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2002

TANG MAN KIT AND ANOTHER v. HIP HING TIMBER CO LTD

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52768-EN-2006-06-08

TANG MAN KIT AND ANOTHER v. HIP HING TIMBER CO LTD

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CACV 137/2002

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 137 OF 2002

(ON APPEAL FROM HCA 8000 OF 1990)

______________________

BETWEEN

TANG MAN KIT and FOO TAK CHING
(suing as Managers of WAH YAN MO FAN HEUNG (華人模範鄉))
Plaintiffs
and
HIP HING TIMBER COMPANY LIMITED
(
協興木業有限公司)
Defendant

Before : Hon Cheung JA, Hon Yeung JA and Hon Chung J in Court

Date of Hearing : 24 May 2006

Date of Decision : 24 May 2006

Date of Reasons for Decision : 8 June 2006

________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

________________________

Hon Cheung JA :

1. These are my reasons for dismissing the defendant’s application to vary a costs order.

Variation of a costs nisi order

2. On 13 May 2005 we delivered judgment in this appeal and allowed the appeal.  We ordered that the plaintiffs were entitled to have the costs of the appeal and below on a nisi basis.  On 11 July 2005 the defendant applied to extend the time for making an application to vary the order nisi and to vary the costs orders.

Order 42, rule 5B(6)

3. Order 42, rule 5B(6) of the Rules of High Court provides that :

‘ Where a written decision is given pursuant to this rule the Court may make therein an order nisi as to costs and, unless an application has been made to vary that order, that order shall become absolute 14 days after the decision is pronounced.’

The delay

4. The defendant did not apply to vary the order within 14 days of our order but instead the application was made 59 days later.  The 14-day period ended on 28 May 2005.

Jurisdiction

5. Mr. Koo, counsel for the plaintiffs, argued that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear this application.  In gist he argued that the rule states that unless an application is made within the 14-day period the order will become absolute and in this case this means that since no application has been made within this period, the order has become absolute and the power to vary the order nisi no longer exists. 

Ma Wan Farming Limited

6. In Ma Wan Farming Limited v. the Chief Executive in Council and another (No. 2) [1998] 2 HKLRD 314, this Court (Nazareth VP, Liu and Mayo JJA) was of the view that the court has jurisdiction under Order 3, Rule 5 and Order 59, Rule 10 to allow time to be extended for a variation of the costs nisi. 

7. Although Mr. Koo did not in his written submission stated that the case was wrongly decided in accordance with the recognized principles, he, however, took this stand on the hearing of the application.  In order not to follow our previous decision, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that that case was decided in ignorance or forgetfulness of an inconsistent statutory provision or where there was a manifest slip or error.  These are strong requirements and in my view they have not been overcome by the plaintiffs. 

8. On the question whether once the order becomes an absolute order it cannot be undone, my view is that, contrary to Mr. Koo’s submission, this Court had in fact considered this point.  It held that,

‘If an extension were granted for making an application under Order 42, rule 5B(6), the order nisi would not become absolute because it shall become absolute “unless an application has been made to vary” it within the time prescribed or extended.’

9. I am further of the view that Ma WanFarming Limited was correctly decided.  Liu JA held that Rule 5B(6) implicitly authorizes a party to apply to vary an order nisi within 14 days.  As the 14 days is a time prescribed by the Rules for the doing of an act in any proceedings, Order 3, Rule 5 and Order 59, Rule 10 (inherent jurisdiction), would allow such a time to be extended.

10. I think the reasoning is sound and supported by the wording of Order 3, Rule 5(1) which provides that

‘5.—(1) The Court may, on such terms as it thinks just, by order extend or abridge the period within which a person is required or authorized by these rules, or by any judgment, order or direction, to do any act in any proceedings.’ (emphasis added)

As Rule 5B(6) provides for 14 days for a party to vary the order nisi, Order 3 Rule 5(1) is engaged.  Once there is jurisdiction to extend time, the application to extend time can be made either before or after the time prescribed by the rules.  This is also clear from Order 3, Rule 5(2) which provides that

‘(2) The Court may extend any such period as is referred to in paragraph (1) although the application for extension is not made until after the expiration of that period.’

11. This reasoning is supported by authorities such as Manley Estates Ltd. v. Benedek [1941] 1 All ER 248 and Regina v. Bloomsbury & Marylebone County Court ex parte Villerwest Ltd [1976] 1 WLR 362.  The fact that Rule 5B(6) provides for an eventual event, namely, the order becoming absolute is not a basis for excluding the jurisdiction.  In terms of logic, it is no different from, for example, an order giving judgment or dismissing an action unless a party perform certain acts within a specified period.  In such a case, the court still has jurisdiction to extend time for the act to be done after the period has expired.  While I appreciate the requirement of finality of a decision, the rationale for making a provisional order on costs is that arguments have not been heard and hence the parties are given time to vary the order.  This being the case it is inconceivable that the jurisdiction to vary the costs order can only be exercised if an application is made within the 14-day period but not otherwise.  This being the case, Ma Wan Farming Limited is binding on this Court and hence the Court retains jurisdiction to extend time.

The other requirements

12. In order to succeed on the application the defendant also has to show that there is justifiable reason for not making the application within time and there are merits in changing the order. 

Reason for the delay

13. The defendant did not file any evidence to justify the delay until one day before the hearing.  This is an extremely long time considering that the application was issued on 11 July 2005.  The affirmation was made by the solicitor who handled this case on behalf of the defendant.  He claimed that since early 2005 the managing director of the defendant had been constantly out of Hong Kong on business and personal trips to the Mainland and other places.  His deputies and assistants who used to be involved in assisting him in dealing with these proceedings were not available due to their other commitments.  As a result it had become very difficult for his firm to contact or reach the managing director in order to take instructions from him, some time even for weeks.  It was only in early July 2005 that the solicitor received instructions to vary the costs order.  Upon obtaining his instruction the application was made on 11 July 2005. 

14. While the solicitor’s affirmation revealed that the instruction was given only in July 2005, there was no explanation why the managing director only gave instructions to proceed at that time.  Obviously he was aware of the need to apply to vary the costs order nisi, otherwise he would not have given the instruction to go ahead.  This situation is even more unsatisfactory when the defendant had earlier applied for leave to appeal against our judgment to the Court of Final Appeal.  The application was issued in June 2005.  The defendant has clearly not provided a satisfactory answer for the delay. 

Merits

15. In any event, my view is that there is no justifiable ground to vary the costs order.  The defendant said the Court should only order costs in favour of the plaintiff after 31 August 2000.  The significance is that on that date the Government approved the appointment of the plaintiffs as the manager of the Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung.  In my view, this is not a justifiable basis to vary the order.  It was stated at paragraph 55 of the judgment that irrespective of the question of whether the managers only acquired a legal title to the land upon the registration of the approval by the District Officer, the right of the managers as landlords and as persons entitled to possession to recover the land in question can hardly be challenged.  On this basis, there is nothing to challenge the fundamental principle that costs should follow the event. 

Conclusion

16. Accordingly, the application is dismissed with costs to the plaintiffs.

Hon Yeung JA :

17. I agree.

 

Hon Chung J :

18. I agree with para. 1 to 9 and 12 to 16 of the judgment of Hon Cheung JA.  I also agree that the decision in Ma Wan Farming Ltd. is binding on this court.

19. If there had not been any binding authority, however, I would have come to a different conclusion as regards whether the time to apply to vary a costs order nisi prescribed by Ord. 42 r. 5B(6) can be extended.  Because my conclusion differs from that reached by judges of this court of vast experience and legal knowledge, I will set out the reasons for so concluding.

20. The basis of the court’s decision in Ma Wan Farming Ltd. to the effect that the prescribed time can be extended can be summarized in the following quote in that decision:-

“[Order 42] Rule 5B(6) would implicitly authorise a party to apply to vary an order nisi as to costs within 14 days after a written judgment is handed down.  Clearly, the period of 14 days is a time prescribed by RHC for the doing of an act in any proceedings.  Order 3 rule 5 and inherent jurisdiction penned in by Order 59 rule 10 would allow such a time to be extended” (emphasis supplied) (para. 4).

21. Hence, the court there concluded that, as a matter of construction, Ord. 42 r. 5B(6) “implicitly” authorizes the act to apply to vary the order nisi.

22. The object of construction of a legislation (or subsidiary legislation, as Ord. 42 r. 5B(6) no doubt is) is to ascertain the legislative intention of the enactment: Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes (1976) 12th Ed., p. 1, text to n. 3; Craies on Legislation (2004)8th Ed., para. 16.1.1.  It has been pointed out in Bennion: Statutory Interpretation (2002) 4th Ed.:-

“Parliament is presumed to intend that in construing [a statute] the court, by advancing the remedy which is indicated by the words of [the statute] being dealt with, and the implications arising from those words, should aim to further every aspect of the legislative purpose.  A construction which promotes the remedy Parliament has provided to cure a particular mischief is now known as a purposive construction” (Section 303)

and:-

“A purposive construction of an enactment is one which gives effect to the legislative purpose by ─

(a) following the literal meaning of the enactment where that meaning is in accordance with the legislative purpose (in this Code called a purposive-and-literal construction, or

(b) applying a strained meaning where the literal meaning is not in accordance with the legislative purpose (in the Code called a purposive-and-strained construction)” (Section 304).

Hence, two matters are of particular importance when the court construes a statute:-

(a) the actual language used;

(b) the purpose of the enactment (put in another way, the mischief against which the enactment is intended to remedy).

23. The actual words used in Ord. 42 r. 5B(6) are:-

“Where a written decision is given pursuant to this rule the Court may make therein an order nisi as to costs and, unless an application has been made to vary that order, that order shall become absolute 14 days after the decision is pronounced”.

24. As regards the language used, I observed in Syed Haider Yahya Hussain and Another v. Registrar of Births and Deaths, HCAL 73/1999 (12 July 2005):-

“The language chosen by Ord. 42 r. 5B(6) also supports the conclusion that the rule does not intend the time of application can be extended.  The rule provides that a costs order nisi should become absolute 14 days after the decision is pronounced.  Thus, the time period expressly prescribed is concerned with a change in the nature of the costs order (namely, a change from an order nisi to an order absolute), not an act to be done in any proceedings” (emphasis supplied) (para. 11).

That line of reasoning was in effect also adopted by counsel in Ma Wan Farming Ltd.:-

“… the order nisi as to costs was part of the judgment delivered by [the] court on 26 March 1998.  It took effect on that day.  See Order 42 rule 3(1).  It is appealable from that date, and Order 3 rule 5 and inherent jurisdiction should not be called in aid to vary an order as to costs which is part of the final judgment.  After all, so counsel submits, it has now become absolute … ” (para. 5).

Once an order nisi has become an order absolute, the court cannot “unwind” the change in its nature merely by extending the prescribed time.

25. To ascertain the mischief against which Ord. 42 r. 5B(6) is intended to direct, one would have to examine the context in which it was enacted.

26. The rules governing court procedure in civil litigation in England are now the Civil Procedure Rules but before then, the civil litigation regime was regulated by the Rules of the Supreme Court (“the RSC”).  Hong Kong’s Rules of the High Court are largely based on the RSC in England.  However, Ord. 42 r. 5B(6) did not appear in the RSC; it is a rule unique to Hong Kong.

27. Ord. 42 r. 5B(6) must have been enacted to save costs and time.  Without it, the parties concerned would invariably have to appear in court again before any decision on costs can be pronounced (after the court has given its written decision).  In many instances, such appearance may not be necessary.  After all, the usual rule relating to costs (Ord. 62 r. 3(2)) is:-

“If the Court in the exercise of its discretion sees fit to make any order as to the costs of or incidental to any proceedings, the Court shall, subject to this Order, order the costs to follow the event, except when it appears to the Court that in the circumstances of the case some other order should be made as to the whole or any part of the costs” (emphasis supplied).

28. I also observed in the Hussain decision:-

“It is trite law that, at least in its civil jurisdiction, the [court] is functus officio after its decision has been pronounced and perfected: Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2004, para. 20/11/1 and 20/11/6.  The rationale behind this rule is that it is desirable that there be finality of litigation”. (para. 8)

If the true meaning of Ord. 42 r. 5B(6) is that the prescribed time to vary the costs order can be extended, it would mean that costs orders nisi are theoretically always open to variation.

29. In fact, in the Hussain decision, the costs order nisi was made in January 2000.  The substantive litigation was dealt with by the Court of Final Appeal in December 2001.  But the application to vary the costs order was brought in March 2005, more than 5 years after the costs order nisi was made (and after those costs have been taxed (in January 2004)).

30. Is there any good reason why the time prescribed to vary a costs can be extended even after its expiration?  The main reason would appear to be, if the time prescribed by Ord. 42 r. 5B(6) cannot be extended, it can result in injustice because the paying party has effectively been prevented by a mere non-compliance with time from exercising its right to be heard.

31. However, such disadvantage will have to be looked at in its proper context.  First, costs in civil litigation have been viewed differently from the substantive aspects of such litigation: prolonged dispute regarding costs is discouraged.  That underlying legal policy is evidenced by the following:-

(1) the usual rule relating to costs set out in Ord. 62 r. 3(2) has the effect of simplifying many of the disputes relating to costs;

(2) costs in the High Court are treated as a matter of discretion from which appeals are famously difficult: s. 52A(1), High Court Ordinance (Cap. 4);

 leave to appeal against costs orders is needed: s. 14(3)(e), Cap. 4.

32. Secondly, any potential injustice of depriving a litigant will have to be premised on the court (which gives the written decision) wrongly:-

(a) exercising its power to make a costs order nisi; and

(b) exercising its discretion power relating to costs.

But even in such instances, the appeal avenue would still be open to the aggrieved party.

33. The circumstances involved in Manley Estates Ltd. and ex parte Villerwest Ltd. were different.  In both instances, the dispute was whether time could be extended to parties who have earlier failed to act in accordance with court orders and the consequences of not extending the prescribed time would in essence be to put an end to the whole litigation purely because of procedural fault.  There will be no appeal from such automatic result (unless one appeals the earlier orders imposing the prescribed time periods).

34. Further, the following observations in those two decisions should be noted:-

“R.S.C., Ord 64, r. 7, provides as follows :

A court … has power to enlarge any time fixed by these rules, although the application for the same is not made until after the expiration of the time appointed or allowed.

I think that one would be deleting those words ‘although the application for the same is not made until after the expiration of the time’ from the rule altogether if this suggested point [that the court had no jurisdiction] were a good one. …  Here, the action has not disappeared.  It is in existence … I think that, within the words of that rule, there was jurisdiction in the master to enlarge the time” (emphasis supplied) (Manley Estates Ltd., p. 251);

“… Whistler v. Hancock (1878) 3 Q.B.D. 83.  It seems there to be suggested that if a condition is not fulfilled the action ceases to exist … I do not agree with that line of reasoning.  Even though the action may be said to cease to exist, the courts has always power to bring it to life again, by extending the time” (per Lord Denning, ex parte Villerwest, p. 366);

“If one rejects that submission [about the lack of jurisdiction after the prescribed time has expired] it is difficult to see in logic why the position shall be different according to whether the application is made before the time runs out or after …, unless a different answer is compelled by the language of the relevant rules” (emphasis supplied) (per Roskill, LJ, ex parte Villerwest, p. 366).

35. In my view, in relation to Ord. 42 r. 5B(6), both the language and the context compel the conclusion I reached above.

 

 

(Peter Cheung)
Justice of Appeal
(Wally Yeung)
Justice of Appeal
(Andrew Chung)
Judge of the Court of First Instance

 

Mr. Ernest Koo, instructed by Messrs Christine M. Koo & Ip, for the Plaintiffs

Mr. Jeremy Chan, instructed by Messrs Kao, Lee & Yip, for the Defendant

 

51136-EN-2005-12-13

TANG MAN KIT AND ANOTHER v. HIP HING TIMBER CO LTD

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CACV 137/2002

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 137 OF 2002

(ON APPEAL FROM HCA 8000 OF 1990)

 

BETWEEN

TANG MAN KIT and FOO TAK CHING Plaintiffs
(suing as Managers of WAH YAN MO
FAN HEUNG(華人模範鄉))
and
HIP HING TIMBER COMPANY LIMITED Defendant
(協興木業有限公司)

Before : Hon Cheung JA, Yeung JA and Chung J in Court

Date of Hearing : 13 December 2005

Date of Judgment :  13 December 2005

 

______________________

J U D G M E N T

______________________

 

Hon Cheung JA (giving judgment of the court) :

1.  We will refuse leave as we do not consider this case involves matters of great, general or public importance.  This is from beginning to end, a case of a landlord who is entitled to possession seeking to recover land from the tenant whose tenancy had been terminated by the service of a proper notice to quit.  The case is a simple one and is not detracted by the many issues raised by the defendant.

2.  We will order the defendant to pay the costs of the application.

 

 

(Peter Cheung)
Justice of Appeal
(Wally Yeung)
Justice of Appeal
(Andrew Chung)
udge of the Court of First Instance

 

Mr. Ernest Koo, instructed by Messrs Christine M. Koo & Ip, for the plaintiffs

Mr. Jeremy Chan, instructed by Messrs Kao, Lee & Yip, for the defendant

 

45181-EN-2005-05-13

TANG MAN KIT AND ANOTHER v. HIP HING TIMBER CO LTD

HTML content

CACV 137/2002

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 137 OF 2002

(ON APPEAL FROM HCA 8000 OF 1990)

______________________

BETWEEN

 TANG MAN KIT and FOO TAK CHING
(suing as Managers of WAH YAN MO FAN HEUNG (華人模範鄉))
Plaintiffs
 and 
 HIP HING TIMBER COMPANY LIMITED
(協興木業有限公司)
Defendant

______________________

Before : Hon Cheung JA, Hon Yeung JA and Hon Chung J in Court

Dates of Hearing: 12 to 14 April 2005

Date of Judgment: 13 May 2005

______________________

J U D G M E N T

______________________

Hon Cheung JA :

History of the appeal

1. On 3 September 2001, Yuen J (as she then was) set aside the Re-Re-Amended Writ of Summons of the plaintiffs and dismissed their action.

2. The plaintiffs appealed.  The Court of Appeal (Rogers V-P and Le Pichon JA) reversed the decision on 11 December 2002.  The action was ordered to be remitted to the Court of First Instance for trial (“the first judgment”).

3. The defendant then appealed to the Court of Final Appeal.  The Court set aside the first judgment of the Court of Appeal on the ground that it was given without jurisdiction: the judgment of Yuen J was a final judgment and the appeal should be heard by a full bench of the Court of Appeal instead of two judges.  The original appeal was ordered to be reinstated.

4. This Court heard the reinstated appeal.

Nature of the claim

5. The facts of the case are fully set out in the first judgment of this Court and in the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal, I will only refer to the essential facts.

6. The action was first commenced in 1990 to recover land belonging to the Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung (華人模範鄉) (‘the Heung’) which had been occupied by the defendant.  The plaintiffs contended that the land was let to the defendant as a yearly tenant and notice to quit had been served on 10 April 1986 terminating the tenancy on 31 December 1986 but the defendant wrongfully held over possession of the land after expiration of the notice to quit.

The defence

7. The defendant admitted that in 1966 Mr. Wong Tat To, a manager of the Heung agreed to let the land to Mr. Chong Shui Kit (‘Mr. Chong’) for a nominal fee until such time when the Government resumed the land.  It was also agreed by them that in the event of resumption, Mr. Chong would be entitled to receive 60% of the compensation for resumption payable by the Government to the Heung (‘the 1966 agreement’).

8. Mr. Chong was then trading in the name of Hip Hing Timber Company.  In 1974, the defendant was incorporated.  Mr. Wong Tat To and Mr. Chong agreed that the 1966 agreement would continue to apply with the defendant taking over the place of Hip Hing Timber Company (‘the 1974 agreement’).

9. The defendant averred that it and Mr. Chong had incurred expenditure on the land with the result that they acquired an equity in respect of their expenditure on the land.  The defendant sought, among these things, for specific performance of the 1966 agreement and 1974 agreement.

The applications before Yuen J

10. The plaintiffs were not able to litigate their claim because the defendant applied by way of notice of motion (‘the motion’) to set aside the writ on the basis that it was issued without authority.  The motion was said to be issued pursuant to the procedure laid down by the House of Lords in Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank v Comptoir d’Escompte de Mulhouse [1925] AC 112 and followed in Banco de Bilbao v Rey [1938] 2 All ER 253.

11. This application was lodged shortly after two failed attempts by the defendant to stop the action from proceeding in its normal course.  The first was an application taken out in March 1998 to strike out the amended statement of claim and dismiss the action on the ground that the plaintiffs were an unincorporated association and therefore was not a separate legal entity which had the capacity to sue.  The title of the plaintiff was then ‘Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung (華人模範鄉) with Chan Kam Cheung and Tang Man Kit as mangers’.  On the hearing of this application, the plaintiffs obtained leave to amend the title of the action to “Tang Man Kit (suing as sole manager of Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung”.  Mr. Chan Kam Cheung (‘Mr. Chan’) had by that time died.  The statement of claim also included a plea that the Heung was a T’ong within the relevant section of the New Territories Ordinance (“NTO”), Cap. 97 (now section 15 of the current edition of the NTO).

12. After this failed attempt, the defendant then applied for a trial of preliminary issue on the following four issues:

(1)Was Mr. Tang Man Kit (‘Mr. Tang’) a validly approved and registered manager of the Heung under section 15 of the NTO?
  
(2)Was the Heung a T’ong within the meaning of the NTO?
  
(3)Whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring the action.
  
(4)Whether Mr. Wong Tat To and Mr. Wong Pui were validly approved and registered managers of the Heung under section 15 of the NTO as of 10 April 1986.

13. At the hearing Yuen J was of the view that the question of lack of authority to sue could not be raised as a defence in the action, hence a trial of preliminary issues was not the correct procedure.  She gave the parties liberty to apply.  This resulted in the defendant issuing the motion.

The grounds

14. The motion was later amended by specifying that the plaintiffs’ action was issued without authority on the following grounds:

(1)the Heung is not a clan, family or T’ong within the meaning of sections 15 and 16 of NTO or exempted from the requirement to be registered under the Companies Ordinance by virtue of section 16 of the NTO;
  
(2)the Heung has no legal status and is not recognised in law as a legal entity capable of enforcing rights over the land orauthorising the commencement of an action on its behalf; and
  
(3)no application for approval has been made under section 15 of the NTO or approval granted pursuant to any such application or at all.

The decision

15. The issues that Yuen J considered were as follows:

(1)What is the meaning of ‘T’ong’ in the context of section 15 of the NTO?
  
(2)What is the Heung and is it a T’ong within the meaning of section 15?
  
(3)Even if the Heung is a T’ong within the meaning of section 15, have Mr. Tang and Foo Tak Ching (‘Mr. Foo’) been appointed managers of the T’ong and have their appointments been approved and registered so that they are authorized to bring or continue this action?  (It is to be noted that Mr. Foo had by then became another manager of the Heung).

Yuen J came to the view that –

(1)A section 15 T’ong is one whose members would be devoted in common to the same worthy objectives such as those described in the Lockhart Report.  She held that a business T’ong is not covered by section 15.
  
(2)The Heung was not a T’ong within section 15.
  
(3)Even if it was a T’ong, the plaintiffs were not the registered managers of the T’ong at the time when action was commenced and therefore could not commence these proceedings.

History of the Heung

16. As to the history of the Heung, evidence was provided by an affirmation from Mr. Chong Kai Man.  Mr. Chong Kai Man was a member of the Heung.  His knowledge was based on information provided to him by his grandmother and aunt both of whom had passed away.  The aunt was at one time a member of the Heung.

17. In 1924, two gentlemen by the names of Wong Yuet Chiu and Lui Lap Ka (‘Mr. Lui’) formed an unincorporated company known as Chap Shing Company (‘Chap Shing’) with a view to inviting investors to participate in an investment project in Yuen Long, New Territories for the purpose of providing mutual benefits to its investors.  The investment project was named Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung (“華人模範鄉”) which means model village for the Chinese.  Chap Shing was a management company which provided management service to the Heung in return for a management fee.

18. The original idea of the investment was for the Heung to acquire land in the Yuen Long region.  A very small portion of the land would then be carved out into individual ‘house lots’ and then transferred into the names of the individual members in accordance with their share of interest.  This would enable these members to build their own dwelling houses on the land. 

19. The remaining but majority part of the land of the Heung would be put under the management of Chap Shing for the purpose of letting them out for farming in return for rent.  The rent derived from letting out the land would then be distributed amongst the members of the Heung in accordance with their share of interest in the Heung. 

20. Between 1924 and 1928 Chap Shing through Mr. Wong Yuet Chiu and Mr. Lui, collected money from intended investors who were willing to invest in the Heung.  Against such payment, certificates were issued to the investors.  The certificates certified the names of the investors and their share of interest of the Heung. 

21. During this period Mr. Wong Yuet Chiu and Mr. Lui used the money collected from the investors and acquired various agricultural land in the New Territories.  They then caused the land to be registered in the name of “Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung by its managers Wong Yuet Chiu and Lui Lap Ka”. 

22. In 1932 Mr. Wong Yuet Chiu and Mr. Lui caused part of the land of the Heung to be carved out so that the house lots could be allotted to the individual investors.  After the house lots were allotted to these individual investors they were registered as owners of these house lots.  The remaining part of the land were let out by Mr. Wong Yuet Chiu and Mr. Lui for and on behalf of the Heung in return for rental income.  

23. Due to the turbulent history of China starting from 1937 onwards, no house was ever built by the Heung or members on the land.  Because of World War II and the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong the only activities undertaken by the Heung was to let the agricultural land to farmers in return for rent.

24. Part of the land had been resumed by the Government and compensation was paid to the managers of the Heung. 

The District Office records

25. According to the memorial registered in the District Office of Tai Po, Mr. Wong Yuet Chiu and Mr. Lui had acquired land in two ways.  The first was as trustees of Chap Shing.  The second was in their personal names.  However on 30 December 1929, these lands were transferred to “Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung trustees Lui Lap Ka and Wong Yuet Chiu”.  Prior to the transfer, notice of the intended transfer was posted by the District Office.

26. As to the division of the land, according to the memorial dated 2 December 1932, it was recorded that ‘The property of Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung with Wong Yuet Chiu and Lui Lap Ka as trustees of 45 Wing Lok Street Hong Kong is hereby divided into the portions as in the attached list’.

27. Prior to the division, the District Office again posted notice of the intended division.

28. Mr. Wong Yuet Chiu died in 1959 and Mr. Wong Tat To was appointed as a manager in his place.  The appointment was registered by a memorial dated 4 January 1960.

29. Mr. Lui died in 1965.  Mr. Wong Tat To continued as the sole manager until 1984 when Mr. Wong Pui was appointed as a manager to replace Mr. Lui.  The appointment was registered by a memorial dated 15 September 1984.

30. Mr. Wong Pui died in 1987 and Mr. Wong Fook Pui and Mr. Wong Kwan Fat were appointed as managers to replace him.  The appointment was registered by a memorial dated 18 March 1988.

31. Mr. Wong Tat To died in 1989.  Mr. Chan and Mr. Tang were appointed as managers to replace Mr. Wong Tat To, Mr. Wong Pui, Mr. Wong Fook Pui and Mr. Wong Kwan Fat.  The appointment was registered by a memorial dated 28 January 1989.  According to a Notice of Appointment annexed to this memorial, this appointment was made at a meeting of the Heung on 28 January 1989 in which it was noted that since Mr. Wong Tat To had passed away, he was unable to explain the rights and authorities he had to appoint Mr. Wong Fook Pui and Mr. Wong Kwan Fat.

32. Mr. Chan died in 1997 and Mr. Foo was appointed as a manager in his place in 1999.

The recognition by the District Office

33. In April 2000, Mr. Tang and Mr. Foo as managers of the Heung commenced proceedings against the Secretary of Justice claiming that –

(i)Mr. Chan and Mr. Tang were registered or entitled to be registered as managers of the Heung under section 15 of the NTO since 1989 and Mr. Tang and Mr. Foo were registered or entitled to be registered as managers of the Heung since 1999;
  
(ii)the Director of Home Affairs was obliged to register them as managers of the Heung since 1989 and 1999 respectively; and
  
(iii)the Director of Lands was obliged to pay compensation to them as such managers for the resumption in 1997 of certain lands registered in the name of the Heung.

34. A compromise was reached by the plaintiffs and the Secretary for Justice.  A Tomlin order was made by Yuen J on 30 August 2000.  Pursuant to the compromise, the District Office of Yuen Long by a letter dated 31 August 2000 acknowledged that:

‘1.The ‘Wah (or Wa) Yan Mo Fan Heung’ was, and still is, a t’ong within Section 15 of the New Territories Ordinance;
   
 2.CHAN Kam Cheung and TANG Man kit were, between 1989 and 1999, managers of the said ‘Wah (or Wa) Yan Mo Fan Heung’ within the meaning of Section 15 of the New Territories Ordinance;
   
 3.The said TANG Man kit and FOO Tak Ching, were, since 1999, and still are, managers of the said ‘Wah (or Wa) Yan Mo Fan Heung’ within the meaning of Section 15 of the New Territories Ordinance.’

35. The formal ‘Approval of Appointment of Manager’ was issued by the District Officer in respect of Mr. Foo on 31 August 2000.  The document was registered in the Yuen Long New Territories Land Registry by a memorial on 1 September 2000.

The issue cannot bereopened

36. The hearing before Yuen J started in June 2000 but had to be adjourned due to the non-availability of a witness who had fallen sick.  While the status of the Heung and the capacity of the plaintiffs might be a live issue when the hearing first commenced, by the time it was resumed in August 2000, the District Office had clearly recognised the Heung to be a T’ong under section 15 of the NTO.  The section provides that –

‘Whenever any land is held from the Government under lease or other grant, agreement or licence in the name of a clan, family or t'ong, such clan, family or t'ong shall appoint a manager to represent it. Every such appointment shall be reported at the appropriate New Territories District Office of the Home Affairs Department, and the Secretary for Home Affairs on receiving such proof as he may require of such appointment shall, if he approves thereof, register the name of the said manager who shall, after giving such notices as may be prescribed, have full power to dispose of or in any way deal with the said land as if he were sole owner thereof, subject to the consent of the Secretary for Home Affairs, and shall be personally liable for the payment of all rents and charges and for the observance of all covenants and conditions in respect of the said land….’ 

37. The power to approve and register managers was vested by the NTO on the Land Officer, who was also the District Officer until 1982.  The NTO was amended in 1993 to vest such power on the Director of Home Affairs who was subsequently re-named the Secretary for Home Affairs.

38. If the Heung is such a T’ong, then it must possess such a status, at least, from 30 December 1929 when it began to hold land as a result of the transfer from Mr. Wong Yuet Chiu and Mr. Lui acting in their personal capacity and as trustees for Chap Shing to themselves acting as trustees for the Heung. 

39. Further if Mr. Chan and Mr. Tang were recognised as managers of the Heung from 1989 to 1999, then clearly they had the capacity to commence the action in 1990.  The District Officer’s approval of the manager can take effect retrospectively from the time the managers were appointed by the members: Light Ocean InvestmentsLtdv Enway Development Ltd [1994] 3 HKC 31, per Litton JA.

40. The approval by the District Officer was given pursuant to a statutory provision.  It was given not as a matter of formality but upon consideration of the law and facts.  The fact that the District Officer had in earlier years, namely in 1972, took a different approach as to the status of the Heung becomes irrelevant once the approval was given in August 2000. 

41. This decision must affect both the Heung, its managers and members on the one hand and also the Heung and the public on the other hand.  The recognition of the status of the Heung as a section 15 T’ong must be in the nature of a recognition ‘in rem’. 

42. In my view, until such time as the approval by the District Officer is set aside, it is not open to anyone, including the defendant in this case, to litigate on this issue again and challenge the status of the Heung and the plaintiffs.

43. The defendant, as an outsider of the Heung, had gone to undue length to challenge the status of the Heung and the managers when its stake in the land only came from the Heung and the mangers.  This is an extraordinary approach which in my view is totally unjustified.  It is worth repeating what Lord Millett NPJ said in the Court of Final Appeal :

‘...... the authority of the plaintiffs to represent the Heung was a matter of the Heung's internal administration and had nothing to do with the defendant. It was entitled to challenge their authority to represent the Heung, but its only legitimate interest in doing so was to ensure that it was not exposed to the risk of being made the subject of a second claim. It was entitled to be protected against this risk; but the proper way to protect it was not to enquire into the propriety of the plaintiffs' appointment, which was a matter between the plaintiffs and the Heung, still less to strike out the proceedings, but to make an appropriate representation order.’ 

44. The defendant had never applied for such an order. 

Application to stay the appeal

45. Counsel for the defendant, Mr. Jeremy Chan and Miss Phoebe Man, who did not appear in the court below, recognized the hurdle they faced and applied in the course of the submission to stay the appeal in order to allow the defendant to challenge the decision of the Secretary for Home Affairs.  In my view, this is not an option that is opened to the defendant at this stage.  Yuen J had refused to allow the defendant to intervene (and in my view rightly so) when the plaintiffs and the Secretary of Justice reached the compromise.  If the defendant considered its position has been affected by this development, then it should proceed with the application well before the hearing of this appeal.  It cannot simply stand by to see which view the courts may eventually take.  The defendant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review to challenge the approval was lodged in 2002 but was not proceeded upon.  The views expressed by the Department of Justice in March 2003 that the defendant should withhold its application pending the outcome of the appeal before Rogers VP and Le Pichon JA is simply not a sufficient reason for the defendant not to take any action earlier.  I will refuse the application.

Relevance of registration of approval

46. Yuen J recognised that the approval of the managers by the District Officer can be backdated to the date of the appointment.  But at the same time she was of the view that the registration of the District Officer’s approval of appointment could not have a retrospective effect and the plaintiffs could only have power to sue from 1 September 2000 onwards when the approval was registered.

47. In Light Ocean Investments Ltd the issue before this Court (Power VP, Nazareth and Litton JJA) was concerned with the ability of the vendors in the sale of land to show good title which in that case was dependent on the registration of the approval of three persons as managers.  The wording of section 15 is that

‘The (Secretary) … shall, if he approves (the appointment), register the name of the said manager who shall, after giving such notices as may be prescribed, have full power to dispose of or in any way deal with the said land as if he were sole owner thereof, subject to the consent of the Secretary….’

Title irrelevant

48. The present case, however, is not concerned with the question of title of the managers.  It is concerned with their capacity to sue to recover the land.  The question of title by registration is irrelevant.  As correctly pointed out by Mr. Anthony Neoh SC who together with Mr. Ernest Koo appeared on behalf of the plaintiffs, the person who is entitled to recover land rests on his right to possession of the land and not on his right to pass title to a third party.  In this case Mr. Chan and Mr. Tang were the approved mangers of the Heung between 1989 and 1999 and Mr. Tang and Mr. Foo were since 1999 and still are the managers of the Heung.  On this basis the plaintiffs clearly were in possession of the land in 1990 when they began this action to recover land.

49. The Heung has always been managed by trustees and managers.  In the context of New Territories landholdings by traditional organizations, terms like trustee, manager or SzeLei (司理) are synonymous: Tang Yau Yi Tong and Another v Tang Mou Shau Tso and Others [1996] 2 HKLR 212.

50. The land was let by Mr. Wong Tat To as manger of the Heung in 1966 to the defendant as a yearly tenant.  The Defendant had refused to deliver back the land to the Heung after the expiration of the notice to quit thereby trespassing on the land.  The then current managers then commenced the proceedings against it to recover the land.  I just do not see how in the circumstance the defendant could possibly argue that the plaintiffs have no right to bring the proceedings. 

Two principles

51. Two principles of law come into play.  First, an action for trespass can be maintained by someone in possession of the land: see Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Ed.) Vol. 45 Paras 1396 and 1397.  Second, estoppel by tenancy will preclude the defendant from raising this defence. 

Estoppel

52. As pointed out by the editors of Hill and Redman’s Law of Landlord and Tenant (17th Ed.) Para 88, this estoppel has two aspects –

(1)A tenant is prevented or estopped from denying the right of his landlord to grant the lease and, conversely, a landlord is prevented or estopped from denying the title of his tenant under the lease.
  
(2)A person who has no legal estate in the land may nevertheless purport to grant a lease of that land; in that event, there is created between him and his purported tenant a tenancy by estoppel which binds them and their respective successors in title just as if the landlord had a sufficient interest to grant the lease.

53. The position is best stated by Lord Denning MR in Industrial Properties (Barton Hill) Ltd and Others v Associated Electrical Industries Ltd [1977] 1 QB 580:

‘If a landlord lets a tenant into possession under a lease, then, so long as the tenant remains in possession undisturbedby any adverse claim – then the tenant cannot dispute the landlord’s title.  Suppose the tenant (not having been disturbed) goes out of possession and the landlord sues the tenant on the covenant for rent or for breach of covenant to repair or to yield up in repair.  The tenant cannot say to the landlord: “You are not the true owner of the property.”  Likewise, if the landlord, on the tenant’s holding over, sues him for possession or for use and occupation or mesne profits, the tenant cannot defend himself by saying: “The property does not belong to you, but to another.’

The managers

54. That the managers always have the right to manage the land and the right of possession of the land is further demonstrated by the fact by the acts of the Government towards the Heung.  Despite the refusal by the Government to legally recognise the status of the Heung and its managers until August 2000, it had looked towards the mangers to be responsible for the management of the land belonging to the Heung.  It accepted the managers’ surrender of the land resumed by the Government and compensations for the resumption was paid to the managers and it regarded the managers being in a position to provide receipts for the compensation.  The Government had also treated the manager to be persons liable for rent and other charges of the land.  There was evidence that rates and property taxes were demanded by the Government from the managers and actions were brought against them for payment.  Further, as pointed out by Mr. Neoh, although there was no evidence before the court of payment of Government rent, it is reasonable to assume that such rent would in the normal course of events be demanded from and was paid by the managers. 

55. In my view, irrespective of the question of whether the managers would only acquire a legal title to the land upon the registration of the approval by the District Officer, the right of the mangers as landlords and as persons entitled to possession to recover the land can hardly be challenged.

Relevance of unincorporated association

56. Great play had been made by the defendant about the Heung being an unincorporated association; that the property of an unincorporated association must be held by trustees and since the plaintiffs were not trustees therefore they have no capacity to bring the action. 

57. This is to ignore the true nature of the plaintiffs’ claim: the right to bring the claim does not depend on whether the plaintiffs had the paper title to the land but rather on whether they have possession of the land and also on the existence of the landlord and tenant relationship between the parties which on the face of this case can hardly be challenged by the defendant. 

58. When Wong Tat To let the land to the defendant, he did so in his capacity as the trustee/manager of the Heung.  The office of the manager is transmitted to the current plaintiffs.  In view of the unique position of a manager of a traditional T’ong, I do not regard him as a mere agent of the members.  It can hardly be challenged that when Mr. Wong Tat To let the land he did not do so in his capacity as a manager but only ‘personally’ and therefore the current managers could not rely on the estoppel.  Likewise it can hardly be challenged that Mr. Wong Tat To was a trustee in the sense of a trustee of an unincorporated association and therefore had title to the land but not the current managers who are mere managers.

59. To do so is to ignore the context of this case.  The land is situated in the New Territories.  The Heung which held the land came into existence in about 1929.  This was in the early stage of the New Territories administration.  The time frame was 30 years after the administration of the New Territories was first given to the United Kingdom.  The fact that the land was actually conveyed to the trustees of the Heung and the managers’ subsequent application for registration of their office in the District Office whenever they became managers could only be consistent with the fact that those involved with the management of the Heung regarded the Heung as a traditional landholding organization which the District Officer finally recognised in 2000 to be a section 15 T’ong.  This clearly showed that the Heung was not an unincorporated association whose land have to be held by trustees in the legal sense of these terms.

60. In my view the right of the plaintiffs to possession of the land and the operation of the principle of estoppel are determinative of the issue of the capacity of the plaintiffs to bring this proceedings. 

61. Mr. Neoh submitted that in relying on the above principles, he does not even need to pray in aid the requirement that the Heung is a section 15 T’ong.  That may be so, but if the status of the Heung has been recognised to be a section 15 T’ong, it only reinforces the view that the plaintiffs could properly bring this action to recover the land.

The Heung is a section 15 T’ong

62. In any event, even if the status of the Heung could be determined afresh by the court, I am of the firm view that it must be a section 15 T’ong.  I would respectively adopted the analysis of Rogers VP in the first judgment.  I will only briefly summarise my position on this issue –

(1)That the existence of a business T’ong as recognised in Tang Yau Yi Tong [1996] 2 HKLR 212 is clearly supported by contemporary literature: see the memorandum by Dr James W. Hayes entitled Tong & Tso intheNew Territories (Hong Kong Government 19/12/1962).  A business T’ong is also recognised by the experts in this case, namely Professor Wejen Chang and Professor Anthony Dicks SC.
  
(2)A communal landholding is not the only basis in which a business T’ong can be qualified as a section 15 T’ong.  The Lockhart Report did not impose such a restriction.
  
(3)The context in which the Heung came into existence; the conveyancing of the land to the trustees of the Heung; the Heung have always been managed by managers and the steps taken by the managers to have their appointment registered with the District Office, clearly demonstrated against the view that the Heung was merely a label or style adopted by Chap Shing in holding its land.

Section 345(1) of the Companies Ordinance

63. The next question is whether the Heung offends section 345(1) of the Companies Ordinance, Cap. 32 which provides that:

‘No company, association, or partnership consisting of more than 20 persons shall be formed for the purpose of carrying on any business that has for its object the acquisition of gain by the company, association or partnership, or by the individual members thereof, unless it is registered as a company under this Ordinance, or is formed in pursuance of some other Ordinance.’

64. An exemption is provided by section 16 of the NTO that in respect of any clan, family or t’ong owning land on 28 October 1910 with a registered manager and the land is used for agricultural, religious, educational or charitable purposes etc as certified by the Secretary for Home Affairs.

65. As the Heung did not own land in 1910, the section 16 exemption does not apply and one has to see whether the Heung falls within the prohibition of section 345.

66. Section 345 is based originally on section 4 of the United Kingdom Companies Act 1862.  Jessel MR in In re Padstow Total Loss and Collision Assurance Association (1882) 20 Ch D 137 held that the object of the section was that commercial associations or companies consisting of more than twenty members should be registered.

The factors

67. In considering the application of the section there are three relevant factors:

(1)Is this an association?
  
(2)If it is an association, whether it is formed for the purpose of carrying on any business?
  
(3)Even if it satisfied this requirement, one still needs to consider who actually carries on the business: see Smith v Anderson (1880) 15 Ch D 247.

Association

68. It is clear from the cases in this field, whether a particular organization falls within the section depends on the nature of the organization and facts of the individual case.

69. In a general sense the Heung is an association of members which exceeded twenty in number.  However, it is still necessary to consider the nature of an ‘association’.  The individual members of the Heung acquired the house lots in the land which would be transferred to their names.  The remaining part of the land would be let and the rent would be distributed to the members in accordance with their share of interest as represented by the house lots they owned.  Apart from having a right to the part of the land belonging to them and having a right to the rent of the land belonging to the Heung, the members really do not have any mutual rights and obligations towards each other.  From the information disclosed, the interest of the members in the Heung is freely transferable.  Mr. Chong’s grandaunt transferred her interest to Mr. Chong’s aunt who in turn transferred it to Mr. Chong.  As James LJ observed in Smith v Anderson, persons who have no mutual rights and obligations do not constitute an association because they happen to have a common interest or several interests in something which is to be divided between them.  I would adopt the same approach and hold that the Heung is not an association within the meaning of section 345.

Business

70. As to the business aspect of this section, the Heung is a business T’ong.  However the term ‘business’ here is used to distinguish it from other t’ongs such as a family t’ong or religious t’ong.  One still needs to consider whether the Heung was set up for the purpose of carrying on business.  Brett MR in Shaw v Benson (1883) 11 QBD 563 held that in each case this will depend upon the inference to be drawn from the facts.  In Armour v Liverpool Corporation [1939] 1 Ch 422, Simonds J held that the test is: ‘whether that which is being done is what persons would describe as the carrying on of a business for gain.’

71. Applying these principles I think that the members of the Heung would be surprised if they were told that they had contracted with each other with a view to gain by entering into business transactions.  What they had really done was to invest money in a project which entitled them to have some shares in the land conveyed to themselves and also to receive rent from the land which had not been divided amongst themselves.  The project was not simply to operate a business of letting.  The main purpose must be one of investment.  Without having the individual house lots, the members would not even be entitled to the division of rent, because from the limited information we have in this case, the distribution will be based on their share of interest in the project by virtue of their landholdings.  My view is that the ‘business purpose’ aspect of section 345 is also not satisfied.

Managers carry out the business

72. In any event, I would regard the business to be carried out by the managers and not the members.  In view of the unique position of a manager of a traditional T’ong, I would not like to characterize him simply as an agent acting for and on behalf of the members and therefore rendered the members to be the ones carrying on the business.  This is not the case here.

Nature of proceedings

73. In many of the cases where section 345 was in issue, the association wished to enforce a contract it had entered into with another party.  The fact that the association may be illegal because it had not been registered does not mean the contract itself is also illegal.  This depends on whether the contract is in its very nature illegal.  This in turn depends on whether the terms of the contract was entered into in accordance with the rules of the association.  In other words, whether the transaction had for its object the carrying out of the illegal purpose of the association: see Shaw v Benson. 

74. In this case the issue is not concerned with the enforcement of a contract which is illegal because it was entered into pursuant to the objects of an illegal association.  The plaintiffs are merely seeking to recover land from a trespasser who has no right to remain on the land.  The nature of the proceedings is not tainted by illegality.

75. I do not regard this ruling will open a flood gate of actions by traditional t’ongs whichhave not been registered under section 345.  This is clearly a fact sensitive issue depending on the circumstances of an individual case.

Section 13 of the NTO

76. Mr. Neoh also relies on section 13 of the NTO which provides that in any proceedings in the Court of First Instance or the District Court in relation to land in the New Territories, the court shall have power to recognize and enforce any Chinese custom or customary right affecting such land.

77. Having reached my conclusion on section 345, it is not necessary for me to determine whether section 13 of the NTO overrides the requirement of section 345.

Consent to bring proceedings

78. One last question to be considered is whether the consent of the District Officer is required to bring this action in accordance with section 15 of the NTO.

79. In Man Ping Nam, the manager of Man Sham Chung Wui v Man Mei Kwai (CACV No. 193 of 2002) this Court (Le Pichon and Cheung JJA and Stone J) by a majority held that consent is not required when a manager leased land belonging to section 15 landholding organization.  I took the contrary view in that case.  I maintain that view.  However, the majority view must prevail in this case because of the application of the principle of precedence.  Moreover, while in a strict sense recovery of land is a form of dealing in land, its true nature is really an act of management of the land.  The Heung is not disposing of or removing the land from its control.  I do not regard consent from the District Officer is required.

Other matters

80. Mr. Jeremy Chan and Miss Phoebe Man had conducted the case on behalf of the defendant with ability and advanced many arguments in support of their client’s case.  I have considered their arguments but I do not think it is necessary to deal with all of them because I have chosen to deal with the essential issues which I believe to be determinative of this appeal.

Conclusion

81. Accordingly I will allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of Yuen J and order the case to be remitted to the Court of First Instance for trial.  I will make an order nisi that the plaintiffs are to have the costs of the appeal and below.

Hon Yeung JA:

82. I agree.

Hon Chung J:

83. I agree.

Hon Cheung JA:

84. There shall be an order of this Court in accordance with paragraph 81 above.

(Peter Cheung)
Justice of Appeal
(Wally Yeung)
Justice of Appeal
(Andrew Chung)
Judge of the Court of First Instance

 

Mr. Anthony Neoh, SC, and Mr. Ernest Koo, instructed by M/S Christine M. Koo & Ip, for the Plaintiffs

Mr. Jeremy Chan and Miss Phoebe Man, instructed by M/S Kao, Lee & Yip, for the Defendant

 

38984-EN-2004-06-03

TANG MAN KIT AND ANOTHER v. HIP HING TIMBER CO LTD

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CACV000137B/2002

CACV 137/2002

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 137 OF 2002

(ON APPEAL FROM HCA NO. 8000 OF 1990)

_________________________

BETWEEN
TANG MAN KIT and FOO TAK CHING
(suing as Managers of WAH YAN MO FAN HEUNG
(華人模範鄉))
Plaintiff
AND
HIP HING TIMBER COMPANY LIMITEDDefendant
(協興木業有限公司)

_________________________

Coram: Hon Rogers VP and Le Pichon JA in Court

Date of Hearing: 3 June 2004

Date of Judgment: 3 June 2004

Date of Handing Down Reasons for Decision: 5 June 2004

_________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

_________________________

Hon Rogers VP:

1. This action commenced in 1990. It is an action by which the plaintiffs claim possession of land which, on the plaintiffs' case, was let on a yearly tenancy to the defendant. The defendant's defence is that it is entitled to remain on the land by reason of permission which has been given to it on behalf of the plaintiff. Part of the history of this action has already been set out in the judgment of this court of 11 December 2002. The order made by this court on that occasion was that paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Madam Justice Yuen's order of 21 December 2001 be set aside, the Notice of Motion amended on 24 May 2000 be dismissed and the matter be remitted to the Court of First Instance. The Court thus ordered the action to proceed.

2. It is to be noted that the arguments raised in the amended Notice of Motion did not relate to issues that arose on the pleadings in the action. The sealed copy of the order made following the appeal was filed on 27 May 2003. That followed an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. That application was heard on 30 April 2003 and the decision refusing the leave to appeal was handed down on 16 May 2003. Subsequently, on 17 July 2003, an application was made to the Court of Final Appeal for leave to appeal. That application was successful and we have the benefit of a transcript of those proceedings.

3. The hearing of the appeal before the Court of Final Appeal was listed for 25 May 2004. However, on 22 April 2004 the acting Registrar of the Court of Final Appeal wrote to the parties raising a concern as to whether the judgment of Yuen J (as she then was) appealed from was an interlocutory judgment or a final judgment in the light of Shell Hong Kong Ltd v Yeung Wai Man Kiu Yip Co. Ltd & Another (2003) 6 HKCFAR 222. The parties were invited to attend a chambers directions hearing before a single judge to explore how "... if at all possible, the pending appeal can proceed on a firm and unquestionable jurisdictional footing...."

4. The outcome of that directions hearing appears to have been that the parties were directed to be prepared to argue the question as to whether the decision of Yuen J was final or interlocutory and on the substantive merits of the appeal.

5. The appeal before the Court of Final Appeal came on for hearing on 25 May 2004. We do not have the benefit of a transcript of those proceedings however it appears that at the outset of the proceedings the court suggested that the appeal before them should be stood down to enable parties to:

"(i)file a consent order under section 34B(4)(c) of the High Court Ordinance, Cap. 4; and to then
(ii)go back to the Court of Appeal (Rogers VP and Le Pichon JA) to invite it to hand down afresh, without hearing further argument, the judgment which it had handed down on 11 December 2002, and to grant leave to appeal."

At the conclusion of that hearing, the resumed hearing of the appeal was fixed for 8, 9 and 10 June with 11 reserved as a precaution.

6. It is clear from the Decision, handed down 2 days later, that although the Court of Final Appeal indicated that there were reasons upon which it might find that Yuen J's judgment was a final judgment, it made no such finding and, importantly, did not set aside the judgment of this court as having been a nullity.

7. It might, therefore, be gathered from the Decision and from the order which was made, that the Court of Final Appeal was disposed to hear the appeal without deciding whether Yuen J's judgment was interlocutory or final. No doubt it was considered that any decision in that regard would not, in itself, assist the parties nor the due disposal of the case. The Court of Final Appeal was looking for a course which it regarded as expedient. Unfortunately, in its effort to find an expedient course the Court of Final Appeal appears to have overlooked the fact that, since this court has given its judgment and the order on that judgment has been perfected, sealed and filed, this court has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter unless it was shown that Yuen J's judgment was final. Moreover, the matter has gone to the Court of Final Appeal. That court has commenced hearing the appeal and has stood over the hearing.

8. It would be fundamentally wrong for any court which has completed its task by hearing a matter before it and making its order to reopen the matter except on grounds where its judgment has to be set aside or, perhaps, where it is possible to make some further order under the slip rule. This court is not aware of any power in this court to deliver any further judgments after its task has been completed and counsel before us did not direct our attention to any. Indeed, it is not clear what status the judgment of 11 December 2002 and any later judgment to be handed down would have. The Court of Final Appeal's endeavour to put itself on what has been referred to as a firm and unquestionable jurisdictional footing cannot be accomplished by asking this court to do something which it has no jurisdiction to do.

9. Whatever the circumstances, this court, when called upon to deliver a judgment will give its fullest consideration to that judgment and to all arguments which are directed towards its judgment being correct. In the present case, if the judgment of 11 December 2002 were to be held to be a nullity, there are clearly reasons for this court to consider the matter again prior to giving any further judgment. There have been arguments raised in the Court of Final Appeal. There are, no doubt, arguments in the cases submitted to that court. Those are documents which this court has, as yet, not seen. There is also a further judgment of another division of this court which bears on some of the matters which have been raised. There have been comments made that this court has not dealt with certain issues. It would be desirable for this court to consider in any further judgment whether it was correct in not dealing with those matters and to explain why it did not do so. And so the matter rests.

10. The matter came before this court on a summons with the marginal note indicating that it had been taken out under section 34B(4) of the High Court Ordinance. The summons was a consent summons of both parties. The orders sought were that:

"1. The appeal be heard and determined by Two Justices of Appeal; and

2. The costs of this application be in the cause of the appeal to the Court of Final Appeal."

11. By a letter written on behalf of the Registrar of the High Court dated 31 May 2004, the attention of the parties was drawn to the difficulties posed by the fact that this court had fulfilled the functions of its office in hearing the appeal and unless and until its judgment and order were set aside, it had no jurisdiction to take any further action in the matter. Furthermore, the parties' attention was drawn to the fact that if this court were in a position of having to deliver a further judgment, it would have to consider the matter properly before handing down any judgment.

12. Subsequently, on 2 June 2004, the parties filed a "Notice of Consent". That referred to the parties giving their consent on the following terms "... the Appeal herein is to be heard and determined by the Court of Appeal with Two Justices of Appeal pursuant to Section 34B(4)(c) of the High Court Ordinance." The notice concluded with a statement that both parties would adopt the arguments previously made in front of the Court of Appeal and that they were intending to present no further submissions. That, as already indicated, is a course which this court is not prepared to sanction.

13. When this matter was called on for hearing, the court raised the question of its jurisdiction to make the orders sought in view of the fact that it had concluded its function in hearing the appeal and the order had been drawn up and entered. It appeared that both parties appreciated the difficulty and at the court's invitation there was a short adjournment so that counsel could consider amongst themselves and with their clients as to what course they wished to adopt.

14. After the short adjournment, counsel informed this court that neither party wished to take the point that the judgment of Yuen J had been other than an interlocutory judgment and that the appeal before this court had been other than an interlocutory appeal. It was said that the parties had consistently treated the matter as being interlocutory and although the question as to whether the matter had been a final decision was raised by the Court of Final Appeal itself, neither party wished to argue that the matter was other than interlocutory. In those circumstances it would seem that if the matter were to proceed in the Court of Final Appeal no point could thereafter be taken by either party that there had been a lack of jurisdiction. The decision on the appeal would not be a precedent and would not be binding on any other party.

15. In those circumstances the application by consent summons was not pursued and neither party wished to apply to set aside the judgment and order of this court on the basis that it was a nullity.

16. I would simply add that whether the Court of Appeal can be duly constituted by 2 judges is dependent on whether the particular appeal is against an interlocutory judgment or order: see section 34B(4). The question of whether any matter is interlocutory or final is thus of some importance. As is acknowledged on both sides the test of whether a matter is final or interlocutory is a question of applying what has been called the application test. That is, of course, a judge made test. It has been referred to in the Shell case referred to above. It is often said to be unsatisfactory, but until there is a change in the law it is important that there is some certainty about its application.

17. In deciding whether a matter is an interlocutory matter or final matter the court looks to see whether the position finally disposes of an issue in the case whichever way the decision goes. The simplest way of determining what are the issues is to make reference to the pleadings. This case has now proceeded for 14 years. In those circumstances it might be assumed that the issues have been pleaded. The issues in a case are defined in the pleadings as they stand, not in some way that they might stand if one or other of the parties had been bolder or better advised.

18. The importance of the matter to the proper functioning of this court can be seen in its practical application. Given the volume of cases which come before this court, there were 404 civil appeals in the 2003 (in comparison to 198 civil appeals in 1990 when this case was first launched) in addition to the 555 criminal appeals the court must make best use of the 8 appellate judges (in comparison to 9 appellate judges in 1990). Indeed, this is emphasised by the fact that of the 404 appeals heard in 2003, 221 were interlocutory appeals. It is thus in the interests of the efficient operation of this court that it applies the application test in a straightforward and easily comprehensible manner.

Hon Le Pichon JA:

19. I agree.

(Anthony Rogers)(Doreen Le Pichon)
Vice-PresidentJustice of Appeal

Representation:

Mr Anthony Neoh SC and Mr Ernest Koo, instructed by Messrs Christine M Koo & Ip, for the Plaintiff/Appellant

Mr Johnny S L Mok and Mr Michael Chai, instructed by Messrs Kao, Lee & Yip, for the Defendant/Respondent

8757-EN-2003-05-16

TANG MAN KIT AND ANOTHER v. HIP HING TIMBER CO LTD

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CACV000137A/2002

CACV 137/2002

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 137 OF 2002

(ON APPEAL FROM HCA NO. 8000 OF 1990)

____________________

BETWEEN
TANG MAN KIT and FOO TAK CHING
(suing as Managers of WAH YAN MO FAN HEUNG
(華人模範鄉))
Plaintiff
AND
HIP HING TIMBER COMPANY LIMITED
(協興木業有限公司)
Defendant

____________________

Coram: Hon Rogers VP and Le Pichon JA in Court

Date of Hearing: 30 April 2003

Date of Handing Down Decision: 16 May 2003

____________________

D E C I S I O N

____________________

Hon Rogers VP:

1. This was an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal from a judgment of this court handed down on 11 December 2002. At the conclusion of the hearing, this court reserved its decision to be given in writing. The facts and background of this case are contained in this court's judgment.

2. The application for leave to appeal was made under section 22(1)(b) of the Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap. 484, on the ground that the questions involved in the intended appeal were by reason of their great general or public importance or otherwise such as should be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision. There were four questions which had been framed. As modified in the skeleton argument they were as follows:

"(1) Whether a 't'ong' ('a section 15 t'ong') within the meaning of section 15 of the New Territories Ordinance ('NTO') includes a t'ong established to carry on business or commerce for the purposes of gain.

(2) Whether the commencement and continuation of legal proceedings based upon the non-payment of rent fall within the words 'dispose of or in any way deal with the said land' under section 15 of NTO such that the consent of the Land Officer or Secretary for Home Affairs would be required.

(3) Whether the letting of land in the New Territories falls within the words 'dispose of or in any way deal with the said land' under section 15 of NTO such that the consent of the Land Officer or Secretary for Home Affairs would be required.

(4) Whether proceedings commenced by persons purporting to be managers of a section 15 t'ong in the absence of proper authority could be retrospectively validated by the subsequent approval and registration of such or other persons as managers of a section 15 t'ong."

In argument, Mr Mok on behalf of the defendant concentrated on the first three questions.

3. In considering this application the following matters would appear to be relevant. In the first place, the pleading, as presently framed on behalf of the defendant in the amended defence and counterclaim, is that the plaintiff ("the Heung") is and has at all material times been the beneficial owner of the land in question. It is also the defendant's pleaded case that Mr Wong Tat To was at all material times a manager of "the Heung". The defence to the plaintiff's claim for possession is based in part upon agreements said to have been entered on behalf of the plaintiff with the defendant and those responsible for running the defendant. The defence of estoppel is also raised. In the counterclaim, the defendant seeks an order for specific performance of the agreements said to have been reached between the defendant and the plaintiff.

4. To put the matter simply, therefore, it is the defendant's case that the land, which is the subject of this action, is owned by an entity, namely the plaintiff, and that at some stage, a manager, Mr Wong Tat To, had authority and power to deal with the land in such a way as to bind the plaintiff such that the defendant is now in a position to claim that it is entitled to remain on the land. It is not part of the defendant's pleaded case that there is no entity capable of owning the land, nor, indeed, is it their case that the plaintiff was incapable of owning the land. In those circumstances, the questions which are sought to be raised on this application do not arise on the pleadings. On the contrary, they are in conflict with the defendant's pleaded case.

5. As this court pointed out in the judgment handed down on 11 December 2002, the matter under appeal was the order of the judge below, made on a motion, setting aside the re-re-amended writ of summons and dismissing the action because the writ of summons had been issued without authority. These matters were pointed out during the course of the hearing for leave to appeal, as indeed, it was pointed out that this action was commenced in 1990 and the matters sought to be taken to the Court of Final Appeal do not begin to address the issues raised in the defence and counterclaim. Mr Mok on behalf of the defendant suggested that the action could continue on a parallel basis at the same time as leave being given to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. It is not clear to me how that could happen. In conclusion, Mr Mok sought the leave of this court to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal on the basis that the questions sought to be raised in the Court of Final Appeal would have to be re-litigated if a trial were to take place.

6. In my view, if the defendant wishes to raise the matters which are the subject of the questions, the pleadings should be amended so that these issues are raised in the action. The trial can then take place. The appropriate facts can then be found, for example, as to the existence of the plaintiff or otherwise. Once the relevant facts have been established, the issues can then be decided. Even if anything said by this court were to be considered binding I see no reason why that would preclude the defendant from raising any appropriate issues in the Court of Final Appeal. Although Mr Mok submitted that there might be some kind of time bar, I do not see that any should apply in the circumstances of this case where the real issue to date has been whether the action has been commenced with proper authority.

7. In my view, it would be inappropriate for the questions to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal in the state in which the action is at present.

Hon Le Pichon JA:

8. I agree.

(Anthony Rogers)(Doreen Le Pichon)
Vice-PresidentJustice of Appeal

Representation:

Mr Anthony Neoh SC and Mr Ernest Koo, instructed by Messrs Christine M Koo & Ip, for the Plaintiff/Respondent

Mr Johnny S L Mok, instructed by Messrs Kao, Lee & Yip, for the Defendant/Applicant

8758-EN-2002-12-11

TANG MAN KIT AND ANOTHER v. HIP HING TIMBER CO. LTD.

HTML content

CACV000137/2002

CACV 137/2002

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 137 OF 2002

(ON APPEAL FROM HCA NO. 8000 OF 1990)

____________________

BETWEEN
TANG MAN KIT and FOO TAK CHING
(suing as Managers of WAH YAN MO FAN HEUNG (華人模範鄉))
Plaintiff
AND
HIP HING TIMBER COMPANY LIMITED
(協興木業有限公司)
Defendant

____________________

Coram: Hon Rogers VP and Le Pichon JA in Court

Date of Hearing: 18-19 September 2002

Date of Handing Down of Judgment: 11 December 2002

____________________

J U D G M E N T

____________________

 

Hon Rogers VP:

1. This action was commenced by a writ dated 22 November 1990. The named plaintiff in the action was "Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung (華人模範鄉) with Chan Kam Cheung and Tang Man Kit as Managers."

2. The claim was relatively simple, if, perhaps, defectively pleaded at the time. The relief sought was the recovery of various lots of land in Demarcation District 107 (the "land") which are said to be agricultural land which had been let to the defendant on a yearly tenancy. The Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung (the "Heung") was pleaded as being an unincorporated association. Paragraph 2 of the statement of claim referred to the appointment of one Lui Lap Ka (sometimes referred to as Lui Lap Kar or Lui Lap Gar and, for convenience, hereinafter referred to as Lui Lap Ka) and Wong Tat To in January 1960 as the Managers of the Heung. Paragraph 3 referred to the replacement of Lui Lap Ka by Mr Wong Pui in 1984. All these persons were said to be the legal owners of the land and trustees of it for the Heung. It was said that the Heung was beneficially interested in the land. It was pleaded that solicitors had served a notice to quit on 10 April 1986 and in doing so had acted on behalf of the registered managers of the Heung. It might be mentioned that at that stage there was no indication as to how Mr Chan Kam Cheung and Mr Tang Man Kit had become Managers.

3. The defence and counterclaim, which was filed on 10 January 1991, is of some interest. There is first of all an admission that the Heung is and had at all material times been the beneficial owner of the land in question. It was also admitted that Mr Wong Tat To had been a Manager of the Heung. It was said that the defendant had been carrying on business of a timber yard on the land. The crucial part of the defence was that there had been an oral agreement between Mr Wong, in his capacity as manager and trustee of the Heung, with a Mr Chong in 1966. Mr Chong was carrying on business under the name Hip Hing Timber Company. The agreement was in essence that, provided Mr Chong preserved and improved the land on which the timber yard was and paid nominal fees to the Heung, he would be allowed to use the land until the government resumed it and would be entitled to 60% of any compensation paid by the government. After the business of the defendant had been incorporated in 1974, the oral agreement was, in effect, renewed with Mr Chong this time acting on behalf of the company. It was said that, in reliance upon the promise made by Mr Wong, the defendant had altered its position in a large number of material respects by improving and paying costs related to the timber yard. Whilst it was admitted that a notice to quit had been served, it was said that Mr Wong Tat To had informed the defendant, through Mr Chong, that the notice to quit did not represent his or the Heung's intentions and he had dissociated himself from it. On the basis of that, the defendant counterclaimed for specific performance of the 1966 and 1974 agreements with Mr Wong and, in the alternative, for a declaration and also for damages.

4. It can thus be seen that the defendant's case was that not only had there been a yearly tenancy but that an agreement had been made with Mr Wong, the manager of the Heung, acting as manager and trustee which entitled the defendant to remain on the land and to an interest of sorts therein. Its defence and counterclaim was thus predicated upon the position of Mr Wong Tat To having been manager and trustee of the Heung.

5. Very little happened in relation to the action until December 1997. It was then that the plaintiff amended the statement of claim largely in relation to the position of the trustees and managers. It was said that Mr Wong Pui had died in May 1987 and Mr Wong Tat To had died on 17 January 1989. Mr Chan Kam Cheung and Mr Tang Man Kit were then said to have become the new sole managers and hence the legal owners and trustees for the Heung by virtue of a notice of appointment dated 28 January 1989 which had been registered in the District Land Office. The amendments to the statement of claim occasioned almost no amendment to the defence and counterclaim.

6. In March 1998 the defendant applied by summons to have the amended statement of claim struck out and the action dismissed or stayed on the ground that the plaintiff was an unincorporated association and had no corporate or separate legal existence or capacity. Unfortunately, that application was the first of what has now become a protracted series of peripheral disputes, the net effect of which has precluded the real issue in the case being given consideration or being decided.

7. On the hearing of the defendant's summons to strike out, the plaintiff applied for leave to amend the title of the writ and to re-amend the statement of claim. The title of the action was to be changed to "Tang Man Kit (suing as sole manager of Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung (華人模範鄉)". The body of the statement of claim was to include a plea that the Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung was a T'ong within the meaning of section 19 of the New Territories Ordinance (Cap. 97, Laws of Hong Kong 1960 Edition) and section 17 of the New Territories Ordinance (Cap. 97, Laws of Hong Kong Current Edition [presumably as at the date of the writ]). It appears that at the hearing the argument turned upon the draft re-amended statement of claim. In the outcome, the judge below, who also heard that application, came to the conclusion that it was arguable that the Heung was a T'ong and also that it was not clear that the managers in 1984 and 1989 were not approved by the then Land Officer, Yuen Long. She therefore refused to strike out the action and permitted the re-amendment of the statement of claim.

8. Shortly after that decision, a further summons was taken out by the defendant in December 1998 for trial of a preliminary issue namely whether Mr Tang Man Kit, who was at that stage the sole named plaintiff, was the validly approved and registered manager of the Heung under section 15 of the New Territories Ordinance, secondly whether the Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung was a T'ong within the meaning of the New Territories Ordinance and thirdly, consequently, whether the plaintiff had locus to bring this action. A fourth preliminary issue was also sought, namely, whether Wong Tat To and Wong Pui were validly approved and registered managers of the Heung under section 15 of the New Territories Ordinance at the time when the notice to quit was issued on 10 April 1986.

9. That summons was heard together with other matters in March 1999. At that hearing it appears that the defendant relied upon the case of Banco de Bilbao v Rey [1938] 2 All ER 253. Relying upon that authority, the judge below said that she did not think that the procedure of a preliminary issue was the correct procedure since a question of lack of authority to sue could not be raised as a defence in the action. She thus gave the parties liberty to apply, expressing the view that if the defendant were to take the point as to authority to sue, it should be taken immediately. It thus came about that on 26 March 1999 a notice of motion was issued seeking an order that the writ be set aside as having been issued without authority.

10. As a matter of form no exception can be taken to that notice of motion. However, it is to be noted that the form of procedure referred to in the judgment of Clauson LJ in the Banco de Bilbao case was based upon the decisions in Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank v Comptoir d'Escompte de Mulhouse [1925] AC 112 and in particular what was said at page 130 by Viscount Cave. At that juncture Viscount Cave had referred to a decision of Wellington J in the case of Richmond v Branson & Son [1914] 1 Ch 968, where incidentally Clauson had appeared as leading counsel. What is clear from these decisions and indeed the decision in Daimler Company Limited v Continental Tyre and Rubber Company (Great Britain) Limited [1916] 2 AC 307, another decision of the House of Lords, is that the procedure is one to determine whether the particular action has been brought on the proper authority of the party in whose name it has been brought. The procedure assumes the existence of a particular party and if the court decides there was not proper authority, in effect, it refuses to consider the case because it has been brought without the proper authority of that party. Indeed, the decision of the House of Lords in the Daimler case is instructive in this respect. The majority of the House of Lords reached the conclusion that the action had been brought without authority. Underlying the case was the question as to whether the Daimler Company, which was an English company, should have been treated as an enemy company by reason of the ownership and control thereof. That matter had been considered at length in the lower courts. As a result, the speeches in the House of Lords dealt with the matter, but it was made clear that although the action should have been struck out for want of the authority, the question as to the legal status of the plaintiff was a matter which should have been gone into at trial. See, for example, Lord Atkinson at page 328 of the report.

11. Whilst on the face of the notice of motion the application was confined to the question of whether there was authority, it took a further turn by the decision of the judge below recorded in her Reasons for Decision of 25 May 2000. On that occasion the judge heard an application on the part of the defendant to add to the notice of motion in the following terms.

"TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that it will be contended at the hearing of the this Amended Notice of Motion that this action has been issued without authority since:-

(1) the Heung is not a clan, family or t'ong within the meaning of section 15 and 16 of the New Territories Ordinance (cap. 97)('NTO') or exempted from the requirement to be registered under the Companies Ordinance by virtue of section 16 of the NTO);

(2) the Heung has no legal status and is not recognised in law as a legal entity capable of enforcing rights over the land or authorising the commencement of an action on its behalf; and

(3) no application for approval has been made under section 15 of the NTO or approval granted pursuant to any such application or at all."

12. It will be noticed, at once, that, although presented under the guise that there was lack of authority, the issues sought to be tried concerned the legal status and existence of the Heung. Two points may be noted in this respect. In the first place the Heung was not the plaintiff. In the second place, the existence and legal capacity of the Heung was not merely admitted on the pleadings but was a fundamental part of both the defence and the counterclaim. The judge below, however, allowed the amendment of the notice of motion on the basis that "Clearly all the issues that arise between the parties on this aspect should be before the court for determination once and for all." The procedure on the notice of motion had thus been changed from one which was to strike out the action for want of the authority to one which involved the trial of issues which should be determined at trial, moreover, in circumstances where they had yet to be pleaded. The difficulty posed by the stance taken by the defendant is perhaps highlighted by the fact that Mr Fung SC, on behalf of the defendant, asserted and averred in this court, in answer to a question from the court, that the defendant's case was that it had a valid tenancy which had been granted to it by Mr Wong Tat To on behalf of the Heung. Yet, the motion sought to challenge the Heung's status and existence as well as the authority of the plaintiff to act on its behalf.

13. There were 7 hearing days of the notice of motion ending on 5 September 2000. There was an adjournment after the first two days. The decision was handed down on 3 September 2001. In the decision the judge defined the issues that arose as follows:

"(1) What is the meaning of 't'ong' in the context to s.15 NTO?

(2) What is 'Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung' and is it a t'ong within the meaning of s.15 NTO?

(3) Even if Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung is a t'ong within the meaning of s.15 NTO, have Tang Man Kit and Foo Tak Ching been appointed managers of the t'ong and have their appointments been approved and registered so that they are authorised to bring or continue this action?"

14. In brief, the judge came to the conclusion that the Heung was not a section 15 T'ong and in paragraph 100 she summarised her conclusions that "They (the named plaintiffs) have not purported to sue in their personal right, and insofar as Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung is an unincorporated association, the evidence as to the composition of the association and the validity of the votes is far from clear." The judge did, however, indicate at paragraph 99 that despite the fact that section 15 of the New Territories Ordinance did not backdate the effect of the approval and registration of managers, since there were no competing interests in this case, "... it would be adequate if authority is vested before the determination of proceedings by way of ratification, subject always to arguments as to the costs."

15. The appellants sought to argue on three broad grounds of appeal:

(1) That the managers had the right of management and the actual possession of the land in question. They had put the defendant into physical possession and had granted the tenancy to the defendant. Irrespective of whether the Heung was a T'ong under section 15 of the New Territories Ordinance, the managers in the exercise of their possessory title had the legal right to seek to recover the land.

(2) That the managers were in fact approved and registered by the District Officer under section 15 of the New Territories Ordinance as managers of the Heung, having the right of disposal or otherwise dealing with the land subject only to the consent of the District Officer as if they were the sole owners. The plaintiffs remained vested with these rights unless they were taken away by court order. The declaration made by the judge below that the Heung was not a T'ong within the meaning of section 15 did not accomplish this. The conferment of these rights is a matter of discretion for the District Officer.

(3) That even if the judge below had been justified in making her own findings despite the registration of the managers, she was wrong in finding that the Heung was not a T'ong within the meaning of section 15 in that the finding was not based on the evidence or any reasonable construction of the New Territories Ordinance.

The history of the land

16. In 1924, there was in existence an organisation, which was probably an unincorporated association, by the name of Chap Shing Company. It is not known at this stage who formed that company. It is known that as early as that year one Lui Lap Ka and Wong Yuet Chiu took conveyances of various parcels of land being named first as trustees for Chap Shing Company and later as trustees for Lui Lap Ka and Wong Yuet Chiu and Chap Shing Company.

17. It would appear that on 25 October 1929 the District Officer caused a notice to be exhibited at Chap Shing Company, Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung Village recording the fact that Wong Yuet Chiu and Lui Lap Ka, the managers of Chap Shing Company, had come to the District Office wishing to assign the various properties to Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung managers, Wong Yuet Chiu, Lui Lap Ka and to sell them. The notice invited anybody who considered that to be inappropriate to go to the District Office and make a report, in which event the matter would be determined. There is a memorial dated 30 December 1929, which is registered in the District Office at Tai Po and certified as correct by the District Officer, recording the transfer for the consideration of merely the payment of Crown rent for those parcels of land to Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung trustees Lui Lap Ka and Wong Yuet Chiu.

18. There were in evidence documents, referred to as share certificates by the judge below, which emanated from about this time which were headed Chap Shing Company with the words underneath British New Territories Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung. This bore the inscription that they were to certify that a particular person "has in accordance with the constitution of our Heung paid the share money. So it has issued the form of share certificate appended with a numbered house lot to be possessed by him permanently." On the reverse of the certificate was a diagram showing the layout of houses in Demarcation District 107 Pok Wai.

19. On 2 December 1932 another memorial was registered, again, certified as correct by the District Officer. On this occasion it was recorded that the property of the Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung with Wong Yuet Chiu and Lui Lap Ka as trustees was divided amongst the parties whose names were on the list attached. This division of the property appears to have been approved by the District Officer following an advertisement the translation of which reads as follows:

"New Territories Tai Po District Office Wai for the purpose of announcement of matters according to Hong KongVillageWah Yan Mo Fan HeungT'so/T'ong Manager Wong Yuet Chiu Lui Lap Gar now wish to distributesellpledge the following properties of the said HeungT'so/T'ong to peoplevillage. Should any person consider this to be inappropriate and wish to object, should within one month from the date of showing this notice come to Tai Po/Ping Shan Land Office and report to this Office for determination. For such purpose hereby notifies."

It would appear that this notice had been posted up on 14 June 1932 and that it was recorded that no objection had been raised by 21 October of that year.

20. It is not known whether anything of significance was recorded as having taken place in respect of the Heung property in the period leading up to, during and immediately following World War II. On 4 January 1960, a memorial was registered, certified as correct by the Assistant Land Officer, recording the appointment of Wong Tat To as manager of the "Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung" in place of Wong Yuet Chiu, deceased.

21. There was, apparently, a meeting of members of the "New Territories Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung Chap Shing Company" held on 17 April 1959 when it was resolved that Mr Wong Tat To and Lui Lap Ka should jointly represent the company as managers and signatories to the land deeds. This was followed by the registration of the memorial.

22. There was evidence from Mr Robinson, the Assistant Director of the Legal, Advisory and Conveyancing Office of the Lands Department who had been posted to the New Territories in 1981 and had been Senior Solicitor Tuen Mun, Yuen Long, Tsuen Wan and Assistant Principal Solicitor in New Territories North, that he had seen a memorial in the T'so/T'ong Registry of the appointment of Wong Tat To which went back to 1960: see page 166 of the transcript.

23. Lui Lap Ka died in 1965. It should be mentioned at this stage that the judge below made specific reference at paragraph 81 of the judgment to the fact that no trace had been found of any record of Lui Lap Ka's application to be registered as a manager of a T'ong from 1929 until his death in 1965. Whilst it is correct that there is no specific record of an application by Lui Lap Ka, the various memorials which were signed certifying their correctness by the District Officer and the 1932 notices, which were referred to above, are all consistent with Lui Lap Ka having been a manager. Moreover, the property list attached to the memorial relating to Wong Tat To's appointment bears Lui Lap Ka's name as being an owner of the property and, of course, upon the occasion when Wong Tat To was elected as a manager, Lui Lap Ka acted as Chairman of the meeting. Lui Lap Ka's death was registered under memorial number 223351 in September 1979.

24. As noted above, it is the defendant's claim that some time in or about 1966, Wong Tat To, in his capacity as manager and trustee of the Heung, granted a tenancy to Chong Shui Kit who operated a business of Hip Hing Timber Company on the site. It is also the defendant's case that Mr Chong and Mr Wong Tat To agreed in 1974, when the defendant's company was incorporated, that it would be substituted for the Hip Hing Timber Company and the previous 1966 Agreement and other arrangements were applied to the defendant.

25. There were two attempts, one in 1972 and one in 1980, to register managers of the Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung. The earlier date was about the time that has been described by Dr James Hayes as being the commencement of considerable change in the New Territories. Dr Hayes retired as Regional Secretary of New Territories in 1987 and had been a District Officer for many years. He refers to the District Officers' responsibilities having been greatly extended, mostly connected with the physical development of the New Territories as a result of a giant housing programme which began in 1971: see "Chinese Customary Law in New Territories of Hong Kong: The Background to the Operation of the New Territories Ordinance 1899-1987" Asian Profile Volume 19 No. 2 page 97 esp. 97 and 122. It is not altogether surprising therefore that someone who was identified as a comparatively junior officer should have written in 1972 response to a request to register a new manager that:

"This is the similar case as that ..., causing a lot of troubles on appointment of managerships dispute. In fact, in my opinion, this is a private company and not Tso/Tong, and this office should not put an hand into it and the D.O.'s consent is not necessary. They should put the whole matter into the hand of their solicitor."

26. There was some evidence in the court below directed to the question as to whether proper consideration had ever been given to the question of whether the Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung was a T'ong. There was some doubt about the matter because in 1980 the solicitor acting on behalf of the Registrar General in the New Territories Section, Tsuen Wan, wrote a very short memo in which he said that "If land is held in the name of an unincorporated body which is not a clan, family or T'ong the appointment of an additional manager need not be reported to the District Land Office and the Land Officer would not be in a position to approve such appointment." Some 20 years later, the same officer, who by then was Deputy Director/Legal for Director of Land, indicated in a memo to the District Officer, Yuen Long, after reviewing the file that

"It appears that the District Officer of the time has made the decision that the Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung was not a t'ong for reasons which I cannot now identify."

Suffice it to say that, as recorded in paragraphs 18-21 of the judgment below, there has been a settlement of proceedings which were brought against the Secretary for Justice. That settlement has resulted in the recognition as managers of the Heung under section 15 of the New Territories Ordinance. The current managers who are now registered are the present named plaintiffs.

27. In December 1981, the Government paid compensation for resumption of part of the land. The payment order was made to "Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung with Wong Pui and Wong Tat To as managers." It would appear that for the payment of what was clearly a substantial amount of compensation the Government was prepared to treat Mr Wong Pui as a manager of the Heung. There was a resolution at a meeting of the Heung in September 1984 whereby Mr Wong Pui was appointed to act as manager with Wong Tat To in place of Lui Lap Ka. That appointment was recorded by a memorial in the Land Registry which was again certified by the Land Officer shortly thereafter.

28. On 1 May 1987 Mr Wong Pui died. In January 1988, the District Lands Office issued a notice to Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung and Wong Pui and Wong Tat To as managers indicating that more land would be resumed. This no doubt prompted some action to appoint a manager to fill the vacancy left by Wong Pui's death. It appears, however, that Mr Wong Tat To purported to do this on his own by appointing Mr Wong Fook-pui and Mr Wong Kwan-fat. He notified the District Lands Office, Yuen Long of this and a memorial was entered on the register recording the fact that the two new managers had been appointed to replace Mr Wong Pui.

29. January 1989 saw further action. A meeting of the Heung was called by Mr Tang Man Kit acting as secretary. The notice of the meeting was published in local newspapers on 6 January 1989. The meeting took place on 28 January 1989 but in the intervening time Mr Wong Tat To died. As a result of the meeting, Mr Tang Man Kit and Mr Chan Kam Cheung were appointed as managers and their appointment was recorded under Memorial No. 388993 on 31 January 1989. Thereafter, on 22 March 1989, compensation was again paid, the order at this time being made in favour of Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung. There were a series of demands in the period of 1990 through to 1998 whereby the Inland Revenue Department issued demands for tax and rates to Mr Chan and Mr Tang as managers of the Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung. Indeed, in 1991, proceedings were issued on behalf of the Director of Accounting Services, the defendants were named as "Chan Kam Cheung & Tang Man Kit (Managers of the Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung)." The District Lands Officer North also communicated by letter with the Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung and Mr Tang and Mr Chan as managers. They were also named in the Demand Note in respect of fees for a short term waiver as the managers of the Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung. That Demand Note was issued on 11 June 1997. It is right to point out that during the period from 1972 to 1998 the Lands Office and later the Lands Department as well as the District Officer Yuen Long took the view in correspondence that the Heung was not a T'ong. That view appears to have begun to be modified somewhat in a letter of 29 July 1999 from the Lands Department.

30. In November 1999, a meeting was called to appoint Mr Foo Tak Ching as manager of the Heung in place of Mr Chan who had died in 1997. Following an advertisement of that by public notice issued by the District Office in July 2000, eventually, as noted above, the District Officer acknowledged that the Heung was a T'ong within the meaning of section 15 of the New Territories Ordinance and approved the appointment of Mr Tam Man Kit and Mr Foo Tat Ching as managers.

These proceedings

31. The statement of claim refers to the Notice to Quit dated 10 April 1986. This was, of course, whilst Mr Wong Tat To was still alive. The writ was issued on 22 November 1990 in the name of Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung with Chan Kam Cheung and Tang Man Kit as managers. That would, of course, correspond to the appointment which was made in 1989. The latest amendment names Mr Tang Man Kit and Mr Foo Tak Ching suing as managers of Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung.

The judge's findings

32. The judge came to the conclusion that the Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung was merely the name or style in which the members of Chap Shing Company (集成公司), an unincorporated association whose members were motivated for the purposes of gain, sought to hold lands and that the Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung is not a T'ong within the meaning of section 15 of the New Territories Ordinance. The judge considered that business T'ongs were in the nature of he-huo (合伙). In essence that they were "narrow" profit making organisations: see paragraphs 45 and 54. She considered that in respect of a he-huo or partnership the T'ong name would be no more than the trade name or style of the individuals in partnership: see paragraph 36 of the judgment.

33. The process of reasoning by which the judge arrived at the conclusion that the plaintiffs were non-suited may be summarised on the basis that she considered that the Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung was not a T'ong within the meaning of section 15 of the New Territories Ordinance and that in any event, even if it had been a T'ong, the present plaintiffs were not the registered managers of the T'ong at the time when action was commenced and therefore could not continue these proceedings.

34. In respect of the first matter the judge posed the question as to whether, when the legislature passed the New Territories Land Ordinance in 1905, it had intended that a business T'ong should be within section 13. Section 15 of the New Territories Ordinance has replaced this section. That section, in the form it was in 1905 read as follows:

"13. Whenever any land is held from the Crown under Lease or other grant, agreement or licence in the name of a clan, family or t'ong, such clan, family or t'ong shall appoint a Manager or Managers to represent it, and may from time to time appoint a new Manager. Every such appointment and change shall be reported at the appropriate office, and the Land Officer on receiving such proof as he may require of such appointment, shall, if he approves thereof, register the name of the said Manager or Managers; the said Manager or Managers thereupon shall after giving such notices as may be prescribed have full power to dispose of or in anyway deal with the said land as if he or they were sole owner thereof, subject to the consent of the Land Officer, and shall be personally liable for the payment of all rents and charges and for the observance of all covenants and conditions in respect of the said land. Every instrument relating to land held by a clan, family or t'ong which is executed or signed by the registered Manager or Managers thereof in the presence of the Land Officer and is attested by him, shall be as effectual for all purposes as if it had been executed or signed by all the members of the said clan, family or t'ong. The Land Officer may on good cause shewn cancel the appointment of any Manager and select and register a new Manager in his place. If the members of any clan, family or t'ong holding land shall not within three months after the coming into operation of this Ordinance, or after the acquisition of the land if acquired after the coming into operation of this Ordinance, make and prove the appointment of such Manager or Managers as aforesaid, or within three months after any change of Manager prove the same as aforesaid, it shall be lawful for the Crown to re-enter upon the land held by such clan, family or t'ong which shall thereupon become forfeited to the Crown. Such re-entry shall be effected by the registration of a memorandum thereof in the appropriate office."

35. Section 15 as it reads today is not materially different. In answering the question as to whether a business T'ong might be a T'ong within the meaning of the section of the Ordinance, the judge considered the nature of a business T'ong. She came to the conclusion that it was a form of business association or he-huo, a business partnership. Whilst not entirely discounting the existence of business T'ongs, it is clear from the manner in which the judge dealt with that, that she was sceptical as to whether a T'ong could engage in business. The judge then considered a number of matters. In particular reference has made to the report made by the then Colonial Secretary, Stewart Lockhart dated 7 February 1900. That was a report in respect of the conditions prevailing in the New Territories at the time when the New Territories came under the jurisdiction of Hong Kong. The report was forwarded to the Secretary of State. The report was wide-ranging and covered all aspects relevant to the administration of the New Territories. Appendix III of that report was a memorandum on land. The judge's conclusion was that a business T'ong did not come within what was referred to in the memorandum in Appendix III. The judge considered that for a T'ong to be registrable within section 15 it should have sufficiently uncontroversial objects so that those responsible for the administration of land could take a role as envisaged the New Territories Ordinance. The judge considered that the legislature would not have intended that the Land Officer should become involved in decisions such as the selection of managers for a business venture.

36. Whilst referring to the paucity of contemporaneous documents, the judge noted that no constitution had been found in respect of the Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung and that no list of members had been found in respect of it although they should be identifiable persons, and that there was no reference in the T'ong or T'so registry book to the Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung. As has already been pointed out, the judge referred to the fact that there was no evidence of the appointment of managers and that there was in particular no evidence that Lui Lap Ka had ever been registered as a manager.

37. The share certificates, which were issued in respect of the Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung, also attracted adverse comment. The judge considered that they were issued by the Chap Shing Company and that therefore this militated against the Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung being a T'ong. The fact that they carried an individual right to a particular house lot meant that it was not a clan or organisation but an individual investment in unequal shares.

38. Before considering the section of the Ordinance, it should be observed that in considering the decision of Cheung J in Tang Yau Yi Tong and another v Tang Mou Shau Tso and others [1995] 2 HKC 245, sight might have been lost of the fact that Cheung J had before him a memorandum of Dr Hayes. That memorandum was apparently written in about 1962. However, it was circulated again in 1984 within relevant Government circles. As already indicated, Dr Hayes retired from government service in a senior position in 1987. He had commenced his service in Hong Kong Government in 1957. During the course of his work in the New Territories he had been District Officer for a considerable time. He had therefore acquired considerable knowledge as to the customs and law in the New Territories over a very long period. Not only has he been awarded a doctorate at the University of London but also an honorary doctorate from Hong Kong University in recognition of his services to culture in Hong Kong. The memorandum to which Cheung J referred makes quite clear that in Dr Hayes' experience, business T'ongs existed.

39. Reference might also be made to the article entitled "Chinese Customary Law - an Examination of Tsos and Family Tongs" by Belinda Wong Sheung-yu in (1990) 20 HKLJ 13 at 14 where reference is made to business T'ongs. Furthermore, Professor Anthony Dicks SC provided written evidence in the present case. Although his evidence was that he had never heard of a T'ong which had a name Heung, his evidence did not go so far as to say that the Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung could not have been a T'ong. Indeed in referring to judicial references to T'ongs, he made a specific reference to the case of Reuter, Brockelmann & Co. v Tung Lok Tong, otherwise Leung Lai Nam and others [1909] 4 HKLR 37 at 50-51. In that passage, Piggott CJ referred to the use of T'ong names. It is quite clear from that passage that T'ong names were used by persons carrying on business. In that case the partners of a business had subscribed to the partnership in their T'ong names. Far from indicating therefore that a T'ong could not carry on business, this fortifies the statement made by Dr Hayes in the memorandum that

"The tong ... is a business association as often as not, and can, in fact, be a registered company."

A little later on in the paper it is stated:

"However, old New Territories' organisations, both tso and tong, which have prospered and become enlarged since 1910 to the extent that they have over twenty members since that date and so put themselves outside the scope of the exemption, rarely registered themselves under the Companies' Ordinance, Cap. 32 and Government seems never to have enquired too closely into the matter. New organisations of the traditional type, large or small, do not seem to register either under the Companies' Ordinance, unless it suits their convenience."

The paper then went on to consider the welfare and family aspects of T'ongs and at the foot of the second page it is stated:

"But whatever its welfare or family functions, whatever its ends and policies, the tong is mainly a business venture concerned with profit and loss on which the continuance of its activities depend. Some of these tong are very large and are extensive landowners, e.g. the WONG Wai Tsak Tong of Cheung Chau at the present day and the LI Kau Yuen Tong of Sha Wan, Kwong Chau, before the lease, which was the taxlord for the whole of Lantau."

40. It is clear, therefore, that not only did very early judgments proceed upon the basis that business activities in relation to a T'ong were to be expected, but those involved in the New Territories administration clearly saw this happening in practice and the academic writers also appreciated this. This approach seems to me to be entirely in keeping with what is stated in the Lockhart Report. There was one subsection of Appendix III which dealt with the varieties of tenure of land. Again, one of the other subsections of that was headed "Land held by Associations" that read:

"China is a land of associations which are as numerous and the objects of which are as varied as the needs of man. Their formation is simple and easy. Certain villages, whatever their object may be, meet in a temple, ancestral hall or private house to deliberate over some scheme. If it is approved, a fund is raised to which the members contribute equally, their contributions being devoted to the purchase of a piece of land, landed property in China being considered the safest investment. The rent derived from this land may be used for the burial of a member of the association when he dies, or may be let out on interest, or may be used to assist members to emigrate to California and Australia, or for any other enterprise or good object that may be desired."

41. For some reason the judge below considered that the Lockhart Report referred only to "good objects" and made no mention of "business or commerce": see paragraph 43 of the judgment. That is not my reading of what the Lockhart Report was saying. In the first place, when referring to associations it was clearly indicating that there was a wide variety of associations. It referred to these associations deliberating over "some scheme". In this respect there is no reason to confine that to "good objects" which I understand to be something akin to, perhaps, charitable objects. Furthermore, the report refers to investments and more particularly the making of money which can be "used to assist members to emigrate to California and Australia or for any other enterprise or good object." I can see no reason why it should be considered that generating profits which could be used to pay for emigration abroad should be treated any differently from any other commercial enterprise. In my view also, the judge took too restrictive a view of the reference to members contributing equally. In the context of the Lockhart Report as a whole, to interpret this phrase as confining recognised associations only to those where each member contributes equally is, in my view, to take too restrictive a view of what the Lockhart Report was saying. In any event, I see no reason why "equal contributions" would not be satisfied where the contributions were equal but individuals were empowered to make more than one equal contribution. Hence, even if the 1905 legislation should be interpreted as if the term "T'ong" only included those organisations which fell within that section of the Lockhart Report, I see no reason why that is not satisfied.

42. Importantly, however, there are a number of matters in relation to the treatment of the Heung which are, in my view, indicative of the fact that the Heung was treated initially and, indeed, probably up until about 1972 as a T'ong. Indeed, it appears that recognition of this was partially the cause of the eventual recognition in 2000 of the Heung as a T'ong. As recognised in the judgment below, it was necessary that there should be identifiable members of the T'ong. There were two indications that the members of the Heung were identifiable. In the first place, as referred to in paragraph 19 above, there was a list attached to the memorial, recording the names of the persons to whom the property was transferred in 1932. In the second place, Mr Robinson said that as far back as 1984 he had seen lists of members and that they were held in the T'so/T'ong Registry.

43. Although it is true that no written constitution has been found relating to the Heung, there is no indication that there was any written constitution of Chap Shing Company either. Not only does the defendant accept in its pleadings that the Heung is a body on whose behalf land can be held and rented, but ever since 1929, trustees of the Heung had been recognised and registered as the owners of the property. The judge stated at paragraph 56 of her judgment:

"Whilst there was no business registration of 'Chap Shing Company' or of 'Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung', nor was either name registered in any t'ong/tso registry book (although it would be fair to say that the evidence of the keeping of such books did not show that such books were kept in all parts of the New Territories at all times)."

The judge does not appear to have considered Mr Robinson's evidence at page 166F of the transcript where he said:

"I do recall seeing the Memorial in the tso - I think it was the Tso/T'ong Registry - there was a memorial of the appointment of Wong Tat To, which went back to 1960."

44. In paragraphs 75 and 76, the judge considered the effect of the advertisement which is set out in paragraph 19 above. The judge said:

"However, the deletion of the generic words 't'ong/tso' in the second place where they appear on the notice (as contrasted to part of the proper name, in the first place where they appear) might show that at least the staff of the Land Office had insufficient materials to identify Wah Yan Mo Fan Heung as a s.15 t'ong with any degree of certainty."

That, in my view, is reading too much into the deletion of those characters. The form which was used was a form which could clearly either be used for a T'so or T'ong. What, perhaps, should be considered is rather that the staff of the Land Office considered it appropriate to use a form which would only be used in respect of a T'so or a T'ong in respect of a Heung. That, perhaps, is indicative that the Heung was considered to be at the least of the same generic type.

45. Equally importantly, the reference in paragraph 76 of the judgment that there was no evidence that notices of that type were only posted for a section 15 T'ong is somewhat curious. The question which would arise immediately is not that there was an absence of evidence that the form was never used for other organisations other than a T'so or a T'ong but rather on what basis it could be used for any other organisation than a T'so or T'ong.

46. In those circumstances, the indicia of a T'ong are, namely, the list of members, the registration at least in 1960 of particulars relating to the appointment of Mr Wong Tat To recorded in the T'so/T'ong Registry, the clear existence from at least 1929 of trustees holding the land and the existence of advertisements by the Land Office in relation to transfers of the land of the type used for T'sos and T'ongs.

47. One factor which was referred to as causing a potential difficulty was that there was no indication that Lui Lap Ka had ever been registered as a manager of the T'ong. Save to say that the land registrations clearly referred to him being a trustee and those events had clearly happened in very early times, it is unlikely that in later years he would have even considered it necessary to take the trouble to make a registration if, which is by no means certain, he had not been registered as a manager in the earlier years.

48. In conclusion therefore I consider that the Heung was always a T'ong within the meaning of the New Territories Ordinance and still remains a T'ong to this day.

49. That, however, is not conclusive of the matter because the judge considered that under section 15 of the New Territories Ordinance, which is the replacement of section 13, the commencement of and continuation of these proceedings is a dealing with land which requires the Land Officer's consent. On a simple construction of the section I find it difficult to envisage that the taking of proceedings based upon the non-payment of rent should be regarded as a dealing with land. The recovery of possession from a recalcitrant lessee who has failed to pay rent is a matter of management and not a dealing with land. Even if it were considered a matter of dealing with land it would be the equivalent of acquisition of land and not disposition of it. Section 15 does not require the Land Officer's consent to the acquisition of land. Section 15 only applies where land is held by a T'so or T'ong.

50. In any event, the conclusion that the bringing of proceedings in respect of the non-payment of rent was a dealing in land is based upon the proposition that the renting of land was a matter which required the consent of the Land Officer. That is, again, a proposition with which I do not agree. In my view, section 13 of the New Territories Ordinance, which is now section 15 was there to ensure that T'so land and family T'ong land were inalienable, indivisible and perpetual: see the judgment of Deputy High Court Judge Robert Tang QC in Kan Fat-Tat also known as Kan Fat v Kan Yin-Tat also known as Kan Tat [1987] HKLR 516 at 533 and the evidence of Dr Hugh Baker referred to at that passage.

51. The importance of non-alienation of land can be seen in the Lockhart Report. At the end of the paragraph under the heading Ancestral Land it is stated:

"Clan land cannot be alienated without the consent of the representatives and elders of the whole clan."

Under the heading Land Sales there is a statement:

"If any owner wishes to sell his land, he is supposed to offer such land in the first instance to his nearest relatives, and is not at liberty to sell to any one outside of his clan, unless the nearest relatives are unwilling to purchase."

52. This statement was taken up by Dr Chi-Cheung Choi of the Royal Asiatic Society and lecturer at the Division of Humanities, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, in the paper entitled "Family and Land Transfer Practice in Guangdong" which he gave to the Panel on Customary Law at the International Symposium on Asian Studies in 1988. He said (at page 489) that:

"Buying and selling property in traditional China was not a free transaction. It is always mentioned in the Chinese property deeds that relatives of the owner had to be asked before the transferred to others. In many of these deeds, some relatives of the property owner are specified as not having any right to intervene in the transaction."

53. The paper then went on to analyse a large number of collected land documents dating from 1812 to 1938. Part of the purpose of the paper was to analyse which parties would not have the right to be consulted. However, what is significant is that in most of the 71 deeds that related to transfer of properties, the reasons for selling the property and the persons with whom the transaction was discussed e.g. father and son and the persons asked e.g. extremely close relatives and the relatives or group who would have the right to intervene are mentioned. Indeed Appendix VIc of the Lockhart Report sets out a sample deed relating to the sale of a stone quarry. One of the matters mentioned in the deed was the fact that relatives had been asked first whether they wished to buy the quarry, before a middleman was instructed to find a buyer.

54. Dr Hayes gave a paper at the same symposium where he referred to the powers of managers under Section 15 of the New Territories Ordinance. He said at page 458:

"This was, on the face of it, very different from their limited powers under the customary law, which emphasized consultation and agreement before any sale or mortgage of trust properties. However the section also required the giving of notices and the consent of the land officer, so that, in practice, they continued to be as restricted in their actions as before, for their members usually insisted on consultation, and the district officers scrutinized every application for alienation" (emphasis added)

55. As referred to by Stephen Selby in his article entitled "Everything You Wanted to Know About Chinese Customary Law (But Were Afraid to Ask)" (1991) 21 HKLJ 45, in particular at pages 46 and 56, the New Territories Land Ordinance 1905 provided a legal framework whereby land held under ownership of the types which had been previously customary could be accommodated by Hong Kong Laws and the English Common Law. The object of the New Territories Land Ordinance was to facilitate the conveyancing of land: see page 56. In contrast, it seems to me that the renting of land is part of management. By definition, all T'ong and T'so land which was not occupied by, for example, an ancestral hall would almost certainly have to be rented, whether it be to members of the T'so or T'ong or outsiders. Given the amount of land which is held by T'sos and T'ongs and, indeed, to this day still so held, if the renting of T'so or T'ong land were considered to require the consent of the District Officer it would seem that such a provision has been honoured by its universal breach. In this respect, I would add that I have had the advantage of seeing the relevant part of the draft judgment of Le Pichon JA in the case of Man Ping Nam, the manager of the Man Sham Chung Wui v Man Mei Kwai (by original action) Man Mei Kwai v Man Ping Nam as manager of Man Sham Chung Wui and others, CACV 193/2002 and I respectfully agree with what has been said there on this topic.

56. If, indeed, it were necessary to obtain the Land Officer's consent to the commencement of these proceedings on the basis that consent was required for any letting of the land, then the curious situation would arise whereby a manager who had let land without consent could not take steps to rectify his error without obtaining the consent of the Land Officer. Put in another way, if the point be right, the original letting was without consent and is therefore liable to be set aside.

57. Finally the point was made that even if the present plaintiffs should be regarded as now being the managers of a T'ong they cannot adopt these proceedings because they were not managers at the time of the commencement of the proceedings. The short answer to the point appears to me to be that a court will endeavour to permit the joinder of parties if that is necessary to constitute what would otherwise be a valid action. In these circumstances even if the action were commenced without authority, if persons who are now managers of the T'ong are joined, I see no reason why the action should not be continued in their name. The action was commenced and carried on by persons who were the managers of the T'ong albeit called a Heung. If necessary, further authority to pursue the action could be obtained although that is only a technicality.

58. In relation to Mr Neoh SC's first point that the managers of the T'ong had granted a tenancy and it was therefore open to them to terminate that tenancy, it seems to me that that point now becomes academic in view of my conclusion in respect of the T'ong. Nevertheless, I see no reason why if a tenancy were granted by a person who was registered as a trustee, and who purported to be manager of an entity which a defendant concedes exists, he cannot terminate that tenancy and proceedings cannot be brought by those who succeed to his place as trustee and manager.

59. In my view, this appeal should be allowed and the matter remitted to the Court of First Instance for trial. There should be an order nisi of costs in favour of the plaintiff.

Hon Le Pichon JA:

60. I agree.

(Anthony Rogers)(Doreen Le Pichon)
Vice-PresidentJustice of Appeal

Representation:

Mr Anthony Neoh SC and Mr Ernest Koo, instructed by Messrs Christine M Koo & Ip, for the Plaintiff/Appellant

Mr Daniel R Fung SC and Mr Johnny S L Mok, instructed by Messrs Wai & Co., for the Defendant/Respondent

Remarks:
Application for Appeal by Defendant to Court of Final Appeal. Granted. Please refer to the appeal judgment of FACV000011/2003.