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Civil Action2002

UDL HOLDINGS LTD AND ANOTHER v. LEUNG YUET KEUNG AND ANOTHER

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64018-EN-2009-01-19

UDL HOLDINGS LTD AND ANOTHER v. LEUNG YUET KEUNG AND ANOTHER

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HCA 4409/2002

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 4409 OF 2002

---------------------

BETWEEN

 UDL HOLDINGS LIMITED1st Plaintiff
 WELL RAISE INVESTMENT LIMITED2nd Plaintiff
 and 
 LEUNG YUET KEUNG1st Defendant
 WONG SUM YUEN2nd Defendant

----------------------

Before: Hon Stone J in Chambers

Date of Written Submissions:-

By plaintiff/applicant: 2 December 2008; 6 January 2009

By defendant/respondent: 16 December 2008; 9 January 2009

Date of Handing Down Decision: 19 January 2009

 

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DECISION  UPON  APPLICATIONS
TO  VARY  COSTS'  ORDERS  NISI

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The applications

1.  On 22 October 2008 this court handed down Judgment in this action, wherein the plaintiffs had sued the defendants for the sums of US$1.2 million and US$520,778.51.

2.  In the event, for the reasons adumbrated in the Judgment the plaintiffs’ action was dismissed, and the court made a costs’ order nisi that the costs of the action be to the defendants, such costs to be taxed if not agreed; it further was ordered that in so far as either side wished to make application to vary this order, the application so to do was to be made within 21 days of the date of the Judgment.

3.  As matters have transpired, there are in fact cross-applications as to this costs’ order nisi before the court, which directed that these issues be canvassed, and thereafter be decided, on paper.

4.  By its written submission dated 2 December 2008, the plaintiffs filed their submissions in support of a proposed variation, and on 16 December 2008 the defendant filed not only the response to the plaintiffs’ submission, but also purported to make its own belated application for variation.

5.  Thereafter, each party has responded to the others’ allegations, resulting in Reply submissions dated 6 and 9 January 2009 respectively, which further submissions were followed by a slew of acrimonious solicitor’s letters complaining about the conduct of the other side, correspondence which has not figured large in the exercise of my judicial discretion upon the applications for variation now before me.

Applicable legal principle

6.  Variation of costs’ orders nisi recently has been the subject of a judgment of this court in Akai Holdings Ltd (In Liquidation) v Thanakharn Kasikorn Thai Chamkat (Mahachon) [2008] 6 HKC 82, wherein, in the context of an application by the unsuccessful liquidator for a variation to the costs’ order nisi, the principles and approach adopted by the Commercial Court were rehearsed in some detail.

7.  In that Judgment, this court noted that Hong Kong courts had no predisposition requiring them to be “more ready” to make separate costs’ orders reflective of the outcome of different issues in the litigation, and that in the Commercial Court in particular the practice was not ordinarily to engage in any ‘filleting’ of cases in costs’ terms according to the success or failure of disparate issues – albeit, in that specific case, this court was minded, on those particular facts, to take the highly unusual step of making a positive costs’ order in favour of Akai, the unsuccessful plaintiff, upon an issue which in the circumstances should not have been taken at all and which, when taken, was taken deficiently.

8.  In that Judgment this court also made it clear (at paragraph 27) that it did not share the view of Lord Woolf in AEI Rediffusion Music Ltd [1999] 1 WLR 1507 wherein his Lordship had been discussing the merit of the ‘follow the event’ principle, and wherein he had suggested that there had been a move away from the Elgindata approach and that the change of philosophy embodied by the then new English Civil Procedure Rules had begun to permeate judicial practice and to require courts to be “more ready” to make separate orders as to costs reflecting the outcome of different issues: “the new Rules are reflecting a practice which has already started…”

9.  I therefore found it curious that although the written submissions of the plaintiffs’ counsel on this application had rehearsed that part of the judgment in Akai (op cit) wherein this court had referred to its disinclination so to ‘fillet’ cases in terms of disparate issues so as potentially to attract disparate costs’ orders, by the same token the part of that same Akai judgment which had taken respectful issue with the views of Lord Woolf was ignored. 

10.  In this context it is fair to mention, however, that the views of Yuen JA in Wang Din Shin v Nina Kung CACV 460 of 2002 & 67 of 2003, which had favourably quoted Lord Woolf’s views, were prayed in aid on behalf of the plaintiffs, but in my view her Lordship’s broad discursive statement, which was concerned with particular costs’ orders in that case (the result of which was overturned in the Court of Final Appeal), is not binding, and I repeat my disinclination as rehearsed in Akai (op cit.) to follow the view of Lord Woolf in AEI Rediffusion (op cit.), a view which was stated in a different context and which, equally, is not binding on this court.

11.  Against this background, therefore, I turn to the respective applications to vary the costs’ order nisi.

The plaintiffs’ application

12.  For the reasons set out in its principal written submission, the plaintiffs seeks a variation in the existing order nisi, and submit that in the particular circumstances of this case that the costs of this action should be to the defendants, save that the plaintiffs themselves should have a positive costs’ order against the defendants in terms of two specific issues which were raised by the defence in this action, but which were abandoned at trial; these were the issues of the plaintiffs’ locus standi, and whether the defendants were de facto or de jure directors of the plaintiff companies.

13.  As to the locus standi issue, it is argued that this was a discrete, self-standing point introduced within paragraph 3 of the Defence, and thereafter expanded substantially by way of amendment to the Defence, which amendment was filed on 4 October 2004 to give effect to the defendant’s denial that the 2nd plaintiff was an indirect subsidiary of the 1st plaintiff; in this regard, the plaintiffs were put to strict proof that the present action had been brought with the knowledge and consent of the Scheme Administrator then in place, and had this plea succeeded, it necessarily would have followed that the defendants would have established that the 2nd plaintiff, being the owner of the vessel “KAI HONG” would have had no locus to bring this action, and thus there would have been no necessity to deal with the other issues in this case.

14.  It is said that the ‘locus point’ was “hotly disputed” between the parties, leading to substantial time and costs being incurred on this specific issue during discovery as well as in the preparation of witness statements.

15.  However, notwithstanding this backdrop, on the opening day of the trial leading counsel for the defendants, Mr Sussex SC, effectively had abandoned the point, and thus the point turned out, in the end, to be of no practical significance.

16.  It is also said on behalf of the plaintiffs that in any event the issue unreasonably was advanced because as directors of the 1st plaintiff (and the 2nd plaintiff as director of the 1st defendant) that the plaintiffs knew or ought to have known that the 2nd plaintiff was an indirect subsidiary of the 1st defendant.

17.  As to the second issue upon which the plaintiffs complain that costs were unreasonably and unnecessarily thrown away, namely that of the new allegations by the defendants, made by amendment just over two months prior to the trial, that they neither had been de facto or de jure directors of the 1st or 2nd plaintiffs at the material time, and thus belatedly had withdrawn longstanding pleaded admissions in this regard going back to 2002 to the effect that both the defendants had been directors of the 1st plaintiff and that the 1st defendant was a director of the 2nd plaintiff, once again it is asserted that there had been “complete defeat” on this issue by reason of the like fact that on the first day of trial this point again had been conceded by leading counsel; as Mr Sussex SC had put the position to the court, he was “prepared to accept that both the first and second defendants were de jure directors of P1”, and that although he had not seen a resolution appointing the first defendant as director of P2, “I am prepared to accept that he was a de facto director…”

18.  In these circumstances, says the plaintiffs’ counsel, Ms Catrina Lam (who had appeared, together with Mr Daniel Fung SC, on behalf of the plaintiffs at trial), substantial time and costs had been thrown away by the course events had taken, more particularly in the first instance wherein long-standing admissions had been withdrawn, only for the locus point to be peremptorily dropped, and thus the plaintiffs should have a positive costs’ order against the defendants in relation to both such issues.

19.  This application for variation in these terms is strongly resisted by the defendants.

20.  For her part Ms Frances Lok, counsel for the defendants (as, together with Mr Charles Sussex SC, she had been at trial), submits that the plaintiffs’ application should be dismissed because first, it has not been established that the two issues were unnecessarily or improperly raised by the defendants, and hence that this is the type of ‘exceptional case’ wherein the general rule as to costs following the event should not be followed, and second, that the two issues in question did not lead to any substantial wastage of time and costs either during the trial or during the interlocutory process.

21.  In particular, she points out that security for costs was ordered against the plaintiffs on 16 July 2003 on the basis that the 1st plaintiff was a nominal plaintiff suing for the benefit of Scheme creditors, but the 1st plaintiff never had produced the written consent of the Scheme Administrator to the commencement of the action by the 1st plaintiff; she says, also, that after the security for costs order the 2nd plaintiff had applied to discontinue its claim against the defendants by summons dated 9th December 2003, an application for discontinuance which was withdrawn only on 24th August 2004.

22.  It is further submitted that the 2nd plaintiff was not mentioned as an indirect subsidiary of the 1st plaintiff in the Scheme documents, that there had appeared to have been a transfer of the shares in the 2nd plaintiff to a third party for distribution to the Scheme creditors, and that the 2nd plaintiff had been dissolved on 2 December 2005, only to have been restored on 8th July 2008 – an order of which the defendants had been wholly unaware until the last Supplemental List of Documents of the plaintiffs dated 1 August 2008 – so that if indeed there had been nothing in the locus point, such application for restoration would have been otiose.

23.  Accordingly, it is argued that in these circumstances the defendants were entitled to take the point, and that it has been shown to be a respectable argument, albeit in the event this was a point not actively pursued at trial.

24.  As to the question of the status of the defendants as directors of the plaintiffs, once again it is said that the plaintiffs had not produced valid evidence of the appointment of the defendants to the Board of the 1st plaintiff, and in fact even had objected to the production of Minutes of the Board of the 1st plaintiff for the period from 3 February 1997 to 29 January 1999, whilst the Minutes of the AGM of the 1st plaintiff held on 21 December 1999 had not been discovered until the plaintiffs’ 3rd Supplemental List of Documents dated 1 August 2008; had these been discovered earlier, it is submitted, all the argument relating to the status of the defendants qua directors of the 1st plaintiff could have been saved, whilst even to date, no proof had been provided as to the proper appointment of the 1st defendant as director of the 2nd plaintiff.

25.  Once again, therefore, the defendants argue that it could not be said that this matter was wholly inconsequential and should not have been taken, and that this had been a respectable argument for the defendants to raise, notwithstanding that in the exercise of his unfettered discretion as to how to run the case at trial Senior Counsel had decided not to positively take the point.

26.  Accordingly, it is submitted that these were matters which easily and conveniently could have been put to bed at an early stage by the plaintiffs, and in any event it was dubious as to what precisely had been the costs generated at the interlocutory stage by the two issues being allowed to remain on the pleadings, and that the present application would lead to an wholly “disproportionate” wastage of time and costs.

Decision on plaintiffs’ application

27.  The point requires to be made that the specific interlocutory matters the subject of the detailed written submissions by each side on the plaintiffs’ application to vary the order nisi did not come to the attention or scrutiny of the court during the trial because, in the event, these particular points were not pursued by Senior Counsel for the defendants.

28.  However, the fact that they were not pursued does not in itself connote illegitimacy or prima facie unreasonableness of the points having been taken on the defendants’ pleadings, not least since the conclusion of this court was that this was an unmeritorious case, and in which the Judgment, which speaks for itself, recited that in my view (at paragraph 108) that “this action was ambitious, artificial and without obvious merit.”

29.  Against this backdrop, therefore, and in light of the procedural background to this case – including the ‘Procedural Chronology’ which helpfully has been supplied with the Defendants’ submissions – it is eminently clear that this matter has a long and textured interlocutory history, dating back to 28 April 2000, when the 1st plaintiff’s Scheme of Arrangement was sanctioned by the court.

30.  In these circumstances, and having reflected at some length on the matters respectively raised – of which only the ‘locus’ point seemed to me to hold any promise for the plaintiffs – it strikes me that argument and counter-argument appear equally poised, and accordingly I have decided not to accede to the plaintiffs’ application for a variation of the existing costs’ order nisi.

31.  As this court remarked at trial, and as is evident on the face of the Judgment delivered, the plaintiffs’ case was far from attractive, there remained a real doubt about whether the principal witness had come to court with ‘clean hands’ and that it was tolerably evident that there was “a clear agenda” (vide paragraph 106) on the part of Mr YT Leung in prosecuting this action to trial and a general “air of unreality” (vide paragraph 96) about the manner in which this case had been framed.

32.  Accordingly I am unsympathetic to any argument which now would seek to ‘fillet’ the existing costs’ order in a manner in which, I would guess, would be likely to cause significant difficulty at taxation and would, in my judgment, in any event not be fair having regard to the extended procedural history of the case, a history of which, as I have said, I have only at this stage briefly become acquainted.

33.  It follows, therefore, that I have concluded that the plaintiffs’ application to vary the costs’ order nisi itself is to be dismissed with costs, such costs to be taxed if not agreed.

34.  I so order.

The defendants’ application

35.  By its own application, the defendants’ themselves seek to vary the costs’ order nisi, and request that this order be varied to substitute therefor that the costs of this action should be to the defendants “on an indemnity, alternatively common fund basis, to be taxed if not agreed.”

36.  This application is patently an ‘after-thought’ which obviously has been precipitated by the plaintiffs’ application, paragraph 4 of the defendants’ submissions in opposition to those of the plaintiffs commencing thus: “As the issue of costs is now re-opened and considered by the court afresh, in light of the overall conduct of the parties in this action, the defendants further submit that the costs of the action…should be on an indemnity, alternatively common fund basis…”

37.  It seems to me that in this context two distinct issues arise for consideration:

first, are the defendants now entitled to belatedly raise the issue of the scale of costs at this late stage, not having done so by application within the 21 days as specified within the final paragraph (paragraph 110) of the Judgment?; and

second, and if so, what are the merits of this application?

38.  On that which for convenience of reference I will term the ‘time issue’, the plaintiffs’ Reply Submissions strongly oppose what is denigrated as this “belated attempt to ‘slip in’ a cross-application out of time and through the ‘back door’”, and note that this was not an application foreshadowed in any of the correspondence between the parties.

39.  In this connection, reference is made to the decision in PCCW-HKT Telephone Ltd v Telecommunications Authority, CACV 274 of 2003, judgment dated 7 September 2004, wherein Ma CJHC (with whom Rogers VP and Le Pichon JA agreed) had emphasized that an application to vary a costs’ order nisi should formally be made by summons rather than by informal application (a letter in that case), and that such informal application was “most unsatisfactory” and “incorrect”; the reason for this, as the learned Chief Judge explained, was to apprise the other side and the court as to the precise nature and extent of the variation order as is being requested, “otherwise there is a danger that it becomes unclear just what is being sought from the court, thereby allowing the parties to ask for relief in haphazard manner”.  In principle, I respectfully agree with this sentiment.

40.  In the instant case, the point forcefully is made by the plaintiffs that the defendants have made no attempt whatever, whether by summons or letter, to vary the order nisi, nor for that matter had there been any explanation for the “substantial delay” in making the cross-application for variation.  Accordingly, the plaintiffs say that absent any such explanation, this “haphazard cross-application” ought not to be entertained, and that the costs should be borne by the defendants in any event.

Decision on defendants’ application

41.  In my view the ‘time point’ is a serious one, and one as to which I am unaware of any direct authority.

42.  Necessarily implicit within the defendants’ approach is that in these circumstances in which variation of the existing order nisi is sought to be raised by the plaintiffs, the defendants now are entitled as of right to mount this cross-application for variation absent any letter or summons announcing their intention in this regard.  Is this correct?

43.  Whilst a formal summons clearly is to be preferred, nevertheless given that this is the Commercial Court – wherein procedural formalism is not always insisted upon provided that procedural fairness otherwise can be achieved – I should not have rejected the application by reason of the mere absence of a summons if and in so far as, within the 21 day period laid down in the judgment for applications to vary the order nisi, the defendants’ application had been made in time by letter announcing both to the court and to the opposing party the intention to seek to vary, and the consequential order to be sought; the precise grounds of the application thereafter naturally would appear in the skeleton argument of the party seeking the variation in the terms sought.

44.  However, the present situation is very different.

45.  As I understand the situation, notwithstanding the date of the judgment containing the order nisi, that is, 22 October 2008, no move whatever was made by the successful defendants to vary this order nisi until the plaintiffs themselves sought a variation.

46.  Whilst the matter has not been expressed thus, the defendants’ underlying assumption is that by means of the plaintiffs’ application so to vary, the plaintiffs thereby have rendered the costs’ issue at large, with the result that there is no necessity to ask for an extension of the 21 day period as prescribed for a variation application, nor indeed to proffer any explanation for the delay, and that the defendants thereby are entitled to put forward their own plea for a variation.

47.  With respect, I consider that this approach is neither permissible nor appropriate.

48.  It seems to me that in principle an application to vary a costs’ order nisi is ‘party-specific’, by which I mean that, absent any cross-application within the prescribed period by the opposing party in whatever terms may be considered appropriate, the approach of the respondent to any variation application as properly constituted is confined to resisting the application and to upholding the order nisi as originally made, and I fail to see why the fact of a variation application by one party in effect gives the opposing party carte blanche to make its own distinct and substantively different variation application out of time.

49.  Of course, it remains open to the party which is out of time to seek leave to extend time to make such variation application, but no effort has been made to do this in this case, and for my part I wish to give the lie to the apparent idea that a cross-application simply can be ‘tacked on’, as of right, to a properly-constituted application.  In my judgment it cannot.  And in the current instance the court has been given no material upon which to exercise any discretion to extend time, even had it been asked to do so, which it has not.

50.  Thus I am unable to agree with the contended effect of the defendants’ reliance, as outlined in its ‘Addendum to Defendants’ Submissions’, upon the terms of Order 42, rule 5B(6), which provides that “Where a written decision is given pursuant to this rule the Court may make therein an order nisi as to costs and, unless an application has been made to vary that order, that order shall become absolute 14 days after the decision is pronounced”, and the corresponding assertion, following upon citation of that Order, that “the order nisi has not become absolute due to the plaintiffs’ application to vary and therefore can be considered by the court afresh”.

51.  The short point, it seems to me, is that the order nisi indeed can be reconsidered by the court, upon appropriate application within time, in terms of the variation proposed, but only in terms of that proposed variation, and that if and in so far as the opposing party wishes to canvass its own variation, for the reasons adumbrated in any specific application, the court can and will consider that variation also; however, as earlier indicated, what in my view it does not do is effectively to throw the entire issue costs’ issue open to general and unrestricted debate, and thereby relieve the opposing party from responsibility for the proper formulation, within time, of its own proposed variation. 

52.  Accordingly, if this view be correct, this ruling leaves the defendants’ application out of time and out of court for a variation in terms of the appropriate scale of the original costs’ order, and the application thus is rejected on this basis alone. 

53.  I so order.

54.  If and in so far as this ruling is incorrect – which I do not consider that it is, albeit in principle this point clearly would benefit from appellate consideration – then nevertheless I should go on to indicate what would have been my view had the defendants made their own variation application within time, or alternatively had applied for an extension of time in which to do so, underpinned by relevant evidence.

55.  The short point here is that in any event I would not have considered this case to merit a costs’ order on the basis of indemnity costs, for which award the principles have been clearly set out by the Chief Justice in Town Planning Board v Society for Protection of the Harbour Ltd (No 2) (2004) 7 HKCFAR 114, at 124.

56.  As the judgment of this court in this case makes clear, whilst I did not think much of the plaintiffs’ case, I did not and do not pitch it as high as warranting such a stringent order as indemnity costs.

57.  Whether I could have been persuaded to depart from the normal party and party basis in favour of common fund is less clear, although I suspect (although I cannot now say with any degree of conviction, given the passage of time) that had I instinctively been inclined to this view at the time of writing the judgment, I should have followed the practice of this court and have made such an order nisi on this enhanced basis.

58.  However, there is little to be gained by speculation; this was not done and, as I have now ruled, it is too late to revisit this issue.

59.  It follows, therefore, that the defendants’ purported cross-application for variation of the order nisi to make provision for an enhanced basis as to costs also is dismissed, with the costs of such application to the plaintiffs, such costs to be taxed if not agreed.

60.  I so order.

 (William Stone)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

Ms Catrina Lam, instructed by Messrs Michael Li & Co, for the plaintiffs

Ms Frances Lok, instructed by Messrs Ho & Ip, for the defendants

62984-EN-2008-10-22

UDL HOLDINGS LTD AND ANOTHER v. LEUNG YUET KEUNG AND ANOTHER

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HCA 4409/2002

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 4409 OF 2002

---------------------

BETWEEN

 UDL HOLDINGS LIMITED1st Plaintiff
 WELL RAISE INVESTMENT LIMITED2nd Plaintiff
 and 
 LEUNG YUET KEUNG1st Defendant
 WONG SUM YUEN  2nd Defendant

  ----------------------

Before: Hon Stone J in Court

Dates of Hearing: 16, 17, 18 and 22 September 2008

Date of Judgment: 22 October 2008

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J U D G M E N T

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Nature of this action

1. This is not an action which is factually complicated.  To the contrary, with several exceptions, much of the factual background is not in dispute. 

2. At issue is a single point of law, namely, have the two defendants, who were directors of the plaintiff companies, offended against a rule of equity in successfully bidding for, and thereafter reselling at a profit, a vessel, formerly owned by the 2nd plaintiff, which was the subject of judicial sale.

3. If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, then the plaintiffs’ action will succeed, and the defendants must disgorge the profit thus made from the sale of the vessel.

4. If the answer to this question is in the negative, the plaintiffs’ action will fail.

The factual background

5. Shorn of detail, the primary facts are in relatively short compass.

6. The case concerns a vessel known as a ‘trailing suction dredger’ named the “KAI HONG”.  Henceforth I shall simply refer to it by name or as ‘the vessel’ or ‘the dredger’; it is a specialized vessel (in 1992 apparently there were no more than 40 such vessels worldwide) which resembles, as its name implies, a sort of ‘seaborne vacuum cleaner’, the utility of which is to create/clear channels on the seabed, and is primarily used in reclamation works.

7. This vessel was owned by the 2nd plaintiff, Well Raise Investment Limited (‘Well Raise’), which at the material time was a subsidiary of a company known as UDL Ship Management Limited, itself a subsidiary of the 1st plaintiff, UDL Holdings Limited, a Bermudan company publicly listed in Hong Kong, and the holding company of a group – ‘the UDL Group’ – which comprises over 100 subsidiaries.  There is no doubt but that the 1st plaintiff is accepted to be the ultimate holding company of the 2nd plaintiff, Well Raise, which, as I have said, owned the vessel in question.

8. The 1st defendant, Mr YK Leung, was executive director of the plaintiff companies from June 1993 to January 2000.

9. The 2nd defendant, Mr SY Wong, was a close friend and business associate of YK Leung, and a non-executive director of the 1st plaintiff from June 1993 to January 2000; whilst not formally admitted, I do not understand that it is seriously contested that he was at the least also a de facto director of the 2nd plaintiff during this period.

10. The other main individual protagonist who should be identified at the outset in this case – which at times struck me as resembling little more than the latest instalment of an ongoing family ‘row’, which seems to have lasted for the past decade – is the younger brother of the 1st defendant who is Mr Leung Yuet Tung: for the duration of this case referred to by counsel as ‘YT’, whilst his brother (with whom he clearly is at odds, and between whom little love is lost) consistently was referred to as ‘YK’.  For ease of reference hereafter I adopt the like appellations.

11. The present dispute arises from a sequence of transactions concerning the “KAI HONG”.

12. By a Bill of Sale dated 28 February 1997, the 2nd plaintiff, Well Raise, agreed to purchase the dredger from Universal Dockyard Ltd upon an ‘as is, where is’ basis for HK$69.5 million.

13. This purchase was to be facilitated by a tripartite arrangement involving a Japanese financial institution, Nippon Credit Bank (‘Nippon Credit’) as Lender, Well Raise as Borrower, and the 1st plaintiff, UDL Holdings, as Guarantor.

14. On 5 March 1997 these three parties entered in a Loan Agreement in the sum of HK$48,650,000, which sum was to be used for part-financing the acquisition of the vessel and as general working capital of Well Raise.  It appears that on the same day the Vendor and Well Raise agreed to revise the consideration for the vessel itself to HK$15,460,000.

15. Pursuant to a Deed of Covenant dated 7 March 1997, Well Raise mortgaged the “KAI HONG”, in addition to its rights, title and interest in the insurance policy in respect of the vessel, to Nippon Credit as security for the loan.

16. With the onset of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998, the UDL Group faced financial difficulties.

17. In the event, Well Raise defaulted upon payment of its loan to Nippon Credit, and the 1st plaintiff, UDL Holdings, was unable to make repayment to the mortgagee under its guarantee of the loan.

18. Accordingly, on 9 October 1998, Nippon Credit issued a Writ in Rem and Warrant of Arrest against the “KAI HONG” in HCAJ 314 of 1998, and pursuant to the Order of Waung J dated 13 November 1998, the vessel was ordered to be sold.

19. Prior to this court-ordered sale, it seems that the “KAI HONG” had had two accidents after being acquired by Well Raise, both of which had occurred in Taichung Harbour, Taiwan: the first accident was when a fire had broken out in the pump room on 4 April 1998, and the second when the crankcase doors in the port side of the main engine room had been blown off on 25 June 1998.

20. Within the context of the present case, the significance of these accidents – or, at least, the second such accident – lay in the insurance claims that had been lodged in respect of them, and the knowledge of the prospects of recovery thereunder.

21. Following these incidents, UDL Ship Management, as manager of the vessel, had notified its insurer, HSBC Gibbs, of its intention to lodge a claim with underwriters; thus, site investigations were conducted, and survey reports prepared by the Salvage Association in respect of the damage sustained.

22. These insurance claims naturally were of interest to Nippon Credit, the ship mortgagee, to which Well Raise had assigned the insurance policy covering the vessel as part of the security for the loan as thus advanced; pursuant to this arrangement Nippon Credit possessed the legal and beneficial interest in the fruits of these claims, which appear to have been estimated (at least by YT Leung) to be in the region of US$1.1 to US$1.5 million.

23. Subsequent to the Order of Waung J for the sale of the “KAI HONG”, it is alleged by YT Leung that he had secured an offer for the vessel from a potential third party purchaser, one Dragomar S.P.A. (‘Dragomar’), an Italian dredging contractor with whom UDL earlier had been a joint venture partner in the Reclamation Stage 3 Project of the Yau Ma Tei Typhoon Shelter between 1992 to 1995.

24. It is said that at that time Dragomar had offered to purchase the dredger for US$3.5 million on an ‘as is, where is’ basis.  However, the unpaid mortgagee, Nippon Credit, declined to postpone the court-ordered sale of the vessel, which was duly advertised on 22 December 1998, with a closing date set for bids on an ‘as is, where is’ basis, of 7 January 1999.

25. The Invitation to Tender of that date, signed by Madam Carlye Chu, then Acting Registrar of the High Court, is in standard form: in particular paragraph 1 of the advertisement states that the Vessel “is offered for sale as she lies in the waters of Hong Kong in her ‘as is’ ‘where is’ condition without any warranties or guarantees at the date of delivery…”, whilst paragraph 3 of the same document stipulates that “no warranties are given” relating to the vessel’s seaworthiness or condition or that she is fit for any particular purpose, that her equipment is adequately certificated, that the appropriate authority of the country of her present flag will consent to the transfer of title of the vessel, and so forth.  In short, this was the standard-form Invitation to Tender in use at that time, with further information provided as to inquiries that may be made as tenderers “think fit”, and that permission to inspect the vessel might be obtained from the Chief Bailiff, together with information as to where, and by when, tenders should be submitted, and in what form.

26. That which then occurred in terms of the filing of bids pursuant to the advertised invitation to tender for the “KAI HONG” forms the factual origin of this case.

27. Because both the 1st defendant, YK Leung, and his friend and business associate, the 2nd defendant, SY Wong, placed bids through nominee BVI companies, respectively Fanwick Limited (‘Fanwick’) and Healthy Wharf Limited (‘Healthy Wharf’).

28. In fact, it appears that the 1st and 2nd defendants placed two distinct bids: first, that which has been referred to as a ‘conforming bid’ – by which is connoted a bid conforming to the terms of the published Invitation to Tender – of around US$1.1 million; and second, a ‘qualified bid’ – by which is connoted a bid not conforming to the terms of the Invitation to Tender – of a sum of around US$1.9 million, the qualification therein being that Nippon Credit assign to the purchaser under that bid the benefit of the extant insurance claims which then remained due and payable in respect of the accident damage to the vessel earlier suffered in Taiwan Harbour.

29. To be more precise, on 7 January 1999 the two bids in question were made in the following terms:

(1)     Healthy Wharf (the ‘qualified bid):              HK$14,721,200

(2)     Fanwick (the ‘conforming bid’):                  HK$8,522,800

30. In the event, and as no doubt was anticipated, the Healthy Wharf bid was the highest submitted in the tender pursuant to the judicial sale; notwithstanding that this bid was girt about with the qualification that Nippon Credit assign all its rights and benefits in all insurance policies on the “KAI HONG”, the bailiff chose to act thereon and apparently sought the instructions of the mortgagee (who appeared to be the sole creditor), and Nippon Credit agreed to accept the purchase price tendered by Healthy Wharf.

31. The judicial sale was completed on 21 January 1999, and Nippon Credit assigned to Healthy Wharf all its rights, title, interest and benefit in the insurance claims which had been made consequent upon the damage to the vessel.

32. However, this is not the end of the story.

33. On 6 February 1999, Healthy Wharf assigned these insurance claims to one Excelwise Enterprises Limited (‘Excelwise’), another company controlled by the 1st and 2nd defendants, and in turn Excelwise, whilst retaining the benefit to the insurance claims, assigned the “KAI HONG” to Success Team Limited (‘Success Team’), a company likewise controlled by the 1st and 2nd defendants.

34. In the event, the vessel thereafter was on-sold by Success Team to a nominee of Dragomar, Fiangen SpA, for the sum of US$3.1 million, that is, some US$1.2 million over and above the purchase price of the vessel consequent upon the successful bid in the judicial sale of the dredger.

35. Shortly thereafter, Excelwise, which had retained the rights in the insurance policies, reached a settlement of the claims with insurance underwriters, and recovered the sum of US$520,778.51.

36. It is these sums, respectively of US$1.2 million and US$520,778.51, which are the amounts claimed by the plaintiffs in this action. 

37. The basis of the case is variously pleaded (at paragraphs 29, 29A and 30 of the Re-Amended Statement of Claim, dated 24 March 2006), but the claim as now propounded is premised upon the assertion that in acting as they did the 1st and 2nd defendants were in breach of fiduciary duty owed to the 1st plaintiff and/or in breach of fiduciary duty owed by the 1st defendant to the 2nd plaintiff in the utilization of confidential information available to them as directors for wrongful profits made in the cumulative sum of US$1,720,778.51 (paragraph 29), further or alternatively that the defendants had incurred an obligation to account to the plaintiffs for the profits made by them in the sale and re-sale of the “KAI HONG” (paragraph 29A), further or alternatively that the defendants are holding the profit of US$1.2 million and the proceeds of US$520,778.51 recovered under the insurance policy as constructive trustees for the plaintiffs (paragraph 30).  Interest also is claimed on these sums at such rate and for such period as the court shall decide.

38. This, therefore, is the broad shape of the case now requiring decision by this court.

The issues for decision

39. Although various other issues have been raised on the pleadings (for example, whether the plaintiffs have locus standi to bring this action, and whether at the material time the 2nd defendant was a de jure, as opposed merely to a de facto director of the 2nd plaintiff), at the end of the day the good sense of leading counsel has prevailed, and, as argued, the issues for decision in this trial are threefold:

First, in the circumstances of this case were the defendants in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the plaintiffs, or either of them?;

Second, if so, did such breach lead to consequential loss on the part of the plaintiffs?; and

Third, is there any necessity or justification in the present case to invoke the provisions of section 358 of the Companies Ordinance, Cap. 32?

Viva voce evidence

40. As initially indicated, there are relatively few matters of fact that require a specific finding of the court; indeed, as I understood his able argument, Mr Fung SC boldly advanced the proposition that whatever findings of fact were made by the court within the factually-disputed areas, such would make little difference in light of the legal arguments propounded by the plaintiffs.

41. Be that as it may.  In my view there is in the circumstances no necessity to do more than briefly advert to the oral evidence as it was led before the court, which was in addition to the usual profusion of box files of documents – as to which, in the finest traditions of litigation in Hong Kong, relatively little of this documentation was required to be consulted, or otherwise impacted directly upon the nature of this dispute.

42. For the plaintiff, two witnesses were called: first, Mr YT Leung, who spoke to the background of the decision to purchase the “KAI HONG”, of the allegedly ‘confidential information’ he had imparted to the defendants, and, also, of the concept he had floated before the defendants in terms of wishing this vessel to be purchased at judicial sale with funds supplied by the defendants, and thereafter to be chartered out to him or one of his companies for use in a reclamation project in Singapore; and second, one Mr Kent Wong Ka Wah, who had worked for the UDL Group until 30 September 2005, and whose principal utility in terms of the plaintiffs’ case appeared to be his evidence, firmly disputed by the 1st and 2nd defendants, that he had presented to the 1st and 2nd defendants at a meeting in or about end of December 1998 the set of files relating to the insurance claims arising from the earlier accidents to the vessel.

43. For the defendants, the 1st and 2nd defendants each gave evidence.

44. The first to be called was Mr YT Leung’s older brother, YK Leung, who described the sequence of events that had led to the bidding at auction for the “KAI HONG”, and at the same time touched upon his historically tenuous and regrettably sour relationship with his younger brother, YT, which appeared to have history not directly relevant to the present dispute, and which centered on the manner in which the erstwhile family ‘UDL business’ (which was founded by the brothers’ father in the 1930’s) had developed and been run by YT.  The second witness to be called was his friend, and close business associate, the 2nd defendant, Mr SY Wong.

45. Let me say immediately that having seen and heard these witnesses, I was considerably the more impressed with the 1st and 2nd defendants as witnesses of truth; in listening to their evidence, and in observing their demeanour, I formed the view that these two gentlemen were fundamentally honest and truthful.

46. To the contrary, I was wholly unimpressed with Mr YT Leung, who gave his evidence under an Indemnity contained in a UDL Holdings Ltd Board Resolution dated 1 September 2006 – whereby it was resolved to continue to proceed against Mr YK Leung and Mr SY Wong “with a view to recover losses incurred to the company as a result of their breach of fiduciary duty to the company and/or to recover ill gained profit from their dealing in the purchase and sale of the “Kai Hong”, and further that the company was “to waive any claims against Mr Leung Yat Tung in exchange for [his] cooperation in respect of the case” for the stated reason that “as [Mr YT Leung] is an undischarged bankrupt and has obtained no financial gains, the Company sees no benefit to take any action against [him], but to seek assistance from him to pursue with recovery actions against the other two former directors”.

47. Mr YT Leung currently is the CEO of the 1st plaintiff, UDL Holdings Ltd, and the terms of the aforesaid Indemnity notwithstanding, it is tolerably clear that he is, and remains, the driving force in this particular litigation (which, I gather, is but one of several pieces of litigation which have been, or currently are being, conducted against his brother), and for my part I formed the view that he did not recollect and retell to the court the history of events with the degree of accuracy that may be expected of the top executive of a listed company – indeed in these circumstances it seemed to be both in his and the 1st plaintiff’s interests to ensure that his recollection of events should fit the case as now mounted by the plaintiffs against his older brother.

48. Accordingly, and for the avoidance of doubt, in instances wherein the evidence of the two brothers is in conflict on any material fact, I have no hesitation in preferring the evidence of his brother, YK Leung, and also that of the 2nd defendant, SY Wong.

49. In the particular circumstances I am minded to go further.  There was about this peculiar case a distinct and unappetizing aroma of ‘pay back’ in terms of the present pursuit of his brother by the plaintiffs; YT Leung is now the CEO of UDL Holdings, and has been thus appointed – by a Board containing, among others, his wife, daughter and son – since 2 May 2008 subsequent to his discharge from bankruptcy on 1 March 2008.  In this regard YT Leung was rendered bankrupt in Bankruptcy Proceedings No 2019 of 2000 pursuant to a Petition presented on 14 June 2000 which was issued by Healthy Wharf Limited (YK Leung’s company) on the basis of YT Leung’s failure to pay to that company a debt of HK$3,566,479.37, plus interest thereon: see the judgment in these proceedings of Cheung J (as he then was) dated 1 March 2001, wherein the Bankruptcy Petition was granted, and the subsequent judgment of the Court of Appeal (Hon Rogers VP and Le Pichon JA) dated 19 April 2001, wherein the appeal from the judgment of Cheung J was dismissed. 

50. On his own story YT Leung had been the architect of this scheme to purchase the “KAI HONG” in the judicial sale, and he had been instrumental in broaching the idea with SY Wong and YK Leung, and I regret to say that I took the view that in giving his version of events that Mr YT Leung had a distinct ‘agenda’, and that I neither trusted nor believed crucial aspects within his account of that which actually had transpired.

51. In any event, against the backdrop of these preliminary remarks, I now proceed to make some specific findings of fact.

52. In terms of the evidence of the former company employee, Mr Kent Wong, my view (and my finding on the point) is that he is and was mistaken in his assertion that at the meeting on 29 December 1998 held between Mr YT Leung and his brother, YK, and SY Wong to discuss the acquisition of this vessel that he had attended that meeting, and that upon his departure therefrom he had left the relevant insurance files with the 1st and 2nd defendants.

53. Mr Kent Wong had no documentary evidence to support his memory of that which had occurred years previously, and I note also that in this regard there is a conflict between the evidence on the point as given by Kent Wong and by YT Leung: the latter says that the meeting with the two defendants took place in his office, whereas Kent Wong maintains that the meeting occurred in the 2nd defendant’s office.  It also seems that some 7 weeks after this meeting, in which Mr Kent Wong said that he had handed the files over to the defendants, YT Leung had asked Kent Wong to pass these files to one Mike Tan for processing the insurance claim, presumably with the assistance of these files, which is not necessarily consistent with the version of events now put forward by Kent Wong.

54. In this context I further believe the denial of Mr YK Leung that any such ‘passing of insurance files’ had occurred, and also the like and equally strenuous denial of his business colleague, Mr SY Wong, whose evidence I had no difficulty in believing, and whom I thought was a shrewd and honest man who testified in a down to earth and often humorous manner; he stated unequivocally that the “KAI HONG” had been purchased for long term investment of 4 to 5 years, until it was realized that the plans proposed for the chartering of the vessel by YT Leung did not stand up on the projected figures: “after we won the bid, I was told YT could not afford to charter the vessel…”, information he said he had received subsequently on the telephone from YK when he was in Canada.

55. Mr SY Wong left the court in little doubt that in his view Mr YT Leung had “gone back on his word about chartering the boat”, and that he had been told that in the circumstances there was no alternative but to find a buyer.  It was, he said, a stroke of luck that Dragomar had emerged as a buyer: “a windfall in a way”.

56. In so far as it be necessary formally to decide the matter, I also find that there were two meetings between YT Leung and the 1st and 2nd defendants, one on 28December and one on the following day, 29 December 1998, and that at these meetings the 1st and 2nd defendants were not informed by YT Leung of any interest on the part of Dragomar to purchase the “KAI HONG” either in repaired state (for US$5 million) or in unrepaired state (for US$3.5 million); to the contrary, I find that the defendants were not told about Dragomar’s interest in the vessel until after the judicial sale, and when it had become clear that YT Leung was in no position to charter the newly-acquired vessel.

57. In the circumstances I am unable to see how it would have been in YT Leung’s interests to have disclosed Dragomar’s interest at such an early stage; he was, after all, careful not to disclose Dragomar’s identity to Nippon Credit, no doubt for fear that the bank might itself take over the sale negotiations; it is also significant that there is no written evidence of any kind before the court to corroborate YT Leung’s story of Dragomar’s willingness privately to purchase the vessel at this point, either in a repaired or an unrepaired state, and Mr Fok, the broker through whom YT Leung said he had reached a tentative agreement with Dragomar to purchase the vessel for use in a dredging project in Thailand, pointedly has not been called.

58. As Mr Sussex pointed out in his closing submission, it became clear later in the evidence of YT Leung that even on his own story (which in salient part I did not accept) that Dragomar never had given any firm commitment to purchase the vessel at any price – in fact, on the documents the figure of US$3.5 million appears to have been a price suggested by Nippon Credit, and YT Leung was wholly unable to explain why in this connection UDL had employed the phrase “your indicative selling price”. 

59. Nor, for that matter, did I comprehend YT Leung’s ‘explanation’ of why Dragomar chose to submit an apparently ‘cosmetic’ bid of only US$1 million at the tender for the “KAI HONG”, which in the circumstances appears make no commercial sense: clearly if Dragomar could have obtained the vessel for that far lower price upon the judicial auction it was entirely in its interests to have done so. 

60. In fact, I agree with the view that the contemporaneous documents tend to suggest that Dragomar did not become interested in a separate private sale until after the judicial auction, their own bid in that tendering process having been unsuccessful.  I agree with Mr Sussex that this thesis is borne out by the fact that apparently YT Leung seems still to have been attempting to persuade his unnamed ‘buyer’ – which he has maintained always was Dragomar – to pay US$3.5 million in December 1998: see the fax from Nippon Credit dated 16 December 1998 to UDL Holdings Ltd, attention Mr YT Leung, wherein there is reference to his discussion of the sale of the vessel “with a potential purchaser in Singapore”.

61. I further find as a fact that YT Leung indeed did persuade the 1st and 2nd defendants to bid for the vessel via tender at the judicial sale with a specific view to entering into a charter of this vessel with either YT Leung (or a company owned or controlled by him), that any discussion as to the price that the vessel would fetch at the judicial sale was no more and no less than the subject of speculation, and merely was a ‘guesstimate’ as to the approach of such other bidders as they may have been; in the circumstances, therefore, I do not accept that there was any specific statement by YT Leung to the defendants to the effect that the bids at the tender for the vessel would not exceed US$1 million.

62. To sum up: I find truthful the specific evidence of the defendants as to their ignorance of Dragomar, and its interest in purchasing the vessel, until YT Leung proved incapable of taking the vessel on charter, which had been the original rationale of the purchase plan which he had taken to the defendants.  In this context, I further wholly reject YT Leung’s disingenuous suggestion that his proposed ‘chartering arrangement’ was nothing but a ‘fall back’ position; as Mr Sussex pointed out, this position patently flies in the face of the wording of two letters, each dated 11 January 1999, written by SY Wong on behalf of Healthy Wharf to Samsung Corporation (confirming the “unqualified commitment” on behalf of UDL “as owner” to supply the vessel to Mr YT Leung and his associates “for unfettered use” of the vessel throughout the duration of the [Changi Reclamation Project] “subject to due payment of hire”, and to Leighton Contracts Asia Ltd in like terms [with reference on this occasion to the Tung Chung Development Phase 3A], letters which YT Leung admitted were written on his instructions. 

63. It is also abundantly clear on the face of an handwritten memo from YK Leung to YT Leung dated 25 January 1999, that discussions over a charter arrangement for the vessel collapsed when YT Leung was unable even to pay an economic charter rate: “based on the attached analysis, it would appear that the rates you have offered are so low that it would not even allow the owners [Healthy Wharf] to break even”. 

64. I note also that on this issue YT Leung earlier had confirmed in an affirmation sworn by him in these proceedings, dated 4 March 2002, that he had wanted the vessel for future dredging operations: “Given my knowledge of the background information to this vessel and with a remote chance of keeping this unique vessel for future dredging operations, I approached YK and persuaded him to put in a bid for this vessel.  I understand that YK was uncertain if he had capacity to finance this exercise and so, he invited Mr Wong Sum Yuen, his long time personal friend and non-executive director of UDL Holdings Limited to join as 50/50 equity partner in this exercise.  Healthy Wharf was used as their vehicle…”

65. I would add, finally, that my rejection of the so-called ‘independent’ evidence of Mr Kent Wong as to his attendance at the 29 December 1998 meeting and as to his assertion that he left the relevant insurance files with the 1st and 2nd defendants does not mean that I labour under the impression that at the time of the tendering for the vessel at the judicial sale that the 1st and 2nd defendants wholly were unaware or ignorant of the existence and unsatisfied insurance claims.  In my view this is improbable.  The defendants may well not have had a grasp of the detail – or even of the precise sum that was likely to be yielded consequent upon settlement of such claims – but both Mr YK Leung and Mr SY Wong struck me as acute businessmen who would not have missed this fact, which in the event was almost certainly mentioned by Mr YT Wong when he proceeded to convince his brother and SY Wong to bid for this vessel; indeed, the ‘non-conforming’ bid as ultimately accepted at the judicial tender was girt about with the qualification that the insurance interests then vested in the mortgagee be transferred to the purchaser together with title to the “KAI HONG”.

66. Accordingly, I approach the legal argument in this case on the basis that I accept, and find to be true, the account of the material events as given by the 1st and 2nd defendants, and in terms of disputed matters of fact reject as inaccurate the significant and substantially differing account proffered on behalf of the plaintiffs by YT Leung. 

67. Whilst this conclusion in itself is not necessarily decisive of the issues raised in this case, I do not think correct the correlative submission of Mr Fung SC, who appeared for the plaintiffs, to the effect that, as a matter of law, the plaintiffs’ claim must succeed even if the court were wholly to accept the evidence of the defendants.

68. In light of the foregoing findings of fact, therefore, the balance of this judgment focuses upon the issues of law as raised by the plaintiffs in support of their claim.

(1)     Was there a breach of fiduciary duty owed by the defendants to the plaintiffs?

69. In opening this case on behalf of the plaintiffs, Mr Fung SC pinned his colours squarely to the mast of breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the 1st and 2nd defendants. 

70. In this connection he cited the rationale underlying the imposition of fiduciary duties as explained by Mason J (as he then was) in the High Court of Australia in HospitalProducts v. US Surgical Corporation [1984] 156 CLR 41, at 96-97, wherein the learned judge observed that it is because the fiduciary’s exercise of his power or discretion can adversely affect the interest of the person to whom the fiduciary owes a duty that “the fiduciary comes under a duty to exercise his power and discretion in the interests of the person to whom it is owed…”

71. Mr Fung further submitted that there are two separate themes to the rule that oblige fiduciaries to account for personal benefit or gain, citing in this regard the observations of Deane J in KakLoui Chan v. Zacharia (1984) 154 CLR 178, at 198:

“The first is that which appropriates for the benefit of the person to whom the fiduciary duty is owed any benefit or gain obtained or received by the fiduciary in circumstances where there existed a conflict of personal interest and fiduciary duty or a significant possibility of such conflict: the objective is to preclude the fiduciary from being swayed by considerations of personal interest.  The second is that which requires the fiduciary to account for any benefit or gain obtained or received by reason of or by use of his fiduciary position or of opportunity or knowledge resulting from it: the objective is to preclude the fiduciary from actually misusing his position for his personal advantage…”

72. Mr Fung also addressed the relevant principles governing fiduciary duties owed by directors to companies, citing in this regard the joint judgment of Rich, Dixon and Evatt JJ in the High Court of Australia in Furs Ltd v. Tomkies (1935) 54 CLR 583, at 592:

“In our opinion the decision of this appeal is governed by the inflexible rule that, except under the authority of a provision in the articles of association, no director shall obtain for himself a profit by means of a transaction in which he is concerned on behalf of the company unless all the material facts are disclosed to the shareholders and by resolution a general meeting approves of his doing so, or all the shareholders acquiesce.  An undisclosed profit which a director so derives from the execution of his fiduciary duties belongs in equity to the company.  It is no answer to the application of the rule that the profit is of a kind which the company itself could not have obtained, or that no loss is caused to the company by the gain of the director.  It is a principle resting upon the impossibility of allowing the conflict of duty and interest which is involved in the pursuit of private advantage in the course of dealing in a fiduciary capacity with the affairs of the company.  If, when it is his duty to safeguard and further the affairs of the company, he uses the occasion as a means of profit to himself, he raises an opposition between the duty he has undertaken and his own self interest, beyond which it is neither wise nor practicable for the law to look for a criterion of liability.  The consequences of such a conflict are not discoverable.  Both justice and policy are against their investigation…”

73. Both Mr Fung SC for the plaintiff and Mr Sussex SC, who appeared for both defendants, agree that the formulations of relevant principle embodied twin themes – often referred to as the ‘No Conflict Rule’, wherein directors cannot place themselves in a position whereby personal interests conflict with fiduciary duties, or where there is a real possibility of such, and the ‘No Profit Rule’, whereby directors cannot gain any undisclosed profits obtained or received by reason of fiduciary position, or from any opportunity or knowledge resulting therefrom.

74. The difference between the two sides, of course, lies not in appreciation of fundamental principle, but in terms of the application of such principle to the facts of the present case.

75. Given that the essence of the ‘No Conflict’ rule is the absence of conflict between duty and personal interest, clearly the starting point for any evaluation of the existence of such conflict must be to determine whether the alleged fiduciary indeed owed a duty to the plaintiff companies, and was in breach thereof.

76. Clearly, the answer to this question is ‘fact sensitive’: “the rule is essentially a simple one, albeit that it may in some cases be difficult to apply”, per Jonathan Parker LJ in Bhullar v.Bhullar [2003] 2 BCLC 241, at 253c-h.  Equally clearly, it is only if and when the analysis of any factual situation reveals infringement of the ‘no conflict’ principle that the issue of the acquisition of a ‘secret profit’ arises.

77. Mr Fung does not admit of the possibility that there is no conflict arising on the facts of the present case. 

78. His submission at trial on this issue very clearly was made on the basis of his case that the defendants well knew at the time of the judicial sale of Dragomar’s interest in purchasing the vessel, but in light of the specific finding of this court that the defendants did not know of Dragomar’s interest in the vessel at this stage, his consequential position must, I think, necessarily be that the existence of the insurance claims, and their potential value, plus the ability to acquire the interest and benefit under these claims from Nippon Credit, were matters which would impact on the price to be realized for the “KAI HONG”; and, I assume Mr Fung would go on to say, it thus follows that both the defendants and YT Leung were under a duty to communicate this fact to the plaintiff companies.

79. Moreover, asserted Mr Fung, the defendants had not disclosed their intention to bid for the vessel to the plaintiff companies; instead the defendants had placed a ‘strategic bid” for the “KAI HONG”, incidentally outbidding Dragomar in the process, and by letter dated 28 January 1999 from Well Raise to HSBC Gibbs had procured the 2nd plaintiff to state that it had assigned its insurance claims over the vessel to Nippon Credit, and thereafter had proceeded to make a secret profit by on-selling to Dragomar, and retaining the fruits of the insurance proceeds for themselves, thereby accruing the overall sum of US$1.72 million in clear breach of the defendants’ duties of disclosure to the plaintiffs.

80. In the course of his submission Mr Fung emphasized that the true principle of Regal (Hastings) v. Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134 is not that should the director happen to come upon commercial information or opportunity which would be beneficial to the company in a capacity other than qua director, he is then at liberty to use that information for personal benefit without referring the same to the company, but, to the contrary, it matters not in what capacity the director receives the information, he nevertheless must refer such information/commercial opportunity to the company of which he is director.  Moreover, contrary to the defendants’ contention, the authorities made it plain, he said, that a director has a duty to pass on information that was “of concern” to the company and was “relevant” for the company to know: see, for example, Industrial Development Consultants v. Cooley [1972] 2 All ER 162, at 173H-J, per Roskill J (as he then was), and Bhullar v. Bhullar, op cit., at 256B-C, per Jonathan Parker LJ.

81. Mr Fung further maintained that it was not relevant that the potential value of the insurance claims arising consequent upon the accidents to the “KAI HONG”, that is, in the area of US$1-$1.5 million, was higher than the sum ultimately realized, since that latter, namely US$520,778.51, represented a ‘settlement figure’ reached with underwriters and related only to the second accident.

82. On behalf of the defendants, Mr Sussex took strong issue with the contention that, on the facts of this case, the defendants properly could be said to be in breach of fiduciary duty to the plaintiff companies.  Quite obviously, he said, there could be no conflict of interest and duty if no duty (or duties) were owed in the circumstances.

83. Mr Sussex took as his starting point the nature of a judicial sale of a vessel such as the “KAI HONG”, observing that it was well-established that once a vessel is ordered to be sold by order of the Court that no-one, including the owner, is able to interfere with such judicial sale, and thus, if the shipowning company, the 2nd plaintiff, was incapable of doing anything to sell the vessel, so too was the 1st plaintiff as guarantor company.  In this context he referred to the observations of Brandon J (as he then was) in The “Jarvis Brake” [1976] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 320, at 321:

“I have no doubt at all that, once a ship has been ordered to be sold by an officer of the Court, it is contempt for the owner to attempt to sell the ship himself….he [the owner] must realize that these matters must be left to the Court and that he is not to interfere…”

In this context Mr Sussex also drew the attention of the court to Meeson’s Admiralty Jurisdiction and Practice (3rd ed), 2003, at paras 4.107, wherein the learned editors note thus:

“Upon an order for sale being made by the court the situation alters, and an attempt to sell the property privately constitutes a contempt of court.  In The “Ruth Kayser” (1925) 23 Ll.L.Rep 95, an order for sale had been made, but the Admiralty Marshal’s brokers had experienced great difficulty because there were persistent rumours that the ship was being sold privately and if that rumour continued it would prevent people from coming to look at the ship.  Hill J said:

‘When an order for sale had been made in [this] Court, and the owner chose to carry out some private negotiations of his own, he would land himself into difficulty, while anyone dealing with him would know he could not give good title.  If an owner in such circumstances got private information, his duty was to bring it to the attention of the Marshal so that everyone might benefit by it.  [I am] not going to have private owners interfering with the orders of the Court when it gave an order that there was to be a sale.  If anyone did interfere, he would have to consider whether it was a contempt of court or not.  If there were any private offers, let them be brought to the notice of the Marshal.  The sale must go on by the Marshal without interference.’”

84. I accept Mr Sussex’s submission that in the circumstances neither the 1st nor the 2nd plaintiff itself could bid in the judicial auction: the 2nd plaintiff, Well Raise, could not, because as a matter of law it could not buy the vessel from itself, and it was only by virtue of a court sale to a third party that clean title could be passed to such purchaser – which is one of the principal advantages of a judicial sale.  Moreover, he said, and apart from the fact that the plaintiffs had no money to bid, any successful bid merely would have resulted in the plaintiffs having an asset against which the creditor, Nippon Credit, could and would have issued a writ offi fa.

85. Accordingly, Mr Sussex argued, if it was correct that there was nothing that could have been done by the plaintiff companies in respect of the judicial sale, then it was difficult to see how or why the defendants as directors owed duties in relation to the judicial sale.

86. In my view it is difficult to disagree with the submission thus advanced on behalf of the 1st and 2nd defendants that there was no conflict of interest in the very particular circumstances of this case, because there was nothing that the directors, nor indeed the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs, could have done in relation to the court-ordered sale.  Any attempt to obtain bids for the vessel, or to achieve a private sale (even, had the defendants known, which I have held they did not, of Dragoma’s alleged interest in acquiring the vessel) would have amounted to a contempt of court.

87. In a relatively recent English case, Wilkinson v. West Coast Capital [2007] BCLC 717 (Ch.), involving, inter alia, directors’ duties in the context of a ‘maturing business opportunity’ which their company actively was pursuing – and which, if established, would have resulted in the directors being disqualified from securing such ‘maturing business opportunity’ for themselves by reason of the ‘no conflict’ and ‘no profit’ rules – Warren J observed, at 767, para 245:

“The courts have, over the last century or more, had a great deal to say about the duty of directors and their obligations as fiduciaries.  It is clearly of great importance in any case based on breach of duty to be careful to ascertain the scope of that duty.  Some general principles can be set out.  But it must always be remembered that the content of any fiduciary duty is, in the ultimate analysis, fact dependent; it is trite law that not all relationships described as fiduciary relationships import precisely the same duties…”

88. An additional consideration underpinning the defendants’ argument as to an absence of a fiduciary duty in the particular circumstances is that the 1st and 2nd defendants did not avail themselves of information or opportunity which was within the scope of the plaintiffs’ business; the contrary, not only were the plaintiffs not in a position to sell the vessel privately, but they were in no position to make use of the insurance information of which the defendants availed themselves, which in any event expressly had been ceded by Well Raise to Nippon Credit by the Deed of Covenant dated 7 March 1997.  In fact, upon the occurrence of an Event of Default (which had arisen due to non-payment of the loan), under the terms of the Deed of Covenant only Nippon Credit was entitled to receive “all claims then outstanding or thereafter arising under the insurances”, so that on any view it could not be said that the insurance information was the property of the plaintiff companies; to the contrary, it clearly belonged to Nippon Credit.

89. Nor do I consider that such information as had been imparted by YT Leung to the 1st and 2nd defendants (as to which I have rejected the evidence of YT Leung as to the defendants’ then-knowledge of Dragomar’s interest in acquiring the vessel) was given to the defendants in their capacity as directors of either of the plaintiff companies, nor in execution of their duties as directors, and thus it cannot be said that, in the words of Lord Russell in Regal (Hastings) v. Gulliver (op cit) that the defendants have made a profit “by reason of and in the course of” their fiduciary relationship. 

90. The ineluctable fact was that the plaintiffs had abandoned the “KAI HONG”.  On 5 October 1998 Nippon Credit had given notice of an Event of Default in accordance with clause 11.2 of the Loan Agreement, shortly before the writ in rem was issued and the “KAI HONG” was arrested on 9 October 1998; the service of Nippon Credit’s writ was not acknowledged, and all but the necessary minimum crew had been dismissed.  Hence I fail to see how the vessel remained the property of the plaintiffs, since at that stage it clearly belonged beneficially to the sole creditor, Nippon Credit.

91. If this analysis be correct, as in my view it is, it must follow that the limited information imparted by KT Leung to the defendants as the meetings at the end of December 1998 – which, as I have found, did not include reference to Dragomar’s interest – was not confidential information belonging to the plaintiff companies, and the opportunity of which the defendants availed themselves, that is, to bid and thereafter to acquire the vessel under the judicial sale, was not an opportunity which would have been open to the plaintiffs or either of them.

92. In this context I agree with and accept the submission made by Mr Sussex that whatever information was given to the defendants concerning the real value of the vessel, or as to the likely level of bids in the judicial auction, can have been speculative only on the part of YT Leung, and could not properly be regarded as satisfying the test laid down in, for example, the case of Aas v. Benham [1891] 2 Ch 244, at 255, per Lindley LJ, or in the well-known dicta of Lord Upjohn in Boardman v. Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46, at 124.

93. In my view, therefore, on the facts of this case as found, there was no abuse of fiduciary duty on the part of the 1st and 2nd defendants.  I find that his information, such as it was, which came to the defendants did not come to them by reason of their fiduciary position, and the ‘business opportunity’, if such it be characterised, was, by the very nature of a judicial sale, an opportunity open to anyone interested in the acquisition of the “KAI HONG” via the process of judicial sale.

94. The sole piece of information regarding the existence of the insurance claims, and the anticipated quantum thereof (an amount ultimately not realized) was information which in any event belonged to Nippon Credit by reason of the occurrence of the Event of Default by the 2nd plaintiff, and in the circumstances of this case I fail to understand how or why the defendants could be said to have been under a duty to acquire the vessel for the plaintiff companies, when the 2nd plaintiff expressly had ceded its right thereto, and had abandoned the vessel prior to the order for judicial sale.

95. It follows, therefore, that I am unable to accept the submission strenuously advanced by Mr Fung on behalf of the plaintiffs that in the circumstances there has been a clear breach of the ‘no conflict’ rule by the defendant.

96. Indeed, in my view there is an air of unreality about this case, and the manner in which it has been framed.

97. Stripped of rhetoric, it seems tolerably clear that the position was as follows.  The prime mover in this scheme, YT Leung, himself a director, went to the two other directors, the 1st and 2nd defendants, with a plan to purchase the vessel at judicial sale, ostensibly (as I have found) with a view to a private charter thereof for his own profit.  At this stage the vessel had been left to its fate by the 2nd plaintiff owner, and a judicial sale has been ordered.  The plaintiffs put in two bids, and the higher of the two (which specifically took account of the prospective insurance recovery) was accepted by the sole creditor, Nippon Credit.  Having thus purchased the vessel, the defendants found that the chartering plan outlined by YT Leung made no commercial sense – in short, the figures simply did not add up, as the spreadsheets demonstrate.  As a result the defendants took steps to resell the vessel to Dragomar, having (as now has been found) been uninformed of Dragomar’s allegedly earlier interest in the vessel prior to such sale.

98. It is from these unpromising scenario that Mr Fung must weave a case of breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the defendants.  Despite the persuasiveness with which he invested the task, in my judgment he is unable to do so.

(2)     Should there be a disgorgement of the allegedly ‘secret profits’ made by the defendants?

99. Having thus found that there is no breach of fiduciary duty which conceptually would ground any duty to disgorge monies under the ‘no profit’ rule and/or to justify any form of account, the answer to this question is self-evident.

100. Against the relevant factual background, and in light of the facts as found, I divine no legitimate basis for the contention that the monies as derived by the defendants upon resale to Dragomar now should accrue to either of the plaintiff companies.

(3)     Section 358 of the Companies Ordinance, Cap 32

101. This is the fallback position of Mr Sussex, and whilst on the findings of this court strictly it is not relevant, lest I be incorrect in the conclusions to which I have come upon the primary issues, I should deal briefly with this argument.

102. It is this.

103. Section 358, Cap 32 is similar to section 60 of the Trustee Ordinance, Cap 29, and empowers the court to excuse, in whole or in part, the liability of a director for default, breach of duty or trust where the court concludes that in the circumstances of the case, it would be fair for a person to be excused where he had acted honestly and reasonably.

104. Mr Sussex has pointed out that Judge Reid QC considered the application of the UK equivalent of section 358 in the case of Coleman Taymar Ltd v. Oakes [2001] 2 BCLC 749, at 770, wherein three questions were mooted: first, did the director act subjectively honestly; second, did the director act reasonably when his actions are viewed objectively; and third, if the answer is ‘yes’ to both questions, the court then should consider whether in the circumstances the director ought to be excused, and if so on what terms.

105. In my firm view these two defendants patently fulfilled both criteria in terms of subjective honesty and objective reasonableness, and thus, if and in so far as there has been any technical breach in this case (which in my opinion there has not), they should be excused from visitation of any consequences thereof.

106. In this connection I accept the submission that the court is entitled to take into account that the plaintiff companies, through the person of YT Leung, who is a director of both, did not come to court with ‘clean hands’, in that I have found that he was not full and frank about precisely what he had, or had not, told the 1st and 2nd defendants at the time that he mooted the purchase of the “KAI HONG”, and that in my view he had a clear agenda to use these factual circumstances, under protection of personal indemnity granted by the plaintiff holding company, to extract damages against his older brother, YK Leung, and against the latter’s friend and business associate, SY Wong.

107. My attention also has been drawn to the fact that there is at least a pleaded case concerning whether the Bye Laws of the 1st plaintiff or the Articles of the 2nd plaintiff permitted directors to profit from agreements of this nature, and for the avoidance of doubt, and in response to a line of argument that was but faintly alluded to, I agree with the submission that in the case of the 2nd plaintiff company it is wholly artificial for the plaintiffs now to contend that no disclosure was made to the Board of Directors when the only other director of the 2nd plaintiff, aside from the 1st and 2nd defendants, was YT Leung himself, who clearly was the progenitor of the entire sequence of events and indeed, as Mr Sussex characterised the position, was the “moving genius” behind the sequence of events which has spawned this action.

Order

108. In my view this action was ambitious, artificial, and without obvious merit.

109. I have little hesitation in ordering, which I now so do, that the plaintiffs’ action against the 1st and 2nd defendants be dismissed, with an order nisi that costs be to the defendants, such costs to be taxed if not agreed.

110. If and in so far as either side wish to make representations as to costs, an application so to do is to be made within 21 days of the date hereof, absent which the existing order nisi will become absolute.

 (William Stone)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
  High Court

Mr Daniel Fung SC, leading Ms Catrina Lam, instructed by Messrs Michael Li & Co, for the plaintiffs

Mr Charles Sussex SC, leading Ms Frances Lok, instructed by Messrs Ho & Ip, for the defendants

Appeal by the 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs to the Court of Appeal dismissed. Please refer to CACV356/2008 dated 14 September 2009

34586-EN-2003-07-16

UDL HOLDINGS LTD AND ANOTHER v. LEUNG YUET KEUNG AND ANOTHER

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HCA004409/2002

HCA4409/2002

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 4409 OF 2002

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BETWEEN
UDL HOLDINGS LIMITED1st Plaintiff
WELL RAISE INVESTMENT LIMITED2nd Plaintiff
AND
LEUNG YUET KEUNG1st Defendant
WONG SUM YUEN2nd Defendant

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Coram: Deputy High Court Judge Poon in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 19 June 2003

Date of Handing Down Judgment: 16 July 2003

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J U D G M E N T

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1. This is an application for security for costs. The background leading to the present proceedings may be summarised as follows.

Background

2. The 1st plaintiff is a company incorporated in Bermuda and has since September 1991 been listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. In February 2000, the 1st plaintiff proposed a scheme of arrangement under section 166 of the Companies Ordinance, Cap.32 involving each of the 1st plaintiff and 24 subsidiaries ("the Scheme"). The Scheme was sanctioned by the court on 18 April 2000 and became effective on 28 April 2000.

3. The 2nd plaintiff was at all material times a subsidiary of the 1st plaintiff. It is, however, not one of the 24 subsidiaries that participated in the Scheme. It was the registered owner of a trailing suction hopper dredger named "Kai Hong" whose port of Registry is in Hong Kong with an office number of HK-0103 ("Kai Hong").

4. The 1st defendant had been an executive director of the 1st plaintiff and a director of the 2nd plaintiff since June 1993 until about 18 January 2000 when he resigned. The 2nd defendant had been a non-executive director of the 1st plaintiff since December 1994 until he resigned in March 2000.

5. On 5 March 1997, a loan of HK$48,650,000 was granted by Nippon Credit Bank Limited ("Nippon Credit") to the 2nd plaintiff as borrower with the 1st plaintiff as guarantor. Kai Hong was pledged to Nippon Credit as security for the loan. In September 1997, the plaintiffs defaulted in repaying the loan. In the event, Nippon Credit commenced HCA314/1998 and obtained default judgment against them. On 13 November 1998, Kai Hong was ordered to be sold by open tender.

6. Shortly before the order for sale was made, two accidents happened and caused damage to Kai Hong. The first accident occurred on 4 April 1998 when a fire blazed out in the pump engine room of the vessel. The damage was subsequently repaired at the 2nd plaintiff's expense. The second accident occurred on 25 June 1998 when the port side main engine of the vessel was damaged. However, no remedial work had been carried out. It is the plaintiffs' case that the 2nd plaintiff proceeded to lodge insurance claims and the insurance benefits would amount to approximately US$1.1 million to US$1.5 million and that the 1st plaintiff, as the ultimate holding company of the 2nd plaintiff, was beneficially interested in the potential insurance claims, although the benefits of the insurance claims had already been assigned to Nippon Credit pursuant to a deed of covenant dated 7 March 1997.

7. On 21 January 1999, Kai Hong was sold to Healthy Wharf Limited ("HWL"), of which the defendants were shareholders and directors. HWL had put in the highest bid at HK$14,721,200 (about US$1.88 million). Kai Hong was then sold by HWL to Excelwise Enterprise Limited ("EEL") and was then sold to Success Team Limited ("STL"). Both EEL and STL were BVI companies beneficially owned by the defendants. Eventually on 23 April 1999, STL sold Kai Hong to Finagen SPA who brought as nominees for Dragonmar at US$3.1 million.

The plaintiffs' case

8. The plaintiffs allege that the defendants were aware of the outstanding insurance claims in respect of the loss damage caused to Kai Hong by the two accidents which would increase the value of the vessel provided that it was sold with the benefit of the insurance policies. This knowledge enabled the defendants (using their corporate vehicle HWL) to put in a high bid which included a condition that the policy be assigned to them. Substantially higher than any other bid, the defendants' bid was in the event successful.

9. The defendants admitted that they knew of the insurance claim before the bidding. The plaintiffs contended that it is clear from their evidence that before bidding they anticipated being able subsequently to sell Kai Hong for US$5 million after carrying out the necessary repairs. The 1st plaintiff, as the owner of the vessel, had suffered a loss to the extent that the sale was at an undervalue in the sum of US$1.5 million. Further the defendants are said to be liable to account to the 1st plaintiff for the secret and unauthorized profits made by them in the sum of US$1.2 million. They are trustees of the property and assets of the company, including confidential information and business opportunities.

10. The 1st defendant is similarly liable to the 2nd plaintiff, of which he was at the material times a director. Although the 2nd defendant was not a director of the 2nd plaintiff, he would still be liable for having assisted the 1st defendant in his breaches of fiduciary duties as a director of the 2nd plaintiff. The plaintiffs claimed for the said sum of US$1.5 million or damages to be assessed, an inquiry as to damages for breach of confidence and loss of profits of US$1.2 million and an account for all profits made by the defendants.

The defendants' case

11. The defendants denied liability. In essence, they denied any breach of duty or confidence. They alleged that it was Mr Leung Yat Tung, the then chairman of the 1st plaintiff, who on or about 28 December 1988 told the 1st defendant that Kai Hong was to be sold by public tender with a view that the latter should help to persuade the 2nd defendant to participate. Mr Leung suggested that the defendants could bid for the vessel against the propositions, inter alia, that should they be successful in acquiring Kai Hong, Mr Leung would take the vessel from the defendants and help to procure the necessary repair and refurbishment work to bring it to an operational condition; and that once Kai Hong had been returned to operational condition, it would then be chartered to Mr Leung at such rates as to give the defendants a good return on their investment. The defendants alleged that Mr Leung had misrepresented them on the value of the insurance claims. He said the claims would be worth approximately US$1.6 million. The defendants acted on the misrepresentation and put in the bid via HWL. In the event, they had suffered a loss of profit in the region of HK$2.1 million.

Application for security for costs

12. Insofar as the 1st plaintiff is concerned, the defendants are relying on Order 23, rule 1(1)(b) of the Rules of the High Court. The relevant part of the rule provides :

" (1) Where, on the application of a defendant to an action or other proceedings in the Court of First Instance, it appears to the Court-

...

(b) that the plaintiff (not being a plaintiff who is suing in a representative capacity) is a nominal plaintiff who is suing for the benefit of some other person and that there is reason to believe that he will be unable to pay the costs of the defendant if ordered to do so, or

...

then if, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the Court thinks it just to do so, it may order the plaintiff to give such security for the defendant's costs of the action or other proceedings as it thinks just."

13. Two criteria have to be met under Order 23, rule 1(1)(b) :

(1) the 1st plaintiff is a nominal plaintiff suing for the benefit of some other person; and

(2) there is reason to believe that 1st plaintiff will be unable to pay the costs of the defendants.

I will deal with them in turn.

Is the 1st plaintiff a nominal plaintiff?

14. Under Clause 19 of the Scheme, as soon as the 1st plaintiff receives any recoveries of their "Accounts Receivables" (other than inter-company debts... and the accounts receivables referred to in Clause 20) they shall remit and transfer such recoveries after deduction of all expenses incurred including all legal expenses to the Scheme Account and the Scheme Administrator shall be responsible for distributing such recoveries which constitute part of the Scheme Funds available for distribution to the Scheme Creditors under the Scheme. The term "Accounts Receivables" is defined to mean in essence all accounts receivables of the 1st plaintiff as at the effective date of the Scheme other than certain exceptions which do not apply here.

15. Mr Ip, appearing for the defendants, submitted that given the wide definition of "Accounts Receivables" in the Scheme and the fact that all matters complained of by the plaintiffs occurred prior to the effective date, any money received by the 1st plaintiff from the defendants, should they be held to be liable, must from part of all the accounts receivables of the 1st plaintiff as at the effective date. The 1st plaintiff is thus obliged to pay the money so recovered to the Scheme Account for distribution to the Scheme Creditors.

16. Mr Smith, SC, appearing for the plaintiffs, disagreed. He submitted that the Scheme does not really define "Accounts Receivables", except for the purpose of excluding inter-company debts and receivables charged by way of security to certain financial creditors. In the absence of a specific definition for the purposes of the Scheme, they must be given their ordinary dictionary meaning, that is to say, debts : see Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed.) at p.17. The plaintiffs' claim is not in the nature of a debt and therefore does not fall within the meaning of "Account Receivables". Counsel further submitted that the 1st plaintiff is in any event not suing on behalf of the Scheme. In this connection, he relied on Clause 13 of the Explanatory Statement to the Scheme. An identical clause can be found at Clause 21(a)(i) of the Scheme. Under that clause, the 1st plaintiff undertook to the Trustee for the benefit of the Scheme Creditors that it would provide a maximum of HK$2 million revolving fund during the term of the Scheme to finance all the costs of recovering the Accounts Receivables. According to Mrs Irene Leung Yu Oi Ling, wife of Mr Leung Yat Tung and a director of the plaintiffs, the 1st plaintiff is funding all the costs of the present proceedings : see paragraph 4 of her 2nd affirmation filed on 11 June 2003.

17. In my view, the term "Accounts Receivables" has to be understood in the context of the entire Scheme. (The definition clause, being exclusionary in nature, probably does not add much to its meaning.) Under the Scheme, the 1st plaintiff and the participating subsidiaries transferred to a new company all their "Unencumbered Assets" as defined, excluding "Accounts Receivables". This new company held the assets for the purpose of their realisation and distribution in accordance with the Scheme. "Accounts Receivables" were dealt with under Clauses 19 to 21 of the Scheme. Briefly, as soon as the 1st plaintiff and the participating subsidiaries received any recoveries of their "Accounts Receivables", they shall remit and transfer such recoveries to the Scheme Account for distribution. Legal proceedings for recovery are clearly contemplated. Further, under Clause 20(e), it was envisaged that accounts receivables might involve claims which were subject to arbitration proceedings. In my view, "Accounts Receivables" are not confined to debts. If that were the intention of the parties, there is no reason why the term "debts" is not used, as is the case in other clauses. When properly understood in the entire context, the term "Accounts Receivables", in my view, includes monetary claims in legal or arbitral proceedings so long as the cause of action accrued at or before the effective date.

18. The 1st plaintiff's claims are monetary in nature. The matters complained of and hence the causes of action all occurred before the effective date of the Scheme. Accordingly, any recovery by the 1st plaintiff in this action from the defendants has to be transmitted to the Scheme Account for distribution. The 1st plaintiff is thus a nominal plaintiff suing for the benefit of the Scheme Creditors. Mrs Irene Leung's assertion that the 1st plaintiff is not using the Revolving Funds to fund the present action is neither here nor there. Even if true, it does not alter the 1st plaintiff's status as a nominal plaintiff.

19. I next turn to the second criterion, namely, whether there is reason to believe that the 1st plaintiff will be unable to pay the defendants' costs.

Is the 1st plaintiff impecunious?

20. Mr Smith contended that the evidence does not show that the 1st plaintiff will be unable to pay the costs of the defendants if they are successful in their defence. On the contrary, the evidence shows that the 1st plaintiff has the resources to pay such costs if ordered to do so. In gist, the evidence relied on by the plaintiff shows that a right issue was successfully completed in December 2002 and thereby raised HK$6.6 million in working capital; that the interim report for the six months ended 31 January 2003 shows that the 1st plaintiff made a net profit of HK$3,426,000; that since the preparation of the said interim report, there have been further positive developments including the settlement of certain litigation and the removal of certain vessels from the threat of foreclosure; and that the unaudited net asset value of the 1st plaintiff is now HK$16,987,000.

21. The above, however, does not represent the full picture of the 1st plaintiff's financial position. As at 31 July 2002, the 1st plaintiff had a net liability of HK$8,030,000 : see the audited balance sheet which formed part of its annual report for 2002 exhibited as "ITK-2" to the affirmation of Mr Ip Tak Keung filed on 27 March 2003 in support of the present application. The performance of the 1st plaintiff's group of companies for the same period of time was equally bad, if not worse. In the chairman's statement in the said annual report, it is stated that "for the year ended 31 July 2002, the 1st plaintiff's group of companies recorded a net loss of HK$76 million, comprising HK$65 million as a result of relatively high operating gearing and low turnover, provisions of HK$26 million for the impairment in value of vessels as to reflect their reduced in-use value estimates down to net selling price and provisions of HK$22 million for the problematic in-dispute receivables." The Group had net current liabilities of HK$128,458,000 and net liabilities of HK$51,966,000. The above figures were prepared on a going concern. However, the auditors of the 1st plaintiff made a disclaimer of opinion in these terms : "Because of the fundamental uncertainties relating to the going concern basis, we are unable to form an opinion as to whether the financial statements give a true and fair view of the state of affairs of [the 1st plaintiff] and of the Group as at 31 July 2002 or of the loss of the Group for the year then ended."

22. The working capital of HK$6.6 million raised by the rights issue in December 2002 did not improve the 1st plaintiff's position. Even assuming that the working capital was not spent, it would only reduce the 1st plaintiff's net liabilities from HK$8,030,000 to HK$1,430,000. Further, despite the rights issue, as shown in the condensed consolidated cashflow statement in the unaudited interim results for the six months ended 31 January 2003 (exhibit "LYOL-5" to Mrs Leung's affirmation filed on 9 May 2003), the cash and equivalents at the beginning of the period in the sum of HK$3,626,000 was reduced to a negative balance of HK$43,000 at the end of the period. There had been a further diminution in turnover to HK$13,480,000.00 producing a gross profit of merely $112,000 for the six-month period ending 31 January 2003. The Group had the net decrease in cash and cash equivalents of HK$3,669,000 in the period in question despite the injection of working capital by the said rights issue in December 2002.

23. As noted, the gross profits for the above period was a mere HK$112,000. However, the 1st plaintiff reported a net profit of HK$3,426,000 for the Group in the six-month period ended 31 January 2003 in the unaudited interim results. However, no explanation was given for the tremendous increase of 'Other revenue' from HK$910,000 in the six-month period ended 31 January 2002 to HK$25,207,000 in the six-month period ended 31 January 2003 although it would appear that the so-called revenue was primarily a paper exercise with reversal of impairment losses of HK$15,659,000 and overprovision of rental expenses. Even with such revaluation, the Group remained to have net liabilities of HK$21,169,000.

24. A sum of HK$2 million and HK$4.5 million had been recovered in HCA9544/2001 and HCA4545/2001 by the 1st plaintiff's related companies. But they had to be paid into accounts designated by the secured creditors, presumably for repayment of secured loans owed by those related companies. Accordingly, those recoveries do not improve the cashflow of the Group and even taking them into account, the net liabilities of the Group stood at HK$14,669,000. The sum of HK$5.6 million recovered by another related company in the settlement of HCA5307/2001 did not improve the overall position either.

25. Mrs Leung asserted in paragraph 7 of her 2nd affirmation that she was advised by the 1st plaintiff's Financial Controller that by virtue of the settlement of litigation and the winding-up order made against Universal Dockyard Limited ("UDL") on 9 June 2003, they resulted in a net asset value of the Group in a positive figure of HK$16,987,000. Mrs Leung did not go into detail as to how this unnamed Financial Controller came to his advice. Further, such advice is inconsistent with the following statement made at p.27 of the 1st plaintiff's Annual Report 2002 :

"Save for the estimated litigation costs and expenses amounting to approximately HK$200,000, the Directors are of the view that the legal proceeding concerning [UDL] will not have any material impact on the Group and the Shareholders."

According to this statement, the winding up order made against UDL resulted in a likely loss of litigation costs and expenses estimated at HK$200,000 and not any increase in net asset value. Mrs Leung has not offered any explanation on the discrepancy.

26. The test is if there is reason to believe that the 1st plaintiff will be unable to pay the costs of the defendants if they are successful. Having carefully considered all the evidence before me concerning the 1st plaintiff's financial strength, I am so satisfied. The 1st plaintiff's assertion that it is financially capable of paying the defendants' costs if so ordered is not borne out by the evidence summarized in paragraphs 21 to 25 above. This brings me to consider whether in all the circumstances, security for costs should be ordered against the 1st plaintiff.

Whether to order security against the 1st plaintiff

27. The principles governing how the court should exercise its discretion when considering an application for security are well settled. In short :

(1) The court has a complete discretion whether to order security, and accordingly it will act in the light of all the relevant circumstances.

(2) The possibility or probability that the plaintiff company will be deterred from pursuing its claim by an order for security is not without more a sufficient reason for not ordering security.

(3) The court must carry out a balancing exercise. On the one hand it must weigh the injustice to the plaintiff if prevented from pursuing a proper claim by an order for security. Against that, it must weigh the injustice to the defendant if no security is ordered and the defendant finds himself unable to recover costs from the plaintiff in due course.

(4) In considering all the circumstances, the court will have regard to the plaintiff company's prospects of success. But it should not go into the merits in detail unless it can clearly be demonstrated that there is a high degree of probability of success or failure.

(5) The court may order any amount up to the full amount claimed by way of security, provided that it is more than a simple nominal sum; it is not bound to order a substantial amount.

(6) Before refusing to order security on the ground that it would unfairly stifle a valid claim, the court must be satisfied that, in all the circumstances, it is probable that the claim would be stifled. There may be cases where this can properly be inferred without direct evidence. The court should consider not only whether the plaintiff company can provide security out of its own resources to continue the litigation, but also whether it can raise the amount needed from its directors, shareholders or other backers or interested parties. It is for the plaintiff to satisfy the court that it would be prevented by an order for security from continuing the litigation.

See Wing Hing Provision v. Hanjin Shipping [1998] 4 HKC 461, per Godfrey JA at p.464. With these general principles in mind, I turn to consider whether I should order security against the 1st plaintiff.

28. Submissions have been made on the merits of the parties' respective case. But I do not think I need to go into the merits in detail for neither party can demonstrate that there is a high degree of probability of success or failure. The 1st plaintiff is not contending that its claims will be stifled if security for costs is to be ordered. In fact, they maintained that they are able to pay the defendants' costs if so ordered. Having considered all the circumstances, it is in my view an appropriate case to order security for costs against the 1st plaintiff. I will come to the question of quantum in a moment. I will turn to the 2nd plaintiff's position first.

Whether to order security for costs against the 2nd plaintiff

29. Section 357 of the Companies Ordinance, which applies to the 2nd plaintiff, provides that the court may order security for costs where it appears by credible testimony that there is reason to believe that the company will be unable to pay the defendant's costs if successful in his defence. Mr Smith did not seriously dispute that the 2nd plaintiff is impecunious within the meaning of the section. However, he contended that there was a complete overlap of claims advanced by the plaintiffs. Security for costs should not be ordered against the 2nd plaintiff : John Bishop (Caterers) Ltd and another v. National Union Bank Ltd and others [1973] 1 All ER 707; Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2002, Vol.1, para.23/3/5, at p.381. Should the court find that there is only a partial overlap of claims, the 1st plaintiff undertakes to pay any costs ordered against the 2nd plaintiff which would not otherwise be payable by the 1st plaintiff.

30. It remains a matter of discretion whether to order security for costs in a co-plaintiffs scenario. As a general rule, security for costs should not be ordered if one of the plaintiffs is able pay the defendant's costs or has assets within the jurisdiction to meet any adverse costs order. Mr Smith's submissions primarily rest upon the assertion that the 1st plaintiff will be able to pay for the 2nd plaintiff the defendants' costs if so ordered. However, as I have already ruled, there is reason to believe that the 1st plaintiff itself will be unable to pay the defendants' costs if so ordered. The 2nd plaintiff cannot in the circumstances rely on the 1st plaintiff's alleged ability to pay the defendants' costs in order to avoid the application of section 357.

31. I will therefore order security for costs against the 2nd plaintiff as well.

Quantum

32. I now come to the quantum of security. I have carefully considered the skeleton bill of costs put forward by the defendants and the parties' submissions. The costs incurred prior to this application which are in the region of HK$110,000 are not in dispute. The bulk of the security for costs relates to the costs for this application, the costs for the preparation of the trial and the trial itself. In my view, it is premature to order security for costs for the entire action. I will only order security up to the stage of completion of discovery and preparation of witness statements. And a sum of HK$450,000 is reasonable in the circumstances.

Conclusion

33. For the above reasons, I will order that the plaintiffs do give security for the defendants' costs by paying into court the sum of HK$450,000 within 14 days from today, and that all further proceedings be stayed until the security is given. I will also make an order nisi that the defendants shall have the costs of this application in any event, to be taxed if not agreed.

(J. Poon)
Deputy High Court Judge

Representation:

Mr Clifford Smith, SC, instructed by Messrs Tsang & Lee, for the 1st and 2nd Plaintiffs

Mr Francis Ip of Messrs Ho & Ip, for the 1st and 2nd Defendants

Remarks:
Appeal by 1st Plaintiff to Court of Appeal. Appeal dismissed. Please refer to the appeal judgment of CACV000271/2003.