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Civil Action2001

CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS LTD v. LUK SHU KEUNG AND OTHERS

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70647-EN-2010-04-20

CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS LTD v. LUK SHU KEUNG AND OTHERS

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HCA 2895/2001

 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 2895 OF 2001

----------------------

BETWEEN  
 CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS LIMITED Plaintiff
 and 
 LUK SHU KEUNG 1st Defendant
   CHAN CHI KEUNG   2nd Defendant
 CHAN SAU FONG3rd Defendant
 FUNG KIT CHING4th Defendant
    CHAN SAU YU   5th Defendant
 TOP REGENT INVETMENTS LIMITED6th Defendant
 MACWORLD INVESTMENTS LIMITED   7th Defendant
 MACWORLD MOTORS8th Defendant
 DIAWIN DEVELOPMENT LIMITED trading as MACWORLD MOTORS9th Defendant
 CHINA-HK INDUSTRIAL LIMITED 10th Defendant

----------------------

 

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Carlson in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 16 April 2010

Date of Ruling: 16 April 2010

Date of Reasons for Ruling (Handed Down): 20 April 2010

-------------------------------------------

REASONS  FOR  RULING

---------------------------------------------

Introduction

1.  This is an application by the 1st, 3rd and 5th to 10th Defendants to have funds currently held by a Mareva injunction, originally made on 26 June 2001 and subsequently varied in November 2001 and August 2002, released to them so that they may settle their legal bills and pay for anticipated costs up to and including the preparation of witness statements.  Having heard the argument on 16 April, I directed that $678,000 should be released for this purpose within 14 days.  These are my reasons for having done so.

The Application

2.  The summons, dated 24 March 2010 [Bundle 1/205-207] seeks the release of $1.25 million.  This is based on outstanding bills of $848,584.02 and for a further amount of $350,000 for fees incurred since the last bill was rendered to the Defendants on 31 October 2009.

History

3.  By a ruling on 3 November 2006, I let the Defendants have $500,000 from the proceeds of sale of a property at Fairview Park which were not the subject of a proprietary claim by the Plaintiff.  By a further ruling on 27 August 2008, I released a further amount of $900,000 from the same funds leaving over a balance of $378,000 from there.

4.  Under the order that I made on 16 April, this balance will be exhausted and a further $300,000 will have to come from funds to which the Plaintiff lays a proprietary claim.  It is said on its behalf that this is money which belongs to it and that the Defendants should not be allowed to use its money to fund their defence unless they are able to demonstrate that they have brought themselves within the two-stage test set out in The Ostrich Farming Corporation Ltd v Ketchell and Walker, unreported 10 December 1997.  The process was described by Roch LJ, at pages 9 and 10, in this way:

  “When, as in this case, a plaintiff makes a proprietary claim to funds in the possession of the defendant and has obtainedfrom the court a Mareva injunction freezing assets in the hands of a defendant, an application by that defendant for the release of monies from the frozen funds to be used to finance his defence to the plaintiff’sclaim involves a two-stage process: see Fitzgerald and others v Williams and others [1996] 2 All ER 171 at 178E, the judgment of the then Master of the Rolls, Sir Thomas Bingham.

  The first stage is in effect a hurdle that the defendant must clear before the court’s discretionary power to release moniesfromthe frozen funds for the purpose of financing the defendant’s defence arises. That hurdle is to establish on proper evidence that there are no funds or assets available to the defendant which can be used by him to pay his legal expenses other than the assets in respect of which the plaintiffbrings his proprietary claim.

      The reason for the first hurdle is obvious. The defendant should not be permitted to diminish the funds whichthe plaintiff claims are his and in respect of which the defendant is (if the plaintiff is correct) a trustee for the plaintiff.  A defendant cannot clear this hurdle unless he provides evidence on affidavit giving afulland frank account of hisfinances to the court.

Once that hurdle is cleared, the court can make an order allowing the defendant to use part of the funds (the equitable ownership of which is claimed by the plaintiff) for the defendant’s legal expenses.  That power in the court is a discretionary power.  The court in deciding whether to exercise that power, must weigh the potential injustice to the plaintiff of permitting the funds which may turn out to be the plaintiff’s property to be diminished so that the defendant can be legally represented, against the possible injustice to the defendant of depriving him of the opportunity of having the assistance of professional lawyers in advancing what may, at the end of the day, turn out to be a successful defence.”

5.  In this regard and in respect of the funds against which there is no proprietary claim, I have already considered the position at law in the course of my ruling in November 2006.  Therefore, I do not propose to say more about this here.

The Objections

6.  Mr Tollan, on behalf of the Plaintiff, points to the fact that in respect of this claim which is for $12.7 million, the net value of the security represented by monies already in court and property frozen by the injunction amounts to $9.7 million.  If the Plaintiff were to succeed, there will be a $3 million shortfall on the judgment, quite apart from the added shortfall on the Plaintiff’s costs.  This consideration alone must weigh very heavily in the exercise of my discretion.  This having been said, Mr Tollan does recognise that there has been an increase in property prices since these properties were last valued, but even so looking at it from the Plaintiff’s point of view it is not likely to be fully covered by the injunction.

7.  I have carefully read the Defendant’s affirmations in support of this application.  A particular feature is that none of them has had any meaningful employment since the start to the action.  The 1st Defendant says that the stigma of his prosecution for these matters, of which he was acquitted by the District Court Judge, has resulted in him not finding any employment.  Subject to a matter raised by Mr Tollan about the 1st Defendant’s non-disclosure of his employment as Deputy Project Co-ordinator in a government sponsored project from 2004 to 2007 and any salary earned by him in that position, I would have thought that the cost of this litigation as reflected in the Defendants’ solicitors’ bills would almost certainly overwhelm their earnings and so in the greater scheme of things contributions from earnings would not be particularly significant.  It has not been suggested by Mr Tollan that any of these Defendants has a large unfulfilled earning capacity which ought to affect the outcome of these applications to any great extent.  Even without this injunction, they would have had to fund the litigation through capital either by selling property to settle legal bills or obtaining mortgages to raise the necessary funds.  Subject to what I am going to say in the next paragraph, I find that the Defendants have all overcome the first hurdle of this two-stage process. 

8.  Nevertheless, Mr Tollan has raised very proper concerns about the 1st Defendant’s non-disclosure as Deputy Project Co-ordinator of the Government funded project for the Kowloon Fish Meal Factory Limited for the three years from 2004 to 2007.

9.  By his very late affirmation, on the eve of the hearing, the 1st Defendant has said that he took up the appointment because he felt passionately about the work that was being done through this project and that he was not paid for it which is why he forgot to disclose it.

10.  Mr Tollan has been able to find Government Guidelines for the funding of such projects.  In these guidelines there is specific provision for the payment of the Project Director and for his Deputy.  Miss Gershon, who has appeared for the Defendants, has not sought an adjournment to enable more evidence to be filed by the 1st Defendant to comment on the guidelines and why he was not paid despite specific provision being available for him to be paid out of the Government funding.

Conclusions

11.  This latter aspect has concerned me because in exercising what is a discretionary jurisdiction, the court would expect, as the authorities make abundantly clear, an applicant to make full and frank disclosure.

12.  In the event, I have decided, if not to overlook the omission, to defer any final conclusions for any subsequent applications for release of funds or, if there are none, to the trial itself as a matter going to the credit of the 1st Defendant.

13.  In releasing the amount that I have I was satisfied that at present none of these Defendants has the ability to raise money to pay for their substantial legal bills.  I have read the bills and they are, subject to taxation, properly drawn and referable to the defence of this action.

14.  I have decided to release all of what is left from Fairview Park and a relatively modest amount from the proprietary assets, if I can so describe them.  I expect the remaining properties will have gone up in value so as to defray most, if not all, of what I have directed to be paid out.  Without receipt of these amounts I am satisfied that the Defendants would run the very real risk of not being represented in future in what is reasonably complex litigation.  At present that is as far as I am prepared to go in balancing the parties competing interests on an application such as this.

The Future

15.  I am at this stage in no position to ascribe blame for the worrying delay in bring this action to trial which has resulted in substantial costs for both sides.  I suspect that the stage is about to be reached where the Plaintiff, even if it succeeds in full in this action, will barely break even.  It runs the risk of getting less than the sum of what it says it has lost as a result of the Defendant’s alleged fraud because what is currently secured by the injunction cannot fully compensate it and there must be the near certainty that it will not be able to look to the Defendants to reimburse it for its costs in prosecuting the action against them.  From the Defendants’ point of view, and I don’t wish to pre-judge any future applications to draw down further amounts to pay for legal costs, the stage has now been reached when the only assets held by the injunction are those over which a proprietary claim is being asserted.  Unquestionably, the burden of persuasion for the release of more funds for legal costs, where on my calculation over $2 million has already been released, will become very much greater than it has been.

Costs

16.  The costs of this application will be costs in the cause.  The order will be an order nisi. The Plaintiff was fully entitled to object to the application in the way that it has and the Defendants have had to come to court and obtain a substantial amount although well short of what was asked for.

    

 (Ian Carlson)
 Deputy High Court Judge

Richard Tollan, of Messrs JSM, for the Plaintiff

Samantha Gershon, of Messrs Robertsons, for the 1st, 3rd, 5th to 10th Defendants

The 2nd and 4th Defendants, did not appear and were not represented

62518-EN-2008-08-27

CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS LTD v. LUK SHU KEUNG AND OTHERS

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HCA2895/2001

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 2895 OF 2001

                                     

BETWEEN

 CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS LIMITEDPlaintiff
 and 
 LUK SHU KEUNG1st Defendant
 CHAN CHI KEUNG2nd Defendant
 CHAN SAU FONG3rd Defendant
 FUNG KIT CHUNG4th Defendant
 CHAN SAU YU5th Defendant
 TOP REGENT INVESTMENTS LIMITED6th Defendant
 MACWORLD INVESTMENTS LIMITED7th Defendant
 MACWORLD MOTORS8th Defendant
 DIAWIN DEVELOPMENT LIMITED trading as MACWORLD MOTORS9th Defendant
 CHINA-HK INDUSTRIAL LIMITED10th Defendant

                                     

Coram: Deputy High Court Judge Carlson in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 27 August 2008

Date of Ruling: 27 August 2008

 

                  

R U L I N G

                  

 

1.  I have no doubt this is a bona fide application made by Mr Lintern-Smith on behalf of the 1st defendant, who is undoubtedly the main character in these proceedings. 

2.  The plaintiff, so far as this matter is concerned, is acting perfectly reasonably.  In correspondence it has indicated that it would be prepared to consent to any reasonable order relating to the release of funds provided the 1st defendant would indicate to it, either by himself or through the other defendants, what their assets are.  That is a reasonable stance to take because Mr Lintern-Smith is representing all of them. 

3.  At the moment, one does not have any indication, other than from Mr Lintern-Smith, to the effect that although he is representing the other defendants as well he has not had very much contact with them, and although the amended-defence has been filed on behalf of all of them, most of the costs which had been expended and which are going to be expended in defending this action are going to be on behalf of the 1st defendant. 

4.  It seems to me that this is a perfectly logical answer to the problem, but it is only a partial one, because there is no doubt that of these individuals, a number of them are close relatives of the 1st defendant, the 3rd Defendant being his wife, and the 5th is his sister-in-law.  One of the matters that can be legitimately raised on an occasion such as this is whether the 1st Defendant could turn to them for financial assistance in what is always, of course, a difficult and delicate balancing exercise where one needs to protect the legitimate interests of the plaintiff whilst, on the other hand, not leaving the defendant in a position where he simply cannot afford to pay his lawyers and therefore is perhaps left unrepresented in what is obviously going to be a difficult and fairly long action if it were to come to trial. 

5.  The way I have approached this matter is by being reasonably generous to the 1st defendant, but to I wish make it absolutely clear to him that on the next occasion he is going to need to be more forthcoming than he has on this occasion.  I am going to direct the release of $900,000 from the proceeds of sale of this particular property against which the plaintiff has no proprietary claim and so one can afford to be more generous in relation to these funds than would be the case in respect of other properties against which the Plaintiff is asserting a proprietary claim.  But on the next occasion it strikes me that - and Mr Lintern-Smith has said that inevitably there is going to have to be a next occasion where more moneys are going to be needed and applied for release - if the 1st defendant is going to have any decent chance at obtaining the release of more funds, he is going to need to be more forthcoming as to what attempts he has made to obtain money from other sources, particularly from the other defendants, two of which are his close relatives.  It would help him immeasurably, if he were to come to court on the next occasion, providing full disclosure of their assets. 

6.  Nevertheless, today I am going to release this substantial amount of money simply because I have no doubt, based on the skeleton bill, that most of this, if not all of it, has been spoken for.  There has obviously been a great deal of time and effort that has been gone into preparing the amended defence, and further instructions have had to be obtained.  It is, therefore, only right that this amount should be released today.  But in future I do not really think the court could legitimately be persuaded to release more unless there is far more disclosure of the assets of the other defendants, and also of the efforts that the 1st defendant, as the principal defendant in this action, has made to obtain other funds. 

(Discussion re costs in the cause)

7.  Well, I have considered it, and I think costs in the cause is the right order.  In a real sense, this matter had to come to court.  You now have had a substantial amount of money released, but it is some way down on what you were asking for, and you have obtained this “advice” from me as to how any future application would need to be mounted.  Thank you very much.

 

 (Ian Carlson)
Deputy High Court Judge

Jacky Yeung of Messrs JSM, for the Plaintiff

Michael Lintern-Smith of Messrs Robertsons, for all Defendants

54923-EN-2006-11-03

CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS LTD v. LUK SHU KEUNG AND OTHERS

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