THE INCORPORATED OWNERS OF KWAI WAN INDUSTRIAL BUILDING v. KWAI FUNG INDUSTRIAL LTD

LDBM208, 209, 210,
212, 222, 226 & 20/2002
(consolidated)

IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

BUILDING MANAGEMENT APPLICATION NO. 208 OF 2002

-----------------------

-----------------------

(Consolidated by the Order of His Honour Judge Yung dated
10 October 2002 and the Orders of Deputy District
Judge Wong dated 5 November 2002 and 13 February 2003)

Before : Hon Chu J in chambers

--------------------

JUDGMENT

--------------------

1.  This is the appeal of the respondent in LDBM 20 of 2002 against the decision of the Master made on 15 July 2004 staying the taxation proceedings in respect of its Bill of Costs.

Background

2.  According to the records of the Land Registry, the Incorporated Owners of Kwai Wan Industrial Building (“IO”) has the following management committees since 1999:

3.  The management committee appointed in 1999 with Chan Koon Keung as the treasurer is named as the respondent in LDBM 20/2002.  It is also the appellant in the present appeal.  The management committee appointed on 16 October 2003 and that appointed on 2 December 2003 are the same management committee except that the secretary and the treasurer had swapped their positions (“collectively referred to as “Chan Pui Ying’s MC”).

4.  On 5 January 2002, Chan Pui Ying, one of the owners of the building, instituted Application No. LDBM 20/2002 in the Lands Tribunal, claiming for declarations that the management committee of the IO had since 31 December 2001 become incapacitated and was defunct and, alternatively, ceased to be a valid management committee, and their acts, decisions and resolutions were void, and for a dissolution of the management committee as well as the appointment of an administrator. 

5.  Initially, the respondent named in the Application was the IO, but it was subsequently amended to become: “The Management Committee (lastly with the treasurer Mr Chan Koon Keung) of the Incorporated Owners of Kwai Wan Industrial Building”.  It appears that the amendment was made in the light of the Lands Tribunal decision in Chan Yip Keung & Leung Shiu Kuen v. The Incorporated Owners of Belvedere Garden Phase II and Chiang Shu To (unreported) LDBM 54/2002, a decision of the lands Tribunal delivered on 9.9.2002.  I shall return to this aspect in the latter part of this Judgment.

6.  Subsequently in 2002, the IO acting by the management committee appointed on 1 March 2002 with Chan Koon Keung as the chairman (“the 2002 MC”) instituted LDBM 208, 209, 210, 212, 222 and 226 against Chan Pui Ying and the owners of six other units in the building, for arrears in management fees and interest.  The owners defended the claims on a number of grounds and counterclaimed for relief similar to those claimed in LDBM 20/2002.

7.  By three orders made on 10 October, 5 November 2002 and 13 February 2003, all the seven Applications were consolidated.  Despite that the Applications involve different plaintiffs and that Chan Pui Ying is the plaintiff in LDBM 20/2002 but a defendant in LDBM 222/2002, there were no consequential directions on the conduct of proceedings and parties that usually accompany a consolidation: see Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2004 vol.1 para.4/9/2. 

8.  In the consolidated proceedings, the IO and the respondent in LDBM 20/2002 were represented by the same firm of solicitors, Messrs. M K Lam & Co (“MKL”) until 23 October 2003 when their retainer was terminated by the IO acting by Chan Pui Ying’s MC.  On the other hand, Chan Pui Ying and the respondents in the other Applications were represented by the same firm of solicitors.  Subsequently on 27 January 2003, both the claim and counterclaim in Application No. LDBM 226/2002 were withdrawn, but there was no de-consolidation of the application.

The costs orders of the Lands Tribunal

9.  The consolidated proceedings underwent a 9-days trial in July and August 2003.  In a reserved judgment handed down on 6 November 2003, Deputy District Judge Wong gave judgment for the IO’s claims and dismissed the owners’ counterclaims in Applications No. LDBM 208 to 210, 212 and 222/2002 as well as Chan Pui Ying’s claim in Application No. LDBM 20/2002.  The judge further made the following cost orders nisi (“the 6-11-2003 costs order”):

(1)	In Applications No. LDBM 208 to 210, 212 and 222/2002, the respondent owners shall pay the party-and-party costs of the IO, to be taxed on District Court scale if not agreed, together with a certificate for counsel.
(2)	In Application No. LDBM 20/2002, the applicant shall pay the party-and-party costs of the respondent, to be taxed on District Court scale if not agreed, together with a certificate for counsel.

10.  By its own terms, the costs order nisi became absolute 14 days after the handing down of the judgment.  On 14 January 2004, upon the application of the respondent in LDBM 20/2002 by summons filed on 3 December 2003 for a review, Deputy District Judge Wong ordered inter alia, the costs of the consolidated Application Nos. 208 to 210, 212, 222 and 226 of 2002 be paid by the respondents in LDBM 208 to 210, 212 and 222/2002 and the applicant in LDBM 20/2002, to the applicant in LDBM 208 to 210, 212 and 222/2002 and the respondent in LDBM 20/2002, to be taxed on District Court scale,if not agreed, with certificate for counsel (“the 14-1-2004 costs order”).  

11.  Although this had not been set out in clear terms, it would appear that the 14-1-2004 costs order is intended to be additional to the 6-11-2003 costs order.  According to Mr Lau who appears for the respondent in LDBM 20/2002 in this appeal, it was considered that the terms of the 6-11-2003 costs order did not cover the costs of the consolidated proceedings, and the 14-1-2004 costs order was to address this.  I am however unable to understand why the 14-1-2002 costs order did not exclude the costs of the consolidated proceedings relating to LDBM 226/2002 given that the claim and counterclaim in LDBM 226/2002 had been withdrawn in January 2003.  As this is not a point in issue in this appeal, I shall not labour on the point and shall leave it to the parties to sort it out.

Other proceedings on the validity of the management committees

9.    Returning to the factual background of the matter, on 24 October 2003, the 2002 MC commenced Application LDBM 310/2003 in the name of the IO against the members of Chan Pui Ying’s MC and other owners, claiming for inter alia, declarations that Chan Pui Ying’s MC was not a valid management committee of the IO and could not perform the duties and exercise the powers of the IO.

10.    On 4 November 2003, the members of Chan Pui Ying’s MC instituted High Court Action No. 4083 of 2003 against the members of the 2002 MC claiming, inter alia, a declaration that they were duly appointed on 16 October 2003 as the members of the management committee of the IO.  The proceedings in the Lands Tribunal and in the High Court are in progress.

Taxation of the costs orders of the Lands Tribunal

11.    On 3 March 2004, the respondent in LDBM 20/2002 took out taxation proceedings to tax the costs of LDBM 20/2002 and of the consolidated Applications.  The Appointment to Tax and the Bill of Costs are taken out in the sole name of the respondent in LDBM 20/2002 and are directed against the applicant in LDBM 20/2002 and all the respondents in LDBM 208 to 210, 212 and 222/2002.  Part I of the Bill of Costs relates to the costs of LDBM 20/2002 and is taxed pursuant to the 6-11-2003 costs order.  Part II of the Bill of Costs covers the costs of the consolidated Applications and is taxed pursuant to the 14-1-2004 costs order.

12. On 8 April 2004, Messrs Johnnie Yam, Jacky Lee & Co (“JYJL”) issued a summons on behalf of the IO seeking to stay the taxation proceedings pending the determination of LDBM 310/2003 and HCA 4083/2003.  On 12 July 2004, JYJL issued another summons on behalf of the IO applying for leave for “the Incorporated Owners of Kwai Wan Industrial Building (of which the Management Committee was erected on 16 October 2003 with Madam Chan Pui Ying as chairman)” to intervene in the taxation proceedings and to be joined as a party thereto on the ground that it has interest which is directly related or connected to the subject matter of the taxation proceedings.

13. On 15 July 2004, the Master heard both summonses.  He granted the summons for stay, dismissed the intervener summons and reserved the costs of the summonses.  On 19 July 2004, the respondent in LDBM 20/2002 issued the present Notice of Appeal.

The appeal

14. The respondent in LDBM 20/2002 argues that the stay is not justified for the following reasons:

(1)	It was sued in LDBM 20/2002 as a legal entity separate from the IO and not as an agent of the IO.
(2)	The IO has no interest in the taxation proceedings.  Its summons to intervene had been dismissed, from which there is no appeal.
(3)	It does not require the authority of the IO to proceed with the taxation proceedings because it is a legal entity separate and independent from the IO, and also because in LDBM 20/2002, MKL only acted for it and not for the IO.
(4)	The disputes in LDBM 310/2003 and HCA 4083/2003 do not prevent the respondent in LDBM 20/2002 from proceeding to taxation of costs ordered in its favour (as opposed to costs of the IO) against the respondent owners in the consolidated Applications.

15. The IO acting by Chan Pui Ying’s MC on the other hand argues that the stay is necessary.  The argument is mainly twofold.  Firstly, it is said that the respondent in LDBM 20/2002 has since ceased to be in office and has become defunct such that it has no capacity to proceed with any proceedings.  Secondly, it is argued that the respondent in LDBM 20/2002 does not have the authority of the IO to enforce the costs orders or to proceed with the taxation proceedings.  Additionally, the IO questions the holdings that a management committee is a legal entity and that each term of management committee is by itself a separate legal entity.  Mr Chan who appears for the IO acknowledges that he is embarrassed in raising the point despite that both legal representatives appearing at the trial had agreed that a management committee is a legal entity.  

The appearance of the IO at the appeal and the authority of JYJL

16.  At the hearing of the appeal, Mr Lau makes preliminary challenges to the locus standi of the IO to be present at this appeal and also the authority of JYJL to act for the IO at the appeal.  It is contended that with the validity of the Chan Pui Ying’s MC remains unresolved, JYJL cannot rely on its instructions and purports to act for the IO.

17.  In my view, the IO acting by the Chan Pui Ying’s MC is entitled to appear at this appeal.  Firstly, the present appeal stems from an order of the Master made upon the IO’s application for stay.  Secondly, it is not correct to say that the IO has no interest in the taxation proceedings.  Contrary to the assertions of the respondent in LDBM 20/2002, the Bill of Costs in question is not confined to its costs, but has included the costs of the IO.  Part II of the Bill covers the costs of MKL and the fees of counsel retained by the firm in the consolidated proceedings.  Given that MKL acted for both the IO and the respondent in LDBM 20/2002 and that the Bill of Costs was taken out in the sole name of the respondent in LDBM 20/2002, there should have been an apportionment of the costs of the consolidated proceedings to reflect the rule that the respondent in LDBM 20/2002 is only entitled to its proportion of the general costs of proceedings taken jointly on its and the IO’s behalf plus any costs specifically incurred on its behalf: Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2004 vol. 1 para.62/7/1.  However, there was no apportionment of the costs and fees in Part II of the Bill of Costs.  Further, even if there were proper apportionment of the costs incurred for the consolidated proceedings, the taxation of the Bill of Costs will still have a bearing on the IO’s costs entitlements vis-à-vis the owners who had lost in the consolidated Applications.  As such, the IO must have an interest in the taxation proceedings. 

18.  The IO, being a party in the consolidated proceedings and affected by the costs orders giving rise to the taxation proceedings and whose interest stands to be affected by the taxation proceedings, must be entitled to appear in the taxation proceedings and this appeal. The dismissal of the IO’s summons to intervene is irrelevant because the IO is already a party and it does not need to intervene.

19.  As to the authority of JYJL to act for the IO, there is before the court evidence of their appointment in the form of minutes of a meeting of Chan Pui Ying’s MC held on 6 April 2004.  The Land Registry records also show Chan Pui Ying’s MC as the current management committee of the IO.  Although the validity of the meeting and the appointment of Chan Pui Ying’s MC is being challenged in the pending Lands Tribunal and High Court proceedings, there is as yet no determination in favour of the challenge and there is also no order restraining Chan Pui Ying’s MC from acting in the name of the IO.  There is thus insufficient basis to dispute the authority of JYJL to act for the IO.  It is also to be noted that JYJL has explicitly indicated in the Notice to Act filed on 8 April 2004 and the summonses that it was solicitors for the IO acting by the management committee with Chan Pui Ying as the chairman.

Justifications for staying the taxation proceedings

20.  The central point in the arguments advanced by the respondent in LDBM 20/2002 against staying the taxation proceedings is that it is a legal entity and can act separately and independently of the IO with regard to the costs orders in question.  In relation to the legal status of the respondent in LDBM 20/2002, Deputy District Judge Wong had held that each term of the management committee of the IO constituted a separate legal entity, and there has been no appeal from his judgment.  However, as noted above, at the trial before the Judge, counsel for the IO and the respondent in LDBM 20/2002 and solicitor who appeared for the other parties were in agreement that, as a matter of law, a management committee is a legal entity distinct from the incorporated owners.  The point was therefore not argued.  Although he regarded it to be a complicated question of law, the Judge felt constrained in view of the parties’ stance, to accept that a management committee is on its own a legal entity capable of bringing and defending legal proceedings.  Proceeding on this conceded or assumed basis, the Judge went on to hold, for reasons given, that each term of management committee is a legal entity on its own: see paragraphs 8 and 12-16 of the judgment.   

21.  For my part, I am unable to agree that in law, a management committee of an incorporated owners is a legal entity distinct from the incorporated owners.  The legal position of a management committee has been succinctly summarized by His Honour Judge L Chan in the recent decision of 恆麗園業主立案法團第四屆管理委員會 訴 恆麗園業主立案法團第二屆管理委員會及恆麗園業主立案法團第三屆管理委員會 (unreported) LDBM 73 of 2004 at para.6 as follows:

“A management committee of an incorporated owners of a multi-storey building or a housing estate is just like the board of directors of a limited company. The company is a legal person but the board of directors is not. The fact that section 45 of the Building Management Ordinance, Cap. 344 has included a management committee as one of the persons who is competent to commence proceedings in the Tribunal under that section is, without more, insufficient to make the management committee a legal person. When the interest of the company is in issue, it is the company that can sue or be sued in its own name, not the board of directors. The board of directors is not a legal person independent of the company. The same applies to an incorporated owners and its management committee.”

22.  I will additionally point out that a management committee is in essence a body of natural persons who are the officer bearers of the incorporated owners.  Their appointments are regulated by the Building Management Ordinance.  They are appointed for the purpose of carrying out the powers and duties of, and to make collective decisions for the incorporated owners, through and under the name of the management committee.  Insofar as they are intra vires, decisions and acts taken by the members of a management committee are not only the decisions and acts of the management committee, but also those of the incorporated owners.  It follows that the mere inclusion of a management committee as one of the persons competent to commence proceedings in the Lands Tribunal under section 45 of the Building Management Ordinance does not make a management committee a legal entity.  It is therefore difficult to see the legal basis for a management committee being regarded as a legal entity independent from the incorporated owners.

23.  Apart from this, it is clear from section 29 of the Building Management Ordinance, which delegates the powers and duties of the incorporated owners to the management committee, that a management committee is the agent of the owners incorporated.  It follows that, irrespective of whether it is a legal entity, a management committee must act under the authority and mandate of the incorporated owners.  It is thus untenable that a management committee does not require the authority of the incorporated owners to proceed with the enforcement of the rights and entitlements of the incorporated owners it enjoys directly or indirectly through the management committee. 

24.  Accordingly, it is not open to the respondent in LDBM 20/2002 to argue that it is a legal entity separate and independent from the IO and is not an agent of the IO.  It also cannot say that it does not require the authority of the IO to enforce the 6-11-2003 and the 14-1-2004 costs orders and to proceed to taxation thereunder.

25.  Taking the matter one step further, it is not in issue that the appointment of the respondent in LDBM 20/2002 came to an end with the appointment of the 2002 MC.  The respondent in LDBM 20/2002 has become defunct and can no longer carry out the delegated powers and duties of the IO.  Irrespective of whether it is a legal entity, it simply does not have authority to act for the IO.  Hence, if, as held, a management committee is a legal entity and that each term of the management committee is a legal entity in itself, the inescapable conclusion is that the respondent in LDBM 20/2002 has become incapacitated and non-existent.  It is in no position to enforce whatever rights and interests it might have acquired, whether in its own right or on behalf of the IO, during the time when it was in office.  It follows that it cannot enforce the costs orders in question and to proceed to taxation thereunder.  In my view, this state of affairs illustrates the difficulties intrinsic in the contention that a management committee is in itself a legal entity and that different management committees are separate legal entities.  Given that there is bound to be a new management committee every two years: paragraph 5(1) of Second Schedule of the Building Management Ordinance, there will be great difficulties in enforcing orders and judgments made in favour of or against a particular management committee. 

26.  In the circumstances, there are grave doubts as to the capacity and authority of the respondent in LDBM 20/2002 to commence and to carry on the present taxation proceedings.  Unless and until these doubts have been resolved and removed, it is right that the taxation proceedings should be stayed.  The Master is therefore correct in ordering a stay of the taxation proceedings.

27.  The respondent in LDBM 20/2002 has submitted that it is not in the interest of the IO to withhold the taxation proceedings and that Chan Pui Ying’s MC in causing the IO to stay the taxation proceedings is acting mala fide and for the interest of Chan Pui Ying and the other owners who had lost in the consolidated Applications.  There is no doubt that the respondent in LDBM 20/2002 and the 2002 MC, on the one hand, and Chan Pui Ying’s MC, on the other hand, hold different views over the costs orders and their enforcement.  However, the propriety and fides of the acts of Chan Pui Ying’s MC are not in issue in these taxation proceedings.  If need be, they have to be litigated in other forum.  The fact is the IO acting by Chan Pui Ying’s MC has, as it is entitled to and rightly so, called into question the capacity and authority of the respondent in LDBM 20/2002 to proceed with the taxation proceedings, and however much the proceedings may be for the benefit of the IO, it is the court’s duties to see to it that legal proceedings are properly brought and constituted.

Conclusion

28.  For the above reasons, the appeal is dismissed.  Applying the normal rule of costs follow event, I also make an order nisi that the appellant pays the IO the costs of the appeal, to be taxed if not agreed.

Mr Kenneth C L Chan and Mr Herbert Y F Leung instructed by Messrs. Johnnie Yam, Jacky Lee & Co. for the Incorporated Owners of Kwai Wan Industrial Building (of which the Management Committee was elected on 16 October 2003 with Chan Pui Ying as the chairman)

Mr Walter Lau instructed by Messrs. M K Lam & Co. for the Management Committee (lastly with the Treasurer Mr Chan Koon Keung) of the Incorporated Owners of Kwai Wan Industrial Building, the respondent in LDBM 20/2002.

LDBM 208/2002
LDBM 209/2002
LDBM 210/2002
LDBM 212/2002
LDBM 222/2002
LDBM 226/2002
LDBM 20/2002
（合併案件）

香港特別行政區

土地審裁處

建築物管理申請編號2002年第208號

_____________________

______________________

（依據容耀榮法官於2002年10月10日及黃一鳴暫委法官於
2002年11月5日及2003年2月13日所作之命令予以合併）

________________

判案書

________________

背景

1． 本案原先涉及七宗案件，不過本席已於2003年1月27日批准在案件編號LDBM226/2002中之申請人及答辯人分別撤回其申請及反申索。因此，本案之審訊只涉及餘下之六宗案件，即案件編號LDBM208/2002、LDBM209/2002、LDBM210/2002、LDBM212/2002、LDBM222/2002及LDBM20/2002。

2． 在案件編號LDBM208/2002、LDBM209/2002、LDBM210/2002、LDBM212/2002及LDBM222/2002中之申請人均為香港新界葵涌永健路2號葵灣工業大廈（“該大廈”）之業主立案法團（“該法團”）。在案件編號LDBM208/2002、LDBM209/2002、LDBM210/2002、LDBM212/2002及LDBM222/2002中之答辯人分別為該大廈之1B單位、5B單位、5C單位、10C單位及14A單位之註冊業主（分別稱為“1B業主”、“5B業主”、“5C業主”、“10C業主”及“14A業主”）。在案件編號LDBM20/2002中之申請人為14A業主，而答辯人則為該法團最後以陳觀強先生為司庫之管理委員會（“該管委會”）。

3. 在案件編號LDBM208/2002、LDBM209/2002、LDBM210/2002、LDBM212/2002及LDBM222/2002中，該法團對1B業主、5B業主、5C業主、10C業主及14A業主所作出的申請都是要求各有關業主支付欠交的管理費和計算至2002年8月1日之利息（分別為53,370.21元、75,140元、105,787.85元、116,260.40元及11,183.34元）、150元徵收管理費費用、田土廳註冊的費用(分別為4,325元、4,325元、4,365元、4,340元及4,340元)及由2002年8月1開始計算的利息和按彌償基準計算的訟費。

4. 各有關業主所提出的答辯理由都是一樣，即是說：-

(1)	該法團無權、無地位及/或喪失能力提出有關申請；
(2)	該管委會人數不足；
(3)	由於陳觀強先生無權召開大會，2002年1月23日及其押後所開的會議無效；
(4)	2002年2月28日委任的管理委員會無效，原因是有4名委員都是同一業主的代表和1名委員並不是業主或業主代表，以致管理委員會委員人數少過法定數目；
(5)	在召開2002年1月23日業主大會之前，該法團不接納沒有公司印章的委託書；
(6)	該法團未有妥善管理該大廈；
(7)	陳觀強先生濫用權力；及
(8)	該法團未有履行《建築物管理條例》（“該條例”）第27(1)條、第27(1)(A)條、附表3第1(1)(b)段及附表6第2段條文所述的職責。

5. 14A業主在案件編號LDBM222/2002中則提出多一項答辯理由，即是說，她已於2002年3月20日支付72,738元給該法團作為管理費的最終和完滿和解。

6. 各有關業主所提出的反申索亦都是一樣，即是說：

(1) 宣告該法團的管理委員會自2001年12月31日起喪失能力或無效；

(2) 宣告該法團的管理委員會自2001年12月31日起所作的一切均無效；

(3) 解散該法團的管理委員會；及

(4) 委任一名管理人。

7. 14A業主在案件編號LDBM20/2002中所作出的申請與上述的反申索都是一樣，但所針對的是該管委會。原先在案件編號LDBM20/2002中的答辯人亦都是該法團，不過經修改後變為該管委會。代表各有關業主的陳律師認為一個管理委員會有其自己的法律實體，與業主立案法團不同，因此須要作出這方面的修改，陳律師的見解是基於周兆熊法官在Chan Yip Keung and Leung Shiu Kuen v. The Incorporated Owners of Belvedere Garden Phase II and Chiang Shu To (蔣書濤), LDBM54/2002一案中的裁決而作出。

8. 其實管理委員會是否真的有其法律實體是一個很複雜的法律問題，不過代表該法團及該管委會的劉大律師同意陳律師的見解，並未就此項法律觀點提出爭論。在雙方同意及沒有爭論的情況下，本席只可接受管理委員會有其法律實體，可以提出訴訟，亦可作為答辯人。

9. 不過在結案陳詞時，陳律師提出另一個法律觀點須要本席作出裁決。陳律師認為一個業主立案法團，由始至終，不論經過多少次業主大會選舉，都只得一個管理委員會。換句話說，管理委員會內的委員可以因每一屆的選舉而產生不同的委員，但管理委員會亦只是同一個管理委員會，不會分為第一屆、第二屆或第幾屆管理委員會。劉大律師則不同意這個見解，認為管理委員會可以分為第一屆、第二屆或第幾屆管理委員會，每一屆都有其法律實體。因此，現時14A業主所告的只是最後以陳觀強先生為司庫之管理委員會，並不涉及其後在2002年選舉出來的新一屆管理委員會。

10. 陳律師同意如果本席裁定管理委員會不只是一個，而是每一屆的管理委員會都是不同的法律實體，那麼各有關業主所提出的反申索和在案件編號LDBM20/2002中的申請均不成立，因為各有關業主所提出的指控都只是涉及該管委會，不包括2002年度選舉出來的新一屆管理委員會。再者，陳律師亦同意各有關業主提出管理不善的指控並不構成最基本的違反（fundamental breach），因為該法團的確有提供基本的管理服務。因此，有關管理不善的指控不會成為不支付管理費的理由：見 The Incorporated Owners of South Seas Centre, Mody Road v South Seas Centre Management Co. Ltd. and Others [1985] HKLR 457及 Holiday Resorts (Management) Co. Ltd. v. The Incorporated Owners of The Sea Branch, HCA4978/98。

爭議事項

11. 基於各方的案情，本席須要作出裁決的爭議事項如下：

(1) 管理委員會是否只得一個，還是可以有不同屆別的管理委員會，各自都有其法律實體；

(2) 該管委會是否人數不足；

(3) 2002年度選舉產生的管理委員會是否無效；

(4) 該法團及該管委會是否有管理不善和違反其職責；

(5) 陳觀強先生及該管委會是否有濫權；

(6) 該法團是否無權、無地位或喪失能力提出申請；

(7) 14A業主是否有支付72,738元來完滿和解欠付的管理費。

管理委員會是否只得一個

12. 正如上述一樣，各方同意管理委員會有其獨自的法律實體，有別於業主立案法團。在這個大前提下，本席認為每一屆的管理委員會都有其個別的法律實體，而不是陳律師所述的管理委員會只得一個。陳律師的見解只是基於該條例第2條有關“管理委員會”的定義而作出。該條例第2條說明“管理委員會”指根據第3、3A或4條委任的管理委員會。陳律師認為由於第3、3A及4條都是涉及業主立案法團的成立和註冊，因此管理委員會亦是指在成立時的唯一一個的管理委員會，不過其後的委員就可以有所改變。

13. 本席完全不同意陳律師這個論點。首先，該條例第2條的定義並不包括所有管理委員會，第2條的開頭已經說明“在本條例中，除文意另有所指外”，而管理委員會亦可根據該條例第40C條而產生。很明顯，第40C條所述的管理委員會並沒有包括在第2條的定義中，這正好說明並非所有管理委員會都是指第2條定義所述的管理委員會。

14. 再者，該條例第8(2)(b)條有這樣的條文：-

“根據第3、3A、4或40C條委任的管理委員會，即當作為該法團的第一屆管理委員會。”（底線後加）

15. 既然根據第3、3A、4或40C條產生的管理委員會只是第一屆管理委員會，那麼管理委員會必定有第二屆、第三屆，如此類推。該條例附表2第5(2)段亦清楚說明管理委員會在業主周年大會退職時，法團須委任“新管理委員會”。很明顯，管理委員會是有新舊之分，那麼新管理委員會必定與舊管理委員會有所不同，陳律師的論點完全站不住腳。

16. 因此，本席裁定管理委員會並非只得一個，而每一屆的管理委員會都有其個別的法律實體。

該管委會是否人數不足

17. 基於以上的裁決，該管委會只是指最後以陳觀強先生為司庫的管理委員會，並不包括在2002年選舉出來以陳觀強先生為主席的管理委員會。各方對該管委會的人數有所爭議。有關業主提出該管委會的人數只剩下陳觀強先生一人，而該法團及該管委會則提出該管委會在2001年12月31日前並沒有減少人數，仍然是7名委員。

18. 管理委員會會員的停任須根據該條例附表2第4(2)段所述的情況下才生效。但在本案中，並沒有證據清楚顯示該管委會有會員附合附表2第4(2)段所述的情況而停任。第4(2)(d)段特別說明委員辭職要以書面通知管理委員會秘書，但根據證人陳少霞女士所作之證供，她當時是該管委會秘書，但並沒有收到過其他委員，即黎志堅、李惠娟或曾文祥的辭職信，而她自己亦只是到2002年1月中的時候才正式辭職。因此該管委會的人數並沒有少過法例所限。

19. 各有關業主的指控其實只是基於陳觀強先生於2001年12月31日發出的通告，提及秘書陳少霞女士呈辭，委員黎志堅、李惠娟退出管理委員會及主席陳錫麟先生失去聯絡，與陳觀強先生在2002年1月23日業主大會上的發言而作出，並沒有真實的證據證明這些人等已真正辭職。雖然陳少霞女士在接受盤問時承認她的辭職信已在2001年12月31日的通告之前發出，但這未能證明該管委會的其他委員也已經辭職。除了主席陳錫麟先生和秘書陳少霞女士之外，該管委會還有5名委員，並不少於法定人數。

20. 劉大律師並沒有傳召委員黎志堅、李惠娟和曾文祥作證，認為陳少霞女士的證供已足以證明這幾位委員並沒有呈交辭職信。本席認為陳少霞女士是一位誠實可信的證人，雖然她在提及她自己的辭職信時可能有所混淆，但這並不等於她的其他證供不可信。本席接受她提及沒有收到其他委員的辭職信的證供。其實要證明其他委員已經辭職的責任在於各有關業主的身上，因為這是他們提出的答辯理由，應由他們去證明。當劉大律師不傳召這些委員作證時，陳律師理應考慮傳召這些證人，來證明他們有否辭職。

21. 在沒有其他證人反駁陳少霞女士的證供的情況下，本席認為各有關業主未能證明這些委員已經辭職。雖然陳律師在最後陳詞時，提出很多有關委員人數的疑點，特別是有關2002年1月23日開會時只得陳觀強先生出席而沒有其他委員，和陳觀強先生在開會時的說話，但本席認為這些疑點都不足以抵銷陳少霞女士這方面的證供，或用來作為證明這些委員已經確實辭職的證據。本席認為各有關業主未能證明該管委會的委員人數已少過4位。

2002年度的管理委員會是否無效

22. 各有關業主認為陳觀強先生只是司庫，無權召開2002年1月23日及2月28日之業主大會，因為根據該條例附表3第1段只有管理委員會才可召開業主大會。不過該法團及該管委會則提供了兩份會議紀錄證明陳觀強先生有權召開業主大會。第一份會議紀錄，即證物編號“A3”，證明該管委會於2001年7月8日召開管理委員會會議及議決委任陳觀強先生為署理主席。第二份會議紀錄，即證物編號“A4”，則證明該管委會於2001年12月20日召開管理委員會會議及通過由陳觀強先生發出通知召開業主大會。

23. 陳律師對於這兩份會議紀錄提出反對，認為其真確性有疑問。在最後陳詞時，陳律師亦就其真確性提出很多論點，要求本席不接納這兩份會議紀錄。不過陳觀強先生及陳少霞女士都有提供證供證實其真確性。本席認為這兩位證人都是誠實可信的證人，接受他們這方面的證供。雖然陳少霞女士的證供在某些地方上與陳觀強先生的證供未必吻合，但本席認為這只是陳女士可能因為時間太久而在細節上有所混淆，不足以證明這兩份會議紀錄不真實。

24. 本席亦接受劉大律師的陳詞，認為如果這兩份會議紀錄是偽造的證供，那麼第一份會議紀錄並不需要說及會議是在2001年7月召開，而不是在較近召開業主大會的時候。同時，會議的地點亦不需要偽造為該大廈1A單位內進行。再者，這兩份會議紀錄未有在2002年5月之前提供出來，並不是因為這是偽造的文件，而是這方面的爭議在當時還未出現。

25. 由於本席接受上述兩份會議紀錄的真實性，及陳觀強先生和陳少霞女士的證供，本席裁定陳觀強先生已於2001年12月20日委任為署理主席，並於2001年12月20日獲該管委會授權發出通知召開業主大會。因此，本席認為陳觀強先生於2001年12月31日發出召開業主大會的通告並無不當。

26. 陳律師又提出在2002年1月23日的業主大會中，該法團認為沒有公司印章的委託書無效，不准有關授權人士投票這種做法不正確。不過陳觀強先生的證供已清楚說明在2002年1月23日的會議中，所有人士包括有關的授權人士都有投票同意將會議押後，所以這方面的指控並沒有實質影響。

27. 至於2002年2月28日的押後會議中，並沒有任何授權人士因為委託書沒有公司印章而被拒絕參予會議。14A業主亦不是因為沒有公司印章而不參予會議，所以陳律師這方面的指控對會議的有效性完全沒有實質影響。

28. 陳律師同樣指出陳觀強先生無權召開2002年2月25日之押後會議。不過，正如上述一樣，本席認為陳觀強先生有權召開2002年1月23日之會議，那麼，陳觀強先生亦當然可以召開相關的押後會議。因此，本席裁定2002年2月28日的業主大會並非無效。

29. 此外，有關4名委員都是同一業主的代表和1名委員並不是業主或業主代表的指控，該法團和該管委會已提供了6張會議紀錄，即證物編號“A9”至“A14”來證明有關的委員其實是代表不同的業主，並傳召了陳志華、陳錦欣及吳麗貞等證人為這方面的問題作證。雖然陳律師對這些證物和證人的證供提出了很多疑問，不過本席接受陳志華、陳錦欣和吳麗貞為誠實可信的證人，及證物編號“A9”至“A14”並非偽造的。這些文件在2002年5月之前未有提供出來亦只是因為這方面的爭議在當時還未出現。因此，本席裁定2002年2月28日所選舉出來的委員並沒有重覆代表同一業主，或者不是業主的代表，委員的人數亦沒有因此而少於法定數目。

30. 基於上述理由，本席裁定2002年度的管理委員會並非無效。

31. 其實，2002年度的管理委員會是否有效，並不是本案的問題關鍵所在。陳律師同意周法官在 Chan Yip Keung一案中的裁決，即是說業主立案法團和管理委員會是不同的法律實體。周法官在該案中裁定如果要解散管理委員會的話，必須以管理委員會，而不是業主立案法團作為答辯人。陳律師乃根據此項裁決在案件編號 LDBM 20/2002中修改答辯人為該管委會。由於本席裁定每一屆的管理委員會都是不同的管理委員會，所以在案件編號 LDBM 20/2002中的答辯人並不是2002年度的管理委員會。至於在案件編號 LDBM208/2002、LDBM209/2002、LDBM210/2002、LDBM212/2002及LDBM222/2002中，不論該管委會或2002年度的管理委員會都不是案中的當事人。因此，即使2002年度的管理委員會確實是無效，本席亦不會頒發各有關業主所要求的命令。

該法團及該管委會是否有管理不善和違反其職責，及陳觀強先生是否有濫權

32. 各有關業主提出很多有關該法團及該管委會管理不善和違反職責的指控，亦提出很多有關陳觀強先生濫權的指控。不過陳律師卻同意所有這些指控都是發生在委任2002年度管理委員會之前，與2002年度管理委員會無關。陳律師亦同意這些指控不會構成不支付管理費的理由。

33. 正如劉大律師所提出一樣，本席認為所有這些指控都不需要本席作出裁決，因為完全與本案中的申請和反申索無關。由於本席裁定管理委員會不只一個，而該管委會已於2002年度管理委員會成立時解散，那麼所有這些指控都是針對一個已經解散的管理委員會。本席認為不應就一個已經解散的管理委員會頒發各有關業主要求的命令。假若管理委員會只得一個，所有這些指控亦只是針對管理委員會過往的一些行為，而陳律師同意現時管理委員會已經沒有什麼做得不對的地方，所以本席亦不會頒發各有關業主要求的命令。

34. 再者，由於陳律師同意這些指控不會構成不支付管理費的理由，所以這些指控亦不會對於法團的申請有任何影響。

35. 既然不論本席有關管理委員會是否只得一個的裁決是對與否，各有關業主都不會因為有關指控而獲得其要求的命令，本席認為無須為這些指控作出裁決。

該法團是否無權、無地位或喪失能力提出申請

36. 該法團的申請主要是追收管理費，不論該管委會或2002年度的管理委員會是否有效，各有關業主都有拖欠該法團管理費。陳律師既然同意業主立案法團與管理委員會是不同的法律實體，那麼即使該管委會和2002年度的管理委員會無效，亦不等同該法團無權、無地位或喪失能力追討管理費和有關申請。

37. 各有關業主並未在狀書中提出其他原因為何該法團無權、無地位或喪失能力提出申請，但在最後陳詞時，陳律師提出該法團未有為管理費作出每年預算，違反該條例第21(4)條及附表5的規定。由於這方面的指控並未在狀書中出現，本席認為各有關業主不能引用這方面的指控作為答辯理由。

38. 基於上述理由，本席裁定該法團並非無權、無地位或喪失能力提出申請。

14A業主是否有支付72,738元來和解

39. 雖然14A業主的證供是她有支付72,738元作為完滿和解欠付的管理費，但該法團則只是同意14A業主有支付70,000元給恆桓工程有限公司作為電梯維修費用和29,035.84元給4名該法團的員工作為他們的工資而這些費用可以作為扣除管理費的費用，但並不是最終和完滿的和解。該法團在其申請中已經扣除了這兩筆款項。

40. 由於14A業主並沒有提供任何證據證明她已支付72,738元和這筆款項是作為一個完滿和解，亦沒有任何證據顯示該法團不會追討利息，相反，該法團則提供了兩張收據，即證物編號“A1”的第110及111頁，證明14A業主所支付的款項正如該法團所述一樣，分別為29,035.84元及70,000元，和只是作為扣除管理費之用，本席接受該法團這方面的證供。因此，本席裁定14A業主仍然拖欠該法團一共11,183.34元之管理費和計至2002年8月1日之利息。

總結

41. 基於以上裁決，本席認為各有關業主提出的答辯理由、反申索和在案件編號LDBM20/2002中的申請均不成立。該法團亦已經提出足夠證據證明各有關業主確實拖欠有關之管理費和利息。因此，本席裁定該法團所有的申請得直，而各有關業主的反申索敗訴。14A業主在案件編號LDBM20/2002中的申請亦敗訴。

42. 至於訟費方面，雖然該法團可以根據該大廈公契第11(d)條追收以律師與當事人之間的訟費基準計算的訟費，不過本席認為在本案中，各有關業主並沒有濫用司法程序，不應支付比一般訟費基準較高的訟費。因此，本席不會要求各有關業主支付以彌償基準計算的訟費，而是一般對訟當事人基準的訟費，本席亦認為本案適合大律師出席，該法團及該管委會可得大律師證書，但訟費的計算應以區域法院的收費釐定。

命令

43. 因此，本席頒令如下：-

(1)	有關案件編號LDBM208/2002、LDBM209/2002、LDBM210/2002、LDBM212/2002及LDBM222/2002：-
	(a)	按有關申請書上第1至4項申索頒令；
	(b)	撤銷所有反申索；及
	(c)	臨時訟費命令：答辯人須支付申請人以對訟當事人基準及區域法院收費標準計算之訟費，包括大律師證書；如果雙方未能就數額達成協議，則由法庭釐定；如果雙方不在14天內就訟費提出申請，則此項臨時訟費命令作實。
(2)	有關案件編號LDBM20/2002：
	(a)	撤銷申請人之所有申請；及
	(b)	臨時訟費命令：申請人須支付答辯人以對訟當事人基準及區域法院收費標準計算之訟費，包括大律師證書；如果雙方未能就數額達成協議，則由法庭釐定；如果雙方不在14天內就訟費提出申請，則此項臨時訟費命令作實。

LDBM208/2002、LDBM209/2002、LDBM210/2002、LDBM212/2002及LDBM222/2002中之申請人及LDBM20/2002中之答辯人由林文傑律師事務所轉聘劉榮照大律師代表。

LDBM208/2002、LDBM209/2002、LDBM210/2002、LDBM212/2002及LDBM222/2002中之答辯人及LDBM20/2002中之申請人由鍾沛林律師行陳志華律師代表。