LA MODE, INC. 訴 WANG TAI ENTERPRISE (INTERNATIONAL) DEVELOPMENT LTD AND OTHERS

HCA1290/2001

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

案件編號2001年第1290號

---------------------------

---------------------------

___________

判 案 書

___________

1. 就司法常務官2003年5月12日的頒令，本案第一﹑第二﹑第四及第五被告人在2003年5月26日分別發出四份上訴通知書。

案件背景

2. 原告人是一間在美國成立的公司。第一被告人是一間在香港註冊成立的公司("被告公司")。第二和第四被告人是夫妻關係。第五被告人是他們的兒子。第二﹑第四和第五被告人同是被告公司的股東和董事。

3. 就一項在塞班島興建一座工廠大廈的工程，原告人在美國向第一和第二被告人及一間據稱由第二被告人操控的美國公司提出民事索償。2001年1月11日美國法院頒令原告人得直。該頒令在2001年1月29日經美國法院修訂。按經修訂的判令，第一和第二被告人及該案的被告公司須償付原告人共5,007,815.60美元的賠償及訟費("判決債務")。

4. 2001年3月21日原告人在香港展開本訴訟，向第一和第二被告人追討該判決債務。2001年3月23日，應原告人單方面的申請，原訟法庭法官任懿君針對第一和第二被告人頒下強制令。該命令在2001年8月17日獲原訟法庭法官鍾安德延長至本案判決後或法庭另有命令止。

5. 2002年10月4日，原告人獲法庭批准修改傳訊令狀和申索陳述書，加入第四和第五被告人作本案的被告人。在此之前，應原告人單方面的申請，原訟法庭法官夏正民在2002年9月26日頒下一項針對第四和第五被告人的強制令。該命令在本年2月21日獲鍾安德法官延長至本案判決後或法庭另作命令止。

6. 第一和第二被告人在2001年5月21日已提交抗辯書。2002年11月2日，第一﹑第二﹑第四和第五被告人共同提交了一份修改抗辯書。2003年4月25日，原告人以傳票申請進一步修改其申索陳述書。原告人同時以被告人不具有可供爭辯的抗辯理由為由，按《高等法院規則》第14號命令申請簡易得直令。

7. 第一和第二被告人自本訴訟開始直至本年5月9日和2月18日均由律師代表處理文件和出席法庭聆訊。同樣，第四和第五被告人自加入本訴訟後一直由律師代表，直至本年2月18日。第二﹑第四和第五被告人在2003年2月18日分別存檔一份通知書，表示不再由律師代表。2003年5月9日，第一被告人亦提交了一份類同的通知書。本席得指出，第一被告人作為有限公司，在未獲法庭批准以獲授權董事代表進行訴訟前，發出這樣的通知書是不恰當的，該通知書亦是無效的。2003年5月30日，原訟法庭聆案官鄺卓宏批准被告公司由第二被告人代表處理本訴訟及出席聆訊。

8. 2003年5月12日，原告人的修改申索陳述書和第14號命令申請在司法常務官陳爵席前審理。該日同時審理第二﹑第四和第五被告人在5月9日提出的傳票，申請「以後用中文聆訊及所有已入稟及由2001年3月23日所發出之禁制令內容及以後所有入稟之法院文件來往信件都譯成中文或中英對照，以等將所有申請之文件已譯成中文後才再排期進行聆訊」。

9. 經聆訊後，司法常務官作出下列命令：

(A) 就原告人的傳票申請：

(1) 原告人可按夾附於傳票的草擬進一步修改申索陳述書的文本，進一步修改申索陳述書，

(2) 不須再送達經進一步修改的申索陳述書予第一﹑第二﹑第四和第五被告人，

(3) 第一﹑第二﹑第四和第五被告人可在14天內提交反對原告人第14號命令申請的誓章，

(4) 原告人的傳票申請押後至2003年6月2日作第二次提訊，和

(5) 訟費問題保留。

(B) 就第二﹑第四和第五被告人的傳票申請：

(1) 過往的文件不用翻譯給被告，

(2) 日後要呈遞及存檔的文件用中文，

(3) 原告人的第14號命令的申請用中文聆訊，和

(4) 勝訴一方可得今次申請的訟費。

10. 就司法常務官上開命令，第一﹑第二﹑第四和第五被告人在2003年5月26日提出本上訴。在上訴通知書中，他們提出下列要求：

(1) 要求原告人將下列文件譯成中文：

(a) 2001年3月23日之禁制令，

(b) 所有索取文件之申訴書，及

(c) 所有原告人之誓章；

(2) 要求在上述之英文申訴書及文件譯成中文後才定出時間宣誓答辯及提交原告人所須之文件及數據。

11. 第二被告人在上訴聆訊時，澄清他們現時要求的，是2001年3月23日和2002年9月26日的強制令，以及原告方的誓章的中譯本。2003年6月2日當原告人的第14號命令申請作第二次提訊時，鄺聆案官應被告人等的要求，把聆訊再押後至6月16日，以待是次上訴的結果。

被告方新近提交的誓章

12. 就是次上訴，第二被告人代表第一﹑第四和第五被告人和自己，以及第四和第五被告人在5月26日一共存檔四份誓章，內容幾乎完全相同。6月6日第二被告人再存檔補充誓章。代表原告人的律師反對被告方提交這些誓章。

13. 在針對聆案官的決定而提出的上訴，訴訟各方是沒有當然權利提交新的或補充誓章。這些在作出上訴以後提交的誓章只有在法庭批准下才可被納入考慮的證據之一。就5月26日存檔的誓章，基於內容不怎樣具爭議性，本席行使酌情權接納它們成為是次聆訊的考慮證據。就第二被告人6月6日存檔的誓章，當中對原告人及其代表律師作出了一些嚴重的指控，而且講述的事情又非新近發生者，被告人是可以在作出5月9日傳票申請時一併存檔誓章予以講述，以便原告人倘認為有需要，可予以適當回應。第二被告人解釋因為不理解程序和在6月份才想起誓章中的事項，所以遲至聆訊前4日才提交這份誓章。本席認為這些不構成良好的解說和理由。基於對訴訟各方公平的原則，本席酌情拒絕接納第二被告人6月6日存檔的誓章作為是次上訴的證據之一。

被告方的代表問題

14. 因第二被告人已獲聆案官批准可以董事身份代表被告公司，所以在是次上訴中，他是可以代表自己和被告公司向法庭作出陳詞。然而，第二被告人同時擬代表第四和第五被告人出席上訴和作出陳詞。第四和第五被告人明顯是有行為能力的成年人，他們所作的誓章亦沒有披露任何原因，致使他們不能親自出席聆訊和作出陳述。即使第二被告人是他們的親屬和對訴訟所涉事宜知情，這也不構成法律可供接納的基礎，以批准第二被告人代表第四和第五被告人出席上訴聆訊和作出陳詞。當然，本席在考慮第四和第五被告人的上訴時，是會同時考慮第二被告人代表被告公司和自己所作的陳詞。

上訴理據

15. 被告方的上訴理據可歸納如下：

(1) 按《基本法》第九條和《法定語文條例》第4條和《高等法院民事程序(採用語文)規則》第5條，被告方是有權要求中文譯文。

(2) 因為申索陳述書全以英文書寫，被告方無從知悉內容以及擬進一步修改的內容。在未提供中譯本之前，不應批准修改的申請。此外，在免除原告人送達進一步修改後的申索陳述書的情況下，被告人將無法瞭解內容而進行宣誓答辯。

(3) 如果在14天內原告人未提交中譯文，則不應要求被告人在14天內存檔反對原告人第14號命令申請的誓章。

(4) 被告人並非法律界人士，又不諳熟英文，且求助無門，因此所有入稟法庭的文件都應以中文書寫或中英對照，否則對被告方是不公平的。

判決理由

16. 《基本法》第九條規定香港特別行政區的司法機構「除使用中文外，還可使用英文，英文也是正式語文」。簡而言之，中、英語皆為法定語文，訴訟人士得隨意擇一，以進行訴訟程序。《法定語文條例》("《條例》")第3條亦就此點作出明確的說明。按第3(2)條，在法院程序上，中英文享有同等待遇。

17. 《條例》第5(1)同時規定：

「法官、裁判官或其他司法人員可在於他席前進行的程序中或於他席前進行的程序的任何部分中兼用兩種法定語文或採用其中一種，視乎他認為何者適當而定。」

第5(2)條同時指明法官根據第5(1)條所作的決定為最終決定。《高等法院民事程序(採用語文)規則》("《規則》")第3(1)條說明，法官在按《條例》第5(1)條作出決定時，須以公正而迅速地處理法律程序為首要考慮。

18. 《條例》第5條和《規則》第3條所規管的是在法官席前進行的聆訊程序。就高等法院民事訴訟程序中提交的法庭文件，《規則》第4(1)條規定可採用兩種法定語文的其中一種。 第4(2)條授權法官可指示訴訟一方在指定時間內向另一方提交文件的另一種法定語文譯本。

19. 《規則》第5(1)至(6)條同時規定：

「(1) 如─

(a) 採用一種法定語文的文件送達法律程序的某一方，而該方不諳熟該種法定語文；及

(b) 該方諳熟另一種法定語文，

該方可要求該法律程序的送達該文件的一方向他提供該文件的該另一種法定語文譯本。

(2) 根據第(1)款作出的要求須─

(a) 以書面作出；及

(b) 在有關文件送達後3天內作出。

(3)	(a) 被要求的一方須在接獲有關要求後3天內以書面通知作出要求的一方─

(i) 他將會應要求提供譯本；或

(ii) 他不會提供譯本。

(b) 凡被要求的一方通知作出要求的一方他將會提供譯本，他須在合理期間內提供該譯本予作出要求的一方。

(4) 凡作出要求的一方─

(a) 不獲被要求的一方根據第(3)(a)款通知；

(b) 獲被要求的一方根據第(3)(a)(ii)款通知該方不會提供譯本；或

(c) 獲被要求的一方根據第(3)(a)(i)款通知該方將會提供譯本，但沒有在合理期間內收到該譯本，

他可向法院申請命令，飭令被要求的一方向他提供有關譯本。

(5) 如作出要求的一方根據第(4)款提出申請─

(a) 法院如信納有關要求是合理的，可命令被要求的一方在法院認為合適的期間內提供有關譯本予作出要求的一方；

(b) 法院可命令每一份須在該命令的日期後由被要求的一方為有關法律程序的目的送達作出要求的一方的文件，須符合以下其中一項規定 ─

(i) 採用作出要求的一方諳熟的法定語文；或

(ii) 採用作出要求的一方不諳熟的法定語文，並附上該文件的另一種法定語文譯本；及

(c) 法院可就該項申請的費用及附帶費用作出法院認為公正的命令。

(6) 除非法院另作指示，否則依據─

(a) 根據第(1)款作出的要求；或

(b) 根據第(5)(a)或(b)款作出的命令，

而提供譯本的費用及附帶費用，屬在法律程序中產生的訟費。」

20. 第5條明顯要求索取另一種法定語文譯本的訴訟一方，必須在文件送 達後3天內向提交文件一方以書面要求譯本。在要求被拒或不果後，索取譯本一方可向法院申請，飭令對方提供譯本。換而言之，《規則》第5條並不賦予訴訟人士當然權利，可在訴訟程序的任何階段向另一方要求以往送達的法庭文件的另一種法定語文譯本。

21. 就本案的情況而言，被告方現時要求的是自2001年3月23日起原告人曾提交的法庭文件的中譯本，然而，被告方並沒有在原告律師送達强制令和誓章後3天內以書面要求中譯本，因此被告方的情況並不符合《規則》第5條所規定的情況。第一、第二、第四和第五被告人援引《基本法》第九條、《條例》第5條和《規則》第5條以支持本上訴，並不恰當。本席認為，被告方要求獲提供以往在本訴訟中提交的法庭文件的中譯本，有關申請應按《規則》第4(2)條提出。法庭在考慮第4(2)條下的申請時，應以公正和迅速有效進行訴訟程序為首要考慮。而所謂公正，乃是指在兼顧訴訟各方的情況下作出的公平決定。

22. 在本訴訟中，本席須緊記被告人上訴的是司法常務官拒絕指令原告人提供以往法庭文件的譯文。法庭除卻要考慮被告方的語文能力和需要外，也要考慮現時被告方要求翻譯的文件所涉的數量、所招致的費用和時間，以及對原告人和司法程序可能造成的影響。

23. 就被告人等的語文能力和需要，第二和第四被告人在誓章中均稱自己不懂英文。但黃律師指出，第二被告人在代表被告公司與原告人交易時，採用的合約和書信都是以英文發出和簽署的。而且第五被告人在其名片也自稱是具有美國大學學士學位(B.A.(U.S.A.))。黃律師提及的這些合約、書信和第五被告人的名片，已夾附在原告人以往提交的誓章中。第二被告人解釋是因為原告人是美國公司，而且有關的工程是在塞班島進行，在別無選擇下他不得不採用英文。然而他是借助其他人，包括一位香港的柯律師，方能明瞭該等英文文件的內容。第二被告人又表示第五被告人只是修讀美術設計，英語水平不高，對訴訟所涉工程全不知情，所以不能依靠他幫忙。

24. 本席認為，第二和第四被告人一方面在誓章中堅稱不懂英文，但另一方面第二被告人在過往曾以英文與原告人進行交易和溝通。這顯示即使他們不諳熟英文，他們也不是完全如其所言求助無門。再者，第五被告人的誓章並沒有具體說明他的教育程度，英語水平。若如其名片所述，他在美國唸書且取得大學學士學位，他不可能是不懂或不諳熟英文。至於他對訴訟所涉的工程不知情這點，本席認為無關宏旨。即使他不知內情，這也不會影響他理解法庭文件的英文內容。就第五被告人個人的情況而言，本席不以為他有任何理由，支持其要求獲提供法庭文件的中譯本的申請，更遑論就此所引發的上訴。

25. 被告人現時要求獲中譯本的文件共有多項，當中單是Edward Kahn的誓章(不計所附證物)也有數百頁之多，而且有部份誓章是講述美國法律，所涉的翻譯費用和時間必十分龐大。第二被告人在上訴聆訊時更要求原告人為中譯文進行核證(certification)。第二被告人同時表示他們沒有經濟能力支付所需的費用，所以應先由原告人墊支，日後案件完結時再考慮怎樣。第二被告人認為這是合情合理的要求，因為訴訟是原告人提出，所以它應負責所引發的後果，包括龐大的翻譯費用。

26. 本席認為，在中﹑英文皆為法定語文，享有同樣地位的情況下，原告人及其律師是有權採用他們諳熟和慣用的法定語文進行訴訟，這再加上被告方直至最近也是以英文撰寫法庭文件和書信，故原告人以英文撰寫法庭文件是沒有任何不當之處。然而，在對訴訟各方公平的原則下，倘若被告方如今在處理英文文件是合理地存在困難，並在對原告人不構成不合理的負擔的前提下，原告人是應該考慮以中文撰寫法庭文件或提供中譯文。本席相信，司法常務官也是在這個考慮下，指令原告方日後存檔的文件須提供中文文本。

27. 但就以往提交的法庭文件而言，本席認為被告人現時的要求是不合理的，且會對原告人造成不合理的負擔和對訴訟帶來不必要的延誤。首先，各被告人直至2003年都是透過律師代表進行訴訟，期間他們曾提交以英文撰寫的兩份抗辯書和四份回應誓章。明顯地，他們的代表律師曾向他們解釋原告人申索的事項﹑事實基礎和法律理據，原告方誓章所述事項以及法庭頒令的內容。更重要的是他們必然是在清楚瞭解這一切後才能就原告人的申索和誓章及法庭頒令作出回應。但是被告人如今卻宣稱他們完全不知悉和不掌握本訴訟所涉議題和原告人所持的申索事項和事實基礎。第二被告人在上訴聆訊時稱這是因為被告人的律師沒有向他們解釋訴訟中所提交的文件的內容，即使是法庭的強制令也只是粗略地給予講解。第二被告人這些宣稱與他和第四及第五被告人2003年5月26日所作的誓章並不脗合。他們在誓章第三頁稱律師當時曾向他們解釋強制令的內容，但因事隔已久，部份已忘記，擔心會陷入法網而不自知，所以要求給予中文譯本。再者，若然被告人是不知悉原告人申索事項和詳情，所提交之誓章以及法庭頒令的內容，他們又怎能向律師發出指示，以撰寫抗辯書和回應誓章？第二被告人指抗辯書和誓章是由律師撰寫，不是出自他們的手筆。但律師不可能是憑空想像，而必是在向他們取得事實方面的指示後，才能草擬這些文件。第二被告人這些陳述完全不可信，本席不予接納。

28. 其次，被告方現時要求提供譯文的文件數量相當多，第二被告人在陳詞時甚至要求給予經核證的中譯本。這會引發龐大的費用，而且須時極久。對訴訟的程序，尤其是目前正進行的簡易得直令申請，會構成頗長之延誤。本席認為被告方並沒有提供任何可供信納的良好理由，以支持原告人應承擔這些費用和延誤。雖然訴訟是原告人提出，但不容忽視的是原告人是基於一項判決債務提出申索。第二被告人指稱原告人是不誠實地獲得美國法院的判決，但不爭的事實是直至目前為止，被告人並沒有針對該判決採取任何法律行動以求把它推翻。再者，原告人是在合法合理的情況下提交英文的法庭文件，如果純因為被告方放棄由律師代表改為自辯，便要原告人墊支龐大的翻譯費用和面對訴訟的延誤，不但於理不合，而且不合乎法律公平和公正的原則。

29. 其三，如前分析，法庭現時的資料不顯示第五被告人是不具英語能力和不能理解原告人的法庭文件，也不顯示其他被告人是沒有其他方法可以瞭解知悉過往提交的法庭文件的內容。

30. 基於上述各項理由，第一﹑第二﹑第四和第五被告人不具理由，就司法常務官頒令不須翻譯過往提交的法庭文件的判決提出上訴。本席駁回這部份的上訴。

31. 至於司法常務官批准進一步修改申索陳述書的判決，被告人的上訴理由是修改申索陳述書的申請應在他們獲得中譯本後才處理。基於本席已駁回他們要求原告人提供以往法庭文件中譯文的上訴，這個上訴理由自不能成立。本席得同時指出，原告人現時的進一步修改，所涉者僅是在要求濟助部份加入一項要求第四和第五被告人作出帳目的申請。本席認為司法常務官是得當地行使酌情權，批准原告人修改申索陳述書。有鑑於擬修改的申索陳述書已夾附在原告人的申請傳票，而傳票也已送達各被告人，司法常務官免除原告人送達經修改後的申索陳述書的正式文本是符合法庭一貫的常規和做法，也能達致省時省費的案件管理原則，是得當地行使他的酌情權。本席因此駁回第一﹑第二﹑第四和第五被告人就批准修改申索陳述書的判決所提的上訴。

32. 至於司法常務官就原告人第14號命令申請，指示被告人可在14天內提交反對誓章的頒令，被告人的上訴理由是應在取得中譯文後才提交反對誓章。基於本席已駁回他們要求過往法庭文件的中譯文的上訴，這部份的上訴亦應駁回。

訟費

33. 按一般訴訟常規，敗訴者須付勝訴一方的訟費，是次上訴亦不例外。第一﹑第二﹑第四和第五被告人的上訴既遭駁回，他們便應支付原告人的上訴訟費。有鑑於是次上訴所涉議題和文件不多，維時亦不長，本席認為適宜採用《高等法院規則》第62號命令第9(4)(b)條規則，指定訴訟費的數額，免除進行評定訟費的程序。

34. 代表原告人的黃律師自1981年取得執業資格，應可獲每小時4,000元的收費。黃律師表示連同上訴聆訊所花的2小時，他共花了6小時處理是次上訴。本席認為按「訴訟各方對評基準」，合理和得當地花在審閱上訴文件和預備上訴聆訊的時間應不超於1 1/2小時。加上聆訊維時2小時，原告人的訟費應以黃律師的3 1/2個工作小時為設定基礎，原告人上訴的訟費因而設定為14,000元(3 1/2 x 4,000元)。

總結

35. 就第一﹑第二﹑第四和第五被告人的上訴，本席判決如下：

(1) 駁回上訴。

(2) 第一﹑第二﹑第四和第五被告人須即時支付原告人上訴所招致的訟費；訟費按《高等法院規則》第62號命令第9(4)(b)條規則設定為14,000元。

原告人：由黃焯勝律師行黃焯勝律師代表。

第一被告人：無律師代表，由授權董事謝松發先生代表。

第二被告人：無律師代表，親自出庭。

第四﹑第五被告人：無律師代表，缺席。

HCA 1290/2001

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 1290 OF 2001

____________

____________

______________________________________

DECISION ON INJUNCTION

______________________________________

1. This is the Plaintiff's application for the continuation of a Mareva injunction granted ex parte on 10 August 2001 and the 3rd Defendant's application for its discharge. The writ in this action was issued in March 2001. At the time the action was against the 1st and 2nd Defendants only. That action was based on a judgment entered apparently in default against the 1st and 2nd Defendants by the US District Court of the Northern Marianna Islands in January 2001.

2. The case on the Statement of Claim originally was simply that the 1st Defendant (which is a Hong Kong company controlled by the 2nd Defendant) had failed to construct a factory in Saipan in accordance with approved plans and within time. After the issue of the Writ against the 1st and 2nd Defendants in Hong Kong on 21 March 2001, a Mareva injunction was obtained against them on 23 March 2001. Pursuant to an order granted on that day, the 2nd Defendant filed an affirmation disclosing the assets of the 1st and 2nd Defendants in April 2001.

3. Four months later, however, the Plaintiff applied to amend the Writ to join the 3rd Defendant as a defendant and for an ex parte Mareva injunction against the 3rd Defendant, a company in Hong Kong. The case against the 3rd Defendant as shown in the amended Statement of Claim was that it was in a conspiracy with the 1st and 2nd Defendants to injure the Plaintiff. It has been alleged that the Plaintiff paid the 1st Defendant some US$1.08m for the design and the construction of a factory in Saipan and that between February 1998 and April 1999, 14 payments totalling HK$3.6m approximately were apparently made by the 1st Defendant to the 3rd Defendant purportedly as payment for construction materials supplied by the 3rd Defendant for the Saipan project.

4. By way of evidence in support in the Plaintiff's affidavits, there has been exhibited invoices chopped with a chop purporting to be that of the 3rd Defendant although Mr Chan, counsel for the 3rd Defendant, says that on a close examination the chop does not appear to be the same as that used by the 3rd Defendant in some other invoices that it had issued to unrelated parties.

5. The Plaintiff has also exhibited statements of account showing "payment by cheque" (although unspecified) on 14 occasions. Such statements of account have been purportedly issued by the 3rd Defendant to the 1st Defendant.

6. The Plaintiff's case is that these invoices and statements of account were disclosed by the 1st Defendant in the proceedings in Saipan, and it is the Plaintiff's case that the items in the invoices were not shipped or were not required for the Saipan project. Further or alternatively, the 1st and/or 2nd Defendants, it is said, have disposed of or transferred their profits, income or assets to the 3rd Defendant and others for their holding, use or benefit. However, no particulars of such dispositions or transfers have been given.

7. The 3rd Defendant, on the face of the company returns, is a company controlled by two brothers of the 2nd Defendant's wife. Of these two brothers, one Mr Danny Lee Shu Yan is the controlling shareholder holding 99% of the shares. The 3rd Defendant has by Mr Danny Lee filed an affirmation alleging that the 3rd Defendant had nothing to do with the Saipan project, that the invoices had not been issued by it, that the statements of account had not been issued by it and the 3rd Defendant had never received any payment from the 1st Defendant. The 3rd Defendant has exhibited statements of what it says is its only bank account, being a bank account in the Dao Heng Bank, showing that all receipts can be accounted for as receipts for invoices that it had issued for hats manufactured by a company called Interhats which is owned by the brothers. It has also said that none of the 14 payments can be traced into the Dao Heng Bank account.

8. The 3rd Defendant therefore says that it can be shown clearly that it has never received the $3.6m or any part thereof, and it has also exhibited audited accounts showing that its auditors have also taken the Dao Heng Bank to be the sole bank account of the 3rd Defendant.

9. The issues joined between the parties at the hearing are as follows:

1) whether the Plaintiff has shown a good arguable case for the grant of a Mareva injunction;

2) whether the Plaintiff has shown that there is a real risk of dissipation;

3) whether the ex parte injunction should be discharged because the Plaintiff (which is a foreign corporation) had failed to disclose that its only asset in Hong Kong, being its subsidiary company by the name of Le Mode Far East Limited, had a petition for winding up presented against it on the basis of a Labour Tribunal award; and

4) whether there has been such delay that the Plaintiff should not be granted the remedy of a Mareva injunction.

10. First, I shall deal with whether the Plaintiff has shown a good arguable case.

11. The required standard of a good arguable case has been described in the leading case of The Niedersachsen [1983] 2 C.A. 600 as something between "barely capable of serious argument" and "more than 50%". On the face of the invoices and the statements of account, they show that the 1st Defendant had paid approximately HK$3.6m to the 3rd Defendant. Although there is nothing to show to whom the cheques had been written or into whose bank account the money had been paid, one reasonably assumes that when invoices are issued by a particular company, that would be the company in whose favour cheques would be written and money would be paid, in the absence of anything else shown. If the 3rd Defendant had nothing to do with the issue of those invoices and statements of account, one wonders why its name was chosen for these false documents. No explanation has been offered by the 3rd Defendant as to why the 1st Defendant, a company run by a brother-in-law the 2nd Defendant, would implicate it in this way. As far as the 1st and 2nd Defendants are concerned, their position as stated by their solicitors in correspondence is that they had not forged any documents.

12. It is not for this court at this stage to determine conflicts of evidence as to who had issued those invoices and statements of account and to whom payments were made (see Derby v Weldon [1990] Ch 48). As for the 3rd Defendant's point that none of the money could be traced into its Dao Heng Bank account, that assumes that that is indeed its only bank account anywhere in the world. Further, Mr Chan, counsel for the 3rd Defendant, has accepted in the course of submissions that cheques written in favour of the 3rd Defendant if endorsed by it would not find their way into the Dao Heng Bank account.

13. In my view, given the invoices and the statements of account which show on their face that invoices had been issued by the 3rd Defendant and that payments had been made, the Plaintiff has shown a sufficiently good arguable case for the purposes of a Mareva injunction. Once that standard is reached, the court would not consider fine points of merits, see the Court of Appeal's decision in Wah Nam [2000] 3 HKC 118.

14. I then turn to the issue of real risk of dissipation. There has been no or no adequate evidence that there is a real risk of dissipation by the 3rd Defendant. By that I mean that there is no or no adequate evidence that the 3rd Defendant is likely to remove any assets away from Hong Kong or use them in such a way as to avoid execution should judgment be granted against it in the future.

15. The 3rd Defendant has been operating for some 10 years and it holds a residential property which is the residence of its controlling shareholder, Mr Danny Lee. That property has been charged to provide banking facilities to Interhats and it is also the subject matter of an instalment loan. Interhats has been carrying on business since 1989.

16. In support of its suggestion that there is a real risk of dissipation, the Plaintiff could only say that Mr Lee is the brother-in-law of the 2nd Defendant, that both companies have offices (although in different rooms) on the same floor of a building and that Interhats has been listed as an "affiliated" company in the name card of the 2nd Defendant's son.

17. In my view, however, it is not adequate evidence that the 3rd Defendant is controlled by or is the alter ego of the 1st and/or 2nd Defendants or was its or his trustee. By way of example, there is no evidence that the 1st or 2nd Defendants had even had a hand in the 3rd Defendant's business or was an authorised signatory of the 3rd Defendant's bank account, and certainly there is no evidence that the 3rd Defendant had been dealing with its property in any way other than in the usual course of its business. In my view, in the absence of any adequate evidence that there is a real risk of dissipation by the 3rd Defendant, I would discharge the injunction and I would refuse to continue the Mareva injunction.

18. Third, is the issue of material non-disclosure. I find that the fact that the Plaintiff did not disclose that its subsidiary in Hong Kong was at the receiving end of a winding up petition is not material non-disclosure. The fact that the Plaintiff is a foreign company is clear from its name and from the evidence in support of the Mareva injunction. Of course, that might give rise to an application for security for costs but that is not equivalent to saying that the Plaintiff had to disclose what assets it had in Hong Kong and the state of those assets when otherwise it own financial position appear to be healthy. This is different from the Wah Nam case where the plaintiff's disclosure to the ex parte judge of its financial position was necessary because of the parlous state of its finances and it was necessary so that the ex parte judge could consider for himself whether to grant the injunction with a cross undertaking disclosed as being risky.

19. Fourth, there is the issue of delay. This is quite apart from the lack of evidence that there is a real risk of dissipation. I am concerned with the delay in the application for the Mareva injunction in this case. On the Plaintiff's own evidence, it had known for 11/2 years that the invoices were false in that it says the goods had not been shipped or that the goods were not for the Saipan project. However, no steps were taken against the 3rd Defendant. It was not sued in the US District Court.

20. The Plaintiff sought to explain the delay by saying that it was only in April 2001 that it realised that the 1st and 2nd Defendants had no assets. Even then, however, it waited for another 4 months before applying for an ex parte Mareva injunction against the 3rd Defendant. No explanation has been offered for this delay of 4 months.

21. The Mareva injunction and the Anton Pillor order have been described quite often as two of the most lethal weapons in the law's arsenal. The court should be very cautious when deploying these weapons and they should be deployed only when the facts of the case warrant it. They should not be used casually in aid of a plaintiff who had chosen to sit on his hands for a substantial period of time when the facts which it now says show a conspiracy were known to it. I am not saying that the Plaintiff cannot proceed with an action against the 3rd Defendant but, in my view, as I have said, this delay causes me very great concern.

22. In view of the matters set out above, I would discharge the ex parte order granted on the 10 August 2001 and I would dismiss the Plaintiff's summons for the injunction.

Representation:

Miss Catrina Lam, instructed by Wong & Lam, for the Plaintiff

Mr Samuel Chan, instructed by Liao Ho & Chan, for the Defendant

HCA 1290/2001

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 1290 OF 2001

____________

____________

________________________________________

DECISION ON ADJOURNMENT

________________________________________

1. This is an application by the Plaintiff on the adjourned return date of a Mareva injunction to adjourn the matter further. What had happened was that an ex parte Mareva injunction order had been obtained by the plaintiffs on 10 August 2001. At the hearing on the return date of 17 August 2001, Chung J adjourned the hearing of the summons to today and directions were given for the parties to file affidavits.

2. The 3rd Defendant's affidavit was filed on 31 August within time and therefore the Plaintiff has had one week within which to consider the contents of the Defendant's affidavit. This morning the Plaintiff has sought an adjournment due to various grounds.

3. The first is that the 3rd Defendant and the Plaintiff, through their respective solicitors, have been engaged in negotiations. I say no more about these negotiations, save to say that it would appear to me that in any litigation, until such date as a Consent Summons has been signed by both parties, one would have thought that any litigator would have realised that it is necessary to continue with preparation for the hearing. This is not only the 3rd Defendant's application to discharge the Mareva, it is also the Plaintiff's own summons to continue the injunction.

4. I say this with no criticism whatever of counsel appearing for the Plaintiff in view of the very late instructions given to her, but one would have thought that solicitors who realise that a Mareva injunction is being sought to be discharged or continued would know that no time can be lost in preparation for Mareva applications and that the court would be very strict indeed in expecting that time limits should be complied with. Therefore the fact that there have been negotiations, no matter how close, is not an excuse at all for any application for an adjournment.

5. Secondly, the ground for an adjournment is that the Plaintiff was only given a relatively short time in which to reply to the 3rd Defendant's evidence. In this respect, one should remember that we are not dealing with an ordinary hearing, but with a Mareva injunction. A Mareva injunction is one of the strongest weapons available in the law and the Plaintiff should be ready with his case as soon as possible. I have looked at the Defendant's affidavit. While there are a number of supporting documents, a lot of them are the same types of documents and I do not see how it can be said that 7 days is not adequate for the purposes of preparing a reply.

6. The third ground is that further investigation would be necessary and a number of examples had been raised in Miss Lam's skeleton. Obviously any factual dispute would have to be determined at the end of the day. At the moment, what is necessary for the purposes of the Mareva injunction is for the court to consider whether there is just a serious question to be tried and therefore it does not seem to me that the examples of the issues raised would be adequate for the purposes of getting an adjournment.

7. As for the point made that the 1st and 2nd Defendants would be making discovery pursuant to Chung J's order, in other words, that the Plaintiff could await the results of the discovery made by the 1st and 2nd Defendants before putting in an affidavit to reply, that point had been made before Chung J when he gave the time frame for the Mareva application against the 3rd Defendant and therefore I see nothing in that aspect.

8. As I have said, a Mareva application is a very serious application and it is an application in which time is of the essence. Consequently, I see no reason why I should grant the Plaintiff the adjournment that he seeks.

9. As far as the prejudice to the 3rd Defendant is concerned, its bank has indicated that it is considering its annual renewal of facilities. Miss Lam, counsel for the Plaintiff, has said that given the factual context of the Defendant, it is just to hold a property and also to issue invoices on behalf of another business owned by the persons controlling the Defendant. The fact remains that whether that method of trading or method of business could be undertaken by any other company, the point remains that the 3rd Defendant had been set up to carry on that particular method of doing business (assisting another company by the name of Interhats) and therefore, in my view, there would be prejudice caused by any further adjournment to the 3rd Defendant. Therefore I would not grant any adjournment.

Representation:

Miss Catrina Lam, instructed by Messrs Wong & Lam, for the Plaintiff

Mr Samuel Chan, instructed by Messrs Liao Ho & Chan, for 3rd Defendant