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Building Management Application2000

The Incorporated Owners of Matauwei Apartments v. Ng Shung Cho

Related cases with same parties

  • LDBM384/2000The Incorporated Owners Of Matauwei Apartments 訴 Chan Sui Keung
  • LDBM386/2000The Incorporated Owners Of Matauwei Apartments 訴 Lam Kan

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21204-EN-2002-10-07

The Incorporated Owners Of Matauwei Apartments v. Ng Shung Cho

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LDBM000387B/2000

LDBM 387 OF 2000

IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

BUILDING MANAGEMENT APPLICATION NO. 387 OF 2000

_______________

Between
The Incorporated Owners Of Matauwei ApartmentsApplicant
AND
Ng Shung ChoRespondent

_______________

Coram: H. H. Judge Chow, Presiding Officer of the Lands Tribunal

Date of Decision: 7 October 2002

 

___________________________________

DECISION ON REVIEW

___________________________________

 

1. On 16.7.2002, the Respondent took out a summons and one of the orders it applied for is as follows: -

"1. That this application No. LDBM 387 of 2000 ("the Application") be for want of prosecution dismissed with costs (including the costs of and occasioned by this application by this Summons) to be taxed and paid by the Applicant to the Respondent.

(a) under the inherent jurisdiction of the Lands Tribunal pursuant to Section 8(9) of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance;

(b) ................................

(c) ................................

(d) ................................

(e) under the inherent jurisdiction of the Lands Tribunal and the Court of Fist Instance as applied in the Lands Tribunal, the Applicant being in abuse of the process of the Law in allowing to remain on file the Application but without taking any steps after the cause of action under the Application was extinguished by the Applicant accepting payment in respect thereof."

2. On 21.8.2002, I dismissed item 1 of the summons. In doing so I held that all the issues as pleaded are still live issues in this case and that the Respondent had not shown to the Tribunal that the prejudice he suffered by reason of the Applicant's delay in pursuing the Application could give rise to a risk of a substantial likelihood that a fair trial was no longer possible by virtue of a delay of 151/2 months on the part of the Applicant.

3. By virtue of the power conferred upon this Tribunal pursuant to rule 14(2) of the Lands Tribunal Rules, I restored the application to list for hearing (which was adjourned sine dine on 19.3.2001) on 3.9.2002. On 3.9.2002, I fix the trial of this case on 21.10.2002.

4. On 10.9.2002, the Respondent took out a notice of application to review my decision in dismissing item 1 of the summons. Its main ground is that the Applicant's cause of action for a debt in the liquidated sum of HK$30,079.00 was settled and extinguished upon the payment of that sum on 18.12.2000, and such payment was admitted by the Applicant's solicitors, Messrs. Y. T. Szeto & Co. in: -

(a) letter of Y. T. Szeto & Co. dated 19.12.2000;

(b) Paragraph 4 of 2nd affirmation of Szeto Yuk Ting filed on 7.8.2002;

(c) Bank statement issued by Wing Hang Bank Ltd. dated 13.12.2000.

5. The Respondent submitted that when the Applicant cashed the said debt it accepted the offer made by the Respondent to settle the said debt, thereby forming a contract and the Applicant was bound by it and estopped from pursuing the said debt and the Lands Tribunal has no jurisdiction on the said contract. The Respondent further submitted that all the facts pleaded by the Applicant in the Application were related to the said debt only and upon payment of it, such pleaded facts were no longer triable issues.

6. The Respondent submitted that the Applicant's cause of action for the debt in the sum of HK$30,079 was extinguished on 18.12.2000. In paragraph 4 of the Notice of Opposition the Respondent pleaded the payment of the said sum. But whether there was in fact such a payment and whether the Applicant had cashed the cheque are matters of evidence for the trial judge. The question is: should such matters of evidence be received, considered and determined prior to the trial? By way of the summons dated 16.7.2002, the Respondent sought to adduce such pieces of evidence. It is therefore crucial to consider the legal basis upon which the summons was taken out.

7. Ground (a) of item 1 of the summons is based on section 8(9) of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance, which provides: -

"(9) In the exercise of its jurisdiction, the Tribunal shall have the same jurisdiction to grant remedies and reliefs, equitable or legal, as the Court of First Instance."

The Respondent's application has nothing to do with the granting of remedies and reliefs by the Tribunal. Therefore this ground is inapplicable to the summons.

8. Grounds (b), (c) and (d) of item 1 of the summons are not relevant for the purpose of this review application. Only Ground (e) is material for the Tribunal's consideration. Under section 10(1) of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance, the Tribunal may follow the practice and procedure of the Court of First Instance, in so far as it thinks fit. But this section does not confer upon the Tribunal the so called "inherent jurisdiction" as referred to in Ground (e).

9. Ground (e) involves the following findings of fact: -

1. whether the Respondent did tender payment of the sum claimed ;

2. whether the Applicant did accept payment thereof.

Such findings of fact can only be made after all the relevant evidence has been adduced during a trial, and whether the cause of action was extinguished as alleged by the Respondent is a matter for the trial judge to decide at the conclusion of the trial. By way of Ground (e) the Respondent is asking the Tribunal to make such findings of facts and to make the said determination prior to the trial. But there is no provision which empowers the Tribunal to do so. There is no legal basis upon which Ground (e) can be made. Therefore all the issues pleaded are still live issues.

10. For the reasons given above, I dismiss this review application, with costs to the Applicant, to be taxed, if not agreed.

(H. H. Judge Chow)
Presiding Officer,
Lands Tribunal

Representation:

The Applicant : Absent.

The Respondent : represented by M/S Yu, Tsang & Loong, Solicitors.

23005-EN-2002-08-21

The Incorporated Owners of Matauwei Apartments v. Ng Shung Cho

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LDBM000387A/2000

LDBM 387 OF 2000

IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

BUILDING MANAGEMENT APPLICATION NO. 387 OF 2000

_______________

Between
The Incorporated Owners of Matauwei ApartmentsApplicant
AND
Ng Shung ChoRespondent

_______________

Coram: H. H. Judge Chow, Presiding Officer of the Lands Tribunal

Date of Decision: 21 August 2002

 

______________

D E C I S I O N

______________

1. This is an application on the part of the Respondent for the following orders: -

'1. That this Application No. LDBM 387 of 2000 ("the Application") be for want of prosecution dismissed with costs (including the costs of and occasioned by this application by this Summons) to be taxed and paid by the Applicant to the Respondent,

.......................................

2. That Messrs. Yu, Tsang & Loong do forthwith: -

(a) be discharged and released of and from and cease to be liable on the undertaking to withhold as stakeholder the sum of HK$60,000.00 given by them under an Order made by His Honour Judge Chow on 28th December 2000; and

(b) be at liberty to return the said sum to the Respondent.

3. The Applicant do repay by way of refund the sum of HK$4,000.00 paid for a Release which was not drawn.'

2. The application to dismiss the Application

On 21st November 2000, the Applicant took out the Application, and claimed against the Respondent for (a) the sum of HK$30,079.00 (being contribution to the maintenance and repair expenses in respect of the repair, maintenance and decoration works of the building in question, legal costs in preparing memorandum of charge, legal costs and search fee), (b) damages, (c) cost of the Application on a solicitor and own client basis to be taxed if not agreed, (d) interest, and (e) further or other reliefs.

3. On 18th December, 2000, the Respondent tendered to the Applicant a cheque in the sum of $34,079.00 in payment of $30,079.00 as claimed in the Application and $4,000.00 being legal costs for discharge of the memorandum of charge. This fact was pleaded in the Notice of Opposition which was filed on 19th December 2000. But the payment was made, as expressed in the letter dated 18.12.2000, "in the light of the urgency of the impending completion of the sale and purchase of the Property". It was made by the Respondent while reserving all his rights and under protests. He only tendered the cheque in order to make his property, the subject matter of a sole and purchase agreement, free from incumbrance. In the Notice of Opposition the Respondent did not admit the legal status of the Applicant. He also did not admit that the Applicant had duly served on him on 14th December 1998 a letter of demand for contributions to the costs, charges and expenses of the repair, maintenance and decoration works, and according to Clause 13 of the Deed of Mutual Covenant of the building in question it was only on demand that the liability on the part of the Respondent to pay such contributions arose. It is clear that the Respondent made the payment not because it admitted the liability to pay such contributions. Therefore all the issues as pleaded are still live issues in this case. Therefore the Respondent's allegation that the Applicant was in abuse of the process of the law in allowing to remain on file the Application but without taking any steps after the cause of action under the Application was extinguished by the Applicant's accepting the said payment cannot stand. Assuming that the cause of action under the Application was extinguished, there is still the issue of costs which has to be tried.

4. On 22nd February 2001, the Applicant filed an application (Form 31) to list for hearing. The parties were notified by the Tribunal to attend the Tribunal on 19th March 2001, for a call-over hearing.

5. On 9th March 2001, the Applicant took out a summons for the purpose of striking out the Notice of Opposition and the Grounds and Particulars on the ground that they disclosed no reasonable ground of defence. This summons was returnable on 19th March 2001. This application was dismissed on 29th March 2001.

6. On 19th March 2001, this application to list for hearing was adjourned sine dine, with liberty to restore. This order is necessary because if the application to strike out succeed, then there was no need to list the case for trial.

7. Since 29th March 2001 the Applicant has not restored the application to list the case for hearing. It should have done so because its application to strike out the Notice of Opposition failed, and it is necessary to have the case listed for trial. There has been a delay of about 151/2 months.

8. Mr. Szeto Yuk Ting, the senior partner of Messrs. Y. T. Szeto & Co., submitted in his affirmation filed on 7.8.2002 that at the hearing on 19th March 2001, while their striking out application was dismissed, the Respondent's solicitor submitted to the Tribunal that the Respondent admitted liability. This coupled with the fact that the Respondent had paid the sum claimed by the Applicant, the Respondent's present summons should be dismissed.

9. On 19th March 2001, it was Mr. C. H. Yeung of Messrs. Y. T. Szeto & Co, who appeared on behalf of the Applicant. The striking out application was not dismissed on 19th March 2001. It was dismissed on 29th March 2001. What Mr. Szeto stated in his affirmation is wrong.

10. I am satisfied that the Applicant had failed to pursue the Application with due diligence, and there has been an inordinate and inexcusable delay on its part in this Application. Despite this, the power to strike out should not be exercised unless the Tribunal is satisfied that the inordinate and inexcusable delay is such as to give rise to a substantial risk that it is not possible to have a fair trial of the issues in the action or is such as is likely to cause or to have caused serious prejudice to the Respondent.

11. The onus is on the Respondent to satisfy the Tribunal that the Notice of Application should be struck out on these grounds. But the Respondent has simply failed to discharge this burden. Mr. Anthony Pak Kit Loong, a partner of Messrs. Yu, Tsang & Loong, solicitors for the Respondent, claimed that the Respondent has been and is prejudiced. He has been and still is subject to the anguish of litigation over his head without end. As executor in relation to the property in question, he has been hard pressed by beneficiaries to conclude these proceedings. But he has not shown to the Tribunal that the prejudice he suffered can give rise to a risk of a substantial likelihood that a fair trial is no longer possible in view of the 151/2 months' period which has elapsed. In order to dispel the anguish he could have simply applied to restore the application to list for hearing, so that the case can be tried as soon as possible. Mr. Loong also stated that the Applicant is liable for inordinate or inexcusable delay and abuse of the process, but he has not referred to the consequence thereof. The Respondent has not demonstrated that the inordinate and inexcusable delay is such as to give rise to a substantial risk that it is not possible to have a fair trial of the issues in this case. Therefore the Application should not be struck out and I dismiss the Respondent's application to dismiss the Application, with costs to the Applicant, to be taxed, if not agreed.

12. In exercise of the power conferred upon me under Rule 14(2) of the Lands Tribunal Rules, I restore the application to list for hearing which was adjourned sine dine on 19.3.2001. I fix the restored hearing at 9:30 a.m. on 3rd September 2002 in Court No. 1, with an estimate of 1/2 hour reserved for the hearing.

13. Item 2 of the application

With consent of the parties, I make an order in terms of item 2(a) and (b) of the summons, with no order as to costs, upon the Applicant's waving the costs of amendment made on 9th August 2002.

14. Item 3 of the application

Upon the Applicant's undertaking to repay by way of refund the sum of $4,000.00 paid for a Release which was not drawn, I make no order in respect of this item, with no order as to costs.

(H. H. Judge CHOW)
Presiding Officer,
Lands Tribunal

Representation:

The Applicant : Absent.

The Respondent : represented by M/S Yu, Tsang & Loong, Solicitors.

26705-CH-2001-03-29

The Incorporated Owners of Matauwei Apartments 訴 Ng Shung Cho

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LDBM000387/2000

LDBM 387/2000

香港特別行政區

土地審裁處

建築物管理申請編號LDBM 2000年第387宗

 

The Incorporated Owners of Matauwei Apartments申請人
訴
Ng Shung Cho答辯人

主審法官:周兆熊法官

判案日期:2001年3月29日

______________

判 案 書

______________

 

1. 根據申請通知書所載,申請人是位於九龍馬頭圍道名為Matauwei Apartments 的業主立案法團,而答辯人是Matauwei Apartments 內一個樓房單位的業主。

2. 申請人的申請,是要求土地審裁處將答辯人的反對通知書剔 除,原因是該反對通知書並無披露合理的抗辯。

3. 在申請通知書內,申請人指答辯人拒絕或並無繳交該大廈的維修分擔費,因而違反Matauwei Apartments公契第 3(b) 條的規定。對繳付大廈維修費的規定,申請書的第7段有以下的陳述:

"Clause 13 of the DMC provides that if either of the parties thereto shall fail to fulfil his share of the re-instatement of or repairs to the Building if such re-instatement or repairs shall become necessary or shall fail to pay his share or the cost of such re-instatement or repairs within two months from the date of any notice from the other requiring the same to be done or paid then the party serving such notice may at his own discretion proceed to carry out such re-instatement or repairs and the defaulting party shall on demand pay to the other party his share of the costs and expenses incurred in such re-instatement or repairs..........."

(原文無劃線)

4. 依據上述公契第13條的規定,祇有在申請人提出付款時,答辯人才需繳交維修分擔費。

5. 申請通知書的第10段是有關送達要求繳付維修分擔費的通知(“通知”):

"10. Demand for contributions to the costs charges and expenses of the aforesaid works (hereinafter "the Repairs and Maintenance Fund") in respect of the Respondent's Property was duly served on the Respondent on 14th December 1998 :-

Particulars

1st instalment payable on or before 31st December 1998HK$8,400.00
2nd instalment payable on or before 31st January 1999HK$6,300.00
3rd instalment payable on or before 28th February 1999HK$6,379.00

Total:

HK$21,079.00"
===========

6. 在反對通知書內的第8段,答辯人提出下列的抗辯:

"Paragraph 1 and Paragraphs 3 to 12 (inclusive) of the Application are not admitted."

7. 在申請通知書的第1段,申請人指稱它本身是按香港法律成立的業主立案法團。

8. 如果申請人未能証明它是業主立案法團,它的申請會失敗。

9. 如果它未能証明在1998年12月14日將通知送達予答辯人,則申請人並無提出申請的訴因,而它的申請必定失敗。

10. 反對通知書述明答辯人並不承認申請人的法律地位以及載於第10段的指控,因此它已披露了合理的抗辯。

11. 基於上述的原因,本席撤銷申請人的申請。

12. 申請人須支付答辯人有關本傳票的訟費。如與訟雙方未能議定訟費的款額,則該款額由法庭審定。

周兆熊法官
土地審裁處

申請人:由司徒毓廷律師行代表。

答辯人:由余曾龍律師行代表。