however, to record the fact that he was married.  Indeed, he specifically recorded that he was not married : an untruth.  During cross‑examination, it was put to the applicant that he filled out the form in the way he did in order to try and build some sympathy for himself, perhaps avoiding prosecution.  It was suggested that he did so by trying to show that his parents had no family to look after them in Hong Kong and that he — without any obligations himself —had been here to care for them.  As I understood his evidence, the applicant accepted that this had been his intention.

383. After he had completed his ID 457 form, he was interviewed by Ms Chow Wing Man.  The applicant testified that he was asked why he had overstayed.  He replied, he said, to the effect that he had come to Hong Kong in order to remain here permanently to care for his parents.  The applicant continued by saying that he gave the interviewing officer details of his parents’ ailments and asked if the officer could use her discretion to let him remain in Hong Kong to care for his parents.  According to the applicant, the officer replied by saying that this could not be done unless one parent was near to death.

384. Ms Chow, the interviewing officer, whom I found to be a credible witness, testified that officers of her rank were not permitted to exercise their discretion by allowing overstayers to remain in Hong Kong for compassionate reasons.  If such a request had been made, she said, she would have referred the matter to a more senior officer.

385. The applicant said that when he was handed a ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form, the interviewing officer showed him a laminated piece of paper with characters on it.  The officer said that he should not be troubled and that she would tell to him what should be written onto the form.  This was done.  The familiar mantra was written by the applicant to the following effect :

“I have overstayed because of keeping company with my family.  I now want to go back to China.”

386. During the course of cross‑examination, the applicant accepted that what was written was essentially the truth.  He qualified this, however, by saying that if he had been told the true nature of the form and if he had been allowed to write what he wish to write, he would have added to those words or qualified them so as to state that he sought right of abode.

387. When the interviewing officer, Ms Chow, was questioned on the basis that the applicant’s characters written on the ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form where exactly the same as the characters written by another person interviewed by her, she accepted that this may well have been the case.  However, she denied the use of any laminated paper or dictating what should be written.  At the beginning of her evidence, Ms Chow was shown two earlier ‘grounds for non‑removal’ forms completed when she had been the interviewing officer.  Both forms both record that the interviewees had overstayed because they believed they had right of abode in Hong Kong.  Although each case must be judged on its own facts and within its own ‘administrative policy’ context, these forms do indicate at least that previously Ms Chow had permitted interviewees to record the fact that they believed they had right of abode.  As it is, of course, the applicant did not testify that he been actively prevented from writing what he wished.  As I understood his evidence, it was rather that he did not comprehend the true nature of the ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form and that, if he had been given the opportunity in stated terms to write exactly what he wished, he would have written different characters.

388. In my judgment, the applicant was not a credible witness.  On his own admission, he had learnt from inquiries made through his father that he would have to return to the Mainland to process any claim for right of abode and indeed that was why he was attempting to return.  That intention to return in the knowledge that he could make no claim here must have coloured his thinking.  He was given at least two opportunities to have it recorded that he sough right of abode, the second time, in his own writing, and yet the documentary evidence does not support him in any way.  Far too much of the applicant’s testimony smacked of what he wished he had said rather than what he honestly remembered saying.

389. In any event, neither the ID 457 form nor the ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form can be taken as constituting any form of record of a claim.  Even on the most indulgent reading, they come nowhere near any such conclusion.

390. On 31 July 1997, the applicant appeared at Western Magistracy charged with a breach of condition of his two‑way permit.  He pleaded guilty and, in mitigation, was asked if he had anything to say.  He replied to the following effect :

“      I want to tell you Worship that my parents are in Hong Kong and they don’t have any child in Hong Kong and I held a China permit to come to Hong Kong to look after my parents.  My mum has heart ailment and my father has strained the waist.  And I attempted to apply at the Immigration but they told me that it is only when either my parents’ life is at risk and have medical certificate can I have a chance.  But, in fact, their life is not at risk but indeed they need assistance.”

391. That is a fairly full statement but I do not see how it can be read as constituting evidence of a claim made for right of abode.  The phrase that he ‘attempted to apply at the Immigration’ cannot, on its face, be read, either alone or in conjunction with other records, as recording a claim to remain permanently in Hong Kong by reason of a claim for right of abode.  The whole statement is concerned with mitigation of culpability and, if anything, infers that a claim had been made by him to extend his permission to remain in Hong Kong for compassionate reasons not for reasons arising out of a constitutional right to claim permanent residence.

392. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)      the applicant did not make a claim for right of abode to officers of the Immigration Department either at Lo Wu or at Immigration Tower;

(ii)      the applicant did not make a claim for right of abode to the magistrate;

(iii)     the Director has no record of any claim.

(20)   Wong Yuen Sheung (3910 : a ‘group one’ and ‘group four’ applicant)

393. The applicant came to Hong Kong on 30 August 1996 to visit her father, mother and her two younger siblings, all of whom had right of abode in Hong Kong.  Her two‑way permit authorised her to remain until 24 October 1996.  However, she overstayed.

394. The applicant had overstayed on one previous occasion; that is, in 1993 when she had been arrested and detained pending prosecution and repatriation.  On that occasion she had been required to complete an ID 457 form and a ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form.  When she overstayed for the second time, she was not therefore a complete stranger to these forms or the process generally of prosecution and repatriation.

395. The applicant testified that in 1996 she overstayed for two reasons.  First, she intended to wait until the change of sovereignty in order to claim right of abode.  She had heard, she said, that children of Hong Kong residents who surrendered themselves after the change of sovereignty would be given Hong Kong identity cards.  In addition, she said that in or about February 1997 her mother was injured and confined to a wheelchair.  As her younger siblings was still at school, it was necessary for her to remain in Hong Kong to care for her mother.

396. The applicant said that she intended to apply for a Hong Kong identity card shortly after the change of sovereignty.  However, she learnt that large numbers of persons in her position who had surrendered were arrested and repatriated.  In light of her previous experience, she was therefore too frightened to present herself to the immigration authorities.

397. Eventually, she said, on 6 January 1998, she surrendered herself to the authorities at the Immigration Tower.

398. In the earlier part of 2002, in a brief record of her case prepared by her then solicitors, the applicant is said to have surrendered herself because she felt discouraged by events post reunification and wished to be surrendered to the Mainland.  In this regard, the record reads :

“Ms Wong came to HK on 29/8/96 to wait for amnesty, but there was no news all along.  In 1998, she was still waiting to see what happened and felt discouraged.  She wanted to surrendered to return to China …”  [my emphasis]

399. During cross‑examination, the applicant accepted that she had given these instructions.  However, in her testimony — in a clear volte face — she said that she presented herself to the immigration authorities in order to obtain an identity card which would enable her to remain permanently in Hong Kong.

400. Although she said that she paid attention to media reports and took an interest in the on‑going right of abode litigation, the applicant testified that she knew nothing of the certificate of entitlement scheme in terms of which all applications for right of abode had to be processed on the Mainland.  In the context of her testimony this evidence rang hollow.

401. As to the course of events on 6 January 1998, the applicant said that she went to the Immigration Tower with her mother and a younger sister.  They went first, she said, to the second floor to ask where they should apply for a Hong Kong identity card.  However, when the expired two‑way permit was shown, they were all directed to the offices of GIS on 13th floor.

402. At the offices of GIS, the applicant said that both she and her mother approached the officer at reception.  They said that they were seeking an identity card for the applicant.  However, when the expired two‑way permit was revealed, the applicant said that the officer told them that she was not permitted to apply for an identity card until she had processed her application for a one‑way permit through the Mainland authorities.  According to the applicant, upon hearing this her mother became emotional, insisting that her daughter had to remain in Hong Kong to care for her.  The applicant said that she was then given an ID 457 form to complete.  Strangely, in light of what she herself said she had just been told, the applicant said that she believed she was completing the form so that she could apply for a Hong Kong identity card.

403. The applicant said that her younger sister had to complete most of the ID 457 form as her mother at that time was in some discomfort and she had to attend to her.  The form itself contains no specific endorsement that may, on its face, be read as constituting any sort of claim for right of abode.

404. The applicant testified that she was interviewed in the absence of her mother.  The interviewing officer was Ms Lindy Yu Man Yan.

405. The applicant said that she told the interviewing officer that she wished to apply for an identity card so that she could remain in Hong Kong to care for her mother.  In reply, she said, the officer told her that as an overstayer she was liable to be imprisoned and that if she wanted to obtain right of abode in Hong Kong she must process her application on the Mainland.  The applicant said that she nevertheless persisted in her request.  The applicant said that the interviewing officer then gave her a ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form and told her to fill it out.  Surprisingly, the applicant testified that she believed this form too to be part of her process of applying for an identity card.  It was manifest, in my opinion, that the applicant was prepared to tailor her testimony in whatever fashion was necessary to try and demonstrate that — in her mind at least — all the documents completed by her were a record of her claim for right of abode.

406. As it is, nothing appears on the face of the ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form that speaks, directly or indirectly, of Hong Kong identity cards or of a desire to remain permanently in this jurisdiction.  The characters written by the applicant were instead to the following (familiar) effect :

“I have overstayed because of keeping company with my family.  I now want to go back to China.”

407. How then did the applicant say that these words came to be written by her?  She testified that the interviewing officer showed her a piece of paper on which the characters were written and instructed her to copy them.  Initially, said that applicant, she refused to do so.  She was, however, threatened that if she refused she would have to go to prison.  In the face of this threat, she said that she complied.

408. Despite this threat, the applicant accepted that she signed the ‘no loss, no complaint’ form, putting a circle around the character which indicated she had no complaint.  When asked why, the applicant said that the interviewing officer had covered part of the form with her hand so that she could not read all the characters.  Presumably therefore she circled the character for ‘no’ instead of ‘yes’ without understanding why.  Her testimony smacked of invention.

409. During the course of cross‑examination, the applicant was referred to the ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form completed by her on the first occasion she had overstayed.  That form read :

“      I, WONG Yuen‑sheung, have overstayed in Hong Kong without applying for an extension of stay.  (I) now want to return to China as soon as possible.  I have never worked in Hong Kong.  My father, WANG Szu‑tsai, wants to bail me out pending hearing.”

When shown this form, the applicant accepted that she had understood at that time that it had been completed by her as part of the process of her repatriation.

410. Ms Yu, the interviewing officer, said that she did not direct that applicant what to write on the ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form.  I reject her evidence in that regard.  It is telling, in my view, that the earlier ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form had been completed by the applicant in simplified characters used in the Mainland.  The 1998 form, however, completed just four years later, was in traditional characters.  I am satisfied that Ms Yu was deliberately untruthful.

411. But having made that finding, it does not follow, in my judgment, that the applicant was threatened by Ms Yu that she must write these words.  I am satisfied that at the time the applicant knew that she had no alternative but to surrender herself for the purposes of return and that she complied voluntarily with the necessary process for bringing that about.

412. For the reasons given in the body of my findings, I reject the applicant’s evidence that she surrendered herself in order to claim right of abode and did make such a claim.  In my judgment, the first recording of her case was the accurate one; namely, that she was discouraged by events and simply sought her return to the Mainland.

413. The applicant also asserted that when she was prosecuted for breaching her conditions of stay she claimed right of abode.  I reject that assertion.  The applicant appeared in court on 13 January 1998.  In mitigation, she said the following :

“      I intended to go back at the time when my period of stay expired, but as my mother had her foot injured at that time and had therefore to be hospitalized, I had to take care of her and could not go back.”

There is nothing in those words to imply any form of claim for right of permanent residence in Hong Kong.

414. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)      the applicant did not make a claim for right of abode, either to officers of the Immigration Department or to the magistrate;

(ii)      the Director has no record of any claim.

(21)   Cheng Siu Yin (593 : a ‘group one’ and ‘group four’ applicant)

415. The applicant came to Hong Kong on 17 August 1996, being authorised in terms of her two‑way permit to remain until 10 October of that year.  She overstayed.  She did so, she said, because she hoped that after the change of sovereignty an amnesty would be granted for persons in her position — children of parents who had right of abode — so that she could remain permanently in Hong Kong.

416. Certainly, she knew that before the change of sovereignty overstayers could not claim right of abode.  Her own sister, who had come to Hong Kong illegally, was repatriated on 13 May 1997.  The applicant testified that the removal of her sister had been effected without the knowledge of her family.  This, however, was false.  Evidence revealed that her father had been kept fully informed.

417. Upon reunification, the applicant did not immediately surrender herself.  Indeed, she did not surrender herself until 14 January 1998.  She said that she went to the offices of GIS in order to obtain a Hong Kong identity card.  Although she admitted she was not absolutely clear on the issue, she said that she believed there was an amnesty in place and, to use her words, that she would be welcomed under the amnesty.  However, when cross‑examined as to why she had waited until January 1998 to surrender herself, she then admitted that she had learnt there was no amnesty.

418. In my judgment, the applicant’s evidence was incapable of belief.  It shifted from question to question.

419. The applicant said that she went to the offices of GIS with her father and told the officer at the reception counter that her father was a Hong Kong permanent resident and that she wished to remain in Hong Kong.  She was asked to produce her expired two‑way permit, she said, and was then told that a certificate of entitlement was not available in that office.

420. The applicant said that she filled out her ID 457 form at the time she was interviewed.  That, in my judgment, was a lapse of memory on her part.  The time noted at the top of the form is 9:30 a.m. while the interview itself is recorded as taking place at 10:15 a.m.  The interviewing officer, Ms Leung Wing Yee, explained that the officer at the reception counter would note down the time when a completed ID 457 form was returned to the reception counter.

421. When the applicant was interviewed by Ms Leung, she completed a ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form.  The characters she wrote were to the following effect :

“I have overstayed because of keeping company with my family.  I now want to go back to China.”

422. The writing of these characters, according to the applicant, came about in the following way.  When the interview commenced, the applicant said that she told the officer that she did not want to leave Hong Kong and wanted to stay.  She produced evidence of her parents’ identity cards to show that they enjoyed right of residence in Hong Kong.  She said that when the ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form was placed in front of her, a piece of paper was used by the interviewing officer (paper on which was written the characters she was to copy) to cover the top part of the form so that the sentence – ‘please state your grounds for non‑removal’ — was not visible.  She said that she was then told to copy the characters onto the form.

423. The applicant’s testimony as to the use of a piece of paper to hide the true nature and purpose of the form was, in my opinion, quite patently invented by the applicant to try to explain why it was that, if she was seeking right of abode, she did not, when given the opportunity, state that fact.

424. The applicant said that the first sentence she copied was correct.  However, she said that she did not want to return to the Mainland and hesitated before writing the second sentence.  When she hesitated, she said, she was urged to finish quickly.  She protested, she said, that she did not wish to leave Hong Kong.  The officer did not answer her.  After that, she said, she wrote the second sentence.  In cross‑examination, the applicant admitted that it was at that time important for her to ‘get her message across’.  But she did not do so, she said, because she was told what to copy, was frightened and did not believe she had any choice in the matter.

425. The applicant may well have been frightened but I reject any suggestion that, objectively, she was given no choice.

426. The interviewing officer, Ms Leung, struck me as essentially credible. She said that she would ask an interviewee why he or she had overstayed and what they now intended to do.  Common answers, she said, were that the interviewee had been staying with family and now wished to return to the Mainland.  I am satisfied on the probabilities that Ms Leung did assist the applicant in completing the form.  But I do not accept that it was without the applicant’s consent.

427. On 19 January 1998, the applicant was prosecuted in the magistracy for breaching her conditions of stay.  She pleaded guilty.  The transcript of proceedings reveals following exchange in respect of mitigation :

“COURT : … Mitigation, please.

DEFENDANT :     In 96 my father fell and got his back injured and application for social assistance is made.  He rely on the 1,200 allowance for living each month.

COURT :        What have you done for money while you’ve been here for almost 18 months?

DEFENDANT :     The whole family live together.  I have my parents and younger brother.”

I fail to see how, on any basis, that exchange can be put forward as a claim for right of abode.

428. I am satisfied that the applicant did not at any time make a claim for right of abode.

429. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)      the applicant did not make a claim for right of abode either to the Director or the magistrate;

(ii)      the Director has no record of any claim.

(22)   Fu Kwong (1084 : a ‘group one’, ‘group two’ and

         ‘group four’ applicant)

430. Both of the applicant’s parents and his younger brother enjoyed the status of permanent residents in Hong Kong.  The applicant testified that he had first attempted to obtain a one‑way permit to join his family in Hong Kong in 1986 but had been unsuccessful in all his attempts.

431. The applicant came to Hong Kong on 2 February 1997, his two‑way permit authorising him to remain until 27 March of that year.  During this visit, he said, he learnt of his rights under Art.24 of the Basic Law.  Being eager to secure permanent residence, he said that he purchased a copy of the Basic Law.

432. In addition, immediately on his return to the Mainland, he said that he applied for a notarial certificate verifying his relationship with his parents.  This document was obtained, he said, because he understood that in applying for right of abode in Hong Kong he would have to submit proof of relationship.

433. The plaintiff testified that he went to considerable trouble to obtain an English translation of the notarial certificate.  He did so, he said, because he mistakenly believed that the Hong Kong authorities would demand a document in the English language.  Although the applicant was subject to cross‑examination on the question of why he thought it necessary to obtain an English translation, I accept the submissions made by the applicant’s counsel that the important point is that the evidence demonstrates that he did go to the trouble to obtain a notarial certificate.  There can only be one reason for so doing : a belief that it was a necessary document to advance his claim for right of abode.

434. While, due to the lapse of time, many applicants had difficulty recalling events, this applicant appeared to have a detailed recollection, speaking with force of matters even of the most peripheral significance.  During the course of his testimony the applicant was easily raised to anger.  He spoke with an air of righteous indignation, stating that he had on a number of occasions attempted to assert his belief that he was entitled to right of abode.  Clearly, the applicant felt that he had been dealt with unfairly by the Hong Kong authorities.  In my judgment, however, having portrayed himself as a man of such forceful character, it is puzzling that no record was made by him of his alleged claims.

435. Being in possession of his notarial certificate, the applicant said that he wished to return to Hong Kong as soon as possible.  However, he was unable to do so until 19 December 1997, his two‑way permit authorising him to remain until 12 January 1998.  During this second visit, he said, he and his mother made a number of visits to the Immigration Department.  His purpose was to claim right of abode.  He said that he went to the Immigration Tower and was referred to the Information Office.  Having shown his various documents, including his notarial certificate, he said that the staff at the office advised him that he must process his claim on the Mainland and could not do so in Hong Kong.

436. The applicant, however, did not return to the Mainland within the time permitted.  He overstayed, only surrendering himself on 27 March 1998.  On this occasion, he said, he went to the Immigration Tower with both his parents.  He said that he was again in possession of all relevant documents and that his purpose was to obtain a permanent Hong Kong identity card; in short, to secure his permanent residence in Hong Kong by completing the required formalities.

437. On his own evidence, of course, the applicant had just a month or two earlier been advised by the immigration authorities that he could not make a claim for right of abode in Hong Kong and would have to return to the Mainland to do so.  Indeed, evidence demonstrated that at the relevant time staff of the Information Office were instructed to give a standard response to enquiries of the kind made by the applicant, the response to be in the standard form cited earlier in this report : see paragraph 373.

438. While I accept that the applicant may have had his difficulties with the Mainland authorities in trying to process a claim for a one‑way permit and while he may have been uncertain as to the exact state of the law, I am unable to accept that he surrendered himself on 27 March 1998 in such sure knowledge, as he wished to portray, that he was there solely to process a claim for right of abode.

439. The applicant said that he and his parents went to the Information Office on the second floor but were referred to the offices of GIS after his expired two‑way permit had been examined.

440. At the offices of GIS, the applicant said that he showed his various documents to the officer on duty.  These were returned to him.  He was given an ID 457 form to complete and did so.

441. He was then interviewed.  He said that he went into the interview room with his mother but she was told to leave.  The interviewing officer was Mr Ng Wai Lun, an immigration assistant.  According to the applicant he showed his documents to the interviewing officer, telling him that both his parents were Hong Kong permanent residents and that he wished to settle in Hong Kong.  According to the applicant, the interviewing officer merely asked him if he was in Hong Kong to keep his family company.  On being told that this was correct, according to the applicant the interviewing officer then took a card out of the box and told the applicant to copy the contents of that card onto a ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form.  In papers prepared for his case, the applicant is recorded as saying that the interviewing officer was holding a set of card that he spread on the table, giving the applicant the choice from which card to copy.  This, in my view, was a clear inconsistency.

442. The applicant testified that he wanted to tell the interviewing officer that he was seeking an identity card in order to remain permanently in Hong Kong.  However, according to the applicant, the officer told him that he had committed in offence by overstaying and that he must go back to the Mainland if he wished to make an application for right of abode.  In the result, said the applicant, he simply copied what was contained on the card and at the end, under instruction, placed his signature on the ‘grounds for non‑removal’ document.  The characters written by the applicant were to the following effect :

“I have overstayed because of keeping company with my family.  I now want to go back to China.”

443. The applicant said that he attempted to elicit the officer’s sympathy by showing him documents concerning his brother’s serious illness.  The applicant said that however the officer appeared either not to understand him — the applicant complained of language difficulties during the interview — or was simply disinterested.  According to the applicant, the officer told him for second time that he must return to the Mainland, that he had committed an offence in Hong Kong and that he was liable to prosecution.

444. The applicant testified that during the interview he requested the interviewing officer to retain copies of the various documents that he wished to submit.  He said that the officer declined to do so.  During the course of the hearing, however, evidence was led to show that this same interviewing officer had on other occasions accepted documents given to him.  In my judgment, the applicant greatly exaggerated his testimony.  I am satisfied on the probabilities that if he had wished to give documents to the interviewing officer, those documents would have been accepted and placed on file.

445. I am also satisfied that the interviewing officer did not present the applicant with the choice of pre‑written forms removed from a box.  The interviewing officer accepted that it was his practice to ask each interviewee why they had overstayed and what they now wished to do.  To that extent, I am satisfied that there may have been some assistance given by him but not without the applicant voluntarily accepting that assistance.

446. The applicant signed the ‘no loss, no complaint’ form, indicating on the face of the document that he had no complaint.

447. While I accept that initially the applicant no doubt did make a number of enquiries concerning his status, I reject his evidence that on 27 March 1998 he asserted a claim for right of abode.  As I have indicated, I am unable to place any reliance on his testimony concerning his visit to the offices of GIS that day.  In my judgment, if he had been so determined to assert his claim for right of abode, he would have been able to write something on the ‘grounds for non‑removal’ form and would have taken advantage of that opportunity.

448. On 1 April 1998, the applicant was prosecuted for breaching his conditions of stay.  He pleaded guilty.  In mitigation, the transcript reveals that the applicant said the following :

“DEFENDANT :      My Mother was ill and my father was unemployed and my brother was sick as well so I stay in Hong Kong to look after them.

COURT :    And what does the family do for money?

DEFENDANT :     The money is from my father’s work.”

449. In respect of the applicant’s brief statement in mitigation, it was suggested that his words were not correctly interpreted.  In the course of submissions, counsel for the applicant said that the words spoken by him could mean either “I had to remain in Hong Kong to take care of them” or “I want to remain in Hong Kong to take care of them”.  The applicant testified that he had spoken the second sentence; in short, a statement of his desire to remain in Hong Kong to take care of his family.  In my judgment, after such a long lapse of time, this smacked of an attempt to manipulate existing evidence to advantage.  The words would have been translated by a qualified court interpreter.  The translation is the official translation and on the basis of that translation I am satisfied that no claim for right of abode was made or is recorded.

450. The applicant returned to Hong Kong in late 1998, again on a two‑way permit.  During his visit, he went to the Chinese Visitors Office (“the CVO”) with his mother.  Again, according to the applicant the purpose of his visit was to assert his claim to right of abode.  Again, according the applicant he approached the officer at the counter and showed him his file of supporting documents.  He said that he told the officer all his family lived in Hong Kong and he wished to settle here.  In reply, the officer told him that the CVO only dealt with extensions of stay.  If he wished to seek an extension that could be done.  However, if he wished to seek settlement then he would have to return to the Mainland in order to process his application.  The applicant said that the officer became impatient with him as there was a queue of people waiting.  The exchange became agitated.  The applicant said that he was then given an ‘application for an extension of stay’ form.  The applicant said that he partially completed this form but told a second officer that he wished to obtain an extension of stay so that he could apply for right of abode.  In response, he was told that he would only been given two days.  This, he said, led to an argument between himself and his mother who was anxious for any extra time with him.  The applicant said that he told the officer that two days meant nothing and that his claim for settlement in Hong Kong must be dealt with.  But in the end result, said the applicant, his mother’s wish prevailed and he agreed to apply for an extension of two days only.  Accordingly, in that portion of the form where he was to state his reasons for seeking an extension, he wrote : “live with my parents for a period of time longer”.

451. In my judgment, the evidence of the applicant in respect of this visit to the CVO was exaggerated at best if not invented.  I reject his testimony that he made a claim for right of abode on that occasion.  In any event, the document completed by him cannot, on its face, constitute the record of any such claim.

452. The applicant was for a time included on the Director’s concession list.  A good deal of evidence was led concerning this.  I am satisfied, however, that the inclusion was a mistake.  Nothing further emerged from this evidence to suggest that the applicant had claimed right of abode and/or that there was a record which evidenced such claim.

453. My determinations are therefore as follows :

(i)      the applicant did not make a claim for right of abode to the Director, either at the offices of GIS or the CVO, nor did he make a claim for right of abode to the magistrate;

(ii)      the Director has no record of any claim.

Conclusion

454. Accordingly, in respect of the cases of the 22 applicants determined to date, I have concluded that only three have made claims for right of abode with records of those claims resting with the Director.  The three applicants are Chan Pik Shan (307), Wu Kit Nga (4000) and Hui Yuk Heung (1380).

(M.J. Hartmann)
Judge of the Court of First Instance,
High Court

Ms Gladys Li, SC leading Mr S.H. Kwok and Mr Sean H.J. Fang, instructed by Messrs Barnes & Daly, for the Applicants

Mr Joseph Fok, SC leading Mr Denial Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent

34076-EN-2000-06-30

NG SIU TUNG AND OTHERS v. THE DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

HTML content

HCAL000081/1999

HCAL81/1999, HCAL2/2000 and HCAL70/2000

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO.81 OF 1999

------------------

BETWEEN
NG SIU TUNG AND OTHERSApplicants
AND
THE DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATIONRespondent

------------------

AND

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO.2 OF 2000

-------------------

BETWEEN
LI SHUK FANApplicant
AND
THE DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATIONRespondent

--------------------

AND

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO.70 OF 2000

--------------------

BETWEEN
SIN HOI CHU AND 42 OTHERSApplicants
AND
THE DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATIONRespondent

--------------------

Coram: Hon Stock J in Court

Dates of Hearing: 22-26 and 29-31 May, 1-2 and 5 June 2000

Date of Judgment: 30 June 2000

 

___________________________

JUDGMENT INDEX

____________________________

 

I. Introduction

II. These Cases

III. The Constitutional and Statutory Framework

IV. The Right of Abode Cases

V. Reaction to the Litigation

VI. The Interpretation, and After

VII. The Applicants' Cases

VIII. Interpreting the Interpretation

IX. The Common Law Approach applied to the CFA judgments

X. Legitimate Expectation

XI. The Concession

XII. The "So What" Question

XIII. Periods 1 and 2 Arrivals

XIV. Other Grounds

XV. Conclusion

 

-------------------------

J U D G M E N T

-------------------------

 

I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 29 January 1999, the Court of Final Appeal delivered judgments in two cases. By its judgment in Ng Ka Ling and Others v. Director of Immigration [1999] 2 HKCFAR 4, it was decided that the statutory scheme enacted on 10 July 1997 was unconstitutional to the extent that that scheme required permanent residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ("HKSAR") who were residing on the Mainland to hold a one-way permit issued by Mainland authorities before they could enjoy their right of abode in Hong Kong. The second judgment was Chan Kam Nga and Others v. Director of Immigration [1999] 2 HKCFAR 82, by which it was declared that a statutory provision which, in relation to those of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong, conferred the status of permanent resident upon those born to a parent who was a permanent resident of the HKSAR but only if the parent was a permanent resident at the time of the claimant's birth, was, to the extent of that time of birth limitation, unconstitutional; in other words, the Court held that those born before either parent became a permanent resident were also permanent residents.

2. There were many who, not surprisingly, thought that they would benefit from those judgments, even though they had not themselves joined in either proceedings. Those were people who assumed that, subject to proof of their claim, they would be entitled to exercise the right of abode without having first to secure a one-way permit on the Mainland and, amongst them, there were those who believed that the fact that they were born before their parents became permanent residents was, as a result of one of the judgments, not a bar to their own claim. The authorities represented that they would abide by the judgments of the Court of Final Appeal and that they would put in place a verification scheme, not linked to the one-way permit. But, in accordance with the decision in Ng Ka Ling, the Director of Immigration insisted that claims for right of abode which had, of course, to be verified, had, in the case of Mainland residents, to be made on the Mainland, and for this purpose Mainland residents included those who were in Hong Kong subject to conditions of stay or who had overstayed, and who immediately before coming to Hong Kong, either illegally or subject to conditions, had been residing on the Mainland. So the Director of Immigration, who is the respondent to these cases, made removal orders in respect of some such claimants, and that led to another application for judicial review which features in these proceedings, and came to be known as the Lau Kong Yung case.

3. The Government of the HKSAR assessed the practical implications of the two judgments, and said that those implications on resources and services were alarming. The Government decided to seek an Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress ("NPCSC") of arts. 22(4) and 24(3) of the Basic Law. Article 22(4) of the Basic Law provides that for entry into the HKSAR, people from other parts of China must apply for approval and that the numbers who entered Hong Kong from the Mainland for the purpose of settlement was to be determined by Mainland authorities; but the Court of Final Appeal had decided that that did not include permanent residents, and that art. 22(4) - which was deployed as the suggested justification for the statutory requirement enacted on 10 July 1997 - did not therefore inhibit the entitlement of those who were permanent residents from enjoying or exercising their right of abode. Article 24 itself defines who shall be permanent residents. The validity of the time of birth limitation with which the court was engaged in Chan Kam Nga depended upon a construction of art. 24(2)(3), and the Court held that the article, properly construed, disregarded the time of birth.

4. The Interpretation was adopted by the Standing Committee on 26 June 1999 and announced that day. It said that the interpretation by the Court of Final Appeal of both articles was not consistent with the legislative intent; that the requirement of art. 22(4) to obtain approval for entry into the HKSAR included persons of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong of permanent residents who wished to enter, for whatever reason; and that art. 24(2)(3) meant that at least one parent must have become a permanent resident at the time of the claimant's birth in order for that person himself or herself to be a permanent resident.

5. To give effect to the Interpretation, the Legislative Council passed a resolution (see section 59A Immigration Ordinance) on 16 July 1999, reinstating the time of birth limitation; and, by a procedure prescribed by the Ordinance, the Director of Immigration in effect reinstated a procedure for Mainland residents who claimed right of abode which procedure, as before, was linked to the one-way permit, which procedure, to the extent of that linkage, had been struck down by the Court of Final Appeal.

6. In October 1999, the Lau Kong Yung case was heard by the Court of Final Appeal. At issue was whether the Standing Committee had the power to make the Interpretation and, if so, its effect. The Court of Final Appeal decided that the Standing Committee did have the power in law to make the Interpretation; that the effect of that Interpretation was that permanent residents by descent (under art. 24) were within art. 22(4) and subject therefore to the one-way quota system and, further, that in order to qualify as a permanent resident under art. 24(2)(3), at least one parent had, at the time of birth of the person concerned, to be a permanent resident. The Court said that the Interpretation was applicable from 1 July 1997, and that the Interpretation declared what the law had always been.

7. The events thus described received very wide publicity and were of keen interest to the community at large, and in particular to those Mainland residents, whether at any given time in Hong Kong or not, who hoped to establish claims as permanent residents. There had been but four applicants in Ng Ka Ling, and 81 in Chan Kam Nga. There were others who took the benefit of the judgments because they had joined in other cases in respect of which those two cases were by court order made representative or test cases; and still others who were the subject of undertakings by the authorities. But the proceedings with which I am concerned are launched by several thousands of those who, for a variety of reasons, were not named parties to Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga and in respect of whom such undertakings were not given. They are all Chinese nationals with at least one parent who is a permanent resident. Some were born before that parent became a permanent resident, some after. The applicants arrived in Hong Kong at different stages - some before 1 July 1997, some since. Many have been to Hong Kong several times. In most cases their last visit to Hong Kong was on a two-way permit, but many overstayed (and are still here), although there are some whose arrival was unlawful. Some applicants are now back on the Mainland. The respondent has, in respect of the representative applicants chosen for these proceedings, made removal orders in most cases, and where removal orders have not been made, has rejected claims made in Hong Kong that they are entitled to right of abode. It is these decisions that are challenged in these judicial review proceedings.

8. At issue is the effect in law of the Interpretation upon these applicants. They say that the judgments of January 1999 still inure to their benefit. They say that the effect of the Basic Law, and of the Interpretation, and of the common law, is that the judgments of January 1999 are unaffected by the Interpretation. The argument is that the judgments were final judgments in public law, represented by the Government of the HKSAR to be determinative of issues not merely between the named parties, but as between the Government of the HKSAR and all persons who fell within the same categories as did the claimants in those cases; that, on that footing, these applicants were encouraged to abstain from joining in those proceedings and that as a matter of right, as well as of legitimate expectation, they are to be treated as parties to those judgments, and that since the Basic Law and the Interpretation themselves preserved the efficacy of judgments rendered prior to an Interpretation by the Standing Committee, the Interpretation of June 1999 has no bearing on the rights which these applicants accrued under those judgments.

9. They rely, in the alternative, on an announcement by the Chief Executive on 26 June 1999. In these proceedings, it has been called "the Concession". The Chief Executive announced, on the same day that the Standing Committee issued its Interpretation, that the Executive Council had met, and that a number of decisions had been made. Amongst them was a decision to allow persons who had arrived in Hong Kong between 1 July 1997 and 29 January 1999, and had claimed the right of abode, to have their status as permanent residents verified in accordance with the Court of Final Appeal decision. The proper interpretation of that undertaking is a matter of dispute in this case, but many of the applicants say that it gave rise to a legitimate expectation in their favour that they would be so treated, for they contend that they fall within the prescribed facts. The respondent has examined the claims of the representative applicants to fall within the Concession, but in each case has rejected it. Those rejections are also challenged in these proceedings.

II. THESE CASES

1. Broadly, this judgment covers three cases, which it has been convenient to hear together :

(1) Ng Siu Tung & Others v. Director of Immigration (HCAL No.81 of 1999)

10. There are 5,308 applicants for judicial review. 19 were selected as representative applicants; representative in the sense that they represent different times of arrival in Hong Kong, and other different factual contexts, such that their cases will cover the issues of law that have to be determined in relation to all the applicants in the case. The original application for leave to apply for judicial review in this case was made in July 1999. There were then about 4,400 applicants. The leave application was adjourned. That was because one of the issues then pleaded was the validity of the Interpretation, an issue which it was known was going to the Court of Final Appeal for determination in the Lau Kong Yung case. After that determination, in December 1999, the applicants have amended the application for judicial review and the amendment presents itself in a re-issued application. I gave leave, on 18 April 2000, to the applicants to apply for judicial review.

(2) Sin Hoi Chu & Others v. Director of Immigration (HCAL No.70 of 2000)

11. There are 43 applicants in this case. Seven had been chosen as representative. I gave leave on 19 April 2000 for them to apply for judicial review.

(3) Li Shuk Fan v. Director of Immigration (HCAL No.2 of 2000)

12. There is only one applicant. Although there were some questions whether Miss Li's case should be heard with the others, there are circumstances peculiar to her condition which suggested that an early determination was appropriate and, in the circumstances, I agreed to join her case with that of the others. Leave was given on 20 April 2000.

13. It will be seen that this hearing - the substantive hearing - has taken place within a very short time span of the granting of leave. I am most grateful to all those who have worked so hard to ensure that this case was ready for hearing in the time-frame that was allotted.

2. Time bands

14. There are issues in these cases that turn on the date upon which an applicant arrived in Hong Kong. For the purpose of those issues, there have been identified five bands or periods :

P1: This period is designed to deal with those who arrived before 1 July and stayed until 1 July 1997 itself, or beyond. 1 July 1997 is significant for that is the date upon which the Basic Law took effect. It is said that, regardless of the Interpretation, those who arrived before 1 July 1997 and stayed on beyond that date were entitled to claim right of abode without applying on the Mainland : they could make their claim in Hong Kong and the Director of Immigration was obliged to examine that claim while such an applicant was still in Hong Kong. Such a person, it is said, does not come within the scheme enacted on 10 July 1997, and is a person also unaffected by art. 22(4) of the Basic Law.

P2: Arrivals between 1 July and 10 July 1997. This period is significant because 10 July is the date of enactment of the Immigration (Amendment) (No.3) Ordinance 1997 ("the No.3 Ordinance"), which prescribed the manner in which right of abode was to be established, failing the establishment of which in that prescribed manner, a person was to be regarded as not enjoying the right of abode. That piece of legislation purported to bring that scheme into operation as from 1 July 1997, but it was held in Ng Ka Ling that that retrospective provision was unlawful, and that those here between 1 July and 10 July 1997 were, by their presence, exercising their right of abode and, upon proof that they fell within one of the categories that conferred that right, were entitled to permanent identity cards and to remain in Hong Kong.

P3: Arrivals between 10 July 1997 and 29 January 1999. This is the period during which the No.3 Ordinance scheme operated until, on 29 January 1999, the Court of Final Appeal by its judgment in Ng Ka Ling held that the scheme was unlawful to the extent that it required an applicant before entry to Hong Kong as a permanent resident to have a one-way permit. It is also the date upon which the Court of Final Appeal in Chan Kam Nga held that art. 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law conferred the status of permanent resident on those whose parents were permanent residents, or one parent was a permanent resident, regardless of the time of birth of the applicant. This period, P3, also covers almost all the time during which claims had to have been made in order to qualify for the Concession.

P4: Arrivals from 30 January to 26 June 1999. 26 June 1999 was the date upon which the Standing Committee issued its Interpretation of arts. 22(4) and 24(3); and is also the date of the Concession announcement. Those who made claims during this period or after would not benefit from the Concession. So much is common ground.

P5: Arrivals after 26 June 1999.

Histories vary, of course, from applicant to applicant. When we talk in this case of Period 1 or Period 2 or 3 arrivals, and so on, it does not always mean that the applicant has arrived in Hong Kong during that period and then stayed until now. In many representative cases, the applicant has arrived during that period but then returned to the Mainland and has come back to Hong Kong after, say, the January 1999 judgments or after the Interpretation, and has then, in many cases, overstayed, the overstaying leading to a removal order.

3. The challenge in each case

(1) Ng Siu Tung & Others (HCAL 81/1999)

15. Amongst the 5,308 applicants in this case, ages vary widely - a few, I note, born as long ago as the 1930s, a few now aged only two or three years, but most born in the 1960s and 1970s. Most were born before either parent had ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for seven years. We have called that group "Group B". Those born after a parent was already a permanent resident, we have called "Group A" applicants. There is a helpful table in the Notice of Application for each group and each time band :

PeriodBorn After
(Group A)
Born Before
(Group B)
Total
P141439480
P221416
P325121842435
P414915161665
P572640712
Total :51547935308

Of the 5,308, a minority percentage has returned to the Mainland. I do not have the up to date figure; but earlier this year I was told that of about 3,700 who had then been identified as having at some stage surrendered to the Immigration Department, in the region of 300 had returned to the Mainland. That figure may have changed. They nonetheless remain claimants.

16. The 19 representative applicants have been so chosen so that arrivals within each time band are represented, so that both Group A and Group B claimants are represented, and also in the expectation that the facts behind each case will enable the court to deliver a judgment which will embrace a spectrum of facts cast by the various cases. As argument progressed, it became increasingly apparent that there were two representative applicants in respect of whom the facts were so much in dispute as to render them inappropriate to be representative and by agreement, I shall not therefore deal with their cases, namely, Mr Ng Kam Chi (RA2) and Miss Lin Li Pin (RA9). Their withdrawal, as it were, as representative applicants, does not dilute the representative nature of the remaining claims.

Decisions challenged

17. When the application for judicial review was first filed in this case, no (or few) removal orders had been made in respect of these applicants. The conduct attacked at that stage was the suggested failure of the respondent to implement key parts of the Court of Final Appeal judgments of January 1999. The decisions now attacked are different; and that is because decisions have since been made in relation to most of the representative applicants, to make removal orders. In the representative cases the pattern varies. Some have been here since 1997, having arrived on a two-way permit, and simply overstayed the period permitted for their stay. Others came, during one or more of the time bands, on such permits, and left in accordance with the condition of stay then imposed, but have returned at various stages in 1999 after the January 1999 judgments, have overstayed, and have subsequently surrendered and claimed right of abode. In one of these cases, the applicant did not surrender but was arrested by a police officer and then made a right of abode claim. In another representative case, the applicant was in Hong Kong lawfully during 1997 and left, and then entered Hong Kong illegally in July 1999 and then surrendered asking for a permanent identity card, which has been refused.

18. What has happened is that in March and April this year, the respondent has, through various of his officers, interviewed members of applicants to decide in particular whether each falls within the terms of the Chief Executive's Concession. Where there was, in the eyes of the Director of Immigration, no lawful authority for the applicant to remain in Hong Kong - for example, because the applicant has breached a condition of stay, and where in addition he has decided that the applicant does not fall within the terms of the Concession, he made a removal order. Save in the case of one representative applicant, removal orders were all made in March and April 2000. In one or two of the representative cases, there has simply been a decision to refuse an application for the right of abode.

19. In the case of Tang Kam Ching (RA18), a Group A representative applicant, he arrived lawfully in June 1999, did not overstay and has returned to the Mainland. Whilst here he made applications for a permanent identity card. He is considered to be outside the terms of the Concession.

20. The ground given in each case of a removal order is that the applicant has contravened his or her condition of stay, and that in the exercise of the power conferred upon the Director of Immigration by section 19(1)(b) of the Immigration Ordinance, a removal order has been made. I note that in those cases where an applicant has appealed against the removal order to the Immigration Tribunal, the Director of Immigration has filed a summary of facts and reasons for the removal order, citing such breach of condition of stay, and also stating that the applicant's status cannot be established in accordance with section 2AA of the Ordinance (in other words, in accordance with the linked certificate of entitlement scheme) and, in Group B cases, that, further, neither parent was a permanent resident at the time of the applicant's birth. The decision-maker has stated in evidence filed in these proceedings that he has considered whether there are any powerful or strong humanitarian or other exceptional circumstances which may justify the Director of Immigration's exercise of discretion to permit the applicant to remain, but finds none, and whether the applicant falls within the Concession. Where an applicant has overstayed, and does not fall within the Concession, a removal order has been made.

21. In relation to the representative applicants, removal orders have in three of the cases not been made; that is, in relation to -

i) Miss Ng Siu Tung (RA1)

Since the list of representative applicants was drawn and included in the Notice of Application, she has been accepted by the respondent as falling within the Concession. No relief is now sought in her case.

ii) Miss Ng Kam Chi (RA2)

She entered unlawfully. No removal order has been made but as I have explained, she is not to be treated as a representative applicant any longer.

iii) Mr Tang Kim Ching (RA18)

He was not an overstayer. He came to Hong Kong lawfully in July 1999 and left on time. He has made an application for verification of his status for a permanent identity card and says that he falls within the Concession. The respondent has refused his application for verification of status and says that he does not benefit from the Concession. Those decisions are challenged.

22. In the case of Lau Kong Yung, a removal order was made as long ago as February 1999. He was the lead applicant in the case that went to the Court of Final Appeal in late 1999. The respondent was asked to revoke the removal order, but has refused to do so.

23. The decisions under attack in HCAL 81/1999 (Ng Siu Tung) are therefore these :

(i) The removal orders made.

(ii) The decision not to classify Lau Kong Yung (RA7)as coming within the Concession. Originally it was the decision not to revoke the removal order that was under attack in this case, but since Master Lau has now obtained his one-way permit and certificate of entitlement, that, for practical purposes falls away. Nonetheless I am asked to consider the legality of the Concession decision in his case because it is said to affect other applicants.

(iii) A decision said to be contained in pro forma letters to various applicants that a person applying for verification of status would be treated as affected by the Interpretation unless he was (a) in Hong Kong between 1 - 10 July 1997 and made a right of abode claim to the Director of Immigration, or (b) in Hong Kong between 11 July 1997 and 29 January 1999 and had made a right of abode claim to the Director of Immigration.

Relief sought

24. The court is asked :

(1) To quash the removal orders made against the representative applicants.

(2) To grant declarations -

(i) that each of the representative applicants who arrived in periods 1 to 3 inclusive come within the Concession;

(ii) that those representative applicants who arrived in periods 1 and 2 are permanent residents;

(iii) that the decision of the Director of Immigration to treat any applicant who received a pro forma letter in the terms to which I have referred above as if affected by the Interpretation is unlawful;

(iv) that all representative applicants are unaffected by the Interpretation and that each is entitled to have his or her status verified in accordance with the two Court of Final Appeal judgments of January 1999; and

(v) in the case of Lau Kong Yung, that the facts relating to him fell within the terms of the Concession.

Grounds

25. The grounds of the application, distilled as much as one can for the purpose of a broad summary, are these :

(1) That those born after their parents became permanent residents and who were here before 1 July 1997 are permanent residents under art. 24(2)(3) and are not affected by art. 22(4) because art. 22(4) affects only those who came to Hong Kong after the Basic Law came into effect.

(2) That those born after their parents became permanent residents and who were in Hong Kong before 10 July 1997 are, by reason of the judgments in Ng Ka Ling and Lau Kong Yung, unaffected by the Interpretation.

(3) That the respondent in making removal orders against the applicants erred in law when he applied to them the Interpretation of the Standing Committee. The contention is that the declarations made by the Court of Final Appeal in the January 1999 cases determined the rights not just of the named parties to those proceedings but also of every person who, at the date of those judgments (or at the date of the Interpretation) was a Chinese national born outside Hong Kong and who had at least one parent who had completed seven years ordinary residence in Hong Kong and who, up to the date of the Interpretation could, or would, have brought proceedings but for the fact that there were test cases (namely, Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga) before the courts and that their rights, crystallized in January 1999, could not be removed by the Interpretation, because judgments rendered prior to the Interpretation were unaffected - a result demanded by common law principles as well as by the Basic Law and by the last paragraph of the Interpretation itself.

(4) Accordingly, the applicants have been and remained entitled, it is said, to have their status verified in accordance with the January judgments, so that those born before their parents became permanent residents, as well as those born after, are permanent residents, and are entitled to have their status verified without linkage to a one-way permit issued on the Mainland. Since removal orders were made in disregard of these rights, the orders were unlawful and must be quashed.

(5) Given that there is now in operation no scheme for verification which is not linked to the issue of a one-way permit, the only reasonable course is for the respondent to verify the applications without requiring the applicants to go back to the Mainland.

(6) That in any event there arose on the part of the applicants a legitimate expectation that as regards them and others in their position, they were to take the benefits of the January 1999 judgments. Such expectation arose by reason of the nature of those judgments and of the proceedings in respect of which the judgments were delivered and, further, by reason of statements by Government officials, before and after the judgments, that the judgments would be implemented and that a scheme would be put in place to give effect to them, not limited for the benefit of the named parties; and that persons in the position of the applicants were discouraged from themselves joining the Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga litigation on the footing that it was unnecessary for them so to do. These expectations gave rise to substantive rights ignored by the respondent in making the removal orders; and that it was also Wednesbury unreasonable, against that background, to make the orders.

(7) The announcement of the Chief Executive in January 1999 gave to those who arrived before 29 January 1999 and who claimed the right of abode before that date a legitimate expectation of having their status verified in accordance with the January 1999 judgments and without having to go back to the Mainland; but that the Director of Immigration has misinterpreted the Concession, has construed it too narrowly, and has wrongfully failed to treat the applicants as fulfilling the Concession conditions.

(2) Sin Hoi Chu (HCAL 70/2000)

26. In this case, all the applicants were born before a parent had completed seven years ordinary residence. Some - a total of nine of this group - came to Hong Kong for the first time after the Interpretation. Most of the remainder came to Hong Kong on two-way permits after the Interpretation, that is, in the latter half of 1999 or even early 2000, and have since stayed; but had also visited Hong Kong on earlier occasions for a short period at a time on two-way permits, in the main after 1 July 1997, although a few came before that date and stayed through and beyond July before later returning to the Mainland. Of these applicants, seven have been chosen as lead or representative applicants.

Decisions challenged

27. Removal orders had been made in the case of each representative applicant on different dates in December 1999, save in the case of Miss Sin Siu Yin, where the removal order was made in March 2000. In the case of these representative applicants, too, the reason for the removal order was, in each case, contravention of a condition of stay. Since all these claimants are Group B applicants, the Director of Immigration no doubt took the view (as I see is expressly stated in a summary of facts in the case of Sin Siu Yin) that they were in any event outwith the class of those entitled to permanent resident status. In each case he decided that they did not qualify as beneficiaries of the Concession. The applicants ask this court to quash the removal orders as well as such determinations as have been made that the applicants are not entitled to the right of abode in Hong Kong. They also seek declarations :

(1) that each is unaffected by the Interpretation of 26 June 1999 and is entitled to have his/her permanent resident status verified in accordance with the two Court of Final Appeal judgments, and without being removed from Hong Kong until such status is verified;

(2) that each comes within the Concession and is entitled to be treated accordingly, that is to say, to remain in Hong Kong whilst his or her status is verified in accordance with the Court of Final Appeal judgment; and

(3) that each is a permanent resident by virtue of art. 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law.

Grounds

28. The grounds in the Notice of Application cover the same terrain as that traversed in the case 81/1999, and to that extent need no repetition. These applicants, however, make two additional points :

(i) the first is an emphasis, perhaps, of a point touched upon in 81/1999, that unlike the situation immediately following the January 1999 judgments, there is now under contemplation by the Director of Immigration no status verification scheme as modified by the Court of Final Appeal in June 1999, that is, a scheme on the Mainland unlinked to the quota system which is evidenced by the one-way permit, so that it would be unfair to require return to the Mainland for verification there; and

(ii) that Group B claims have never been subject to the statutory provisions which required a certificate of entitlement, so that the Group B applicants, being previously entitled to the right of abode, are entitled to prove their status in Hong Kong in whatever manner suffices to establish the facts which constitute that status.

29. There is outstanding an application to re-amend the Notice of Application in this particular case, to plead procedural impropriety. The contention is that the procedure used by the respondent to determine whether an application fulfilled the Concession conditions was, in the case of these applicants, unfair. To this application I shall return in due course.

(3) Li Shuk Fan (HCAL 2/2000)

30. The applicant was born on the Mainland in 1980, the year her father came to Hong Kong, and he has been ordinarily resident here since then. Her mother has been here since 1996 on a one-way permit. The applicant arrived in Hong Kong on 19 February 1998 on a two-way permit. The respondent says that her permission to remain expired on 10 March 1998, and that she is an overstayer. It is said that she suffers from acute schizophrenia; and that in September 1998 she was brought by her father to the Director of Immigration for verification of her right of abode. She was, however, told to leave Hong Kong within a week. Before that date arrived, she was admitted to hospital where she remained an in-patient for some months. It is said that on 4 December 1998, the father wrote to the Director of Immigration stating why the applicant should not be forced to leave Hong Kong. She was discharged from hospital on 23 February 1999. It is claimed that there were subsequent visits to the Immigration Department for verification of her right of abode. In December 1999, she was detained for the purpose of removal. Just before the removal order was to be executed, the applicant's solicitors obtained an injunction preventing that step.

Decisions challenged :

(i) The removal order dated 17 December 1999;

(ii) A decision by the Director of Immigration on or about 28 December 1999 that the applicant is not entitled to the benefit of the Concession announced by the Chief Executive; and

(iii) A decision of the Director of Immigration on or about 28 December 1999 to execute the removal order. The order has, by reason of interim relief granted in December 1999 by Ribeiro J, as he then was, not been executed.

Relief claimed :

(i) An order to quash the removal order; and to quash the decision to execute it;

(ii) A declaration that the applicant is entitled to the benefit of the Concession by the Chief Executive on 26 June 1999; and

(iii) A declaration that the applicant is a Hong Kong permanent resident.

Grounds

31. This applicant, too, claims entitlement to the benefits, both procedural and substantive, of the January judgments, and prays in aid the same argument in support of those rights as are deployed in the other two cases, adding that she was in Hong Kong on the day those judgments were pronounced.

32. She relies also on the Concession, saying that she was in Hong Kong before 29 January 1999 and that she had made a claim : the claim upon which she relies is constituted by a letter written by her father to the Immigration Department on 4 December 1998. There were other assertions in the Notice of Application, namely, that a visit to the Immigration Department by the father in October 1998 included a claim on the applicant's behalf for the right of abode, and also an assertion that by overstaying, the applicant has claimed the right of abode. Both these contentions have formally been abandoned by Ms Li, SC, on behalf of the applicant, so that I have only to consider whether this applicant is unaffected by the Interpretation and, if necessary, whether the letter of 4 December 1998 constituted a claim within the terms of the Concession.

III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

33. The issues raised by these applications require an examination of the relationship between the Basic Law, the No.2 and No.3 Ordinances; the judgments of January 1999 and their precursors in the lower courts; the Interpretation of June 1999; and the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Lau Kong Yung. Whilst the right of abode cases hitherto have extensively rehearsed the statutory and constitutional framework relevant to those cases and to these, some re-statement of the key constitutional and statutory provisions, and some rehearsal of the history of the earlier litigation, is unavoidable.

(1) The Basic Law

34. In so far as is relevant, art. 24 provides as follows :

"Article 24

Residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region ('Hong Kong residents') shall include permanent residents and non-permanent residents.

The permanent residents of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be:

(1) Chinese citizens born in Hong Kong before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region;

(2) Chinese citizens who have ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a continuous period of not less than seven years before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special administrative Region;

(3) Persons of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong of those residents listed in categories (1) and (2);

(4) ....;

(5) ....; and

(6) ....

The above-mentioned residents shall have the right of abode in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and shall be qualified to obtain, in accordance with the laws of the Region, permanent identity cards which state their right of abode.

...."

Article 22(4) provides that :

"For entry into the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, people from other parts of China must apply for approval. Among them, the number of persons who enter the Region for the purpose of settlement shall be determined by the competent authorities of the Central People's Government after consulting the government of the Region."

Article 2 authorizes the HKSAR :

"... to exercise a high degree of autonomy and enjoy executive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication, in accordance with the provisions of this Law."

Article 8 ensures the maintenance of the common law system; and art. 19 returns to the theme of final adjudication, by its provision that :

"The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested with independent judicial power, including that of final adjudication";

an independence reaffirmed in art. 85; and a finality reasserted in art. 82 :

"The power of final adjudication of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be vested in the Court of Final Appeal of the Region ..."

Chapter VIII of the Basic Law has two articles in which are dealt the power of the Standing Committee to interpret the Basic Law, and the power of the National People's Congress to amend it. It was the power of interpretation that was invoked in June 1999, and is contained in art. 158 :

"Article 158

The power of interpretation of this Law shall be vested in the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress.

The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress shall authorize the courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to interpret on their own, in adjudicating cases, the provisions of this Law which are within the limits of the autonomy of the Region.

The courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may also interpret other provisions of this Law in adjudicating cases. However, if the courts of the Region, in adjudicating cases, need to interpret the provisions of this Law concerning affairs which are the responsibility of the Central People's Government, or concerning the relationship between the Central Authorities and the Region, and if such interpretation will affect the judgments on the cases, the courts of the Region shall, before making their final judgments which are not appealable, seek an interpretation of the relevant provisions from the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress through the Court of Final Appeal of the Region. When the Standing Committee makes an interpretation of the provisions concerned, the courts of the Region, in applying those provisions, shall follow the interpretation of the Standing Committee. However, judgments previously rendered shall not be affected.

The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress shall consult its Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region before giving an interpretation of this Law."

(2) The Immigration Ordinance

35. The Basic Law came into effect on 1 July 1997. Section 2 of the Immigration Ordinance defines a Hong Kong permanent resident as "a person who belongs to a class or description of persons specified in Schedule 1".

36. On 1 July 1997, the Provisional Legislative Council enacted the No.2 Ordinance, which came into effect that day and repealed the existing Schedule 1 and replaced it by a schedule intended to give effect to the Basic Law and its definition of permanent resident. Paragraphs 2(a)-(c) of the Schedule provided as follows :

"A person who is within one of the following categories is a permanent resident of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region -

(a) A Chinese citizen born in Hong Kong before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region if his father or mother was settled or had the right of abode in Hong Kong at the time of the birth of the person or at any later time.

(b) A Chinese citizen who has ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a continuous period of not less than 7 years before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

(c) A person of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong to a parent who is a permanent resident of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in category (a) and (b) if the parent had the right of abode in Hong Kong at the time of the birth of the person.

...."

The time of birth limitation to which I have earlier referred is in paragraph 2(c).

37. On 10 July 1997, the No.3 Ordinance was enacted; and by section 1(2) was deemed to have come into operation on 1 July 1997. It made a number of amendments to the principal Ordinance. In particular, it provided that the rights of a permanent resident (the right to land, not to have any condition of stay imposed, and not to be subject to a deportation or removal order) could not be enjoyed or exercised unless the person first established his status as a permanent resident; that he could only establish his status by holding a valid travel document as well as a valid certificate of entitlement affixed to that document; and that an application for a certificate of entitlement had to be made in such manner as was specified by the Director of Immigration by notice in the Gazette (see section 2A, 2AA and 2AB of the Ordinance). There were other ways by which the status as permanent resident could be established, but so far as Mainland resident applicants were concerned, they are of no relevance. An application for a certificate of entitlement could be made on behalf of an applicant by his parent or other person acceptable to the Director of Immigration. Section 2AB(5) provided that the making of an application for a certificate of entitlement did not give the applicant the right of abode in Hong Kong.

38. On 11 July 1997, the Director of Immigration issued a Notice by which he specified the manner in which an application for a certificate of entitlement was to be made. The Notice was published in the Gazette on 16 July 1997. The resulting scheme in relation to a Mainland resident claiming the status of permanent resident under paragraph 2(c) of Schedule I to the Ordinance is fully described in Ng Ka Ling (at pages 19-20) :

"(1) He has to apply to the Director for a certificate of entitlement through the Mainland Exit-Entry Administration in the district where he is residing in the Mainland. His application to the Mainland Exit-Entry Administration for a one-way permit may be regarded as an application for a certificate of entitlement.

(2) After confirming the person's identity, nationality and the validity of his parents' marriage, the Mainland Exit-Entry Administration will send his application to the Director for processing. If the Director is satisfied, he will issue a certificate of entitlement. This will be sent to the Mainland Exit-Entry Administration.

(3) He is subject to the quota for one-way permits determined and operated by the Mainland authorities. Upon the grant of the one-way permit by the Mainland Exit-Entry Administration, his certificate of entitlement will be affixed by them to that permit. The one-way permit is the valid travel document for him contemplated by the scheme introduced by the No 3 Ordinance.

(4) His status can only be established by his holding the one-way permit affixed with the certificate of entitlement. Without this, he shall be regarded as not enjoying the right of abode. This is so notwithstanding that the Director is satisfied of his status as a permanent resident by descent and has issued the certificate of entitlement (which would be sent to the Mainland Exit-Entry Administration). Under the scheme, that certificate alone is insufficient to establish his status. It can only be established by holding a one-way permit affixed with the certificate.

(5) He cannot come to Hong Kong to make his application. It must be made to the Mainland Exit-Entry Administration in the district in the Mainland where he is residing. If he is physically in Hong Kong, he is treated as residing in the Mainland during his stay in Hong Kong for the purposes of the scheme's operation. He cannot resist a removal order made under the Immigration Ordinance (Cap.115) by producing evidence to establish his status. He can only establish that status by holding a one-way permit affixed with a certificate of entitlement."

I refer in section VI of this judgment (page 57 below) to the legislation introduced on 16 July 1999.

IV. THE RIGHT OF ABODE CASES

39. The history of the right of abode cases is the fabric of the applicants' central argument, for it is an argument that speaks of test cases, of the intense public interest in, and of official reaction to, the shifting prospects offered or denied claimants for the right of abode by decisions at first instance, on appeal, and upon final appeal; and of the expectations of these applicants, which expectations they say were founded on those decisions and upon undertakings of the HKSAR Government immediately before as well as after the final appeal. This emphasis on the history, status and treatment of these cases requires a relatively detailed account of that history. The account also reveals the repeated insistence of the courts regardless of such verification scheme as was or was not valid or in place, upon the need for applications for verification of status to be made on the Mainland.

The selection of representative cases

40. By early July 1997, a number of applications which engaged art. 24 of the Basic Law were already before Keith J, a fact drawn to the attention of the Department of Justice by that judge's clerk in a letter dated 7 July, which stated that there were three cases (Nos.9, 13 and 44 of the Administrative Law List) which each raised a question as to the circumstances in which a right of abode in Hong Kong can be acquired by virtue of art. 24 :

"Article 24 has attracted much attention recently. Mr Justice Keith regards it as important for there to be an authoritative determination as to its legal effect as soon as possible."

It was proposed that the three cases be heard together, expedited, and that such additional cases as might come in would be heard with the existing cases. A further case (No.56 of 1997) came before the court on 8 July. It was an application for leave to apply for judicial review - another art. 24 case. There was a lengthy reply from the Department of Justice and for reasons which are not now relevant, those cases fell away - in three of them the respondent was considering a settlement which involved rescission of the removal orders. By the time the court came to respond - and all this was happening apace, within a frame of a few days - leave had been given in another case : No.60/1997, and the court decided to hear that case urgently. As for new cases coming in, they would all be referred to Keith J, and if leave was granted, a hearing would not take place until after No.60/1997 was heard. No.60 also imported a question touching upon children born in Hong Kong, as well as those born outside Hong Kong. Then, on 17 July, the Department of Justice in the person of the Law Officer (Civil Law) wrote to the court about the emergence of a fresh issue - this was the time of birth limitation issue.

41. On 17 July Messrs Clarke & Kong (formerly Clarke & Liu) informed the court that they were assigned by the Director of Legal Aid to seek judicial review on behalf of 24 more persons with another 30 sets of papers on their way. The Director of Legal Aid wanted to keep costs to a minimum and it was the intention of the solicitors, once instructions were taken from all concerned, to select a few representative cases to be put forward for a single judicial review hearing at which the broad range of issues could be canvassed. This would be done in consultation with the Department of Justice.

42. On 21 July, they wrote to the Department of Justice saying that 36 cases had been assigned but 15 of these were unmeritorious :

"...it should be relatively easy to choose representative cases from that number."

43. On 21 July 1997, Keith J ordered that no further steps would be taken in Nos.9, 13, 44, 56 and 60 "until such representative cases as are to be identified and selected have been heard and determined ...". On 23 July, the Director of Immigration wrote that : "We confirm that for those children where legal aid has been granted, but legal proceedings have not been instituted we would not remove them from Hong Kong pending the outcome of the test cases."

44. The solicitors, Clark & Kong, had been assigned 36 cases. They provided the list of applicants to the Secretary for Justice saying that it did not include "a large number of cases which had been identified as hopeless. The Legal Aid Department is taking steps to discharge legal aid in the hopeless cases." On the advice of counsel, they, the solicitors, had selected five cases "to proceed as test cases". Each case was put forward to test a different point (for example, retrospectivity of No.3 Ordinance; art. 22 Basic Law, and so on). There was an exchange of correspondence about the most appropriate selection. The parties agreed upon four cases which could proceed as test cases. On 4 August, Clark & Kong sought an undertaking from the Director of Immigration - apparently the Director of Immigration had said that all those not granted legal aid would be removed - an undertaking that she (the Director) would "not remove persons reporting to the Director of Immigration and claiming right of abode, whether or not they had been granted legal aid" without first giving such a person time to lodge an application for judicial review. That proposal was rejected, and it was pointed out that of the 500 applications then before the Director of Legal Aid, almost half had been refused legal aid. The Director of Immigration did however undertake not to remove the five applicants in those four cases "pending conclusion of the proceedings".

45. It was against that background that the right of abode litigation commenced before Keith J. The four cases were : Cheung Lai Wah (68/1997); Ng Ka Ling and Ng Tan Tan (70/1997); Tsui Kuen Nang (71/1997); and Yeung Ni Ni (73/1997).

(i) October 1997 : Cheung Lai Wah (First Instance)

46.Ng Ka Ling started in the Court of First Instance as Cheung Lai Wah [1997] 3 HKC 64. It was heard in September 1997 and judgment was delivered by Keith J, as he then was, in October. The hearing was of the four selected cases. It was asserted on behalf of the applicants that whilst those claiming the right of abode in Hong Kong by descent must establish the facts which gave rise to their claim, they should be entitled to entry into Hong Kong pending the establishment of the facts; and that to require them to remain out of Hong Kong was to deny them the right of abode "to which he may be found to be entitled during the period of verification," (page 80), and that that was inconsistent with art. 24 of the Basic Law which was not expressed to be subject to limitation. Keith J rejected that argument saying that it was left open to the legislature to make art. 24 workable in practice, and that the logical consequence of the argument, if correct, would enable anyone who entered Hong Kong, lawfully or not, to remain pending verification, a consequence carrying serious implications for immigration control, one which could never have been intended.

47. The requirement in the No.3 Ordinance that a claimant could only establish his status as a permanent resident if he held a valid travel document - which in reality meant a one-way permit - as well as a certificate of entitlement, was said by the applicants to be incompatible with the exercise of the right of abode envisaged by art. 24, and that it was "not permissible to use immigration legislation as a means of correcting such social problems as were thought would arise as a result of the exercise by large numbers of Mainland children of their right of abode in Hong Kong by descent." This reference to social problems is interesting because the apprehended social problems became the rationale, 20 months later, for the request to the Standing Committee for the Interpretation. Keith J pointed out that one of the objectives of the No.3 Ordinance was to ensure that the arrival of persons who had acquired the right of abode in Hong Kong by descent would be staggered. In its Brief to the Provisional Legislative Council, the Security Bureau had said :

"If they all arrived at once the impact on the social support services would be extremely difficult to bear." (see page 82F)

The judge took the view that a purposive construction of art. 22(4) "requires it to be construed as applying to those persons who enjoyed the right of abode under art. 24 but who are living in Mainland China" (page 84E), and rejected the suggestion that that article was irrelevant to those already in Hong Kong - they could, he found, only establish their right by descent in accordance with the No.3 Ordinance (page 86C).

48. Also raised by Keith J was the retrospectivity issue : did the No.3 Ordinance operate from 1 July 1997 as it purported to do? He took the view that :

(1) It did not take away a right of abode from those who up to 10 July enjoyed that right because restriction on the exercise of the right was to be found in art. 24 which came into effect on 1 July. In so far as it was argued that the retrospective operation of the No.3 Ordinance conflicted with art. 15(1) of the International Covenant on Civil & Political Rights ("ICCPR"), as applied to Hong Kong, by which no one shall be held guilty of a criminal offence on account of any act which did not constitute a criminal offence under Hong Kong law at the day of its commission, he found against the claimants on his view that that article prohibited prosecution for such an offence, rather than legislation which exposed a person to the possibility of prosecution.

(2) There was a separate issue in relation to illegitimate children, for the No.2 Ordinance imported a provision which took out of the relationship of parent and child, a man and his child born out of wedlock, where the child was not subsequently legitimized by marriage of the parents. The judge held that that provision contravened art. 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law.

Agreements and Undertakings

49. Shortly before this judgment was handed down, there was correspondence which sought to ensure that clients of Clark & Kong would not be removed from the jurisdiction until any appeal procedure had, if the question arose, been instituted. The Department of Justice agreed that :

"The status quo should be preserved until the final determination of the issues in these proceedings or appeals thereof ... . It shall be taken to be such final determination if no appeal is lodged by either of the parties during the prescribed period for lodging an appeal... . Your clients will not be removed until the final determination of the issues.... . The above ... arrangement will apply to all your other clients who had been granted legal aid to bring similar proceedings and who are now granted recognizance by the Director of Immigration ... . However, our proposed arrangement will stop to apply to any of these cases as soon as a legal aid certificate granted is discharged."

That proposal was accepted. The evidence is that up to September 1997 legal aid had been granted to some 1,086 persons to bring proceedings similar to the representative cases.

50. However, after 22 September 1997, the Director of Legal Aid stopped issuing legal aid certificates even where the merits test was satisfied. This was done to save public funds. This fact was drawn to the attention of the respondent by the Director of Legal Aid by a memorandum dated 13 October 1997, and by that memorandum the respondent was asked to extend the undertaking not to remove claimants from Hong Kong to the "children covered by our remaining meritorious cases where legal aid [has] been withheld". A list with names was attached. Updated lists of meritorious cases would from time to time be served. The evidence is that the respondent accepted this proposal. 442 claimants were, up to 11 January 1999, covered by the "meritorious list" arrangement. After this judgment was delivered, orders were made by Yeung J on a number of cases adjourning applications for judicial review pending determination of the appeal in Cheung Lai Wah.

(ii) November 1997 to January 1998 : Chan Kam Nga (First Instance)

51. In November 1997, proceedings in Chan Kam Nga were lodged by Pam Baker & Co. on behalf of 81 applicants. In due course one applicant was chosen as a representative applicant. The Department of Justice suggested that to be a wise and cost-saving step since the sole issue was a legal one.

52. The respondent agreed not to remove the proposed applicants pending the outcome of the application for judicial review, but it was an agreement subject to a requirement that the applicants report to the respondent as required by the terms of their respective recognizances. The non-removal agreement was extended to a number of additional proposed applicants, all clients of Pam Baker & Co., on the understanding that those who had not previously reported to the respondent or who had breached reporting requirements would report within a week. Further lists, of additional applicants, were forwarded from time to time. The first instance hearing took place in January 1998, and judgment given one week later, on 26 January 1998 ([1998] 1 HKC 16). Keith J declared that the time of birth limitation contravened the Basic Law.

(iii) April 1998 : Cheung Lai Wah (Court of Appeal) [1998] 1 HKC 617

53. The appeal was referred to as arising from four test cases (page 627). The issues were said to include the constitutionality of the No.2 and No.3 Ordinances, and of the retrospective provision of the No.3 Ordinance, and the validity of that part of the No.2 Ordinance affecting illegitimate children. Recognition of the wide import of the issues under discussion is evident from the nature of the judgments. The Chief Judge said that it was universally accepted that an orderly settlement of the children in Hong Kong was necessary and that there had to be a procedure for verifying applications claiming permanent resident status. Whatever procedure was to be devised had to facilitate rather than restrict the right of abode, unless such restriction were permitted by the Basic Law. He also emphasized the serious social problems that would arise if all Group B persons came at once. The right of abode was, in the circumstances, not restricted by requiring a claimant to apply for it in Mainland China and to obtain a certificate of entitlement. He held that the requirement for a valid travel document to which the certificate of entitlement was affixed went beyond a mere procedure or proof. However, art. 24(2)(3) had, so far as was possible, to be read in conjunction with art. 22(4), and art. 22(4) was to be construed as applying to all persons seeking to leave the Mainland and enter Hong Kong, including those within art. 24(2)(3). The No.3 Ordinance was not unconstitutional.

54. On the question of retrospectivity, the Chief Judge drew a distinction between the establishment of the right of abode and its exercise, and held that "if before the enactment of the No.3 Ordinance [a claimant] was able to prove his permanent resident status under art. 24(2)(3), then he would have a right to remain in Hong Kong and could not be removed." As for two of the appellants who came before 1 July 1997, they would in any event not be affected by art. 22(4). He held that the retrospective provision was unconstitutional.

55. Nazareth VP agreed (page 653) that those who entered before 1 July were not affected by art. 22(4); that art. 22(4) applied to those who were permanent residents under art. 24(2)(3) (page 654). He held that art. 22(4) sanctioned the restriction on the right of abode conferred by art. 24(2)(3). The retrospective provision of the No.3 Ordinance was constitutional since it was a provision subsidiary to art. 22(4).

56. Mortimer VP concluded (page 663G) that even permanent residents with a right of abode under art. 24 from other parts of China must apply for approval for entry into the HKSAR and that the No.3 Ordinance, in making such provision, was not unconstitutional. As for retrospectivity, he held that since the exercise of the right of abode was restricted by art. 22(4), the argument that the No.3 Ordinance retrospectively deprived claimants of a right of abode fell away (page 664I).

(iv) May 1998 : Chan Kam Nga (Court of Appeal)

57. Keith J's decision that the time of birth limitation was unconstitutional was overturned : [1998] 1 HKLRD 752. The Chief Judge remarked on the practical consequences of such a finding, saying that that can never have been intended by the Basic Law drafters, and spoke of a family tree that would grow to "a number which is difficult to imagine". That practical effect was also referred to by Nazareth VP (page 760), and both he and Mortimer VP held that, upon a true construction of the words of art. 24(2)(3) themselves, there was imported a time of birth limitation.

(v) 29 January 1999 : Ng Ka Ling (Court of Final Appeal)

58. Li CJ said ([1999] 2 HKCFAR 4, 12) :

" Throughout history, residents in Hong Kong have had family ties in the rest of China. Since the Mainland began her open door policy, ... these family ties have very much grown. By 1 July 1997 ... a number of Chinese nationals born on the Mainland have at least one parent who is a Hong Kong permanent resident with the right of abode here.

We are concerned in this appeal with their status as permanent residents of and their right of abode in Hong Kong. Questions involving the proper interpretation of the Basic Law are before us for the first time. These are questions of momentous importance for both the future of the people involved as well as the development of constitutional jurisprudence in the new order."

59. He referred to the four cases as test cases. The issues were stated in broad terms, by which I mean that they were stated by reference to the constitutionality of specified legal provisions - whether the No.3 Ordinance in introducing the scheme was constitutional; whether section 1(2) of that Ordinance was, given its purported retrospective effect, constitutional; whether the out of wedlock provision in so far as it distinguished between the case of children whose mothers who were permanent residents and those whose fathers were, was constitutional. The points related to facts common to many thousands of people rather than facts peculiar to the applicants in those cases. The relief that the court granted was in wide terms, relief directed at the constitutionality of the legislative provisions, as well as relief specific to the applicants themselves.

(vi) 29 January 1999 : Chan Kam Nga (Court of Final Appeal)

60. In Chan Kam Nga [1999] 2 HKCFAR 82, 87, Bokhary PJ referred to the 81 applicants, adding this :

" How this question is answered will affect not only these 81 appellants but many other persons now and in the future.... . The question is now before this Court. And I approach it with a keen sense of its wide implications."

61. The relief granted in that case by the Court of Final Appeal were declarations as follows :

"(1) Each appellant can become a Hong Kong permanent resident under category (3) of art.24 of the Basic Law by virtue of a parent's Hong Kong permanent resident status under category (2) of that article whether such status of the parent's was acquired before or after the appellant's birth.

(2) The words 'if the parent had the right of abode at the time of the birth of the person' in para.2(c) Sched.1 of the Immigration Ordinance ... (which schedule was introduced by the Immigration (Amendment) (No.2) Ordinance 1997 ... contravene art.24 of the Basic Law and are therefore unconstitutional and null and void."

V. REACTION TO THE LITIGATION

1. The Government

62. The stance of, and suggested representations by, the authorities from and including 1997 through, to and including 1999, both to the public at large and to individuals who had a direct interest in the effect of immigration legislation and the effect of the on-going litigation, plays a central role in the argument advanced in this application. The flavour of that behaviour and of those representations requires to be described so that the argument of the applicants can better be appreciated. This is a convenient point at which to describe it. As to what was said to the public at large, much of it comes from press reports, and it is not suggested by the respondent that those reports reflected anything other than an accurate picture.

63. In early July 1997, in response to the challenges then launched in the courts, the Chief Executive said that people were of course free to challenge the Government in the courts. The Government would obviously uphold the law. The Government was sympathetic to what was happening but the problem was one for the community as a whole : education, housing, medicine, social welfare.

64. The Director of Immigration, then Mrs Regina Ip, said that if the Government lost in the courts, they would have to amend the legislation according to the judgment : in other words, as I understand it, to give legislative effect to the judgments.

65. In the same month, the Legal Aid Department was reported to have commented that the test cases would become a precedent for similar cases. In relation to the choice of representative cases, the same source was said to have commented that if a particular case lost, then other similar cases would be given the same judgment and then there would be no need to hear them individually ('Oriental Daily' report).

66. On 31 July 1997, the Chief Executive said in Hong Kong, in relation to a challenge in the courts to the legality of the Provisional Legislative Council, that the Government would argue its case in court and abide by the court's ruling. In October in a speech overseas, the Chief Executive repeated, in a general context, the point that the Government would argue its cases in court and continue to abide by the court's ruling.

67. On 19 February 1998, there was a Security Bureau Report to the Legislative Council Security Panel. It referred to the two First Instance judgments then under appeal, and in relation to Chan Kam Nga said :

"The serious implications of this judgment, which was recognized by the judge, is that it extends the right of abode to Chinese nationals of any age born outside Hong Kong, one of whose parents acquires the right of abode at any time subsequently. Provided however the certificate of entitlement provisions are upheld, it would still be necessary for such a person to obtain a one-way permit before entering Hong Kong for the purpose of settlement."

After the decisions of the Court of Appeal in the spring of 1998, the Government issued a press release welcoming the decisions.

68. A paper submitted by the Security Bureau to the Legislative Council Panel on Security in October 1998 reported the essence of the decision of the Court of Appeal in the two cases and the fact that appeals had been lodged by both sides against such decisions as had gone against them.

69. On 29 January 1999, the Secretary for Security said that the Hong Kong authorities would discuss with the Mainland authorities ways to facilitate the early entry of eligible persons, that is, those eligible under the judgments issued that day by the Court of Final Appeal. She stressed the fact that it remained necessary for claimants to have a certificate of entitlement before coming to Hong Kong to settle as permanent residents. Persons without certificates of entitlement would be sent back to the Mainland.

70. I have a transcript of a media question and answer session by the Chief Executive on 30 January 1999. Asked about the decision of the Court of Final Appeal, he said that :

"We respect that decision. ... This is a legal process - two sides present a case, one side will win, the other side will lose. And that is the way it is going to work."

He was asked how concerned he was about the practical implications of the judgments and he said that those implications were being evaluated. On the same day, the Acting Chief Executive, in Hong Kong, said that :

"We respect the court's decision and we will act accordingly."

She added that the decision would place pressure on services in Hong Kong. She stressed that any person without a certificate of entitlement illegally entering Hong Kong would be repatriated to the Mainland.

71. On the same day, 30 January, the Secretary for Security, Mrs Ip, summarized the effect of the Court of Final Appeal's judgments including that court's conclusion that it did not need to seek an interpretation, and also said that :

"We respect the court's judgment and will employ appropriate measures to implement the court's judgment."

There was no need, she said, to wait for agreement of the Chinese side before implementing the new certificate of entitlement scheme. She expressed serious concern about the practical ramifications of the time of birth judgment :

"Although at the moment we are not certain about the marked increase in numbers of people eligible for right of abode as a result of this judgment, we will be negotiating with Mainland departments to study just how many children are in this category."

She said that there would have to be an estimate of the pressure that would be put on social services. She urged those who believed that they had the right of abode not to come to Hong Kong illegally.

72. On 1 February 1999, the Immigration Department issued a statement saying that the effect of the Court of Final Appeal judgments was that those who claimed to have a right of abode should apply for the certificate of entitlement on the Mainland. Discussions would be necessary with the Mainland authorities about appropriate arrangements. Those who entered Hong Kong illegally would be immediately repatriated.

73. I do not, however, need to cite every governmental announcement made in those days. They all said much the same thing : that they would respect the Court of Final Appeal's judgments, expressed concern about the practical ramifications, and also said, again and again, that the judgments did not entitle people to come to Hong Kong for settlement other than with a certificate of entitlement, and that those who came on two-way permits and then claimed the right of abode without holding a certificate of entitlement would not have their applications processed in Hong Kong, and would have to leave at the expiry of their stay in Hong Kong.

74. On 5 February 1999, the Chief Secretary said that a task force had been established "to implement and to comply with the Court of Final Appeal's judgment as regard the certificate of entitlement scheme". There was to be a survey to assess the likely number of people eligible. There would be talks with the Mainland authorities about the new certificate of entitlement scheme.

75. On 11 February, it was announced that the Secretary for Justice would be visiting Beijing the next day to meet officials and with legal experts.

76. On 2 March 1999, there was a meeting of the House Committee of the Legislative Council. Some members asked officials present whether it was intended to amend the Basic Law. Mrs Ip said that the issue had not been discussed. She agreed that a new set of lawful and reasonable application procedures should be put in place as soon as possible. Details were being worked out, she said, but that this would take time.

2. Individuals and their families

77. It goes without saying that the right of abode litigation and the accompanying responses and reactions of the authorities was watched with keen interest by those affected : those living on the Mainland, those who came here on two-way permits, those who came here unlawfully, those who overstayed, and all their families. As one would expect, the conduct of such persons varied one from the other and at different stages from July 1997 until after the judgments of January 1999. According to the evidence filed, many applicants made claims from time to time for one-way permits whilst still on the Mainland. Quite a few say that they were told there that they were too old to be considered for such applications. Some, whilst in Hong Kong, made applications for legal aid. Others, or their families, made enquiries in Hong Kong from the Immigration Department. Some were told that they were not eligible. Quite what information they were given depended upon the state of the law as dictated by the stage at which the question or issue was raised; in other words, if after the Court of Appeal decision in the Spring of 1998, when the time of birth limitation had been held by the Court of Appeal to be constitutional, Group B applicants had no chance of a reply that was anything other than discouraging. Many say that they were told that they were not eligible or that they should make their application on the Mainland. Some applied for legal aid but were refused. Some people wrote frequently on behalf of their children. Some wrote to the authorities through concern groups. Some approached the authorities immediately after the Court of Final Appeal January judgments only to find themselves arrested. Some did nothing. They permitted their youngsters to return to the Mainland because they did not want them to risk trouble with the authorities for overstaying. Some did nothing in the sense that they overstayed in Hong Kong, but made no approach to any authoritative body, for fear of discovery and arrest. There were also those who say that they deliberately stayed in the Mainland before coming to Hong Kong at all, awaiting the decisions of the Court of Final Appeal.

3. Moving towards the Interpretation

78. The history I have related shows that in the immediate aftermath of the two judgments, the authorities in Hong Kong represented they intended to implement a scheme to give effect to the two Court of Final Appeal judgments. They said that they intended to respect those judgments. The evidence is that discussions were held with Mainland authorities about procedures for the collection and verification of certificate of entitlement applications. The idea was that the Exit and Entry Administrative Bureau of the Public Security Ministry would act as the respondent's agent on the Mainland in the application procedure for a certificate of entitlement.

79. Quite what these representations about implementing the judgments amounted to is an issue in the case, to which I shall return.

80. But upon one matter the authorities were firm, which was that applications had still to be made on the Mainland. And so overstayers were made the subject of removal orders, which orders eventually were challenged in the Lau Kong Yung proceedings. There were 18 applicants in that case. Evidence filed in those proceedings in March 1999 was to the effect that over 800 overstayers and illegal entrants had approached the immigration authorities claiming the same rights as did the 18 applicants, and that there were many others still on the Mainland waiting to apply for certificates of entitlement in accordance with such new procedures as might emerge.

81. The Government of the HKSAR then conducted a survey to ascertain the number of persons from the Mainland who would, under the Court of Final Appeal judgments, have the right of abode in Hong Kong. On 28 April 1999, a paper was placed before the Legislative Council with the Government's estimate of the number of Mainlanders with right of abode in Hong Kong. It catered for first and second generation eligibility, by which I mean that it estimated the number of Mainland children of Hong Kong residents as well as the number of children of those Mainland children who would be eligible for right of abode under the Court of Final Appeal ruling. The total was 1,675,000. It was thought that a high proportion of those eligible would seek to establish and exercise that right.

82. On 6 May 1999, the Government issued its assessment of the practical implications of the admission into Hong Kong of that number. It issued a paper which addressed the impact on housing, education, health care, welfare services, employment, transport and the environment, and the related costs. The Government took the view that to absorb the estimated additional numbers would create an unbearable burden upon the Region.

83. On 18 May, the Government announced that it would seek an Interpretation of the NPCSC under art. 158(1) of the Basic Law. Other options, such as amending the Basic Law, had, it said, been considered, but each was said to have signal disadvantages.

84. On 20 May 1999, the Chief Executive submitted to the State Council of the PRC a Report, seeking the assistance of the Central People's Government in resolving problems encountered in the implementation of the relevant provisions of the Basic Law. "The judgments," said the Report, "of the Court of Final Appeal ... have extended the eligibility for the right of abode of persons born in the Mainland of Hong Kong permanent residents beyond that previously provided for in the Immigration Ordinance," had ruled that such persons could enter Hong Kong without the prior approval of the Mainland authorities. That interpretation was different from the HKSAR Government's understanding of the relevant provisions of the Basic Law and "the effect of the Court of Final Appeal's interpretation would be to place unbearable pressure on the HKSAR." To support the Government's understanding, reference was made to the Joint Declaration and to an Opinion of the Preparatory Committee in 1996. Public opinion was said, in the Report, to be overwhelmingly in favour of an early resolution of the issue. The judgments of the Court of Final Appeal were annexed.

85. The State Council then approached the Standing Committee to interpret the two articles. The Standing Committee consulted the Basic Law Committee.

VI. THE INTERPRETATION, AND AFTER

1. The Interpretation

86. The Interpretation of the Standing Committee was issued on 26 June 1999. There is but one official version of the Interpretation and it is in Chinese. The English version before me is a translation prepared by the Department of Justice, a translation widely used, but about which, in one important aspect, there is an issue. The translation has no legislative effect. The translation, the accuracy of which is not in dispute save, as I say, for one phrase, runs as follows :

"THE INTERPRETATION BY THE STANDING
COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL PEOPLE'S
CONGRESS OF ARTICLES 22(4) AND 24(2)(3) OF THE
BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

(Adopted by the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress at its Tenth Session on 26 June 1999)

The Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress examined at its Tenth session the 'Motion Regarding the Request for an Interpretation of Articles 22(4) and 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law of the [HKSAR] of the [PRC]' submitted by the State Council. The motion of the State Council was submitted upon the report furnished by the Chief Executive of the [hksar] under the relevant provisions of Articles 43 and 48(2) of the Basic Law of the [HKSAR] of the [PRC]. The issue raised in the Motion concerns the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Basic Law of the [HKSAR] of the [PRC] by the Court of Final Appeal of the [HKSAR] in its judgment dated 29 January 1999. Those relevant provisions concern affairs which are the responsibility of the Central People's Government and concern the relationship between the Central Authorities and the [HKSAR]. Before making its judgment, the Court of Final Appeal had not sought an interpretation of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress in compliance with the requirement of Article 158(3) of the Basic Law of the [HKSAR] of the [PRC]. Moreover, the interpretation of the Court of Final Appeal is not consistent with the legislative intent. Therefore, having consulted the Committee for the Basic Law of the [HKSAR] under the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress has decided to make, under the provisions of Article 67(4) of the Constitution of the [PRC] and Article 158(1) of the Basic Law of the [HKSAR] of the [PRC], an interpretation of the provisions of Articles 22(4) and 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law of the [HKSAR] of the [PRC] as follows:

1. The provisions of Article 22(4) of the Basic Law of the [HKSAR] of the [PRC] regarding 'For entry into the [HKSAR], people from other parts of China must apply for approval' mean as follows: People from all provinces, autonomous regions, or municipalities directly under the Central Government, including those persons of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong of Hong Kong permanent residents, who wish to enter the [HKSAR] for whatever reason, must apply to the relevant authorities of their residential districts for approval in accordance with the relevant national laws and administrative regulations, and must hold valid documents issued by the relevant authorities before they can enter the [HKSAR]. It is unlawful for people from all provinces, autonomous regions, or municipalities directly under the Central Government, including persons of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong of Hong Kong permanent residents, to enter the [HKSAR] without complying with the appropriate approval procedure prescribed by the relevant national laws and administrative regulations.

2. It is stipulated in the first three categories of Article 24(2) of the Basic Law of the [HKSAR] of the [PRC] that the 'permanent residents of the [HKSAR] shall be:

(1) Chinese citizens born in Hong Kong before or after the establishment of the [HKSAR];

(2) Chinese citizens who have ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a continuous period of not less than seven years before or after the establishment of the [HKSAR];

(3) Persons of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong of those residents listed in categories (1) and (2);'.

The provisions of category (3) regarding the 'persons of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong of those residents listed in categories (1) and (2)' mean both parents of such persons, whether born before or after the establishment of the [HKSAR], or either of such parents must have fulfilled the condition prescribed by category (1) or (2) of Article 24(2) of the Basic Law of the [HKSAR] of the [PRC] at the time of their birth. The legislative intent as stated by this Interpretation, together with the legislative intent of all other categories of Article 24(2) of the Basic Law of the [HKSAR] of the [PRC], have been reflected in the 'Opinions on the Implementation of Article 24(2) of the Basic Law of the [HKSAR] of the [PRC]' adopted at the Fourth Plenary Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the [HKSAR] of the National People's Congress on 10 August 1996.

As from the promulgation of this Interpretation, the courts of the [HKSAR], when referring to the relevant provisions of the Basic Law of the [HKSAR] of the [PRC], shall adhere to this Interpretation. This Interpretation does not affect the right of abode in the [HKSAR] which has been acquired under the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal on the relevant cases dated 29 January 1999 by the parties concerned in the relevant legal proceedings. Other than that, the question whether any other person fulfils the conditions prescribed by Article 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law of the [HKSAR] of the [PRC] shall be determined by reference to this Interpretation."

Particular points to be noted at this juncture are these :

(1) The Interpretation was expressly issued under art. 158(1) of the Basic Law : it was, in other words, a free-standing interpretation, and not an interpretation following a judicial reference under art. 158(3).

(2) The effect of the Interpretation was that -

(i) art. 22(4) qualified art. 24(3); in other words, even permanent residents had to apply to the Mainland authorities before they could enter Hong Kong to exercise their right of abode; and

(ii) art. 24(2)(3) was to be read as containing a time of birth limitation.

(3) The Interpretation made express reference to those who are not to be affected by the Interpretation.

The contentious translation is of the characters "當事人" ("dong sze yan") which are translated by the Department of Justice as "parties concerned" (in the relevant proceedings). To this issue I must return.

2. The Concession

87. It has been convenient to call the Chief Executive's statement of 26 June 1999, made in both Cantonese and English at a media session, "the Concession". In a sense, that is to beg one of the questions raised in this case, which is whether the steps then taken by the Government were steps which they were obliged in law in any event to take or whether, on the other hand, they were acting as a matter of grace or, as it has been termed, concession.

88. In its English version and in so far as is relevant to the issues in this case, this is what it said :

" After receiving the Interpretation of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, the Executive Council met earlier today. We have made the following decisions :

First, we will introduce a resolution to the legislature to amend Schedule 1 to the Immigration Ordinance :

a) to make it clear that children born outside Hong Kong will only be eligible for the right of abode if at least one of their parents has already acquired permanent resident status at the time of their birth; and

b) to provide for children born out of wedlock to apply for right of abode.

Secondly, to comply with the principle that judgments previously rendered by the Court of Final Appeal should not be affected by an Interpretation of the National People's Congress Standing Committee, we will allow persons who arrived in Hong Kong between July 1, 1997 and January 29, 1999 and had claimed the right of abode, to have their status as permanent residents verified in accordance with the Court of Final Appeal decision. It is estimated that there are about 3,700 in this category.

Thirdly, for those who arrived after January 29, 1999, or I could put it another way, thirdly, for any other persons, they will only be able to apply for the right of abode if they satisfy the terms of the Interpretation given by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress."

3. The legislation in July 1999

89. In July 1999 legislative amendments were made, and a new Notice gazetted specifying the manner in which applications for certificate of entitlement schemes were to be made. The relevant changes were summarized by Li CJ in Lau Kong Yung [1999] 2 HKC FAR 300, 327-8, as follows :

"Following the Interpretation, on 16 July 1999, the Legislative Council passed a resolution under s.59A of the Ordinance to amend Sched.1. The relevant amendment for this appeal is that para.2(c) was repealed and substituted by:

(c) A person of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to a parent who, at the time of birth of that person, was a Chinese citizen falling within category (a) or (b).

.....

On 16 July 1999, the Director gazetted a new notice to replace the Notice (the new Notice). The new Notice is similar in substance to the former Notice. Paragraph A(i) is in the same terms. A Mainland resident shall apply for a certificate of entitlement through the Exit-Entry Administration of the Public Security Bureau in the district where he is residing. Paragraph B is similar in effect although the wording is different. It reads:

Where a person is at the time of application residing in the Mainland of China, an application for settlement in Hong Kong made to the offices or departments of the Exit-Entry Administration of the Public Security Bureau under the laws in force in the Mainland of China, whether before or after the gazetting of this notice, may be regarded as an application for a Certificate of Entitlement or certified duplicate.

The former Notice is similar : '... an application for an exit permit to Hong Kong and Macau made to the Exit-Entry Administration of the Public Security Bureau under the laws in force in the Mainland of China for settlement in Hong Kong, ... may be regarded as an application for a Certificate of Entitlement ...'"

4. Lau Kong Yung

90. The efficacy of the Interpretation was the key issue before the Court of Final Appeal in Lau Kong Yung - whether the Standing Committee had the power to make the Interpretation and, if so, what was its effect. The Court of Final Appeal in Lau Kong Yung [1999] 2 HKCFAR 300 held that the Standing Committee had the power to make the Interpretation under art. 158(1); that it was a valid and binding interpretation of arts. 22(4) and 24(2)(3) which the courts of the HKSAR were under a duty to follow; that under art. 22(4) all persons from the Mainland, including those within art. 24(2)(3), who wished to enter for whatever reason had to apply on the Mainland to relevant authorities of their district for approval, and were required to hold valid documents issued by those authorities before they could enter the SAR; that to qualify as a permanent resident under art. 24(2)(3), it was necessary for at least one parent to be a permanent resident at the time of birth of the person concerned; and that the Interpretation had effect from 1 July 1997. The resulting position was described by Li CJ, at page 327B :

"As a result of the Interpretation the original scheme is and has since 1 July 1997 been constitutional.

The time of birth limitation in the No.2 Ordinance is and has since 1 July 1997 been constitutional.

The provisions in the No.3 Ordinance and the notice declared by the court to be unconstitutional ... are and have since 1 July 1997 been constitutional."

I shall deal later with the findings of the Court as to the constitutionality of the retrospective provision of the No.3 Ordinance.

91. The Court also dealt with the position of the applicants in that case as it had been immediately after the January judgments, saying that whatever scheme for a certificate of entitlement was or was not in place, they had, as overstayers, no legal claim to remain in Hong Kong. To this aspect, I shall also return.

VII. THE APPLICANT'S CASE

92. Mr Chang, on behalf of the applicants, says that in the context of this history, the question to be asked, the central question, is who it is that is unaffected by the Interpretation. The answer, he says, is a question of mixed law and fact, to be examined against the complex and very public history to which I have referred; a history which has at its heart a practice in which it is taken as read that the authorities abide by judgments of final jurisdiction; a case assumed by the public, by those with an interest in the outcome, and by the courts, to affect the many persons outside the number of those who were named parties to the proceedings; where people were, he says, discouraged from joining in proceedings because it was simply not necessary to do so, and it was not necessary to do so because every one took it for granted that the January judgments of the Court of Final Appeal, whichever way they fell, would be applied to all and not just to the named parties. They were test cases; cases that were litigated in public law; deciding questions of status; and were in their essence in the nature of judgments in rem; cases which, by reason of tradition and express representation, it was assumed would flower into judgments of the courts that would be applied and implemented either for the benefit of, or against, a wide tranche of Mainland residents with family in Hong Kong. He states that the courts themselves encouraged the selective approach to the choice of cases; that it would be unthinkable so to approach the power of interpretation and the preservation of judgments previously rendered so that the only way one could be protected from the effect of an interpretation subsequent to a judgment would be by joining in, willy-nilly, to existing proceedings, regardless of the numbers already joined, regardless of the nature of the proceedings, and regardless of the open attitude of the authorities in saying that they will abide by whatever judgment emerges. These applicants and many like them, it is said, enjoyed an identity of interest with and in those cases which took their inexorable route to the Court of Final Appeal through 1999 and into early January 1999, and that they should for all these reasons be treated as parties to the judgments delivered at the end of that month, on 29 January 1999. All of this, it is said, is but a proper application of common law principles, preserved by the Basic Law, a reflection of those central aspects of the Basic Law that underscore Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy, and the power of final adjudication reposing in the courts; and none of it sits uncomfortably either with the Interpretation itself which, it is said, by its terms, properly read, contemplates that those with a direct and sufficient interest in the January 1999 judgments shall not be affected by the Interpretation; or with the sentiment of art. 158(3) which envisages that judgments previously rendered shall not be affected by a Standing Committee interpretation subsequently issued.

93. Who is it then, on this analysis, that should benefit from those judgments, apart from the named parties? The answer, so runs the contention in the Notice of Application, is everyone who at the date of the judgments, or alternatively at the date of the Interpretation, was a Chinese national born outside Hong Kong and had then at least one parent who had completed seven years ordinary residence in Hong Kong and who could or would, but for the fact that there were test cases, have brought proceedings for a declaration in relation to his or her status. In other words, those who would not benefit from the Interpretation, would be those not yet born as well as those whose parents had not by the date of the Interpretation yet acquired the status of permanent resident. As an alternative to this proposition, it is argued that the class of beneficiaries of the Interpretation might be limited to those who had before the January 1999 judgments in some way asserted their right of abode, that assertion manifesting itself either by presence in Hong Kong or by a claim to the right of abode other than by mere presence, including any form of oral claim made to the authorities.

94. Distilled into its separate compartments, the applicants' case is that :

(1) Despite the retrospective effect of the Interpretation, that they are entitled to the benefit of the judgments of January 1999; this because -

(i) The terms of the Interpretation itself are consistent with an intention to save the position of the applicants; the saving provision in the Interpretation is intended to inure to the benefit not only of the named parties but also for "persons concerned" in the litigation, meaning those whose personal interest was and is involved. This is consistent with the provision in art. 158(3) which requires that "judgments previously rendered shall not be affected."

(ii) The applicants are entitled as a matter of law to be treated as parties to the litigation which resulted in the January 1999 judgments. The Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga cases were test cases in public law intended to determine the status of those in the position of the applicants as well as that of the named parties, and that those judgments have the effect of judgments in rem.

(iii) That, alternatively, the applicants entertain a legitimate expectation that the judgments in Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga would be implemented for their benefit, by reason of which expectation a substantive right to that benefit accrues. That expectation is said to be the fruit of long established practice and, in this particular case, of representations by the authorities of the HKSAR that the judgments would be implemented - representations to the world at large, and some representations to specific applicants.

(2) The consequence of the right which is said thus to inure to the benefit of the applicants is that -

(i) The applicants who were born before their parents became permanent residents are entitled, upon proof of that parentage and the status of the parent(s), to the right of abode (as indeed are all applicants born after a parent acquired the status of a permanent resident);

(ii) The applicants are entitled to have their claims verified and established in a manner which does not depend upon acquisition of a one-way permit; and

(iii) The Director of Immigration is not (and was not) entitled to order the removal of the applicants, despite breaches of condition of stay, since the applicants are, in the absence of any prospect of a scheme unlinked to a quota, entitled to prove their claim whilst in Hong Kong in such manner as may establish the requisite facts.

(3) In the alternative, the representative applicants are entitled to the benefit of the Concession, which benefit has wrongfully been denied them.

(4) In any event, those of the applicants who arrived in Hong Kong before 1 July 1997 and stayed beyond that date are unaffected by the Interpretation in so far as art. 22(4), as interpreted, required claims to be made on the Mainland, since art. 22(4) applies only to those entering the HKSAR after the Basic Law came into effect.

(5) That those who arrived between 1 July 1997 and 10 July 1997 are unaffected by the Interpretation because there are judgments binding on this court stating that the retrospective provision of the No.3 Ordinance remains unconstitutional.

VIII. INTERPRETING THE INTERPRETATION

95. The English translation of part of the Interpretation states that :

"This Interpretation does not affect the right of abode which has been acquired under the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal on the relevant cases dated 29 January 1999 by the parties concerned in the relevant legal proceedings."

96. There is but one official version of the Interpretation, and it is the version in Chinese. The translation is, as I have said, a translation produced by the Department of Justice.

97. The point is made that this passage - which I shall call the saving provision of the Interpretation - makes clear, or at least suggests, that the Interpretation was not intended to impact upon those whose personal interests were affected by the Court of Final Appeal judgments; a category, in other words, considerably wider than the named parties. My attention is drawn to the fact that in Lau Kong Yung, the Court of Final Appeal did not deal, and took care to say that it was not dealing, with the effect of this last paragraph of the Interpretation (see Li CJ at page 321D-E). The Chinese characters which have been translated as "parties" are the three characters "當事人" ("dong sze yan"). These characters, it is suggested by Ms Ng, on behalf of the applicants, are used in different ways depending on context, but they more properly mean "persons concerned", rather than "parties" in the sense of named parties to proceedings. She contends that where "parties" in the narrow sense is intended, the characters likely to be used are "一方當事人" ("一方"; 'yat fong'- literally meaning one side). She takes me to Ordinances where the characters "當事人" are used to mean client, and to mean principal; and to section 59 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance, Cap.1, where "一方當事人" is used to mean party.

98. I am of course at a disadvantage in the sense that I am not versed in Chinese characters (save to an extremely limited degree). But that disadvantage has not precluded me from coming to a conclusion with which I am comfortable; and no one has suggested that the matter can fairly be determined only by a judge conversant with Chinese characters. I am, for a number of reasons, satisfied that the broad meaning or sense for which the applicants contend is not supportable :

(1) It can never have been intended. The justification put forward to the State Council and to the Standing Committee for the request for the Interpretation was the suggestion that the Court of Final Appeal judgments had not reflected legislative intent, and that the practical result was inimical to a manageable immigration regime. It was said (see the speech of Mr Qiao to the Standing Committee on 22 June 1999) that the true legislative intent of art. 22(4) was to affirm a long standing quota system, and that the true legislative intent of art. 24(2)(3) served to prevent a large influx of Mainland residents. That the Interpretation was drafted with great care can be assumed. The idea that those who drafted it intended it to allow through the net a wholly ill-defined mass of persons who were not named parties to the litigation which culminated in the January judgments defies, in my judgment, the history of the matter.

(2) The text of the Interpretation itself, in other words the very context in which the saving provision appears, suggests a phrase designed to cater for actual parties to litigation. The phrase "當事人" does not appear in some vacuum. It is in terms a reference to those who have acquired rights under a specific and identified judgment - in other words, the clear contextual sense is directed at obvious and identifiable beneficiaries of a judgment, rather than categories whose definition and limits were to be determined by some broad brush, expansive approach, whose numbers were almost anyone's guess.

(3) The characters "當事人" are found in the Basic Law itself, in art. 87. Article 87 is translated thus :

"In criminal or civil proceedings in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, the principles previously applied in Hong Kong and the rights previously enjoyed by parties to proceedings shall be maintained."

The characters "一方" do not appear, and there is no argument about the accuracy of the translation of art. 87. Of course that point is not conclusive, but it shows that the use of the characters "當事人" in the Interpretation, itself an instrument which engages itself with the Basic Law - the use of those characters to denote parties to proceedings is not inconsistent with their use in the same sense in the Basic Law itself.

(4) I am not assisted by the use of "當事人" or by "一方當事人" in the ordinances of Hong Kong. If anything, the use of "一方當事人" in section 59 of Cap.1 supports the impression that where those two characters (一方) are used, they are used to refer to but one side in a legal dispute, or one side to a contract.

(5) In the course of this hearing there arose questions about the correct translation of a number of passages in the Concession announcement and in a press release of the same day, and it was agreed that the court interpreter be requested to provide his interpretation. He kindly did so, and at my request, provided his interpretation of the saving provision in the Interpretation. His opinion is that, in context, the relevant phrase means "parties concerned in the relevant legal proceedings".

"Judgments previous rendered"

99. Article 158(3) which confers on the courts of the HKSAR the power to interpret those provisions of the Basic Law which are outwith the limits of the autonomy of the HKSAR and prescribes the circumstances in which the Court of Final Appeal shall seek an interpretation of relevant provisions from the Standing Committee, ends with the qualification :

"However, judgments previously rendered shall not be affected."

100. The Interpretation with which this judgment is concerned was not an interpretation upon a judicial reference under art. 158(3). It was an Interpretation rendered under the free standing power affirmed by art. 158(1), and the question which might arise is whether the phrase "judgments previously rendered shall not be affected" is restricted to interpretations made pursuant to judicial referrals. I am not asked to determine that issue in this case, and I do not think it necessary to do so, though it seems to me from the judgment of Mason NPJ in Lau Kong Yung, at page 346, that :

(1) he took the view that it was a phrase used deliberately in connection with art. 158(3) alone, but that

(2) the absence of the same phrase or a similar phrase at the end of art. 158(1) did not mean that the same principle was not to be respected after a free standing interpretation :

"As to the effect of a free standing interpretation by the Standing Committee, that is, an interpretation given otherwise than on a reference, judgments previously given are protected by the vesting of judicial power in the courts of the region and the vesting of the power of final adjudication in the Court of Final Appeal. Under the common law, a final judgment would not be reopened as between the parties to the litigation in which the judgment was delivered by reason of the subsequent adoption of a new interpretation of the relevant legal instrument."

In other words, it is evident from the terms of the Basic Law, the powers it confers on the courts of the Region, the preservation of the common law, that as between parties an Interpretation will provide no basis for the reopening of litigation. In my judgment, what is intended for art. 158(1) is intended also for art. 158(3), and there is no warrant for supposing in either case that the intention is to create an approach broader or narrower than the common law approach.

IX. THE COMMON LAW APPROACH APPLIED TO THE CFA JUDGMENTS

101. I am invited to say that, in the exceptional circumstances of this case, and of the cases which fell for final judicial determination in January 1999, the applicants are, in accordance with common law principles, to be treated as parties to the litigation which culminated in the two Court of Final Appeal judgments. That conclusion is said to be warranted by a singular combination of factors : the Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga cases were expressly acknowledged to be test cases on public law issues described as issues of great public importance, the answers to which were expressly acknowledged to have "wide implications", and to affect not only the named applicants whose numbers were relatively few "but many other persons now and in the future" (per Bokhary PJ in Chan Kam Nga, page 87); in respect of which issues judgments were delivered which were declaratory of the constitutional invalidity of legislative provisions affecting status, so that in essence the judgments were in the nature of judgments in rem; and that whilst it is recognized that the Interpretation had retrospective effect, retrospectivity, even for non-parties, is never absolute in its impact, but might exclude those from its grasp who had altered their position by reason of judgments rendered prior to the creation and operation of the instrument which had retrospective effect.

1. Test cases

102. A test case, properly so called, is "an action on the result of which liability in other actions depends" (Jowitt's Dictionary of English Law, 2nd Edition, page 1761, citing Healey v. A. Waddington & Sons [1954] 1 WLR 688). In practice they arise, as is demonstrated by the cases of Amos v. Chadwick (1878) 9 Ch D 459 and Perry v. Corydon Borough Council [1938] 3 All ER 670, where issues in a number of actions are identical and "where one case inevitably decides all the other cases," and where it is agreed by the parties to all the actions that they will be bound by the result in the one, or where the other actions are accordingly stayed to see what transpires with that one.

103. I have referred at some length (under "The Right of Abode Cases") to the history of proceedings before Cheung Lai Wah was heard at first instance in September 1998. The correspondence, and the court orders made, show that the four cases, involving five applicants, proceeded as test or representative actions in relation to other actions which had been assigned to Messrs Clarke & Kong; that there were specific actions stayed by Keith J pending determination of the Cheung Lai Wah proceedings; and particular undertakings given in relation to named parties in whose favour legal aid had been granted. So, too, we have seen that a limited number of claimants were the beneficiaries of undertakings by the respondent not to remove them from the jurisdiction even though legal aid was not granted - but, again, these were identified persons in respect of whom the Director of Legal Aid had made a favourable decision on the merits and whose identity was supplied to the Director of Immigration under the terms of a specific agreement hedged by certain stated conditions. I have noted, too, the refusal in August 1997 of a request that there be some blanket undertaking not to remove persons who reported to the Director of Immigration, claiming right of abode, even though not granted legal aid.

104. None of these facts supports the contention that Ng Ka Ling (or its predecessor Cheung Lai Wah) was a test case for all persons, named or unnamed, identified or not, who would subsequently prove themselves to fall within the same factual parameters as the named parties in those cases. They were test cases, properly so called, only in the sense that they were deliberately identified as appropriate to test issues which arose in relation to other clients of Clarke & Kong who had been identified. There were others identified by the legal aid authorities who were to benefit from such judgments as emerged, but that was a question of specific agreement.

105. In Chan Kam Nga, one applicant was chosen as a representative applicant - representative, however, of the named applicants in that case; not representative somehow of all prospective or potential right of abode applicants.

106. It cannot be gainsaid that the courts engaged in these right of abode cases from September 1997 to January 1999 made pronouncements in the course of the judgments suggesting that the cases were of great moment, affecting persons beyond those named as parties. In his judgment in Cheung Lai Wah, Keith J, as he then was, was obviously aware of the possible impact of the judgment on many others. He spoke in general terms of the children in Mainland China who wished to come to Hong Kong; of the system in general which had previously been in place for the entry of children and others from the Mainland - the quota system. He said in terms that the cases were test cases; he spoke in general of the impact upon immigration control if verification of status were to take place whilst a claimant remained in Hong Kong. He dismissed the application for judicial review adding that since this had been in the nature of a test case, he did not think that it would be right to make an adverse order as to costs. In Chan Kam Nga, Keith J said that the issue in that case affected very many people. In Ng Ka Ling, the Chief Justice stated that the issues raised questions of momentous importance; and in Chan Kam Nga, Bokhary PJ said that the answer to the questions raised in that case "will affect not only these 81 appellants but many other persons now and in the future ... and I approach it with a keen sense of its wide implications."

107. Comments of that nature made in cases, sometimes referred to as landmark cases, are of course accurate, and are not loosely made. They are accurate because of the precedent which the decision will create, and it is the difference between res judicata estoppel on the one hand, and, on the other, the doctrine of judicial precedent which, in my judgment, provides the entire answer to this aspect of the applicants' case.

108.Estoppel by res judicata is a rule of public policy, and the rule is this :

"Where a final judicial decision has been pronounced on the merits by a ... judicial tribunal with jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter, any party to such litigation, as against any other party (and in a case of a decision in rem, any person whatsoever, as against any other person) is estopped in any subsequent litigation from disputing such decision on the merits whether it be used as the foundation of an action or as a bar to any claim indictment affirmative defence or allegation, provided the party entitled raises the point at the proper time."

(see "Res Judicata" Spencer Bower Turner and Handley, 3rd Ed., pages 9 and 10)

That rule in these right of abode cases operates only in relation to the named parties, and such other persons bound by express agreement or court order.

109. Expressions used by judges which underscore the wide effect of a judgment, wider, that is, than upon the named parties, are expressions founded not on some notion that there are other parties to the case, or other persons who are to be treated as parties, but which recognize, especially if it is a court of senior rank, that the issue of law resolved or affirmed by that decision will in other comparable cases be treated as the applicable law; and will continue to be so treated unless and until the law is changed either by legislation or by later decisions. But the effect of the Interpretation as explained by the Court of Final Appeal in Lau Kong Yung was not merely to state the law prospectively, but was to declare what the law had always been, an effect akin to the common law declaratory theory of judicial decisions by which it is said that judges' declare the law not only as it is at a given time but as it has been, their declarations operating retrospectively. It is this declaratory theory of law to which the Chief Justice referred in Lau Kong Yung, at page 326 :

"The Interpretation, being an interpretation of the relevant provisions, dates from 1 July 1997 when the Basic Law came into effect. It declared what the law has always been. Compared the Common Law declaratory theory of judicial decisions, see Kleinwort Benson Ltd v. Lincoln City Council [1998] 3 WLR 1095 at pages 1117 to 1119 and 1148."

110. It is suggested by Mr Chang that the retrospective effect of the declaratory theory allows for exceptions or defences such as where a person or body has, in reliance upon a judgment, changed his position, or where rights become vested. I do not think that the passages in Kleinwort Benson upon which he relies support such a general proposition. Defences of that kind to which the judgments in Kleinwort Benson referred were defences in the specific context of the law of restitution (see Lord Goff at page 382G; Lord Hoffmann at page 401D; and Lord Hope at page 417H), and I note that Lord Goff says in terms, at page 382H, that "the proposed 'settled understanding of the law' defence is not, overtly, such a defence".

111. Then it is contended that there are cases where non-parties to an action have been treated as parties, bound by earlier judgments, and in support of this proposition, the judgment of the Privy Council in Yat Tung Investment Co. Ltd v. Dao Heng Bank Ltd and Another [1973-1976] HKC 194 is cited. There, the Privy Council referred to the doctrine of res judicata in a sense wider than that normally employed. That case does not help these applicants. In that case, an action was brought against the bank and against the 2nd respondent claiming that a property sale to the 2nd respondent was void as fraudulent, in that the bank and the 2nd respondent were said to have been acting in concert with a design to extinguish the plaintiff's interest in the property. The plaintiff had brought an earlier action claiming that the sale of the property to it was a sham, and the bank had counterclaimed for loss suffered in the resale of property to the 2nd respondent. The bank had succeeded. The Statement of Claim in the second action was struck out. It had been open to the plaintiff in the first proceedings to raise the self same matter as the plaintiff now sought to raise, and it was that aspect that gave rise to the reference to "a wider sense in which the doctrine [of res judicata] may be appealed to." (per Lord Kilbrandon at page 200). It was the transaction impugned, or which ought to have been impugned, that was identical in both cases, and the fact that the 2nd respondent was not a party to the first action was wholly irrelevant to any issue that had to be determined in that case. It is not a judgment that helps in any exercise of deciding who should, for the purpose of the res judicata rule, be treated as a party to a case in which judgment has been delivered.

2. Judgments in rem

112. The further contention is that the judgments in Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga were public law judgments intended to operate in rem. If I understand the argument correctly, it is that the judgments determined the status of classes of Mainland residents, and that those determinations are in the nature of judgments in rem. I think that this is but a variation of the test case argument, and highlights the confusion in the applicants' case between a judgment inter partes, and the precedent which that judgment creates. Ng Ka Ling was a case in which the status of permanent resident was declared only in relation to particular named applicants; and otherwise declarations were made which established that certain steps prescribed by Ordinance for claiming permanent resident status were void. Chan Kam Nga resulted in a declaration in favour of the particular appellants, which declaration inured to the benefit of those appellants. Whether that declaration inured to their benefit as against the Director of Immigration or as against the whole world is not necessary to debate. The point, however, is that no declaration as to status was made in anyone else's favour. The determination in Chan Kam Nga that the time of birth limitation in the No.2 Ordinance was unconstitutional can hardly be called a judgment in rem.

113. The cases upon which Mr Chang relied for the "in rem" part of his case do not assist the applicants. They were Wakefield Corporation v. Cooke [1904] AC 31 and Armstrong v. Whitfield [1974] 1 QB 16. The question in Wakefield was whether Sludge Lane was a highway repairable by the inhabitants of the city at large, or a private street, the costs of works to which should be apportioned amongst owners of adjoining premises. The question had already been decided in 1898. The matter was res judicata and the earlier decision, a decision in rem, the "res" being the street; and it is noteworthy that the question raised the first time was as between the corporation "and the same owners as were concerned" on the later occasion, with very few exceptions. Armstrong concerned the status of a lane. The defendant applied for a declaration that there was no public right of way over the path. Quarter Sessions refused the declaration. When, subsequently, the defendant was prosecuted for obstructing the lane under the Highways Act 1959, it was held that he was estopped from calling evidence on the question whether there was a right of way over the lane. It was held by the Divisional Court, on a case stated, that the decision of Quarter Sessions was a decision in rem binding on the justices. The determinations in both these cases are far removed from the character of decisions in Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga and from the exercise in which the courts were then engaged. The two English cases were concerned with local authority issues where decisions as to the designation of a single identified res were, by reason of the statutory provisions in force, intended to bind all the world, and that is illustrated particularly in the Armstrong case by the terms of section 31(8) of the National Parks and Access to Countryside Act 1949, which provided that a declaration made by Quarter Sessions under the relevant section "shall be conclusive evidence of the matters stated in the declaration".

3. Conclusion

114. In the result, I am satisfied that there is nothing in art. 158, or in the terms of the Interpretation itself which enables these applicants to escape the retrospective impact of the Interpretation. Nor is there any principle of common law applicable to the facts of their cases by which they are to be treated as parties to the judgments of the Court of Final Appeal of January 1999. Whether they benefit as Period 1 or Period 2 arrivals, or whether representations gave to them a legitimate expectation from which they derive some substantial benefit which takes them outside the impact of the Interpretation, are issues to which I shall shortly turn. But those particular questions aside, those who are unaffected by the Interpretation are the named parties to the litigation, namely, to the Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga litigation, those named as parties to the cases in respect of which Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga were directed to be representative cases, and such others as the respondent directly undertook to treat as parties to that litigation.

X. LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION

115. The real issue in this case is an issue about expectation. There can be no escape from the fact that the Interpretation was lawful and that, as a matter of law, its statement of the meaning of arts. 22(4) and 24(3) of the Basic Law represents the law as it has been since 1 July 1997. Those who were parties to the Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga judgments benefit from the effect of those judgments because they were final judgment inter partes and, as Mason NPJ said in Lau Kong Yung, judgments previously given are, in the face of a free standing interpretation, nonetheless protected and will not be reopened as between the parties to the litigation by reason of the subsequent adoption of a new interpretation of the relevant legal instrument. If others are to be treated as parties, then that would not be because of some extended concept of res judicata or judgments in rem, or because the cases were important public law cases. As a matter of law, non-parties can only take the benefit of these judgments if they can point to an agreement that they would be treated as parties, or if they can rely upon a legitimate expectation that they would be so treated.

116. There was never a hint throughout the Cheung Lai Wah (Ng Ka Ling) and Chan Kam Nga litigation that were the Government to lose its arguments in the courts, it might resort to legislative amendment (in this case an amendment to the Basic Law) to give effect to its understanding or interpretation of the two articles under dispute, or that it might, in such an event, seek an interpretation from the Standing Committee. The question of referral to the Standing Committee was raised before the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Ka Ling but, as I read that judgment, whilst those acting for the Government submitted that the condition for a judicial reference to the Standing Committee under art. 158(3) was satisfied, the respondent did not actively seek a reference to the Standing Committee under that article. The applicants say that they, like the public at large, or as part of the public at large, were led to believe that the Government would give effect to whatever decision of the Court of Final Appeal emerged, whether for or against the parties in those cases, and would give effect to them not just in relation to the named parties but altogether, so that anyone whose circumstances fell within the law as that law was, by the Court of Final Appeal, determined to be, would be treated accordingly. As Mason NPJ recognized (see Lau Kong Yung, page 347J) no one could "reasonably be expected at that time to act on the possibility that such an interpretation would issue".

117. Counsel for the applicants has returned in the course of this long hearing, on quite a number of occasions, to stress the sense of grievance nurtured by these applicants, and I accept that they harbour a profound feeling of injustice. They feel that had they but suspected that the authorities would not in fact give effect at large to the Court of Final Appeal decisions, they would have brought proceedings themselves and would then be in the same position as the named parties to the Court of Final Appeal litigation, either because they would themselves have been named parties, or would at least have secured undertakings that their cases would be saved by the test case principle, properly so called.

118. It is in these circumstances that I formed the view early on, rightly or wrongly, that the area which required particular exploration was that of legitimate expectation, and it was because of comments which I made at an early stage of the hearing that the applicants expanded their case, with leave, to plead this issue with greater particularity.

The pleaded case

119. The expectation pleaded is that "declarations of public law rights made by the Court of Final Appeal will be given effect to by the Executive not only as a matter of procedure but also in substance". It is said that :

"Further and/or in the alternative the applicants who were in Hong Kong or who had made a claim before the Interpretation are entitled to benefit from Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga by reason of legitimate expectation arising from representations of the Government to the public at large and to specific individuals that these judgments would be followed and implemented."

"All the applicants not limited to those who arrived before 29 January 1999 have relied on a determination of their rights deemed to be final and on the determination to be given effect by the Director by reason of principles of the rule of law under which it was the unvaried practice of the Government in Hong Kong to follow the law as declared by the court until such time as the law is changed. Until the Interpretation was given by the NPCSC on 26 June 1999 and decided by the CFA in Lau Kong Yung on 3 December 1999 to take effect retrospectively from 1 July 1997, there was no indication that their rights already determined would be affected. Immediately after the judgments of the CFA on 29 January 1999 and on many occasions thereafter, the Government had reaffirmed the aforesaid practice and its intention to give effect to the judgments."

"But for the invariable practice of the Government in Hong Kong making it unnecessary for anyone to bring proceedings in his own behalf while test cases were being determined, or for fresh proceedings to be brought after issues were determined, each of the applicants would have done so. Applicants in P1, 2, 3 and 4 were in Hong Kong before the Interpretation. Applicants in P5 could either have come to Hong Kong earlier or bring proceedings through their parents."

"Moreover but for the Director refraining from processing their claims although in law it was within his power to do so, the applicants would have had their status verified. The Director's failure to do so when the Chief Executive took step to move a change in the law by way of the Interpretation amounts to special circumstances under which it is unfair to remove the applicants even if they are removable."

"The Director enjoys extensive discretionary powers under the Immigration Ordinance, including giving permission to stay and removing the condition of stay with the effect that a person can apply for a certificate of entitlement or identity card while remaining in Hong Kong. These discretionary powers are unchanged by the No.2 and No.3 Ordinances, and have been used by the Director of Immigration before and since these Ordinances came into effect. The Director of Immigration is duty bound to exercise his discretion reasonably. In the special circumstances of the applicants, it is Wednesbury unreasonable of the Director not to exercise his discretion to allow them to remain."

120. The applicants also rely on "the repeated statements made by senior officials of the Government of the HKSAR before and immediately after the Court of Final Appeal judgments were given, that the Government will accept the court's determination and respect and implement the CFA judgments."

The statements referred to are :

(1) On 23 July 1997 the Chief Secretary for Administration, in answer to a written question, in the Provisional Legislative Council, about legal aid applications for legal aid in right of abode cases, said :

"So far 73 cases had been granted legal aid. However with the agreement of the courts and both sides, a few cases will be selected as test cases to obtain rulings from the courts on points of law. It is therefore unnecessary to initiate separate proceedings for each and every legally aided person."

(2) In a speech to the Australian Chamber of Commerce on 31 July 1997, the Chief Executive said that "the Hong Kong SAR Government will argue its case in court, and abide by the court's ruling." This statement was made in the context of comments about the rule of law, a challenge in the courts to the legitimacy of the Provisional Legislative Council, and an expected challenge concerning Mainland born children with Hong Kong parents.

(3) On 26 January 1998, there was a press release announcing that the Government intended to lodge an appeal against the decision in Chan Kam Nga, that is, the decision of the Court of First Instance handed down that day. It was said that there were no statistics on persons affected by the decision, and that the Government would not pending appeal "remove these applicants".

(I note in passing that on 19 February 1998, the Security Bureau was saying to the Legislative Council Panel on Security that that judgment had serious implications.)

(4) On 20 May 1998, the day of the Court of Appeal judgment in Chan Kam Nga, which upheld the validity of the time of birth limitation, there was a press release by the Government welcoming the judgment, as well as the earlier Court of Appeal judgment which had upheld the constitutionality of the No.3 Ordinance.

121. Those are the statements made before the Court of Final Appeal judgments, relied upon in all three cases before me as giving rise to a legitimate expectation.

122. In the case of Ng Siu Tung and Others (HCAL 81/1999), there are expectations said to repose with individual applicants as a result of representations made to them, and I must deal with these later.

123. As for public representations made after the Court of Final Appeal judgments and before the Interpretation, the representations relied upon are :

(1) Statements made at a press conference on 30 January 1999, the day after the January judgments. The tenor of comments made by the Secretary for Security were that there would be discussions to give effect to the judgments. (I also note in passing that the validity of the certificate of entitlement scheme was emphasized at the press conference, and she said that persons without a certificate of entitlement would be sent back to the Mainland.)

(2) In Davos, Switzerland, on 30 January 1999, the Chief Executive, at a question and answer session ranging across the number of disparate topics was asked about the Court of Final Appeal rulings and said that : "We respect that decision ... you have been brought up by the common law. You have to understand this is the legal process - that two sides present a case, one side will win, the other side will lose. And that's the way it's going to work." He added that the implications of the decision were being evaluated in Hong Kong; that "We need to be concerned about whatever additional children might come in suddenly, the impact on education, on schools." (He also warned against "coming across illegally".)

(3) On the same day, the Acting Chief Executive said that the court rulings demonstrated that anyone was free to challenge the administration's decisions in the courts and that "We respect the court's decisions and we will act accordingly". (She spoke, too, of the pressure on Hong Kong services which laid in wake, and she then said "I want to stress that any person without a certificate of entitlement illegally entering Hong Kong will be repatriated to the Mainland.")

(4) On 30 January 1999, Mrs Ip was reported as saying that "We respect the court's judgments and will employ appropriate administrative measures to implement the court's judgments."

(5) On 8 February 1999, the Legal Aid Department issued a press statement in response to inquiries about legal aid by two-way permit holders. The inquiries were made by people who wanted assistance in relation to claims for right of abode, and the Department said that those who had already registered their details with the Department had no need to re-register or to inquire about their case unless a removal order were issued or the person concerned was detained. Those who wanted extensions of stay should apply to the relevant authority - that was not a matter for the Legal Aid Department.

Expectation of a substantive benefit

124. "There is a hot debate about the extent to which public law recognizes substantive legitimate expectations" (Fordham, Judicial Review Handbook, 2nd Ed, page 481). So, too : "There is a continuing uncertainty and difference of opinion as to whether the concept of legitimate expectations only has an impact on procedure, or whether it can also have a substantive impact, and if so, precisely what." (see Paul Craig "Legitimate Expectations : A Conceptual Analysis" (1992) 108 LQR 79).

125. But it is just such an expectation that the applicants say arise in this case, and they point to several cases (R. v. North and East Devon Health Authority, Ex parte Coughlan [2000] 2 WLR 622; R. v. Home Secretary, Ex parte Ruddock [1987] 1 WLR 1482; R. v. Home Secretary, Ex parte Asif Khan [1984] 1 WLR 1337) which show a willingness by the courts, in an appropriate case, to give effect to expectations of a substantive benefit; and the recent case of R. v. Secretary of State for Education and Employment, Ex parte Begbie [2000] 1 WLR 1115 provides further cement to the suggestion that it is now accepted that the rule operates in the sphere of substantive as well as of procedural rights.

126. In R. v. Devon County Council, Ex parte Baker and Another [1995] 1 All ER 73, 88, Simon Brown LJ identified the distinct senses in which the phrase "legitimate expectation" is now used, and of expectation of a substantive right, he put the position as follows :

" Sometimes the phrase is used to denote a substantive right: an entitlement that the claimant asserts cannot be denied him. It was used in this sense and the assertion upheld in cases such as R v Secretary of State for the Home Dept, ex p Khan [1985] 1 All ER 40, [1984] 1 WLR 1337 and R v Secretary of State for the Home Dept, ex p Ruddock [1987] 1 WLR 1482. It was used in the same sense but unsuccessfully in, for instance, R v Board of Inland Revenue, ex p MFK Underwriting Agencies Ltd [1990] 1 All ER 91, [1990] 1 WLR 1545 and R v Jockey Club, ex p RAM Racecourses Ltd (1990) [1993] 2 All ER 225. These various authorities show that the claimant's right will only be found established when there is a clear and unambiguous representation upon which it was reasonable for him to rely. Then the administrator or other public body will be held bound in fairness by the representation made unless only its promise or undertaking as to how its power would be exercised is inconsistent with the statutory duties imposed upon it. The doctrine employed in this sense is akin to an estoppel. In so far as the public body's representation is communicated by way of a stated policy, this type of legitimate expectation falls into two distinct sub-categories: cases in which the authority are held entitled to change their policy even so as to affect the claimant, and those in which they are not. An illustration of the former is R v Torbay BC, ex p Cleasby [1991] COD 142; of the latter, Ex p Khan. "

127. The argument before me in this case has not focused on the issue whether representations might give rise to an expectation of a substantive benefit, and I proceed on the footing that in appropriate cases they can.

Analysis

128. The questions in this case are these :

(1) What precisely is the representation that it is said was being made and was being made to the applicants, and precisely what expectation can legitimately be said to arise from that representation?

(2) If representations gave rise to an expectation on the part of the applicants that was legitimate, did the failure to fulfil that expectation constitute an abuse of power? Was the expectation one which the respondent was bound to honour by not making removal orders?

129. The representations alleged are that the judgments would be followed and implemented; and the legitimate expectation asserted is that the applicants were entitled to benefit from the judgments. There is, in this case's context, necessarily implicit the assertion of a legitimate expectation that they would benefit from the judgments regardless of any subsequent events and regardless of any change in the law.

130. I am not persuaded that that was the legitimate expectation. The representations were indeed that the judgments would be implemented, and there is implicit in those representations that the law stated by the judgments would be followed in the case not only of the litigants, but also in favour of those who would benefit by the law thus stated. The statements were, in essence, statements of the obvious - that the law would be implemented; that the authorities would do as the law declared by the courts required them to do.

131. What was not represented (and one notes that statements were made to the public at large, and not specifically to litigants or potential litigants as such) was that the applicants and those in their position would be treated as parties to the litigation regardless of events subsequent to such judgments as may emerge, or to the judgments which did emerge. I discern in these various statements no express representation, for example, before the Court of Final Appeal judgments, that if claimants did not institute proceedings, they would nonetheless be treated as parties to the litigation. The statement of 23 July 1997 that it was unnecessary to initiate separate proceedings was a statement that concerned only those cases in respect of which legal aid had been granted, making the point that it was quite unnecessary for any but the selected test cases, properly so called, to advance to full hearing. There is no warrant in my judgment in reading anything more into it than that.

132. I do not for a moment belittle the sense of frustration which the applicants must feel, since they could hardly have envisaged the turn of events which culminated in the June Interpretation, but it seems to me that in order to cull from the statements by the authorities a substantive benefit such as that now enjoyed by the parties to the Court of Final Appeal judgments, the applicants would have to establish a representation directed at them which went beyond the broad public statements upon which they rely. To point to the "unvaried practice of the Government ... to follow the law as declared by the court until such time as the law is changed" as establishing a legitimate expectation from which the applicants hope to benefit, is to point to the flaw in the argument, because the law itself permits interpretation by the Standing Committee, and the Court of Final Appeal has held that, before as well as after the Court of Final Appeal judgments, the law was not such as could benefit these applicants. Looked at from another angle, the named parties to the Court of Final Appeal judgments have benefitted from a judgment based on interpretations of the Basic Law held now (in effect) to have been erroneous, and the applicants seek to derive the same benefit. The invariable practice upon which the applicants rely is the invariable practice of following and applying the law as it is at any given time. It is not an invariable practice of conferring on everyone the benefit (or indeed of imposing the burden) of the law as determined by a judgment even in the face of, say, retrospective legislative amendment or of a declaration, operating retrospectively, which holds that the law was not that which was accepted law at the time of that judgment.

133. But if I am wrong about that, and if the representations are to be construed as representations to these applicants and to those Mainland residents, whether in Hong Kong or not, who fell within the categories of applicants covered by the two January judgments, that they would be treated as if they were parties to that litigation, come what may, and therefore be accorded all the advantages which had then to be accorded to those named parties, then the question is whether to deprive the applicants of that expectation constitutes an abuse of power; and it is in this realm that the applicants face, as a matter of law, real difficulty. I emphasize the words "as a matter of law" because the courts do not stand in the shoes of policy makers, because policy decisions and changes of approach which affect large sections of a community and which may give rise to perceptions, sometimes justified, sometimes not, of a breach of faith, often involve matters of general policy upon the complex reasoning behind which the courts are not expected, and may not be competent, to adjudicate. The fact of the approach by the authorities to the State Council with a view to a reference to the Standing Committee for an interpretation was the subject of considerable controversy at the time and subsequently, and there were in some sectors of the community expressions of serious concern for the precedent set, and by those in the position of these applicants there is the sense of injustice to which I have referred. But, all that said, as with the judge at first instance in ex parte Begbie, the question is not whether the way a matter has been handled might or might not be criticized - the question for a judge is whether the ground of challenge in a particular case is sound in law (see Begbie at p.1123). That, as far as this court's function is concerned, is the long and the short of the matter, and invitations to a court to take a broad brush approach must not be permitted to obscure the parameters of the court's function.

134. The essential difficulty of the applicants' position is illustrated by a consideration of the respondent's statutory duty at the time he came to make the decisions now under challenge. The requirement that a public body shall abide by representations runs for so long as implementation of a promise does not interfere with the body's statutory duty (see AG of Hong Kong v. Ng Yuen Shiu [1983] 2 AC 629; Ex parte Coughlan and Ex parte Begbie, supra). That statutory duty, in the context of the decisions which have to be made by the respondent in respect of those in Hong Kong in breach of conditions of stay is the subject of repeated reference in Lau Kong Yung. The Director of Immigration has to have regard to the overall objective of a statutory scheme designed to discourage unlawful entry, illegal stay in breach of conditions of stay, and the prevention of queue jumping.

135. At the time the respondent made removal orders in all these cases before me, or decisions about the entitlement of the applicants for right of abode, the Immigration Ordinance in force, as amended by resolution on 16 July 1999, provided, in so far as is relevant, that those of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong to a parent who at the time of birth of that person was a permanent resident had the right of abode. That meant that those born before did not have the right of abode. That was not the law only from 16 July 1999 but was the law from 1 July 1997. Similarly, the Ordinance provided for a certificate of entitlement scheme which was the only method by which a Mainland resident may establish his right of abode. The provision of the No.3 Ordinance requiring the claimant to hold a valid travel document and a valid certificate of entitlement affixed to it was effective in and from July 1997. All that apart, art. 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law was qualified by art. 22(4) so that those applicants with the right of abode in Hong Kong could not exercise it unless armed with an exit permit from the Mainland.

136. This was the statutory and constitutional context in which decisions had to be made by the respondent; a context in which applications by Mainland residents for certificates of entitlement had to be made on the Mainland. Mainland residents could not, under these statutory provisions, make applications in Hong Kong and those making them could not remain in Hong Kong pending the result of an application. As was made clear in Lau Kong Yung, the policy reasons for the scheme included discouragement of illegal entry, unlawful stay after lawful entry, as well as queue jumping, and it was not for the respondent to frustrate that legislative intent (per Litton PJ, page 337).

137. Although the Director of Immigration had a discretion to allow individuals to remain, he was under no duty to exercise that discretion. It is in any event one thing to exercise a discretion in individual cases for reasons peculiar to that individual case. It is quite another for the Director of Immigration, in the face of the statutory and constitutional provisions and the policy underlying them, which I have described, provisions lawful since July 1997, to say that he would nonetheless permit thousands upon thousands of Mainland residents, whether in Hong Kong or otherwise, to be given right of abode even though born before a parent became a permanent resident, and to permit very large numbers to have their claims verified whilst they were in Hong Kong, or otherwise unlinked to any quota system.

138. If the real question is whether the frustration of an expectation will amount to an abuse of power (see Coughlan at page 645; and Begbie at page 1131), it is in my view impossible to say in the circumstances of this case that the decisions of the respondent which frustrated such expectations of the applicants (if such were their legitimate expectations) that the January 1999 judgments would be implemented in their favour too, constituted an abuse of power or were other than fully commensurate with his statutory duty.

139. And one is bound to add that, in so far as the applicants rely on public statements of Government officials about the right of abode cases and the judgments pronounced, almost each statement was accompanied by the clearest of warnings that persons without a certificate of entitlement, or persons overstaying or entering unlawfully, would be sent back.

140. The reality of the matter is that the applicants, quite understandably, desire to freeze the law at a time which is beneficial to them. But as a matter of law they cannot do that (even though armed with the representations made at that time). The judgments in Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga do not benefit the parties to that litigation because of representations made that the judgments would be implemented. Those parties take the benefit of the judgments because, despite the error as to legislative intent, to be taken as subsequently revealed by the Interpretation, they were parties to the litigation. The reality of the matter is also that the applicants' claim rests upon a real sense of grievance that the free standing power of interpretation was used at all after a final judgment. But its use is a fact, as is its legality, and it is exclusively with the legal impact with which I am concerned.

141. Further pertinent principles at play are illustrated in R. v. Secretary of State for Social Security, Ex parte McEntire, an unreported judgment of Popplewell J sitting in the Queen's Bench Division on 23 March 1992. The Department of Social Security had rejected an application for industrial injury disablement benefit because the applicant had not made a claim within five years from the last day when he worked, and regulation 25(2) of the applicable regulations precluded such a claim in those circumstances. However, in October 1989, the Court of Appeal ruled that regulation 25 was ultra vires. So, in May 1990, the Department revised its decision because regulation 25 was then regarded as ultra vires. They wrote to the applicant telling him so, and he said that this letter gave him a legitimate expectation that his claim would be dealt with on the basis that lateness was no longer an issue in the case. However, in July 1990, the Social Security Act of 1990 came into effect and one of its provisions was that regulation 25 "shall be taken to be, and always to have been validly made". In September that year, the decision of May 1990 was reviewed in the light of the new statutory provision, and it was decided that the benefit was, after all, because of the limitation period, not payable.

142. It was suggested in argument that the July 1990 legislation was not retrospective, but the judge was satisfied that it had retrospective effect and that the result was that the five year limit was to be treated as always having been the law. He also did not believe this to be a case of legitimate expectation - there could not be a legitimate expectation that Parliament would not change the law, nor an expectation that the position would obtain always. Most pertinently for present purposes, however, is the following passage from the judgment :

"Finally, so far as the point as to whether the adjudication officer has any power to review a decision by validating a previous invalid instrument is concerned, in my judgment what the adjudication officer has to do, albeit that he has a discretion, is to apply the law. The law as it stood in September was that this applicant was out of time, and although the adjudication officer had a discretion, it was not a discretion which he could exercise in favour of the applicant and contrary to what the law now was, and indeed always had been, as Parliament had declared."

143. The same position, it seems to me, faced the respondent when, in the cases now before me, he came to make removal orders or decisions refusing the right of abode. The decision to apply the law as it was then, and indeed as it always had been, was not an impeachable decision, and, as in the case of McEntire, it was not rendered impeachable by a representation made at an earlier time when the law was thought to be in the applicants' favour.

144. In R. v. Customs & Excise Commissioners, Ex parte Littlewoods Home Shopping Group Ltd [1997] STC 317, the Commissioners had given assurances to mail order traders using a retail scheme that if they paid value added tax (VAT) on balances outstanding from customers in 1973 (the year of introduction of the tax), they would not have to pay VAT on outstanding balances when they ceased to use the scheme. A High Court decision subsequently established that using the standard method under such a retail scheme represented an unauthorized derogation from a European Community Council directive, and the Commissioners decided, in 1995, that they would, with immediate effect, rescind their previous agreement not to tax outstanding sums due upon a retailer's ceasing to trade, or leaving the scheme. It was contended, upon an application for judicial review, that the assurances of the Commissioners that retailers would not have to pay VAT on outstanding balances when they ceased to use the scheme had given rise to a legitimate expectation that they would not be withdrawn. Tucker J had this to say, at page 325 :

"In my judgment, where there has been a change in the law, or where there has been a new judicial interpretation of the law, as the Commissioners reasonably believe occurred in the present case and as did in my opinion occur, then the Commissioners should not be bound by assurances given in different circumstances based on a different view of the law which has been held to be mistaken. This is especially so when, as in the present case, the public interests require that there should be a change in policy."

145. The question of a change in policy does not arise in this case. It was not argued before me that there has been a change in policy justified by some overriding public interest. Nor has there been a change in the law. What there has been is a new interpretation of the law, which represents the law as it has always been, and such public pronouncements as were made when the law was differently interpreted or viewed cannot be taken to bind the respondent.

Representations to individuals

146. There are individual applicants in the Ng Siu Tung application (HCAL 81/1999) who are said to benefit from specific representations :

(1) Yuan Zhi Wei (RA13)

147. Mr Yuen Chun Choi is the father of Yuan Zhi Wei, a Group B male aged 24, who did not arrive in Hong Kong until June 1999 (Period 4). In June 1997 he was told that the respondent could not even consider any direct applications from the Mainland to come to Hong Kong, that there were numerous such applications, and that those who wanted to come had to apply through the one-way permit scheme. He continued to write. He mentioned the Basic Law and art. 24 and clearly asserted the right of his children to permanent resident status. In September 1997 he was told that because his children were born before he and his wife acquired permanent resident status, they did not meet the requirements for permanent residence. On 24 April 1998 the Director of Immigration wrote to him saying that "according to the law at present your Mainland children cannot have the right of abode", citing the time of birth limitation. This was a strange thing to say because there was a first instance ruling against that contention. Nonetheless, the letter referred to that ruling and said that it was under appeal :

"The Court of Appeal will hear the case on 1 May. After the whole litigation process is completed, the Immigration Department will follow the final judgment of the courts in dealing with the applications for the certificate of entitlement."

On 28 April that year, after judgment had been given in the Court of Appeal in Cheung Lai Wah, but before judgment in the Court of Appeal in Chan Kam Nga, he was told that the appeal on the question of the time of birth limitation was pending and that applications for certificates of entitlement in such cases would not, for the time being, be processed. On 13 February 1999, he was told that the respondent was making arrangements for certificate of entitlement applications. He was told much the same thing in March 1999; and April as well. His son, the applicant, came to Hong Kong in June 1999, and a removal order was in due course made.

(2) Wong Yuk Heung (RA12)

148. In April 1998 the respondent wrote to the father of Wong Yuk Heung (a Group B lady aged 21) : this was at the time when the appeal in Chan Kam Nga was pending before the Court of Appeal. The letter, in part, said :

"About the matter where children were born outside Hong Kong before they are permanent residents that when the father or mother obtained permanent residency afterwards, that they too enjoy the right of abode, as the case is under appeal, the application of persons in this category cannot be given decisions yet."

He was also told, however, that those claiming the right of abode had to apply on the Mainland. He was told precisely the same thing in October, November and December 1998, when the case was pending before the Court of Final Appeal. Then, after the Court of Final Appeal judgments he wrote, pressing the claim of his children, and was then told, on 25 February 1999 that the Court of Final Appeal had given judgment and that "this Department is actively considering the specific arrangements to accept the applications for certificate of entitlement. Please make your application accordingly in a manner that will be announced at a later date". A removal order was issued in April 2000, the applicant having arrived in March 1999 and then overstayed.

(3) Lau Kong Yung (RA7)

149. Reliance is placed on a letter dated 19 January 1999. Lau Kong Yung, an eight year old boy, had overstayed since September 1997; a Group A claimant. His father had written on a number of occasions to the respondent about the son's application for the certificate of entitlement. He was told that the application had to be made on the Mainland. The letter of 19 January 1999 from the respondent to the father said that :

"As the case is under appeal, the application of persons in this category cannot be given decisions yet."

It is a proforma letter and it is safe to assume that a letter in the same terms, at about that stage, must have been sent to some others.

(4) Lau Pong (RA8)

150. There is a letter referred to dated 10 July 1998 from the Secretary for Security to a family reunion concern group who had written on behalf of families with children waiting to join their parents in Hong Kong, appending a list of names, including that of Lau Pong. In July 1998, the flavour of the litigation stood against Group B applicants and in favour of the scheme under the No.3 Ordinance. The letter of 10 July tells the group that Mainland residents have to apply on the Mainland for a one-way permit if they wish to settle in Hong Kong, that the Court of Appeal had decided that the arrangements for establishing right of abode were in accordance with the Basic Law, and that "the hearing for this case will continue in the Court of Final Appeal at a later date".

151. None of these letters, it seems to me, carries the position any further for these individual applicants than do the general representations with which I have already dealt. The representations are of the same mould and the result in law the same for the reasons I have provided.

The Legal Aid letter - December 1998

152. There is also, in the papers before me, a letter dated 11 December 1998 from the Legal Aid Department to Mr Chan Kei Yui (RA11). The evidence is that it is a proforma letter issued at that time. It reads as follows :

" Regarding application for legal aid

Regarding your application for legal aid please note the following matters :

(1) Extension of stay:

This is not within the range of services provided by this Department. If you need to, please apply to the appropriate department.

(2) Right of abode:

As your application for legal aid relates to legal matters that are being heard in the Court of Final Appeal at this time, there is accordingly no need to bring individual cases for litigation at this stage."

153. The letter has exercised my mind particularly, because it touches closely on that theme of the applicants' case which argues that the applicants ought to be treated as parties to the Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga litigation, and the suggestion here is that individual proceedings were discouraged on the footing that applicants not parties to that litigation would nonetheless be treated as parties to it.

154. The evidence, as I understand it, is that these letters were not issued until on or after 7 December 1998, a matter of a few weeks before the hearing of the two Court of Final Appeal cases. There was introduced by the Director of Legal Aid a registration system on 7 December 1998 which lasted until 23 February 1999, to cope with the sudden influx of thousands of proposed legal aid applications by those who held two-way permits. In such circumstances, the Director of Legal Aid had to distinguish between urgent cases in respect of which formal legal aid applications were arranged, and the rest, applicants who held valid two-way permits that had not expired and in respect of whom no removal orders had been made. Lists were compiled of those thus registered, and these lists were sent to the respondent. But they were only sent to the respondent in December 1999 and January 2000, and they were sent to see whether the respondent would accept those on the list as beneficiaries of the Concession. In other words, they were not sent to the respondent in the course of the litigation, and there is no suggestion of any agreement made, or indeed request, in relation to those registered, between the Legal Aid Department and the respondent, of the kind made in 1997 between the respondent, Pam Baker & Co., Clarke & Kong, and the Department of Legal Aid, respectively. Indeed, one recalls that in August 1997, a request for an undertaking that those not granted legal aid and whose cases had not been assessed as meritorious might nonetheless, if they reported to the Director of Immigration, not be removed, was rejected. There is no justification in the circumstances for reading some agreement between the respondent and the Director of Legal Aid (on behalf of those registered) from the events of December 1998 and January 1999.

155. There is a suggestion that the respondent was aware of these letters. That is correct, although the date upon which he became aware of them is not altogether clear. The evidence of a Mr Mak Kwai Yan, Assistant Director of Immigration, is that by 26 June 1999, there were 964 persons who had been present in Hong Kong between 1 to 10 July 1997 (and therefore not subject to the certificate of entitlement scheme) whose claims had been verified. In explaining how their claims were approached, he says that the categories of claimant accepted were named parties in the litigation; persons covered by specific agreements (I have referred to these 1997 agreements); and others, including "persons who surrendered to or were arrested by Immigration Officers and whose names were on a list of persons set out in pre-7 December 1998 letters issued by the Director of Legal Aid to the Director of Immigration .... [and] ... other persons who brought with them post-7 December 1998 letters issued by the Director of Legal Aid to them."

156. The pre-December 1998 letters take the applicants' case no further. They were mere notifications of receipt of a legal aid application, with a request not to remove the applicant pending the outcome of the legal aid application or of subsequent proceedings. Even if I were to assume that the respondent was aware before 29 January 1999 of the terms of the letters issued to two-way permit holders on and after 7 December 1998, those letters do not in my judgment constitute any representation, express or implied, flowing from the respondent to any applicant to whom such a letter was given.

157. It follows from this analysis that the applicants' case based on legitimate expectation (the question of the Concession apart) must fail.

Wednesbury unreasonableness

158. I have earlier reproduced, for their relevance to the legitimate expectation argument, those paragraphs of the Notice of Application which address the previous invariable practice of the Government of following judgments, and previous practice in relation to test cases. But they fall also to be considered under the heading of suggested Wednesbury unreasonableness. It is said that had the applicants thought that the judgments of the Court of Final Appeal might not be followed, they would have issued proceedings, and had the Director of Immigration processed their claims when it was in his power to do so, they would have had their status verified. It is said that the Director enjoys discretionary powers to remove a condition of stay, thus enabling a person to apply for an identity card, or for a certificate of entitlement whilst in Hong Kong.

159. This argument is closely allied to the legitimate expectation case, and once that has gone, there seems to me to be very little scope for an argument based upon Wednesbury unreasonableness. The limits to the availability of an argument based on discretion in circumstances where the respondent is addressing his statutory duties in relation to overstayers were thoroughly canvassed and emphasized in Lau Kong Yung. In making removal orders, the respondent was doing so in relation to persons who had no legal claim to stay; and the failure to exercise a discretion favourable to them could not, in my judgment, in the circumstances I have described, including the law then prevailing and the policy behind the law, be said to be Wednesbury unreasonable.

XI. THE CONCESSION

160. The applicants' case is that, independent of any other ground in this application for judicial review, those who arrived in Hong Kong before 29 January 1999 and who made a right of abode claim before that date have, by reason of the Concession announced by the Chief Executive on 26 June 1999, a legitimate expectation to have their status verified according to the judgments in Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga without returning to the Mainland.

161. The statement of 26 June was made (at a media session) in both English and Cantonese. I have already referred to it. In its English version it said, in so far as is relevant to the legitimate expectation point which now arises :

".... To comply with the principle that judgments previously rendered by the Court of Final Appeal shall not be affected by an interpretation of the National People's Congress Standing Committee, we will allow persons who arrived in Hong Kong between July 1 1997 and January 29 1999 and had claimed the right of abode to have their status as permanent residents verified in accordance with the CFA decision. It is estimated that there are about 3,700 people in this category."

162. The questions which arise are these :

(1) What does this Concession mean?

(2) Has the respondent, generally, applied the correct meaning to the Concession?

(3) Is it demonstrated in particular cases, where the facts are common ground, or are accepted for the purpose of this application for judicial review, that the respondent has not applied the correct meaning of the Concession?

The contentions

163. The applicants and the respondent are poles apart on the meaning of the Concession. The respondent asserts that there were three elements that are required to be satisfied for someone to come within the Concession :

(1) presence by a claimant within the relevant period;

(2) a claim for right of abode must have been lodged with the Director of Immigration, of which claim the Director has a record; and

(3) that claim must have been made whilst the claimant was in Hong Kong.

164. It is common ground :

(1) that those applicants categorized in these cases as Period 4 and 5 arrivals do not fall within the Concession;

(2) that it suffices for a claim to be constituted if it was lodged on behalf of the claimant by a parent or guardian or some person authorized by the claimant to make the claim; and

(3) that it was not necessary to qualify for the Concession that the claimant was in Hong Kong throughout the Concession period.

165. The applicants, on the other hand, say that the conditions imposed by the respondent as conditions precedent to satisfying the Concession criteria are unwarranted by a plain reading of the statement. In particular, they say that there is no need for a claim to have been documented; that there is no need for a claim to have been made to the Director of Immigration rather than, say, to the Legal Aid Department, or some other government authority; and that it suffices if the claim or assertion is made when the person concerned is out of Hong Kong, so long as he or she has been in Hong Kong at the same stage during the Concession period. The Notice of Application asserts that a person has made a claim if -

"(a) s/he had approached the Immigration Department and asserted that s/he qualifies as HKPR or enjoys the right of abode or otherwise made statements implying s/he has the right of abode (e.g. by applying for a Certificate of Entitlement or an I.D. card); or

(b) his/her guardian or agent had approached the Immigration Department and made the above assertion or statements on his/her behalf; or

(c) had approached the Immigration Department for an extension of stay pending the outcome of the test cases; or

(d) s/he had applied for legal aid for the purpose of compelling the Director of Immigration to recognize his/her status as HKPR, whether s/he was granted legal aid and/or included under the 'test cases' by name, or was told to await the decision of the test cases without further action; or

(e) s/he had by conduct including presence asserted that s/he is a permanent resident enjoying the right of abode.

(f) s/he or someone on his or her behalf had applied or attempted to apply for a one-way permit and is the child of a Hong Kong permanent resident."

166. The respondent's position is explained in an affidavit sworn by the Secretary for Security. She states that after the Interpretation, the Government "formulated a policy to identify classes of persons who would have their claim as permanent residents determined in accordance with the law as declared in the [Court of Final Appeal] judgments rather than the law as then declared by the ... Interpretation." It was clear, she says, that the named applicants in the two cases were not to be affected; and that neither were those covered by express undertakings that they would not be removed pending the outcome of that litigation. "The Government also considered whether there were any others who should similarly be treated in the same way. The Government considered that the fairest and most rational way to determine who should be so treated was to have regard to the person's physical presence in Hong Kong and also to the question of whether that person had sought to establish his status as a permanent resident by making a claim to the Director of Immigration for right of abode of which the Immigration Department had a record." Those who had made a claim between 1 and 10 July 1997 should, the Government considered, benefit because of the ruling of the Court of Final Appeal that the certificate of entitlement scheme in the No.3 Ordinance did not have retrospective effect. Those who made claims before 29 January 1999 should be treated favourably, according to this thinking, "because if they had brought their own proceedings, they would either have been parties before the Court of Final Appeal in their own right or would have been the subject of the implied agreements (by way of undertakings not to remove) that they should be treated in the same way as the applicants in Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga cases." She asserts that the requirement that the Director of Immigration should have a record of a claim should have been self-evident from the fact that an estimate was given in the Concession statement, as well as later, of the number of persons said to benefit. Furthermore, the need for a record was necessary as a matter of good administration. She adds that the Concession decision was made as an exception to the limited saving provision of the last paragraph of the Interpretation, and that the Government considered that the meaning and scope of the Concession was a matter for the Government to determine administratively.

167. On the same day as the Concession announcement, there was issued a press release (other than the release which simply transcribed the media session). It again referred to the 3,700 persons said to benefit, saying that they would be those who had laid right of abode claims with the Director of Immigration whilst in Hong Kong. On 28 June 1999, by a paper before the House Committee of the Legislative Council, the Security Bureau said that the Director of Immigration considered that those who were in Hong Kong and who between 1 July 1997 and 29 January 1999, inclusive, "made a claim to the Director of Immigration to the effect that they were entitled to the right of abode be regarded as being parties involved in the Court of Final Appeal judgments." The paper added that there were 3,700 persons thus affected, of whom 964 had already had their claims verified; 900 of the rest were in Hong Kong and they would not need to return to the Mainland before their claims were processed and results made known; and the remaining 1,800 had returned to the Mainland, and in their cases the Director of Immigration would discuss with the Mainland authorities arrangements for their entry when their claims for right of abode had been established.

168. There are some issues as to correct translation of the Chinese version of the Concession issued; and of the press release the same day. The applicants say that the Chinese version of the Concession refers to those who arrived in the relevant period and had claimed the right of abode "to the authorities". This, they say, is important because it brought in, or covered claims to, any Government authority, in particular to the Legal Aid Department. The court interpreter says that the correct translation is "lodged the right of abode claim with the authorities". It is common ground that the Chinese version (like its English counterpart) makes no express reference to the need to have made a claim whilst in Hong Kong. Nor does the Chinese version of the press release introduce such a requirement.

Principles of law

(1) The true meaning of a policy or a policy statement is a matter for the court to determine (see R. v. Ministry of Defence, Ex parte Walker [1999] 1 WLR 1209, 1216 (Court of Appeal)); and it is for the court to determine whether the public authority implementing it has interpreted it correctly (Ex parte Walker, [2000] 1 WLR 806, 810 (House of Lords)).

(2) "If a statement is not clear and unambiguous, such expectations such a statement gives rise to will not be legitimate" (see Hong Kong and China Gas Co. Ltd v. Director of Lands [1997] HKLRD 1291, 1297).

(3) If the statement is not precise, or as fully expressed as it might be, and permits of a range of meaning, the court will respect the policy maker's interpretation of it, unless that interpretation is irrational (Ex parte Walker, [1999] 1 WLR 1209, 1216F).

(4) It is not for the court to determine whether the policy represented by the Concession is a fair policy, unless it be shown that the policy is wholly unreasonable (see Ex parte Walker, [2000] 1 WLR 806, 812).

Analysis

169. I am satisfied that the Concession statement could not legitimately give rise to the expectations which the applicants say that it nurtured. The breadth of the Concession, as the applicants would interpret it, makes no practical sense and sits wholly ill at ease with the historical context in which the decision was made and announced. It permits classification as a claim an oral assertion, or inquiry, by those approaching inquiry or information counters, for example, at the Immigration Department. If that be sufficient, it is difficult, frankly, to see why an assertion over the telephone, of which there is no record, would not do. What was meant by "claimed the right of abode" in the statement of 26 June was not, in my judgment, explained with any particularity, and the broad statement permitted a range of meaning which was open to the authorities to interpret and limit in a practical way. To assume that the claim need not be formal and recorded and made to the Immigration Department is to invite a coach and horses to be run through the immigration policy to which the Interpretation (and indeed the judgments of January 1999) sought to give effect. How was one to check whether a claim had or had not been made? Absent a record and assuming the authorities were bound to accept anyone who had visited the Immigration Department, or indeed said that he or she had visited the Department, and asserted, in whatever context, and in whatever way, the right of abode, what numbers then qualified for verification processing in Hong Kong? The answer is that no one would have much of an idea, and the notion that the authorities would embrace such a policy has only to be stated for its weakness to be revealed. And from where, incidentally, came the figure of 3,700? It must in itself have suggested some disciplined method by which that figure had been reached. The Concession statement is not a statutory instrument to be analyzed for the precise words used, divorced from context and from history and from practical considerations; yet I am bound to say that the only route by which the applicants' interpretation could survive would involve digression from context, history and practical considerations.

170. It is said that a person has made a claim if he or she applied for legal aid, and the applicants point to a radio interview given by the Secretary for Security on 28 January 1999 in which she said that the claim would be regarded as sufficient if a person could prove an approach to the Legal Aid Department or to the Immigration Department. The Secretary for Security explains that her comment about approaches to the Legal Aid Department was intended to refer to those clients of Clarke & Kong who had been granted legal aid and whose removal had been withheld pursuant to express agreement, or those identified by that Department as having meritorious cases and whose removal was withheld by express agreement made in October 1997. I have to say that that being her intention or meaning, it was not a meaning conveyed in the radio interview, but I do not think that an error of this kind - error in the sense that what was said clearly went beyond the decided policy - can bind the authorities (see Ex parte Begbie, supra, at page 1127C). In any event, this broadcast is not the statement said to give rise to the legitimate expectation. What is said to give rise to the legitimate expectation is the Concession statement of 26 June. Furthermore, an application for legal aid is just that, an application for legal aid, for legal advice, for assistance in bringing an action assuming that the Legal Aid authorities considers there to be merit.

171. In my judgment, this court is bound, in the circumstances of the case, the broad phrase used, the context, the history, the need for some certainty of numbers, to respect the interpretation placed on the Concession by the authorities. It was imprecise enough for several meanings or applications to be adopted and the application of the Concession was not such "as to be 'so aberrant that it cannot be classed as rational' " (see Walker [2000] 1 WLR 806, 813, citing also R. v. Monopolies and Mergers Commission, Ex parte South Yorkshire Transport Ltd [1993] 1 WLR 23, 32). That being so, the respondent's interpretation of the Concession cannot be impugned.

172. This analysis answers the first two questions I have posed as to the meaning of the Concession, and the respondent's interpretation of it.

Individual cases

173. The third question which now falls to be considered is whether it is demonstrated in particular cases that the respondent has misapplied the Concession in the light of the interpretation of it.

174. In the consideration of individual cases, the court should ask whether the decision-maker has misunderstood the policy and, if not, whether he has made a material finding of fact that cannot reasonably be entertained (see R. v. Monopolies Commission, Ex parte South Yorkshire Transport Limited [1993] 1 WLR 23). In asking whether the decision-maker has misunderstood the policy, it is to be remembered that where the criteria, such as they are, are themselves not precise, decision-makers will have some latitude when applying the policy. Thus, in the Monopolies Commission case (referred to in Ex parte Walker at [1999] 1 WLR 1209, 1216 F-G), Lord Mustill said, at page 32, that :

"... The criterion so established may itself be so imprecise that different decision-makers, each acting rationally, might reach differing conclusions when applying it to the facts of a given case. In such a case the court is entitled to substitute its own opinion for that of the person to whom the decision has been entrusted only if the decision is so aberrant that it cannot be classed as rational : Edwards v. Bairstow [1956] AC 14."

He went on to say that even after eliminating inappropriate senses of a word or phrases, one may still be left "with a meaning broad enough to call for the exercise of judgment rather than an exact quantitative measure". The question in such a case is whether the decision arrived at by the decision-maker is within "the permissible field of judgment".

175. I have earlier concluded that the broad meaning which the applicants would attribute to the Concession statement is unacceptably wide, and that the Director's interpretation that there had to be a claim made to the Director of Immigration of which he had a record, and made whilst the applicant was in Hong Kong, was perfectly acceptable and indeed, from a practical point of view, sensible. There has in effect been much debate in this hearing about the meaning of the word "claim" in the context of the announcement. Did it mean "lodge a claim"? The applicants point to suggest the differences in the words used in the English version of the Concession announcement and in what is said to be the correct Chinese version (where the word "lodge" is said not to be an appropriate translation), and I have been taken to a debate about the translation of the Chinese version of the second press release that day where the words "submitted claims to the Director of Immigration" are said to be an inaccurate translation, the suggestion being that the translation should be "had claimed they have right of abode". This is to elevate these broad statements, clearly intended, in my view, to be rendered practical by further definition and precise application, to the level of statements in statutory instruments, which they were not. These statements were broad statements of policies already formed by the Chief Executive in Council - and I note that the decision in the Executive Council was in relation to those who had "lodged claims on right of abode with the Director of Immigration" - (see the affidavit of the Secretary for Security, paragraph 4). I note that in the explanation of the policy and its background, and in papers to the Legislative Council, and in the explanation of the approach to those who by 26 June 1999 had been treated as if benefitting from the judgment, the authorities themselves seemed interchangeably to refer to lodging a claim for right of abode, and to making a claim to the effect that they had the right of abode. Clearly, they were applying it in a sense more strict than mere inquiries about possible status, more strict than follow-up inquiries, and more strict than references in passing in other contexts to a right of abode. They interpreted it as making an application, or saying something which clearly had that effect. That was a view and a latitude to which, in the circumstances, they were entitled. These comments are all particularly germane to the cases of Lau Kong Yung (RA7 in HCAL 81/1999), and Li Shuk Fan (the sole applicant in HCAL 2/2000). The other individual cases which I have examined, and to which I refer below, tend to fall outwith the Concession for the relatively obvious reasons that an approach was an inquiry and not a claim or application, or because there is no record of the asserted claim.

176. In some of the individual cases, the respondent accepts factual assertions to be true or is prepared to assume them to be true and is content for a removal order to be quashed in any such case if the court is against the respondent on his classification of the case as falling outwith the Concession, even though some facts are merely assumed. There are two cases of fundamental factual dispute in respect of which it has been decided that it is not appropriate for the applicant to be a representative applicant. I refer to them below.

177. Quite a number of the representative applicants say that they or members of their family went to make enquiries at the information office of the Immigration Department. There is evidence from the respondent about what, generally, transpired at that office. It is a large office with a public waiting area and 15 enquiry counters at which members of the public make their enquiries of officers. In 1997, there were 24 Immigration Officers and Assistants working at the office; in 1998 and 1999 there were 30. Those at the counters handled general enquiries made in person and by telephone and those making enquiries were not required to provide their particulars, and the office keeps no records of the enquiries made. In each of the years 1997 to 1999 inclusive, between 1.159 million and 1.458 million enquiries were handled by that office, about half of which were for those appearing in person and the rest by telephone. For right of abode enquiries, officers were instructed to deploy standard responses. I have been shown them. They merely told people how they were to claim and of the need to apply on the Mainland. There are also forms that are available at the office, particular application forms such as "application for certificate of entitlement" and "application for verification of eligibility for permanent identity card".

I. HCAL 81/1999

(RA1) Ng Siu Tung

178. She has been accepted by the respondent as coming within the Concession. No relief is now sought in relation to this applicant.

(RA2) Ng Kam Chi

179. There is a factual dispute in relation to Miss Ng. She says that she had provided her personal particulars in writing to the Immigration Department in July 1997. This is disputed. There is some record of particulars provided by her husband but not by her. It was agreed towards the end of the hearing that in the circumstances, this applicant is not suited to be a representative applicant, and I shall therefore not treat her as one.

(RA3) Lo Po Lai

180. Ms Lo, aged 21, has been in Hong Kong since April 1997. As far as suggested claims made in Hong Kong to the Director of Immigration are concerned, the contention is that her father asked an immigration officer about application procedures. The officer said that documents should be brought including proof of the parent-child relationship. The respondent is entitled to take the view, as he has, that this was an enquiry and does not constitute claiming the right of abode, of which in any event there is no record. It is said that the father visited the 13th floor of the Immigration Department on 7 January 1999 and told them that she wished to apply for the right of abode. There he was told, according to his account, that he should go to an office in Yaumatei. He went and presented documents, and was told that his daughter had overstayed and should surrender, but she was afraid to do so and there the matter was, for the time being, left. Evidence by the respondent is that at the 13th floor there are no records of any visits by or on behalf of this applicant and the Yaumatei Office handles applications for extension of stay. In the case of such an application, a record would be made. In the case of other enquiries, the enquirer would be referred to the information office and no record made. Those applying for extensions of stay would be given a form on which might be stated an intended right of abode claim. There is also a suggested visit by the father to the Legal Aid Department in May 1998 to enquire about procedures and the progress of litigation.

181. Assuming the evidence of these visits to be accurate, the Director of Immigration has, in the light of the Concession interpretation which he has adopted, made no material error in his assessment as to whether there has in the case of this applicant been a Concession claim.

(RA4) Chu Chun Man

182. She arrived in Hong Kong in October 1994 and overstayed since November 1994. No claim is alleged to have been made by her or on her behalf during the concession period.

(RA5) Tam Siu Ming

183. Tam Siu Ming was only in Hong Kong between 10 July 1997 and 17 July 1997, and then again on and after 16 July 1999. The only claim, therefore, that could survive, as it were, for Concession purposes would be one made in that week in July 1997. The contention is that on about 12 July 1997 he went with his family members, armed with documentary evidence, to the Wanchai Immigration Tower's inquiry counter to make his application but was told to return to the Mainland to apply. There is no record of any claim having been lodged. In the circumstances, the Director's decision on the Concession claim of this applicant cannot be upset by this court.

184. I note, incidentally, that Tam Siu Ming arrived on 10 July 1997. The respondent is prepared to treat him as having arrived before 10 July and therefore as a P2 applicant, a point relevant when I come to address the specific issue relating to that period. The cases of Lo Po Lai and Chu Chun Man also fall for consideration as Period 1 arrivals, in respect of which group there is also a discrete argument which I deal with later in this judgment.

(RA6) Lee Wang Lung

185. This applicant was in Hong Kong in the summer of 1997 and the summer of 1998, so far as the Concession period goes. It is said that in July 1997 he and his family went to the Immigration Department. What happened is summarized by those acting for the applicant thus : "Father, mother, Master Lee and sister attended Wanchai to assert their claim. They were not permitted to do so. There were no procedures available." It follows that no claim, in the form required by the Concession, was in fact made. In the same month, the father went to the Legal Aid Department "for legal assistance for my two children's right of abode in Hong Kong". Information was noted and a card evidencing his request given to him. But, in August, his legal aid application was refused. This could not be construed as a claim to the respondent, regardless of the fact that in any event there is no record of this with the respondent.

(RA7) Lau Kong Yung

186. This youngster now has a one-way permit and a certificate of entitlement, but I am nevertheless asked to determine the rejection of his Concession claim, for it is said on behalf of the applicants that such a determination will assist in cases of other applicants who have no one-way permit.

187. Lau Kong Yung arrived in Hong Kong in September 1997 but overstayed and has been in Hong Kong ever since. Amongst the assertions made are :

(1) That his family went to the Immigration Department in December 1998 where they handed over family documents as well as Lau Kong Yung's documents, asking for his right of abode to be processed. There is a dispute about what happened there, which is not one I can decide. There is, however, no record of such a visit.

(2) That there was a telephone enquiry asking how to apply for right of abode. This could not possibly fall within the Concession criteria.

(3) The father says that at the end of 1998 he took his son's documents to the Immigration Department in Wanchai and asked for his right of abode to be processed. Now, again, there is a factual issue here which is not for this court to determine. The respondent does not accept that this was the purpose of the visit. He exhibits a letter of 31 December 1998 to Mr Lau which acknowledges Mr Lau's report of a change of his marital status, which required or accompanied an application to amend his identity card particulars. There is a copy of that printed application form completed by or for Mr Lau on the records and the form is an "Application for amendment of registered particulars of Hong Kong identity card". On it are added the words "Enquire about the application for certificate of entitlement of Lau Kong Yung". It is said by the respondent that this is not an application for right of abode and is rather an enquiry made in passing in the course of an application for amendment of identity card particulars. I am unable to say that that is an aberrant application of the policy.

(4) The strength of this applicant's case on the Concession arises from letters which his father wrote in January 1999, still during the Concession period, to the Director of Immigration. At that stage, Master Lau was in Hong Kong, although the Director did not know it and although it would appear from the correspondence that Mr Lau, the father, was representing that the son was still in the Mainland. The reason given for rejecting those letters as coming within the Concession is important : Mr Chiu Wai Kai, Assistant Principal Immigration Officer, says :

"As is apparent from the contents of the letters written by Mr Lau, he only enquired about the progress of the processing of the application for certificate of entitlement by Master Lau. The letters ... did not make reference to Master Lau being present in Hong Kong, having overstayed in Hong Kong since 2 December 1997. It is the Director's case that these letters of enquiries and progress checks did not amount to lodging claim for right of abode in Hong Kong with the Director."

The essence of the decision in this particular case is not put on the footing that the Director would not treat as a claimant someone who had not surfaced or surrendered (and that was a pre-requisite for those whose claims were verified by 26 June 1999) - it is put on the footing that what Mr Lau was doing was making follow-up enquiries. A certificate of entitlement could not, in any event, Mr Fok said, be applied for in Hong Kong and there was no record of a certificate of entitlement claim on the Mainland.

188. In my judgment, the finding that Mr Lau was by these letters not in fact making a right of abode claim for his son is a finding that cannot reasonably be entertained. I accept that a follow-up enquiry about progress of a claim allegedly made elsewhere is by no means necessarily itself a claim to the Director in Hong Kong for the right of abode. But, on the facts of this particular case, Mr Lau was not merely complaining of lack of progress of a claim on the Mainland : he was renewing the application. He had given up hope of anything happening on the Mainland. On 2 January 1999 he wrote saying that he had sent documents to the PSB as long ago as before July 1997 - he had not even had a reply. "I would be very grateful if you could approve my son's application for the certificate of entitlement." On 22 January, he wrote enquiring about whether the certificate of entitlement had been given to the PSB (that is a follow-up enquiry), but then added : "May I bring my son to the Immigration Department for applying resident's document?" I suppose a legalistic approach might say that by that added question he was signalling a possible future claim, but that is not the reality of what this layman was saying. He was saying : "My son has the right of abode. Please now give him the necessary document to permit him to exercise that right."

189. That these documents were received by the respondent is not in doubt.

190. The relief claimed in the Notice of Motion is that I quash the decision of the respondent not to revoke the removal order. That relief is no longer sought, because Lau Kong Yung has in fact acquired his certificate of entitlement and his one-way permit. I am asked, instead, to make a declaration as to the validity of the decision about the Concession, since it is said that Lau Kong Yung's case is representative of others. The case turns very much on its own facts and I have doubts as to how helpful this decision is in relation to other applicants. I do not, in the event, think it appropriate to declare that Lau Kong Yung came within the Concession, for a question does arise, and it was hinted at in argument, as to the position of those who were represented to be on the Mainland but were in fact here. (I note in a letter of 17 January 1999 that the father writes "If my son has to come to Hong Kong, can he apply for a certificate of entitlement?") I do not decide that matter one way or the other, though I rather doubt that Concession claims were contemplated as constituted in the face of a representation of that kind, if made and if untrue. The only appropriate course, I believe, is for me to record my finding that the view taken in this case that no claim was made for the right of abode by the letters written in January 1999 was not a tenable view.

(RA8) Lau Pong

191. The only time Master Lau was in Hong Kong during the Concession period was from 14 July 1998 to 2 August 1998. It is said that on 20 July that year, he and his mother went to the 21st floor of the Immigration Department "to enquire", and asked for assistance to apply for right of abode, but they were told that they could not apply in Hong Kong. There is no record of his attendance, or of any assertion then made for the right of abode. This type of enquiry is the subject of the evidence, to which I have earlier referred, about the informal nature of proceedings at the information office of the Immigration Department. A similar enquiry at the same place was apparently made on 25 July 1998 and again on 27 July. It is said that on 27 July, the mother asked for applications for right of abode to be processed but they were turned away. Again, there is no record of these visits or enquiries. The respondent says that these approaches did not constitute claims and that there is in any event no record of the approaches, and that they therefore do not fall within the Concession. Given the scope and acceptable interpretation of the Concession by the respondent, that conclusion must follow.

192. The family also went to the Legal Aid Department on 27 July 1998 "to apply for legal assistance regarding my application for right of abode". That department issued him with a card and a file number. Although the evidence filed by the respondent says that it was not until July 1999 that he was aware of such an application having been made, there is evidence from the Legal Aid Department that a letter dated 27 July 1998 from the Director of Legal Aid was sent to the respondent which stated that the applicant had applied for legal aid and asking that no removal order be made until the outcome of the application for legal aid of any subsequent legal proceedings. The respondent takes the view that this is, in any event, not a claim for right of abode made to the Director of Immigration. It is a notice of application for legal aid. That is not an unreasonable conclusion.

(RA9) Lin Li Pin, Penny

193. Ms Lin alleges that in November 1998, whilst she was in Hong Kong, she sent a letter to the respondent and she exhibits her copy of that letter. In its effect it clearly, in my judgment, claims right of abode. But the respondent does not accept that she sent the letter. This is a fundamental factual issue, and towards the end of this hearing it was agreed that the issue was such as to make it easiest no longer to treat her as a representative applicant. So that is what I shall do; although I did make the comment to counsel that where there are issues of fact of this kind, they are not in any event for the court unless it be suggested that the determination by the respondent of such an issue of fact was plainly wrong.

(RA10) Lau Kwai Fong

194. Although she has been present in Hong Kong since September 1998, it is not alleged that she made a claim during her presence in Hong Kong during the concession period.

(RA11) Chan Kui Yui

195. The only claim relied upon by this applicant during the concession period arises from a visit to the Legal Aid Department on 11 December 1998 "to apply for legal assistance in the right of abode litigation". This applicant was given one of the post-7 December 1998 letters. It is not suggested that that letter was taken to the Immigration Department during what remained of the Concession period. This application for legal aid does not constitute a claim within the Concession.

Representative applicants 12-19 inclusive :

196. I do not intend to summarise their assertions or the respondent's answers to those assertions. That is because none of these applicants was in Hong Kong during the Concession period, and that reason alone suffices to take them out of its ambit.

II. HCAL 70/2000

197. There are seven representative applicants:

(RA1) Chan Chung Sau

198. Mr Chan is aged 30 years. During the Concession period he was in Hong Kong from 2 September 1997 to 2 October 1997. He says that he went with his mother to the Immigration Department headquarters in Wanchai "to inquire whether or not I was entitled to right of abode". He was told that he had to make the appropriate application on the Mainland. He requested no forms. There is no record of his visit and the events amount in any case to an enquiry rather than a claim as such.

(RA2) Chau Yin Ping

199. It is not suggested that this applicant's case is a Concession case.

(RA3) Chung Chi Kwong

200. Mr Chung is aged 21 years. He was in Hong Kong for one week during the concession period, namely, 1 February 1998 to 8 February 1998. This too is a case of a visit to the 2nd floor of the Immigration Department in Wanchai where the applicant says that he told the officer that he wished to apply for right of abode, but was told that he had to apply in the Mainland. There is, not surprisingly, no record of this enquiry, and it in any event constituted no more than an enquiry.

(RA4) Lam Chi Lok

201. Mr Lam, who is aged 36 years, is a Period 1 applicant. During the Concession period he was in Hong Kong from (before) July 1997 until 24 October 1997. His evidence is that in late July 1997 he went to the 2nd floor information desk of the Immigration Department in Wanchai "to inquire whether or not I could claim the right of abode in Hong Kong". There, he was told that he was required to return to the Mainland to make an application for a one-way permit. The view taken by the respondent that this does not amount to a claim within the Concession (and there is no record) is not impeachable.

202. The evidence is that he went again to the Immigration Department in October 1997 and went to the 13th floor "to enquire about my eligibility for the right of abode in Hong Kong". It is to be remembered that he, like other applicants in 70/2000, is a Group B applicant, not then considered eligible for right of abode in any event. He asked if he could make an application in Hong Kong. It was discovered that he had overstayed. He was told to make the application on the Mainland and when asked why he had overstayed, he was, he says, provided with a range of suggested responses, none of which included an assertion of a right of abode, in consequence of which he wrote : "Because I want to be with my family". It is accepted that Mr Lau went to the General Investigation Section on the 13th floor of Immigration Department in Wanchai on 16 October 1997. It is said that there is no list there of suggested answers. It is not for me in these proceedings, for the purpose of the present question, to resolve that issue. The General Investigation Section is responsible for processing two-way permit holders who have overstayed and have surrendered and sought permission to leave Hong Kong. The respondent puts his case on this basis, that even on the applicant's case, details of which are disputed, there has been no Concession claim : no claim for right of abode was lodged, and there is no record of one. In my judgment, there exist no valid grounds to challenge the validity of that conclusion.

(RA5) Sin Hoi Chu

203. Ms Sin was in Hong Kong twice during the Concession period - from 24 January 1998 to 6 February 1998; and from 30 October 1998 to 10 November 1998.

204. She says that in early February 1998 she went to the 2nd floor enquiry counter of Immigration Tower and asked whether she was "eligible to apply for the right of abode in Hong Kong". She was told that she had to apply on the Mainland. For reasons well canvassed, this was not a Concession claim.

205. She then says that when she came to Hong Kong in October 1998, she proceeded through immigration control and that during an exchange with the immigration officer about her reason for visiting Hong Kong, she said that she was visiting her parents and was entitled to the right of abode. He told her to apply on the Mainland. These assertions are disputed. But be that as it may, there is no record of it. It would be odd if the Concession decision had ever contemplated bringing within its fold oral statements in circumstances such as those described by Ms Sin. There is no ground for disturbing the respondent's Concession decision in this particular case.

(RA6) Sin Siu Yin

206. Ms Sin is an elder sister of Ms Sin Hoi Chu. She was in Hong Kong with her sister in late January 1998 for two weeks; and was here without her sister in July 1998 for three days. She says that in July, she went with her mother to the enquiry counter on 2nd floor of Immigration Tower, and her mother asked for "some forms in order to apply for her daughters to stay in Hong Kong for resettlement. At the same time my mother indicated to the officer that I was one of the daughters applying for the right of abode". The officer on hearing that the mother was not a permanent resident at the time of the birth of the daughters, told her that an application had to be made on the Mainland and the request for forms was declined. No forms were there submitted, meaning that no claim was lodged and that there exists no record of any claim.

207. She also says that her mother works near to the Immigration Tower and was a very frequent visitor to the Immigration Tower but was always told that the application had to be made on the Mainland. Obviously, there is no record of such visits or conversations or of any assertions or claims made during them. So, similarly in this case, there is no ground to overturn the Director's decision in relation to this applicant and the Concession.

(RA7) Yau Po Chun

208. It is not suggested that this applicant falls within the Concession.

The application to re-amend

209. There is outstanding in the case of HCAL 70 of 2000 an application for leave to re-amend the application for leave to apply for judicial review, by addition of a paragraph (23A) to assert procedural impropriety in the gathering of information from applicants as to whether they had made claims for the right of abode. The issues raised by that proposed application to re-amend do not now arise in this case because I have ruled that the Concession agreement is properly construed by the Director of Immigration to mean claims for the right of abode lodged with the Director of which he has a record. Since the assertions which the applicants say they were precluded from putting forward by reason of the suggested procedural improprieties would in any event fall outwith the Concession as thus interpreted, it would be unnecessary for me to determine the issues proposed to be raised, even if leave to re-amend were granted. It seems to me to be best in the circumstances to adjourn the application sine die, thus preserving the position for the applicants should they appeal and succeed on the question of the proper width of the Concession. I shall make an order accordingly.

III. HCAL 2/2000 : LI SHUK FAN

210. Ms Li was born in May 1980. She is a Group B applicant. Her father came to Hong Kong in 1980 and her mother in 1996. She came to Hong Kong in February 1998 on a two-way permit and was granted leave to remain as a visitor. Her permission to remain expired in March 1998 and she has, since then, remained in Hong Kong in breach of the condition of stay. The removal order in her case was made on 17 December 1999. The decision that she was not entitled to the benefit of the Concession was made on or about 28 December 1999.

211. There is but one matter upon which the Concession claim is put forward in the case of this applicant. It is a letter dated 4 December 1998. Argument based upon other facts, or alleged facts, said to constitute a Concession claim, have been abandoned.

212. The respondent's evidence is that before the decision to make a removal order was taken, the question whether this applicant fell within the Concession was addressed. It is said that :

"All the relevant departmental file records had been looked at and considered in relation to the applicant. No record of the applicant having lodged a claim for right of abode with the Director in the period between 1 July and 29 January 1999 was found. Nor was there such a record of such a claim having been made on her behalf."

213. Mr Fok accepts that if the letter was sent and received, the letter itself constitutes a record. The evidence on behalf of the Director is that their records show that a letter from the father was received on 7 December 1998. I presume that that is a fact only discovered on checking the records after receipt of the evidence of the applicant and her father in this case. Although the applicant said in her first affirmation that no copy was kept of the letter of 4 December 1998, the father subsequently produced a copy saying that the original had been misplaced. There is, however, no question but that a letter was received on 7 December and since it is not suggested that any other letter was written, it must be the case that the letter of 4 December was sent and was received by the department, that that letter was a record, and that the Director had a record of that letter. In my judgment, the respondent has, in coming to his decision in relation to this applicant's Concession claim, failed to take into account a material fact, namely, the fact of this letter.

214. The respondent says that the letter does not in any event constitute a claim to the right of abode. It is a letter which speaks of the applicant's background, that numerous applications for a one-way permit were made but refused for the reason that he, the father, had not at the time of the birth of the applicant acquired permanent resident status. He acknowledges that the applicant has overstayed, thereby breaking the law and he ends, according to one translation :

"In view of the above circumstances, in order to save my daughter, I hereby can only apply to the Immigration Department for assistance. I hope the Immigration Department will deal with my daughter's case with discretion in the spur of humanity. Perhaps could right of abode be granted? Or perhaps is there any other way by which my daughter can apply on the Mainland for a one-way permit to come to Hong Kong to live with her parents who give her confidence and who can care for and guide her? Only this would help ameliorate her mental illness.... It is sincerely hoped that the Immigration Department will make allowances for this exceptional case and handle it with discretion and leniency."

215. The phrase "perhaps could right of abode be granted" is, as to translation, challenged by the respondent and the same translator now says that the best translation she can give is "perhaps could she be given/granted residence and stay/remain".

216. I am asked to say that this letter is not in fact a right of abode claim nor any assertion that the applicant was entitled to the right of abode but that it is, in proper context, a plea for the exercise of discretion for the applicant to be allowed to stay, on compassionate grounds. It is then said by Mr Fok on behalf of the respondent that "once it is held that the letter is not a claim for right of abode to the Director of Immigration within the Concession decision, the proper conclusion is that the decision-making process leading to the removal order under challenge was not flawed." I do not, with respect, follow the logic of that. If, ex post facto, the letter were thought by this court not to be a claim for the right of abode, that would not mean that the procedure by which the respondent reached his decision was not flawed. The decision whether this letter is or is not a Concession claim was for the Director to make. He did not, before the removal order, make that decision. If he had made that decision, then this court would examine whether his decision was obviously wrong. But he did not make it at the time he ought, because he did not take the letter into account. For the reasons I have given, he has, as I say, failed to take into account a material fact.

217. I could, in the circumstances, quash the removal order and require the Director of Immigration to consider the content of this letter. That, however, would, in truth, be an artificial exercise because the respondent has made perfectly clear the view he takes of it. Sending it back for reconsideration would largely be motivated by a hope that in the sad circumstances of this case, the Director would exercise his discretion in favour of this applicant on humanitarian grounds. But this is not an acceptable approach. I am bound to say that the construction on the letter which the respondent has adopted seems correct. The applicant's father was writing this letter from the stance that his daughter was not in fact entitled to the right of abode, apparently, because she was a "born before" child; and from the point of view that she was not lawfully in Hong Kong. It seems to me that what the father was saying in this letter was that, nonetheless, he hoped that the daughter would be allowed to remain. In the circumstances, I shall not remit this case for reconsideration of this letter in the context of the Concession and shall not quash the removal order. I am asked also to declare that the applicant is entitled to the benefit of the Concession. Given the flavour of the letter, that is a declaration I do not think I can properly make.

218. That said, it is not disputed that the applicant suffers from schizophrenia and that she has been hospitalized in Hong Kong for that condition. Cases of children being apart from their parents are sad enough, and that refers to almost all the cases with which this whole hearing has been concerned. But where there is the added element of psychiatric illness, the child's need for family comfort and attention is surely all the more acute. I am concerned in the case of this applicant with the general question whether she is, as a matter of right, unaffected by the Interpretation, failing which whether she should be treated as a beneficiary of the Concession. The decision to remove her has not been challenged on the footing of a failure to give sufficient weight to her personal circumstances, a challenge to discretion which is always very difficult successfully to mount. Having said that, I can but express this court's serious concern, which does not bind the Director, at this applicant's special predicament, and express the strong hope that the Director might reconsider his decision on the special compassionate grounds that would appear to exist in this case.

XII. THE "SO WHAT" QUESTION

219. There was a question canvassed in argument that it is not now necessary for me to determine though I shall mention its ambit. I need not determine it because it is a question predicated on the footing that the applicants are unaffected by the Interpretation. It was a question which Mr Chang labelled the "so what?" question, in other words : "So what if an applicant was unaffected by the Interpretation?" His argument, in a nutshell, was that if an applicant was unaffected by the Interpretation, he was entitled to the benefit of the January 1999 judgments, and that meant that both Group A and Group B persons were entitled to remain in Hong Kong pending verification. That was because those judgments held that verification schemes could not go beyond reasonable verification; yet, after the Interpretation and at the time that the removal orders in this case were made, there was only in place on the Mainland a scheme which linked the certificate of entitlement with the exit permit; and there was no promise or intention, as there had been in the immediate aftermath of the Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga judgments, to put in place a delinked scheme. Therefore, the removal orders were unlawful, as well as irrational. So, too, now the court should not assume that if the removal orders were left in place, there would be instituted some scheme enabling the applicants to verify their status on the Mainland by a delinked scheme.

220. Mr Ma's response was to say that one had but to concentrate on the reason for which the removal orders were made; namely, that the applicants were in breach of conditions of stay. If the applicants wished to be unaffected by the Interpretation and therefore to be viewed as if they were parties to the Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga judgments, they had to take the rough with the smooth. They could not merely pick the benefit of those judgments, namely, the recognition of the rights of those establishing themselves to be Group B persons, and the benefit of a certificate of entitlement scheme delinked from the one-way permit. They had to take the burdens too, namely, that they were subject to a certificate of entitlement scheme nonetheless and that they were required to make their applications from the Mainland. And it was made perfectly clear, he points out, in the Lau Kong Yung judgment in the Court of Final Appeal that those who had entered illegally, or who had stayed in breach of condition of stay had no right to remain here, even though claiming to be a permanent resident; and that there was no duty upon the Director to exercise a discretion to permit them to remain. In Lau Kong Yung, at page 336, Litton PJ said that in Ng Ka Ling, the benefit of which the applicants now claim :

"We were at plains to emphasize that the provision in the No.3 Ordinance for verification of a person's claim to be a permanent resident remained intact."

And the statutory provision which remained intact despite the court's excision in January 1999 of the provisions then said to be unconstitutional and which retained the requirement of a valid certificate of entitlement was "not a provision the Director could ignore." (page 336F).

221. I need not, as I say, determine this issue, although there appears to me to be considerable force in Mr Ma's contentions. There is a difference, and always has been, between establishing the right of abode and exercising it. As the Chief Judge in the Court of Appeal in Cheung Lai Wah said :

"If applicants are allowed to lodge their applications after they have come to Hong Kong instead of doing it in China, this would, in the special circumstances of Hong Kong, defeat any scheme which is aimed at orderly settlement. It will encourage unlawful landing and illegal activities."

Nazareth VP in the same case labelled the suggestion that claimants be entitled to remain in Hong Kong to have their claims processed here as absurd. It not only confused a bare claim with verified status, but it had practical consequences almost too obvious to have to articulate.

222. The fact is that the applicants had stayed in breach of condition of stay. They had not established their right of abode. They had no legal claim to stay. The removal orders were made for that reason, and for that reason they were valid. The point was made by Litton PJ in Lau Kong Yung at page 336I :

"The absence of a workable scheme in February 1999 meant simply that, at that time, residents in the Mainland claiming the status of permanent resident were unable to put forward their claim : this did not amount per se to the deprivation of a core right guaranteed by the Basic Law."

And by Ching PJ, at page 341H :

"... the respondents had either entered Hong Kong illegally or had stayed in Hong Kong in breach of the conditions upon which they were permitted to enter. They had no legal claim to stay. Whatever scheme for an application for a certificate of entitlement was or was not in place, they had no legal claim to remain in Hong Kong. The Director was therefore justified, as a matter of law, in making the removal orders under section 19(1)(b) of the Immigration Ordinance (Cap.115). This would have been so whether the orders had been made before our judgment, after our judgment up to the Interpretation or after the Interpretation."

XIII. PERIODS 1 AND 2 ARRIVALS

223. The contention is that applicants who were already in Hong Kong before 1 July 1997 and stayed on after that day are permanent residents under art. 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law and are not affected by art. 22(4) because art. 22(4) applies only to those entering the HKSAR after the Basic Law came into effect. This ground stands independently of all other grounds. The assertion is that there is authority for the proposition thus advanced which is binding on this court. That authority is said to be the Court of Appeal decision in Cheung Lai Wah [1998] 1 HKC 617.

224. The contention in relation to Period 2 arrivals, that is, those applicants who arrived between 1 and 10 July, is that they are unaffected by the Interpretation because the Court of Final Appeal in Lau Kong Yung decided that the provision of the No.3 Ordinance (section 1(2)) that purported to give effect to the No.3 Ordinance as from 1 July 1997 remained invalid because it rendered persons guilty of criminal offences and was therefore unconstitutional as contrary to art. 15(1) of the ICCPR as applied to Hong Kong by virtue of art. 39 of the Basic Law.

225. These contentions remain live issues for category A applicants.

226. I think it convenient to deal first with the Period 2 argument.

Period 2 arrivals

227. Mr Chang points to the fact that the Court of Final Appeal held in Lau Kong Yung that the retrospective provision in the No.3 Ordinance remained unconstitutional because one of the bases put forward by the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Ka Ling for so saying, namely, that it retrospectively rendered persons guilty of criminal offences, was unaffected by the Interpretation. That being so, the respondent's powers and an applicant's status between 1and 10 July 1997 were dictated by the statutory provisions then in force, namely, section 2A of the Ordinance, unamended by the No.3 Ordinance. That simply provided that a Hong Kong permanent resident enjoyed the right of abode, which was to say that he had the right to land, and not to have any removal order made, and any condition of stay was to have no effect. And if that be so, no question of a removal order for breach of a condition of stay (the reason for removal orders in all relevant cases) could arise.

228. The original scheme prescribed by the No.3 Ordinance provided, in its effect, that those rights could not be enjoyed unless a person had established his right of abode by the specific method prescribed by that Ordinance : the holding of a certificate of entitlement, as well as a one-way permit; the application could be made nowhere but on the Mainland; and status could only be established by this method. A person seeking to exercise his right of abode in the absence of establishing his right by this method committed a criminal offence (unless he otherwise had permission to be in Hong Kong).

229. The respondent, however, points to that part of the Court of Final Appeal judgment in Lau Kong Yung [1999] 2 HKCFAR 300, 327, in which the Chief Justice said :

"The resulting position

As a result of the Interpretation the original scheme is and has since 1 July 1997 been constitutional.

...

The provisions in the No.3 Ordinance and the Notice declared by the court to be unconstitutional ... are and have since 1 July 1997 been constitutional." (Emphasis added)

230. How then does this sit with the passages which immediately follow in that judgment? :

"In Ng Ka Ling the court also declared section 1(2) of the No.3 Ordinance unconstitutional.... Section 1(2) had deemed the No.3 Ordinance, although enacted on 10 July 1997, to have come into effect on 1 July 1997. In my view this is not affected by the Interpretation. In Ng Ka Ling the court in holding this retrospective provision to be unconstitutional relied on two grounds.

First, on the modified scheme, the No.3 Ordinance took away the constitutional right of abode which a permanent resident by descent, who had arrived in Hong Kong on or after 1 July and before 10 July 1997, was already enjoying under the Basic Law... This ground is affected by the Interpretation. This is because the effect of the Interpretation was that article 22(4) qualified article 24(2)(3) and with that qualification, unless a requirement of Mainland approval in article 22(2)(4) was satisfied, the person concerned could not enjoy the right of abode.

The second ground relied on by the court was that the retrospective provision rendered the persons concerned guilty of criminal offences and was unconstitutional as contrary to article 15(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as applied to Hong Kong by virtue of article 39 of the Basic Law... This ground is not affected by the Interpretation. On the basis of this ground, the retrospective provision in section 1(2) of the No.3 Ordinance remains invalid."

231. I cannot agree with Mr Ma's contention that, by reason of the two sentences under the heading "The resulting position", which I have recited, the Court of Final Appeal intended to say that the No.3 Ordinance took effect from 1 July. It sits ill with the later passages about the unconstitutionality of the retrospective provision, and I note that at page 328 the Chief Justice said :

"As a result of the Interpretation, the original scheme is and has since the enactment of the No.3 Ordinance been constitutional." (emphasis added)

232. So how can the suggested contradiction be resolved? It must be recognized that the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Ka Ling had held that the type of restrictions on the enjoyment and exercise of the right of abode found in the No.3 Ordinance derogated from the constitutional right of abode conferred by art. 24(2)(3), which article was unqualified by art. 22(4). Since, however, the effect of the Interpretation was to render the exercise of the right of abode under art. 24(2)(3) subject to the provisions of art. 22(4), a scheme which required persons to obtain an exit permit and which required application for verification of the right of abode to be made on the Mainland did not, in the event, constitute a restriction on the constitutional right of abode. In that sense, the scheme was never unconstitutional. But the statutory provision which prescribed that since 1 July 1997 fulfillment of the litany of conditions laid down by the No.3 Ordinance was the only way in which right of abode could be established and but for which fulfillment the right of abode could not be executed, was a provision which could not operate as from 1 July, for if it did, those purporting to exercise their right of abode pursuant to fulfillment of other or less restrictive conditions which, but for that provision, were available, would be guilty of a criminal offence, on facts rendered criminal retrospectively. So whilst such a scheme, as a scheme, was permissible, it was not from 1 July permissible as the only set of conditions precedent to the exercise of the right of abode. That is one approach by which the suggested contradiction can be said to fall away.

233. In my judgment section 2A remained, between 1 and 10 July, unencumbered by the No.3 Ordinance. But where I do not agree with Mr Chang's argument is in the suggestion that the Ordinance was the only instrument which dictated the exercise of the respondent's powers. The Basic Law, then in force, was then part of the law of Hong Kong and if art. 22(4) placed a restriction upon the exercise of the right of abode, that was not a restriction which he could ignore, and such statutory provisions then in force had to be read and applied in conjunction with that restriction.

234. The link between art. 22(4) and art. 24(2)(3) is a centerpiece of the Interpretation and of the Lau Kong Yung judgment. The Interpretation states that art. 24 means that it is unlawful for anyone, including category 24(2)(3) persons, to enter Hong Kong from the Mainland without an exit permit, regardless of the reason for entry, and the Court of Final Appeal said in Lau Kong Yung that "The effect of this Interpretation is that as a matter of the Basic Law permanent residents by descent must obtain exit approval from the Mainland authorities and must hold a one-way permit before entry into the HKSAR." (per Li CJ at page 325H) and further "... the effect of the Interpretation was that art. 22(4) qualified art. 24(2)(3) and with that qualification, unless the requirement of Mainland approval in art. 22(4) was satisfied, the person concerned could not enjoy the right of abode." (page 327G). The essence of the matter is found in an analysis by Professor Yash Ghai "The NPC Interpretation and its consequences" in "Hong Kong's Constitutional Debate," (Ed. by Chan, Fu & Ghai) at page 210 :

"The second issue [in Lau Kong Yung] was the effect of the Interpretation. The first point was whether the Interpretation linked articles 22(4) and 24(2)(3), as this was not explicitly stated in the Interpretation. The court had little difficulty in demonstrating that the NPCSC saw a link between the provisions and that an exit permit was essential to the exercise of a right of abode."

235. It follows that if someone came to Hong Kong between 1 and 10 July, not entitled to exercise the right of abode because he had no exit permit, he could only lawfully enter and remain in Hong Kong by permission of the respondent, who was entitled to impose conditions of stay. If an offence were committed by reason of an unlawful entry or breach of a condition of stay, that would arise not because of the No.3 Ordinance, not yet in effect, but by reason of other provisions of the Immigration Ordinance then in force. In so far as it might be suggested that this analysis means that in the absence of an Ordinance giving effect to art. 22(4) between 1 to 10 July, no one could lawfully enter from the Mainland, and exercise, for the first time, a right of abode, that suggestion, in my judgment, would not hold good - a person who had an exit permit and whose circumstances matched those in art. 24(2)(3) could both establish and exercise the right of abode. He was not restricted by the No.3 Ordinance in the way in which he was able to establish the right of abode. Nor did the No.3 Ordinance then dictate the conditions precedent to the exercise of a right of abode. He could not be told that he was bound to hold a certificate of entitlement applied for and obtained in the way prescribed by the No.3 Ordinance, as well as an exit permit. But he did have to have an exit permit. None of the Period 2 applicants in cases No.81/1999 or 70/2000 held such a permit. The contention that the removal orders made were unlawful because Period 2 arrivals are unaffected by the Interpretation is a contention which, for the reasons I have given, I must reject.

Period 1 arrivals

236. Applicants Ng Kam Chi, Lo Po Lai and Chu Chun Man (in HCAL 81/1999) and Lam Chi Lok (in HCAL 70/2000) are the Period 1 representative applicants in this case. (No relief is any longer sought in relation to Ng Siu Tung). They had each before 1 July 1997 already overstayed. Each was in Hong Kong, on 30 June 1997, in breach of condition of stay. I find some difficulty with the proposition that because they happened to be here in Hong Kong already on 1 July 1997, they were entitled to exercise the right of abode, although they held no exit permit. It is true that the Basic Law came into effect only on 1 July, and that art. 22(4) only came into effect on 1 July. But the fact is that no one from the Mainland could from (and including) 1 July enjoy the right of abode unless the requirement of art. 22(4) was satisfied. That is the effect of the judgment in Lau Kong Yung. Those applicants here before 1 July had no right of abode. They were not here lawfully on 30 June. They were in a position no different from someone who entered clandestinely on 30 June, and it seems to me odd that when such a person seeks to exercise a right of abode on 1 July, he should be in a better position than the person who enters openly and lawfully on a two-way permit and then seeks to exercise the right of abode. Ching PJ in Lau Kong Yung, at page 341, said that "... the Interpretation means that as from 1 July 1997 ... persons seeking to settle in Hong Kong need both a one-way exit permit and a certificate of entitlement." It is the phrase "seeking to settle" which strikes me as apposite. A person in Hong Kong unlawfully on 30 June who stayed over to 1 July and purported to do so under a right newly acquired, sought thereby to exercise that right : but he was not, in my judgment, entitled actually to exercise it without the exit permit.

237. The applicants' argument was addressed thus by Mortimer VP in Cheung Lai Wah [1998] 1 HKC 617, 667 :

"The two applicants on these appeals entered Hong Kong before 1 July 1997. Cheung Lai Wah entered Hong Kong on a two-way exit permit in early 1995 but overstayed and was still in Hong Kong on 1 July 1997. Yeung Ni Ni entered Hong Kong illegally on 8 January 1997 and although she was surrendered by her parents to the Immigration Department on the following day and a removal order was later made, that removal order had not been put into effect before 1 July 1997. She was still present in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on that date and will remain pending the outcome of these proceedings.

It is submitted that they are permanent residents by descent under art 24. That status with its right of abode was given to them on 1 July 1997. The restrictions on the exercise of the right of abode as provided by art 22(4) applied only 'for entry into the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region'. These applicants did not enter the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region at all. When they either overstayed or entered Hong Kong art 22(4) was not in force. Therefore, they take advantage of their status and right of abode under art 24 but are not caught by either the provisions of art 22(4) or the retrospective provisions of No.3 Ordinance.

The position of these applicants as at midnight plus on 1 July 1997 was that they had become permanent residents by descent under art 24(3). But art 22(4) had also come into force. A permanent resident wishing to exercise his right of abode and settle in Hong Kong could only do so having applied for - and by necessary implication obtained - approval evidenced by a one-way permit. It follows that the approval to which the article refers is not simply approval for entry.

For example, so far as permanent residents are concerned, the approval to which the article refers is not simple entry by way of a two-way permit, but approval 'for the purpose of settlement'. Even a permanent resident who is granted a two-way permit could not arrive in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and then claim his right of abode. He would not have received the necessary approval for entry 'for the purpose of settlement' under art 22(4).

The purpose and intent of art 22(4) when read with the corresponding provision in the Joint Declaration is, in my judgment, not in doubt in spite of the general terms in which it is couched. The intention and purpose is that those who seek to exercise a right of abode as permanent residents after 1 July 1997 must do so in accordance with art 22(4) as clarified by Ordinance No.3.

Further, I am not in doubt that although the Basic Law came into effect after midnight on 1 July 1997, those who became permanent residents by descent at the handover but who held the approval of a one-way permit issued before the handover had sufficient approval to comply with art 22(4). This seems to me to be a necessary implication. Pre-handover permits are not irrelevant to a consideration of the meaning and effect of the article.

The remaining question is whether the language of art 22(4) prevents the court from giving effect to its purpose. The point is not devoid of difficulty but in my judgment it does not. It is necessary, however, to apply a wide and purposive construction to art 22(4). I would hold that on its true meaning, permanent residents present in Hong Kong on 1 July 1997 who have not entered with the necessary approval to enter Hong Kong for the purpose of settlement are not entitled to exercise their right of abode."

238. The applicants say that this court is, however, bound by the majority decision in the Court of Appeal in Cheung Lai Wah, which is said to decide the proposition in their favour. The majority to whom the applicants refer was constituted by Chan CJHC and by Nazareth VP. It is, however, pertinent to note the approach to art. 22(4) which underpinned the conclusion of the Chief Judge on this point :

" Article 22(4) requires any person who may fall within any of the categories, including article 24(3) and who is still residing in Mainland China, to seek approval to leave the Mainland. It suspends the exercise of such a right while a person is in Mainland China until after he (having established his right) has been issued a one-way permit, until he has come to Hong Kong. Article 22(4) therefore imposes a restriction on the exercise of the right of abode when the person having that right is in Mainland China. But this restriction is only a restriction on the coming to Hong Kong to exercise the right. Article 22(4) does not qualify the substance of the right of abode when that person is in Hong Kong."

239. In my judgment, the Interpretation and the judgment in Lau Kong Yung affect the view there expressed. The effect of the Interpretation and the judgment in Lau Kong Yung is not merely that those with the right of abode coming to Hong Kong to settle may not come to do so without first obtaining an exit permit, but that the right of abode may not be exercised by art. 24(2)(3) persons without an exit permit. If that be right, and I proceed on that footing, then the majority decision in Cheung Lai Wah on the point in question is affected by the Interpretation and by the decision in Lau Kong Yung and does not in the circumstances bind this court. Accordingly, this independent ground of attack upon the orders and decision which are the subject of this appeal also fails.

XIV. OTHER GROUNDS

(1) There is an amendment which I permitted to the Notice of Application in HKAL 70 of 2000. It was as follows :

"22(e) Further, in deciding to issue a removal order, the Director has failed to consider whether or not the applicants were persons unaffected by the Interpretation, or alternatively misdirected himself in law by only considering the question as to whether the applicants were unaffected within the confines of the Concession."

It was said that this amendment was intended to make more clear the legal argument. If it be suggested that the Director of Immigration did not consider the question of the Interpretation and its effect, it is not a suggestion that fits with the history and reality of these cases. The view had obviously been taken well before any individual decisions, in the light of the Interpretation, that all Group B applicants were affected by that Interpretation, and that they did not enjoy the benefit of the January 1999 judgments and could only remain in Hong Kong to take those benefits if they satisfied the Concession criteria.

(2) Group B applicants : procedural entitlement

240. It is asserted in the Notice of Application in HCAL 70 of 2000 that :

"In the case of the applicants in respect of whom a removal order has been made, there has never been a requirement that they hold a certificate of entitlement since the legislation requiring persons to hold a certificate of entitlement has never applied to them. Being persons entitled to the right of abode or entitled to be treated as having the right of abode, they are not removable as a matter of law and the Director has no power to remove them.

...

... they were never included in the certificate of entitlement scheme. Therefore there has never been any procedural restrictions applicable to them. Under Chan Kam Nga ... they were permanent residents without any requirement in law that they have to first satisfy administrative conditions such as holding a valid certificate of entitlement affixed to a one-way permit. ... They are in the same position as the applicants in Ng Ka Ling who arrived before 10 July 1997 when the No.3 Ordinance was passed."

241. Whilst this ground is pleaded only in the Notice of Application in HCAL 70 of 2000, it is, as I understand it, the position advanced in argument in relation to all Group B applicants in these cases.

242. The analogy with the pre-10 July arrivals is put on this basis, that whatever the effect of the "blue pencil exercises" in Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga, there was in fact between July 1997 and 29 June 1999, no certificate of entitlement scheme available to a Group B person, so that to read the effect of Ng Ka Ling as retrospective in the imposition of a certificate of entitlement requirement is to render all Group B persons (who could not possibly have obtained certificates of entitlement) and who were present in Hong Kong during that time guilty of a criminal offence. Therefore, it is said, all Group B persons should be entitled to establish their status by whatever means they may without requiring them to return to the Mainland.

243. I do not intend to labour this already very lengthy judgment with analyses of issues that do not in the event arise. Since the Group B applicants are not in fact entitled to the right of abode, nor entitled to be treated as having the right of abode, the question of procedural rights (or encumbrances) does not arise.

XV. CONCLUSION

244. It follows from my analysis and resulting conclusions that the applicants are not unaffected, as they contend, by the Interpretation. Nor have they a legitimate expectation that they would be treated as if they were parties to the litigation culminating in the Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga judgments. Alternatively, if they had such an expectation, the failure on the part of the Director to fulfill that expectation does not constitute an abuse of power. And I have further concluded that the applicants are not entitled to relief in consequence of the Concession announced in June 1999. Furthermore, those entitled under art. 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law to permanent resident status who arrived in Hong Kong during the period 1 July to 10 July 1997, without an exit permit, were not entitled to exercise the right of abode. Similarly, those in Hong Kong before 1 July 1997, who had by then overstayed or who had entered Hong Kong unlawfully, and were still here on and after 1 July, who on 1 July were persons described by art. 24(2)(3) as permanent residents, were nonetheless not entitled to exercise the right of abode unless they had acquired approval under art. 22(4) of the Basic Law to exit the Mainland.

245. Accordingly, the result of these applications for judicial review is as follows :

(1) HCAL81 of 1999

(1) The application for judicial review for orders of certiorari to quash the removal orders made against representative applicants 3 to 8 inclusive, and 10 to 17 inclusive, and representative applicant 19, is dismissed. (RA9 is no longer treated as a representative applicant).

(2) In the case of Lau Kong Yung, the court declines, for reasons given, to make a declaration that Lau Kong Yung came within the Concession announcement by the Chief Executive on 26 June 1999, although the court finds that the decision that letters written on his behalf in January did not constitute a claim for right of abode was irrational. No other relief in his case is sought.

(3) In relation to Ng Siu Tung's application for an order of certiorari quashing the decision in her case that she does not come within the Concession, she no longer seeks this relief since she has been accepted as a Concession case. Accordingly, in relation to this particular application by her, I shall make no order.

(4) The application for judicial review for declarations that each of the representative applicants who arrived in Hong Kong in Periods 1-3 (namely, representative applicants Nos.3 to 8 inclusive, and 10 and 11) came within the Concession, is dismissed. (RA2 and RA9 are no longer treated as representative applicants). In relation to Ng Siu Tung (RA1) she no longer seeks relief and because she has been accepted as falling within the Concession, I shall in relation to this particular application by her make no order.

(5) The application for judicial review for declarations that representative applicants 1, 3 and 4 are Hong Kong permanent residents by reason of the Court of Appeal judgment in Ng Ka Ling (Cheung Lai Wah) and the Court of Final Appeal judgments in Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga is dismissed. (RA2 is no longer treated as a representative applicant, although that is as a result of a Concession issue).

(6) The application for judicial review for a declaration that Tam Siu Ming is a Hong Kong permanent resident by reason of the judgments in Ng Ka Ling is dismissed.

(7) The application for judicial review for a declaration that the decision of the respondent contained in or evidenced by certain proforma letters to a number of representative applicants (to treat them as affected by the Interpretation) was unlawful, is dismissed.

(8) The application for judicial review for a declaration that all the representative applicants are unaffected by the Interpretation and that each is entitled to have their status verified in accordance with the Court of Final Appeal judgments in Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga while remaining in Hong Kong is dismissed.

(2) HCAL70 of 2000

246. The application for judicial review in this case for orders quashing the removal orders and the decisions made not to grant right of abode to the representative applicants is dismissed. The applications for declarations that each of the applicants is unaffected by the Interpretation and is entitled to have his permanent resident status verified in accordance with the Court of Final Appeal judgments in Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga without being removed from Hong Kong and that each is a permanent resident by virtue of art. 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law, are also dismissed; as is the application (in respect of the representative applicants who arrived in Hong Kong before 29 January 1999) for a declaration that each comes within the Concession.

(3) HCAL2 of 2000

247. The application for judicial review to quash the removal order in the case of Ms Li, and the decision to execute it is dismissed. Similarly the applications for declarations that she is entitled to the benefit of the Concession, and that she is a Hong Kong permanent resident are dismissed.

COSTS

248. I have of course not been addressed on the question of costs. I shall leave it to the parties, in the first instance, to see whether there can be agreement on the issue of costs. In the absence of agreement, I shall in

due course hear counsel on that issue.

 

 

(F. Stock)
Judge of the Court of First Instance,
High Court

 

Representation:

Mr Denis Chang, SC and Ms Gladys Li, SC leading Ms Margaret Ng, instructed by Messrs Pam Baker & Co., for the Applicants (HCAL81/99)

Ms Gladys Li, SC leading Ms Margaret Ng, instructed by Messrs Barnes & Daly, for the Applicants (HCAL 70/2000)

Ms Gladys Li, SC leading Mr S.H. Kwok, instructed by Messrs Clarke & Kong, for the Applicant (HCAL 2/2000)

Mr Geoffrey Ma, SC, Mr Joseph Fok, SC leading Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent (HCAL 81/99 and 70/2000)

Mr Joseph Fok, SC leading Mr Daniel Wan, instructed by Department of Justice, for the Respondent (HCAL 2/2000)

 






Remarks:
Appeal by all Applicants to the Court of Appeal. Appeal dismissed. Please refer to the Appeal Judgment CACV000415/2000.