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Companies Winding-up Proceedings2002

RE: SAINT POWER INDUTSRIAL LTD

Files (4)

59009-CH-2007-10-31

有關先力實業有限公司的事宜

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HCCW 1309/2002

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

高院公司清盤案件編號2002年1309號

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 有關先力實業有限公司(清盤中)(《該公司》)
 及
 有關香港法例第32章《公司條例》的事宜

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主審法官:高等法院原訟法庭法官關淑馨公開聆訊

聆訊日期:2007年10月30日及31日

判案書日期:2007年10月31日

判案書

 

1.  這是一個交付羈押令的申請,申請人是先力實業有限公司(簡稱“先力香港”;Saint Power Industrial Limited) 的清盤人。清盤人在2006年12月14日,單方面申請許可,要求准許向第一答辯人沈筱嫻女士,提出交付羈押令的申請,因她犯了藐視法庭罪。本席在2006年12月15日給予許可,清盤人在12月20日提交申請。沈女士是香港永久居民。

2.  申請首次聆訊,是2007年1月17日。沈女士的丈夫楊宗熹先生(本案第二答辯人)告訴法庭她因病缺席。本席把聆訊押後,並作出指示,要雙方在指定的時間內,以誓章形式提交証據。

3.  2007年5月4日,是第二次聆訊。由於沈女士在沒有許可下,臨近審訊前又提交了第二份誓章,且提出有關內地法律的問題,清盤人需要時間回應。故此,主審的潘兆初法官把案件再度押後。

4.  昨天已是申請的第三次聆訊。

5.  在支持申請的陳述書,清盤人列出指稱沈女士所犯藐視法庭罪的理由:沈女士是沒有遵守本席在2006年5月3日作出命令的第一段(簡稱“該命令”),向清盤人交出有關文件。

6.  該命令的重要條文,引述如下:

「1.第一答辯人及第二答辯人須在本法庭命令送達後第十四天下午四時三十分前將下列第一答辯人及第二答辯人管有、擁有權力或控制的物品交出及送達予清盤人: 
  (a)有關該公司[該公司是指先力香港]及/或其附屬公司(即先力模具(上海)有限公司(簡稱“先力上海”;Saint Power Mould (Shanghai) Industrial Limited)與先力模具(番禺)實業有限公司(簡稱 “先力番禺”;Saint Power Mould (Panyu) Industrial Limited)的所有帳簿,紀錄和銀行結單的正本和副本;及 
  (b)所有由該公司及/或先力上海及/或先力番禺擁有或曾經擁有的財產和資產,包括(但不限於)本文第二段內所提及的交易或事務的相關業權契據,業權證明書和一切其他文件的正本和副本。 
 2.清盤人可就下述事項對宣誓後的第一和第二答辯人盤問: 
  (a)售賣上海市松江區九亭高科技園區C-2 號之地塊和其售賣所得收益的下落; 
  (b)在2003年3月至10月期間,先力上海和光力模具(上海)有限公司(簡稱“光力上海”;Sun Power Mould (Shanghai) Company Limited)所達成的協議和根據或有關此協議的償付; 
  (c)所有關於或出於上文(b)段所提及的交易,包括(但不限於)由先力上海轉移至光力上海的廠房、機械和設備; 
  (d)租期為2005年2月1日至2009年9月30日,租出先力番禺擁有的工廠或其部份而由第一答辯人據稱代表先力番禺所簽署的租賃協議,以及根據或有關此租賃協議所償付金錢的下落;及 
  (e)該公司與其附屬公司(即先力上海和先力番禺)的一切其他事務,包括(但不限於)此等公司的任何各別資產。
 3.對第一和第二答辯人的盤問在高等法院的聆案官前進行,預計須一天,日期則另訂。
 4.清盤人獲准在本司法管轄權之外,根據中華人民共和國法律的程序規定,把此法庭命令送達予中華人民共和國境內的第一和第二答辯人。」

7.  由於清盤人一直未有從沈女士獲取有關文件,認為在欠缺文件下對她進行訊問,成效不大,所以沒有向聆案官申請排期作訊問的聆訊。

8.  本席先敍述與申請有關的背景事實。

9.  先力香港是一間控股公司,在香港成立,但從未在此經營業務。一直以來,股東和董事只有兩人,是沈女士和徐立夫先生,沈女士持有發行股本的51%。

10.  先力香港在內地成立了兩間外資獨資企業,是先力番禺和先力上海,從事設計和生產工業用的模具。這兩間子公司,是先力香港的重要資產。沈女士當時是這兩間子公司的董事長和法定代表人。

11.  2002年11月28日,徐先生入禀香港高等法院,按照《公司條例》第 177(1)(f) 條規定的公正公平理由,要求把先力香港清盤。2003年8月29日,應徐先生的申請,鍾安德法官委任廖耀強先生和楊文安先生(兩人均為安永企業財務服務有限公司的董事總經理),為先力香港的臨時清盤人,接管先力香港的資產,以免任何人在法庭未有裁決之前,非法挪用或轉移公司的資產。

12.  2004年5月6日,鮑晏明法官裁定徐先生得直,把先力香港清盤。他裁定沈女士在2003年3月間,把先力上海的業務,轉移至光力上海,後者是由她的家庭成員擁有。沈女士曾就鮑法官的判決,提出上訴,但後來沒有進行。

13.  2005年1月4日,鄺卓宏聆案官作出命令,委任廖先生和楊先生為先力香港的共同及個別清盤人。2007年5月4日,潘兆初法官接納楊先生的請辭,委任莫禮詩先生接替他,出任先力香港的共同及個別清盤人。

14.  臨時清盤人和清盤人,都有責任接收或接管公司的資產。如果公司是控股公司,資產當然包括子公司。先力香港全資擁有先力番禺和先力上海的股權,兩間子公司的章程,都賦予股東亦即是投資者權力,任命子公司的董事。

15.  清盤人行使先力香港作為子公司全資股東的權力,由股東決議,更換了兩間子公司的董事,再向有關的工商行政管理局申請撤換登記的董事長及法定代表人。他們希望循這途徑,接管先力番禺和先力上海。

16.  對此,沈女士的態度是很清晰的。她強烈反對,清盤人在子公司撤換她為董事長及法定代表人,她表示要抗爭到底。

17.  沈女士多次在內地的法院提出訴訟。就先力番禺,清盤人雖然在2004年10月12日,成功申請變更董事長、法定代表人和董事會成員的登記,但由於沈女士反對,2005年7月4日,廣州市工商行政管理局撤銷了登記變更。2006年6月15日,廣州市天河區人民法院裁決,工商行政管理局撤銷變更登記的決定,並無不當。清盤人敗訴後,保留就判決提出申訴的權利,他們在2008年6月14日前,可以提出申訴。

18.  至於先力上海,清盤人在2005年1月18日,成功登記變更董事長及法定代表人。之後沈女士多次提出行政訴訟,要求撤銷上海市工商行政管理局的變更登記。2007年6月15日,上海市徐匯區人民法院駁回她的起訴。她就此在7月向上海市第一中級人民法院上訴,9月上訴被駁回。沈女士在10月向同一法院提出申訴,正在處理中。她堅決表示,絕不會接納清盤人變更先力上海的董事長和法定代表人。

19.  由於沈女士的積極抗爭,縱使香港法院在2003年8月已對先力香港委任了臨時清盤人,他們至今也未能有效控制並接管內地兩間子公司。在這四年間,沈女士繼續完全操控這兩間公司的運作和資產,進行交易前她當然沒有知會清盤人,事後也沒有交待資產的去向。據清盤人所知,她經手處理的交易和資產,最少有以下幾宗:

(1)2004年7月,中國工商銀行拍賣先力上海抵押在上海松江區九亭的地塊,還債後有餘款人民幣三百五十多萬。清盤人在2004年9月要求沈女士提供資料,確認餘款的下落、用途及分配,她拒絕合作,聲稱先力上海應按照大陸的法律法規辦事。
(2)2003年10月,光力上海向先力上海追討人民幣一百多萬,聲稱是與先力上海達成十三份協議應付的款項。2003 年12月,沈女士的丈夫以光力上海的名義向先力上海提出訴訟,她與丈夫分別代表與訟雙方,達成調解協議,答應由先力上海支付人民幣675,900給光力上海,其中約六十五萬元以先力上海的生產設備折價清付。
(3)2005年,沈女士把先力番禺的廠房,租予一租戶,為期五年,租約至2009年9月才終止,她聲稱租金已存入先力番禺的銀行帳戶,但未有向清盤人提供確實的資料。
(4)2007年5月,清盤人始獲悉先力番禺的廠房,在2006年9月被番禺區人民法院查封,於2007年1月又被上海市虹口區人民法院輪候查封。清盤人在5月和6月致函沈女士,要求就查封及輪後查封的事提供資料,但沈女士宣稱清盤人不是先力番禺的投資者,她不會提供資料給清盤人。

20.  清盤人為着履行職責,唯有循《公司條例》第221條,在2006年4月11日向法庭申請,要求命令沈女士提供先力香港及其子公司的文件,並出席法庭接受訊問。本席准許了這申請,在2006年5月3日作出該命令。沈女士有出席聆訊,她提出的反對理由,本席都不接納,反對理由記載在判案書的第6段。沈女士沒有就該命令提出上訴,卻仍舊引用之前提出的反對理由,不向清盤人提交該命令要提交的任何文件。

21.  清盤人於是以沈女士藐視法庭罪為理由,申請向她作出交付羈押令。

22.  作為申請人,清盤人有舉証的責任。他們必須讓法庭毫無疑點認為:(1) 沈女士是知道該命令的內容,和不遵守該命令將受法律懲處;(2) 沈女士不遵守該命令,並非是無心之失或出於意外,她的行為或遺漏,是有意識的舉動。這是民事藐視法庭罪行,清盤人不需要証實,沈女士是蓄意或存心不遵守該命令。有關行為或遺漏,即使出於良好意願,或真心誠意地信賴某些法律意見,並不構成免罪理由,只是求情理由(參看 Re Mileage Conference Group of the Tyre Manufacturers’ Conference Limited’s Agreement [1966] 1 WLR 1137第1162頁E至1163頁A;Kao, Lee & Yip v. Koo Hoi Yan & Others [2006] 4 HKLRD 631第641頁I至J)。

23.  清盤人之一的廖耀強先生,做了六份誓章,他出席聆訊,並接受沈女士的盤問。沈女士和丈夫楊先生,各做了兩份誓章。經本席向她解釋,她有沉默的權利,沈女士選擇作証,接受代表清盤人的廖大律師盤問。至於她丈夫,由於沒有出庭,他的誓章不被採納為証供。

24.  亳無疑問,沈女士清楚知道該命令、其內容,及不遵守的後果將受法律懲處。第一,本席宣讀頒布該命令時,沈女士親自出庭,目睹及聽聞這事實。第二,該命令的文本,加上法庭蓋印及懲處通知,在2006年6月初,已郵寄給沈女士在香港及上海的地址,她亦在6月14日去信清盤人的律師,承認在6月13日收到寄往上海的命令。其後,香港高等法院又經上海市高級人民法院,把命令經蓋章的文本,及核証副本翻譯,在2006年9月1日送達沈女士在上海住所,由她丈夫代簽收。第三,2006年6月至2007年1月,清盤人的律師和沈女士就該命令需提交的文件,多次書信往來,清盤人的律師數次明確提醒她,交出文件的時限已過,她必須立刻遵守該命令,否則會構成藐視法庭罪而被監禁。

25.  該命令作出後,沈女士並無遵照命令,把任何有關文件提交清盤人,她對這點沒有爭議。

26.  沈女士在2006年6月22日首次去信回應清盤人,聲稱她目前手中已沒有該命令要提交的文件,因此不能遵從命令指示,把“管有、擁有權力或控制的物品交出及送達予清盤人”。她指出先力番禺的所有文件,已在2005年由清盤人委託的代理人王志偉先生非法搶走。2006年2月20 日,深圳市南山區人民法院裁定,王先生須於判決生效之日十日內向先力番禺歸還所佔有的公司帳本,但王先生未有執行法院的命令,故她也不能交出文件。至於先力上海的帳簿記錄、銀行結單、所有交易或事務的相關業權契據等,已由上海楊浦經偵大隊借走作查核之用,至今尚未歸還。

27.  本席裁定,該命令作出的任何時間,沈女士都管有、擁有權力或控制一些該命令涉及的文件。撇除王先生和經偵大隊取去的文件,沈女士在盤問下承認,她還管有兩間子公司的其他文件,例如批准証書、營業執照、先力番禺的國有土地使用証及房地產權証,企業法人機構代碼証、稅務登記証、財務登記証、外匯登記証等,和2005年後(即是在王先生和經偵大隊取去文件後)才產生的文件。

28.  至於王先生在2005年初取去先力番禺的文件,王先生在2006年9月15日去信沈女士,副本抄送南山區法院,指出已多次與她的律師聯絡,但沈女士遲遲未往他處取回文件,王先生在信內再次通知沈女士,務請在2006年9月30日前,往他處取回所存的帳本,逾時不取,他將當廢品棄之,後果由沈女士自負。

29.  2006年9月22日,沈女士覆信王先生,抄送南山區法院,拒絕往王先生處取回帳本,堅持王先生須把帳本交給南山區法院,並列出清單。本席認為沈女士是採取拖延的態度,她無意從王先生處取回帳本。

30.  王先生也曾聯絡南山區法院,要求根據判案書規定交出的文件,可交由法院暫代保管,但遭法院拒絕,並建議他與沈女士自行處理有關事宜。

31.  清盤人早在2006年7月4日向沈女士提出,建議她授權清盤人代表她向王先生取回管有的帳簿,但沈女士拒絕,她聲稱內地的法律,不容許她把帳冊文件交給清盤人帶出境外。清盤人在2006年9月18日澄清,他們從沒有堅持沈女士要將內地公司的帳冊文件帶出境外,並多次重申她可以選擇,將文件交到安永企業財務服務有限公司位於上海及廣州之辦事處,及清盤人於國內之代理人。沈女士沒有理會這提議,只是重覆她一貫的立場,清盤人沒有依照內地法律辦事,香港法庭的命令,在內地不具備直接執行的効力,清盤人必須在內地辦理清算子公司的事宜,方有權要求內地公司出具文件帳目。

32.  沈女士在庭上作供堅決表示,即使王先生和經偵大隊把文件交還先力番禺和先力上海,她也不會把文件交給清盤人的,她聲稱這是違反內地的法律。

33.  法庭作出了命令,與訟雙方必須遵守。與訟人士如對命令不服,可行使上訴的權利。原審法庭的命令,如未被上訴法庭推翻,或在上訴期間暫時擱置,是有效的命令。與訟人士不遵守有效的法庭命令,是嚴重影響司法公義的執行。

34.  沈女士辯稱她並非不願意遵守該命令,她沒有遵守命令,是非不得已,是內地的法律不容許她這樣做。她這次提出的論點,在本席作出該命令時的聆訊,亦已提出,本席當時並不接納。

35.  該命令是針對沈女士本人作出,如前所說,她是先力香港的董事,是香港永久居民。香港法院對她有司法管轄權。命令的對象,並非是內地的子公司,也不存在在內地直接執行香港法庭命令的問題。

36.  沈女士不承認清盤人可行使先力香港作為子公司全資股東的權力,也不承認她已被清盤人撤去她任子公司董事長和法定代表人的職位,誓要與清盤人周旋到底,不惜任何代價。

37.  作為母公司的清盤人,接管全資擁有的子公司及其資產,有多種方式,不一定要把子公司清盤。沈女士堅稱清盤人須在內地把子公司清算,方可接管公司,是非理性的堅持。她指稱清盤人向她索取文件,用意是製造假帳加害於她,是無理的指控。清盤人接管子公司,並非是侵吞子公司,或把其資產變作任何人的私人財產。清盤人是法庭委派的人員,受破產管理署的監管,需要對法庭負責,行使職權時,必須依照法律行事。沈女士指稱清盤人企圖把子公司變作私人財產,是完全曲解事實。

38.  沈女士不適當地引用內地的法律,構成種種理由,不遵守該命令,把帳目文件交給清盤人。她可以在子公司的所在地,把文件交給清盤人,根本不屬於內地法律所述把公司會計檔案文件借出,或携帶出境的情況。她如果不堅持否認清盤人已取代她成為子公司的法定代表人,清盤人以法定代表人的身份,接收她移交的文件及印章,是順理成章的事,絕不違反任何內地法律的規定。她如果不是否認清盤人可行使子公司唯一股東的權力,內地的公司法,是明顯允許股東有權要求查閱、複制公司的財務會計報告的。

39.  本席不認為沈女士遵守該命令,不為內地法律容許。

40.  本席裁定,沈女士藐視法庭罪名成立。

41.  沈女士嚴重違反法庭的命令,繳付罰款或就其良好行為提供保証,不是適當的懲處。本席認為應該對她作出交付羈押令,在監獄羈押六星期。

42.  本席聽取過廖大律師和沈女士的陳述,考慮到應否引用《高等法院規則》第52號命令第7條規則賦予的權力,指示交付羈押令有條件暫停執行,條件是沈女士必須在指定的時間內,遵守該命令把管有的一切有關文件交給清盤人。

43.  沈女士最終向法庭表示,願意交出她管有的文件,並簽署兩份授權書,授權清盤人向王先生和經偵大隊取回先力番禺及先力上海的文件。

44.  本席作出以下的命令:

(1)交付羈押令作出,監禁沈女士六星期。
(2)按照如下的條件,交付羈押令暫停執行:
 (a)沈女士須於今天下午五時半前,簽署兩份授權書,授權清盤人代表她或有關的子公司,向王志偉先生和上海楊浦經偵大隊取回被其管有的一切有關文件;
 (b)她須在今天起計十四天內,向清盤人交出及送達她所管有的一切有關文件及物品,包括印章。
(3)沈女士履行第(2)段的條件後,交付羈押令將自動解除。
(4)清盤人的訟費由沈女士支付,以彌償基準評定。
  
  
 (關淑馨)
高等法院原訟法庭法官
  

呈請人 : 由胡百全律師事務所轉聘廖玉玲大律師代表出席

第一答辯人 : 沈筱嫻女士,親自應訊

52523-EN-2006-05-03

THE JOINT AND SEVERAL LIQUIDATORS OF SAINT POWER INDUSTRIAL LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) v. SHUM SIU HAN AND ANOTHER

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HCCW 1309/2002

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES (WINDING-UP) NO. 1309 OF 2002

______________________

 IN THE MATTER of Saint Power Industrial Limited (In Liquidation) (the “Company”)
 and
 IN THE MATTER of Section 221 of the Companies Ordinance (Cap. 32)

______________________

BETWEEN

 THE JOINT AND SEVERAL LIQUIDATORS OF SAINT POWER INDUSTRIAL LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) Applicant
 and 
 SHUM SIU HAN1st Respondent
 YANG ZONGXI2nd Respondent

 

Before : Hon. Kwan J. in Chambers (not open to public)

Date of Hearing : 3 May 2006

Date of Decision : 3 May 2006

 

______________________

D E C I S I O N

______________________

 

1.  This is a summons taken out by the liquidators of Saint Power Industrial Limited (“the Company”) under section 221 of the Companies Ordinance, Cap. 32.  The 1st respondent, Madam Shum Siu Han, is a shareholder and director of the Company.  Her husband Yang Zongxi, the 2nd respondent herein, is the company secretary of the Company.  The liquidators seek an order for delivery up of documents specified in the summons and an order that the respondents be examined on oath on various matters relating to the Company and its subsidiaries.

2.  The summons and the supporting evidence have been served on the respondents at their last known address in Hong Kong and their last known address in Shanghai.  The 1st respondent has appeared today.  The liquidators’ solicitors have received a telephone call from the 2nd respondent who is in Shanghai confirming that he has received the documents.  I understand from the 1st respondent that her husband had a traffic accident, so cannot attend court today.

3.  The background to the application may be stated briefly as follows.

4.  The Company was set up as a holding company and had never carried on business in Hong Kong.  It had established 2 wholly foreign owned enterprises in the People’s Republic of China – Saint Power Mould (Panyu) Industrial Limited (“Saint Power Panyu”) and Saint Power Mould (Shanghai) Industrial Limited (“Saint Power Shanghai”), to carry on the business of design and production of moulds for use in industrial manufacturing.  The 2 subsidiaries were the 2 substantial assets of the Company.

5.  On 28 November 2002, a winding-up petition was presented by the other shareholder and director of the Company.  Provisional liquidators were appointed for the Company on 29 August 2003.  The Company was ordered to be wound up after a trial on the just and equitable ground on 6 May 2004.  The same individuals who were the provisional liquidators were appointed liquidators by an order made on 4 January 2005.

6.  Shortly after their appointment as provisional liquidators and for about 2 years thereafter, the provisional liquidators and then the liquidators had made various requests to the respondents for information and documents.  The respondents have not been co-operative.  Although some documents were provided by the 2nd respondent on behalf of the 1st respondent on 2 October 2003, I am satisfied that the documents provided were not complete.  I do not accept the 1st respondent’s assertion in her oral submission today that all the documents in her possession relating to the Company and its 2 subsidiaries have been provided to the liquidators.  In summary, the response and attitude of the respondents may be stated in this way.  The 2 subsidiaries are companies established in the PRC, these companies are not subject to Hong Kong law, nor have they been wound up by any court order, so the respondents are under no obligation to comply with any requirement of the liquidators to provide them with documents and information relating to the 2 subsidiaries.  The liquidators should make an appropriate application to the courts in the PRC to obtain documents and information relating to the 2 subsidiaries.  The 1st respondent also claims that she would contravene the laws in the PRC if she were to part with the accounts, books and records of the 2 subsidiaries to the liquidators.

7.  I consider this court does have jurisdiction to order the respondents, as officers of the Company, to produce documents in their possession, custody or power relating to the Company and its subsidiaries.  The documents sought in the summons of the 2 subsidiaries in the PRC are documents relating to the affairs of the Company.

8.  I think it is right I should exercise my discretion to order production of these documents.  These documents would clearly assist in the liquidators’ investigation of the affairs of the Company and its subsidiaries.

9.  As for an order for oral examination, I am satisfied that the liquidators have made out a requirement to examine the respondents orally in respect of the various matters listed in the summons.  I note that the liquidators have served various questionnaires on the respondents, and I have considered the answers provided by the respondents to the questionnaires.  It seems to me it is only appropriate that there should be an oral examination to really take things forward.

10.  I make an order in these terms:

(1)The 1st and 2nd respondents shall by 4.30 pm on the 14th day from the date of service of the order made herein produce and deliver to the liquidators the following documents in their possession, power or control:
 (a)all originals and copies of the books and records and bank statements of the Company, Saint Power Shanghai and Saint Power Panyu; and
 (b)all originals and copies of the title deeds, certificates and all other documents of and relating to the properties and assets owned or had been owned by the Company and/or Saint Power Shanghai and/or Saint Power Panyu, including without limitation the transactions and matters referred to in paragraph (2) hereof.
(2)The liquidators be at liberty to examine the 1st and 2nd respondents on oath in matters concerning:
 (a)the sale of the land at Jiuting Hi-Tech Park C-2 of Shanghai Song Jiang District, Shanghai, and the whereabouts of the proceeds arising from such a sale;
 (b)the agreements made between Saint Power Shanghai and Sun Power Mould (Shanghai) Company Limited (“Sun Power Shanghai”) during the period between March and October 2003, and the payments made pursuant or related to these agreements;
 (c)all transactions relating to or arising from the agreements referred to in (b) above, including without limitation the transfer of plant, machinery and equipment by Saint Power Shanghai to Sun Power Shanghai;
 (d)the tenancy agreement made by the 1st respondent purportedly on behalf of Saint Power Panyu for the leasing of a factory owned by Saint Power Panyu or any part thereof for the period from 1 February 2005 to 30 September 2009, and the whereabouts of the money paid pursuant or related to this agreement; and
 (e)all other affairs of or relating to the Company, Saint Power Shanghai and Saint Power Panyu, including without limitation any of their respective assets.
(3)The oral examination of the 1st and 2nd respondents be conducted before a Master of the High Court on a date to be fixed, with an estimated length of one day.
(4)The liquidators do have leave to serve this order on the 1st and 2nd respondents out of the jurisdiction in the People’s Republic of China, by effecting service on them pursuant to such procedural requirement in accordance with the laws of the People’s Republic of China.
(5)There be no order as to the costs of this application against the 1st and 2nd respondents.

 (S Kwan)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

 

Miss Elaine Liu, instructed by Messrs P C Woo & Co., for the Applicants

The 1st Respondent, appearing in person

The 2nd Respondent, absent

 

36105-EN-2004-05-06

RE: SAINT POWER INDUTSRIAL LTD

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HCCW001309A/2002

HCCW 1309/2002

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES WINDING-UP PROCEEDINGS NO. 1309 OF 2002

____________

 

IN THE MATTER of SAINT POWER INDUTSRIAL LIMITED

AND

IN THE MATTER of the Companies Ordinance, Chapter 32

____________

Coram: Hon Barma J in Court

Dates of Hearing: 15-18 December 2003

Date of Judgment: 6 May 2004

______________

J U D G M E N T

______________

 

The proceedings

1. This is a petition to wind up Saint Power Industrial Limited ("the Company") presented on 28 November 2002 by Mr Hsu Lap Foo ("Mr Hsu"), a shareholder and director of the Company. The petition was opposed by the Company's only other shareholder and director, Madam Shum Siu Han ("Madam Shum"), in her capacity as a contributory. The Company itself took no part at the trial, and has taken no part in these proceedings since about March 2003, when it transpired that the Company had not validly resolved to instruct lawyers to act on its behalf, no board resolution to this effect having been passed, as a result of the differences which had arisen between Mr Hsu and Madam Shum.

2. The petition was originally based only on an allegation that the Company was insolvent, as it had failed to comply with a statutory demand dated 31 October 2002 served on behalf of Mr Hsu, claiming the sum of HK$5,574,942.47, which was said to be owed to him by the Company as a result of advances which he made to the Company between 6 March 1992 and 30 June 2002. It was amended on 13 May 2003 to seek, in the alternative, a winding up order on the just and equitable ground under section 177(1)(f) of the Companies Ordinance, it being alleged by Mr Hsu that there had been a breakdown in the mutual trust and confidence which had previously existed between himself and Madam Shum, in the light of various matters of which complaint was made against Madam Shum, and also that the Company was in a state of deadlock, as he and Madam Shum (who were its only two directors) could no longer co-operate with each other. The petition was re-amended shortly before the trial, on 27 November 2003, to add further complaints as to Madam Shum's actions in relation to the Company's assets, arising out of the discovery by Mr Hsu of what appeared to be a diversion of the business of the Company's main asset, a business in Shanghai, to an entity with which Madam Shum appeared to be associated. The petition was further re-amended at the conclusion of the trial to add an allegation that the commercial substratum of the company had been lost, in the light of matters revealed by the evidence at the trial, and in a recent report by provisional liquidators who had been appointed by Chung J on 29 August 2003. This was relied on as a further basis for the making of a winding up order under section 177(1)(f).

3. Insofar as it was based on the Company's indebtedness to Mr Hsu, the petition was opposed on the basis that the debt relied upon by Mr Hsu was disputed. Madam Shum contended that some HK$3.03 million of the alleged debt was not a debt at all, as it represented a contribution by Mr Hsu to the capital of the Company, and that the balance of HK$2.54 million was not presently repayable, having regard to a letter dated 6 September 2002 signed by both Mr Hsu and Madam Shum at the request of the Company's auditors, in which they both stated that they would not demand repayment of any loans made by them to the Company until the Company was able to independently finance its operations.

4. So far as the just and equitable ground was concerned, the petition was also opposed, notwithstanding that Madam Shum accepted that the relationship between herself and Mr Hsu had broken down and that they no longer trusted each other. Madam Shum said, first, that she still felt that it was possible for one of them to buy the other out. Secondly, Madam Shum denied that she was responsible for the breakdown or herself guilty of any wrongdoing, claiming that the responsibility for the breakdown lay with Mr Hsu and suggesting that his objective was to drive her out of the Company and take it over for himself.

5. At the trial, the evidence consisted of a number of affirmations made in the course of the proceedings by Mr Hsu and Madam Shum respectively and oral evidence from each of them. Mr Hsu was represented by Mr Harris, while Madam Shum appeared in person.

The factual background

6. The background to these proceedings is as follows. Mr Hsu and Madam Shum are the only directors and shareholders of the Company. At the date of the petition, Mr Hsu held 8,647 shares in the Company (representing 49% of its issued share capital), and Madam Shum held 9,000 shares (representing 51% of its issued share capital). The Company was set up as a holding company, and has never carried on business in Hong Kong. It was from the outset intended that it should set up wholly foreign owned enterprises on the Mainland to carry on the business of the design and production of moulds for use in industrial manufacturing processes. It was common ground that the respective families of Mr Hsu and Madam Shum had known each other for many years, and that when Madam Shum wished to start her own business in about 1992, she went to Mr Hsu for assistance. Mr Hsu was prepared to assist by providing funding for the business, and did so.

7. The Company first set up a wholly foreign owned enterprise in Panyu ("the Panyu WFOE"), which acquired factory premises and commenced business. It was common ground that at the beginning, Mr Hsu did not have any management role in relation to the Company or the business of the Panyu WFOE in which it had invested, this being run by Madam Shum, although Madam Shum said that she would from time to time consult him on major decisions. Mr Hsu said that he regarded the business as being really Madam Shum's, and he agreed that (at this stage, at least) he did not involve himself to any real extent in its affairs.

8. As further funding was required for this business, Mr Hsu and Madam Shum each contributed further amounts to the Company, which used these contributions to provide further funding for the Panyu WFOE. By the end of 1993, Mr Hsu's contributions totalled slightly over HK$3 million, whereas Madam Shum's contributions were just over HK$850,000.00. Along with the increased funding which they provided, their respective shareholdings changed over time. Initially, Mr Hsu had a 10% interest in the Company, which increased first to a 25% interest, and finally to the 49% which he now holds.

9. The nature of the respective contributions up to this stage was, however, the subject of controversy. Madam Shum said that the contributions were capital contributions, and that the increasing capital commitment by Mr Hsu was the reason for the gradual increase in the level of his shareholding in the Company. Mr Hsu, however, said that the parties respective contributions were shareholders' loans, and were always intended to be repaid in due course. I shall deal with this aspect of the dispute later, when considering the merits of Mr Hsu's claim that he is a creditor of the Company.

10. The Panyu WFOE was not particularly successful, and in around 1998, Madam Shum proposed to Mr Hsu that a new WFOE ("the Shanghai WFOE") should be established in Shanghai, where prospects appeared to be better. In the event, the Shanghai WFOE was established on 26 March 1999. At the time that the Shanghai WFOE was established its directors were Madam Shum and Mr Hsu. There was a dispute as to whether a Mr Wang Yie, who its General Manager, was also a director. Be that as it may, Mr Wang retired towards the end of 1999, since when Madam Shum has served as the General Manager of the Shanghai WFOE. After his retirement, it seems that Madam Shum's mother, a Madam Lam Yuen Yee ("Madam Lam") was appointed as a director of the Shanghai WFOE (either in his place, or as a third director). This appointment was also the subject of controversy, Mr Hsu saying that he knew nothing about it, and contending that his signature on documents relating to the appointment had been forged. These matters formed one of bases on which Mr Hsu claimed (in the amended petition) that there had been a breakdown in the mutual trust and confidence that had previously existed between Madam Shum and himself.

11. Unlike the Panyu WFOE, the Shanghai WFOE soon proved to be profitable. It was operating out of rented premises, but sometime in 2000, Madam Shum proposed that it should acquire its own factory and workshop premises. It seems that Mr Hsu was agreeable to this course, and steps were then taken for the Shanghai WFOE to acquire property, which it did in 2001. However, this appears to have resulted in the expenditure of its entire reserves, and it was accordingly necessary for means to be found to fund the construction of the factory. In connection with this, Mr Hsu says that he made further advances to the Company totalling some HK$2.54 million, the most recent of such advances being some US$100,000.00 on about 27 June 2002. It is accepted by Madam Shum that these advances were loans to the Company, although she contends that Mr Hsu was not entitled to demand repayment of them when he did.

12. Mr Hsu says that prior to making this last advance, he came to the view that having regard to the very substantial amounts of funding which he had already made available to the Company for its investments in the Panyu and Shanghai WFOEs, he should have a majority shareholding in the Company (even if not one that was fully proportionate to the amount of funding which he and Madam Shum had respectively provided), to reflect the loans which he had made, and that he and Madam Shum agreed that his shareholding should be increased to 60% of the issued shares in the Company. Mr Hsu says that it was in reliance on this agreement that he made the advance of US$100,000.00 in June 2002, and also provided personal guarantees for temporary banking facilities provided to the Shanghai WFOE by the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation Ltd. Ms Shum did not really dispute that such an agreement had been made. Her position in her affirmations was that having reflected on it, it did not seem to her to be right that Mr Hsu should have both a majority shareholding and at the same time treat the advances which he had made to the Company as loans, and that she therefore did not regard herself as bound to carry it out and arrange for the shareholdings to be altered as agreed. At trial, Madam Shum sought to justify her failure to carry out the agreement on the basis that certain conditions had not been fulfilled. However, despite being pressed as to what these unfulfilled conditions were, Madam Shum was unable to explain them. The failure on Madam Shum's part to honour this agreement appears to have been the factor which precipitated the breakdown in the relationship between herself and Mr Hsu, and it was one of the factors that Mr Hsu relied upon in support of his case that the Company should be wound up on the just and equitable ground.

13. Earlier in 2002, it was agreed between Mr Hsu and Madam Shum that Mr Hsu should take a greater role in the affairs of the Company and the Shanghai WFOE. Madam Shum was to remain responsible for the business and day to day operations of the Shanghai WFOE, while Mr Hsu was asked to take charge of financial matters, and to be more involved with the construction of the new factory premises. Mr Hsu says that from then on, he tried to take a more participatory role in the affairs of the Shanghai WFOE. Mr Hsu says that although at first this appeared to be welcomed by Madam Shum, by mid-September 2002, her attitude had changed, and she was unwilling to allow him any real degree of participation in its affairs. In October 2002, Mr Hsu visited Shanghai, and by the end of that visit on 18 October 2002, it had become plain to him that his involvement in the operations and affairs of the Shanghai WFOE was unwelcome. He says that he then returned to Hong Kong, realising that the relationship with Madam Shum had broken down, and having decided that he should seek to recover his loans and wind up the Company. Accordingly, he caused a statutory demand to be served on the Company on 31 October 2002, demanding repayment of the loans which he had made to the Company.

14. Madam Shum's position was that she felt that Mr Hsu was seeking to take over the whole management of the Shanghai WFOE, and to acquire a majority interest in it, only after it had become profitable, and that she perceived that he wanted to oust her from its management. She was of the view that the situation that had arisen was one which was making it very difficult to run the business of the Shanghai WFOE, and that this was why she had made it clear that Mr Hsu's increased involvement in the business was unwelcome.

15. Thereafter, Mr Hsu made a further trip to Shanghai in mid-November 2002. On this occasion, he met Madam Shum, and there was some discussion of one party buying out the other, or of selling the Shanghai WFOE to a third party. On the last day of his visit, Mr Hsu says that Madam Shum insisted on seeing him, and presented him with an agreement which she wanted him to sign. This provided that matters involving Mr Hsu's loans and equity should be resolved together, that the assets of the Company should be valued, that its net asset value after deduction of all liabilities (including loans by Mr Hsu and Madam Shum) should be ascertained, that Madam Shum should acquire Mr Hsu's loans and his 49% shareholding in the Company (valued at 49% of its net asset value) for cash, within the course of 2003. Mr Hsu says that he refused to sign this document, since he had not reached any agreement in its terms with Madam Shum. About a fortnight after he returned to Hong Kong, he presented his petition for the winding up of the Company.

The course of these proceedings

16. Following the presentation of the petition, Mr Hsu applied by summons dated 20 February 2003 for the appointment of a provisional liquidator, on the basis that the assets of the Company were in jeopardy having regard to the behaviour of Madam Shum which was later to form the basis of the claim to have the Company wound up on the just and equitable ground under the amended petition. This application was heard by Chung J in May 2003, but before judgment was delivered, Mr Hsu learned from a Mr Chen Zuying, formerly the chief engineer of the Shanghai WFOE, that another WFOE called Sun Power Mould (Shanghai) Company Limited ("Sun Power Shanghai") had been set established, and that the entire business of the Shanghai WFOE appeared to have been taken over by Sun Power Shanghai, which was a subsidiary of a Hong Kong company called Sun Power Industrial Limited ("Sun Power"). Further investigations revealed many connections with Madam Shum, which I will refer to below. This discovery led to the making of a successful ex parte application for appointment of provisional liquidators before Chung J on 29 August 2003. The matters relied on in support of the ex parte application were subsequently introduced into the petition by the re-amendments made on 27 November 2003. Shortly before the hearing of the petition, the provisional liquidators made a report to the court from which it appeared that the Shanghai WFOE was no longer operational.

17. Against this background, I now turn to consider the various grounds for the making of a winding up order relied upon in the petition as it now stands.

Loss of substratum

18. I shall deal first with the ground introduced by the latest amendment to the petition, that there has been a loss of the substratum of the Company. In support of this ground, Mr Harris relied upon the statement at paragraph 15.219 of Palmer's Company Law, Vol. 3, to the effect that a winding up order under the just and equitable ground may be made where the substratum of the company has been lost, in the sense that the main object for which the company was formed has become impracticable.

19. It is clear from the report of the provisional liquidators that the Shanghai WFOE is no longer in operation. Although Madam Shum made a number of criticisms of this report, it was clear even upon her own evidence that the Shanghai WFOE is now to all intents and purposes defunct. She agreed that all of its customers have been lost, having gone over to Sun Power Shanghai, and that its employees have (with perhaps one or two exceptions) left and joined Sun Power Shanghai - indeed, Madam Shum agreed that she herself has joined Sun Power Shanghai as a technical consultant. Moreover, she accepted that the Shanghai WFOE had vacated its former premises, that its new factory was still not completed and that the Company had no funds with which to complete it. The Shanghai WFOE's plant and equipment has been sold (and is now in the possession of Sun Power Shanghai). Madam Shum has said that she spends part of her time at the Company, dealing with claims against it and the rest of her time at Sun Power Shanghai, as its technical consultant. Although Madam Shum suggested that she or Mr Hsu could still buy out the other, or that the Company could be sold to a third party, it seems to me that these suggestions are wholly implausible. On the evidence before me, the Shanghai WFOE has no business, no undertaking, and virtually no staff. It is clearly not an operating concern that would attract any third party interest. In these circumstances, the Company, whose only significant asset is the Shanghai WFOE, would not, in my view, be capable of being sold to a third party buyer. For the same reason, it does not seem to me to be reasonable to expect Mr Hsu to buy out Madam Shum. So far as Madam Shum is concerned, she does not appear to have the funds with which to buy out Mr Hsu's interest in the Company. In these circumstances, where the Shanghai WFOE is effectively defunct, it seems clear that the substratum of the Company has been lost, and that it would therefore be appropriate to make a winding up order on this ground.

Diversion of Company's business by Madam Shum

20. Mr Hsu also contends that the loss of the substratum of the Company is due to the fault of Madam Shum. It is his case that she is behind Sun Power, and that she and her family set up Sun Power and Sun Power Shanghai after the breakdown in her relations with him, with a view to diverting the business of the Shanghai WFOE to Sun Power Shanghai. In support of this allegation, Mr Hsu points to the matters of which he was informed by Mr Chen, information that is revealed by company searches in Hong Kong and China, and to material that can be found on Sun Power Shanghai's website.

21. These matters include the fact that the English names of Sun Power and Saint Power (and their respective counterparts in Shanghai) are very similar, and that there is a corresponding similarity in their names in Chinese, which differ in respect only of one character (which although rather different in sound and meaning is nonetheless close in appearance). Sun Power has, as its only shareholders and directors, members of Madam Shum's family - her husband, son and daughter. As I have noted, virtually all the staff of the Shanghai WFOE, including Madam Shum's son, now appear to be employed by Sun Power Shanghai, and Madam Shum has been engaged by Sun Power Shanghai as its technical consultant.

22. Further, it would appear from the Sun Power Shanghai website that it holds itself out as effectively the same business as that which was formerly operated by the Shanghai WFOE. Sun Power Shanghai holds itself out as having existed since 1992, and having started operations in Panyu (despite its very recent incorporation). It lists among its customers all the customers, present and former, of the Panyu and Shanghai WFOEs. It has an address that appears to be the same as that of the Shanghai WFOE's former address, and it appears on the basis of the material in the provisional liquidators' report to be making use of the Shanghai WFOE's plant and equipment. There is a reference to its intended relocation to new premises in precisely the location in which the Shanghai WFOE's new premises were to be situated.

23. Madam Shum did not dispute any of these matters. However, she said that she knew nothing of the setting up of Sun Power, or of Sun Power Shanghai. She professed only to have found out about these entities some time towards the middle of 2003, after she met former employees of the Shanghai WFOE and learnt that they had joined Sun Power. She says that she did not know that her husband and family members were involved in or interested in Sun Power and Sun Power Shanghai and that it was not until summer 2003 that she realised that her son had joined Sun Power after leaving his employment with the Shanghai WFOE. She says that although the address of the Shanghai WFOE and Sun Power appear to be the same, that is because the address is in fact an industrial development or estate, with a number of different factories and workshops. However, on being pressed by Mr Harris in cross-examination, she eventually accepted that whatever may have been the position earlier, Sun Power was now in occupation of the premises formerly occupied by the Shanghai WFOE, and that it was using the plant and machinery formerly owned by the Shanghai WFOE. She said, however, that she had nothing to do with this, having sold the plant and machinery to a third party, from whom Sun Power must have leased it. She sought to dismiss the matters set out in the Sun Power Shanghai website, which gave the clear impression that Sun Power Shanghai was essentially the same company or the successor of the Shanghai WFOE, as being a common occurrence in China.

24. I am unable to accept Madam Shum's evidence in these respects. She was clearly anxious to play down her involvement with Sun Power and Sun Power Shanghai. I find it incredible that she should have displayed such a lack of interest in what was happening in relation to the business of the Shanghai WFOE, especially having regard to her close involvement and control over its affairs, and her role in the development of its business. For these reasons, I am also unable to accept that she was not involved in the transfer of the Shanghai WFOE's customers to Sun Power Shanghai, or that she was unaware of the movement of its staff to Sun Power Shanghai when this occurred, apparently from March 2003 onwards, particularly as she was herself soon involved in the business and operations of Sun Power Shanghai as its technical consultant.

25. Moreover, it is not credible to suppose that she was unaware of her family's involvement with Sun Power. There is, so far as I am able to see, no evidence to suggest that her husband had any particular experience with the business, and I am satisfied that it is no coincidence that she is now Sun Power's technical consultant, although she does not, on the face of it, hold any shares in that company. Although Madam Shum sought to suggest that she does not keep in close touch with her other family members, a brief examination of the correspondence between the dates of steps in these proceedings and the dates on which events occurred in the setting up of Sun Power and Sun Power Shanghai provides, in my view, clear support for the conclusion that Madam Shum was closely involved in the affairs of Sun Power and its taking over of the business of the Shanghai WFOE through Sun Power Shanghai.

26. Thus, it is to my mind significant that the acquisition by Madam Shum's family of Sun Power, and the appointment of her husband, son and daughter as directors of that company, took place at the end of November 2002, less than a month after the service of the statutory demand, and just before the service of the petition, and that shares were allotted to them days after the service of the petition. Similarly, a matter of days after filing and service in February 2003 of Mr Hsu's application for the appointment of provisional liquidators to the Company, an application was made to the relevant authorities in Shanghai for the formation and setting up of Sun Power Shanghai. My attention was also drawn to the constitution of Sun Power Shanghai, which appears to have been copied from that of the Shanghai WFOE, to the extent that in one place at least, the name of the Shanghai WFOE appears in that document. Finally, it appears from the information provided by Mr Chen to Mr Hsu that the recruiting of most of the Shanghai WFOE's staff and the request to two of its customers to transfer their contracts with it to Sun Power Shanghai took place at about the same time as an initial hearing of the application for the appointment of provisional liquidators on 13 March 2003. In my view, the close correspondence of these dates strongly suggests that Madam Shum was in regular contact with her family members in connection with the setting up and development of Sun Power and Sun Power Shanghai.

27. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that the loss of the Company's substratum was the result of the acts of Madam Shum. Even if this had not been the case, I would have concluded that it was appropriate to wind up the Company having regard to the loss of its substratum, for which Mr Hsu cannot be held responsible.

Other bases for winding up on the just and equitable ground

28. I am also satisfied that quite apart from the loss of substratum, it would have been appropriate to wind up the Company having regard to the fact that it was accepted by both Mr Hsu and Madam Shum in the course of their evidence at the hearing that they no longer trust each other and cannot work together, and that this has led to deadlock in the Company.

Whether Mr Hsu was at fault

29. However, Madam Shum says that the breakdown in the relationship is due to the fault of Mr Hsu, and that he is not, therefore, entitled to present a petition on this basis. Madam Shum was of the view that the breakdown in the relationship was engineered by Mr Hsu when his request to be given a majority shareholding in the Company was rebuffed by Madam Shum.

30. Again, I am unable to accept that the fault for the breakdown lies with Mr Hsu. As I have mentioned above, it appears that Madam Shum had in fact agreed to the change in shareholding, but subsequently thought better of it and reneged on the agreement which she had reached with Mr Hsu. Although she appeared to accept this in her affirmations, at trial she sought to suggest that the agreement was in some way conditional, and that the conditions had not been fulfilled. She was, however, unable to explain what these conditions were, and I am satisfied that having initially agreed with Mr Hsu that he should have a majority shareholding to reflect the substantial financial commitment that he had made to the Company, she subsequently went back on this agreement. While it is perhaps understandable that Madam Shum should feel that it was unsatisfactory that Mr Hsu should be entitled to a majority shareholding and at the same time be entitled to recover his loans in due course, it seems to me that this overlooks the fact that shareholder's loans, even though repayable, still involve a very real amount of risk, since they are only ever likely to be repaid if the Company proves so successful that it is able to repay such loans without affecting its ability to continue in business. The provision of finance may be as important as the provision of skills and know how, if a company is to develop and grow into a profitable long term operation. Each of these contributions is of value, and there is to my mind nothing particularly surprising in financial contributions being recognised by way of shareholding, just as much as contributions in terms of skills and effort. Where the parties do not contribute equally in these respects, it is often necessary for a value to be placed on their different forms of contributions when shares in the enterprise are allotted. I therefore do not accept that having agreed to the change in shareholdings, it was open to Madam Shum to change her mind simply because the finance that Mr Hsu was providing was to be by way of shareholders loan.

31. I am also unable to see that Mr Hsu can be criticised for seeking to participate in the affairs of the Company and the Shanghai WFOE to a greater extent than he had previously done, as this seems to have been something that the parties had agreed on earlier. While I can understand that Madam Shum may have felt dissatisfied that Mr Hsu appeared likely to reap the benefits of her earlier hard work, this overlooks his financial contributions and cannot, in my view, justify the course of conduct on which I have found that she embarked in relation to Sun Power and its taking over (through Sun Power Shanghai) of virtually the whole of the business and operations of the Shanghai WFOE.

Other complaints

32. Mr Hsu also complained of a number of other matters in relation to Madam Shum's conduct, which I do not propose to deal with in any great detail as it is unnecessary to do so in the light of the views I have already expressed. Of these, perhaps the most significant related to the appointment of Madam Shum's mother as a director of the Shanghai WFOE. It is Mr Hsu's case that he was not informed of this, and that his signature on various documents of the Shanghai WFOE had been forged. Madam Shum accepted that Mr Hsu's signature had been placed on a number of corporate documents of the Shanghai WFOE by staff of the Shanghai WFOE, but said that this had been done with the authority of Mr Hsu. However, the statement of Ms Guo Li, which Madam Shum relied upon as demonstrating this, merely indicates that Mr Hsu had agreed to board resolutions being prepared and filed with the relevant authorities in respect of an increase of capital and change of address of the Shanghai WFOE, and that he authorised Ms Guo and another member of the Shanghai WFOE's staff to handle these matters, including the filing of documents with the relevant authorities in Shanghai, which required the signature of three directors. Quite apart from the fact that this statement does not indicate that Mr Hsu was aware that Madam Lam was a director of the Shanghai WFOE, it seems to me that Mr Hsu was justified in saying that while he might have agreed to the changes in capital and address, and to their being notified to the relevant authorities, there was nothing to suggest that he had authorised the forging of his signature on particular documents. He said that his own experience in relation to his own business affairs was that where his signature was needed, the documents would be sent to him for him to sign. Madam Shum was of the view that since Mr Hsu was not physically present in Shanghai at the time, there was nothing wrong with the staff of the WFOE purporting to sign documents in his name. She said that this was normal practice on the Mainland. I am unable to accept that this is acceptable commercial practice, and I am satisfied that these matters too caused a justifiable loss of confidence in Madam Shum, so far as Mr Hsu was concerned.

33. For all of the foregoing reasons, I am satisfied that the Company should be wound up on the just and equitable ground.

Whether winding up order should be made on basis of insolvency

34. Finally, I turn to consider whether the Company should also be wound up on the ground that it is insolvent. This calls for a consideration of whether or not the shareholders' loans advanced by Mr Hsu were repayable at the time that the statutory demand was served and when the petition was presented. Mr Harris accepted that for present purposes, it would suffice for Madam Shum to satisfy me that the Company's liability to repay the shareholder's loan was disputed bona fide on substantial grounds.

35. This gives rise to two issues. The first relates to the status of the HK$3.03 million odd that had been advanced by Mr Hsu during the time when the Panyu WFOE was in operation. As I have noted above, it was Madam Shum's case that this amount was a capital contribution by Mr Hsu, and not a loan.

36. At the end of the day, I do not think that a great deal turns on this particular dispute, since regardless of whether this part of the debt claimed by Mr Hsu was recoverable by him, there still remained some HK$2.54 million which Madam Shum did not dispute was truly advanced by Mr Hsu by way of loan. Nonetheless, on balance, I accept the version put forward by Mr Hsu, having regard to the fact that the advances were consistently recorded as loans in the Company's audited accounts, which were approved by both Mr Hsu and Madam Shum. It is also to be noted that at no time did the parties' respective shareholdings correspond in percentage terms with the amount of funding provided by each of them - throughout, the amount of funding made available by Mr Hsu substantially exceed that provided by Madam Shum. Had the advances that each made been by way of capital, one would ordinarily have expected this to be reflected in the number of shares issued, or perhaps by the shares being issued at a stated premium, thus making it clear that the contributions were by way of capital, and not loan. Finally, given the different roles of Mr Hsu and Madam Shum, as financier and operator of the underlying business respectively, it seems to me that it was reasonable for Madam Shum to have tried to place some value on the contribution made by each, whether in money or in the form of expertise, and to reflect this in their respective shareholdings. Even if monetary contributions made were in the form of shareholders' loans, there was nonetheless a real element of risk involved, in that if the Company proved to be unsuccessful, such loans might prove to be largely irrecoverable, so that it is not unreasonable that this element of risk should be rewarded by a more substantial degree of participation in any profits that might be made in the event that the Company's investment in the business of the WFOE proved successful.

37. This leaves the second point taken by Madam Shum. This was that, having regard to Mr Hsu's signing of a letter of financial support dated 6 September 2002 at the request of the Company's auditors in connection with the preparation of the accounts for the year ended 31 December 1999, it was not open to Mr Hsu to demand repayment of his shareholder's loan, as the Company was not yet in a position to support itself from its own operations. In his evidence, Mr Hsu's position on this was that the letter was a formality that was required in connection with the particular set of accounts, to enable the accountants to provide an audit report on the basis that the company was a going concern. In his submissions, Mr Harris (while not accepting that the representation contained in this letter was binding on Mr Hsu) said that this representation would in any event only hold good until the next representation letter was sought, at which time it would be open to Mr Hsu to change his mind.

38. In my view, although the letter was not addressed to the Company, it was nonetheless a representation to the auditors, and to the Company (since the letter, like those in respect of previous sets of accounts, was addressed to the directors of the Company, and would have been seen by Madam Shum, who was also required to sign it), of Mr Hsu's intentions in relation to his shareholder's loan at the time when the letter was provided. It seems to me that it is at least arguable that the Company was entitled to rely on that representation in carrying on its business. I do not think that the letter can be read as being limited to the particular accounting year with which the accounts in question were concerned, since it seems to me that it was necessary for Mr Hsu to give the representation as a true statement of his intentions at the time when it was given (i.e. on 6 September 2002), in order for the auditors to be able to provide an audit report in respect of the Company on the going concern basis as at that date. If the position had been that Mr Hsu had (on 6 September 2002) told the auditors that he had not had, as at the relevant year end, any intention to call in his shareholder's loan as long as the Company required his financial support, but that this was not the case any longer, this would have been something that the auditors would have had to consider in determining whether or not the going concern basis was an appropriate one for the preparation of the accounts of the Company.

39. It is also notable that Mr Hsu said that when the auditors approached him sometime in November 2002 in connection with the next set of accounts, for the year ended 31 December 2000, he made it clear to them that, unlike the position in relation to previous accounts, he would not sign such a letter, as he no longer intended to support the Company (having by then served a statutory demand on the Company). In the event, a letter dated 16 December 2002 was signed by Madam Shum alone, and Mr Hsu's refusal to confirm his continuing support for the Company was reflected in the notes to the audited accounts of the Company for the year ended 31 December 2000. Thus, by the time that Madam Shum came to sign the letter dated 16 December 2002, she and the Company would have been aware that Mr Hsu's position had changed.

40. However, in these circumstances, it seems to me to be at least arguable that the representation was one which was binding on Mr Hsu, at the time that it was given, and cannot be regarded as being of no effect whatsoever. On this basis, it would appear that it is accepted by Mr Harris that that it was binding on Mr Hsu until the time came for the next set of accounts to be prepared. But it was not until around 16 December 2002, after the presentation of the petition, that Madam Shum signed a support letter on her own, without Mr Hsu's signature.

41. For these reasons, I would have been of the view that as at the date of presentation of the petition, the debt relied upon by Mr Hsu was capable of being disputed in good faith on substantial grounds, and therefore would not have supported the petition as at that date.

Conclusions

42. I do not think that this means that it is not open to me to make a winding up petition on the basis of the matters which have emerged thereafter, since it seems clear that a winding up order should be made on the just and equitable ground, particularly in the light of the subsequent developments in relation to the Company. It seems to me that in considering whether or not to make a winding up order, it is appropriate to have regard to the state of affairs at the time when the petition is heard (see Re Fildes Bros Ltd [1970] 1 WLR 592).

43. I therefore conclude that it would be appropriate to make the usual winding up order in relation to the Company. However, so far as the costs are concerned, having regard to my conclusion that it would not have been appropriate to make the order on the basis of the debt relied upon by Mr Hsu, I propose to make an order nisi that Madam Shum should pay Mr Hsu his costs as from the date when the petition was amended to introduce the just and equitable ground as a basis for the making of a winding up order, but that there should be no order as to costs prior to that, such costs to be taxed on the party and party basis if not agreed.

(Aarif Barma)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Representation:

Mr Jonathan Harris, instructed by Messrs Dibb Luption Alsop, for the Petitioner

Company: Saint Power Industrial Limited, absent

The Opposing Contributory: Ms Shum Siu Han, in person

Attendance excused for the Official Receiver

35105-EN-2003-03-13

RE SAINT POWER INDUSTRIAL LTD

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HCCW001309/2002

HCCW 1309/2002

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES WINDING-UP PROCEEDINGS NO. 1309 OF 2002

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IN THE MATTER of SAINT POWER INDUSTRIAL LIMITED

AND

IN THE MATTER of the Companies Ordinance (Cap. 32)

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Coram: Deputy High Court Judge Barma, S.C. in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 13 March 2003

Date of Judgment: 13 March 2003

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J U D G M E N T

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1. I have before me an application for the appointment of provisional liquidators in respect of Saint Power Industrial Limited. The petition was presented on 28 November 2002. It is a creditor's petition based on loans which the Petitioner says he extended to the Company during a period of some ten years between 1992 and 2002.

2. The Petitioner is also a shareholder of the Company holding some 49% of its issued shares. The other 51% is held by a Madam Shum Siu Han. Apart from being the only two shareholders, the Petitioner and Madam Shum are the only directors of the Company.

3. The Petition first came on for hearing on 10 February 2003 when Kwan J ordered the Company to file and serve its evidence in opposition to the petition within three weeks, by 3 March 2003. The Company on that occasion was represented by the same solicitors and counsel who appeared before me today.

4. On 20 February 2003, the Petitioner took out the summons which is before me today, seeking the appointment of provisional liquidators. At the same time, its solicitors wrote to the Company's solicitors suggesting that any evidence in opposition to the application for appointment of provisional liquidators be filed by 3 March (the same as the date that had been fixed or directed for the filing of the evidence in opposition to the winding-up petition) so that the Petitioner could then file a response by the end of the week in order to enable the hearing fixed for today to be effective.

5. The Petitioner's affirmation in support of the application refers to a number of matters which he says cause him to be concerned as to the preservation of the Company's assets. The Company's main assets appear to be two subsidiary companies, both of which are mainland companies incorporated on the Mainland as wholly foreign-owned enterprises ("WFOE"s). On of them is in Panyu and the other in Shanghai. The Shanghai WFOE appears to be the more important on the two subsidiaries.

6. The Petitioner claims that he has been excluded from the management of the Shanghai WFOE; that a third director, believed to be Madam Shum's mother, has apparently been appointed to the Shanghai WFOE without his knowledge or involvement; that there were minutes of a board meeting which he said he did not attend, to the business of which he did not agree and in respect of which his signature is said to have been forged. There was also reference to a loan which had, it was said, been taken without board approval and of denial of access to financial information in respect of the Shanghai WFOE.

7. No response was made by the Company to this affirmation, or indeed to the letter of the Petitioner's solicitors suggesting the timetable for filing of evidence, until 7 March 2003, following a reminder from the Plaintiff's solicitors on 4 March 2003, in which they observed that no evidence had been filed and put down a marker suggesting that they would take it that no opposition would be forthcoming.

8. On 7 March 2003, those representing the Company today said, in a letter to the Petitioner's solicitors, that they were preparing the Company's evidence. Nor was there any evidence filed in opposition to the winding-up petition by 3 March as had been directed by Kwan J. In fact, evidence was not filed until either late on Tuesday or perhaps some time yesterday. That evidence suggests that the loans which are relied upon are disputed. It is suggested that the contributions for funds by Mr Hsu were more in the form of investments rather than loans notwithstanding that they were booked in the Company's books as loans, and that the reason for this was that it was more convenient to use the Company as the intermediate vehicle for holding the interests of Mr Hsu and Madam Shum in the WFOEs which were intended to be the true investment vehicles.

9. It is said that it was agreed that these loans although booked as shareholder's loans would not, in fact, be repayable and represented capital contributions. The affirmation also seeks to refute the allegations which the Petitioner has made and relied on as showing jeopardy to the assets of the Company.

10. This morning, a further complication arose. On 10 March 2002, this Monday, the solicitors for the Petitioner enquired of those acting for the Company whether they had, in fact, authority to do so. In the course of yesterday, a supplemental skeleton argument from the Petitioner's representatives indicated that the question of authority would be raised as a preliminary point at today's hearing.

11. This morning, Ms Ismail submitted on behalf of the Petitioner that there could not be any proper authorization for those purporting to act on behalf of the Company, in fact, to act for the Company, as there could not have been any proper resolution instructing the solicitors to act for the Company. This was so because Mr Hsu, being one of the only two directors, had not participated in any board meeting at which such authority was conferred.

12. Although there was initially a suggestion that there might be some form of estoppel arising from the fact that the point had not been taken when the same solicitors and counsel appeared before Kwan J on 10 February 2002, I did not understand this point to be seriously pursued nor in my view could it have been, since the question of authority is one which cannot be waived and is a matter which the court could raise on its own initiative.

13. It appears that those appearing for the Company now effectively concede that there is not yet authority entitling them to act for the Company. But it is suggested that they could get it by a general meeting of shareholders since the board is deadlocked. Mr Wong, appearing ostensibly on behalf of the Company, asked me to order that a meeting of the shareholders of the Company be held pursuant to s. 114B of the Companies Ordinance. That provision gives the court power to order the holding of a general meeting of the Company where it is impractical for the Company to convene one.

14. Ms Ismail objected to this course on the basis that no notice had been given of such an application, which was not supported by summons or affidavit. She also submitted that it could not be considered that the outcome of such meeting or the outcome of any attempts to convene such a meeting would be a foregone conclusion. She referred me to certain passages in the evidence indicating that there might have been some agreement for the adjustment of the shareholdings in the Company. The validity or binding nature of this agreement appears, however, to be disputed.

15. Ms Ismail also pointed out that quite apart from this court having to be satisfied that it was impracticable to convene a meeting, it was also necessary for the court to exercise its discretion as to whether or not a meeting should be convened. It seems to me that in a situation such this, where, although the petition appears on the face of it to be a creditor's petition, there are matters that indicate that there is some discussion between the shareholders, and that the Company is in a situation of deadlock, it may be open to argument whether it would be appropriate in that situation to order a shareholders' meeting to be convened for the purpose of authorizing the Company to defend the petition. It may be, although I make no final ruling on the matter, and would not wish to fetter the hands of any judge who may subsequently hear the matter, that having regard to the fact that there seems to be a serious dispute between the two shareholders, that it might be thought inappropriate for the Company's funds, which would appear in any event to be fairly limited, to be expended in defence of such a petition. It may be that an analogy might be more closely drawn with the situation in a just and equitable winding-up, or s. 168A petition in which the normal course is for the Company to be joined as a nominal Defendant and where the funding of the litigation is left to the two camps of shareholders.

16. Mr Wong urged me to have regard to what he was described as the practical realities of the situation. But it seems to me that, on the material which I have seen so far, the position is far from clear and it would be desirable to have the issue of whether or not a meeting of the Company should be convened under s. 114B to be properly dealt with if it is to be pursued.

17. In relation to the question of deadlock I have just mentioned, Ms Ismail relied on Art. 15(11) of the Company's Articles of Association, which appear to be apt to cover the appointment of legal representatives, and suggested that the power to do so lies with the board. Mr Wong submitted that on the basis of Art. 82 of Table A, it was clear that the Company in general meeting could override the board if necessary in this respect. It was submitted that the terms of Art. 82 of Table A were clear and that there could be no reasonable interpretation to the contrary. With respect, I do not agree.

18. In the most recent edition of GoreBrowne on Companies, at paragraph 26.4, the comment is made that the old former English article under the English Companies Act 1948 that is equivalent to Art. 82 of our Table A (Art. 80 of the English Table A) is in fairly obscure terms. However, one thing that appears to be settled is that where the word 'regulations' appears in that Article it means it has been treated as meaning 'articles'. So interpreted, it would appear that Art. 82 of Table simply provides that the shareholders' functions are as given to them by the articles, or as they may change the articles to provide. That said however, it also appears from Gore-Browne that, where the board is deadlocked cannot or will not act, the shareholders may step in to take decisions which otherwise would properly be within the province of the board.

19. For these reasons, it seems to me that it may be possible if those on the Company's side think it appropriate to do so, to seek a direction from the court that a general meeting be convened pursuant to

s. 114B of the Ordinance. However, for the reasons which I have given, I do not think that it would be appropriate for me to give such a direction today, without a proper application and evidence going first, to the practicability of convening a meeting, and secondly, to the manner in which the court should exercise its discretion in that regard.

20. I would also point out that one should not overlook the fact that it may well be possible for Madam Shum to oppose the petition in her own capacity, either as a creditor or perhaps as a contributory. If she were to do so, it would no doubt be equally open to her to oppose the appointment of provisional liquidators. I therefore conclude, as things stand, that it does not appear that those claiming to act for the Company today have the authority to do so.

21. The question then arises as to what to do with the application for the appointment of provisional liquidators. I have been urged by Ms Ismail to go ahead with it, and to ignore the evidence filed, whether on behalf of Madam Shum or the Company, as the case may be, and to make a determination on the basis of the uncontradicted evidence of the Petitioner.

22. However, I do not think it would be right to do that. It is clear that there are points to be put forward against the appointment of the provisional liquidator, whether by the Company or by Madam Shum. I do not think it would be appropriate at this stage for me to pass judgment on any of these points, other than to say that there are clearly matters that need to be dealt with.

23. I also bear in mind that, although the application for a provisional liquidator to be appointed is something that should ordinarily be dealt with expeditiously, it is fair to say in this case that the matters that have been relied upon by the Petitioner seem to have been known to the Petitioner at about the time that the Petition was presented, nearly some two months before the application was actually taken out. It was not clear whether these matters were known to the Petitioner earlier than the filing of the Petition but in any case it seems that they were aware of these matters or substantially all of these matters by that point. So far as I can see, no explanation for the delay in making the application for the appointment of a provisional liquidator has been put forward in the evidence.

24. In those circumstances, it seems to me that it would not be inappropriate to adjourn the matter for further consideration at a later date. It seems also that it would, in any event, have been necessary to have an adjournment for some period (whether substantial or short) because of the recent filing of evidence in opposition to the application, to which I understand that the Petitioner would wish to reply.

25. For those reasons, it seems to me that it would be inappropriate to seek to dispose of the application today without giving those who oppose the appointment of a provisional liquidator a chance to put their house in order. I would, therefore, propose to adjourn today's hearing to a date to be fixed. In the meantime, those currently on the record for the Company can take such steps as they think appropriate to rectify their position, and I shall hear submissions as to the costs of today.

(Aarif Barma, SC)
Deputy High Court Judge

Representation:

Ms Roxanne Ismail, instructed by Messrs Dibb Lupton Alsop, for the Petitioner

Mr Anson Wong, instructed by Messrs Y L Yeung & Co., for the Company

Mr M K Tam, instructed by Official Receiver (excused granted)