Holiday Resorts (Management) Co. Ltd. 訴 Cosmos Mutual Ltd. and Another
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LDBM000222A/1999
LDBM 222 OF 1999
香港特別行政區
土地審裁處
建築物管理申請編號1999年第222號
| Holiday Resorts (Management) Co. Ltd. | 申請人 | |
| 對 | ||
| Cosmos Mutual Limited | 第一答辯人 | |
| Fong Lai Kuen | 第二答辯人 |
主審法官：周兆熊法官
宣判日期：2001年6月29日
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覆 核 判 決 書
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1. 2001年4月18日，本席對兩名答辯人（“答辯人”）於 2001年2月22日提出的傳票申請頒下判決書。2001年5月8日，基於下列的理由答辯人要求本席對該判決作出覆核 ：
".........the learned Judge has failed to take into account
(i) the implication and effect of the termination of the Applicant's appointment as manager of The Sea Ranch since 11th December 1999, and
(ii) the stance and attitude of the Incorporated Owners of The Sea Ranch toward the present application."
2． 答辯人指申請人無法律的地位提出訴訟，因為按下述大廈公契第8(e)條的條文，它衹是代理人而已 ：
"In any such action, the Management Company shall conclusively be deemed to be acting as the agent or agents for and on behalf of all the owners other than the defaulting owner ....... "
3． 答辯人指稱 "the pleaded cause of action of the Applicant is found upon its right under the DMC, which plainly is a right incidental to its capacity as an agent/manager. It follows that once it ceased to be the agent/manager in practice, it no longer has any authority to exercise such right." 公契第8(e) 條所指的 "any such action" 是指經理人追討第8條規定業主要為 Estate Management Account 支付的費用及管理費而提起的訴訟行動。本案不是追討上述費用的案件，故此答辯人引用第8(e)條的條文並不恰當。
4． 1999年8月28日，Sea Ranch的業主立案法團通過一項議決，終止申請人作為經理人的委任，生效日期為1999年12月10日。答辯人說 ：
"11. In any event, whether the termination is right or wrong is beside the point. The point is as a matter of fact, the Applicant's status as agent/manager of the owners has been terminated and its authority under the DMC has been revoked as a result.
Effect of termination of agency/manager
12. Once the Applicant for whatever reason, has ceased managing the Building, it is no longer entitled to apply to the Lands Tribunal under the Ordinance for relief (see L. T. Case No. BM33 of 1997)."
5． LDBM 33 of 1997一案是Universal Property Management Services Limited 對 The Incorporated Owners of Ying Ga Garden。該案的判案書指出申請人是Ying Ga Garden的經理人，而答辯人是業主立案 法團。判案書的第1及第2頁有以下的判詞 ：
"The Applicant used to be the building manager of Ying Ga Garden situated at No. 34 Sands Street, Kennedy Town, Hong Kong ..........On 28th December, 1996, the Respondent through its solicitors served notice of termination of engagement upon the Applicant to take effect one month thereafter. In due course, the Applicant withdrew from the Building and another service company has taken over management of the Building. On 31st January, 1997, the Applicant applied to the Tribunal under the Ordinance for determination on the question of length of notice required to terminate the engagement."
該案件的申請人是在退出大廈的管理後，亦即是在不具備經理人的身份下，才提起訴訟。這是與本案重大分別之處。當本案的申請人於1999年8月17日提出本案的申請時，它仍然是Sea Ranch的經理人，故此它具有法律的地位提出本申請。《建築物管理條例》並無任何一部份規定，如果一位經理人在提出訴訟後被撤銷其委任，它便會喪失繼續訴訟的法律地位。
6． 答辯人指稱 "while the Applicant has not disputed the fact that it had ceased to function as the manager of Sea Ranch, it does not accept the validity of the appointment" ("DL-3" of Affirmation of Leung Lo Ming Diana)。這句子的前半部並不是事實，因為 Diana Leung（申請人的經 理）在她的誓章的第6段的說法與此剛好是相反的 ：
"6. The Applicant has at all times been managing the Sea Ranch pursuant to the DMC. It is denied that the Applicant has been dormant since 1995/1996 ................"
7． 根據答辯人的法律代表的指稱，Sea Ranch的法團已於1999年8月28日藉決議終止申請人的委任，生效日期為1999年12月10日，但反對通知書並無提述此點。在反對通知書內答辯人衹指稱申請人的委 任已於1997年6月27日終止，故此它並無法律地位提起本案的訴訟。有關此點，答辯人的說法是互相矛盾的。假如申請人的委任已於1997年6月27日終止，為何答辯人需於1999年8月28日終止它的委任？
8． 在書面陳辭的第15段，答辯人指 "under the DMC, the Applicant is the agent of all the owners whose power and interest have now vested in the Incorporated Owners (s. 16 and s. 18 of the BMO). Accordingly, the Applicant's right to sue is lost by the intervention of its principal and subject to any settlement with the Principal." 本席在判決書的(b)部份（申請人是否無權提出訴訟？）已對這點作出裁決。答辯人並無指出這部份的判決有任何不妥的地方。
9． 有關法團介入一事，第二答辯人的誓章的第8段引述一封日期為1998年11月10日由法團致予申請人的信，其內容為 ：
"Illegal Structures
We refer to your circular dated 3rd October, 1998, sent to owners of Sea Ranch, regarding the above.
To begin with, by reason of the fact that your company has been dormant since 1995/1996, you are not in a position to enforce the conditions and terms of the Deed of Mutual Covenant. You have been in breach of your duty under the Deed of Mutual Covenant and had repudiated the same upon dormancy of your company. Accordingly, you shall refrain from further acting in the capacity of managing the Sea Ranch.
Our owner members hereby reserve their rights to institute legal actions against your company, servants, officers or agents, who enter and trespass their premises without the owners' authority and consent, to remove the structures purportedly to be illegal structures, the legality of which are for the determination of the Buildings Authority."
（原文無劃線）
第二答辯人並無在信中指出申請人的委任已於1997年6月27日終止，而信中指摘申請人違反公契規定的部份顯示出第二答辯人仍然視它為經理人。
10． 基於上述的理由，本席撤銷答辯人的覆核申請。
11． 訟費
第一及第二答辯人須支付申請人是次覆核申請的訟費。如與訟任何一方未能議定訟費的款額，則該款額由法庭審訂。
| 周兆熊法官 | |
| 土地審裁處 |
申請人：缺席。
第一及第二答辯人：由劉汝琛律師行代表。