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2000

黃鴻源 訴 方曼生經營方曼生律師行

Related cases with same parties

  • HCA11795/1999WONG HUNG YUEN v. JOHN FANG

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38180-CH-2002-09-19

黃鴻源 訴 方曼生經營方曼生律師行

HTML content

CACV001114A/2000

CACV1114/2000

香港特別行政區

高等法院上訴法庭

民事司法管轄權

民事上訴

案件編號 :民事上訴案件2000年第1114號

(原高等法院原訟法庭民事訴訟1999年第11795號)

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原告人

黃鴻源
對

被告人

方曼生經營方曼生律師行

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主審法官:高等法院首席法官梁紹中
高等法院上訴法庭法官袁家寧

聆訊日期: 2002年9月19日

宣判日期: 2002年9月19日

___________

判案書

___________

由高等法院首席法官梁紹中宣讀上訴法庭判案書:

1. 原告人黃鴻源向被告人方曼生經營方曼生律師行提出的申索,於2000年8月被聆案官剔除。原告人針對聆案官判決的上訴,亦於2000年12月被原訟法庭法官駁回。原告人向上訴法庭提出上訴,被告人則向上訴法庭申請命令,指令原告人須先繳存法庭上訴訟費保証金,方可繼續上訴程序。被告人的申請獲上訴庭法官胡國興批准。

2. 原告人針對胡國興法官的判決,向上訴法庭上訴。上訴於2002年5月31日被本庭駁回,原告人針對本庭駁回他的上訴的判決,現申請許可上訴終審法院。

3. 原告人在支持申請誓章提出的上訴理由,與他在上訴時提出的理由並無不同之處。正如本庭在5月31日駁回原告人上訴的判案書中指出,原告人提出的理由,不足以指胡法官的判決有錯誤。

4. 原告人向本庭稱他認為要他繳付上訴保証金抵觸基本法法賦予他的上訴權利。

5. 本庭認為原告人上訴針對的判決乃一非正審的判決,要獲得上訴許可,針對非正審判決上訴終審法院,原告人必需符合香港終審法院條例第22(1)(b)條的規定,該規定如下:

"22. 民事上訴

(1) 在以下情況下,可向終審法院提出上訴 -

(a) ...

(b) 如該上訴是就上訴法庭就任何民事訟案或事項所提出的其他判決而提出的,不論是最終判決或非正審判決,而上訴法庭或終審法院(視屬何情況而定)認為上訴所涉及的問題具有重大廣泛的或關乎公眾的重要性,或因其他理由,以致應交由終審法院裁決,則上訴法庭或終審法院須酌情決定終審法院是否受理該上訴。"

6. 原告人提出的上訴理由不足以指出上訴所涉及的問題如何具有重大廣泛的或關乎公眾的重要性,原告人亦未能提出任何其他理由以致該問題須交由終審法庭裁決。

7. 本庭認為原告人未能提出足夠的申請理由,本庭拒絕給予原告人許可上訴終審法院。本庭命令有關本申請的訟費須由原告人支付。

(梁紹中)(袁家寧)
高等法院首席法官高等法院上訴法庭法官

原告人: 無律師代表。

被告人: 由何耀棣律師事務所委派伍煒豪大律師代表。

38140-CH-2002-05-31

黃鴻源 訴 方曼生經營方曼生律師行

HTML content

CACV001114/2000

CACV1114/2000

香港特別行政區

高等法院上訴法庭

民事司法管轄權

民事上訴

案件編號 :民事上訴案件2000年第1114號

(原高等法院原訟法庭民事訴訟1999年第11795號)

----------------------

原告人黃鴻源
對
被告人方曼生經營方曼生律師行

----------------------

主審法官:高等法院首席法官梁紹中
高等法院上訴法庭法官袁家寧

聆訊日期: 2002年5月17日

頒發案書日期: 2002年5月31日

___________

判案書

___________

由高等法院首席法官梁紹中頒發上訴法庭判案書:

1. 1999年7月22日原告人黃鴻源入稟高等法院,向被告人方曼生經營方曼生律師事行索償。原告人指被告人在一宗原告人是賣方而被告人代表買賣雙方的樓宇買賣合約中,有疏忽行為。該合約是原告人於1988年4月19日與買方簽立的,其後原告人沒有履行合約,被買方起訴。該訴訟於1993年8月9日由高奕輝法官判決。原告人敗訴,原告人被法庭命令將樓宇交予買方。

2. 2000年6月16日,被告人向法庭申請將原告人的申索陳述書剔除,理由是原告人的申索是遲於訴訟時效才提出。2000年8月22日,聆案官接納申請將原告人的申索陳述書剔除。原告人不服,向高等法院原訟法庭上訴。

3. 2000年12月14日,上訴被原訟法庭暫委法官關淑馨駁回。

4. 2000年12月28日,原告人針對關法官的判決,向上訴法庭提出上訴。

5. 2001年8月24日,被告人以傳票方式,向上訴法庭申請,要求法庭根據高等法院規則第59號命令第10(5)條,命令原告人需於命令發出後28日內,繳存於法庭上訴訟費保證金98,000元,否則,將原告人上訴撤銷。

6. 上訴法庭法官胡國興在2001年9月26日批准申請,命令原告人需於頒令28日內,將59,000元存於法庭,或以其他司法常務司認可之方式提供59,000元的保證,作為上訴訟費保証金,否則無需被告人申請,即時撤銷原告人的上訴。

7. 胡法官在判決書稱,原告人在他席前承認他的工廠已倒閉,而且他已「破產」。明顯地原告人是陷於窮困境況,因此,如果他上訴失敗的話,被告人很難討回上訴訟費;而且原告人只提供通訊地址,被告人無從知道他的住宅地址,令人可能想到他意圖逃避被告人執行判決。況且,原告人的索償,根本不在訴訟時效內提出,而上訴又缺乏理據,所以原告人需要提供上訴訟費保証金。

8. 原告人針對胡法官的判決,於2001年10月20日向本庭提出上訴。原告人在上訴通知書列出的上訴理由,指被告人代表律師呈交法庭的文件不齊全,誤導法官判案。原告人又要求本庭參考他在2001年9月25日向胡法官作出的陳詞,該陳詞的主要內容是指被告人律師多次阻止他向被告人索償,意圖妨礙司法公正。原告人認為他沒有超越6年的訴訟時效才提出本訴訟。他遲至1999年7月才提出本訴訟的原因是當時之陳兆愷首席法官在就他針對高奕輝法官裁決的上訴中告訴他,他理應向律師索償,他才知道他可以向被告人提出本訴訟。他又稱他現只靠綜援生活,無能力支付訟費保証金。他現時潦倒窮困的情況是被告人的疏忽行為所引致。他的樓宇被人強行收取以致他無固定居住地址,所以他才以通訊地址登記。原告人又解釋因為胡法官的判決書是用英文寫成,別人翻譯成中文後,他才懂得決判理由,以致他拖延了時間,在上訴期限屆滿後才提出上訴。

9. 被告人代表伍大律師稱,原告人的上訴是已超越高等法院規則第59號命令第14條定下的上訴時限,而且上訴缺乏理據。胡法官在考慮所有有關情況後,行使酌情權作出的命令是正確無誤的決定。上訴應該被駁回。不過,伍大律師向本庭稱被告人不會依賴原告人逾期提出上訴這點反對上訴。

10. 本上訴是一宗來自單一名法官的裁定的上訴,對於此類上訴的有效時限,高等法院規則第59號第14條規定如下:

"(12) 來自單一名法官的裁定的上訴,如該裁定並非就申請上訴許可作出的裁定,須向上訴法院提出,並須以新申請的方式在上訴所針對的裁定作出10天內提出..."

11. 原告人的上訴是針對胡法官2001年9月26日作出的裁定,按照以上的規定,該上訴應在2001年9月26日後起計之10日內提出,但是原告人卻待至2001年10月20日才提出,即是已超逾時限兩星期有多。但由於被告人代表律師表示不會依賴此點,本庭決定給予原告人機會就他的上訴,提出他的理據。

12. 本庭認為上訴法庭有酌情權命令原告人提供或缴存法庭上訴訟費保証金,法律對行使此項酌情權,有以下的規定:

"在特殊的情況下,如果法庭認為公允的話,可命令上訴人缴存法庭上訴訟費保証金,法庭作出命令前,可考慮的因素包括原審法庭就上訴人爭議的論據作出的裁斷,及如果容許上訴進行而上訴人又未能提供上訴訟費保証金的話,日後答辯人可能無法執行訟費命令。上訴法庭亦可以因為上訴人的窮困境況,或上訴人擬提出的上訴理由是無可理論的,或上訴明顯是無理據支持的,或上訴是瑣屑無聊,無理取鬧,濫用法庭程序的,頒令上訴人提供上訴訟費保証金。"(香港民事訴訟程序2002年第59/10/28段)

13. 本庭會就本案所有情況,考慮原告人的上訴。本庭認為在本案情況下, 特別是原告人承認他已「破產」及無能力支付訟費,又無固定居住地址,如果原告人上訴失敗,被告人可能無法討回上訴訟費。雖然陳法官在原告人1999年的上訴判決中曾提及原告人可向在買賣合約代表他的律師行追討賠償,但這不等同原告人可在喪失訴訟時效後提出有效的訴訟。原告人追討被告人索取賠償的訴訟因由只有兩類:- 第一類乃毀約(這是指律師與當事人之間之明文或默示的合約),第二類乃疏忽。毀約的訴訟時效乃訴訟因由產生的日期起計6年。應用在本案的情況中,訴訟時效在於1994年(1988+6年)。這一點原告人的法律代表在關法官席前已承認(見關法官2000年12月14日判詞第十頁Q-U)。至於疏忽,一般情況下,訴訟時效是當事人蒙受損失的日期起計6年。應用在本案的情況中,亦即是原告人因拒絕成交而向買家負上「或有法律責任」(contingent liability)的日期起計6年,亦即1994年(1988+6年)。原告人的法律代表在關法官席前亦沒有聲稱他是在高奕輝法官判決的日期或之後才蒙受損失。(見關法官2000年12月14日判詞第12頁F-H)。因此,在時效法例的束縛下,原告人唯一可行的方法是引用該法例的第31條(4)(b)段,即「由知悉日期起計3年,如該期限是於(a)段所述之期限,(即訴訟因由產生的日期起計6年)之後屆滿者」。至於這一點,正如關法官在她的判決書稱,原告人的索償是基於他指稱被告人作為他在該宗買賣樓宇合約的代表律師,沒有提醒他合約中有關訂金的條款和他的責任和權利,又沒有將訂金交給他,反而要他履行合約。關法官的結論是以原告人的情況,他應該可以從高奕輝法官的判決中獲悉他是因為要履行該買賣合約而遭受損失,而被告人沒有就合約的法律效力給予他法律意見。在沒有法律意見的幫助下他錯誤地以沒有收到訂金為理由,將合約解除。他應該知道他遭受到的損失是由於被告人疏忽而引致的。原告人由1993年8月9日就有這樣的知悉。他於1999年7月22日的訴訟過了訴訟時效(1993年8月9日+3年),訴訟是無效。從各方面來看,他的上訴不會有成功機會。胡法官在這些情況下作出上訴訟費保証金命令是正確的做法。本庭看不出胡法官的裁決有任何錯誤的地方。

14. 本庭駁回上訴,並命令原告人支付被告人本上訴之訟費。

(梁紹中)(袁家寧)
高等法院首席法官高等法院上訴法庭法官

原告人 : 無律律師代表。

被告人 : 由何耀棣律師事務所委派伍煒豪大律師代表。

上訴法庭拒絕給予原告人許可上訴終審法院。請參閱CACV1114/2000 日期: 2002年9月19日

38032-EN-2001-09-26

WONG HUNG YUEN v. JOHN FANG

HTML content

CACV001114/2000

CACV 1114/2000

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1114 OF 2000

(ON APPEAL FROM HCA 11795 OF 1999)

_______________________________

BETWEEN
WONG HUNG YUEN
(also known as WONG WING SUM)
Plaintiff
AND
JOHN FANG formerly trading as J. FANG & CO. (a firm of solicitors)Defendant

_______________________________

Coram: Hon Woo JA in Chambers

Date of hearing: 25 September 2001

Date of handing down judgment: 26 September 2001

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JUDGMENT

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Hon Woo JA :

This is an application by summons dated 24 August 2001 made by the defendant for security for costs of the appeal brought by the plaintiff from the judgment of the Deputy High Court Judge Kwan (as she then was) handed down on 14 December 2000.

2. The plaintiff brought the original action, namely HC No. 11795 of 1999 ("HC 11795/99") against the defendant for damages for negligence in the defendant's handling of a sale and purchase transaction regarding a property of the plaintiff. By a sale and purchase agreement dated 19 April 1988 made between the plaintiff and the purchaser of the property, which agreement was prepared by the defendant, the plaintiff agreed to sell the property to the purchaser at the price of $520,000, to be completed on 9 June 1988. It was alleged by the plaintiff that at the time of the execution of the agreement by him and the purchaser before one Mr Leung King Kong ("Mr Leung") of the defendant's firm, Mr Leung represented to him that a deposit of 10% of the purchase money would be paid by the purchaser within a matter of a week or 10 days. It was further alleged by the plaintiff that the purpose of his selling of the property that was his own home was that he wanted to get money as a matter of urgency to help funding his factory which was in financial difficulty.

3. The plaintiff also alleged that he was not paid the 10% deposit on the completion day of 9 June 1988 or even after that day. When he was requested to complete the transaction on 27 June 1988, he refused to do so. He further sent a letter dated 7 July 1988 to the defendant's firm to inform them that he wished to rescind the agreement. Nothing had happened until May 1990 when the purchaser brought High Court Action A2473 of 1990 ("HC A2473/90") against the plaintiff for specific performance of the agreement. On 9 August 1993, Godfrey J (as he then was) gave judgment in favour of the purchaser after trial. The plaintiff was represented by counsel at that trial. Thereafter, he wished to appeal against the judgment but he was not financially capable of engaging lawyers to do so. He could not bring the appeal proceedings himself because he did not understand English. He applied for legal aid, but legal aid was refused. He continued to apply for legal aid a number of times and was refused each time.

4. In 1998, realising that he could use Chinese in court, without legal assistance, he sought leave on 29 June 1998 to appeal against Godfrey J's judgment. On 26 February 1999, the Court of Appeal dismissed the plaintiff's appeal. However, from the judgment of the Court of Appeal, the plaintiff learned that he might have a claim against the defendant. As a result, on 22 July 1999, he brought the original action, HC 11795/99, against the defendant.

5. On 22 August 2000, Master Lam dismissed the plaintiff's action on the ground that his claim for negligence against the defendant had been barred by limitation.

6. On 14 December 2000, upon the plaintiff's appeal, Deputy Judge Kwan also dismissed the action.

7. The plaintiff filed a notice of appeal dated 28 December 2000 to appeal against the judgment of Deputy Judge Kwan.

8. This application before me is made the defendant for security for costs of the appeal.

9. Under Order 59 rule 10(5) of the Rules of the High Court, the Court of Appeal may, in special circumstances, order that such security shall be given for the costs of an appeal as may be just.

10. It is settled practice to require security for costs to be given by an appellant who would be unable through impecuniosity to pay the costs of the appeal, if unsuccessful, without proof of any other special circumstances. See the notes in the Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2001 under the heading of "Security for Costs", para 59/10/28 et seq.

11. Where, however, an appellant contends that security should not be awarded because it would prevent him pursuing his appeal, he has to satisfy the Court not only that he is unable to furnish the security for costs from his own resources, but also (and the onus of proof is on him on this issue) that he is unable to raise the money elsewhere; and in addition he has to demonstrate that his appeal has a sufficiently good chance of success to justify exposing the respondent to the injustice of having to bear his own costs win or lose. However, the security application must not become a dress rehearsal of the appeal. See para 59/10/35 of the Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2001.

12. In the grounds of appeal dated 6 February 2001 written by the plaintiff, it is stated that he had no financial capability to retain a lawyer and that on 17 May 1999, when the bailiffs executed the order for possession against him under HC A2473/90, he only brought out some clothing and left the property with no home and no place over his head. He also mentioned that his factory had been wound up. At the hearing before me, he confirms that his factory had closed and tells me that he is "bankrupt". It is therefore plain that the plaintiff is impecunious which would cause difficulty, or indeed inability, to the defendant in recovering the costs of the appeal, if the appeal is unsuccessful.

13. Moreover, after the bringing of the appeal, the plaintiff has given two notices of change of address. At both times, however, only a care of address was given. His residential address is not shown and is unknown to the defendant. This may lead to the inference being drawn that he tries to avoid execution.

14. In addition to the materials contained in his 3-page written submissions in writing stressing how time should be calculated, the plaintiff tries to impress me how sure he is to win his appeal. Both Master Lam and the Deputy Judge dismissed the plaintiff's action on the ground that the cause of action had accrued and that he first had knowledge required for bringing an action for damages against the defendant and a right to bring the action before the respective periods allowed by section 31(4) of the Limitation Ordinance, Cap 347. I have read the judgment of the Deputy Judge very carefully, and without going into detail, I find her analyses of the relevant facts and the law for reaching her conclusion in striking out the plaintiff's action correct. I am therefore of the view that there is little merit in the plaintiff's appeal. In the circumstances, there is no justification to leave the defendant open to the risk of not having his costs of the appeal met in the event of the appeal being unsuccessful. It is therefore a proper case for me to order security for such costs.

15. In the skeleton bill exhibited to an affirmation filed on behalf of the defendant in this application, a sum of $98,000 is assessed as the required amount for security. That sum was mentioned in a request dated 2 August 2001 made by the defendant's solicitors to the plaintiff, to which the plaintiff did not response. However, included in the sum of $98,000 is a sum of $9,000 for the costs in relation to the plaintiff's two unsuccessful applications for stay of execution regarding the costs orders made by Master Lam and Deputy Judge Kwan. I do not think it just to include this sum of $9,000 in the amount to be secured, because the money could not justifiably be considered as part of the costs of the appeal. Moreover, in the skeleton bill referred to above, there is no mention whether the estimated costs of appeal was made on the basis of party and party or solicitors and own client. In all the circumstances, I consider that a sum of $59,000 to be secured would be fair and just. I therefore make the following orders:

(1) The plaintiff do within 28 days from the date of this order give security in the sum of $59,000 for the costs of the appeal herein;

(2) The security may be given by the plaintiff by depositing a sum of $59,000 into court within the time in (1) above;

(3) As an alternative to (2), the plaintiff may within 28 days from the date of this order, provide security for the sum of $59,000 in such form or manner as may be approved by the Registrar;

(4) Until the security is given, the appeal be stayed; and

(5) In default of the security being given within the time aforesaid, the appeal do stand dismissed without any application and without any further order, with costs to be taxed and paid by the plaintiff to the defendant.

16. I also make an order nisi that the costs of this application be in the cause of the appeal.

(K H WOO)
Justice of Appeal

Representation:

Wong Hung Yuen, the Plaintiff, in person.

Mr Kenneth W H Ng, instructed by Messrs Gallant Y T Ho & Co, for the Defendant.

上訴法庭駁回原告人的上訴。請參閱CACV1114/2000 日期: 2002年5月31日