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Civil Action2003

PEI ZHENG MIDDLE SCHOOL AND ANOTHER v. CHINA PUI CHING EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION LTD AND OTHERS

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  • CACV262/2005PEI ZHENG MIDDLE SCHOOL AND ANOTHER v. CHINA PUI CHING EDUCATION FOUNDATION LTD AND OTHERS

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70835-EN-2010-04-30

PEI ZHENG MIDDLE SCHOOL AND ANOTHER v. CHINA PUI CHING EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION LTD AND OTHERS

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HCA946/2003

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 946 OF 2003

--------------------------

BETWEEN

 PEI ZHENG MIDDLE SCHOOL
(廣州市培正中學)
1st Plaintiff
 THE BAPTIST CONVENTION OF HONG KONG2nd Plaintiff
 and 
 CHINA PUI CHING EDUCATIONAL
FOUNDATION LIMITED
(中國培正教育基金有限公司)
formerly known as
PUI CHING EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION LIMITED
(培正教育基金有限公司)
1st Defendant
 LIANG SHANGLI (梁尚立)2nd Defendant
 CPZ EDUCATION NET LIMITED
formerly known as
PUI CHING EDUCATION NET LIMITED
(培正教育網有限公司) then known as
CHINA PEI ZHENG EDUCATION NET LIMITED
(中國培正教育網有限公司)
3rd Defendant
 CHINA PEI ZHENG COMMERCIAL
COLLEGE FOUNDATION LIMITED
(中國培正商學院基金會有限公司)
formerly known as PEI ZHENG COMMERCIAL
COLLEGE EDUCATION FOUNDATION LIMITED
(培正商學院教育基金有限公司)
4th Defendant

--------------------------

Before : Hon Poon J in Court

Date of Hearing : 22 March 2010

Date of Judgment : 30 April 2010

-----------------------

J U D G M E N T

-----------------------

A.      The parties

1. The培正schools are held in high esteem in the Mainland, Hong Kong and Macau.  First established in the late Qing Dynasty, the schools have in the course of its long history produced a host of famous graduates, including Nobel Laureate Professor Daniel Chee Tsui, and world-class mathematician Professor Yau Shing Tung.  To the public at large in the Mainland, Hong Kong and Macau, the培正name and its red and blue insignia bearing the name in both Chinese and English and the school motto “至善至正” (“the Insignia”)[1], are synonymous with educational institutions that provide high quality education. 

2. 廣州市培正中學, the 1st plaintiff herein, is a government school.  It operates at No. 2 Pei Zheng Road, Dongshan District, Guangzhou (“the Dongshan Premises”).  The 2nd plaintiff owns and administers香港培正中學 (Hong Kong Pui Ching Middle School) and 澳門培正中學 (Macau Pui Ching Middle School).  The plaintiffs claim to be owners of the goodwill in the培正name and Insignia.  They seek redress for the defendants’ wrongful acts of passing off. 

3. The 2nd defendant is the main protagonist of the matters complained of.  An alumnus of培正, he was the vice-mayor of Guangzhou in the 1980s.  He served in the 1st plaintiff’s school board since 1988 and was the chairman since 1996 until late 2001.  The plaintiffs’ case is that as a member and chairman of its school board, he at all material times owed a duty of good faith and fidelity to the 1st plaintiff.  

4. The 1st defendant was incorporated in Hong Kong on 21 June 2000, the 4th defendant, 2 August 2002.  The 2nd defendant is their subscriber and director.  The 1st defendant’s case is that it was set up for the purpose of soliciting donations to support all educational institutions within and without China.  The plaintiffs’ case is that the 2nd defendant personally directed the 1st defendant’s activities.  The 4th defendant’s case is that it was incorporated for the purpose of soliciting donations to support solely the College referred to in Part C below.  

5. The 3rd defendant was incorporated in Hong Kong on 26 April 2000.  After the commencement of the present action, it changed its name to中國培正教育網有限公司in Chinese and China Pei Zheng Education Net Limited in English, which was further changed to CPZ Education Net Limited subsequently.  Ho Hau Wong (“Ho”), also an alumnus of培正, claimed to be its beneficial owners[2]. 

6. Most of the background facts are not in dispute.  They are summarized in Parts B to E below. 

B.      The培正schools

7. The培正schools had a long and well-documented history[3]. 

B.1.   Between 1889 and 1949

8. In 1889, several Chinese members of廣州浸信會[4] established培正書院at廣州市德政街.  In about 1908, the school was relocated to the Dongshan Premises.  Since then, it had been operated by兩廣浸信會總會. 

9. In 1912, the Republic of China was formally established.  The school changed its name to培正學校.  It was then a primary school.  In 1916, it began to provide secondary education.  In 1928, its name was changed again to私立廣州培正中學校. 

10. The period between 1923 and 1938 saw the expansion of the 培正family of schools.  兩廣浸信會總會founded the following schools and operated the same concurrently with私立廣州培正中學校 :

(1)     東山培正小學, a primary school at the Dongshan Premises;

(2)     廣州西關培正小學, a primary school in Xiguan, Guangzhou;

(3)     私立廣州培正中學香港分校, a branch school of私立廣州培正中學校in Hong Kong;

(4)     私立廣州培正中學澳門分校, a branch school of私立廣州培正中學校in Macau. 

11. The培正schools suffered setbacks during WWII.  But they soon revived after the War. 

B.2.   Between 1949 and 1984

12. On 1 October 1949, the People’s Republic of China was founded.  The fate of the培正schools in Hong Kong and Macau on the one hand and those in the Mainland on the other took different turns. 

13. In 1950, 私立廣州培正中學香港分校and私立廣州培正中學澳門分校changed their name to香港培正中學and澳門培正中學respectively. 

14. In 1951, the 2nd plaintiff was incorporated under the name United Hong Kong Christian Baptist Churches Association.  In 1958, it accepted the transfer of the administration of香港培正中學and澳門培正中學from the respective school boards[5].  It has since operated and administered them to date. 

15. In the Mainland, in about 1953, the Central Government promulgated《關於接辦私立中等學校和小學的計劃》.  Pursuant to the new policy enshrined in the《計劃》, all private schools were nationalized and turned into public schools to be run by local governments.  All the schools owned and administered by兩廣浸信會總會in the Mainland, including the培正schools, were thus nationalized.  私立廣州培正中學校at the Dongshan Premises became a public school and had its name changed to廣州市第七中學. 

16. In 1958, 廣州市第七中學moved out of the Dongshan Premises.  廣州師範學院 took up the Premises until 1962 when廣州僑光中學started to operate there.  In 1968, 廣州僑光中學changed its name to廣州市人民一中.  In 1969, pursuant to the authority’s direction, the name was changed to廣州市第五十七中學, which remained the same until 1984. 

B.3.   The resumption of the name培正in 1984

17. Within the培正community, the school situated at the Dongshan Premises is regarded as the alma mater, where the glorious history of the培正schools originated. 

18. In late 1970s and early 1980s, the培正alumni began to campaign for the resumption of the培正name (復名) for廣州市第五十七中學.  The first application for the resumption launched in 1981 was unsuccessful.  The alumni persisted.  Finally, on 22 December 1984, 廣州市人民政府 (the People’s Government of Guangzhou Municipality) approved their application whereby廣州市第五十七中學officially resumed the name (復名) 廣州市培正中學. 

19. The 2nd defendant, then vice-mayor of Guangzhou, was instrumental to the successful resumption of the培正name. 

B.4.   Since 1984 up to now

20. Since 1984, the 1st plaintiff has earned remarkable achievements[6].  As a testimony to its quality education services, the 1st plaintiff was named by廣東省教育廳 (the Department of Education of Guangdong Province) as “廣東省一級學校” in 1994.  The 1st plaintiff and its students have received numerous awards both on the municipal and national level since 1998.

21. Here in Hong Kong, 香港培正中學continue to thrive and is now renowned for providing high quality education to the community. 

22. Today, the培正schools in the Mainland, Hong Kong and Macau, as educational institutions, are highly reputable and successful. 

C.      The College

23. Establishing a non-profit tertiary educational institution within the培正family is the dying wish of the late Mr Wong Kai Ming (“Mr Wong”), principal of培正書院in the 1920s.  It earned unanimous support within the培正community. 

24. The idea of fulfilling Mr Wong’s dying wish had been floating among the alumni after the resumption of the培正name in 1984.  But no concrete proposal was raised until the meeting of the 1st plaintiff’s school board held on 27 July 1992[7].  At the next meeting held on 13 December 1992, the board formally decided to launch the project.  Among other things, the board decided that the tertiary institute should be called “培正商學院”[8].  The name eventually adopted was “私立培正商學院”[9]. 

25. The project then made good progress.  Plans were prepared and tabled for discussions at the school board of the 1st plaintiff and the board of directors of the College.  Funds were raised from the alumni[10].  In 1993, the College obtained approval from the authority to recruit students.  Classes were conducted at the Dongshan Premises.  In the same year, the College signed an agreement with花都市人民政府for building the College campus on a piece of land of some 500 acres situated at花都市.  Progress reports were also submitted to the authority for review.  The endeavours bore fruit in April 1996 when the Department of Education of Guangdong Province formally approved and registered the College as a tertiary educational institute[11]. 

26. The 1st plaintiff had provided great support for the setting up of the College.  Its case is that such support was given upon the 2nd defendant’s representation that the College was to be a non-profit making tertiary education institution established to realize the dying wish of Mr Wong.  The plaintiffs discovered the falsity of such representation in late 2001 when they learnt that unknown to them, the 2nd defendant had in November 1999 caused the registration of an offending trademark which bore the培正name and resembled the Insignia (“the Mark”)[12] with商標局 (the Trade Mark Bureau) in Beijing.  The 1st plaintiff then withdrew its support for the College. 

27. To the registration of the Mark and the trademark proceedings ensued I next turn.  

D.      Registration of the Mark and the trademark proceedings

28. In December 1998, 吳琦, principal of the 1st plaintiff, approached the 2nd defendant, who was then chairman of the 1st plaintiff’s school board, seeking his support for the 1st plaintiff to apply for registration of the培正name and Insignia as trademark.  The 2nd defendant refused.  In December 1999, 吳琦made the request again but was likewise turned down by the 2nd defendant. 

29. Unknown to the 1st plaintiff, the 2nd defendant had in fact earlier caused the College to apply to the Trade Mark Bureau for registration of the Mark.  The application was granted on 14 November 1999. 

30. On 14 May 2001, the College assigned the Mark to the 1st defendant with the approval of the Bureau. 

31. When the plaintiffs found out the registration of the Mark, the培正community was outraged.  Representatives of the plaintiffs and some of the alumni tried to sort out the matter with the 2nd defendant amicably but to no avail.  In June 2002, the 1st plaintiff applied to the Trade Mark Bureau to cancel the registration. 

32. On 14 January 2004, while the 1st plaintiff’s application was still pending, the 1st defendant re-assigned the Mark to the College. 

33. In August 2007, the Trade Mark Bureau allowed the 1st plaintiff’s application and cancelled the registration of the Mark.  In September 2007, the College applied to北京市第一中級人民法院 (the Beijing 1st Intermediary People’s Court) against the Bureau’s decision.  On 20 March 2008, the Intermediary Peoples’ Court dismissed the application.  Upon further appeal by the College, 北京市高級人民法院 (the Beijing Higher People’s Court) confirmed the Intermediary Peoples’ Court’s decision on 20 March 2009.  It is the plaintiffs’ case that the decision of the Higher People’s Court is final[13]. 

34. At the trial, Mr Pao, counsel for the plaintiffs, updated the court on the latest development of the trademark proceedings.  He told me that the College has recently applied to the Beijing Higher People’s Court for再審 (retrial) of the case but the result is yet unknown.  It, however, remains the plaintiffs’ case that the decision of the Higher People’s Court is final.  The chance of the Higher People’s Court ordering a retrial is practically nil because its decision is final and the College has in any event failed to demonstrate that it has any meritorious ground for doing so[14]. 

E.      the licence

35. The 1st defendant had used the培正name shortly before the College assigned the Mark to it. 

36. On 25 April 2001, it granted a licence (“the Licence”) to廣州捷駿房地產開發有限公司 (Guangzhou Jiejun Real Estate Development Company Limited), a subsidiary of Henderson China Holdings Limited, to use the培正name as part of the name of寶華培正小學 (“the Primary School”), a public primary school located in the housing estate恆寶華庭developed by Guangzhou Jiejun in荔灣of Guangzhou (“the Housing Estate”). 

37. This completes the narrative of the background circumstances. 

F.      Asynopsis of the parties’ pleaded case

38. Before the commencement of the action, the plaintiffs did try to resolve the matter with the defendant and Ho.  But neither the 2nd defendant nor Ho gave any positive response to the plaintiffs’ requests. 

39. The plaintiffs then commenced the present action in March 2003. 

F.1.   The plaintiffs’ complaints

40. The plaintiffs complained that the defendants had prior to the issue of the writ committed various wrongful acts :

(1)     The 1st and 2nd defendants had misappropriated the English and Chinese name培正and the Insignia for the exclusive use of the 1st defendant as a registered trademark in the form of the Mark in the Mainland. 

(2)     The defendants had passed off 1st, 3rd and 4th defendants as establishments associated or in some way connected with the plaintiffs. 

(3)     The 1st and 2nd defendants had, through the supply of instruments of deception, passed off and/or attempted to pass off and/or procuring the passing off of schools in the Mainland not being schools or educational institutions established by the plaintiffs as those of the plaintiffs or in some way approved or endorsed by the plaintiffs, including the College and the Primary School. 

(4)     The 1st defendant had on or about 21 December 2001 published an untrue statement in the Sing Pao, a widely circulated Chinese newspaper (“the Statement”) that it had provided services and support to the 1st plaintiff and香港培正中學administered by the 2nd plaintiff thereby misleading the public into believing that the 1st defendant was associated or in some way connected with the plaintiffs.  

These wrongful acts were calculated by the defendants to deceive and cause confusion to lead members of the public in the Mainland and Hong Kong into the mistaken belief that schools educational institutions or other educational providers bearing the name培正and the Insignia established by or the establishment of which was procured by the defendants are those of the plaintiffs or in some way approved or endorsed by the plaintiffs. 

41. The plaintiffs further pleaded that they have suffered loss and damage including the degradation of the培正name and the Insignia and the unjustifiable restraint or hindrance placed upon any future use by them of the培正name and the Insignia in relation to new schools and colleges in the Mainland as a consequence of the wrongful monopoly obtained by the 1st plaintiff, presumably because of the Mark. 

42. As against the 2nd defendant, the plaintiffs pleaded that he is also liable for breaching his duty of good faith and fidelity to the 1st plaintiff by committing the wrongful acts complained of. 

F.2.   Defence raised by the 1st, 2nd and 4th defendants

43. The 3rd defendant had not filed any defence[15].

44. The 1st, 2nd and 4th defendants raised a number of points in their joint defence. 

45. They first disputed the plaintiffs as owners of the goodwill.  They further alleged that the College had since 1993 acquired a reputation and goodwill in it own right with the support of the 1st plaintiff. 

46. They alleged that as the owner of the Mark, the College could assign the Mark to the 1st defendant.  And as assignee, the 1st defendant was entitled to grant the licence, which is gratuitous to the Primary School to use the培正name. 

47. Further, they pleaded that the plaintiffs were estopped from preventing the 1st, 2nd and 4th defendants from using the name培正, the Mark and the insignia used by the College[16].  Since 1985, the defendants started campaigns in Hong Kong and elsewhere for raising funds under the name培正for the plaintiffs and they accepted the same.  The plaintiffs had not raised any objection to the defendants’ use of the培正name for the purpose of soliciting donations.  The defendants had by the campaigns acquired a reputation and known to the public in Hong Kong and overseas as the channels through which donations might be made to the plaintiffs and the College. 

48. They also pleaded that the 2nd defendant did not owe any duty of good faith and fidelity to the 1st plaintiff. 

49. Finally, the acts complained of were not actionable under the PRC law.  They were hence not actionable in Hong Kong either.  

G.      the trial

50. The defendants were all absent at the trial.  The plaintiffs proceeded to prove their claims[17].

G.1.   Factual witnesses

51. The plaintiffs called 15 factual witnesses :

(1) 李旭, the official representative of廣州市智成迅達知識產權代理有限公司, a commercial investigations company.

(2) 朱素蘭, formerly the 1st plaintiff’s deputy principal and member and secretary of its school board.

(3) 吳琦, former principal of the 1st plaintiff.

(4) 陳榮炎, an alumnus of the 1st plaintiff.

(5) Koo Ming Kown, the former vice chairman of The Hong Kong Pui Ching Alumni.

(6) 雷禮和, an alumnus of 香港培正中學.

(7) 曾家石, an executive officer of the 2nd plaintiff.

(8) Clement Young Kwok Hung, 校監 (supervisor) of香港培正中學and香港培正小學, and a former member of the school board of the College.

(9) 陸志中, an alumnus of香港培正中學.

(10) 謝順佳, also an alumnus of香港培正中學.

(11) Lee See Yuen, the principal of香港培正小學and a former member of the school board of the College.

(12) Johnny Law Chi Keung, 校董 (school manager) of香港培正中學and香港培正小學.

(13) Yip Wai Hong, an alumnus of the 1st plaintiff and澳門培正小學.

(14) 麥思明, an alumnus of the 1st plaintiff.

(15) 陳之望, a member of the 2nd plaintiff’s中小學及持續教育部校董會.

52. The plaintiffs further relied on the affidavits of陳衡鍔, 黃汝光and Maurice J Anderson dated 16 August 2005, 13 May 2007 and 15 May 2007 respectively.  陳衡鍔was an alumnus, a former teacher and secretary and member of the 1st plaintiff’s school board and a member of the board of directors of the College.  黃汝光was Mr Wong’s nephew.  Maurice J Anderson was a former council member of the 2nd plaintiff.  These gentlemen had all passed away recently.

G.2.   Expert on the PRC law

53. The plaintiffs called Dr Lin Feng as their PRC law expert.  Dr Lin is a barrister and an associate professor of the Law School, City University and the course leader of the University’s中國法與比較法研究中心and Doctor of Juridical Science (JSD) Programme. 

G.3.   Accepting their evidence

54. Having examined the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs carefully, I find them consistent, truthful and reliable.  I accept them in full. 

H.      BASIC PRINCIPLES

55. I next consider if the plaintiffs have made out their claims.  I preface the discussions with a summary of the basic principles. 

56. A plaintiff has to prove three essential elements for passing off : goodwill, misrepresentation and damages.  In Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd v Borden Inc & Ors [1990] RPC 341[18], Lord Oliver expounded the law at p. 406 :

“… The law of passing off can be summarised in one short general proposition — no man may pass off his goods as those of another.  More specifically, it may be expressed in terms of the elements which the plaintiff in such an action has to prove in order to succeed.  These are three in number.  First, he must establish a goodwill or reputation attached to the goods or services which he supplies in the mind of the purchasing public by association with the identifying ‘get-up’ (whether it consists simply of a brand name or a trade description, or the individual features of labelling or packaging) under which his particular goods or services are offered to the public, such that the get-up is recognised by the public as distinctive specifically of the plaintiff’s goods or services.  Secondly, he must demonstrate a misrepresentation by the defendant to the public (whether or not intentional) leading or likely to lead the public to believe that goods or services offered by him are the goods or services of the plaintiff.  Whether the public is aware of the plaintiff’s identity as the manufacturer or supplier of the goods or services is immaterial, as long as they are identified with a particular source which is in fact the plaintiff.  For example, if the public is accustomed to rely upon a particular brand name in purchasing goods of a particular description, it matters not at all that there is little or no public awareness of the identity of the proprietor of the brand name.  Thirdly, he must demonstrate that he suffers or, in a quiatimet action that he is likely to suffer, damage by reason of the erroneous belief engendered by the defendant’s misrepresentation that the source of the defendant’s goods or services is the same as the source of those offered by the plaintiff.”

57. Some of the wrongful acts complained of took place in the Mainland.  To make good their claims based on those tortious acts, the plaintiffs need to satisfy the double actionability rule.  In Shanghai Reeferco Container Co. Ltd v Waggonbau Elze GmbH & Co. Besitz KG [2005] 2 HKLRD 711, I stated the rule at p. 721A-D thus :

“(4)    The double actionability rule

27.     In my view, the principle derived from the Egg Fillers & Containers (Aust) Pty Ltd v Holed-Tite Packing Corp & Another (1933) 51 RPC 9 case, amplified by the Norbert Steinhardt & Son Ltd v Meth & Another (1961) 105 CLR 440 case and approved in the two subsequent English cases[19] is in substance the application or extension of the double actionability rule on tort to cases involving intellectual property rights. 

28.     The double actionability rule states, as a general rule, that an act done in Country A is a tort and actionable as such in Country B (lex fori), only if it is both : (a) actionable as a tort according to the law of Country B, or in other words is an act which, if done in Country B, would be a tort; and (b) actionable according to the law of Country A where it was done (lex loci delicti).  See generally Boys v Chaplin [1971] AC 356 at p. 374. …”

58. With these basic principles in mind, I now look at each of the three essential elements in greater detail. 

I.       the 1st element – Goodwill

59. Goodwill is a legal right of property associated with every business.  It is “the attractive force which brings in custom” : Inland Revenue Commissioners v Muller & Co’s Margarine Ltd [1901] AC 217, per Lord Macnaghten at p. 224. 

60. In order to succeed in an action for passing off in Hong Kong, a plaintiff must show that he has a goodwill here : See Wadlow, The Law of Passing-Off, 3rd Edn., para. 3-68 at p. 155; Halsbury’s Laws of Hong Kong, 2005 Edn., Vol. 15(2), para. 225.037 at p. 50.  This requirement is of particular significance to the 1st plaintiff, a school operating at Guangzhou. 

61. A full description of the factual circumstances giving rise to the plaintiffs’ goodwill in the培正name and Insignia can be found in the evidence of朱素蘭and陳衡鍔 (relating to the 1st plaintiff) and曾家石, Johnny Law Chi Keung, 陳之望, 黃汝光 and Maurice J Anderson (relating to the 2nd plaintiff).  For present purposes, the summary of the major events as set out in Part B above is sufficient. 

62. As regards the 2nd plaintiff, a local claimant, the position is straightforward.  Historically, the goodwill in the培正name and Insignia was first created in the Mainland when培正書院was set up in 1889.  When私立廣州培正中學香港分校was established in Hong Kong 1933, the goodwill in the培正name and Insignia extended to Hong Kong.  Since 1951, the 2nd plaintiff, as the owner and administrator of培正schools in Hong Kong, has been responsible for the quality of the educational services provided through the schools.  By providing such services, the 2nd plaintiff has continued to build up the goodwill in the培正name and Insignia in Hong Kong, which enures for its benefit.  Plainly, the 2nd plaintiff has the requisites goodwill in Hong Kong to sue the defendants for passing off. 

63. As regards the 1st plaintiff, a foreign claimant, strictly the question is whether it has goodwill in the培正name and Insignia in Hong Kong.  To answer that question, it is however necessary to first consider its legal position in the Mainland.  Dr Lin dealt with that aspect in his 1st opinion dated 16 November 2007 thus. 

64. Dr Lin first pointed out that there existed no specific law to protect the goodwill in a business in the Mainland under the reign of the Qing Dynasty, the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China until 1986.  In 1986,《中華人民共和國民法通則》was promulgated.  Under《民法通則》, 「名譽權」is protected.  And as an important component of a legal person’s「法人名譽權」, 商譽 (goodwill) in a business is also protected.  By virtue of the最高人民法院關於貫徹執行《中華人民共和國民法通則》若干問題的意見(試行)第 196 條, 《民法通則》applied to civil acts committed before 1 January 1987.  Thus although no law specifically existed before 1986 to protect goodwill, a plaintiff can still resort to《民法通則》if necessary. 

65. Dr Lin then said that factually, the goodwill in the培正name and Insignia had come into existence since 1889.  When廣州培正中學was nationalised in 1953, the goodwill was not extinguished.  It survived.  But there was no載體 (carrier) to continue with and develop the goodwill.  Given its historical and sentimental value, the Dongshan Premises was widely recognised as the carrier for the name培正.  That was the reason why廣州市人民政府decided to allow廣州市第五十七中學situated at the Dongshan Premises to resume the培正name in 1984.  廣州市人民政府officially recognised that廣州市培正中學as the continuation of the original培正school at the Dongshan Premises.  廣州市培正中學has since become the carrier to continue with and develop in the Mainland the original goodwill in the培正name and Insignia, together with the goodwill developed by the 2nd plaintiff in Hong Kong and Macau.  In short, the residual goodwill in the培正name and Insignia in the Mainland has since 1984 been revived and re-vested with the 1st plaintiff.  The 1st plaintiff is the owner of the goodwill.  By virtue of《民法通則》, the 1st plaintiff’s goodwill is and was at all material times protected by the law in the Mainland. 

66. Now the 2nd plaintiff has all along regarded the alma mater at the Dongshan Premises as the very source of the goodwill in the培正name and Insignia in Hong Kong.  The goodwill here, as extension of the goodwill originated in the Mainland, cannot be separated from the goodwill enjoyed by the alma mater there.  The alma mater owns and shares with the 2nd plaintiff its goodwill in Hong Kong.  So after the resumption of the培正name in 1984, the 1st plaintiff as the official continuation of the alma mater, has the same goodwill as the 2nd plaintiff does in Hong Kong.  The 1st plaintiff can also sue the defendants for passing off here. 

J.       THE 2nd ELEMENT – MISREPRESENTATIONS

J.1.    In Hong Kong

67. The matters complained of that took place in Hong Kong are the incorporation of the corporate defendants and the publication of the Statement. 

68. The incorporation of the 1st, 3rd and 4th defendants with names bearing the reference “培正” and “教育” in Chinese and “Pui Ching”, “Pei Zheng” and “Education” in English plainly constitutes a misrepresentation to the public that they are associated or connected with the plaintiffs for the purpose of providing education services.  In fact, 陸志中and謝順佳said that they were so misled.  The corporate defendants are liable for passing off : see Wadlow, supra, para. 7-13 at pp. 434 and 435. 

69. Koo Ming Kwon dealt with the circumstances leading to the publication of the Statement by the 1st defendant on 21 December 2001 in his witness statement thus.  The Hong Kong Pui Ching Alumni reported in Issue 162 of its Newsletter (a) the unauthorised registration of the Mark by the College and (b) the incorporation of the 1st and 3rd defendants which had no connections with the培正schools.  On 21 December 2001, the 1st defendant published the Statement in Sing Pao, which read :

“     熱烈歡迎

香港特別行政區全國政協委員

視察私立培正商學院

培正教育基金有限公司致敬

培正教育基金有限公司是世界各地熱心培正

教育事業之校友及社會賢達所創立,專門服務及支持

培正教育事業之各項活動。曾服務及支持過:

花都培正商學院、香港培正中學、廣州培正中學。”

70. What Koo then went on to say can perhaps best sum up the responses that the Statement had provoked :

“35. I was totally baffled by the 1st Defendant’s publication of the Notice.  The HK Pui Ching Alumni has tried to clarify the confusion caused by the 1st Defendant and the College through the Newsletter.  However, shortly after the issue of the Newsletter and within such a short span of time, the 1st Defendant published the Notice giving the public a false impression that it had supported the operation of Pui Ching Group of Schools.  I was unable to fathom the intention of the 1st Defendant other than to confuse the public into believing that the 1st Defendant has some sort of connection with the Pui Ching Group of Schools or that any donation made to the 1st Defendant will be passed to the Pui Ching Group of Schools despite the Hong Kong Alumni’s attempt to clarify that the 1st Defendant was not part of the Pui Ching family.  Further, by making reference to the College in the Notice, the 1st Defendant also gave the wrong impression to the public that the College was connected with Hong Kong Pui Ching and the 1st Plaintiff.  It is my understanding that none of the Pui Ching Group of Schools has been financially supported by the 1st Defendant or the College. 

36.  I was also infuriated by the 1st Defendant’s action in publishing the Notice because for those members of the public who were not privy to the background of the matter, namely that the 1st Defendant and the College were not related to the Pui Ching Group of Schools, it was highly likely that they would falsely associate the 1st Defendant and the College as belonging to the Pui Ching Groups of Schools/family.”

71. Obviously, the Statement falsely misled the public into believing that the 1st defendant was associated or connected with the plaintiffs.  The 1st defendant is liable. 

J.2.    In the Mainland

72. The wrongful acts that took place in the Mainland are the continuous operation of the College after the 1st plaintiff withdrew the support in late 2001, the registration of the Mark and the granting of the Licence.  For these matters, the double actionability rule applies. 

73. It is not disputed that the College was initially set up with the support of the 1st plaintiff.  In paras. 18-27 of his affirmation, 陳衡鍔detailed the circumstances leading to the setting up of the College.  陳榮炎also gave evidence on the same subject matter.  Two major points arose from their evidence.  First, all those involved in the setting up of the College, including the 2nd defendant and other members of the 1st plaintiff’s school board and the培正alumni, understood and agreed that the College would be a non-profit making tertiary education institution to realize the dying wish of Mr Wong.  Second, the 2nd defendant had at all material times purportedly acted upon that agreement and understanding.  He had by his conduct represented to the 1st plaintiff that the College, when formed, would be such an educational institution. 

74. 陳衡鍔, 陳榮炎, Lee See Yuen and Clement Young Kwok Hung had at all material times served on the College’s board of directors but had already resigned.  They described how the College was run in reality.  In gist, contrary to the initial understanding and agreement supporting the setting up of the College, the 2nd defendant, together with his son梁普建, treated and ran the College as his own business.  The 2nd defendant also used the apparent association of the College with the培正family of schools to solicit support from the alumni and others, including donations.  He had caused the incorporation of the 1st and 4th defendants for the purpose of soliciting financial support for the College.  When the 1st plaintiff found out the falsity of the 2nd defendant’s representation in late 2001, it immediately withdrew its support.  The College had since been “disowned” by the 1st plaintiff and excluded from the培正family of schools.  The 2nd defendant had also caused the College to distance itself from the培正family of schools.  In the past, the College used to describe in its school brochures its association with the 1st plaintiff and the培正alumni.  Such description was removed in 2002.  But in its 《隆重紀念培正商學院建校11 周年暨培正創建115 周年》特刊published in 2005, the College again reasserted its relationship with the 1st plaintiff and the培正alumni. 

75. Yip Wai Hong referred to an interview that the 2nd defendant gave on ATV in 2002 to show that he had regarded the College as his own business.  In that interview, the 2nd defendant was described as the one who initiated the idea of setting up the College and that the College was formed through his endeavours.  Towards the end of the program, the interviewer said, presumably with the 2nd defendant’s endorsement, that he would leave the management of the College to his son after his retirement when he reached 84. 

76. Dr Lin said that under the PRC law (lex loci delicti), the College is not in the circumstances described above entitled to use the培正name and its insignia.  Such conduct has caused damage to the 1st plaintiff’s goodwill in the培正name and Insignia in the Mainland.  Under Hong Kong law (lex fori), the position may be analysed thus.  The 1st plaintiff granted the College was a licence to use the培正name when it was first set up.  The College was then treated as a member of the培正family.  As a member of the培正family, the College would not generate any independent goodwill.  In 2001, the licence was terminated and the College had since ceased to be a member of the培正family.  After cessation of its membership, the College does not have any right to use the培正name.  See Wadlow, ibid, Dawnay Day & Co. Ltd v Cantor Fitzgerald International [2000] RPC 669.  The double actionability rule is therefore satisfied. 

77. Plainly, the continuous operation of the College with its name bearing the reference培正and its insignia since late 2001 constitutes a misrepresentation that it is associated or connected with the 1st plaintiff.  In fact, as evident from the《特刊》published in 2005, the College continued to mislead the public that it was associated or connected with the 1st plaintiff.  The 2nd defendant, who is and was at all material times in charge of and responsible for the College’s operation with full knowledge that it is wrongful to do so, is liable.  So are the 1st and 4th defendants, which were formed and are being run by the 2nd defendant with the main purpose of supporting the College.  

78. Inferentially, it is beyond doubt that the intention of registering the Mark by the College in November 1999 was to monopolize the培正name for the field of education services in the Mainland.  Understandably, many in the培正family were infuriated.  At the 1st plaintiff’s school board meeting held on 8 December 2001, members of the board including雷禮和, 吳琦and 陳榮炎confronted the 2nd defendant.  After the meeting, further discussions were made with the 2nd defendant to see if the matter could be resolved amicably.  These efforts had unfortunately failed. 

79. According to Dr Lin, under the PRC law (lex loci delicti), the registration of the Mark was wrongful.  Had it been committed in Hong Kong (lex fori), it was also unlawful.  The double actionability rule is satisfied.  I note that the registration of the Mark had already been cancelled after the commencement of the proceedings.  But it does not detract from the fact that at the time of the writ it constituted an actionable misrepresentation in passing off.  (And it would appear from the recent development in the trademark proceedings, the College still wishes to assert, though wrongfully, that it is the owner of the Mark.)  The 1st defendant who was the owner of the Mark at the time of the writ is liable.  The 2nd defendant who had caused the registration of the Mark by the College is also liable. 

80. The 1st defendant also purported to use the培正name as if it was the owner by granting the Licence.  The plaintiffs carried out investigations, through廣州市智成迅達知識產權代理有限公司, as to how the培正name was used in connection with the Housing Estate and the Primary School.  李旭’s evidence is this. 

81. The investigations were carried out by張勇, who had left employment in 2005.  On 13 February 2003, the investigator went to the sales office of the Housing Estate.  A sales representative gave him floor plans of the Housing Estate.  At the back of the floor plans, the words “創建中之寶華培正小學” and a red and blue insignia resembling the Insignia with the motto “至善至正” appeared.  The representative told the investigator that the Primary School is the “配套小學” of the Housing Estate.  Children of the Housing Estate’s residents have priority to enrol as students.  The investigator then went to the construction site.  There, another sales representative told him that the Primary School was set up with the developer’s financial assistance.  The Primary School helped promote the sale of units in the Housing Estate.  Children of the residents, if enrolled with the School, were entitled to subsidy.  On 17 February 2003, the investigator visited the Primary School.  At its entrance is the name of the School and its red and blue insignia with the motto “至善可正”.  The investigator was received by the deputy principal.  The vice principal told him that the Primary School was directly authorized to be set up by an entity in Hong Kong, whose name she refused to disclose.  She was said that the Primary School and the primary school at the Dongshan Premises were平級學校.  She further said that what the sales representatives told the investigator concerning the Primary School was mere promotional tactics by the developer.  Children of the residents of the Housing Estate did not enjoy priority for enrolment or subsidy.  Subsequently, the investigator went to the sales office of the Housing Estate again.  Another representative told him that the 1st defendant invested in both the Primary School and the College.  In short, the investigations showed that Primary School with the培正name and logo resembling the Insignia had been used to promote the Housing Estate. 

82. What revealed in the investigations showed that the Licence had enabled the Primary School to misrepresent to the public that it is connected or associated with the 1st plaintiff.  The Primary School, which was being misrepresented in such a way, was used as a selling point to promote the Housing Estate.  Dr Lin opined that it is wrongful under the PRC law (lex loci delicti).  It would likewise be wrongful under Hong Kong Law (lex fori).  In particular, the Licence would constitute a supply of an instrument of deception to enable the Primary School to wrongfully use the培正name to mislead the public that it is connected or associated with the 1st plaintiff.  The double actionability rule is satisfied.  The 1st defendant is liable.  

K.       the 3rd element – Damage

83. It is well settled that the claimant in a passing off action does not have to prove that he has actually suffered damage by loss of business or in any other way.  A probability of damage is enough, but the actual or probable damage to him in his trade or business, that is to say, damage to the goodwill in respect of that trade or business.  See Wadlow, supra, paras. 4-11 at pp. 246-247.  The defendants’ wrongful conducts had obviously caused damage to the plaintiffs’ goodwill in the培正name and Insignia. 

84. All the three essential elements are satisfied.  I find that the defendants are all liable for passing off. 

L.      THE 2nd DEFENDANT’S LIABILITY AS MEMBER OF THE SCHOOL BOARD

85. I now come to the 1st plaintiff’s claim against the 2nd defendant for breach of his duty of fidelity as member and chairman of its school board.  Here the double actionability rule applies. 

86. 朱素蘭and陳衡鍔described how the school board was set up thus.  After the resumption of the培正name, a group of alumni including the 2nd defendant set up the school board in February 1988 for the purpose of promoting the development of the 1st plaintiff to become a school of the highest calibre by soliciting and engaging the support of培正alumni everywhere.  According to 朱素蘭, 吳琦 and 陳衡鍔, although the school board was an advisory body, members have always been held in high esteem.  The majority of their advice has invariably been followed by the 1st plaintiff.  Dr Lin said that under the PRC law (lex loci delicti), the 2nd defendant as member and chairman of the school board owed a duty of integrity to the 1st plaintiff.  He had acted in breach of such duty by committing the various acts complained of.  Under Hong Kong law (lex fori), he would have owed a duty of fidelity to act in the best interest of the 1st plaintiff and had breached in breach of such duty by reason of the wrongful acts in question. 

87. I find that the 2nd defendant is liable to the 1st plaintiff for breach of his duty of fidelity as member and chairman of its school board by committing the wrongful acts complained of.  

M.     Estoppel

88. For completeness, I would deal with the defence of estoppel very briefly.  The burden rests on the 1st, 2nd and 4th defendants to make good the defence on estoppel.  As they were absent at the trial, they have adduced no evidence in support.  I will dismiss that plea on this ground alone. 

89. In any event, I do not think the evidence before me is capable of supporting any estoppel as alleged.  Central to the conduct giving rise to the alleged estoppel is the acceptance of donations by way of two cheques dated 24 April 2001 for HK$161,000 and HK$16,100 by the Hong Kong 培正schools.  The two cheques were drawn by the 1st defendant and were accompanied by a cover letter with the 1st defendant’s letterhead signed by the 2nd defendant, stating that “該款是何金容女士慈善金指示本基金會損贈給貴校”.  The donations did not come from the 1st defendant.  It came from何金容女士慈善金, a trust fund managed by Ho, who, according to Lee See Yuen, Clement Young Kwok Hung and Johnny Law Chi Keung, had in the past made similar donations to the培正schools using his personal cheques or cheques of his various companies.  The plaintiffs treated the donations by way of the two cheques as Ho’s.  See the letter of thanks issued by Pui Ching Primary School to Ho dated 27 July 2001.  Further, the plaintiffs learnt of the 1st defendant’s existence only because of the two cheques.  Almost immediately thereafter, they had demanded the 2nd defendant to change the 1st defendant’s name.  No estoppel could have arisen as alleged. 

N.      ORDERS

90. For the above reasons, I will enter judgment for the plaintiffs for :

(1)     An injunction to restrain the defendants and each of them, in the case of the 1st, 3rd and 4th defendants whether acting by themselves, their respective directors, officers, servants or agents or any of them or otherwise howsoever, and in the case of the 2nd defendant, whether acting by himself, his servants or agents or any of them or otherwise howsoever from doing the following acts or any of them :-

(a)  passing off any service, company, school and/or educational institution in the Mainland, Hong Kong or elsewhere not those of, or associated or connected with the plaintiffs as and for the service, company, school and/or educational institution of the plaintiffs or associated or in some way connected with the plaintiffs by the use in relation therewith the name“培正”and/or the Insignia;

(b) attempting to commit the acts in (a) above or any of them; and

(c)  authorizing, approving, directing, causing, enabling, assisting or procuring others to commit the acts in (a) above or any of them. 

(2)     An Order that the defendants do within 21 days from the date of judgment cause or procure the change of the 1st, 3rd and 4th defendants’ name registered at the Hong Kong Companies Registry to comply with the above injunction. 

(3)     An Order that the defendants do within 21 days from the date of judgment deliver up all items in the possession, power, custody or control of the defendants or any of them, the use of which by the defendants or any of them would offend against the above injunction.  

(4)     An enquiry as to damages, or alternatively damages or at the plaintiffs’ option an account of profits in respect of the wrongful acts of the defendants or each of them.  

(5)     An Order for payment of all sums found due with interest thereon. 

(6)     The defendants do within 21 days from the date of judgment provide discovery upon oath of all matters relating to the foregoing. 

91. Costs should follow the event.  The plaintiffs shall have costs against the defendants jointly and severally for the costs of the action, including all costs reserved, to be taxed if not agreed. 

    

 (J. Poon)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

        

Mr Felix H. Pao,  instructed by Messrs JSM, for the Plaintiffs

The 1st Defendant, in person, absent

The 2nd Defendant, in person, absent

The 3rd Defendant, in person, absent

The 4th Defendant, in person, absent



[1]      As appeared at Annex 1.

[2]      See his affirmation filed on 11 December 2005.

[3]      See, for example, 《香港培正中學創校70周年紀念特刊》, 《培正中學百周年紀念特刊》, 《培正中學建校百週年紀念專刊》and《培正一百一十周年紀念特刊》.

[4]      They included馮景謙, 余德寬, 廖德山, 歐陽康 and李濟良.

[5]      See the minutes of the 8th to 10th meeting of香港浸聯會理事會dated 8 October, 5 November and 3 December 1957 respectively.

[6]      For details, see paras.11 to 13 of the witness statement of 朱素蘭, deputy principal of the 1st plaintiff, dated 19 November 2005.

[7]      See item 2 of the minutes of that meeting.

[8]      See para.3 of the minutes of that meeting.

[9]      It further changed its name to “廣東培正學校” in or about 2005.

[10]    The target was HK$30 million according to para.1 of the minutes of the College’s board meeting dated 4 October 1993.

[11]    See《關於成立私立培正商學院的通知》dated 15 April 1996 issued by the Department.

[12]    As appeared at Annex 2.

[13]    See the 2nd opinion of their expert on PRC law, Dr Lin Feng, dated 28 October 2009.

[14]    See the 3rd opinion of Dr Lin Feng dated 3 March 2010.

[15]    By order dated 3 October 2003, the plaintiffs’ application for default judgment against the 3rd defendant was adjourned until trial. 

[16]    The insignia used by the College can be found at Annex 3.

[17]    See Order 35, rule 1 of the Rules of the High Court and Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2010, Vol.1 at para.35/1/1 at p.704.

[18]  Commonly referred to as the Jif Lemon case.

[19]    They are Tyburn Productions Ltd v Conan Doyle [1991] Ch 75 and Pearce v Ove Arup Partnership Ltd & Others [2000] Ch D 403.  

67459-EN-2009-09-07

PEI ZHENG MIDDLE SCHOOL AND ANOTHER v. CHINA PUI CHING EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION LTD AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCA946/2003

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 946 OF 2003

----------------------

BETWEEN  
 PEI ZHENG MIDDLE SCHOOL
 (廣州市培正中學) 
1st Plaintiff
 THE BAPTIST CONVENTION OF HONG KONG2nd Plaintiff
 and 
 CHINA PUI CHING EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION LIMITED
(中國培正教育基金有限公司)
formerly known as PUI CHING EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION LIMITED
(培正教育基金有限公司)
1st Defendant
 LIANG SHANGLI
(梁尚立)
2nd Defendant
 CPZ EDUCATION NET LIMTIED
formerly known as PUI CHING EDUCATION NET LIMTIED
(培正教育網有限公司)
then known as CHINA PEI ZHENG EDUCATION NET LIMITED
(中國培正教育網有限公司)
3rd Defendant
 CHINA PEI ZHENG COMMERCIAL COLLEGE FOUNDATION LIMITED
(中國培正商學院基金會有限公司)
formerly known as PEI ZHENG  COMMERCIAL COLLEGE EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION LIMITED
(培正商學院教育基金有限公司)
4th Defendant

----------------------

Before : Hon Poon J in Chambers

Date of Hearing : 2 September 2009

Date of Decision : 2 September 2009

Date of Handing Down Reasons for Decision : 7 September 2009

--------------------------------------------------

REASONS  FOR  DECISION

------------------------------------------------

 

1. On 2 September 2009, I ruled that the expert reports prepared by the 1st, 2nd and 4th defendants’ historians, 雷雨田教授 and 趙立人教授 are inadmissible and ordered them to be expunged from the court file.  I have indicated that I would give my reasons, which I now do.

Background

2. The background is briefly this. 

3. In 1889, 培正書院was established by members of the Baptist Church in Guangzhou.  It adopted the name私立廣州培正中學校in 1928 about 20 years after it had moved to a permanent premises in Dongshan, Guangzhou.  In the 1930s, branches of the school were established in Hong Kong and Macau, which changed their names to香港培正中學and澳門培正中學in 1950.  The 2nd plaintiff has managed these two schools since 1958.

4. In 1953, 私立廣州培正中學校was nationalized by the PRC Government.  Since then different schools had occupied the Dongshan premises.

5. Over the years, there were many attempts to restore the name of廣州培正中學by its alumni and persons associated with the school.  Eventually on 22 December 1984, the Guangzhou Government agreed to allow its name to be restored, which took place in 1985 when廣州市第五十七中學, which was then operating at the Dongshan resumed the use of the name廣州市培正中學.  That school is the 1st plaintiff.

6. The 1st, 3rd and 4th defendants are Hong Kong companies.  The 2nd defendant is a director of the 1st and 4th defendants.  The plaintiffs sued the defendants for various acts of passing off by their use of and in connection with the name培正.

7. The defendants alleged, among other things, that any goodwill in the name培正was extinguished or vested in the PRC Government by virtue of the nationalization in 1953.

Discussion

8. 雷雨田教授specializes in Chinese religious history, especially the development and history of Christianity in China and history of religion in Guangdong Province.  趙立人教授specializes in the general history of Guangdong.  Both professors touched upon the historical events relating to培正中學in Guangzhou, which are largely not in dispute.  (雷雨田教授sought to support the defendants’ case disputed by the plaintiffs, that 培正書院was established for the purpose of disseminating Christianity.  But as pointed out in the course of submissions, that is simply irrelevant.)  They also dealt with what they perceived to be the policy behind the nationalization in 1953.

9. But what is pertinent to the question if the goodwill in the name培正had become extinguished or vested in the PRC Government by virtue of the nationalization in 1953 is not the underlying policy.  It is the effect of such nationalization, which has already been dealt with by the defendants’ PRC law expert.  That being the case, the evidence of the two professors is irrelevant and will not add anything further to the defendants’ case.

Conclusion

10. For these reasons, I ruled that their experts’ reports are inadmissible and ordered them to be expunged from the court file.

     (J. Poon)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Felix H. Pao, instructed by Messrs JSM, for the Plaintiffs

Mr K.M. Chong and Ms Emma Wong, instructed by  Messrs David Y.Y. Fung & Co., for the 1st, 2nd and 4th Defendants

55388-EN-2006-12-13

PEI ZHENG MIDDLE SCHOOL AND ANOTHER v. CHINA PUI CHING EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION LTD AND OTHERS

HTML content

45945-EN-2005-08-05

PEI ZHENG MIDDLE SCHOOL AND ANOTHER v. CHINA PUI CHING EDUCATIONAL AND OTHERS

HTML content

HCA946/2003

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 946 OF 2003

______________________

BETWEEN

  PEI ZHENG MIDDLE SCHOOL
(廣州市培正中學)
1st Plaintiff
  THE BAPTIST CONVENTION OF HONG KONG2nd Plaintiff
 and 
  CHINA PUI CHING EDUCATIONAL
FOUNDATION LIMITED(中國培正教育基金有限公司)known as PUI CHING EDUCATIONAL
FOUNDATION LIMITED
(培正教育基金有限公司)
1st Defendant
 LIANG SHANGLI (梁尚立)2nd Defendant
  CPZ EDUCATION NET LIMITED
formerly known as
PUI CHING EDUCATION NET LIMITED
(培正教育網有限公司) then known as
CHINA PEI ZHENG EDUCATION NET LIMITED(培正商學院教育基金有限公司)
3rd Defendant
  CHINA PEI ZHENG COMMERCIAL
COLLEGE FOUNDATION LIMITED(中國培正商學院基金會有限公司)formerly known as Pei Zheng CommercialCollege Educational Foundation Limited(培正商學院教育基金有限公司)
4th Defendant

______________________

 

Coram : Deputy High Court Judge L Chan in Chambers

Date of Hearing : 21 and 22 July 2005

Date of Delivery of Judgment : 5 August 2005

 

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J U D G M E N T

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Background

1.  This is a passing-off action.  The 1st plaintiff is a Middle School in Guangzhou and is a legal entity incorporated in the Mainland.  The 2nd plaintiff is a Hong Kong entity and was incorporated in 1951.

2.  The plaintiffs are seeking to enjoin the defendants from passing off as institutions of or associated with the plaintiffs by using the name “培正” or the red and blue insignia of “培正”.  The action has reached the stage where the parties are about to exchange their witness statements and expert reports.

3.  The 1st, 2nd and 4th defendants (“the defendants”) have, however, issued a summons seeking to stay all further proceedings of the 1st plaintiff’s claim.  The application is made on the ground that the courts in Hong Kong are not the proper forum for adjudication of the disputes between the 1st plaintiff and the defendants, and that the defendants are willing to submit the disputes with the 1st plaintiff to a court of law in the Mainland, which is the proper forum.

4.  There is a further summons requiring the plaintiffs’ solicitors to prove authority to sue on behalf of the 1st plaintiff.

History of “培正” (Pui Ching or Pei Zheng)

5.  I briefly recount below the history of a few well-known schools which have the words “培正” (Pui Ching or Pei Zheng) as part of their names. 

6.  The Chinese Baptist Academy of Canton (“培正書院”) (“the School”) was founded in Guangzhou by five Chinese Christians in 1889.  The school moved to its premises in Dongshan of Guangzhou (“the Dongshan Premises”) in 1908 and remained there until it was nationalised in 1953.  Also in 1908, the Guangdong and Guangxi Baptist Association (“兩廣浸信總會”) became the owner of the School.

7.  In 1928, the School changed its name to Guangzhou Pei Zheng Private Middle School (“私立廣州培正中學校”) in accordance with the then legal requirement.  In 1933, the School established a branch in Hong Kong called Guangzhou Pei Zheng Private Middle School Hong Kong Branch (“私立廣州培正中學香港分校”).  In 1938, the School established a branch in Macau called Guangzhou Pei Zheng Private Middle School Macau Branch (“私立廣州培正中學澳門分校”)

8.  In 1950, the two branch schools changed their names to Hong Kong Pui Ching Middle School (“香港培正中學”) and Macau Pui Ching Middle School (“澳門培正中學”) respectively, and were managed by their respective school boards.  In 1953, the School in the Dongshan Premises with its assets was nationalised and changed its name to the 7th Middle School of Guangzhou Municipality (“廣州市第七中學”).  By this time, the Guangdong and Guangxi Baptist Association with its assets had also been nationalised.

9.  In 1958, the 2nd plaintiff took over the administration of the Hong Kong Pui Ching Middle School and Macau Pui Ching Middle School from their school boards.  Also in 1958, the 7th Middle School of the Guangzhou Municipality moved out of the Dongshan premises and merged with another middle school.  A new education institute called the Teachers Training College of Guangzhou Municipality, (“廣州師範學院”) started operating at the Dongshan Premises.

10.  In 1962, this Teachers Training College merged with the Guangdong Teachers Training College and vacated from part of the Dongshan Premises.  A middle school called Guangzhou Kiu Kwong Middle School (“廣州僑光中學”) then moved into the vacant part of the Dongshan premises.  Kiu Kwong Middle School was, in fact, founded in 1957 by the Working Committee of the Guangzhou Municipality of the Returned Overseas Chinese Union (“中國致公黨廣州市工作委員會”).  Apparently, Kiu Kwong Middle School had nothing to do with the School or the Guangdong and Guangxi Baptist Association.

11.  In 1968, Kiu Kwong Middle School was nationalised and changed its name to the People’s No. 1 Middle School of Guangzhou Municipality (“廣州市人民一中”).  In 1969, it changed its name to the 57th Middle School of Guangzhou Municipality (“廣州市第五十七中學”).

Resumption of name

12.  In the late 1970s to early 1980s, the alumni and people associated with the School strove for the resumption or revival of the name of the School, but their quest initially was unsuccessful.  The Education Bureau of Guangzhou Municipality, in a letter dated 20 August 1981 to the Cultural and Education Office of the Municipality and the Revolutionary Committee of the Municipality, said this:

“廣州培正中學於一八八九年冬,由美國南方浸信會友李濟樑、馮景謙、廖德山等人為解決教會子弟入學創辦,初定名為“培正書院”,設於城內德正街。  期後屢遷校址。至一九○八年,培正交由兩廣浸信會管辦,並在東山現址購地新建校舍。學校經費來源主要是學費收入和向中外教友校友募捐。
  
 ……  培正中學為人民政府接辦後改名為廣州市第七中學。  以後又先後改為僑光中學、廣州師私院和第五十七中學。
  
 綜上所述,原廣州培正中學是一所辦學歷史悠久的教會學校,解放後與培英、真光、真中、興華等一大批教會或接受外國津貼的私立學校一起為我人民政府接辦,被接辦的還有其他私立的中、小學。
  
 近年來,原廣州培正中學部分校友多次提出要求恢復“廣州培正中學”校名。我們認為這個問題牽涉面較廣,也較複雜。恢復校名,會有利於團結教育海外和港澳校友,增取他們為祖國“四化”建設服務,有利於學校的建設和發展。同時也利於原廣州培正中學“存款”的解凍。  ……
  
 ……  權衡利弊,我們認為,以不恢復校名為宜。  為保護和發揚華僑、港澳同胞的愛國熱情,應鼓勵原培正中學校友以五十七中學作為原廣州培正中學的母校,歡迎他們關心支持祖國“四化”建設,關心母校的建設和發展。事實上,廣州培正同學會亦以五十七中為基地,開展料一些活動。”

This can be translated as follows:

“Guangzhou Pei Zheng Middle School was established in the winter of 1889.  It was established by Messrs. Lee Chai Leung, Fung King Him, Liu Tak Shan and others who were fellow Baptists of the Southern Part of the United States of America.  The school was established to solve the problem of education for the children of fellow Christians.  Initially, it was called the Chinese Baptist Academy of Canton (培正書院) and located at Tak Ching Street within the city.  There subsequent changes of address.  In 1908, the school was handed over to the Guangdong and Guangxi Baptist Association to manage.  It also purchased land at the present address in Dongshan to build new school premises.  The funding for the school’s expenditure mainly came from school fees and donations from Chinese and foreign fellow Christians and alumni. 
  
 ……  Pei Zheng Middle School, after having been taken over by the People’s Government, changed its name to the 7th Middle School of Guangzhou Municipality.  Later it changed to Kiu Kwong Middle School, Guangzhou Teachers Training College and the 57th Middle School.
  
 To summarize the above, Guangzhou Pei Zheng Middle School was a school run by a religious body with a long history in providing education.  After the liberation, a large number of schools run by religious bodies or private schools which received foreign allowances together with Pei Yin, True Light, Zhen Zhong, Xing Hua and others were nationalized by our People’s Government.  There were also other Middle and Primary schools that were nationalized.
  
 In recent years, some alumni of the former Guangzhou Pei Zheng Middle School have on a number of times requested for resumption of the name of “Guangzhou Pei Zheng Middle School”, we are of the view that this question has fairly wide repercussion and is fairly complicated.  To resume the name of the school would be beneficial for uniting the overseas and Hong Kong and Macau alumni on education, for wining them over to serve the Mother Country’s Four Modernizations, and beneficial to the construction and development of the school.  At the same time, it would be beneficial to “unfreezing” the “deposit money” of the former Guangzhou Pei Zheng Middle School.  ……
  
 ……  After balancing the pros and cons, we consider it better not to resume the name of the school.  In order to protect and develop the patriotic zeal of overseas Chinese and the compatriots in Hong Kong and Macau, we should encourage the alumni of the former Pei Zheng Middle School to take the 57th Middle School as the alma mater for the former Guangzhou Pei Zheng Middle School, welcome their concern and support for the construction of the Mother Country’s Four Modernizations, welcome their concern for the construction and development of the alma mater.  In fact, the Guangzhou Alumni Association of Pei Zheng has already taken the 57th Middle School as the base and launched some activities.”

13.  The quest of the alumni and friends of“培正”eventually succeeded.  The Office of the People’s Government of Guangzhou Municipality, by a letter to the Education Bureau of the Municipality dated 22 December 1984, stated as follows:

“關於培中學復名的報告已悉,經市政府領導同志同意,答覆如下:
   
 一.為了爭取華僑、港澳同胞支持我市教育事業的發展,同意將廣州市第五十七中學復名為廣州市培正中學。
   
 二.要教育學校的幹部和師生員工,在對外交往中堅持教育與宗教分離的原則。”

This can be translated as follows:

“The report on the resumption of name by Pei Zheng Middle School has been considered, with the agreement of the comrades in the leadership of the municipal government, (we) reply as follows:
   
 1.In order to strive for the support of overseas Chinese and the compatriots in Hong Kong and Macau to the development of education in our municipality, (we) agree to use the 57th Middle School of Guangzhou Municipality for resumption of name as Guangzhou Pei Zheng Middle School.
   
 2.It is necessary to educate the comrades, teachers, pupils and staff of the school that in their external relations, (they) must adhere to the principle of separating education and religion.”

14.  After the approval for “復名” or resumption or revival of name, the 57th Middle School of Guangzhou Municipality at the Dongshan Premises became known as Pei Zheng Middle School (“廣州市培正中學”), which is the 1st plaintiff, from 1985 onwards.  The 1st plaintiff was also issued by the government with a certificate of registration as an institution on 11 October 2000.  The certificate stated that the business of the 1st plaintiff was to undertake and develop primary and secondary education.  It also stated that the 1st plaintiff was established on 1 December 1889, the date when the School was founded by the five Christians.

Work of the 2nd plaintiff

15.  Before the resumption of name in Guangzhou, the Hong Kong Pui Ching Middle School and the Macau Pui Ching Middle School, as administered by the 2nd plaintiff, continued to provide quality education and produced very fine graduates.  These graduates include Professor Yau Shing-tung (邱成桐), who is the only Chinese who has been awarded the Field’s Medal (費爾茲獎) in mathematics, and Professor Daniel C Tsui (崔琦) who shared the Nobel Prize in physics with Professor Horst Stormer in 1998.  There are also many other graduates who have made tremendous contributions in different aspects to our community.  There is, therefore, no doubt that there is goodwill in the name Pui Ching, and the defendants do not dispute this.

16.  After the resumption of name, the 1st plaintiff has improved its school buildings and facilities and enhanced the quality of its education.  All these were made possible by the efforts of the staff and students and the contributions and support from the alumni and friends of Pui Ching.  The 2nd defendant is also an alumnus of a primary school of Pui Ching and he has made tremendous contribution to the resumption of name and subsequent development and improvement of the 1st plaintiff. 

17.  After the resumption of name, the 2nd plaintiff recognised the 1st plaintiff as the mother school of Hong Kong Pui Ching Middle School and Macau Pui Ching Middle School, and as the fountain of the goodwill of “培正”.

The plea of goodwill and passing off

18.  In this action, the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs claim in their re-re-amended statement of claim that:

“2(a)The 1st Plaintiff was originally established in 1889 as a private tuition establishment under the name “培正書院” by several Chinese members of the “廣州浸信會”, including 馮景謙,余德歡,廖德山,歐陽康 and 李濟樑.  The name by which the 1st Plaintiff is generally known today was adopted in or around 1928 to reflect its growth in stature and increase in student intake.
   
 (d)In about the early 1950s, the school operating at the Dongshan Premises was nationalised by the PRC Government.  The quality education it had been providing and the reputation and goodwill thereby built up for over half a century as such a provider of quality education, in particular, at the Dongshan Premises became suspended.
   
 (e)The residual reputation and goodwill annexed to the Dongshan Premises survived the said political interruption and was revived and succeeded to by the school operating at the Dongshan Premises in about 1984 through the efforts of the alumni of 培正, including the 2nd defendant, by their application made to the Guangzhou Municipal People’s Government for the resumption of use of the name “廣州市培正中學” by the said school.  The approval for the resumption of use of the name was granted in about 1985 with the condition that the principle of separation of education and religion be upheld.
   
 3(a)For over a century, not only has the 1st Plaintiff been in the service as a provider of quality education to numerous students, but the 1st Plaintiff has also, through the members of its school board and with the assistance of its alumni, established and/or advised, assisted and supervised in the establishment and/or administration of other primary and secondary schools under and by reference to the name “培正” and the red and blue insignia of “培正” throughout southern China, including Hong Kong and Macau.  The “培正” family of schools include: (the names of a number of schools including the Hong Kong Pui Ching Middle School and Macau Pui Ching Middle School are listed under the particulars of this paragraph).
   
 5.The 2nd Plaintiff accepted the transfer of the administration of “香港培正中學” and “澳門培正中學” from the respective school boards of the 2 schools in 1958 and has faithfully continued to carry on the established service as a provider of quality education to numerous students through “香港培正中學” and “澳門培正中學” and their associated primary schools in Hong Kong and Macau.  Notwithstanding the transfer of the administration of “香港培正中學” and “澳門培正中學”, it has always been recognised by the 2nd Plaintiff and the students and alumni of “香港培正中學” and “澳門培正中學” that both schools were and still are inextricably associated with the 1st Plaintiff and that the 1st Plaintiff is the “mother school” of “香港培正中學” and “澳門培正中學”.
   
 7.By reason of the foregoing matters, the Plaintiffs have acquired and shared a substantial reputation and goodwill in the name “培正” and the red and blue insignia of “培正” in the PRC, Hong Kong and Macau and schools and other institutions bearing the name “培正” and/or the red and blue insignia of “培正” have come to be recognised by the public in the PRC, Hong Kong and Macau as associated with the Plaintiffs and none other.” 

19.  The plaintiffs then pleaded that the defendants have passed off the 1st, 3rd and 4th defendants as establishments associated with or in some way connected with the plaintiffs.  They further pleaded that the 1st and 2nd defendants have authorised other schools in the Mainland to pass off as schools of or in some way approved or endorsed by the plaintiffs.  The particulars of this pleading say that the 2nd defendant had, without knowledge or consent of the plaintiffs, procured one Pui Ching Commercial College in Guangzhou to apply for registration in Beijing the Chinese and English name and red and blue insignia of “培正” as a trade/service mark in November 1999.

20.  The 2nd defendant then caused this trade name to be transferred to the 1st defendant.  The 1st and 2nd defendants then allowed a primary school in a Guangzhou property development owned by a Mainland subsidiary of the Hong Kong listed Henderson Land Development Company Limited to be called “保華培正小學”. 

21.  The plaintiffs also pleaded that the 1st defendant had published an advertisement in a newspaper which could mislead the public to think that the 1st defendant was associated with the plaintiffs.  Furthermore, the 2nd defendant has incorporated the 3rd and 4th defendants using the name of “培正”, Pui Ching and Pei Zheng.

22.  After the issue of this writ, the 1st defendant has reassigned the trademark back to the Pui Ching Commercial College. 

23.  The plaintiffs therefore seek an injunction against the defendants from using the name “培正” and the red and blue insignia.  There is also a claim against the 2nd defendant for damages for breach of fiduciary duty as the 2nd defendant has been, since 1988, the chairman of the 1st plaintiff’s school board and had declined a request by the principal of the 1st plaintiff to register “培正” and its red and blue insignia as a trademark for the 1st plaintiff.  The plaintiffs further rely on the acts above mentioned as committed by the 2nd defendant in support of this claim.

The defence

24.  As I have said above, the defendants do not dispute that the name “培正” carries with it goodwill.  Mr Neoh, SC, says that “培正” is a famous name throughout the world, but the defendants’ case as against the 1st plaintiff is that the 1st plaintiff is not the original “培正” and has not succeeded to its goodwill.  They say that the 1st plaintiff is only “培正” in name, but Kiu Kwong (“僑光”) in fact.

25.  Paragraphs 28, 29, 32 and 35 of the defendants’ re-re-amended defence plead as follows:

“28.Between 1962 and 1985, the‘廣州僑光中學 (Guangzhou Kiu Kwong Middle School)’ went through the following changes of name: -
    
  (a)in or about 1968 it was nationalised by the Chinese Government and became a public middle school and it changed its name to ‘廣州市人民一中 (Guangzhou Municipal People’s No. 1 Middle School)’;
    
  (b)in 1969, it changed its name to ‘廣州市第五十七中學 (Guangzhou Municipal No. 57 Middle School)’; and
    
  (c)in 1985 it changed its name to ‘廣州市培正中學 (Guangzhou Municipal Pei Zheng Middle School)’,  (i.e. the 1st Plaintiff).  Despite that, it remains a public middle school owned, operated and run by the Chinese Government.
    
 29.The change of name referred to in paragraph 28(c) above was made and effected for the express purpose of attracting donation and support from persons connected with the former: -
    
  (a)‘兩廣浸信會總會 (The Guangdong and Guangxi Baptist Association)’; and/or
    
  (b)‘培正書院” (The Chinese Baptist Academy of Canton)’ of 1889; and/or
    
  (c)‘私立廣州培正中學校 (Guangzhou Pei Zheng Private Middle School)’ of 1928.
    
 32.By reason of the matters referred to in paragraphs 14-31 above, the 1st Plaintiff is not and has never been the successor of, nor connected either directly or indirectly with: -
    
  (a)‘兩廣浸信會總會 (The Guangdong and Guangxi Baptist Association)’; and/or
    
  (b)‘培正書院 (The Chinese Baptist Academy of Canton)’ of 1889; and/or
    
  (c)‘私立廣州培正中學校 (Guangzhou Pei Zheng Private Middle School)’ of 1928.
    
 35.Further, or in the alternative, since its nationalisation in 1949, all the rights and interests of ‘兩廣浸信總會 (The Guangdong and Guangxi Baptist Association)’ vested in the Chinese Government.  Under Chinese law, the 1st Plaintiff has no locus standi to sue for infringement of the rights of and in the trade name ‘Pei Zheng’ (培正) and/or any of the insignia set out in the Schedule A of the re-re-amended statement of claim and/or the said Trade Mark.”

26.  If these averments in the defence are true, I do not know how the alumni and friends of Pui Ching would feel, as they might have thought that they had made donations to and supported the School and were not aware that they had only supported a school that is “培正” in name but Kiu Kwong (“僑光”) in fact.  But it is not a matter that I have to decide in this application.

27.  Regarding the case of the 2nd plaintiff, the defendants plead that the 2nd plaintiff was only the operator of the Hong Kong and Macau Pui Ching Schools and had not obtained any right in the trade name and/or design insignia of the Guangzhou Pei Zheng Private Middle School Hong Kong Branch (“私立廣州培正中學香港分校”) or its successor, Hong Kong Pui Ching Middle School (“香港培正中學”).  Thus, they say the 2nd plaintiff has no locus standi to sue for infringement of the trade name Pei Zheng (“培正”) or its insignia.

28.  On the subsidiary issue of breach of fiduciary duty by the 2nd defendant, his case is that according to the law of the Mainland and Hong Kong he did not owe any such duty to the 1st plaintiff.

29.  These are the main issues between the parties.  As I have said, this action has reached the stage for the parties to exchange their witness statements.  The defendants in fact have filed their only witness statement, which was made by the 2nd defendant, because the plaintiff did not want to exchange their witness statements with them pending the resolution of this summons.  The defendants are also ready to exchange their expert reports as well.

The application to stay the 1st plaintiff’s case

30.  Despite the defendants’ readiness for the trial, they say that the case brought by the 1st plaintiff should be stayed in favour of the courts in the Mainland, which is the more appropriate forum.  On the law applicable for this application, both sides agree that I should follow the principle formulated in The Spiliada [1987] 1 AC 460 and summarised by Hunter J into a three-stage process in the Adhiguna Meranti [1987] HKLR 904.  The first stage is for the defendants to show that the courts in the Hong Kong SAR are not the appropriate forum and that the courts in the Mainland are clearly and distinctly more appropriate.

The defendants’ grounds

31.  The 2nd defendant has made an affirmation to support the application.  He purportedly identified a number of questions relating to his alleged breach of fiduciary duty and the granting of licence by the 1st defendant to the Guangzhou subsidiary of Henderson Land to use “培正” as part of the name of a primary school in Guangzhou.  As I have observed, the alleged breach of fiduciary duty is a relatively minor issue in this action, as the main thrust is the passing-off claim.  On the granting of the licence, the tort was completed upon the grant being made.  On the state of the pleadings and evidence before me, the reasonable inference I can draw is that the grant was made in Hong Kong.  I will further discuss this below.

32.  The 2nd defendant further dealt with the history of the School and its nationalisation after 1949.  He identified the question of whether the 1st plaintiff is the School, and said that the resolution of this issue depended upon the contemporaneous documents concerning the School which are kept by the Mainland Government since 1889, the contemporaneous documents concerning the 1st plaintiff and direct oral testimony concerning the School and the 1st plaintiff, if any.  He however accepted that it is unlikely for direct oral evidence concerning the School to be available.  He also did not elaborate on what direct oral evidence concerning the 1st plaintiff he can adduce in the Mainland and why is such evidence relevant to the issues in this case.  He did not even identify or describe the witnesses who can give the evidence.

33.  On the documents, he said he believed the Mainland Government is in possession of documents showing whether the 1st plaintiff is the School, but he did not say what sort of documents they are and where they are kept.  He also did not explain why the documents already produced by the parties, including those I have referred to above, are insufficient for resolving the issues in this case, or how these unknown documents can provide a better understanding.

34.  He also said that there are some confidential and secret documents kept by the Mainland Government which relate to the nationalisation of schools formerly run by religious bodies.  He believed that without sight of these confidential or secret documents, the Hong Kong courts would not have a complete picture of what happened since the nationalisation of the School, which he said is central to the issue of fact on whether the 1st plaintiff had originated from the School or from Kiu Kwong (“僑光”).  He said if the 1st plaintiff’s case should be tried in the Mainland, the Mainland judge could have access to these documents.

35.  This supposition is a little bit startling.  What the 2nd defendant has said tantamount to saying that the status of the 1st plaintiff can only be ascertained by perusing confidential documents kept by the Mainland Government and not by looking at the official documents and certificates issued by the Government to the 1st plaintiff and other relevant parties.  But he has not explained why the Mainland Government has seen it necessary to keep the status of the 1st plaintiff a confidential matter and not to state it in the open documents and certificates.  I find this assertion unconvincing.  This is particularly so when his description of these documents is very rough and general. 

36.  He then referred to the central question of whether the 1st plaintiff could be considered as the School or its successor, and this issue has to be resolved by reference to the law of the Mainland.  Mr Pao, counsel for the plaintiffs, accepts that whether the official approval by the Mainland Government for the 1st plaintiff to resume or revive the use of the name “培正” had thereby bestowed the goodwill of “培正” upon the 1st plaintiff is a question of the law of the Mainland.  This is very similar to the question referred to by the 2nd defendant.  The 2nd defendant further said that there were already proceedings brought by the 1st plaintiff in the Mainland courts against Pui Ching Commercial College for removal of the registration of the trademark “培正” on the ground of irregular or illegal registration and three-year non-use, but these are not parallel proceedings as the parties and causes are different.

37.  Finally, the 2nd defendant said that the defendants were willing to submit to the jurisdiction of the Mainland courts. 

The 1st plaintiff’s opposition

38.  The plaintiffs’ solicitor Miss Hester Chan has made an affidavit in reply.  She pointed out that the 1st and 4th defendants (and also the 3rd defendant-though it has not taken part in this application) are companies domiciled in Hong Kong and the 2nd defendant is a resident of Hong Kong.  This action is based on passing-off, which is a common law cause of action.  If the action should be stayed in favour of the Mainland forum, this cause of action would not be available.  Miss Chan also said that even if some witnesses have to come from the Mainland, arrangements could be made for them to come easily.  Finally, she pointed out that this application merely sought to stay the part of the action brought by the 1st plaintiff and not the part brought by the 2nd plaintiff.  It is therefore not in the interests of justice to allow the application, as the case of the 2nd plaintiff will still have to continue in this forum.

39.  The defendants replied to these matters by the 4th affidavit of their solicitor Mr Yeung, but Mr Yeung’s affidavit does not add anything more to the affirmation of the 2nd defendant.

The defendants’ attacks on the merits

40.  Mr Neoh initially argued that the 1st plaintiff’s case is impossible to succeed as a matter of law.  He said the 1st plaintiff only came into being in 1985 and it had not acquired the goodwill of “培正” by assignment or transfer.  The School (or the Guangdong and Guangxi Baptist Association) which owned the goodwill had been nationalised in 1953.  He also submitted that the 2nd plaintiff’s case is also hopeless as it is and was merely the administrator of the Hong Kong and Macau Pui Ching Middle Schools.  He therefore said that both plaintiffs have no case and this action is a futile exercise.

41.  However, I am not asked to strike out this action on the ground of no reasonable cause action or on any other ground, and I do not think I should stay the case of the 1st plaintiff in favour of the Mainland forum simply because its case and/or the 2nd plaintiff’s case is weak or hopeless.  As I will point out below, I also do not think the case of the 1st plaintiff and the 2nd plaintiff is unsustainable.

42.  Mr Neoh refined his arguments in the skeleton in reply.  He argued that the 1st plaintiff has not obtained the goodwill in the generic name “培正” and its insignia.  The goodwill in the School, as owned by the Guangdong and Guangxi Baptist Association, had been nationalised.  The Pui Ching schools in Hong Kong and Macau, as administered by the 2nd plaintiff, had severed their links with the Mainland in the early 1950s to avoid nationalisation.  So all the goodwill in the generic name of “培正” in the Mainland, Hong Kong and Macau had vested in the Mainland Government by virtue of the nationalisation.  Thus, any goodwill owned by the 2nd plaintiff must have been created since the 1950s and it must be goodwill localised in Hong Kong and Macau and not the goodwill attached to the generic name.

43.  Regarding the 1st plaintiff, he submitted that there is no averment in the pleadings that the Mainland Government, in whom the goodwill of the School vested, had assigned or transferred it to the 1st plaintiff.  The goodwill of “培正” as owned by the 1st plaintiff must have started at the earliest in 1985 and is restricted to the locality of Dongshan.  He further submitted that there is no pleading that the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs share a goodwill that was obtained as a result of a pool of common nexus.  Mr Neoh thus argued that the goodwill of “培正” of the 1st plaintiff is different from that of the 2nd plaintiff both in terms of locality as well as date of germination.

44.  In relation to the tort allegedly committed against the 1st plaintiff, he therefore argued that the 1st plaintiff has no goodwill in Hong Kong and thus no right to be infringed here.  Hence, the use of “培正” as corporate names in Hong Kong and the advertisement by the 1st defendant, which were acts done in Hong Kong, have nothing to do with the 1st plaintiff.

45.  Regarding the grant of a licence for the primary school to use the name “培正” in Guangzhou, the defendants said that it was an act done in the Mainland.  For an act done in the Mainland, it is only actionable in Hong Kong if it is a tort according to the law of the Mainland as well as a tort in Hong Kong.  This is the double actionability principle in Phillips v Eyre [1870] LR 6 QB1 at 28 to 30.  Since the 1st plaintiff’s goodwill only exists in the Mainland and not in Hong Kong, the alleged infringement of the 1st plaintiff’s goodwill by this grant can only be actionable in the Mainland and not in Hong Kong.  Thus, Mr Neoh argued, the 1st plaintiff has no cause of action in Hong Kong in relation to this grant.  He therefore further argued that since the rights of the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs are completely different, and the 1st plaintiff’s claim has no connection with Hong Kong, the court should stay the 1st plaintiff’s claim in favour of the Mainland courts.

46.  Mr Neoh further submitted that even if it under the Mainland’s law, the 1st plaintiff has goodwill in Hong Kong, the question of whether the 1st plaintiff has a claim against the granting of licence, which was done in the Mainland, and what remedies are available for the grant, are matters for the law of the Mainland.  He thus suggested that the 1st plaintiff can firstly have its rights determined in the Mainland and then come back to Hong Kong to deal with the names of the 1st, 3rd and 4th defendants.  He further buttressed his case by relying on the assertions by the 2nd defendant that the oral evidence and documents are only available in the Mainland.

47.  The plaintiffs disagree that they have goodwill in different localities and hence different rights.  They maintain that there is just one goodwill in the name “培正” which exists in the Mainland, Hong Kong and Macau, and this goodwill is shared by the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs have a case

48.  I am of the view that the parts of the re-re-amended statement of claim, as quoted above, have stated a case that the goodwill of “培正” was created sometime in 1889 and had become annexed to the Dongshan Premises from 1908 onwards.  After the assets of the Guangdong and Guangxi Baptist Association and the School at the Dongshan Premises were nationalised and the School became the 7th Middle School of the Guangzhou Municipality, the school boards of the Hong Kong and Macau Pui Ching schools then carried the torch of “培正”.  They continued with the cultivation and development of its goodwill in Hong Kong and Macau.  This task and the torch of “培正” was then passed over to the 2nd plaintiff in 1958 and the 2nd plaintiff continued with this virtuous task.

49.  The re-re-amended statement of claim also pleads that when the 1st plaintiff resumed the name of “培正” at the Dongshan Premises in 1985, it was not just a mere change of name from “僑光” to “培正” but a resumption of the operation of the School together with its goodwill as vested in it by the Mainland Government.  Furthermore, once the 1st plaintiff resumed the operation of the School at the Dongshan Premises, the 2nd plaintiff, as well as the alumni and students of the Pui Ching Middle Schools in Hong Kong and Macau, recognised the 1st plaintiff as the mother school of the Pui Ching schools in Hong Kong and Macau.  Hence, the goodwill in “培正”, and the associated insignia have been recognised by the public in the Mainland, Hong Kong and Macau as associated with the 1st and 2nd plaintiffs and they share this goodwill together.

50.  Whether the plaintiffs can prove their case as pleaded is not for me to decide now, but I can surely say that their case of shared goodwill is not hopeless either on the pleadings or on the evidence.  It is the defendants’ case that the goodwill of “培正” had become nationalised and vested in the Mainland Government.  If that is right, the Mainland Government might well have vested the goodwill in the 1st plaintiff.  This is in line with paragraph 2(e) of the re-re-amended statement of claim, which pleads that the Mainland Government has granted the approval for the resumption of use of the name by the 1st plaintiff.  The certificate of registration issued by the government dated 11 October 2000 also stated that the 1st plaintiff had been established on 1 December 1889.  It appears that the Mainland Government intended the 1st plaintiff to be the continuation of the School established on that date by the five Chinese Baptists.  The letter dated 20 August 1981, as quoted above, also shows the understanding of the Mainland Government on resumption of name.  It is not a new entity to be established, but resumption or revival of the previous entity which is to take over the assets owned by that entity but frozen upon nationalisation.

Should the 1st plaintiff’s case be stayed?

51.  Since I take the view that the plaintiffs share a common cause in this action, I should dismiss this application, as the staying of the 1st plaintiff’s action will produce no saving in time or resources.  The 2nd plaintiff’s claim, which relies on the same goodwill coming from the same source, still has to be disposed of in Hong Kong.  Furthermore, there is no authority that suggests that the court can just stay part of an action in favour of another forum and allow the remaining part to go on.  However, in deference to counsel’s thorough arguments, I will deal with the other arguments as well.

52.  On whether the 1st plaintiff has succeeded to the goodwill of the School, there is no dispute that it is a matter for the law of the Mainland.  However, that does not mean that this matter is not appropriate for the Hong Kong courts.  Deputy Judge Lam (as he then was) has said in First Laser Ltd. v Fujian Enterprises (Holdings) Co. Ltd. v Anor HCA4414/2001:

“35.After all, evidence as to foreign law can be adduced if the court shall eventually conclude, after proper arguments on the matter, that a particular issue is to be decided by reference to foreign law.  It has not been suggested before me that there are complicated issues of PRC law which this court will find it too difficult to grapple with.”

53.  The defendants herein have not suggested that the question of whether the 1st plaintiff has succeeded to the goodwill of the School is a very difficult question of law of the Mainland. 

54.  On the availability of witnesses and documents in the Mainland, the defendants have not intimated who are these witnesses, what can they testify to and why is it difficult for them to come here to give evidence.  I note that the through-train takes less than 3 hours to come from Guangzhou to Hong Kong.  The travel formalities which used to be a cause of inconvenience have become much simplified since the relaxation of the ban for Mainland residents to frequent Hong Kong as tourists.  On the documents, save an allegation that they are confidential or secret, there is no clue as to what and where they are.  I also repeat my query of why the Mainland Government should state the status of the 1st plaintiff only in confidential or secret documents rather than in the documents and certificates that have been issued openly.  I am not convinced that there is any need to hear evidence from any unknown witness residing in the Mainland, or to peruse any unknown documents kept somewhere in the Mainland so as to resolve the issue of the 1st plaintiff’s ownership of the goodwill.

55.  The other matter which merits consideration is the grant of licence.  The plaintiffs say that it was granted in Hong Kong.  The 1st defendant is domiciled in Hong Kong.  Though the plaintiffs have not expressly pleaded that the licence was granted in Hong Kong, I can infer that to be so by reason of the 1st defendant’s domicile.  I also note that the defendants have not pleaded in their re-re-amended defence that the licence was granted in the Mainland.

56.  Though the 2nd defendant has said in paragraph 28 of his affirmation that all alleged acts of conversion and breach of duty occurred in China and all are subject to findings of Chinese law, he did not specifically refer to the grant of the licence.  If the grant was indeed made in the Mainland, he would have no difficulty in particularising the date, place and circumstances of the grant.  The defendants’ solicitor, Mr Yeung, in paragraph 17 of his 4th affidavit said that the material act took place in the Mainland.  He said so from his own personal knowledge as he had not indicated otherwise, but he gave no clue as to how he had acquired such knowledge.  There is therefore insufficient evidence to show that the licence was granted in the Mainland rather than in Hong Kong.  I therefore accept Mr Pao’s submission that once the grant, which was an instrument of deception, was made in Hong Kong, the tort was also completed in Hong Kong. 

57.  Even if I should be wrong on this and that the grant was indeed made in the Mainland, that would simply mean that there is the question of whether the grant of licence amounted to a tort under the law of the Mainland.  The principle of double actionability will apply.  If the plaintiffs cannot prove the grant as an actionable tort in the Mainland, they will fail in this part of their claims, but it still does not mean that this extra question under the Mainland’s law can turn the tide.  The defendants have not suggested that this is a difficult question under the law of the Mainland.  This court is accustomed to resolving issues of foreign law with the help of experts.

58.  I also mention that there is the question of alleged breach of fiduciary duty by the 2nd defendant.  Though this may be a question for the law of the Mainland, there is no suggestion that this is a difficult question of law and I also repeat that this is a subsidiary issue in this action.  I do not think that this issue, when added to the considerations discussed above, would persuade me to stay the claim of the 1st plaintiff.

59.  The plaintiffs have a common cause of action of passing-off, and passing-off is a common law cause of action.  The 1st and 4th defendants are corporations domiciled in Hong Kong and the 2nd defendant is a resident of Hong Kong.  The plaintiffs share a common cause and the stay of the 1st plaintiff’s claim will not obviate the need to try the 2nd plaintiff’s claim in Hong Kong.  It will instead produce the need for more time and resources for the parties because they have to deal with an extra set of proceedings in another forum.  All in all, I find that the defendants have failed to prove that Hong Kong is not the natural or appropriate forum, or that the courts in the Mainland are clearly or distinctly more appropriate.

60.  If I should be wrong on this, I should go on to the second stage of the consideration (The Adhiguna).  The plaintiffs have said that there is no passing-off action known to the law of the Mainland.  The defendants do not dispute this but say that this is a matter to be resolved according to the Mainland’s law.  In the light of my finding of a shared cause in the plaintiffs, they have a vested advantage to proceed in Hong Kong because they have a known cause of action in the common law and they can seek remedy here for passing-off against them.  There is no evidence that the passing-off cause of action is available in the Mainland.  The existence of such cause of action here amounts to a juridical advantage for the plaintiffs which they may lose upon a stay.  For this reason, I would also dismiss the application for stay.

Dismissal of summons to stay

61.  I therefore dismiss the application by the defendants for stay of the 1st plaintiff’s case and I also make an order nisi that the defendants do pay the 1st plaintiff the costs of this application.

Summons to show authority to act

62.  I now deal with the next application which is for production by the plaintiffs’ solicitors of proof of authority to conduct this action for the 1st plaintiff. 

63.  There is evidence showing that the 1st plaintiff is a legal person and can carry on its business or undertaking legitimately.  Mr Neoh says that the 1st plaintiff is a Mainland Government school and its objects or purposes are in undertaking and developing education as stipulated in the certificate issued by the government.  Its funding is from the Mainland Government.  He therefore challenged the 1st plaintiff to produce evidence of approval by the Mainland Government for it to institute this action and also to disburse funds for it.  I do not think the 1st plaintiff needs to show such approval.  I think any lawful business or undertaking should have the power to institute legal action to protect its rights and interests.  On the use of funding, I think this is merely a question for the plaintiffs’ own lawyers.  They may wish to be assured that they will be paid their costs, but I do not think that the defendants can compel the 1st plaintiff to produce evidence of such approval.

64.  I also note that the defendants have produced a Chinese legal opinion by a Mainland lawyer.  The opinion was on the establishment and conduct of entities like the 1st plaintiff.  The opinion has not said a word about the need for permission or approval from the Mainland Government for the 1st plaintiff to engage in litigation or to incur and pay legal costs.  If there should be such need, I am sure the Chinese lawyer would have said so in his opinion.  What he said was that the assets of the 1st plaintiff could not be seized by its creditors and the bankruptcy law of the Mainland did not apply to the 1st plaintiff.

65.  I think the issues in the second summons eventually boiled down just to one matter, that is the production by the plaintiffs’ solicitors of the document of authority given to them by the 1st plaintiff authorising them to institute this action.  The defendants rely on Shanghai Land Holdings Limited (in receivership) v Chow Ching-ngai v Another [2004] 3HKC 573, where the solicitors for the 1st defendant, Mr Chow, were required to produce the authority to act.  In that case, Mr Chow was incarcerated in Shanghai pending investigation into his alleged criminal acts.  Only very few people could establish contact with him so that he was almost incommunicado.  The solicitors in Hong Kong were instructed to act for him through a Shanghai law firm.  That law firm was instructed by Mr Chow’s elder brother to assist him.  The letters of authorisation as produced by the Hong Kong solicitors, which were purportedly signed by Mr Chow, had signatures different from Mr Chow’s usual signatures as kept by Shanghai Land.

66.  However, the facts in the present case are very much different from those in the Shanghai Land case.  The defendants here have proved nothing to cast doubt on the authority of the plaintiffs’ solicitors to act for the 1st plaintiff.  They have merely made a demand for production of proof of authority and the demand was rightly rejected.  The demand alone is not enough to create a prima facie case of doubt of authority.  The document of authority is a privileged document and the defendants have not shown any cause to warrant an order for its production. 

Dismissal of summons

67.  In the premises, I also dismiss the second summons and make an order nisi that the defendants do pay the 1st plaintiff’s costs for this summons.

 

 

 (L Chan)
Deputy High Court Judge

 

Mr Felix H Pao, instructed by Messrs Johnson, Stokes & Master, for the Plaintiff

Mr Anthony Neoh, SC, leading Mr K M Chong, instructed by Messrs Peter Mo & Co., for the Defendant

 

On appeal by the 1st, 2nd and 4th Defendants to Court of Appeal. Appeal dismissed. Please refer to the appeal judgment of CACV262/2005