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Civil Action2003

IMADA LUENWAH WORLD LTD v. YIP MING CHEONG AND ANOTHER

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  • DCCJ6521/2003YIP MING CHEONG AND ANOTHER v. IMADA LUENWAH WORLD LTD

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55791-EN-2007-01-23

IMADA LUENWAH WORLD LTD v. YIP MING CHEONG AND ANOTHER

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DCCJ5540/2003

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5540 OF 2003

                                               

BETWEEN

 IMADA LUENWAH WORLD LTD.Plaintiff
 and 
 YIP MING CHEONG and WONG CHI NANGboth trading as MEI-KING MACHINERYENGINEERINGDefendant

____________________

            DCCJ6521/2003

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6521 OF 2003

                                               

BETWEEN

 YIP MING CHEONG and WONG CHI NANG both trading as MEI-KING MACHINERY ENGINEERINGPlaintiff
 and 
 IMADA LUENWAH WORLD LTD.Defendant

                                               

(Consolidated pursuant to the order of
Acting Registrar K W Wong dated 24th March 2004)

Coram: H H Judge Marlene Ng in Court

Dates of Hearing: 17th, 18th, 19th July, 2006 and 6th, 7th and 14th November, 2006

Date of Handing Down Judgment: 23rd January, 2007

 

                                   

J U D G M E N T

                                   

 

I.  Introduction

(a) Parties

1. Imada Luenwah World Limited (“Imada”) produced/sold inter alia red flower medicinal oil (“Oil”). Yip Ming Cheong (“Mr Yip”) and Wong Chi Nang (“Mr Wong”), partners of Mei-King Machinery Engineering (“Mei-King”), manufactured/sold automated production line facilities (“Facilities”). Prior to April 1998, Mei-King manufactured/sold about 10 and 200 Facilities respectively for filling (a) medicinal oil and (b) soft drink, soya sauce, milk powder and pills. Their mechanism and functions were similar to those of the Machine (see below).

(b) Contract

2. By a quotation dated 20th April 1998 (“Quotation”), Mei-King proposed to sell an automated fill-plug-cap-label Facility (“Machine”) to Imada on the following terms for HK$480,000.00 (“Machine Price”) :

“設計說明

本生產線為全新按[Imada]要求設計,參照GMP規格要求而制造,全部組件和材料,尤其針對[Imada]產品的化學特性 ……。

灌裝容量 : 20ML – 100ML [“Specified Volume”]

生產效率 : 每小時3000 – 4000瓶 [“Specified Rate”]

         ……

         付款方式 : 30%訂金 (簽約時支付)

30%中期貨款於完成大樣時繳付

40%交付試車後付清

質量保証 : …… 在正常生產操作情況下,[Mei-King]提供永久保用。在安裝首年內,維修及零件損耗,均免費提供,在次年始即略收回工本成本費用[“Maintenance Term”]。

安裝培訓 : 為適應本港客戶,設計方針以簡單靈活為主,調較容易,一般非技術性橾作員,經簡單培訓後,都會在短時間內熟習操作,且控制自如。……”

3.  By a contract dated 28th April 1998 (“Contract”), Imada purchased the Machine for the Machine Price on the following terms :

“交易細則

支付日期 :98年7月31日
付款方式 :30%訂金 (簽約時支付)
 30%中期貨款於完成大樣時繳付,約於工程進行一個半至兩個月之間
 40%交付試車後付清
備註 :參照[the Quotation]之條款為本。
 其他條款若有添加或更改,買賣雙方再行議定。……”

(c) Machine’s design and functions

4.  Mei-King adapted a basic liquid packing machine to suit Imada’s requirements (eg Imada’s 25ml and 50ml bottles (“Bottles”), plastic inner plugs (“Plugs”) and plastic outer caps (“Caps”)). Imada delivered samples of such packaging materials (“Materials”) to Mei-King for designing the Machine. 

5.  The Machine’s automated functions (“Functions”) were as follows. First, workers would place the Bottles on the loading platform (“Loading Platform”) for the robotic arm to push them onto the conveyor belt to carry them to thefilling nozzles (“Nozzles”) (送樽, “Convey Function”). When the Nozzles filled the Bottles with the Oil, the combined vacuum force and volumetric pistons (活塞注射及真空定位雙結合方式) would standardise the fill volume (灌樽, “Fill Function”). The conveyor belt would carry the Bottles to the turn wheel (星盤/轉盤, “Wheel”), which would rotate and take them to the other side. The Machine would push the Plugs down to cap the Bottles (放塞, “Plug Function”) and screw on the Caps (上蓋, “Cap Function”). Then the Machine would apply glue to Imada’s labels (“Labels”) to paste them onto the Bottles (貼標紙, “Label Function”). The Bottles would pass along the conveyor belt to the collection platform (“Collection Platform”) where the workers would remove them for final packaging.

(d) Piping works and auxillary pump

6.  Mei-King also agreed to supply/install optional piping works (“Pipes”) and auxillary filling pump (“Pump”) for HK$27,560.00 (“Pipes/Pump Price”). The Pipes/Pump would pump the Oil from the preparation room to the storage tank (“Tank”) in the adjoining filling room and then to the Nozzles. The Pipes/Pump had no function independent of the Machine.

(e) Background

7.  Imada paid part of the Machine Price and Pipes/Pump Price in the total sum of HK$440,440.00 (“Paid Price”) leaving an unpaid balance of HK$39,560.00 (“Balance Price”) :

DateInvoiceDescriptionAmount (HK$)
07-08-981754Machine Price480,000.00
07-08-981755Pipes/Pump Price27,560.00
28-04-98Deposit (“Deposit”)(144,000.00)
09-09-982nd payment(72,000.00)
05-12-983rdpayment(40,000.00)
17-12-984thpayment(32,000.00)
11-01-995thpayment(50,000.00)
20-01-996thpayment(50,000.00)
14-04-997thpayment(40,000.00)
26-05-998thpayment(40,000.00)
Balance Price39,560.00

8.  In or about August/September 2002, Mei-King repaired/renovated the Machine (“2002 Repair/Renovation”) and issued invoice no.1850 dated 14th September 2002 (“Invoice”) to Imada for HK$14,265.00 (“Invoice Sum”). Imada did not pay the Invoice Sum.

(f) Mei-King’s claims

9.  Mei-King claimed for the Balance Price and Invoice Sum. It denied the Machine was defective and further averred (a) any observed problems in respect of the operation of the Machine were caused by the diverse specifications, changed shape and poor quality/finishing (collectively, “Changes”) of Imada’s Materials and (b) Imada had accepted and was precluded from rejecting the Machine.

(g) Imada’s claims

10.  Imada claimed :

(a) the Machine failed to achieve the Specified Volume/Rate, could not perform satisfactorily “as what [Imada] needed”, was not in good function and/or did not fit the purpose for which it was purchased;

(b) Mei-King failed to supply the operation/instruction manual (“Manual”) and/or 電腦方程式and 電腦版圖 (collectively, “Computer Documents”) for the Machine;

(c) Mei-King delayed/failed to reply to Imada’s requests to repair the Machine and its repairs were in vain;

(d) the Machine could not work smoothly/properly or be used for production purpose.

11.  Imada was unwilling to confirm the Machine was in order and never accepted the Machine, so there was total failure of consideration or it was entitled to reject the Machine. Imada asked for repayment of the Paid Price or, alternatively, loss/damages equivalent to or being the Paid Price. Further, Imada claimed to have no knowledge of the contents of the Invoice and no obligation to pay the Invoice Sum.

II. Issues

12.  The issues in this case are as follows :

(a) Was the Machine designed for the Specified Rate?

(b) Did the Machine achieve the Specified Rate during the production trial runs in/about July 1998 (“Mei-King’s Trials”) at Mei-King’s Tsuen Wan factory (“Mei-King’s Factory”)?

(c) When was the assembly/installation of the Pipes/Pump and the Machine (“Installation”) at Imada’s Chai Wan factory (“Imada’s Factory”) completed?

(d) Did Mei-King supply the Manual to Imada?

(e) Was the Alleged Implied Term (see below) an implied term of the Contract?

(f) If so, did Mei-King breach the Alleged Implied Term (see below) by failing to supply the Computer Documents to Imada?

(g) Was Mei-King’s on-site training to Imada’s staff after the Installation (“On-Site Training”) adequate?

(h) Did the Machine achieve the Specified Volume/Rate during production trial runs of the Machine after the Installation (“Imada’s Trials”)?

(i) Did Mei-King breach the Contract and/or its implied conditions of merchantable quality and fitness for purpose/description in that the Machine failed to achieve the Specified Volume/Rate or its Functions failed to work properly?

(j) If not, why did Imada pay the Paid Price and not pay the Balance Price?

(k) Is Mr Yip’s remark (“Mr Yip’s Remark”) in Mei-King’s monthly statement dated 2nd May 2001 to Imada (“2/5/01 Statement”) consistent with Mei-King’s case?

(l) What led to the 2002 Repair/Renovation that resulted in the Invoice?

(m) Was Imada obliged to pay the Invoice Sum?

(n) Was Imada entitled to reject the Machine or was it precluded from doing so by acceptance?

(o) Was there total failure of consideration?

(p) If Imada could/did reject the Machine, was it entitled to repayment of the Paid Sum?

(q) If Imada accepted the Machine, what was the measure of its loss/damages (if any)?

13.  At the trial I granted leave for Mei-King to withdraw its counterclaim in DCCJ5540/2003 for the price of the herbal cooker sold to Imada (“Cooker Counterclaim”) and reserved the question of costs.

III.  Witnesses and dramatis personae

(a) Imada’s witness

14.  The expurgated affirmation of Mr Shun (or Suen) Ching (“Mr Shun Sr”) was read at the trial. He was the chairman of Imada’s board of directors, but passed away in September 2006. Imada’s sole witness Mr Suen Hung (“Mr Suen”) was since 1993 its production supervisor who supervised the production process and the workers. Mr Shun Sr’s son Mr Shun (or Suen) Kwok Lung (孫國龍, “Mr Shun Jr”) and daughter Madam Shun Mei Mei Mimi (“Madam Shun”) were/are Imada’s directors/shareholders.

(b) Mei-King’s witness

15.  Mr Yip and Mr Wong acted in person. Mr Yip had 40 years’ experience in designing/selling Facilities and gave evidence for Mei-King. Mr Wong was responsible for inter alia manufacturing such Facilities.

(c) Absence of other evidence

16.  Imada did not adduce any expert surveyor evidence as to the Machine’s alleged defects and their cause(s) or produce any single piece of the Materials still in its possession. In the circumstances, much turned on the credibility of witnesses.

(d) Overview of witnesses’ credibility

17.  Upon considering the totality of the evidence and despite detailed critique by Ms Lau, counsel for Imada, of his evidence, I find Mr Yip reliable/ credible. It is unfair to say he took advantage of Mr Shun Sr’s death to embellish Mei-King’s case. Mr Yip gave evidence in a straightforward manner and stood firm on core matters despite vigorous cross-examination. Minor discrepancies in his evidence do not detract from the reliability of his other evidence which I accept. Where there is any difference, I prefer his evidence to that of Mr Shun Sr/Mr Suen. 

18.  I have considered the factors in section 49 of the Evidence Ordinance Cap.8 in assessing the weight of the hearsay evidence in Mr Shun Sr’s affirmation. Given the hot debate between the parties on some of the factual matters asserted therein, I am unable to place substantial weight those matters (which were untested by cross-examination) although I have taken them into account.

19.  I am not convinced of the reliability of Mr Suen’s evidence. His knowledge (partly derived from Mr Shun Sr) was limited (eg he was not even aware of the terms of the Contract) and he was at pains to emphasise his inadequate technical expertise for understanding the Machine’s problems. In the circumstances, his explanations concerning the alleged defects of the Machine are not persuasive. I also cannot agree with Ms Lau’s suggestion that Imada’s willingness to instruct solicitors/counsel right up to the trial notwithstanding the small amounts claimed by Mei-King in these proceedings reflected the righteousness of Imada’s case.

IV.  Was the Machine designed for the Specified Rate (ie 3,000 to 4,000 Bottles per hour)?

20.  The parties’ dealings began in 1998 when Mr Shun Sr and Mr Yip negotiated the terms of the Contract. Mr Suen was not involved apart from reminding Mr Yip of the corrosive nature of the Oil at a meeting. I prefer Mr Yip’s evidence that Mr Shun Jr and Madam Shun were not involved in the contract negotiations although they attended some negotiation meetings.

21.  Mei-King’s Facilities had a volume range of 0.5ml to 2,000ml per Bottle, a production range of 1,000 to 5,000 Bottles per hour and a Nozzle range of 6 to 12, so a specific production rate and fill volume had to be set for each Facility to suit the customer’s needs. 

22.  During negotiations Imada specified that the Machine would be used for producing 25ml and 50ml Bottles of the Oil at 3,000 Bottles per hour, so Mei-King proposed the Specified Volume/Rate and the use of 8 Nozzles which would provide some margin for future expansion. Despite extensive cross-examination of Mr Yip on the correlation between the number of Nozzles and the price of the Machine, I cannot say the Machine Price and/or the use of 8 Nozzles in the design for the Machine would not support the Specified Rate.

23.  Ms Lau next referred me to the photograph Mr Yip took of the Machine after the Installation on 8th August 1998 (“8/8/98 Photo”) and displayed on Mei-King’s webpage under the caption “Automated Fill-Plug-Cap-Label Production Line KBF-FLP8-CP-CS-LB (Piston Type)” with the description “…… Production Capacity : 2000 – 3000 bottles per hour”. She argued that the Machine’s production rate could not have been the Specified Rate because Mei-King would have described its best rate on the webpage. Mr Yip fairly accepted (a) Mei-King’s webpage was for advertisement of its Facilities and (b) production speed was generally a marketing point. But I also accept that Mei-King’s market research indicated its target customers were mid- to small-sized factories that would look for cost-effective Facilities that met their general requirement of a production rate of 2,000 to 3,000 bottles per hour rather than ones with top production speed. I find on balance that Mei-King’s decision to pitch a production rate of 2,000 to 3,000 bottles per hour on its webpage does not mean that the Machine was not designed for or was unable to achieve the Specified Rate.

V.  Did the Machine achieve the Specified Rate during Mei-King’s Trials?

24.  In about late July 1998, Mei-King invited Imada to attend Mei-King’s Trials. I prefer Mr Yip’s evidence that Mr Shun Sr attended Mei-King Trials with Mr Shun Jr, Madam Shun and a site supervisor of Imada whom Mr Yip met during contract negotiations (ie Mr Suen). After all, Mr Suen was directly responsible for production.

25.  Ms Lau criticised the reliability of Mr Yip’s evidence as to Mei-King’s Trials. Nothing turned on the number of 25ml Bottles that were sent to Mei-King’s Factory or whether 50ml Bottles were so sent as well. There is no dispute that Imada delivered Materials to Mei-King’s Factory for Mei-King’s Trials and both Mr Suen and Mr Yip confirmed in evidence that (a) the 50ml Bottles were not used during Mei-King’s Trials and (b) Imada supplied about 200 25ml Bottles. In any event, I am of the view these matters do not affect the veracity of Mr Yip’s other evidence.

26.  During Mei-King’s Trials, Mr Yip carried out production demonstrations of the Machine using water and the Materials. Mr Yip agreed the production trial runs were mainly for the Fill/Plug/Cap (and not the Label) Functions. Even though there was no written record, I find that Mei-King’s Trials achieved a production rate of over 3,000 Bottles per hour, which Mr Shun Sr found satisfactory. Ms Lau challenged Mr Yip’s recollection of the achieved rate of 3,300 Bottles per hour on the basis that Imada never supplied 3,000 to 4,000 Bottles for Mei-King’s Trials. The short answer is in Mr Yip’s evidence (which I accept) that the Machine was tested over 2 hours by repeatedly filling, emptying and re-using the 25ml Bottles supplied by Imada.

27.  Despite complaint that Mei-King’s Trials were unsuccessful, Mr Shun Sr did not refer to Mei-King’s Trials in his affirmation. Further, Imada’s pleadings admitted that on enquiry Mei-King confirmed the Machine would be delivered on time. Had Mei-King’s Trials been unsatisfactory, I find it improbable that Mr Yip would have suggested (and Mr Shun Sr would have allowed) delivery of the Machine to be made shortly.

VI.  When was the Installation completed?

28.  On 6th August 1998, Mei-King delivered the Machine to Imada’s Factory. Mr Shun Sr/Mr Suen complained that the Installation (which was delayed) took 2 to 3 weeks. However, I prefer Mr Yip’s evidence that right after delivery Mr Yip, Mr Wong and Mei-King’s technicians started to assemble/install the Machine, which was completed by 8th August 1998 (see the contemporaneous 8/8/98 Photo). I reject Mr Suen’s feeble denial that the 8/8/98 Photo depicted the Machine’s condition on 8th August 1998.

29.  I accept Mr Yip’s recollection when he gave evidence that the Pipes/Pumps were delivered on/about 1st and not 6th August 1998 and installed in/about a week’s time. It is sensible/logical for Mei-King to first carry out piping works along the ceiling that connected the preparation and filling rooms before aligning/positioning the Machine that was close to 6m in length. I do not accept Mr Suen’s claim that the Pipes/Pump were installed last. After all, he did not watch over Mei-King’s staff going about the Installation work. In any event, the Installation was completed by 8th August 1998 so the Pipes/Pump must have been installed during the first week of August 1998.

VII.  Did Mei-King supply the Manual to Imada?

30.  I accept Mr Yip prepared operation/instruction manuals for all Facilities designed/manufactured/sold by Mei-King (including the Machine) that gave information on inter alia (a) introduction to the Facility’s functions, production rate and specifications, (b) preparatory matters in relation to the site, power/water source, piping works and packaging materials, (c) pre-production inspection, (d) starting up the Facility, (e) post-production cleaning and (f) trouble-shooting techniques.

31.  Imada claimed it never received the Manual otherwise Mr Shun Jr would have told Mr Suen and/or given it to him. But I prefer Mr Yip’s evidence that he gave the Chinese computer-printed Manual to Mr Shun Jr with other tooling and spare parts.

32.  Ms Lau’s criticism that Mei-King failed to produce to the court a copy of the Manual ignored Mr Yip’s evidence (which I accept) that following replacement of its computer several times over the years Mei-King no longer possessed any hard/soft copy of the Manual. Ms Lau next complained Mr Yip was uncertain as to the Manual’s number of pages. I accept Mr Yip could not remember the exact number of pages, but it would be more than 1 to 2 pages. It must be remembered this happened 8 years ago and Mr Yip drafted over 200 (see paragraphs 1 and 30 above) operation manuals for Mei-King’s Facilities.

33.  I find that Mei-King supplied the Manual to Imada after the Installation and used it for the On-Site Training. Mr Shun Sr claimed Imada pressed for the Manual many times in vain (which I disagree), but did not explain why Imada did not protest about this when it made various written complaints from 2001 to 2003 (see below) and paid the Paid Price over an extended period. I also prefer Mr Yip’s evidence that Mei-King gave a toolbox to Imada at the same time.

34.  Ms Lau argued that Mei-King’s failure to supply the Manual was highlighted by Mr Yip’s assertion that the Manual explained how to tune/adjust the in-built tolerance for certain parts of the Machine (eg the width of the Plug/Cap Feeders and Indentations (see below)) (“Tolerance”). She submitted that if such assertion were true, Mei-King would have taught Imada’s staff to tune/adjust the Tolerance themselves instead of providing free maintenance service over the years (see below).

35.  Mr Yip agreed he did not explain about the Tolerance during the On-Site Training because he thought Imada’s suppliers (“Suppliers”) would supply Materials with standardised specifications within the Tolerance. But I accept he referred Imada to the relevant explanation in the Manual during subsequent Visits (see below) when Mei-King discovered the Changes to the Materials. However, Imada tended to telephone and ask Mei-King to come and repair the Machine whenever a problem arose. As Mr Yip said, Mei-King could not force Imada to apply the trouble-shooting techniques in the Manual.

VIII.  Was the Alleged Implied Term (see below) an implied term of the Contract and if so, was Mei-King in breach of the same?

36.  Imada claimed that in order to give business efficacy it was an implied term of the Contract for Mei-King to supply inter alia the Computer Documents to Imada (“Alleged Implied Term”), but Imada requested for them in vain. There was no such express term in the Contract. Mei-King claimed it would not have agreed to such term since the design of the Machine was its trade secret or “專利”. I reject the Alleged Implied Term.

(a) Legal principles

37.  BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty Ltd v President, Councillors and Ratepayers of the Shire of Hastings (1978) 52 ALJR 20, 26 set out the test of an implied term as follows :

“(1) it must be reasonable and equitable; (2) it must be necessary to give business efficacy to the contract, so that no term will be implied if the contract is effective without it; (3) it must be so obvious that ‘it goes without saying’; (4) it must be capable of clear expression; (5) it must not contradict any express term of the contract”.

(b) Time of contract

38.  Mr Suen confessed Imada would not understand the Computer Documents or have the technical skill to repair/maintain the Machine, so the Computer Documents would be reference material for third party repairer(s) of the Machine (“CD Purpose”). I do not believe the parties contemplated repairs by third party repairer(s) at the time of contract. After all, Imada was contractually entitled to free maintenance service for the first year after the Installation.

(c) Abnormal/improper use of the Machine

39.  Ms Lau argued the Maintenance Term was premised on Imada’s normal/proper use of the Machine (“Proviso”), so Mei-King should supply the Computer Documents in case it withdrew its maintenance service due to potential abnormal/improper use of the Machine by Imada. I find such argument commercially unreal. The parties would hardly be contemplating possible abnormal/improper use of the Machine at the time of contract, and there is no such evidence from Mr Suen or Mr Shun Sr. Indeed, Mr Suen had no idea of the Maintenance Term or any contractual provision concerning the Computer Documents. I also reject his bare assertion that a buyer of any machine should be given the Computer Documents.

40.  I prefer the explanation by Mr Yip who drafted the Maintenance Term that the Proviso gave Mei-King discretion to decide whether to continue or decline maintenance service if there was abnormal/improper use of the Machine. Mei-King could continue such service if the consequences of the abnormal/ improper use were not serious (eg just causing wear and tear of certain parts of the Machine). In my view, it is not reasonable to draw the inference suggested by Ms Lau.

(d) Business efficacy

41.  Although Mei-King’s technicians were best placed to repair/ maintain the Machine, I accept any technician with adequate experience could do so. The easiest way for such technician was to ask Mei-King for the design drawings and Computer Documents. But if Mei-King were unhelpful, he could still use an instrument to download sufficient computerised information from the Machine to fix the control mechanism, which was how Mei-King repaired the Facilities its customers purchased from overseas manufacturers. Ms Lau’s criticism that Mr Yip did not put the above explanation to Mr Suen during cross-examination was unjustified because Imada only pleaded the Alleged Implied Term based on business efficacy after Mr Suen finished his evidence. Further, Mr Yip’s explanation sat well with the fact that Mei-King’s customers did not have to retain Mei-King for maintenance service (eg Lee Kam Kee and Watsons repaired/maintained the Facilities they purchased from Mei-King in-house). There was no necessity or business efficacy for the Alleged Implied Term.

(e) Trade secret and confidentiality

42.  I find Mei-King would not have agreed to provide the Computer Documents to its customers (with consequent risk of disclosure to third parties/ competitors) since it was jealous to protect the trade secret and confidentiality of its machine designs. Ms Lau argued that if computerised information could be downloaded from the Machine, there would be no secrecy concerning at least “電腦方程式” if not “電腦版圖”. But there was no evidence that such downloaded information would be the same as “電腦方程式”. Further, Ms Lau’s argument (as well as the alleged CD Purpose) did not sit well with Mr Suen’s awareness of the concept of “專利”, ie he claimed that had Mei-King supplied the Computer Documents Imada would not just pass them to third parties but would first seek legal advice on how they could be used without infringing Mei-King’s rights. I find it improbable the parties had not expressly discussed the scope of use of the Computer Documents if there was concern Mei-King’s rights might be potentially infringed.

(f) Mei Lee

43.  In my view, Imada requested the Computer Documents when (a) Mr Shun Sr invited 美利包裝機械公司 (“Mei Lee”), another Facility manufacturer/repairer and Mei-King’s competitor, to repair the Machine after the 2002 Repair/Renovation and (b) Mei Lee requested sight of such documents before it would render a quotation or confirm whether the Machine could be repaired. Mei Lee later abandoned the repair attempt, but I need not speculate whether it failed to download computerised information from the Machine. Suffice to say I find Imada was alerted to the Computer Documents when Mei Lee asked for them, which sat well with (a) the absence of complaint concerning the Computer Documents in Imada’s prior written protests in 2001 and 2002, (b) Mr Yip’s evidence that Imada only asked for the Computer Documents after Mei-King commenced its legal claim for the Invoice Sum in the Small Claims Tribunal in January 2003 (“Tribunal Proceedings”), and (c) Mr Suen’s admission that Imada never told Mei-King the CD Purpose (which suggested that Imada knew such purpose infringed Mei-King’s right and/or trade secret).

IX.  Was the On-Site Training adequate?

44.  I accept non-technicians or ordinary workers could operate (操作) the Machine and carry out daily maintenance after (a) brief explanation about the Machine and (b) simple training on how to operate the switches and coordinate operation procedures. Daily cleaning/maintenance after production/use included (i) emptying the remaining Oil from the Tank, (ii) removing Oil traces from the plastic tubes (“Tubes”) to minimise the corrosive effect of the Oil on their use life, and (iii) removing unused Materials from the Machine. But repair/ maintenance under the Maintenance Term had to be done by technicians.

45.  Although the demand letters of Imada’s solicitors dated 19th June and 10th July 2003 claimed Mei-King failed to provide requisite training, the absence of such averment in the pleadings is sufficient to dispose of the matter. In any event, I do not accept Imada’s contentions. Neither Mr Shun Sr nor Mr Suen made such complaint in their affirmation or witness statement.

46.  I prefer Mr Yip’s evidence that parallel with the tuning/adjustment of the Machine and Imada’s Trials Mei-King provided the On-Site Training until Imada’s staff was familiar with the operation procedures. There was no reason for Mei-King to delay (as Mr Suen suggested) when it was entitled to receive the remaining balance of the Machine Price after Imada’s Trials.

47.  Mr Suen claimed Mr Wong only briefly introduced the Machine to Imada’s designated trainees when he expected Mei-King’s on-site training to consist of 2 to 3 days of meetings with Imada’s staff using the Manual to teach them to operate the Machine and to understand the switches. However, I prefer Mr Yip’s evidence that (a) he requested Imada to send smart workers to attend the On-Site Training although technicians or experienced workers were not required for operating (操作) the Machine, and (b) he (and not Mr Wong) used the Manual to give the On-Site Training to Imada’s trainees. I note that Mr Yip was the one who designed the Machine and who liaised with Imada all along whilst Mr Wong’s role at that stage was that of Mei-King’s senior technician who supervised the manufacture/Installation of the Machine. It was Mr Yip’s usual responsibility to handle production trial runs for Mei-King’s customers after installation of the Facilities.

48.  There is no mileage in Ms Lau’s suggestion that Mr Yip’s failure to mention cleaning the Tubes as part of the daily maintenance demonstrated he was not the one who gave the On-Site Training. She conceded Mr Suen confirmed such instructions were in fact given to Imada. I also reject Ms Lau’s argument that Mr Yip insisted he and not Mr Wong gave the On-Site Training because he wanted to present more persuasive “first-hand” evidence. Indeed, despite the lack of pleadings vis-à-vis the On-Site Training, Mr Yip already stated in his witness statement of 4th May 2005 that Imada’s Trials did not stop “until it was proved to me” (my emphasis) Imada’s staff was familiar with the operation procedures.

49.  But irrespective of how the training was done, Mr Suen admitted Imada’s staff knew how to operate the Machine. He also agreed Mei-King advised Imada to empty the remaining Oil in the Tank and the Oil traces in the Tubes (which he claimed was difficult) after daily operations. But I find that Imada failed to follow Mei-King’s instructions to remove unused Materials from the Machine after operations (since Mr Suen thought it was unnecessary).

X.  Did the Machine achieve the Specified Volume/Rate during Imada’s Trials?

50.  Mr Shun Sr said Imada had to chase Mei-King to carry out Imada’s Trials which were unsuccessful and the Machine failed to achieve an average production rate of over 3,000 Bottles per hour. Imada observed problems with various Functions (see below) due to “不正確因素”. Despite assigning 2 further workers to assist the 2 workers required to operate the Machine, the Machine still could not perform all the Functions in one go.

51.  On the other hand, Mr Yip said that between 8th and 11th August 1998 Mei-King carried out continuous and successful production trial runs and achieved a production rate of 3,200 to 3,300 Bottles per hour. But about 2 weeks after the Installation, Imada reported it could not operate the Machine and asked Mei-King to carry out repairs. Mr Yip and Mr Wong went to Imada’s Factory the following day and noticed Imada’s workers could not fully handle the efficiency of the Machine, ie the production rate was too fast for their timely collection of the Bottles from the Collection Platform so many fell onto the floor. At Mr Shun Jr’s and Mr Suen’s requests, Mei-King reduced the production rate to about 2,700 Bottles per hour for ease of handling by Imada’s workers.

52.  Upon careful consideration of the evidence, particularly Imada’s specific complaints discussed below, I prefer Mr Yip’s evidence and disagree that his evidence above was contradicted by his witness statement which stated that he trained Imada’s staff until he was satisfied “they were familiar with the procedures of operating the [Machine]”. Getting familiar with the procedures of how to operate (操作) the Machine can be a far cry from being fully capable of handling the efficiency of the Machine on a regular production basis in the long run. Further, Mr Shun Sr’s affirmation accepted Mei-King did at one stage protest that Imada’s workers were not yet familiar with the operation of the Machine (see also Imada’s letter to Mei-King dated 23rd August 2001 (“23/8/01 Letter”) and circular letter to medicinal and food manufacturers dated 26th August 2002 (“Circular Letter”)).

53.  There was also no plausible explanation why Imada paid HK$72,000.00 to Mei-King on 9th September 1998 (ie shortly after Imada’s Trials) as part payment of the Machine Price if the Machine could not function properly. The pleaded suggestion that it was paid in hope that Mei-King would repair the Machine was commercially improbable given the free maintenance service under the Maintenance Term for the first year after the Installation.

XI.  Alleged defects of the Machine

54.  The key issue here is what caused the observed problems of the Machine. Mr Suen’s reference to “不正確因素” is unconvincingly vague and he was at pains to emphasise he was not a professional technician and could not be expected to know how to repair/maintain the Machine. I am not persuaded that his evidence in relation to the alleged cause(s) of the problems is reliable.

(a) Convey Function

55.  I reject Mr Suen’s complaint that sometimes the robotic arm would pick up and place 6 instead of 8 Bottles onto the conveyor belt to be carried to the Nozzles. I note Mr Shun Sr did not refer to this at all in his affirmation.

56.  Mr Shun Sr and Mr Suen claimed (and Mr Yip denied) Imada had to place a carton box beneath the Loading Platform to catch the Bottles that fell to the floor during the Convey Function. Mr Suen vaguely said it was due to a design flaw (“機器唔到位”), but I need not be concerned with any alleged design defects. Ms Lau in her final submissions confirmed Imada would not rely on design defects. But in any event, I reject Imada’s complaint.

57.  Although there was no electronic sensor at the Loading Platform, there was no satisfactory explanation why the Bottles would fall down during the Convey Function. Overloading could be easily avoided because new Bottles were placed on the Loading Platform manually. Since (a) the Loading Platform and the section of the conveyor belt connecting it to the Nozzles had fenced sides, (b) Mr Suen claimed the robotic arm picked up less (not more) Bottles (see paragraph 55 above) and (c) the Bottles moved along the fenced conveyor belt in single file, there is no cogent reason why or how the Bottles fell down during the Convey Function.

(b) Fill Function

58.  Mr Shun Sr and Mr Suen claimed the fill volume of the Bottles was not standardised resulting in some Bottles having more Oil (with overflow) and others less, so Imada’s workers had to manually remove those with incorrect fill volume.

59.  Mr Yip claimed the Fill Function was upset due to changes in the thickness/shape/size of the Bottles Imada used subsequent to Imada’s Trials (ie they were shorter and thicker than those used for designing the Machine and during Mei-King’s/Imada’s Trials). Mr Suen claimed Imada never changed the design of its Bottles which were supplied by the same Taiwanese supplier華夏玻璃製造廠 (“Bottle Supplier”) all along.  

60.  The key issue here is why the fill volume was not standardised. Imada did not identify any mechanical, electrical or other defect of the Machine that would upset the Fill Function. In my view, it did not necessarily follow from the fact Imada had not changed its Bottle design/Bottle Supplier that the specifications/quality of the Bottles would be standardised/consistent since this turned on quality control in the manufacturing process. But Mei-King gave an explanation which I accept. I also refer to the analysis below in relation to the Changes to the Materials and Mei-King’s liaison with the Bottle Supplier.

(c) Wheel

61.  The conveyor belt would carry the Bottles to the Wheel. Each Bottle should slide into 1 of 12 indentations (“Indentations”) on the rim of the Wheel, which would rotate and carry it to the other side of the Machine for the Plug Function. So the width of the Indentation must be compatible with the thickness of the Bottle.

62.  Mr Suen claimed that due to a design problem the conveyor belt chute did not accurately align with the Indentations so some (but not all) Bottles became stuck at the point between the conveyor belt and the Wheel. When that happened the electronic sensor would stop the Wheel and Imada’s workers would have to forcibly align the conveyor belt chute with the Indentation to let the stuck Bottle slide in.

63.  On the other hand, Mr Yip claimed that whilst the Bottles could successfully slide into the Indentations during Imada’s Trials, the Bottles from subsequent supplies had different shape/size/thickness/specifications. If such Changes exceeded the Indentations’ Tolerance, the Bottles would become stuck as described by Mr Suen. Imada’s workers could remove such Bottles to allow others to slide into place, but if the Changes were too diverse they would cause too many stoppages for normal production. The Materials were Imada’s responsibility, but Mei-King tried to assist Imada by widening the fenced conveyor belt chute and tuning/adjusting the Indentations.

64.  I need not be concerned with Mr Suen’s suggestion of a design problem, but I reject Imada’s contentions in any event. First, Imada did not satisfactorily explain why some Bottles could and some could not slide into the Indentations. Imada could not pinpoint any mechanical, electrical or other defect of the Machine that would cause an intermittent alignment problem. This interesting feature gives credence to Mr Yip’s explanation that the Changes to the Bottles were diverse (ie some within and some without the Tolerance) amongst different batches and even within the same batch of the Bottles. Secondly, it is not disputed Mei-King at one stage dismantled the Wheel and re-worked it at Mei-King’s Factory. Mr Suen claimed it was to do with the alignment problem, but he did not say how re-working the Wheel itself would improve the coordination of the Wheel and the conveyor belt chute. I prefer Mr Yip’s explanation that Mei-King re-worked the Wheel by tuning/adjusting the Indentations’ Tolerance in an attempt to accommodate the Changes to the Bottles. I also refer to the analysis below in relation to the Changes to the Materials and Mei-King’s liaison with the Bottle Supplier.

(d) Plug Function

65.  The Plugs slided down a metal feeder (“Plug Feeder”) one by one to cap the Bottles passing underneath. The Plugs could not enter the Plug Feeder if they changed shape or exceeded the Plug Feeder’s 5% Tolerance. But if the change in size was within the Tolerance, the width of the Plug Feeder could be tuned/adjusted to fit the new size. If the Plugs were smaller than the Tolerance, they would (a) shift left/right and not fit the Plug Feeder snugly to come down in a straight line, (b) ride under to push out the Plugs in front (騎膊馬 or 翻筋斗) or (c) drop down in a bunch rather than one by one.

66.  Mr Shun Sr and Mr Suen claimed some Bottles were not properly/securely plugged with (a) Plugs flying out to become stuck at the cogwheel (齒輪) or conveyor belt and (b) Oil spilling from the relevant Bottles so that Imada’s workers had to remove them manually. Mr Suen said it was due to a design flaw and faulty connection point (接駁位).

67.  Mr Yip frankly accepted that some time after Imada’s Trials and during the Visits (see below) he saw some Plugs fell out of the Plug Feeder to the floor. He claimed the Plugs then used by Imada were smaller than those used for designing the Machine or during Mei-King’s/Imada’s Trials and of poorer quality/finishing, which led to the observed problems, but these problems were unrelated to the Machine which remained operable. Mei-King assisted Imada by narrowing/adjusting the width of the Plug Feeder within the Tolerance, but this could not fully resolve the problem because the Changes to the Plugs in size/thickness and shape (eg some were warped) amongst different batches or within the same batch were quite diverse.

68.  I prefer Mr Yip’s explanation. Mr Suen knew the blue Tube adjacent to the Plug Feeder had a vacuum force that created a suction effect to guide the Plugs down the feeder and prevent them from riding under the ones in front or coming down in a bunch.  Mr Suen agreed that if (a) the rim of the Plugs had “水口”, (b) the thickness of the Plugs was uneven or (c) the flat surface of the Plugs was warped (扭曲), the vacuum force would lose its effect. Plainly Mr Suen knew the Plug Function could be sabotaged by inappropriate size/quality/ shape of the Plugs causing the observed results, which is consistent with Mei-King’s case.

69.  I disagree with Mr Suen’s claim that if there were Changes to the Materials as Mr Yip alleged they could not be used even for manual production. As Mr Yip said, automated production could not hope to match the dexterity of the human hand in manually capping the Plugs/Caps one by one, so more precision and consistency in the specifications/quality/shape of the Materials were required.

70.  Mr Suen next claimed (but Mr Yip denied) Mr Wong used some transparent tape to affix some carton paper to the side of the Plug Feeder in a futile attempt to resolve the problems with the Plug Function. Mr Yip claimed he did not know why/when Imada affixed such carton paper to the Machine, but he did not see it when he had the meeting with Mr Shun Sr at Imada’s Factory in late August 2002 (see below).

71.  I prefer Mr Yip’s evidence. First, I agree with Mr Yip that the carton paper was not appropriately placed for catching any Plug springing out from the mouth of the Plug Feeder/Bottle or for preventing such problem. Secondly, Mr Suen did not say when Mr Wong affixed such carton paper, but Mr Yip was clear it was not so affixed even by late August 2002. Thirdly, the exposed screws near the carton paper indicated that a stainless steel casing had been removed. But Mei-King would not have removed such casing or affixed the carton paper since the good manufacturing practice (ie the Department of Health’s health/hygiene requirements for manufacturing medicine and food, “GMP”) specified in the Contract and adopted for designing/manufacturing the Machine required (a) the use of non-contaminative materials (eg stainless steel) and (b) all component parts to be covered. I accept that Mr Wong (who was responsible for Mei-King’s manufacturing process) and Mei-King’s workers were aware of the GMP and would have notified Mr Yip had they observed any loose carton paper (ie contaminative material) affixed to the Machine.

72.  Ms Lau complained that Mr Yip did not cross-examine Mr Suen about the carton paper, but it was never part of Imada’s pleaded complaints. Ms Lau next complained Imada had no reason to affix the carton paper since Mr Yip claimed Imada would telephone and ask Mei-King to repair the Machine whenever they ran into problems. This argument does not stand because after the 2002 Repair/Renovation in August/September 2002, Mei-King no longer provided maintenance service for the Machine and shortly thereafter Mei Lee also declined to carry out repairs. About 4 years elapsed until Imada took photographs of the Machine on 11th July 2006 (“Photographs”) that showed the carton paper affixed to the Machine. It will not be surprising if during the intervening period Imada resorted to home-made attempts to salvage the Machine for which it had paid a large part of the Machine Price and Pipes/Pump Price.

(e) Cap Function

73.  The Caps slided down a metal feeder (“Cap Feeder”) and were screwed onto the Bottles. The same considerations described in paragraph 65 above applied to the Tolerance of the Cap Feeder. Mr Shun Sr and Mr Suen claimed sometimes the Caps were screwed so tightly that they (a) would burst or (b) could not be unscrewed manually. At other times they were not tight enough or screwed along the screw threads. Mr Suen denied such problems were caused by the poor quality of the Caps.

74.  I prefer Mr Yip’s evidence that the successful Imada’s Trials did not reveal any problem with the Cap Function, but the Caps subsequently used by Imada (like the Plugs) had similar problems in that their specifications/ quality/shape were different from those used for designing the Machine and during Mei-King’s/Imada’s Trials. They had poor quality/finishing and some were so brittle they could not be screwed on properly. Even tuning/adjusting the Cap Feeder could not solve such problems (which were unrelated to the Machine) given the diverse Changes amongst different batches or within the same batch of the Caps.

(f) Label Function

75.  After some trial and error Mei-King found the glue from Taiwan’s 藍寶樹脂股份有限公司 (“Glue Supplier”) to be best suited for the Label Function. I accept Mei-King supplied 20 litres of such glue (“Glue”) to Imada during Imada’s Trials.

76.  Mr Yip claimed Mei-King recommended Mr Shun Sr to use the Glue and offered to contact the Glue Supplier on Imada’s behalf, but Mr Shun Sr preferred to deal with the matter on his own. Mr Suen claimed the Glue was used for production trial runs and there was still a quantity remaining at Imada’s Factory, so it was unlikely Imada made further purchase of glue. I accept that subsequently, irrespective whether it was due to expiry of the Glue’s use life or due to the use of other glue, there was a problem with non-stickiness/adhesiveness.

77.  Mr Shun Sr and Mr Suen claimed (a) the Label Function was a total failure, (b) the Labels could not be pasted onto the Bottles or if so pasted were not quite straight and (c) Mr Wong admitted the Label Function was never operational/successful. So Mr Shun Sr claimed that Imada consequently did not have to pay the Balance Price. 

78.  I accept Mr Yip’s evidence that Imada’s Trials carried out prior to the Changes were successful using the Glue and the Bottles. He frankly accepted that Mei-King’s staff observed some problems with the Label Function (ie the Labels pasted onto the Bottles were not quite straight) during the Visits (see below) in the first year. I accept his evidence that such problems stemmed from the uneven Bottle surface and non-stickiness/adhesiveness of the glue used.

79.  I disagree that Mr Yip shied away from such assertion after Mr Suen testified that Mei-King supplied the Glue. Such explanation was found in Mr Yip’s witness statement dated 4th May 2005 which he adopted as his evidence after Mr Suen gave evidence. I also disagree that Mr Yip changed his evidence when he went on to explain that upon subsequent discussions with the Bottle Supplier for improving the specifications/quality of the Bottles (see below) the parties had an understanding that further tuning/testing of the Label Function would be deferred until there was stable/consistent improvement. I accept such evidence and further accept that since there was no such stable/consistent improvement even up to the 2002 Repair/Renovation, the Label Function was not fully tuned/tested. I do not accept Mr Wong admitted the Label Function was a failure.

(g) Collection Platform

80.  Mr Suen claimed Imada’s Trials were unsuccessful so the Bottles did not even reach the Collection Platform let alone fall down from there to the floor. However, I have found the Bottles fell from the Collection Platform because Imada could not cope with production speed and therefore requested reduction to a more manageable level. Mr Suen next asserted there was no risk of the Bottles falling off the Collection Platform because the electronic sensors would automatically stop the Machine if Imada’s workers could not collect the Bottles fast enough. The unreliability of such assertion is exposed by Mr Suen’s eventual concession that there was no electronic sensor at the Collection Platform.

(h) Summary

81.  In summary, although there were some observed problems with the Machine after Imada’s Trials, Imada failed to prove on balance they were caused by defect(s) of the Machine. In coming to such conclusion, I also bear in mind the discussion below on the Changes to the Materials and Mei-King’s liaison with Imada’s Suppliers.

82.  Mr Suen’s complaint that the Functions could not be performed in one go due to intermittent malfunction of each Function and that Mei-King adopted “頭痛醫頭,腳痛醫腳” approach to repairs in fact supported Mei-King’s contention that the observed problems were due to the diverse Changes to various Materials within the same batch and from batch to batch with some Materials within and some without the Tolerance. This conveniently brings the discussions to Mei-King’s case (which I accept) that (a) at Imada’s requests Imada’s Suppliers re-worked the moulds and ran off new samples of the Materials and (b) Mei-King attempted to tune/adjust the Machine to accommodate such new samples only to have Imada’s quality control over the Materials slip after a while with re-emergence of the problems. In my view, this also explains why there were intermittent or cyclic relapse/malfunction.

XII.  Mei-King’s tuning/adjustment, repair and maintenance of the Machine

83.  Both Mr Yip and Mr Suen confirmed in evidence that after Imada’s Trials and between August 1998 and August 2002, Mei-King’s staff attended Imada’s Factory 12 to 13 times to fix the Machine on Imada’s requests (“Visits”), ie about 3 Visits per year.

84.  Mr Suen said that after the On-Site Training and Imada’s Trials, the Functions had one problem or another and could not be performed in one go even though Imada added further workers to operate the Machine. Imada’s staff would try to resolve minor problems (eg giving the stuck Bottles a push to release them) themselves, but had no professional/technical expertise to repair the Machine. Mr Shun Sr/Imada’s staff telephoned many times to ask Mei-King to repair the Machine, but Mei-King adopted delaying tactics and its repairs were unsuccessful. Mei-King blamed the poor skill of Imada’s workers in operating the Machine, but when they became more adept, the Machine still did not work and was useless for production purpose. Mr Suen recalled only 1 occasion in/about August 1999 when the Machine barely managed to produce 200 half-finished Bottles with 4 workers operating the Machine.

85.  I prefer Mr Yip’s evidence, which I shall discuss below.

(a) Which Mei-King’s staff attended Visits?

86.  Mr Suen claimed mostly it was Mr Wong and at times Mr Wong and another Mei-King’s technician. I find Mr Suen’s denial that Mr Yip attended the Visits unreliable. Mr Suen did not know the distribution of work between Mr Yip and Mr Wong. His claim of having seen Mr Yip and Mr Wong checking the Machine’s electronic sensor box (電眼箱) once did not mean Mr Yip only attended 1 Visit. Mr Suen agreed he had his own work and was not necessarily present when Mei-King’s staff came to work on the Machine. Although Imada’s office would inform him of the arrival of Mei-King’s staff, he would not know whether Mr Yip was amongst them.

87.  I accept that whenever there was a problem with the Machine Imada would just telephone to ask Mei-King to fix it. I agree 2 persons (mostly Mr Yip and Mr Wong) were required since 1 person had to be stationed at each end of the 6m long Machine to inspect and work on it. Further, it was only appropriate for Mr Yip (Mei-King’s “boss”) to liaise on the same level with Mr Shun Sr (Imada’s “boss”) over the Machine. I therefore accept Mr Yip and Mr Wong together attended 70% of the 12 to 13 Visits (ie about 7 to 8 times).

(b)Mei-King’s discovery ofthecause of the observed problems

88.  Mr Yip drew sensible distinctions amongst repair, general maintenance and tuning/adjustment (eg manipulation of the Tolerance of various parts of the Machine or adjustment of the focus of the electronic sensors). I accept Mei-King at first thought the problems with the Machine required repair and were mechanical in nature, but it discovered by the end of 1998 or early 1999 they were caused by the diverse Changes to the Materials. On most Visits Mei-King’s staff found the Machine was still operable and just required tuning/adjustment to accommodate the Changes. On other occasions, certain parts of the Machine worn and torn as a result of production overuse were repaired/replaced.

(c) Meetings with the Suppliers

89.  Even so Mr Yip still attended Imada’s Factory because Mr Shun Sr invited him to meet with Imada’s Suppliers. Between the end of 1998 and mid-2001, Mr Yip attended several (not more than 10) such meetings (“Meetings”) to discuss how to improve/standardise the specifications/quality/shape of the Materials to meet the Tolerance and to resolve the problems caused by the diverse Changes to the Materials received after Imada’s Trials.

90.  Mr Yip drew rough drawings during the Meetings to illustrate his suggestions and gave them to the Suppliers’ representatives who agreed to re-work the moulds. When new samples were run off the re-worked moulds after 1 to 2 months, Mei-King’s staff (including Mr Yip) would attend Imada’s Factory for production trial runs and try to tune/adjust the Machine to accommodate the new samples. This explained why Mr Yip still attended the Visits as distinct from the Meetings after 1998.

91.  Ms Lau submitted it was normal to expect variations in the specifications since the Materials were low-priced items. Such submission did not sit well with Mr Suen’s denial of any change to the Materials, but sat comfortably with Mr Yip’s evidence that after a while Imada’s quality control would slip and the Changes would re-emerge to affect the production process. Imada would again telephone and ask for Mei-King’s help, and together with Mei-King would again go through the process described in paragraphs 89 and 90 above, which happened several times. It took some time for the Suppliers to run off new samples of the Materials and then for the problems to re-emerge, which explained why there were several Visits after 1998 and the frequency was on average 3 times a year.

92.  Despite Mr Yip’s reminder to Imada to liaise with the Suppliers to establish quality control of the Materials, there was no consistent/stable improvement of the quality/finishing of the Materials and/or standardisation of their specifications, so by the latter half of 2001 there was no longer any point for Mr Yip to continue with the Visits. Thereafter Mr Wong attended the Visits on his own or with another Mei-King’s technician to tune/adjust the Machine. This explained why Mr Yip only attended about 70% of the Visits.

(d) Quality control of the incoming Materials

93.  Mr Yip said Mei-King’s other customers (eg Yu Yan Sang, Lee Kam Kee and Watsons) did not have similar problems because (a) they gave standardised written specifications/drawings to Mei-King to design/manufacture the Facilities and (b) their incoming quality control (IQC) departments inspected the packaging materials to ensure compliance with the standardised specifications. Imada did not provide any written specifications/drawings to Mei-King. I accept Imada did not have any IQC department. Although Mr Suen claimed Imada would inspect the Materials supplied by the Suppliers, his admission that Imada did not inspect the Bottles for Mei-King’s Trials because it would not open the Bottle Supplier’s original carton packaging is telling.

94.  I find on balance Imada did not have effective quality control to ensure the Materials were of consistent and standardised specifications/ quality/finishing. But this was Imada’s (not Mei-King’s) responsibility since Mei-King did not know or have any contractual relationship with the Suppliers. Mei-King could only advise Imada to pay attention to these matters and help by tuning/adjusting the Machine to accommodate the new samples of Materials received by Imada from its Suppliers.

(e) Imada’s evidence that supported Mei-King’s case

95.  Ms Lau criticised Mr Yip for not referring to the Meetings in his witness statement, but the best corroboration came from Mr Suen who admitted that (a) during the Visits Mr Wong/Mr Yip complained the Materials were “不標準” and “不合規格”, and (b) in/about 1999 Imada arranged a meeting between Mr Yip and the Supplier for the Plugs/Caps 曾銓記塑膠廠 (“Plastic Supplier”) to discuss such problems.

96.  Mei-King’s case also finds support in Imada’s 23/8/01 Letter to Mei-King as follows : “…… 基於以下某些不正確因素,首次試機是瓶子瓶塞不標準,第二次試機是瓶蓋有問題,經長時間修改,……” (my emphasis). This was repeated in Mei-King’s Circular Letter dated 26th August 2002. 2 matters are immediately obvious. First, Mei-King had actually complained of the non-standardised specifications and poor quality of the Materials to Imada at the material time. Secondly, there could not have been just a one-off meeting with the Plastic Supplier. Imada admitted a long time was spent in improving the Materials, which sat well with Mei-King’s case.

97.  Ms Lau doubted whether the Suppliers “were all so stupid that they failed to produce [the Materials] meeting the standard” after 3 years of advice/suggestion from Mr Yip. But if (as Mr Suen claimed but I disagree) Mr Yip were unable to identify any specific problem with the Plugs during his Meeting with the Plastic Supplier or if (as Ms Lau submitted but I also disagree) the Suppliers would have been able to resolve the problems with the Materials, Imada would not have spent “長時間修改” the Materials.

98.  In my view, Mr Shun Sr must have been aware of the problems with the Materials to have initiated the Meetings or at the latest learnt about such problems at the Meetings. I disagree this is contradicted by Mr Yip’s witness statement which stated that “the problems …… would be reported to [Mr Shun Sr], but he did not appear to agree to [Mei-King’s] observation”.  The tenor of the evidence showed that Imada and Mr Shun Sr were caught between a rock and a hard place. On one hand, they plainly knew there were problems with the Materials that affected the operation of the Machine, yet they could not make the Suppliers supply Materials of consistent standard/quality. On the other hand, given the known problems with the Materials, they did not wish to forgo continued maintenance/tuning service by Mei-King and/or their assistance in liaison with the Suppliers. If Imada openly acknowledged that the problems rested with the Materials, not only would it risk losing maintenance support from Mei-King but Imada would become immediately liable to pay the Balance Price. In short, Imada was unwilling to face reality.

(f)Mei-King’s advice to Imada on theMaterials

99.  I now turn to Ms Lau’s various criticisms of Mr Yip’s evidence. Mr Yip claimed that prior to signing the Contract he suggested to Mr Shun Sr that a Facility buyer should ensure the packaging materials were standardised in order to facilitate automated production (“Advice”) and Mr Shun Sr accepted the suggestion. Ms Lau complained the Advice was not found in the Quotation/ Contract or in Mr Yip’s witness statement. In my view, it is not commercially necessary (as distinct from being prudent) to expressly include the Advice and/or to expressly exclude liability for the quality of the Materials in the Contract. After all, the Quotation/Contract set out the specifications for the Machine and not those for the Materials. I particularly reject Ms Lau’s submission that Mr Yip took deliberate advantage of Mr Shun Sr’s death to give evidence on the Advice without fear of rebuttal.

100.  Further, the Advice is a red herring because it did not further advance Mei-King’s case. Even if Mei-King did not give such Advice, Imada and not Mei-King was still the party responsible for the specifications and quality/finishing of the Materials.

(g) Trouble-shooting

101.  Even though Mei-King introduced Imada to the trouble-shooting techniques in the Manual, it could not force Imada to use them. But during the Visits Mei-King’s staff would jokingly remind Imada’s staff they could also tune/adjust the Tolerance by referring to the Manual without asking Mei-King to repair the Machine. Ms Lau complained that these matters were not in Mr Yip’s witness statement, but I do not think it affected his veracity. After all, there was no pleaded complaint of inadequate On-Site Training and, as Mr Yip said, these fine details were only elicited under extensive cross-examination.

(h) First year under the Maintenance Term

102.  Mr Yip agreed it was improper/abnormal to use Materials with diverse specifications and poor quality/finishing. Ms Lau submitted that in such case there was no reason for Mei-King to provide maintenance service under the Maintenance Term even during the first year. I refer to paragraphs 39 and 40 above for discussion on Mei-King’s continued maintenance service despite abnormal/improper use of the Machine.

103.  Mr Yip explained that Facility manufacturers invariably offered 1 year free maintenance service (akin to a defect liability period) to enable them to put right any manufacturing/installation/workmanship error. Mr Yip fairly accepted the Machine’s initial problems included these errors (eg incorrect alignment of the robotic arm or of the focus of the electronic sensor). But I agree they were rectified and the Machine tuned/adjusted shortly after the Installation.

(i) Continued maintenance service after the first year

104.  Ms Lau submitted Mei-King would not be so “kind” to provide free maintenance service and to attend the Meetings until the end of 2001 when (a) the Maintenance Term provided “在次年始即略收回工本成本費用”, (b) Imada was not a big customer and (c) the Balance Price was not substantial. But in fact immediately after the expiry of the first year Mei-King sent a letter dated 21st August 1999 (“21/8/99 Letter”) to inform Imada the period of free maintenance service had expired and to propose 2 maintenance service plans. Imada did not respond or commit to any maintenance service plan.

105.  Mr Yip explained (and I accept) Mr Shun Sr “misunderstood” the Maintenance Term to mean free life maintenance for the Machine. This I believe explained why Imada freely telephoned to ask Mei-King to repair the Machine whenever it ran into problems. I further find such “misinterpretation” fed (a) Mr Shun Sr’s refusal to openly acknowledge that the problems with the Machine were caused by the Changes to the Materials as well as (b) his insistence that Mei-King should repair the Machine to make it work.

106.  Mr Yip said it was not a done thing amongst Chinese commercial community to cut off maintenance service abruptly even though Imada failed to commit to a maintenance service plan. Further, with a view to facilitate Imada’s use of the Machine and to persuade Imada to commit to a maintenance service plan and/or give some commercial return, Mei-King still attended the Visits and replaced worn and torn parts (eg corroded Tubes) free of charge from the second year onwards, but made clear to Mr Shun Sr such state of affairs could not last. When Imada still failed to (a) commit to any maintenance service plan, (b) pay for the repair/maintenance service or (c) pay the Balance Price by the end of 2001, Mr Yip informed Mr Shun Sr at about the end of January 2002 (ie around Chinese New Year) that Mei-King would suspend maintenance service and the Visits ceased.

107.  Between the end of January 2002 and the 2002 Repair/Renovation, Mr Yip and Mr Wong worked on several projects in the PRC. They could be contacted via their PRC mobile telephones, but did not receive any call from Mr Shun Sr. On return to Hong Kong they were told by Mei-King’s office that Imada had called. But when Mr Yip tried to contract Mr Shun Sr by telephone, he was told Mr Shun Sr was out of Hong Kong.

XIII.  DidImada use the Machinefor production purpose?

108.  On balance I reject Imada’s claim that it had not made any use of the Machine for production purpose. I accept that during the Visits Mei-King’s staff observed a high mechanism depreciation rate contributed partly by normal/ heavy use of the Machine and partly by the corrosive nature of the Oil, which necessitated replacement of worn and torn parts. This was supported by Mr Suen’s admission that during the second or third year (ie before the 2002 Repair/Renovation) Mei-King on 1 or 2 occasions replaced certain parts of the Machine with newly purchased and/or re-worked materials/parts. Further, the Invoice showed that during the 2002 Repair/Renovation Mei-King re-worked and/or replaced certain parts of the Machine.

109.  More significantly, Mr Yip said (and I accept) Mei-King replaced some corroded Tubes for which no invoice was issued (ie prior to the 2002 Repair/Renovation). Although Mr Suen at one stage claimed there was no replacement of the Tubes even up to July 2006 (ie when Imada took the Photographs), he also gave contradictory evidence that he noticed some Tubes were corroded and asked Mei-King to purchase replacements. The latter evidence was corroborated by the Invoice issued about 4 years prior to July 2006. In my view, Mr Suen’s assertion that there was no replacement of the Tubes was to bolster his suggestion that the reddish patches on the Machine shown in the Photographs were rust patches due to non-use of the Machine. I prefer Mr Yip’s evidence that they were Oil traces due to Imada’s failure to clean the Machine properly.

110.  The corroded condition of the Tubes is material because the Oil (an organic solvent that caused corrosion) would only remain in the Tubes for substantial periods if it was regularly pumped into the Tubes during production or if the traces were not properly cleaned afterwards. Given Imada’s claim that (a) Mr Suen knew from experience and/or was told during the On-Site Training of the need to clean/remove the Oil from the Tank/Tubes after use, (b) Imada did so accordingly after the trial runs, and (c) the Machine was never used for bulk production, there is no satisfactory explanation for the significant corrosion of the Tubes that required replacement before and during the 2002 Repair/ Renovation. Although Mr Suen tried to brush this aside by saying the Tubes were difficult to clean, in my view the corroded Tubes speak strongly of Imada’s use of the Machine for production purpose.

111.  I accept that after Imada’s Trials the Functions had intermittent problems and could not at times be performed in one go due to the Changes to the Materials. But this did not mean the Machine was not used for production purpose at all. After all, the Quotation/Contract provided that “[the Machine]各段裝置獨立控制,亦可同步生產,適合各廠户因實際需要而整體或個別操作……”. Indeed, the Machine was put to use/production for the Fill/Plug/Cap Functions only during Mei-King’s Trials. I find on balance Imada used the Machine for production purpose after each tuning/adjustment of the Machine to accommodate new batches of the Materials until the problems re-emerged.

112.  Mr Suen complained Mei-King did not sufficiently take into account the corrosive nature of the Oil in its design of the Machine and in the choice of materials for the Tubes. This was not part of Imada’s pleaded complaints and I am not concerned with allegations of design defects. In any event I prefer Mr Yip’s evidence that no material would be completely corrosion-resistant and Mei-King had used durable and “耐腐蝕性”materials.

113.  Ms Lau referred to (a) Mei-King’s 2/5/01 Statement indicating that Imada “驗收” the Machine (see below) and (b) the Invoice noting that the Tubes were replaced in August/September 2002, and suggested that if the Machine were used for production purpose and had the same rate of wear and tear, it was strange that Imada did not purchase/replace parts between August/September 2002 and the trial. But I am not persuaded Mr Suen’s assertion of no replacement of the Tubes was reliable (see above). I also refer to the discussion in paragraphs 120-122 below in relation to the 2/5/01 Statement.

XIV.  Payment ofthe Paid Priceand non-payment of the Balance Price

114.  Imada did not pay the second 30% of the Machine Price (HK$144,000.00) when “完成大樣”, but paid the same by the 2nd to 4th payments referred to in paragraph 7 above between 9th September and 17th December 1998. It also paid the 5th to 8th payments between 11th January and 26th May 1999. Mr Shun Sr’s affirmation did not explain why Imada made the 2nd to 8th payments for the Paid Price over a span of almost 9 months. Mr Suen could not assist because he did not know about payment matters. So Imada’s plea that it paid the Paid Price because it “needed to pay the fee for the Machine” under the Contract and wanted Mei-King to fix the Machine quickly was unsupported by evidence.

115.  In any event, such pleaded allegation is unconvincing. If (a) Mei-King’s/Imada’s Trials were unsuccessful, (b) the Machine could not be used for production purpose, and (c) there was no Manual and no proper On-Site Training, all of which I disagree, there would have been no commercial reason for Imada to pay for the useless Machine and Pipes/Pump at all, especially when it claimed Mei-King persistently adopted delaying tactics in relation to the futile repairs.

116.  In my view, the various payments of the Paid Price were consistent with Imada’s use of the Machine for production purpose and reflected Imada’s awareness that the problems were unrelated to the Machine.

117.  Ms Lau submitted that Mei-King knew it was not entitled to claim for the Balance Price because it only chased Imada twice for the same. But apart from Mei-King’s monthly statement to Imada dated 21st August 1999 (“21/8/99 Statement”) and the 2/5/01 Statement, the disclosed documents showed that Mei-King also demanded payment of the Balance Price by the 21/8/99 Letter. I also prefer Mr Yip’s evidence that Mei-King followed its standard practice by issuing regular monthly statements to chase Imada for the Balance Price until litigation commenced, but did not retain copies of all such statements. Although normally Mei-King’s staff would liaise with the customers’ accounts departments on outstanding payments, Mr Yip personally chased Mr Shun Sr for the balance of the Machine Price, and when so pressed Mr Shun Sr would arrange the issuance of cheques in part payment of the Machine Price and Pipes/Pump Price.

118.  The part payments ceased after 26th May 1999. When Mei-King’s staff thereafter chased for the Balance Price, Imada’s accounts department proffered many reasons for not being able to pay the Balance Price, which Mr Yip felt were excuses for delaying payment. In my view, this led to Mei-King’s formal demand to Imada to pay the Balance Price by the 21/8/99 Letter and the 21/8/99 Statement. Ms Lau submitted that Mr Yip’s evidence to the effect that Mr Shun Jr told him Imada could not make punctual payments because it was indebted to various firms did not sit well with his assertion that he would not chase Mr Shun Jr for payment. But Mr Yip explained (and I accept) that he elicited this from his “旁敲側擊” chat with Mr Shun Jr and not from any demand he made to Mr Shun Jr.

119.  In my view, the above speaks clearly of Imada’s knowledge that the observed problems were caused by the Changes to the Materials after Imada’s Trials otherwise there would have been no sensible or commercial reason for Imada to pay the Paid Price.

XV.  Is Mr Yip’s Remarkconsistent with Mei-King’s case?

120.  Ms Lau submitted that Mr Yip’s Remark of “[the Machine] 已於去年底前完全調校妥當,並於今年三月五日由[Mr Shun Sr]及[Mr Shun Jr]現場顴察,作為驗收。因此,敬希[Mr Shun Sr]幫忙,將其餘貨款早日付清。謝謝” showed that Imada did not accept the Machine in 1998. Neither Mr Shun Sr nor Mr Suen gave evidence on the subject, so I turn to Mr Yip’s evidence.

121.  Mr Yip explained (and I accept) that some time before the end of 2000 (but he could not remember exactly when) Mei-King at Imada’s request tuned/adjusted and re-tested the Machine as “驗收” since “…… [Imada]做咗一啲新嘅包裝材料,要我哋重新調整,好似嗰啲蓋,或者係樽,或者啲咩嘢,咁嘅時侯,所以我吔係講畀佢聽,係重新做過呢個調校妥當” . I have found there were cycles of (a) the Suppliers supplying new sample Materials from the re-worked moulds and (b) Mei-King attempting to tune/adjust the Machine and carrying out production trial runs with the new samples. Hence, the fact that Imada was satisfied with production trial run and “驗收” for certain new samples of the Materials did not mean the specifications/quality of the Materials would be consistent/standardised for all future supplies. They were only good until the problems with the Materials re-emerged some time later.

122.  There was also no need for Mr Yip to refer to the problems with the Materials in Mr Yip’s Remark since (a) both Mr Shun Sr and Mr Yip knew about such problems, liaised with the Suppliers and were present at “驗收”, and (b) Mei-King had just “調校妥當” and the problems had not yet re-emerged. But after May 2001 and before the end of 2001 or early 2002, Imada still telephoned to ask Mei-King to fix the Machine, and Mei-King’s staff did tune/adjust the Machine due to the re-emerged Changes in the Materials.

123.  Imada’s written response to Mr Yip’s Remark came almost a year later by way of the 23/8/01 Letter (ie “…… 迄今仍未清付款項問題,實因未正式驗收 ……”). The 23/8/01 Letter referred to the matters in paragraph 96 above and concluded by saying “直至目前為止,雙方仍未合理清楚解決,而拖延不是辦法,故本人曾親自電約面談解決,可惜令本人失望,故此特書函通知,盡速合理解決 ……”. In my view, Imada’s allegations of “未正式驗收” and “拖延” were tactical strategies to justify why it “迄今仍未清付款項”. I also refer to paragraphs 98 above and 125-130 below to say that when faced with problems with the Materials that were difficult to resolve and with the risk of losing Mei-King’s assistance coupled with an immediate liability to pay the Balance Price if it acknowledged such problems, Imada attempted to shift blame to Mei-King.

124.  Mr Yip explained (and I accept) that whilst Mei-King was irritated by the 23/8/01 Letter, he felt the parties should resolve commercial differences across the table and not by bickering correspondence that would impair mutual business relationship. So Mei-King did not respond in like manner and still tuned/adjusted the Machine for Imada until the end of 2001 or early 2002. Mr Yip said and I accept that neither party referred specifically to the 23/8/01 Letter and that they focused on dealing with the problems instead.

XVI.  2002 Repair/Renovation

125.  Imada published an advertisement (“Advertisement”) in the newspaper on 5th August 2002 as follows :

“嚴重警告     聲明通知

[Mei-King]     葉銘昌董事經理

[Imada]於一九九八年四月廿四月買賣合約,自動灌瓶、封蓋、貼標,依馬打藥油,生產線壹套,迄今仍未正式驗收,曾經多次函電催馳,全是故意借口拖延,毫無商德。除影響[Imada]營業額生產外,並造成商譽受損。現特此登報聲明,由即日起限十四日內,由[Mei-King]派員前來[Imada]試機,[Imada]將委任國際認可之公証行依合約驗收,解決問題,否則依法追究,賠償一切頂失。特此聲明。

[Imada]  啓

二零零二年八月五日”

126.  Mei-King did not know of the Advertisement until mid-August 2002 when Mr Shun Sr mailed it to Mei-King’s office. Mr Yip was surprised because the problems were due to the Materials and Imada could have liaised with Mr Yip/Mr Wong directly without communicating via such indirect medium. I find it strange (and there is no satisfactory explanation from Imada why) Imada saw fit to publish the Advertisement when it could easily have written to Mei-King or instructed solicitors to do so. Indeed, Imada was able to and did instruct its former solicitors to issue a letter to Mei-King in the same month of August 2002 (“8/02 Letter”) with similar contents as follows :

“…… In breach of the Contract, the Product has shown not to be of merchantable quality. In breach of the Contract, you had failed to, despite repeated requests, by letter and by telephone, from the Buyer since at least August 2001, failed to carry out the final examination. As such, the Buyer has not accepted delivery of the Product.

Unless we or the Buyer hears from you on or before 2 September 2002 to arrange for a final examination to take place within 14 days thereafter, the Buyer shall appoint a qualified surveyor to carry out the final examination and such examination to find out the cause(s) of the Product’s defect. If that happens, the Buyer shall claim against you for the costs of engaging the surveyor and their losses suffered arisen out of the Product’s defects.”

In my view, there is a strong tactical element of publishing bad publicity against and putting pressure on Mei-King, and I am unable to place strong weight on the Advertisement and/or the 8/02 Letter.

127.  I accept that Mr Yip did not respond in writing because he was not into “針針對對” correspondence. But he did express dissatisfaction directly to Mr Shun Sr’s/Imada’s agent Mr Lau on/about 20th August 2002 when Mr Lau approached Mei-King on behalf of Mr Shun Sr/Imada. On that occasion Mr Lau showed the Advertisement to Mr Yip, who complained that “「喂,有冇搞錯,咁樣嚟亂咁「baang」架咁」……所謂亂咁「baang」嘅意思即係話喺報紙亂咄登呢啲咁嘅廣告 ……”. It is all the more difficult to understand why the Advertisement was necessary at all when Imada was able to send Mr Lau to see Mr Yip and Mr Yip was willing to meet and promptly met Mr Lau. This adds weight to my conclusion that the Advertisement was a pressure tactic against Mei-King.

128.  There is no dispute that despite the aspersions cast on Mei-King by the Advertisement, Mr Yip at Mr Lau’s request promptly agreed to meet with Mr Shun Sr at Imada’s office on 27th August 2002 to discuss about the Machine (“27/8/02 Meeting”). This reflected Mei-King’s practical commercial attitude. The alacrity of Mr Yip’s response also defied Imada’s assertion that Mei-King adopted delaying tactics.

129.  Despite Mei-King’s agreement to attend the 27/8/02 Meeting, Imada on 26th August 2002 (ie the day before such meeting) issued the Circular Letter (not addressed to Mei-King) to warn medicinal and food manufacturers (ie Mei-King’s customers) as follows :

“購買機械   小心提防

葉銘昌虛假宣傳   美景機械工程爆光

欺騙欺詐   追究賠償

[the contents similar to the 23/8/01 Letter] ……直至目前為止,均是故意借口拖延,並有欺騙、欺詐業界等行為,毫無商業道德,除影響[Imada]生產運作外,並造成營業額巨大損失,並曾多次函電催馳面談解決,可惜令本人失望,故只有依法追究控訴賠償一切損失。特此順告同業廠商知照,以免受損、留意受騙是盼。”

In light of the 27/8/02 Meeting to be held on the following day, I cannot see any useful commercial purpose in issuing the Circular Letter except for the questionable motive of broadcasting bad publicity against Mei-King. But Ms Lau tried to cast suspicion on Mr Yip because Mei-King did not reply to the Circular Letter. However, Mr Yip said (and I accept) Mei-King only received a copy of the Circular Letter from Imada after commencement of the Tribunal Proceedings in January 2003. Mr Yip thought it unnecessary to make any reply since “…… 佢呢個係所謂向行業,或者喺各界嚟公佈,咁我冇理由見到要逐個接觸過呢封信嘅人嚟解釋”. In my view, there is also little point for any reply since by that time the 2002 Repair/Renovation was completed and the parties were already in litigation.

130.  Imada disclosed in these proceedings a document titled “[Mei-King]協商解決程序” of “二零零二年九月十一日記事” (“11/9/02 Record”). There is no information as to who prepared the 11/9/02 Record although the maker appeared to be Mr Shun Sr (eg “本人示意[Mr Lau]預約[Mr Yip]來公司洽談” (my emphasis)). Strong and vindictive words were used in the 11/9/02 Record against Mei-King, but of greater interest is its statement that “因此,本人才佈局了一些策略,希望能合理解決,亦待事情的演變 ……” (my emphasis), which sat well with the above conclusions. I find Imada’s stance as stated in the 23/8/01 Letter, the Advertisement, the 8/02 Letter and the Circular Letter unreliable and unconvincing, and nothing more than tactical strategies.

131.  The 27/8/02 Meeting was attended by Mr Shun Sr, Mr Shun Jr, Mr Yip and Mr Lau. The 11/9/02 Record noted as follows : “主題:試機驗收。葉云,時間已久,可能機件電腦零件等問題,希望能更換膠喉、充填零件,每天人工1300元,補貼一半,而膠喉零件按原單代支補貼,最重要是電腦問題,本人亦按原則同意,但時間不能拖延,葉云,將盡快解決,即八月卅日,再來公司查視。” There was no plea that Mei-King would bear half of the cost of the 2002 Repair/Renovation and I reject such contention.

132.  Mr Yip suggested that if the Machine’s computer programme was lost/damaged so that re-formulation was necessary, the repair cost might be HK$70,000.00-HK$80,000.00, but otherwise repair/maintenance on a “實報實銷” basis (ie labour cost at HK$1,300.00 per man-day (as echoed in Mei-King’s 21/8/99 Letter and Imada’s 11/9/02 Record) and replacement of parts at cost) would be about HK$20,000.00-HK$30,000.00. I accept that Mr Shun Sr agreed to the proposal.

133.  On 30th August 2002, Mei-King sent staff to Imada’s Factory and they discovered the computer programme was still working, but Imada’s workers failed to properly clean the Oil traces from the Tubes after production, so the Oil could not be pumped through the leaking/corroded Tubes to the Nozzles for production purpose. Such corroded Tubes and other parts of the Machine (eg the robotic arm) worn and torn due to long use had to be and were replaced/repaired during the 2002 Repair/Renovation. On 31st August 2002, Mei-King’s staff dismantled and brought certain parts of the Machine back to Mei-King’s Factory for re-working/replacement. Mei-King also purchased components and materials for making new parts. 

134.  The 2002 Repair/Renovation was completed on 13th September 2002. I accept the Machine was eventually tested and confirmed to be operable, but the problems with the Materials were still not resolved. Interestingly, although Imada made detailed written record of the 27/8/02 Meeting, it did not record the result of the 2002 Repair/Renovation at all.

XVII.  Was Imada obliged to pay the Invoice Sum?

135.  The Invoice comprised 6 man-days at HK$1,300.00 each man-day (HK$7,800.00) and expenses for the purchase of materials/parts (HK$6,465.00). There is no dispute that Mei-King actually carried out the 2002 Repair/ Renovation and no suggestion that it was free of charge, so Imada was liable to pay for the cost thereof. The only question is the quantum.

(a) Labour costs

136.  Ms Lau submitted “實報實銷” only applied to the purchase of materials/parts only, but such submission ignored paragraph 19 of Mr Shun Sr’s affirmation that acknowledged labour cost would be charged on that basis as well (ie “由於[Mr Yip]承諾實報實銷,故此本人要求[Mei-King]解釋工人的計算方法……”). Ms Lau did not argue any other basis of charge. I find labour cost was charged on “實報實銷” basis.

137.  Mr Yip explained (and I accept) the cost of HK$1,300.00 per man-day was based on average daily remuneration of 2 workers each of HK$650.00 (ie monthly wages of HK$11,000.00 ÷ 24 working days plus the cost of employees’ compensation insurance, statutory holiday, paid annual leave, overtime pay and lunch allowance). This was Mei-King’s “行家價”, ie the rate it charged customers for repairs (see the 21/8/99 Letter). Such rate was exclusive of profit, cost of using Mei-King’s transport, fuel charges, harbour tunnel fees, carpark charges and other expenses. Further, the 11/9/02 Record also showed the parties had actually discussed such man-day rate at the 27/8/02 Meeting.

138.  I find it justified to premise the rate on 2 workers since the 2002 Repair/Renovation required 1 to 2 workers and a driver. 1 worker had to be stationed at each end of the 6m long Machine for inspection/repairs. 2 workers were required to dismantle and transport the worn and torn parts to Mei-King’s Factory. Mei-King sent a driver with 1 or 2 workers to purchase the materials/parts listed in the Invoice the total weight of which exceeded 200kg. Back at Mei-King’s Factory, a lathe worker and a milling worker had to carry out additional works on the materials/parts. Then Mei-King’s driver and 2 workers delivered the repaired/renovated parts to Imada’s Factory for assembly/ installation before testing the Machine and carrying out production trial runs.

139.  Ms Lau submitted it was unbelievable for Mei-King not to keep formal or detailed log of the involved workers, the works undertaken and the hours spent for the repair/renovation of the Machine. But Mei-King’s workers would as a matter of practice make brief notations on the calendar and inform Mei-King’s management of the work done and materials/parts purchased for the issuance of bills (if appropriate) to customers. Mr Yip did not expect the workers and they would not have been able to make formal/detailed written record. I find Mr Yip’s evidence realistic.

140.  Imada admitted Mei-King carried out repair/renovation work at Imada’s Factory on 31st August and 6th, 11th and 13th September 2002 (see Mr Shun Jr’s statement dated 3rd October 2003 for the Tribunal Proceedings). I am satisfied the 2002 Repair/Renovation took 6 man-days. As early as in July 2003, Mr Yip in his statement for the Tribunal Proceedings explained that the 6 man-days comprised (a) 2  workers working at Imada’s Factory for 3 man-days dismantling worn and torn parts, re-installing new parts and carrying out tests and production trial runs (corroborated by Mr Shun Sr’s statement dated 16th September 2003 for the Tribunal Proceedings) and (b) 2 workers incurring 3 further man-days outside Imada’s Factory, ie carrying out additional works at Mei-King’s Factory and purchasing materials/parts.

(b) Materials/parts

141.  Mr Yip said (and I accept) all purchased materials/parts listed in the Invoice were either used for the Machine or given to Imada. Ms Lau complained that this was not mentioned in his witness statement, but in fact Mr Yip in his statement dated 26th July 2003 for the Tribunal Proceedings already stated that “零件費 …… 實報實銷,安裝後剩餘零件亦全部交付[Imada]”. I reject Imada’s pleaded complaint that it had no knowledge of the contents of the Invoice.

142.  Mr Yip fairly accepted Mei-King did not produce any bill/receipt for the purchased materials/parts. But since Imada was unable to say which materials/parts listed in the Invoice were not purchased or not used for the Machine or not given to Imada, and further since the purchased materials/parts were admittedly not free of charge, the court should do its best to ascertain the quantum of the “實報實銷” cost. There is no countervailing evidence to suggest the contemporaneous listed cost of the materials/parts in the Invoice was excessive or unreasonable. I accept on balance they were the “實報實銷” cost.

143.  It was also suggested that Imada was not obliged to pay the Invoice Sum because the 2002 Repair/Renovation was unsuccessful. I disagree that such repair/renovation was unsuccessful, but in any event no such condition was discussed at the 27/8/02 Meeting or noted in Mr Shun Sr’s affirmation or the 11/9/02 Record. On the contrary, Mei-King in its letter to Imada dated 14th November 2002 (“14/11/02 Letter”) stated that at the 27/8/02 Meeting “[Mr Yip]承諾派技術員維修跟進,閣下亦承諾支付所有的維修費用及零件費用,按照承諾,[Mei-King]隨即派員進行維修。” I accept that Mei-King refused Mr Shun Sr’s proposal to pay half of the Invoice Sum in full and final settlement.

144.  Ms Lau argued Imada would not have avoided payment of the small Invoice Sum and “waste the Paid Price”. But such argument did not sit well with the lack of response from Imada (which all along had not been shy in making written complaints) to the 14/11/02 Letter that stated “維修工作於2002年9月14日完成,亦經閣下滿意接受 ……” and demanded payment of the Invoice Sum. 

(c) Summary

145.  I find the Invoice Sum was the “實報實銷” cost of the 2002 Repair/Renovation. Imada was liable to pay the same to Mei-King.

XVIII.  Tribunal Proceedings

146.  On 15th January 2003 Mei-King issued the Tribunal Proceedings, but did not at the same time claim for the Balance Price. After careful consideration of the totality of the evidence, I do not consider this detracted from the veracity of Mr Yip’s evidence or Mei-King’s case. 

XIX.   Was Imada entitled to reject the Machine or was it precluded from doing so by acceptance?

147.  I have found that Imada failed to prove on balance any failure of the Machine to meet the Specified Volume/Rate or to perform all Functions in one go was due to defects of the Machine itself. There is no breach of the implied conditions of merchantable quality and fitness for purpose/description. This is sufficient to dispose of Imada’s claim.

148.  But if I am wrong and there were breach of such warranties, Mei-King argued Imada was precluded from rejecting the Machine because it (a) used the Machine in its business since August/September 1998, (b) retained the Machine ever since August 2002 without intimating to Mei-King after lapse of a reasonable time it rejected the same, (c) was deemed to have accepted the Machine by accepting the Pipes/Pump which formed part of the Facility, and (d) continued to effect part payments constituting the Paid Price. 

149.  There is no doubt Imada took physical delivery of the Machine and Pipes/Pump. However, Imada all along claimed it “never accepted” the Machine. Ms Lau submitted that since Imada paid the Paid Price it was prepared to accept the Machine if Mei-King’s repairs were successful, but since they were not Imada was entitled to and rejected the Machine.

150.  Ms Lau at first submitted that Imada rejected the Machine between 5th and 26th August 2002 by the Advertisement and Circular Letter. But such proposition did not sit well with the subsequent 27/8/02 Meeting that discussed repair/renovation of the Machine, the 2002 Repair/Renovation and Imada’s still later invitation to Mei Lee to repair the Machine. Ms Lau was therefore constrained to submit that Imada rejected the Machine by issuing its claim in DCCJ5540/2003 on 23rd September 2003. But Mr Suen (who finished his evidence before Imada amended its pleadings to add the formal plea on rejection) seemed to think otherwise. He said that after the 2002 Repair/Renovation Imada left the unused Materials on the Machine even up to the trial in July 2006 because Imada was inter alia still waiting for Mei-King to send staff to repair the Machine despite the litigation. Had there been clear and unequivocal rejection of the Machine in September 2003, it is strange indeed for Mr Suen to still expect Mei-King to come and repair the Machine in 2006. Such evidence is inconsistent with the plea of rejection.

(a) Relevant law

151.  A buyer exercising his right to reject must communicate to the other party clearly and unequivocally otherwise he may lose the right to reject as under certain circumstances an affirmation of the contract may be implied by law. But a buyer who rejected goods is not bound to return them to the seller.

152.  Section 37 of the Sale of Goods Ordinance Cap.26 (“Ordinance”) deals with conduct/inaction by the buyer which constitute acceptance by him, upon which his right to reject will be lost. A buyer will be deemed to have accepted the goods if he so intimates to the seller or does something inconsistent with the seller’s ownership (section 37(1)). But if the buyer has not previously examined the goods, he is not deemed to have accepted them until he has had a reasonable opportunity to do so for the purpose of ascertaining whether they are in conformity with the contract (section 37(2)(a)). The buyer will also be deemed to have accepted the goods if a reasonable time has elapsed after his retaining the goods without intimating to the seller that he has rejected them (section 37(4)). In deciding whether a reasonable time has elapsed, it is material to consider whether the buyer has had a reasonable opportunity of examining the goods for the abovementioned purpose (section 37(5)).

153.  Section 35(6)(a) of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 has no application to Hong Kong, so it is not expressly clear from the Ordinance whether a buyer’s attempt to remedy defective goods or to have them remedied by the seller or third party would amount to deemed acceptance under section 37(1). But since what is a “reasonable time” for rejection is a question of fact, I am of the view that there is flexibility for the court to consider whether and how much time taken for repairing the goods should be taken into account in deciding what “reasonable time” is in each case.

(b) “驗收”

154.  Mr Shun Sr claimed Imada never formally “驗收” the Machine in writing. But such “驗收” was not strictly necessary as it was not provided in either the Contract or the Ordinance. Irrespective of such “驗收”, I have found that Imada used the Machine after Imada’s Trials for production purpose that was more than necessary for testing or trial runs. By such act which was inconsistent with Mei-King’s ownership, Imada was deemed to have accepted the Machine.

(c)Reasonable opportunity to examine

155.  After the Machine was delivered/assembled/installed in August 1998, Imada kept it for more than 5 years before the alleged rejection in September 2003. Has a “reasonable time” elapsed for Imada to be deemed to have acepted the Machine?

156.  I disagree there is any inchoate state of “non-acceptance” beyond (a) a reasonable opportunity for examining the goods and/or (b) a reasonable time for retaining the goods without intimating rejection to the seller. I bear in mind that whilst rejection must be unequivocal, acceptance can be deemed under section 37(1) and (4) of the Ordinance. I now first consider whether Imada had a reasonable opportunity to examine the Machine under section 36(2) of the Ordinance.

157.  Imada by paragraph 3 of its Reply and Defence to Counterclaim in DCCJ5540/2003 admitted that after delivery of the Machine to Imada’s Factory on 6th August 1998, “when the staffs of [Imada] examined and tested the Machine, the Machine could not perform satisfactorily as what [Imada] needed” (my emphasis). Such admission together with Ms Lau’s concession that the alleged defects of the Machine were readily apparent/obvious as early as Mei-King’s/Imada’s Trials lead to the inevitable conclusion that Imada already had a reasonable opportunity to examine the Machine in 1998. 

158.  There was again reasonable opportunity to examine the Machine when in August 2002 Imada (with the benefit of legal advice)warned Mei-King it might retain qualified or internationally recognised surveyor to examine the Machine to ascertain the cause of the defect(s). I reject the argument that it was not possible to retain a surveyor without the Computer Documents. I note Imada did not ask for the Computer Documents when it warned Mei-King it might engage a surveyor, and there was no evidence that the proposed exercise by the surveyor as distinct from repair/maintenance of the Machine required the Computer Documents.

(d) Repair/maintenance of the Machineand lapse of time

159.  Even if Mei-King were in breach of the implied warranties of merchantable quality and fitness for purpose/description, I am not persuaded the whole period up to September 2003 was a “reasonable time” for rejection because of the need to repair/tune the Machine. Imada’s production supervisor Mr Suen (who had some experience with automated machines from his studies at the technical institute) said that in mid-1999 he realised from the way Mei-King tuned/adjusted the Machine that it could not be successfully repaired. Further, Mei-King ceased to provide maintenance service after the 2002 Repair/ Renovation (which Imada claimed was unsuccessful). Not only did Imada not reject the Machine then, Mr Shun Sr approached Mei Lee to carry out repairs because Imada had “invested” in the Machine (ie paid the Paid Price) and wanted to see if the Machine could be fixed in order to contribute to Imada’s business (which conduct/intention appeared to be inconsistent with Mei-King’s ownership). Although Mei Lee eventually abandoned the repair attempt and litigation commenced in January 2003, Imada still did not reject the Machine. Indeed, even when Imada’s solicitors issued demand letters to Mei-King in June/July 2003, Imada only demanded compensation without any intimation of rejection of the Machine. No or no satisfactory explanation was forthcoming on the above stance, and in my view, more than a reasonable time had elapsed and it was too late for Imada to reject the Machine in September 2003.

(e) Imada’s webpage

160.  Mr Suen knew a picture of the Machine was posted on Imada’s webpage some time after the Installation until at least 12th December 2003. There is no doubt that the webpage was to promote Imada and its products. In my view, Imada by posting such picture on the webpage held out that the Machine was part of its production facilities. This did not sit well with Imada’s alleged rejection of the Machine in September 2003. Ms Lau argued there was no narrative description of the Machine on Imada’s webpage, but could offer no credible explanation for the presence of the picture on the webpage. Mr Suen’s admission that it was due to commercial consideration (商業意識) supports the above conclusions.

(f) Payments by Imada

161.  I have rejected Imada’s claim that it paid the Paid Price because it “needed to pay the fee for the Machine” and wanted Mei-King to fix the Machine quickly. Bearing in mind the above factual matrix, I find that Imada’s conduct in paying the Paid Price by the Deposit and 7 other payments over about a year was consistent with Imada having accepted the Machine.

162.  Ms Lau cited All Fund Industrial Limited v Queentex Company Limited HCA11750/1995, Yuen J (as she then was) (unreported, 10th February 1999) in support of the proposition that payment of the price did not debar rejection. In that case, the plaintiff sold/delivered circuit boards to the defendant. After problems with the circuit boards were found and following a meeting, the defendant made part payment of the total invoiced sum. It was held that it did not lose the right to refuse further quantities of circuit boards. But the defendant in that case actually set aside a sum considered to be more than enough protection before making the part payment. Further, it remained liable to pay the plaintiff for some deliveries in any event and indeed judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff for the price of certain circuit boards less the price of the rejected goods. I am unable to draw assistance from this case, the facts of which are a far cry from those of the present proceedings.

(g) Acceptance of the Pipes/Pump

163.  Mei-King argued (but Imada disagreed) that by accepting the Pipes/Pump Imada was deemed to have accepted the Machine since they formed part of the Facility. I need not be concerned with such argument because I have found that Imada had used the Machine and Pipes/Pump for production purpose that was beyond what was necessary for testing or fitting.

(h) Summary

164.  In my view, Imada had accepted the Machine and had lost the right to reject. It therefore follows there was no total failure of consideration.

XX.  Loss and damages

165.  In case I am wrong and Mei-King was in breach of the Contract as alleged by Imada, I shall briefly consider the issue of damages. Ms Lau confirmed that despite claims in Imada’s pleadings for loss of profit and/or damages for loss of use of factory space occupied by the allegedly idle Machine, Imada’s damages were in fact the Paid Price.

166.  Section 55 of the Ordinance provides inter alia as follows :

“(1) Where there is a breach of warranty by the seller, or where the buyer elects, or is compelled, to treat any breach of a condition on the part of the seller as a breach of warranty, the buyer …… may-

(a) set up against the seller the breach of warranty in diminution or extinction of the price; or

(b) maintain an action against the seller for damages for the breach of warranty.

(2) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the estimated loss directly and naturally resulting, in the ordinary course of events, from the breach of warranty.

(3) In the case of breach of warranty of quality, such loss is prima facie the difference between the value of the goods at the time of delivery to the buyer and the value they would have had if they had answered to the warranty. ……”

167.  Section 55(1) reflects the first rule of Hadley v Baxendale but excluding the element of knowledge of special circumstances, and section 55(3) appears to apply equally to breach of warranty of description/fitness as it does to breach of warranty of quality (McGregor on Damages 17th ed. para.20-056 at p.717). The normal measure of damages is the estimated loss directly and naturally resulting in the ordinary course of events from the wrongful party’s breach of contract. Where there is an available market, the measure is prima facie the difference between the contract price and the market/current price at the time of delivery.

168.  Ms Lau submitted that the Machine Price and Pipes/Pump Price should be the best guide of the value of the Machine and Pipes/Pump if they had answered to the warranty. But McGregor on Damages (supra) para.20-258 at p.718 stated that “[the] contract price may be taken as evidence of the value of the goods as warranted where it is difficult to assess, but it is generally irrelevant and is not to be taken in lieu of the value as warranted. Where the contract price has been taken without argument this has probably been because it represented the market price” (my emphasis).

169.  Here there was an available market of available sellers. Mr Yip said other machine companies (eg Mei Lee and Mei-King’s other competitors) also designed/manufactured/sold Facilities similar to the Machine. He said both Mei-King and other such companies normally took 2 odd months from the time the customer committed to the purchase to design, manufacture, deliver and install the Facility. 

170.  Imada did not lead any evidence at all in respect of (a) the warranted value of the Machine from the available market at the time of delivery (eg price quotation from other machine companies) and/or (b) any difficulty in gathering evidence of such warranted value to justify the reference to other evidence of value. In the absence of such evidence, it is not appropriate to adopt the Machine Price and Pipes/Pump Price as the warranted value. After all, Mr Yip said that the price of a Facility depended on the cost of steel. Plainly the warranted value would depend on a host of factors including the price of steel at the material time.

171.  I find on balance that Imada has failed to prove its case for damages on the balance of probabilities.

XXI.  Conclusion

172.  I therefore grant judgment in favour of Mei-King against Imada for the Balance Price (HK$39,560.00) and the Invoice Sum (HK$14,265.00) in the total sum of HK$53,825.00, and interest on the Balance Price from 17th November 2003 and on the Invoice Sum from 15th January 2003 both to the date of judgment at 10.934% pa and thereafter at judgment rate until payment. Imada’s claims against Mei-King are dismissed.

173.  There is no reason why costs should not follow event. I grant a costs order nisi that Imada do pay the costs of the present proceedings, ie DCCJ5540/2003 and DCCJ6521/2003 (with all costs reserved if any) to be taxed if not agreed, but Mei-King do pay Imada costs of the Cooker Counterclaim to be taxed if not agreed.

 

 

 

(Marlene Ng)
District Court Judge

 

Representation:

Ms Lorinda Lau instructed by Messrs Huen & Partners for Imada Luenwah World Limited.

Mr Yip Ming Cheong, partner of Mei-King Machinery Engineering, in person and present.

Mr Wong Chi Nang, partner of Mei-King Machinery Engineering, in person and present.

 

54860-EN-2006-10-27

IMADA LUENWAH WORLD LTD v. YIP MING CHEONG AND ANOTHER

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DCCJ5540/2003

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5540 OF 2003

                                     

BETWEEN

IMADA LUENWAH WORLD LTD.Plaintiff
and
YIP MING CHEONG and WONG CHI NANGDefendant
both trading as MEI-KING MACHINERY ENGINEERING

                      ____________________

          DCCJ6521/2003

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6521 OF 2003

 

BETWEEN

YIP MING CHEONG and WONG CHI NANGPlaintiff
both trading as MEI-KING MACHINERY ENGINEERING
and
IMADA LUENWAH WORLD LTD.Defendant

Coram:   H H Judge Marlene Ng in Chambers (Open to the Public)

Date of Hearing:    25th October 2006

Date of Decision:   25th October 2006

Date of Handing Down Reasons for Decision:    27th October 2006

 

______________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

______________________________

 

Introduction

1.  The Summons returnable before me on 25th October 2006 (“2nd Summons”) is an application by Imada Luenwah World Ltd (“Imada”) for leave (a) to amend its Re-Re-Amended Statement of Claim and (b) to dispense with service of the Re-Re-Re-Amended Statement of Claim on the opposite party, ie Yip Ming Cheong (“Yip”) and Wong Chi Nang (“Wong”) both trading as Mei-King Machinery Engineering (“Mei-King”).

2.  After hearing submissions, I made the following orders at the hearing :

(a) leave be granted to Imada to re-re-re-amend the Re-Re-Amended Statement of Claim in DCCJ5540/2003 as per paragraphs 3, 4A, 7, 8a and 8b of the draft annexed to the 2nd Summons (“Draft”);

(b) Imada be entitled to retain the existing paragraph 8a of the Re-Re-Amended Statement of Claim in DCCJ5540/2003 relating to the plea of total failure of consideration if it sees fit and the same shall be re-numbered as paragraph 8c;

(c) Imada do on/before 27th October 2006 file and serve the Re-Re-Re-Amended Statement of Claim in DCCJ5540/2003;

(d) leave to Yip and Wong trading as Mei-King to file and serve an Amended Defence and Counterclaim in DCCJ5540/2003 if so desired on/before 9:30am on 6th November 2006;

(e)        Imada do arrange for paginated copies of all newly filed/served pleadings for insertion in the trial bundle for Yip, Wong and the court before/upon the resumption of the trial on 6th November 2006;

(f) Imada do pay costs of the 2nd Summons to Yip and Wong to be taxed if not agreed.

3.  After the hearing, a review of the papers reveals that on the second day of trial (ie 19th July 2006) I granted leave to Yip and Wong to amend paragraph 11 of the Defence and Counterclaim in DCCJ5540/2003 by replacing the phrase “Paragraph 8 is denied ……” with “Paragraphs 8 and 8a are denied ……”. In light of the minor amendment and the fact that Yip and Wong act in person, I further directed the filing and service of the Amended Defence and Counterclaim in DCCJ5540/2003 be dispensed with.

4.  In the circumstances, the order made in paragraph 2(d) above should refer to the Re-Amended Defence and Counterclaim and not the Amended Defence and Counterclaim.

5.  Ms Lau, counsel for Imada, informed me that if Yip and Wong do not further amend Mei-King’s pleadings pursuant to the above order, they will be taken to have traversed Imada’s new averments in the Re-Re-Re-Amended Statement of Claim and no pleading point will be taken against them.

6.  I informed the parties that I will hand down my reasons for decision in due course and this I now do. I also told Yip and Wong that they can liaise with my clerk to arrange for the court interpreter to interpret these reasons to them in the punti language.

Background

7.  For proper understanding of the application, it is necessary to set out the background in some detail. The trial of the present proceedings commenced on 17th July 2006 with three days reserved. Shortly before the trial, Imada issued a Summons (“1st Summons”) returnable before a Master in chambers inter alia for leave to be granted to Imada to :

(a) file/serve the affirmation of Suen Ching as per the draft attached to the 1st Summons (“SC Affirmation”) and for the SC Affirmation to be read at the trial or as the trial judge may direct otherwise;

(b) amend the Reply and Defence to Counterclaim as per the draft attached to the 1st Summons.

8.  The learned Master adjourned the 1st Summons to be heard before me on the first day of trial. After hearing submissions, I granted leave to Imada to file/serve the expurgated SC Affirmation and for the same to be read at the trial, but refused leave for Imada to amend the Reply and Defence to Counterclaim. Full reasons were given in my ruling on 17th July 2006.

9.  Briefly, I held that Imada’s proposed amendments to add a new line of defence to Mei-King’s counterclaim (ie Mei-King agreed to waive the balance price of the subject machine (“Machine”) in the sum of HK$39,560.00) was late and there was no satisfactory explanation for the lateness. Further, such proposed amendments were bare averments with no particularity and no supporting evidence identifiable from the discovered documents or Imada’s witness statements. I also bore in mind the litigation prejudice that would be caused to Yip and Wong as a result of Imada’s intention not to call Suen Ching as a live witness for cross-examination on the alleged agreement. In the circumstances, the proposed amendments to Imada’s pleadings were disallowed.

10.  However, I granted leave for Imada to read the SC Affirmation (but without some new assertions therein) at the trial. The contents of the expurgated SC Affirmation were consistent with the filed witness statement of Suen Ching. At that time Suen Ching had a serious illness and his prognosis was uncertain. The new assertions raised a pleading point, but more importantly, if they were allowed Yip and Wong would suffer litigation prejudice in not being able to cross-examine Suen Ching on those matters. Consequently, the new matters were excised from the SC Affirmation.

11.  On the second day of trial, in the course of Ms Lau’s opening submissions, I asked for clarification as to Imada’s cause(s) of action and the corresponding relief(s). Ms Lau at first submitted Imada rested its case on breach of contract (including breach of the requirement of “fitness for purpose”), and would not rely on any claim for total failure of consideration, restitution or rejection. Ms Lau explained there was no plea of rejection because Imada had never accepted the Machine in the first place. But she later submitted that although not specifically pleaded Imada was actually relying on a plea of rejection by averring that it had not accepted the Machine.

12.  Ms Lau further submitted that the reliefs sought for the cause of action based on breach of contract were (a) repayment of Imada’s part payments of the price to Mei-King in the total sum of HK$440,440.00 (“Paid Price”) or alternatively (b) damages being and/or being equivalent to the Paid Price.

13.  The hearing on the second day of trial was stood down twice at 10:06am and 10:23pm respectively for Ms Lau to take instructions on Imada’s cause(s) of action and the corresponding relief(s). After the adjournments, Ms Lau made further submissions on these matters. According to Ms Lau, Imada’s primary stance was that it rejected or never accepted the Machine (which failed to satisfy the contractual requirements), so it claimed for repayment of the Paid Price. Imada’s alternative stance was that if it failed to prove rejection or non-acceptance of the Machine (which was denied), it would claim for damages for breach of contract due to the Machine’s failure to perform as contractually stipulated and such damages would be or would be equivalent to the Paid Price. There was no claim for loss of profits or for loss of use of Imada’s factory space for storing the Machine.

14.  The hearing was stood down again at 10:50am for Ms Lau to consider how damages under the aforesaid alternative cause of action would be or would be equivalent to the Paid Price. After the adjournment, Ms Lau reiterated that the Paid Price was equivalent to the value of the Machine and/or to Imada’s loss/damages, and she applied to further amend the Re-Amended Statement of Claim to add paragraph 8a to plead total failure of consideration with consequent liability on the part of Mei-King to repay the Paid Price.

15.  Yip and Wong did not object to the proposed amendments and I granted leave for Imada to so amend the Re-Amended Statement of Claim and for Yip and Wong to amend Mei-King’s Defence and Counterclaim to deny such averment.

16.  After Ms Lau completed her opening submissions, Imada’s sole witness Suen Hung was called to give evidence. On 19th July 2006, ie the last scheduled day for the trial, Suen Hung completed his evidence and Imada closed its case. The trial was then adjourned part-heard to 6th and 7th November 2006.

Proposed amendments : general

17.  The present proposed amendments of the Re-Re-Amended Statement of Claim can be summarised as follows :

(a) to aver that the subject contract (“Contract”) was a written contract (paragraph 3 of the Draft);

(b) to aver that in order to give business efficacy there was an implied term for Mei-King to supply all relevant documents relating to “the instructions of the Machine” including 電腦方程式and電腦版圖 (paragraph 4A of the Draft);

(c) to aver that when the Machine did not work as contractually provided, was not in good function and was not fit for the purpose it was bought, Mei-King was in breach of the Contract (paragraph 5 of the Draft);

(d) to correct a typographical error (paragraph 7 of the Draft);

(e) to aver that apart from being unwilling to confirm the Machine was in order, Imada also refused to take delivery of and was entitled to reject the Machine, whereby Imada suffered damages being or being equivalent to the Paid Price (paragraphs 5, 8a and 8b of the Draft);

(f) to plead a new cause of action based on fraudulent and/or negligent misrepresentation (paragraphs 8c to 8h of the Draft);

(g) to expand the cause of action on total failure of consideration to rely on the new misrepresentation claim (paragraph 8h of the Draft);

(h) to add two new reliefs, ie return of the Machine to Mei-King and rescission of the Contract, which Ms Lau explained were the corresponding reliefs for the new misrepresentation claim (prayer of reliefs 1A and 1B of the Draft).

18.  When the proposed amendments were explained to Yip and Wong, they indicated they had no objection to Imada’s request to amend the Re-Re-Amended Statement of Claim in respect of (a) to (e) above.

Proposed amendments : new misrepresentation claim

19. The main contention in relation to (f) to (h) concerns the new cause of action on fraudulent and/or negligent misrepresentation. Imada filed and served the affirmation of Shun Mei Mei Mimi (“Madam Shun”), Suen Ching’s daughter, in support of the 2nd Summons (“SMMM Affirmation”).

20.  It appears that Suen Ching passed away on 25th September 2006. Madam Shun in her affirmation explained by way of background how Suen Ching was upset with the Machine’s failure to work properly, how he preferred to have the Machine fixed (if it could be so fixed) since Imada had paid for it, and how he was aggrieved by Mei-King’s irresponsible attitude.

21.  The SMMM Affirmation went on to say that “to expedite the matter, [Suen Ching] asked my legal representative what minimum changes [Imada] would have to made so that [Imada] could claim the return of the purchase price as soon as possible”. Such statement is not particularly intelligible, but Ms Lau explained at the hearing that Madam Shun was referring to Suen Ching’s liaison with Imada’s legal representatives during the trial in July 2006 (see paragraphs 22-23 below).

22.  The SMMM Affirmation continued to state that Madam Shun was advised by her legal representatives there was a need to amend the pleadings “to reflect our case which in law could amount to total failure of consideration as well as misrepresentations. [Madam Shun] have also been explained to [her] understanding that since the trial is ongoing, the more changes we made, the more likely that the court would refuse and/or the trial would be adjourned. Of course, these are legal issues and [Madam Shun] do not have any thorough understanding of these legal matters. After discussion, [Imada] decided not tomake further changes for fear that the whole proceedings would be adjourned” (my emphasis).

23.  I am informed by Ms Lau that the discussions and legal advice referred to by Madam Shun in paragraphs 21-22 above were given to Suen Ching, Imada and herself on/about the first and second days of the trial. Ms Lau submitted that at that time Imada received legal advice on two unpleaded causes of action (ie total failure of consideration and misrepresentation), but decided to apply to amend its pleadings to only include the plea on total failure of consideration but not the plea on misrepresentation.

24.  Madam Shun went on to say in her affirmation that “[now] that the case had been adjourned, [Imada] decided to instruct counsel to apply to amend as per the Re-Re-Re-Amended Statement of Claim. [Madam Shun has] been explained that the risk of adjournment is minimal because (a) the trial would resume on 6th November 2006; and (b) the amendments involved evidence that have either been included in [the SCAffirmation] or given by [Imada’s] witness Mr. Suen Hung thus would not prejudice [Mei-King]. [Madam Shun] was further explained to [her] understanding by [her] legal representative that if [Imada] do not make the amendments now, [Imada] could not invite this Honourable Court to rule on this issue” (my emphasis).

25.  Madam Shun added that whilst it might not be relevant to the application, it was Suen Ching’s wish to bring Mei-King to justice so that it should be made to understand “customers are not to be lied or misrepresented like that” (my emphasis).

26.  I am not persuaded by Madam Shun’s explanation, which I find to be neither reasonable nor justifiable.

27.  First, even on Madam Shun’s explanation, there is no excuse why the application was not issued promptly when the trial was adjourned on 19th July 2006. The 2nd Summons was not issued until 13th October 2006, almost three months after the adjournment of the trial and shortly before the part-heard trial dates were due to resume.

28.  Secondly, even on Madam Shun’s explanation, it is plain that after receiving legal advice Imada made a conscious tactical decision in July 2006 to do the minimum possible by not to putting forward the misrepresentation claim so as to avoid the risk of (a) adjournment of the trial and/or (b) refusal by the court to grant leave to amend if too many amendments were asked for.

29.  In fact, even on Madam Shun’s explanation (see paragraph 25 above), it was claimed that Suen Ching (and therefore Imada) knew Mei-King “lied and misrepresented”. Further, Imada had legal representation since the commencement of the present proceedings if not earlier and its legal representatives knew that without proper pleadings Imada could not ask this court to rule on any unpleaded cause of action (see paragraph 24 above). Yet Imada chose not to include the misrepresentation claim against Mei-King even though it amended the Statement of Claim three times and even though this court stood down the hearing three times on the second day of trial for Ms Lau to consider and take instructions on Imada’s cause(s) of action and corresponding relief(s).

30.  By the SMMM Affirmation (as clarified by Ms Lau), Imada said that although it had the primary factual information as well as legal advice on the misrepresentation claim to hand during the trial in July 2006, it adopted a strategic decision to apply for further amendment of its pleadings to only raise the plea of total failure of consideration. But now that (a) Imada had led its evidence and closed its case, (b) Yip and Wong had completed their cross-examination of Suen Hung (Imada’s sole witness) when unbeknownst to them there was a misrepresentation claim in the wings, and (c) the trial was adjourned part heard, Imada deemed it appropriate to spring the misrepresentation claim on Yip and Wong because (i) Imada could rely on the fait accompli of having led its evidence and closed its case, and (ii) the risk of further adjournment was considered remote.

31.  Such approach appears to run counter to the candour expected of parties in modern civil litigation, and Ms Lau’s oral and written submissions only served to underline such concern. Ms Lau acknowledged that the cause of action based on misrepresentation was not pleaded, but went on to emphasise that (a) Imada’s witness had “already in his evidence covered the said point” and (b) “[since] the case has been adjourned, [Imada] decided to apply for leave to make the amendments”.

32.  But Ms Lau argued that amendments for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties to any proceedings “as well as of correcting any defect in the pleadings” should be allowed. In fact, the relevant extract from Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2006 Vol.1 at para.20/8/6 that Ms Lau relied on referred to “correcting any defect or error in any proceedings” and not “correcting any defect in the pleadings”.

33.  Be that as it may, the reality here is (as I have said) on the second day of the trial time and opportunity were given to Imada to consider “the real issues in controversy between the parties” and to apply to amend its pleadings if appropriate. Indeed, a better part of the morning of the second day of trial was spent on such matters. Yet Imada not only did not intimate that a misrepresentation claim would be in the wings, Ms Lau in her submissions on the second day of trial in relation to Imada’s cause(s) of action and corresponding relief(s) indicated to the contrary :

“……

官: 咁所以如果一般嚟講,法理個原則或者如果妳係嘅,妳可以同本席提及法理原則,好讓本席理解,若然係breach of contract嘅話,咁個濟助就係damages,係賠償。

MISS LAU : 係。

官 : 咁如果你話係應該退回款項,一,就係total failure喇,二,就係話有rejection,咁呢一個想弄清楚個訴因。

MISS LAU : 係,唔該,法官閣下,咁所以如果從嗰個法理嘅立場講,而唔用嗰個籠统嘅……

官 : 或者如果本席所提及嘅法理係錯誤嘅,咁亦都歡迎大律師提出妳嘅意見。

MISS LAU : 我明白,法官閣下,但係當然喺合同入面,我哋都知道嗰個,如果嗰個contract係breach咗嘅,咁唔係有咩嘢mistake呀,唔係有咩嘢misrepresentation呀,咁佢唔會ab initio嘅,咁所以喺咁嘅情況之下,我哋可以得到嘅索償就係一個賠償喇,咁而喺呢一度,我吔要求嗰個賠償金額就係440,440鈫。

官 : 咁我想弄清楚喇,而家總結咗頭先嘅—頭先同大律師嘅對話,現在你哋所索償嘅濟助就係—訴因就係毀約嘅訴因?

MISS LAU : 係。

官 : 然後所索償嘅濟助雖然妳係有一個—提及一個數額,但係妳要求嘅係一個賠償嘅濟助。

MISS LAU : 賠償,係。

……” (my emphasis)

Since then up till the issuance of the 2nd Summons, Imada made no attempt to disabuse the court or Yip/Wong of the impression from the above submissions that there was no plea of mistake or misrepresentation in the wings. It was on such basis that the parties proceeded with the trial and dealt with Suen Hung’s evidence.

34.  In balancing the interests of both parties and considering what is just, I am unable to say Imada’s approach has been fair and just.

35.  It is incumbent on a claimant to set out its case with clarity. Imada being legally represented cannot be unaware of the purpose of pleadings. By the time the trial commenced or indeed before Suen Hung gave evidence, its pleadings should have been in order. Indeed, even on the second day of trial Imada was given time and opportunity to deal with these matters. I cannot ignore the fact that Imada amended its pleadings even on the second day of trial to add the plea of total failure of consideration.

36.  I have referred Ms Lau to the judgment of Ma CJHC in Wing Hang Bank Limited v Crystal Jet International Limited & ors CACV255/2002 (unreported, 12th May 2005) which succinctly summarised the basic principles :

“6. …… (1) The purpose of pleadings is fairly and precisely to inform the other side of the stance of the pleading party so that proper preparation is made possible, and time and effort are not expended unnecessarily on other issues ……

(2) In a trial, particularly where evidence is given by witnesses, it becomes extremely important that each side knows exactly what are the live issues. Where issues are sought to be introduced that have not been adequately pleaded, amendments must be sought unless the consent of the other party or parties has been obtained. It will simply not do for the pleaded issues to be ‘slipped in’ when evidence is being given in the hope that the other side is not sufficiently alert to object. Much testimony given in the course of a trial may in truth relate to a number of possible aspects or may simply be background information. Obviously, counsel must be astute to object when necessary but the primary responsibility of ensuring that any issue is properly before the Court is on the party seeking to advance that issue. He must do so clearly and not ambiguously, and the usual way of doing so is through the pleadings. Care must be taken to plead issues clearly, and not draft pleadings either vaguely or ambiguously perhaps in the hope that the other side might not readily or easily understand a party’s real case. While vaguely or ambiguously drawn pleadings may enable a party to escape a strike out application (since striking out is only for plain and obvious cases), this is not to say that where a court has to decide whether or not an issue is to be permitted to be run, it will smile kindly on such types of pleading.

……

8. …… The object is not to invite prolixity in pleadings but to achieve what has always been the position : to fairly inform the other side and the Court of a party’s case, identifying the issues and the true extent of the dispute between the parties. ……” (my emphasis)

37.  I have also referred Ms Lau to ADS v Wheelock Marden & Co Ltd [1994] 2 HKC 264, 269-270, where Bokhary JA (as he then was) had the following to say regarding pleadings :

“What pleadings must do – generally …

Those complaints go to pleadings. So does the bulk of the other complaints ventilated before us. That being so, it is important to remember this. Our procedure aims to ensure that litigation, particularly the trial itself, is conducted fairly, openly, free from surprise, and without unnecessary delay or expense. In the attainment of that objective, pleadings have a fundamental role to play. Accordingly, there are a number of things which pleadings should do. Ideally, they would do them from the outset. In any event, they must do them by the time they have been properly particularized – whether particularized on the pleader’s own initiative, upon the other side request, or pursuant to the court’s order.

What those things are is to be gathered from the decided cases. That exercise has been performed by the learned editors of the 1993 Supreme Court Practice. And, as one sees from note 18/12/2 at pp 307-308 of Vol 1 thereof, the things which properly particularized pleadings must do are to:

(1) to inform the other side of the nature of the case they have to meet as distinguished from the mode in which that case is to be proved;

(2) prevent the other side from being taken by surprise at the trial;

(3)  enable the other side to know what evidence they ought to be prepared with and to prepare for trial;

(4) limit the generality of the pleadings, the claim and the evidence;

(5) limit and define the issues to be tried, and as to which discovery is required; and the hands of the party so that he cannot without leave go into any matters not included (although if the opponent omits to ask for particulars, evidence may be given which supports any material allegation in the pleadings).” (my emphasis)

38.  In my view, to keep a cause of action up one’s sleeve without properly identifying the real issues in controversy in one’s pleadings (as required under the above principles and particularly when opportunity to do so was given) so as to avoid the risk of adjournment of the trial (and no doubt the potential cost implications that would flow from any such adjournment) and so that the opposite party would complete their cross-examination in ignorance of such cause of action is plainly an attempt to overreach. I bear in mind the new claim is based on inter alia fraudulent misrepresentation, and an assertion of fraud, albeit in the Derry v Peek sense, is not a light matter. Although there is no need at this stage for me to find the proposed misrepresentation claim to be mala fide, it is unlikely this court will, as Ma CJHC said, smile kindly on the approach adopted.

39.  In Chau Mei Lee Fragrance & anor v Ng Yee Tim CACV97/1995 (unreported, 18th December 1996), Ching JA said as follows :

“Amendments should not be refused however late the application is made provided that they are not designed to over-reach and provided that no prejudice is caused to the other side which cannot be cured by costs and an adjournment if necessary.” (my emphasis)

The Court of Appeal endorsed Ching JA’s views again in Tang Kam Wah, Tang Ching Fan, Tang Ka Hi, Tang Ming Cheung (or Tsueng), Tang Luen Hing and Tang Tai Tong as Managers of Tang Mung (or Mang or Mun) Lau Tso & anor v Tang Ming Yat & anor CACV522/2000 (unreported).

40.  And there is more. As regards the relevant principles on late amendment of pleadings, I have previously referred to the decision by Mr Recorder Kwok, SC in Lam Wai Hung v Lam Chun Hung and ors HCA2038/2004 (unreported, 22nd June 2006) in my ruling of 17th July 2006. Ms Lau relied on the principles set out in paragraphs 24-26 of the decision of the learned Recorder in support of the 2nd Summons. Those principles have been set out in paragraph 16 of my ruling and I do not propose to repeat them in detail.

41.  Briefly, the learned Recorder said that for late amendments of pleadings, particularly applications to amend during the trial, the proposed amendments must be sufficiently intelligible and adequately particularised. “The court will always look at the materiality of the proposed amendment. An inconsistent or useless amendment will not be allowed, see Hong Kong Civil Practice 2006 paragraph 20/8/24. The court is entitled to have regard to the merits of the case in an application to amend if the merits are readily apparent and are so apparent without prolonged investigation into the merits of the case, see Hong Kong Civil Practice 2006 paragraph 20/8/6”.

42.  As explained above, the new claim here is based on fraudulent and/or negligent misrepresentation. Fraud (even in the Derry v Peek sense) is viewed with more care than other civil wrongs. The learned Recorder said at para.8 of his decision that “[it] is well-known that fraud can only be pleaded when there is sufficient evidence and that it must then be specifically pleaded and the party making the allegations must give full particulars of them, see generally paragraph 18/8/13 of Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2006”. (my emphasis)

43.  On the day after the learned Recorder delivered his decision, Lam J in his Reasons for Decision in Magic Score Limited v The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited & anor HCA11077/1994 (unreported) reiterated that allegations of fraud are not to be pleaded lightly.

44.  In the ADS case (supra) at p.270, Bokhary JA (as he then was) had the following to say on pleading fraud and the like :

“… and especially where fraud is alleged

To the generality of the foregoing must be added the special rule that allegations of fraud must be pleaded distinctly and with the utmost particularity. The word 'distinctly' is the one used by Thesiger LJ in his well-known statement in Davy v Garrett (1878) 7 Ch. D 473 at p. 489 as to how fraud is to be pleaded. And the expression 'utmost particularity', as one sees from note 18/8/8 at p 297 of Vol 1 of the 1993Supreme Court Practice, is the one chosen by its learned editors and has the authority of their combined experience. That special rule arises in this case.

Never before as much as now

None of the basic rules of pleading have anything to do with technicality. All of them have everything to do with practical justice. They have always been of importance. Never before as much as now. For these days, there are more and more cases so vast and so complex that they push practically to its limit our system's capacity effectively to cope with them. Any laxity in their proper management, whether in regard to pleadings or anything else, can all too easily result in such cases spinning into confusion if not chaos - even before trial but especially at trial. ……" (my emphasis)

45.  In light of the aforesaid principles, which Ms Lau did not disagree, she submitted that the proposed amendments concerning the misrepresentation plea were pleaded with sufficient particularity and they would not result in any change of evidence by the parties. Ms Lau further confirmed Imada would not seek to re-open its case and/or adduce further evidence.

46.  It is therefore necessary to study the proposed new pleadings to see if such submissions are made out. The gist of the proposed amendments in the Draft in respect of the misrepresentation claim are as follows :

(a) In/about April 1998 prior to execution of the Contract, Yip orally represented to Imada’s Suen Ching that the Machine (i) would produce or process about 3,000 to 4,000 bottles per hour with the volume capacity of 20ml – 100ml (“1st Representation”), (ii) was a fully automated machine custom designed for bottling and packaging Imada’s products (including filling medicinal oil into, putting caps on and labelling the bottles) to suit Imada’s business needs and to speed up Imada’s processing time (“2nd Representation”), and (iii) was easy to operate and maintain by one or two workers after simple training with minimal supervision required (“3rd Representation”) (collectively, “Oral Representations”).

(b) The Oral Representations were intended to induce Imada to buy the Machine.

(c) Acting on the faith and truth of the Oral Representations, Imada executed the Contract.

(d) Imada “has since” discovered and the fact was that the Oral Representations were untrue. The proposed amendments described how they were untrue.

(e) “Being an expert and experienced in this filed (sic) and the person designing and compiling the Machine, [Mei King] made the [Oral Representations] fraudulently and either will knowing (sic) that they were false and untrue or recklessly not caring whether they were true of (sic) false or negligently”.

(f) Imada would rely on the provisions of the Misrepresentation Ordinance Cap.284 as entitling it to the reliefs claimed.

(g) “As soon as [Imada] discovered that the representations were untrue, [Imada] repudiated the Contract by commencement of the said legal proceedings.”

47.  The representation is undoubtedly a material element in any misrepresentation claim. But apart from the assertion that Yip orally made the Oral Representations to Suen Ching in/about April 1998, no particulars were given as to the circumstances, place or mode of communication (eg at face to face meeting or by telephone). It is also unclear whether they were made on one or more than one occasions. Bullen & Leake & Jacob’s Precedents of Pleadings 15th ed. Vol.2 para.49-10 at p.802 had the following to say in relation to pleading fraudulent misrepresentation :

“The particulars of claim must show the nature and extent of each alleged misrepresentation …… and contain particulars showing when, where (if relevant) by whom and to whom it was made, and how it was made, whether orally or in writing, and if in writing, identifying the relevant documents (Seligmann v Young [1884] W.N. 93).” (my emphasis)

48.  In my ruling on 17th July 2006, I referred to Heibei Enterprises Limited and others v Livasiri & Co and others HCA20094/1998, Deputy Judge Poon (unreported, 3rd June 2004) and Wellfit Investment Ltd v Poly Commence Ltd & Ors CACV80 of 1995 (unreported, 18 July 2005) and explained why requests for further and better particulars are not an answer to lack of particularity in respect of late amendments to pleadings. Since Imada proposed to aver fraud (albeit in the Derry v Peek sense), it is unjust to ask Yip and Wong to address such new claim in the absence of full, specific and utmost particularity, especially when Imada has closed its case and does not propose to re-open the same.

49.  More importantly, a plea of fraudulent misrepresentation should only be made if there is sufficient evidence, particularly as Imada’s case has been closed. I stood down the hearing to enable to Ms Lau to identify the relevant evidence. However, despite Ms Lau’s diligent search, she was unable to refer me to any evidence adduced by Imada on the Oral Representations.

50.  In the circumstances, Ms Lau was constrained to seek leave at the hearing to amend paragraphs 8c and 8e of the Draft by deleting all references to oral representations made to Suen Ching in April 1998 prior to the execution of the Contract and replacing them with a proposed averment that the 1st to 3rd Representations were made to Imada’s Suen Ching “in writing as evidenced in the quotation MKQ-196-3198 (Revised 2) [“Quotation”] (and subsequently became a term of the contract entered into between [Imada] and [Mei-King])” (“Written Representations”). Yip and Wong did not object to the application and I granted leave accordingly.

51.  But the Written Representations still required scrutiny. The Quotation does not appear to contain the following express written representations and no explanation is forthcoming :

(a) the Machine “would speed up the processing time of Imada’s medical oil bottles production process” under the 2nd Representation;

(b) the production process of the Machine would require “one or two workers under minimum supervision” under the 2nd Representation;

(c) “one or two workers” could operate the Machine under the 3rd Representation.

52.  Likewise, Imada’s discovery of the falsity of the Oral Representations is a material element of the proposed misrepresentation claim. However, all Imada pleaded in the Draft was that it “had since” made such discovery and “as soon as” the discovery was made it repudiated the Contract by commencing “the said legal proceedings”. Ms Lau confirmed “the said legal proceedings” referred to the present proceedings. No particulars were given as to date or even the approximate time when Imada made the alleged discovery. It is clearly a pertinent particular given that (a) the Written Representations were made in April 1998 and (b) the present proceedings were commenced in September 2003 with an intervening lapse of more than five years.

53.  I also note that the equitable remedy of rescission prayed for in the proposed amendments is a discretionary remedy. Mei-King in its Amended Defence and Counterclaim has already pleaded that any right by Imada to reject the Machine has been lost because it has already accepted the same. Plainly, even if the proposed amendments were allowed, there might possibly have been an issue as to whether there had been unreasonable delay and/or affirmation of the Contract debarring rescission.

54.  Ms Lau accepted that late amendments required full particulars (particularly on a material averment) (see paragraph 48 above) and the opposite party should not be required to attempt understanding of the amendments by requesting for further and better particulars. Regrettably the aforesaid material particulars are conspicuously absent in the proposed amendments.

55.  At the hearing before me, Ms Lau was again constrained to seek leave to amend the Draft by adding the following at the end of paragraph 8e :

“(e)   [Imada] will rely on the fact that [Imada] discovered the representations to be false or untrue base on various failing repairs conducted by [Mei-King] and the time of discovery is when [Imada] commenced the said legal proceedings in September 2003.”

Yip and Wong again did not object to Imada’s application and I so granted leave.

56.  There is no prior pleading that Imada’s alleged discovery of the factual matters pleaded in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 8e of the Draft was in September 2003, ie more than five years after delivery/ installation of the Machine. Cross-examination of Suen Hung was conducted in the absence of any misrepresentation claim or any claim for rescission of the Contract. I cannot help feel that had Yip and Wong been told Imada had a case of fraudulent/negligent misrepresentation and a claim for rescission in the pipeline, their cross-examination of Suen Hung might have been conducted differently or at least with additional focus.

57.  Further, the evidence already adduced by Imada on this issue is not clear-cut. On Imada’s case, both Suen Hung in his evidence and the SC Affirmation stated that right from the start (ie from the test conducted shortly after installation of the Machine at Imada’s factory) the Machine could not operate properly and it was never properly operable ever since. Suen Hung gave evidence that by mid-1999 he concluded that the Machine could not function properly. There was no evidence Mei-King made further repairs after August/September 2002. Imada approached another company with a view to carry out repairs. The present legal proceedings were only commenced on 23rd September 2003.

58.  Since the trial is ongoing, it is inappropriate for me to form (and I do not form) any view on the merits of Imada’s case. However, Ms Lau reminded me the court was entitled to have regard to the merits of the case if they were readily apparent and were so apparent without prolonged investigation into the same. In my view, the merits are not plainly obvious and it is inappropriate to delve further into the merits save to note the position is not clear-cut.

59.  Ultimately it is a balancing exercise and the court has to hold the scales between the parties. Here, there is no doubt a new cause of action has been raised for the first time by the proposed amendments. Yip submitted (and his submissions were adopted by Wong) that Imada’s application vis-à-vis the new misrepresentation claim was unfair since all along Mei-King was led to believe it was facing a claim in relation to the quality/performance of the Machine, and a claim for fraudulent/negligent misrepresentation would give a new and unanticipated dimension that would put Mei-King at a disadvantage in the conduct of its defence against Imada’s claim.

60.  In my view, a claim for misrepresentation, particularly fraudulent misrepresentation, will change the focus of the trial. Imada has indicated it does not propose to re-open its case and there will be difficulty for Yip and Wong to address the various matters I raised above. Even if Imada is prepared to tender Suen Hung for further cross-examination, Yip and Wong should not be asked to defend a last-minute additional claim when they have already cross-examined Imada’s key player without all cards on the table, a situation not of their doing but of Imada’s opportunism and tactical choice. I have strong misgivings about the fairness of requiring Yip and Wong to meet this new misrepresentation claim that has not been pleaded hitherto.

61.  Further, if the misrepresentation claim (particularly the fraudulent misrepresentation claim) based on the Written Representations allegedly made to Suen Ching and on the alleged discovery of the falsity of the representations only in September 2003 were raised at an earlier stage, whether I would have allowed the SC Affirmation to be read without live evidence and without any opportunity for Yip and Wong to cross-examine Suen Ching on the broadened front opened by such new claim is something one cannot speculate. The way Imada has pleaded its case and its strategic decision to defer its application to plead misrepresentation has deprived Yip and Wong of the opportunity to adequately address such issue. In my view, the litigation prejudice that will be caused to Yip and Wong by the proposed amendments to add the misrepresentation claim cannot be compensated by costs and/or adjournment of the trial.

62.  On the above analysis, I have refused to grant leave forImada to add the new misrepresentation claim to its pleadings. In reaching such view, I take no account of the fact that Yip and Wong are acting in person and I form no view on the merits of the substantive claim and counterclaim since the trial is still ongoing before me.

Costs

63.  Ms Lau indicated that costs of the 2nd Summons should be in Yip’s and Wong’s favour in any event.

 

(Marlene Ng)
District Judge

Representation:

Ms Lorinda Lau instructed by Messrs Huen & Partners for Imada Luenwah World Ltd.

Yip Ming Cheong, in person and present.

Wong Chi Nang, in person and present.

53465-EN-2006-07-18

IMADA LUENWAH WORLD LTD v. YIP MING CHEONG AND ANOTHER

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DCCJ5540/2003

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5540 OF 2003

                                     

BETWEEN

IMADA LUENWAH WORLD LTD.Plaintiff
and
YIP MING CHEONG and WONG CHI NANG both trading as MEI-KING MACHINERY ENGINEERINGDefendant
 
and

          DCCJ6521/2003

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 6521 OF 2003

                                     

BETWEEN

YIP MING CHEONG and WONG CHI NANG both trading as MEI-KING MACHINERYENGINEERINGPlaintiff
and
IMADA LUENWAH WORLD LTD.Defendant

                                     

Coram:  HH Judge Ng in Court

Date of Hearing: 17 July 2006

Date of Delivery of Ruling:  17 and 18 July 2006

 

                            

R U L I N G

                            

 

1.  This is the plaintiff's application by summons dated 12 July 2006, just three working days before the trial, which is today.  Three days have been reserved for the trial.  The summons seeks:

(1) leave for Imada Luenwah World Ltd. (hereinafter called "Imada") to file and serve the affirmation Suen Ching as per the draft attached to the summons and for the said affirmation to be read at the trial or as the trial judge may direct otherwise;

(2) leave be granted to Imada to file the Re-Amended Writ and Statement of Claim out of time;

(3) leave be granted to Imada to amend the Reply and Defence to Counterclaim as per the draft annexed to the summons.

2.  The summons was made returnable before a master in chambers on 14 July 2006.  Quite properly, the master adjourned the summons to be dealt with by the trial judge.  On 21 February 2006, the case was set down for trial.  Since the setting down, the trial judge has been seized of this case.  The summons seeks reliefs which will impact on the conduct of the trial.  In my view, the relevant discretion as to whether to grant those reliefs should be exercised by the trial judge and Imada's solicitors should have issued the summons returnable before the trial judge either before or on the first day of trial.

3.  The other parties are Yip Ming-cheong and Wong Chi-nang, both trading as Mei-King Machinery Engineering (hereinafter called "Yip", "Wong" and "Mei-King" respectively).  Yip and Wong act in person before me although they were previously legally represented. 

4.  In respect of Imada's application for leave to file the Re-Amended Writ and Statement of Claim out of time, Yip and Wong have no objection.  In fact, Master R. Yu granted leave to re-amend on 3 November 2003 and the Re-Amended Writ and Statement of Claim have been served.  Due to oversight, the same has not been filed and Imada, therefore, seeks an extension of time for late filing.  I consider leave should be granted and I grant an order in terms of paragraph 2 of the summons. 

5.  In the course of submissions in support of the other applications under the summons, Miss Lau, counsel for Imada, applies to adjourn the application and consequently, the trial, to enable the following to be done for the purpose of such applications:

(1) to file and serve an affirmation of Suen Ching, who is the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Imada to account for the lateness of the application;

(2) to file and serve a further report by Dr Chiu Kin-wah to explain the health condition and treatment of Suen Ching to see whether he can attend court hearings at an appropriate time and/or to give evidence in any other manner.

6.  The background to the above is as follows.  Attached to the summons is a report from Dr Chiu Kin-wah of 5 July 2006 which states that Suen Ching has been suffering from acute myeloid leukaemia since May 2004 and he has developed severe chronic renal failure in the recent months.  Since he is undergoing anti-leukaemia treatment and requires frequent hospitalisation for transfusion of blood products, and treatment of opportunistic infection, he is not fit to attend court. 

7.  Prior to the summons, there has been no intimation of the medical condition of Suen Ching.  Although Suen Ching is said to have been suffering from chronic renal failure for some months, no prior attempt has been made to alert Yip and Wong of the possibility that he may not be able to attend court to give evidence or to explore the possibility of deferring the trial to an appropriate time after the current treatment or to another venue with appropriate arrangements.  The latter information is also not placed before this court. 

8.  In respect of Imada's application for leave to amend the Reply and Defence to Counterclaim, the effect of the amendment is as follows.  The existing pleadings show that Mei-King counterclaims for $39,560, being the outstanding balance of the price of the machine sold to Imada.  The present Reply and Defence to Counterclaim denies the counterclaim by relying on the averments in the Reply.  The proposed amendment is to add a further positive defence that due to the malfunction in the label-sticking process of the machine, which was noted by Imada, Imada had verbally agreed with Mei-King that Mei-King would waive the payment of the balance price in the sum of $39,560.

9.  Having carefully considered Miss Lau's submissions and the submissions of Yip and Wong, I am not persuaded I should adjourn the application to amend.

10.  Miss Lau refers me to Guangzhou Green-Enhan Bio-Engineering Co. Ltd. & Anor v Green Power Health Products International Co. Limited  HCA4651 of 2002, HCA2802 of 2003, HCMP74 of 2004, Lam J (unreported, 21 August 2004) at paragraph 14 where it is said that the court will generally allow an amendment to enable the real issue in dispute to be canvassed no matter how late it is applied for.  It is a balancing exercise and the ultimate consideration is fairness (procedural as well as substantive) to the parties in all the circumstances.

11.  I agree with such general principles.  But it is pertinent to note that the learned judge also said lateness and explanation for the delay in making the application are relevant factors to take into account in the exercise of discretion.  Here there is no affidavit to account for the lateness of the application to amend and no or no satisfactory explanation is proffered.  I bear in mind that although Suen Ching is ill, Suen Hung, his son and another witness of Imada, was also involved in this matter.

12.  The question is whether Imada, who has been legally represented all along, should be allowed an adjournment to explain the delay in support of its application to amend.  Having considered the following matters, I consider the proposed amendments are bound to be refused, so I do not consider any adjournment is appropriate.

13.  Lam J in the same paragraph 14 in the case of Guangzhou Green-Enhan Bio-Engineering Co. Ltd. referred to a passage from the judgment of Lord Griffiths in Ketteman v Hansel Properties [1987] 1 AC 189, 220 which draws a clear difference between allowing amendments to clarify the issues in dispute and those that permit a distinct defence to be raised for the first time.

14.  Here the dispute as to liability for the payment of the balance of the purchase price has been raised well in advance of the trial.  The proposed amendment is not technical.  It is a positive averment and a new positive line of defence.  There is no satisfactory explanation why this has not been pleaded much earlier than at the trial. 

15.  In Chan Kwan Yin Shirley & Anor v Wu Wing & Anor HCA7718 of 2000, Lam J (unreported, 27 April 2004), it is said:

"…… As a matter of common sense, a late application raising a new case for the first time that changes the main focus of the trial is more likely to cause prejudice beyond those that can be adequately compensated by costs and adjournment.  Of course, whether such prejudice would actually be suffered (if amendment is allowed) depends on the facts of each case and the court must examine that in the light of the circumstances of the case before it.  It must however be recognised that a last minute moving of the goal posts is not in line with current litigation ethos as reflected in proactive case management and procedural rules for proper and timely disclosure in advance of a case being set down for trial.  Lord Griffiths referred to some other  relevant factors in relation to such an application in Ketteman v Hansel Properties [1987] 1 AC 189 at p.220."

16.  Further, the presently proposed amendments is a bare averment of the alleged verbal agreement without any particularity.  In Lam Wai Hung v Lam Chun Hung & Others HCA 2038 of 2004, Mr Recorder Kwok, S.C. (unreported, 22 June 2006), it was held that the applicable principles are as follows:

"In Heibei Enterprises Limited and others v Livasiri & Co. and others, unreported, HCA20094 of 1998, 3 June 2004, Deputy Judge Poon was taken through a rather comprehensive survey of the relevant authorities; dismissed an application to amend made during the trial and summarised the applicable principles as follows:-

"4. First, an affidavit in support of the application, as a general rule, is not required except that where any delay or special circumstances require explanation ...

5. Second, the proposed amendment must be sufficiently intelligible ... It is incumbent upon the parties seeking amendment to ensure adequate particularity.  It is no answer to an objection that a proposed amendment lacks particulars, to say that particulars can later be given ...

6. This is particularly so in the case of late amendments

……".

17.  Without particulars, it is not known when, where or between whom the alleged verbal agreement was reached in the present case.  Even more importantly, there is no available evidence to support such alleged verbal agreement.  It does not appear in the discovered documents or in Imada's witness statements.  The only support comes from paragraph 24 of the draft affirmation of Suen Ching, which says: "葉先生口頭確認放棄收取此餘款".  But it still does not say when and where the alleged verbal agreement took place and which person on behalf of Imada made such verbal agreement. 

18.  Miss Lau cites no authority in relation to the principles for the exercise of discretion in such circumstances.  However, I have referred the parties to Wellfit Investment Ltd v Poly Commence Ltd & Ors CACV80 of 1995, (unreported, 18 July 2005), where Nazareth VP said, at paragraph 17 as follows:

"Where amendments, particularly material amendments of the present sort, are made so shortly before the hearing, it must be incumbent upon the party seeking them to ensure adequate particularity.  The constraints of time, and the high risk of disruption of the orderly conduct of trials by the courts and of prejudice to the other party must demand strongly that leave be refused …… Likewise in Re Unisoft Group Ltd (No. 2) [1994] BCC 766 at 770-1, Harman J explained in some detail why, in the context of late amendments, requests for further and better particulars are not an answer to the lack of particularity and cause injustice."

19.  I bear in mind, in the present case, the lateness of amendment, the lack of particularity and the injustice that arises from the fact that Imada proposes not call Suen Ching as a witness at the trial so that the proposed supporting evidence is nothing but a bare assertion by Suen Ching, who will not to be subjected to cross-examination.  Imada's other witness, Suen Hung, does not speak to the subject.  Therefore, even if there is a satisfactory explanation before me to account for the lateness of the proposed amendment, I would not have allowed the proposed amendment in light of the applicable principles and the circumstances referred to above.

20.  It is also unfair to Yip and Wong to adjourn the application to enable Imada to provide particulars to "perfect" the application beyond the eleventh hour after the trial date when the particulars of the alleged verbal agreement are not even known or formulated.  Yip and Wong refer to the detriment they will suffer by such adjournment, which cannot be compensated by costs.  They submit that due to the ongoing litigation, Mei-King's credit facilities have been frozen by their bankers and they cannot take advantage of the improved economic condition to expand their business.  Miss Lau criticises the veracity of such assertion and the lack of evidence in support of the same.  But it does not really lie in Imada's mouth to say so since its application for adjournment was not made until close to 12 noon today. 

21.  Having considered all the circumstances and balancing the interests of both parties, I do not consider that it is appropriate to allow the proposed amendment and paragraph 3 of the summons is dismissed. 

22.  As regards Suen Ching, Imada seeks leave of the court to read his affirmation at the trial.  Currently the affirmation is in draft form and has not been finalised.  In the course of submissions, Miss Lau applies for an adjournment of such application with consequent adjournment of the trial to enable Suen Ching to prepare an affirmation to explain the lateness of the application and to explain the differences between his witness statement and his affirmation.  Adjournment is also sought to allow Dr Chiu Kin-wah explain whether Suen Ching can attend trial at a later date after the current treatment or to give evidence in any other manner. 

23.  The need for an affidavit to account for the delay was accepted in the case of Guangzhou Green-Enhan Bio-Engineering Co. Ltd.  No such affidavit is adduced in the present case although Dr Chiu's report states that Suen Ching's poor medical condition has continued for some time already.  The only explanation given by Miss Lau from the Bar table is Imada's hope that Suen Ching may attend court to give evidence.  Imada has been legally represented all along.  It is incumbent upon Imada and those representing them to alert the other side and the court of matters that may affect the impending trial instead of waiting until the eleventh hour to give notice.  In all fairness, the other side should have an opportunity to consider and/or, if appropriate, to challenge the grounds raised.  Even if they do not do so, they should have a reasonable opportunity to assess and prepare the case in light of the developments.  Imada and its solicitors cannot be unaware that Yip and Wong are acting in person.

24.  Miss Lau, in her submissions, suggests that given that Suen Ching is over 70, and the nature of his illness, it is likely that he will require continued future treatment.  Yip and Wong do not take issue over the fact that Suen Ching suffers from medical problems as stated in Dr Chiu's report.  Yip makes the practical and salient point that given Suen Ching's age and the nature of his illness, the prognosis is uncertain and it is unclear whether he will be better or worse or remain stable in the near future.  In short, it is unclear whether he will be able to give evidence.

25.  I believe this is a fair comment on the available information and I am prepared to proceed on the basis that it is not possible to say, on the present material, whether Suen Ching will be able to give evidence in future.  On this basis, I do not consider any adjournment is required for Dr Chiu to expand on Suen Ching's medical condition and prognosis.  That leaves the question of whether the application should be adjourned to enable Imada to file the affirmation of Suen Ching to explain the lateness of the application and the differences between his witness statement and his draft affirmation.  Since the latter purpose touches on the substance of the application, I shall first explain the background. 

26.  Suen Ching's witness statement was filed on 28 June 2005.  The contents of the draft affirmation of Suen Ching are the same as that of his witness statement save and except the following: 

(1) In paragraph 15 of the witness statement, Suen Ching said "美景葉先生同意維修費用將會按維修情況作實報實銷".  In paragraph 18 he repeated "由於葉先生知道實報實銷 ……".  But in paragraph 16 of the draft affirmation, Suen Ching proposes to say as follows: "美景葉先生同意維修工人的開支每人各付一半,而維修零件費用則會實報實銷,美景葉生聲稱人工用去HK$7,800.00 (HK$1,300 x 6天)及零件用去HK$6,465.00 (合共HK$14,265.00),經本公司屢次要求都未能提供單據證明,並且生產線始終未能修理妥當,故此本公司認為尚未需要支付上述費用。".  In paragraph 19 of his draft affirmation, Suen Ching repeats that "由於葉先生承諾實報實銷 ……";

(2) In paragraph 23 of his draft affirmation, Suen Ching newly adds that Mei-King never gave any "電腦方程式及電腦版圖" to Imada; and

(3) In paragraph 24 of his draft affirmation, Suen Ching newly adds that "葉先生口頭確認放棄收取此餘款".

27.  The latter two proposed additions can be dealt with shortly.  In respect of the proposed addition in paragraph 23 of the draft affirmation, since the reference to Mei-King's failure to produce "電腦方程式及電腦版圖" is already made in paragraph 25 of his witness statement, it is not a new assertion.    

28.  In respect of the proposed addition in paragraph 24 of the draft affirmation, since I have disallowed the amendment of the Reply and Defence to Counterclaim, this should not be allowed. 

29.  This leaves the proposed assertion in paragraph 16 of the draft affirmation.  Although Miss Lau seeks to persuade me that what is stated therein is not inconsistent with paragraph 23 of Suen Ching's witness statement, I cannot accept this submission on the plain wording.  "實報實銷" plainly means that the charges were what was actually incurred.  There is no dispute that costs of labour and parts were incurred, and, consequently, paragraph 18 of the witness statement states that Suen Ching requested Mei-King to explain both the calculation of the labour cost and to provide invoice and evidence for the purchase of parts.  On the other hand, paragraph 16 of the draft affirmation states that there was an agreement with Yip for each party to bear half of the labour cost and only the costs of parts would be "實報實銷".  I cannot say that on the plain wording of the two documents they are consistent.  Indeed, it is the very difference between the two that Miss Lau now seeks an adjournment to enable Suen Ching to explain. 

30.  Today is the first day of trial.  Imada proposes the draft affirmation as per paragraph 16 therein.  The question is whether Imada should be granted an indulgence to enable it to move the goal posts still further in a manner not yet known or formulated.  Even assuming that there is a satisfactory explanation for the lateness of the application, I am not persuaded I should exercise my discretion to allow such assertion in paragraph 16 of the draft affirmation of Suen Ching.  Had Suen Ching been able to give evidence, such new assertion would have to be made in a supplemental witness statement if leave is granted and the court will have to be persuaded to allow that to happen.  I am not convinced that because Suen Ching says he is unable to give evidence such assertion can be slipped in by way of his affirmation.

31.  Miss Lau submits that such new assertion is supported by documentary evidence.  She refers to page 125 of the trial bundle which refers to a note dated 11 September 2002, which record, it is submitted, is in line with the new assertion.  There is, however, no evidence or information before me as to who is the maker of that note or the circumstances in which it was made. 

32.  Miss Lau further says that in the Small Claims Tribunal, before Mei-King's claim was transferred to District Court,  Suen Ching's witness statement in those proceedings queried the labour costs and cost of parts.  But such statement, at page 139 of the trial bundle, contains no averment as to the alleged agreement that Mei-King would bear half of the labour costs.

33.  More importantly, such agreement, as well as Mei-King's failure to provide documentary evidence of breakdown, have not been pleaded in the Defence in DCCJ6521 of 2003.  No application to amend has been made in this respect even though a positive line of defence is raised by such assertion, namely, (1) there is an agreement that Imada is not required to bear half the labour costs; and (2) payment of the remaining half of the labour costs and the cost of parts is not yet due pending the provision of supporting documentary justification.

34.  Further, whether the documents support the new assertion is not really of assistance.  After all, a witness statement is a witness's own assertions.  In both the witness statement and the draft affirmation, Suen Ching says that the contents are true and correct but that has to be read in light of the aforesaid differences between the two.  The present consideration is not whether what he says is credible, but what is his evidence and whether a different assertion should be allowed.  I also bear in mind that it is not proposed for Suen Ching to attend court to give evidence.  In such circumstances, Yip and Wong will be deprived of an opportunity to cross-examine him on these matters, even if we ignore, for present purposes, the pleading point. Imada's other witness, Suen Hung, does not speak to such matters. 

35.  In my view, in raising this new assertion, it is a prejudice to Yip and Wong that cannot be compensated by costs after having considered all the circumstances and irrespective of the pleading point.  At first Miss Lau submits that the absence of explanation from Suen Ching can only aid Yip and Wong in their submissions on the weight of such evidence, but she later seeks indulgence for an adjournment of the application for Suen Ching to supply the relevant information.  This is tantamount to having two bites of the cherry.  Movement of goal posts is frowned upon when a case reaches the trial stage.  It gives rise to even more concern when the destination of the goal posts is not even clear.

36.  Looking at the larger picture, I note that even without the new assertion, Imada's case will not crumple.  I also bear in mind that arguments of the parties on the consequence of the adjournment of the application and of the trial.  Looking at all the relevant circumstances and balancing the interests of the parties, I find that it is inappropriate to grant any adjournment and I am not prepared to allow Imada to adduce paragraph 16 of the affirmation of Suen Ching. 

37.  Coming back to the issue of whether Imada should be allowed, under Order 38 rule 2 of the Rules of the District Court, to adduce the affirmation of Suen Ching,  I am of the view that, bearing in mind his age, his illness and severity thereof, as well as the fact that Suen Ching's affirmation, expurgated in the manner referred to above, is the same as his witness statement, so that there will be no new matters that should take Yip and Wong by surprise, I am prepared to grant leave, under Order 38 rule 2, for the affirmation so expurgated to be read at the trial.  Suen Ching's medical illness is unfortunate, but the present case must take such circumstance into account. 

38.  Suen Hung, Imada's other witness, is available to give evidence and his witness statement touches on some matters that overlap with those in Suen Ching's witness statement or Suen Ching's affirmation (yet to be expurgated).   I note there are some areas of factual dispute between Imada and Mei-King (as seen from Suen Ching's witness statement and the statement of Yip) that are not covered by the witness statement of Suen Hung, who will give evidence.  I have carefully considered the weighty consideration of the deprivation of Mei-King's right to cross-examine Suen Ching, but I must also consider the balancing interest of Imada, whose key witness is suffering from a poor medical condition with an unclear prospect of whether he will be able to attend trial in future.  I also bear in mind the unwillingness of Yip and Wong to adjourn the trial if at all possible.  I therefore grant an order in terms of paragraph 1 of the summons save that paragraph 16 and the last phrase "而葉先生口頭確認放棄收取此餘款" in paragraph 24 be struck out.

39.  The matter will now proceed to trial.  No doubt I will, in due course, hear submissions on the weight to be given to the expurgated affirmation of Suen Ching, so the less I say on it the better.

40.  I also note that Yip and Wong have no objection to the photographs disclosed most recently in Imada's supplemental list of documents dated 12 July 2006. 

41.  I will now hear the parties on costs.

(Submissions on costs)

42.  Imada to pay each of Yip and Wong the costs of Imada's summons dated 12 July 2006 assessed at $1,200 for each of Yip and Wong. 

(Corrigendum on 18 July 2006)

43.  The reference to Suen Hung being Suen Ching's son in paragraph 11 above is deleted.

 

 

Marlene Ng
District Judge

Representation:

Ms Lorinda Lau, instructed by Messrs Huen & Partners, for Imada Luenwah World Ltd.

Yip Ming Cheong, In person, present

Wong Chi Nang, In person, present