GROWTH BRIGHT LTD. v. THE INCORPORATED OWNERS OF GRANDVIEW BUILDING
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CACV000843/2000
CACV843/2000
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF APPEAL
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 843 OF 2000
(ON APPEAL FROM LANDS TRIBUNAL
APPLICATION NO. LDBM 61 OF 2000)
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| BETWEEN | ||
| GROWTH BRIGHT LIMITED | ||
| AND | ||
| THE | Respondent |
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Coram: Hon Leong CJHC, Woo JA & Yuen J
Date of Hearing: 20 March 2001
Date of Handing Down
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J U D G M E N T
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Hon Leong CJHC (giving the
1. The present appeal concerns the rights of the appellant (
2. The appellant is the owner of the commercial units on the 1st, 2nd and 3rd floors. It also owns a number of shops on the ground floor. The respondent is the
3. The relevant clauses of the DMC provide as follows :
"3. Each owner shall hold his part of the said building and the said premises subject to and with the benefit of the following rights
privileges and obligations namely :-(a) Full right and liberty to go pass and repass over along the entrances, staircases, landings and passages in the said Building and the footpaths with the said premises and to use the lifts for all purposes connected with the proper use and enjoyment of his part of the said Building.
(e) The right for the owner or occupiers for the time being of any part of the said Building with or without servants, workmen and others at
all reasonable times on notice (except in case of emergency) to enter into and upon the other parts of the said Building and the common areas thereof for the purpose of carrying out any work necessary for the maintenance and repair of the said Building or any part thereof causing as little disturbance as possible and making good any damage caused thereby.
4. Each owner shall be bound by and shall observe and perform the following
covenants provisions and restrictions :-
(f)b. The Costs of operating servicing repairing and renewing the lifts serving the units on the 4th to top floors (inclusive of the said building) (hereinafter referred to as 'the main lifts') shall be borne and paid by the owners of units on the 4th to the top floors (inclusive) of the said building in proportion to the respective shares in the said land attributable to such units for the time being owned by them PROVIDED ALWAYS that the owners of the Restaurant, Ground Floor and External Wall shall be exempt from and shall not be liable to contribute towards such costs charged and expenses.
(m) The Ground, First, Second and Third Floors of the said Building shall be used for commercial purposes only and the units on the 4th to top floors (inclusive) shall be used for private residential purposes only."
4. The appellant's case before Deputy Judge Tong at the Lands Tribunal as well as in the present appeal is that clause 3(a) of the DMC gives the appellant the right to use the residential lifts for purposes connected with its proper use and enjoyment of the commercial units and for that purpose, the appellant has an implied right to break open the residential lift shaft walls and install lift doors there so that lift A can also serve the commercial floors. The appellant also says it has a similar right under clause 3(e) to do the same. The appellant's alternative case is that although no openings had been made in the lift shaft walls on the 1st, 2nd and 3rd floors when the building was built, the building design caters for such openings to be made at some time after completion of the building.
5. The appellant's case is also that the exemption afforded to commercial owners and owners of the external wall under clause 4(f)b from contributing towards the costs of servicing and renewal of the residential lifts does not prevent the appellant from using lift A in the manner proposed. The appellant's argument is that if lift A serves the 1st, 2nd and 3rd floors as well, it ceases to be a lift serving the 4th to the 22nd floors only and the exemption in clause 4 will no longer apply. In that case, the appellant as a user of one of the residential lifts will contribute to the lift expenses and this is not unfair to the residential owners.
6. The Deputy Judge found that clause 3(a) does not give the appellant the right to use lift A for access to the commercial floors nor as a fireman's lift for those floors, in particular, clause 3(a) does not give the appellant a right to break open the residential lifts shaft walls. He found the appellant's right to use the residential lifts is limited to gaining access to the service facilities on the 4th floor and the top floor for inspection, maintenance and repairs.
7. He also found having regard to the physical state of the building on completion that the building was designed to separate the users of the commercial units from the users of the residential units. He found that residential lift shafts were not designed and constructed to enable openings to be made on the 1st, 2nd and 3rd floors. The DMC was drafted after the
In his
"Having this right to use the
domestic lifts in the manner as aforesaid was one thing but saying that such right would enable the applicant to break open the lift shaft walls on the commercial floors and have doors installed to make thosedomestic lift s serving the commercial floors as well was quite another. Having considered the surrounding circumstances of the building in 1978, I am of the view that the latter act would clearly defeat the designers' intention of separating the users of the domestic premises from those of the commercial premises. Such act would also fundamentally alter the use of the domestic lifts as designated in the DMC. For this reason I rule that clause 3(a) of the DMC did not give Applicant the right he had contended for."
8. The appellant appeals. There are a number of
9. The Deputy Judge was wrong in
10. The Deputy Judge was wrong to find that such use was at variance with the design intention and was wrong to equate the intention of the parties to the DMC to the design intention which is not relevant in construing clause 3(a).
11. The Deputy Judge was also wrong to
12. Mr Chong for the appellant
13. Mr Chong further
14. On this last point, Mr Chong referring us to a passage on
15. The passage Mr Chong has referred to is at page 773 of the
"The
construction of a document is not a game with words. It is an attempt to discover what a reasonable person would have understood theparties to mean. And this involves having regard, not merely to the individual words they have used, but to the agreement as a whole, the factual and legal background against which it was concluded and the practical objects which it was intended to achieve. Quite often this exercise will lead to the conclusion that although there is no reasonable doubt about what theparties meant, they have not expressed themselves very well. Their language may sometime be careless and they may have said things which, if taken literally, mean something different from what they obviously intended. In ordinary life people often express themselves infelicitously without leaving any doubt about what they meant. Of course in serious utterances such as legal documents, in which people may be supposed to have chosen their words with care, one does not readily accept that they have used the wrong words. If the ordinary meaning of the words makes sense in relation to the rest of the document and the factual background, then the court will give effect to that language, even though the consequences may appear hard for one side or the other." (Emphasis ours)
In our view, it is necessary to
16. Moreover, it is our view that clause 4(f)b of the DMC clearly draws a
17. It is not clear what concession had been made by the respondent at the trial. Mr Lo for the respondent submits that no concession had been made at the trial. We cannot be certain from what we read in the transcript that there was a concession made by the respondent that the appellant had the implied right to break open the lift shaft walls if the appellant had the right to use the residential lifts in the manner it had contended. Be that as it may, we have come to the conclusion that the Deputy Judge was right to
18. In these circumstances and for the reasons stated above, we
| ( Arthur Leong ) | ( K H Woo ) | ( Maria Yuen ) |
| Chief Judge, High Court | Judge of the Court of First Instance |
Representation:
Mr K M Chong, instructed by Messrs K W Lai & Co., for the
Mr Henry H Y Lo, instructed by Messrs Ho & Tam, for the Respondent