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Civil Action2004

YEUNG GA WAI formerly known as YEUNG PUI WAH v. LAU MING SHUM

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86916-EN-2013-04-30

YEUNG GA WAI formerly known as YEUNG PUI WAH v. LAU MING SHUM

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HCA 798/2004

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 798 OF 2004

____________

BETWEEN

 YEUNG GA WAI
formerly known as YEUNG PUI WAH
Plaintiff
 and 
 LAU MING SHUMDefendant

____________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Seagroatt in Court
Dates of Hearing: 19, 22 - 23 April 2013
Date of Judgment: 30 April 2013

________________

J U D G M E N T

________________

 

1. The plaintiff is a businessman with much experience in some aspects of the financial world. Through a friend of his, Mr Kwong Yick Chor, he was introduced to the defendant, a man with business interests on the Mainland, but also with an interest in a Hong Kong Company called Treasure Spot Limited. Mr Kwong was also a friend of the defendant and it is clear that Mr Kwong, as a mutual friend of the parties, was in fact the person who created a sense of trust by the plaintiff in the defendant.

2. The plaintiff also had an interest in and some limited experience in running gymnasia as a business.  The defendant was intending to establish and gradually did so, a hotel business in Cheung Sha, Hunan province, on the Mainland.  The project was to be managed by Treasure Spot (Chang Sha) Hotel Management Company Limited which, as its name suggests, was linked with the Hong Kong Company bearing the same name.

3. As a result of one or more meetings between the plaintiff Mr Kwong, the defendant and others, the defendant encouraged the plaintiff and Mr Kwong to “invest” and I use that term in its most general sense, in the project.  Initially the defendant was looking to raise 20 million HKD capital for the project, and eventually revised this to 30 million HKD.

4. The plaintiff and Mr Kwong were to provide 2 million HKD initially and then on the revision of the required capital, 3 million HKD, which of course was equivalent to 10 per cent of that capital.  Eventually Mr Kwong repaid 1.2 million HKD to the plaintiff leaving the plaintiff’s interest in the project at 1.8 million HKD.  His principal interest in the project was the gymnasium business.  He had a friend Danny, (Mr Gei Wai Tong), who had some experience of the gymnasium business.

5. The plaintiff’s case is that he expected and was promised shares in the project to reflect his payment.  The Management Company was, in fact, wholly owned by the Hong Kong Company Treasure Spot Limited which is recorded on some Capital Examination Reports as having paid sums of money into the capital account of the Chang Sha Management Company.

6. Although the promise and expectation of a shareholding to reflect the money paid by the plaintiff did not, according to the plaintiff, crystallise until after the first payment, when the defendant sought a further payment because the project was in effect underfunded, his expectation throughout was that a shareholding was promised.  Given the amount of money advanced by the plaintiff, commonsense dictated that there would be or should be some guarantee or recorded account of his “investment”.  Mr Kenneth Chan, for the defendant, had to concede at the outset that there is no record in any books of account, accounts, or any other record, of the sums paid by the plaintiff.  However it is agreed that the cheques provided by the plaintiff were paid into the defendant’s bank account, being made payable to him.  The defendant has not produced any bank record to show how that money, mixed with his own was used. I will deal later with the inevitable inferences to be drawn from this state of affairs, and the findings of fact which consequently have to be made.

7. The return on the investment promised by the defendant in the discussions prior to any payment by the plaintiff, was a share of the profits in proportion to the investment he made i.e. 10%.  The first payment, of 2 million HKD was made on 23 September 2002.  The second, following the defendant’s request for a further payment in the light of the increased budget for the project, of 1 million HKD was made on 13 November 2002.

8. He says he persisted in asking for the certificates when they were not forthcoming, and an attempt appears to have been made by the defendant to “fob him off” with an assurance (it it be such) that he and the defendant were the only two shareholders and that he should have confidence in the defendant.  Thereafter the plaintiff declined to make any further payment and explained that his involvement with the company as Vice‑Chairman was limited to some peripheral matters but he persisted because he wanted to find out more about the financial aspects of the company for his own protection but was thwarted or simply ignored or obstructed when he endeavoured to do so.

9. At some stage the defendant’s cousin (or some such relative) asked him to sign some documents allegedly for the purpose of registering his shareholder status in the project – no doubt in the Management Company. They never materialised.  It is conceded by the defence that there is no document which suggests that the plaintiff became a shareholder.

10. The trading life of the Management Company, and thus the project, was shortlisted.  By April 2003 it had virtually ceased business.  The plaintiff tried to get information on its financial position, and on the assets when they were eventually disposed of.  He failed.  There is a paucity of documentation relating to this collapse and liquidation.  As indicated by the defendant, he was running this business as a sole proprietorship and I am satisfied that the plaintiff’s appointment to the Board – which never seems to have met – was a sop to give the plaintiff the impression that he was directly involved with the running of the Management Company.

11. At some stage he appears to have tried to salvage some aspect of the business by trying to run a gymnasium on some part of the premises.  But he was baulked in this too by proceedings taken against him in China by the Hong Kong Company, which as far as I can ascertain, was also being run by the defendant.

12. The defendant’s case is equally simple though unnecessarily complicated or perhaps confused temporarily by reliance on a large number of irrelevant circumstances and documents.

13. It is that the plaintiff was not promised that he would be a shareholder or would be given a share certificate in respect of the money handed over.  That money, the defendant asserts, was simply a general cash investment in the business – and by that he appears to mean the Management Company – which would entitle him to profits in proportion to the money “invested” but, he would be liable to losses pro rata.  There was some confusion in the defendant’s evidence as to whether that proportion was 10% of the whole investment or 10% of the defendant’s 90% investment in the business.  He tried to create a picture of the plaintiff as Vice-Chairman of the Management Company, helping to run the business on a day-to-day basis and being closely involved in the fundamental decisions.  He prayed in aid a few company records bearing the plaintiff’s name and signature, and some vouchers for expenses of the business which the plaintiff signed as approving them.  The plaintiff explained that, in fact, the payments had already been made and approved by three senior signatories to the vouchers.  His approval he explained was superfluous.

14. According to the defendant, the plaintiff could have had access to the accounts and financial departments, at any time during the existence of the business.  The plaintiff said that he was always prevented from have such access.  Since no accounts or financial reports have been produced, and it is virtually accepted that they do not exist, it is difficult to know how, even if he had been permitted access, he could have learned anything relating to the money advanced by him to the defendant.  That money had gone into the plaintiff’s account and it had not been reflected in any accounting record of the company, or even, in the defendant’s accounts, after it was mixed with his money.  The defendant simply says that the plaintiff’s payments formed part of a fund which was used to run the business and as it collapsed without enough assets to repay even the shareholders’ investment – i.e. those of The Treasure Spot Hong Kong Company, and/or the defendant and a shadowy Mr Ngai – the plaintiff simply lost his money.

15. I found the defendant a most evasive witness, more often than not failing to give an answer to the questions put to him by Mr John Swaine, and sometimes pausing significantly before answering a simple question which required the answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’.  He gave me the clear impression that he was prepared to temper his evidence according to the prevailing wind.  The story he put forward is so contrived as to be lacking in reality.  He ran this business as his own fiefdom.  He had had the money from the plaintiff and simply used it as he thought fit without any regard to the plaintiff’s interest.  He seems to have had no conception of how to treat properly an “investment” of the proportions made by the plaintiff.  His contrived picture of a properly run business with the plaintiff employed at the hub of affairs was a charade. An effort was made to suggest that a bundle of documents – some of which clearly had the official mark of some record office or registry on the Mainland – which had come into the plaintiff’s possession most properly, as I find, from his Mainland lawyers involved on his behalf in the litigation on the Mainland, concerning the tenancy of part of the premises used for the hotel project ‑ indicated that he was heavily involved with the running of the Management Company.  I reject that contention as unreal.

16. It is not necessary for me to identify individually these documents which were adduced in the course of the trial and put to the plaintiff. My earlier comments are composite and comprehensive.

17. In Mr Kenneth Chan’s final submissions which he put forward to seek to change my mind about the firm views I had formed as to the credibility, or lack of it, of the two protagonists, he referred, inter alia to some Capital Examination Reports and Financial Statements, the latter prepare by a Mr Wong Siu Fai.

18. The Capital Examination Reports start on 27 June 2002.  This was well before the plaintiff agreed to advance or in fact advanced any money.  That of 10 October 2002 makes no mention of any payment by the plaintiff, and concerns what appear to be capital payments by The Hong Kong Treasure Spot Limited Company.  The same position applies to the reports of 6 December 2002.  None had any evidential value in relation to the plaintiff’s claim.  They have not been proved as to their source, creation or authenticity but that matters not in the absence of any relevance.

19. The Financial Statements fall into the same category.  They have not been proved by the maker.  They are without relevance to this claim.  They were not prepared until October 2005, 2½ years after the collapse of the hotel project.  They purport to cover the period 10 June 2002 to 30 November 2004.  The plaintiff had commenced proceedings in the early part of 2004.  The purpose of the statements seems to be to demonstrate the total loss over that 2½ year period, breaking it down into the loss of each year or part year of the trading, and finally the net asset value.  Of mere academic interest is the reference to “amount due to a shareholder”.  The shareholder is not identified but is likely to be The Hong Kong Treasure Spot Company.  It is certainly not the plaintiff.  It indicates payments which diminish the debt from 12.386 million RMB to 3.601 million RMB at the end of the period.

20. The only other witness called was Mr Liu Ming Jian who was The General Manager of the hotel project at the relevant time.  He was also a director of the Management Company.  He spoke of the appointment of the plaintiff as Vice-Chairman of the Management Company and produced documents, which the defendant also later relied upon, as examples of the plaintiff’s “hands-on” involvement in the running of the project.  These are as I have found, illusory.

21. He alleged that The Management Company resolutions were made at meetings and that someone circulated minutes.  No minutes ever emerged in the mass of largely, inconsequential documentation.  Oddly enough no meeting took place when it was decided to close the business.  They simply acted upon a directive from Hong Kong.  The concession by Mr Kenneth Chan on behalf of his client is worth recording:

“It is not suggested that he [the Plaintiff] signed all or any accounts, financial reports or statements of financial policy of the Management Company.”

What is most interesting about Mr Liu’s statement however is his bold assertion:

“He [the plaintiff] was also a shareholder.”

As the outset of his evidence, Mr Liu sought to clarify or amend this in some way to “so-called shareholder” or “unofficial shareholder”, explaining that on the Mainland the definition of “shareholder” was somewhat different.  The “official” shareholder was The Hong Kong Treasure Spot Company, and the Management Company was a subsidiary of it.  He was asked by Mr John Swaine why he found it necessary to raise this matter at the start of his evidence.  He was quite unable to give a satisfactory explanation as to why, now some 4 1/3 years after he had made his statement (11 December 2008) he should have this point foremost in his mind.

22. He resisted any suggestion that someone had directed his mind recently to it and had invited him to reconsider or define it.  Despite what he says, the reasonable and logical explanation is that someone had recently re-directed his attention to that assertion because it could be seen as capable of lending support to the plaintiff’s claim.

23. He later went on to explain that he understood that the plaintiff, Mr Kwong Yick Chor, Mr Ngai Shek Kung and the defendant were all “unofficial” i.e. non-registered shareholders.  They had contributed money “so they were bosses – so-called share-holders.”

24. This important evidence finds some parallel in an answer in part of the cross-examination of the defendant by Mr Swaine:

“The intention was to give them [Plaintiff and Mr. Kwong], shares from the interest in my name.”

There was then some convoluted reference to the shares being not in his name [i.e. the Defendant’s] but in the name of T. S. Finance (or T. S. Limited in Hong Kong.)

The evidence went on:

“Q. Your intention was to give shares to Mr. Yeung and Mr. Kwong from the interest that was in your name.

A.   Correct.”

After a reference to the Chang Sha Company being a “sole proprietor company limited”, the defendant’s evidence went on:

“Q. …… your intention was to give the shares to Mr. Yeung and Mr. Kwong from the interest that was in your name? ……

A.  That was the agreement I made with Mr. Yeung and Mr. Kwong at that time.  I agreed that that would be carried out, using the interest in my name.”

Later on came another gleam of light:

“A. Looking back from now …… we should have used our new company instead of an existing company. If we had used a new company, there would be less complication. There would be no trouble if we had used a share holding company instead of a sole proprietorship company.

Q. So in that event, shares would have been issued to all four of you, is that right, if you had established a new company?

A.  Yes, that’s right, when I look back on that, that is using a shareholding company.”

Those exchanges and the evidence of Mr. Liu afford substantial corroboration of the plaintiff’s case.

25. In his closing written submission Mr Chan set out (§71) ‑ “This case turns eventually on the credibility of the respective witnesses”.  He is entirely correct.  He went on to say ((§72):

“‑ on a balance of possibility. D’s case is far more credible than that of plaintiff who fails to explain why he would had entered into the investment under such peculiar terms and manner.”

On that I part company with Mr. Chan.  I find the plaintiff entirely credible and the defendant, for the most part, just not credible save where he confirms expressly or by implication in his evidence that the plaintiff was to have shares to represent his investment.

26. I am satisfied that he was promised shares by the defendant and that the defendant failed to honour this promise.  If matters not whether there were obstacles to the defendant in fact securing shares for the plaintiff.  He at no time suggests that he informed the plaintiff that he could not arrange the shareholding for which he had been paid.  The plaintiff made persistent oral requests and he was ignored.  The fact that he did not put such requests into writing is immaterial.  There was a total failure of consideration and the money went into the defendant’s bank account, and from there we know not where it went, despite what the defendant says.  Even if there had been no specific request until after the first payment, I am satisfied that the second payment was made on the strength of the defendant’s promise, and related to the full amount paid.  Furthermore the plaintiff declined to make any further payment when informed that the project was still underfunded.  He had still not received a share certificate to reflect his financial payments to date.  It was suggested though not with real force, that because Mr. Kwong had not pursued the same course as the plaintiff that should be seen as some evidence against the plaintiff’s case.  That is not logical.  The Defendant breached the agreement.

27. Of some significance is the defendant’s reaction to the plaintiff’s solicitors’ letter of the 14 January 2004.  That letter may not have been as precise as the punctilious  lawyer would have liked but it was clear enough:

“We act for Mr. Yeung Piu Wah who advanced the sum of HK3 m to you by way of two payments [identified by amounts and date]. Our client has requested return of the monies advanced to you but you have delayed or refused to return them.”

The defendant’s solicitors’ reply of 15 January said:

“We are instructed to deny all of your clients’ allegations mentioned in the said letter.”

That was an unequivocal denial of the receipt of any money as identified.  Those are other points upon which the plaintiff relies emerging from pleadings and statements of evidence.  It is not necessary to rehearse these in this judgment.

28. Mr Swaine has put the plaintiff’s claim on a number of additional legal bases.  I will deal with them.

29. The defendant received the sums of money from the plaintiff, as agent with the express purpose and intent of securing shares for him.  He failed to do so. He is therefore liable to account for the money and return it.

30. In receiving that money for the agreed purpose and paying it into his own bank account he was a trustee of those monies.  He failed to honour the promise he made and the agreement reached.  He is in breach of the trust.  He is therefore liable to account for, and repay the money entrusted to him for the failed purpose.

31. There will therefore be judgment for the plaintiff for the sum of $1.8 million HKD, with costs to be taxed if not agreed.  Mr Kenneth Chan has argued that by reason of the protracted proceedings – commenced in 2004, tried in 2013 – there should be some sanction in relation to the plaintiff’s costs.  In my view the plaintiff would have had a strong argument for indemnity costs but Mr Swaine wisely did not put that forward being conscious no doubt that there had been delay in proceeding with this action.

32. Having considered the file and the history of this litigation, it is clear that it was not progressed expeditiously.  There were significant periods of delay.  It has taken 9 years to come to trial.  That cannot be justified.  In my view this should properly be marked not by a penalty in relation to costs but a reduction in the amount of interest recoverable before judgment.  In normal circumstances the rate would be prime rate plus 1 per cent.  That  much  is  agreed.  However  I  consider  that, for  the reasons set out above, the plaintiff should have interest up to the date of the judgment at only half the rate otherwise regarded by the parties as, in normal circumstances, appropriate.

 (Conrad Seagroatt)
 Deputy High Court Judge

Mr John J. E. Swaine, instructed by Leung, Tam & Wong, for the plaintiff

Mr Kenneth C. L. Chan & Mr Roland Lau, instructed by Kenneth Woo & Co, for the defendant

Please refer to CACV106/2013 for the relevant appeal(s) to the Court of Appeal.

83005-EN-2012-08-08

YEUNG GA WAI formerly known as YEUNG PUI WAH v. LAU MING SHUM

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HCA 798/2004

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 798 OF 2004

________________________

BETWEEN

YEUNG GA WAI
formerly known as YEUNG PUI WAH
Plaintiff
and
LAU MING SHUMDefendant

Before : Mr Registrar K.W. Lung in Chambers

Date of Paper Disposal : 7 August 2012

Date of Handing Down Reasons for Decision : 8 August 2012

________________________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION ON COSTS

________________________________________

 

1.  By my Decision handed down on 19 July 2012, I dismissed the defendant’s application for adducing expert evidence at trial with costs to the plaintiff to be assessed summarily by way of a schedule of costs and the list of objections to be filed and served by the parties.

2.  The parties have filed the schedule of costs and the list of objections respectively.

3.  The plaintiff’s costs, as according to the schedule, amount to $82,500.00.

4.  The defendant opposes this amount on the ground that some of the items in the schedule are unreasonable and excessive, bearing in mind that the hearing was set down for 2 hours only.

5.  I agree with the defendant’s objections in respect of the following items, namely, B1: communication including conferences with client and counsel, which should be cut down to 2 hours only; C1: the time for perusal of documents, which should be cut down to 3.5 hours only; E: counsel’s fee, to be disallowed as counsel was not instructed for the hearing.

6.  It is trite that the Court should adopt a broad-brush approach for summary assessment of the costs.

7.  Applying the broad-brush approach, I assess the costs to be $50,000.00, which I order the defendant to pay to the plaintiff within 14 days from 22 August 2012.

8.  This order nisi is made under Order 42 rule 5B(6), which shall become absolute unless an application is made to vary this order by 22 August 2012.

(K.W. Lung)
Registrar, High Court

Messrs Leung, Tam & Wong for the Plaintiff

Messrs Kenneth Woo & Co. for the Defendant

82735-EN-2012-07-19

YEUNG GA WAI v. LAU MING SHUM

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HCA 798/2004

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 798 OF 2004

________________________

BETWEEN

YEUNG GA WAI
formerly known as YEUNG PUI WAH
Plaintiff
and
LAU MING SHUMDefendant

________________________

Before : Mr Registrar K.W. Lung in Chambers (Open to public)

Date of Hearing : 19 July 2012

Date of Handing Down Reasons for Decision : 19 July 2012

________________________

REASONS FOR DECISION

________________________

  

The Application

1.  The defendant has taken out a summons for leave to adduce expert evidence of Professor Zhang Xianchu as an expert at trial pursuant to Order 38 rule 36 of the Rules of High Court.  The plaintiff opposes this application.

2.  This summons was mentioned at the Case Management Conference on 4 July 2012, about two weeks ago.  Since this is the only outstanding interlocutory application before trial, I ordered it to be heard before me today.  I had also given leave to the plaintiff to set down the matter for trial at the last Case Management Conference.

Practice Direction 5.2, paragraph 20

3.  To start with this application, it is clear that the application has not complied with paragraph 20 (1) of Practice Direction 5.2:

“20. Regarding expert evidence:

(1) the Court will not give permission for a party to adduce expert

evidence unless that party has:

(a) identified the expert by name and field;

(b) identified the issue to which the expert evidence will relate

(a mere reference to adducing expert evidence "limited to the issue of liability" or "limited to the issue of quantum" is not sufficient); and

(c) considered the appropriateness of appointing a single joint

expert in the case.”

4.  The summons has not set out the field on which expert evidence is required, the issue to which the expert evidence will relate or whether a single joint expert is appropriate.  Mr. Yim, Counsel for the defendant explains that although these were not stated in the summons, they were stated in the affirmation in support of this application.  In my view, those conditions should be clearly stated in the summons, or even in the parties’ correspondence before the application so as to save argument or misunderstanding.

5.  This application can be dealt with summarily under paragraph 20 of Practice Direction 5.2.  However, this technical disposal will undoubtedly lead to another similar application had I not dealt with it on the merits of the application, which I venture to do now.

6.  The Court calls for cooperation of the profession that they should observe the Practice Directions when they make applications thereunder.  Even if I granted the application, I would take this into consideration when I come to the question of costs.

The legal principles

7.  The relevant legal principles for admissibility of expert evidence can be seen from the judgment of the Hon. Madam Justice Chu in Wong Hoi Fung v American International Assurance Company (Bermuda) Limited & Shrila Chan HCA 4576/2001 at:

“The relevant principles

11. Modern judicial authorities recognize that the court has inherent power to rule on the admissibility of expert evidence at a pre­‑trial stage : Woodford and Ackroyd v. Burgess [2000] CP report 79, Ko Chi Keung v. Lee Ping Yan Andrew [2001] 2 HKC 63 and Annabell Kin Yee Lee & Others v. Lee Wing Kim (May Lee) & Anor (unreported), HCA9522/1997. Where the proposed expert evidence is plainly inadmissible or irrelevant, the court ought to exercise its discretion to refuse the admission of such evidence. But where the court cannot form a clear view on the relevance of the proposed expert evidence or where it considers that the proposed evidence is clearly relevant, then it should grant leave for the evidence to be adduced at the trial : Ko Chi Keung v. Lee Ping Yan Andrew (supra), at p.67 and Annabell Kin Yee Lee & Others v. Lee Wing Kim (May Lee) & Anor (supra), at p.15.

12. In deciding whether certain proposed expert evidence should be received, the relevant test has been stated to be a two‑stage one. Firstly, the evidence has to be admissible as “expert evidence” for the purpose of section 58 of the Evidence Ordinance, Cap.8. Secondly, the evidence must be relevant, in the sense that it is helpful to the court in arriving at its decision on one or more of the issues to be resolved : Barings plc (in Liquidation) & Anor v. Coopers and Lybrand & Ors, Lexis Transcript, 9 February 2001, Evans‑Lombe J at paras.44‑45.”

8.  Section 58 of the Evidence Ordinance provides:

(1) Subject to any rules, where a person is called as a witness in any civil proceedings, his opinion on any relevant matter on which he is qualified to give expert evidence shall be admissible in evidence. (Amended 65 of 1980 s. 6)

(2) Where a person is called as a witness in any civil proceedings a statement of opinion by him on any relevant matter on which he is not qualified to give expert evidence, if made as a way of conveying relevant facts personally perceived by him, is admissible as evidence of what he perceived.

(3) In this section, "relevant matter" (有關聯的事宜) includes an issue in the proceedings in question.

9.  Therefore it can be seen that the expert is only entitled to give his opinion on any relevant matter.  He is not entitled to give evidence on the fact of the matter.

10.  Whether the expert evidence as proposed is relevant to the issue in the proceedings in question determines this application.

The facts

11.  Relevant to this application, the facts of the matter are that the plaintiff claims against the defendant for return of his money for the sum of HK$1.8 million, which he had paid to the defendant for the purchase of 10% of the shareholding of a hotel operation in the Mainland pursuant to an oral agreement between him and the defendant.  The plaintiff said that the defendant was in breach of the oral agreement and he had not applied the money for the acquisition of the shareholding of the hotel operation and he did not have the shareholding of the hotel operation.  See paragraph 9 of the Re-Amended Statement of claim.

12.  The defendant admitted having received HK$1.8 million from the plaintiff, but the money was for the investment in the hotel operation.  See paragraph 7 of the Re-Re-Amended Defence and Counterclaim.  The defendant denied breach of the agreement and said that the plaintiff was not entitled to have the money to be returned to him.  See paragraphs 10A(a)(1) and (2) and paragraph 12 of the Re-Re-Amended Defence and Counterclaim.

13.  The defendant further said that the hotel operation was at a loss and had ceased business and had been sold for RMB9.6 million.  The shareholder’s fund was depleted and the proceeds of the disposal of assets were, according to the mainland’s insolvency law and practice, first used to retire the current liabilities and then shareholders or shareholders’ loan. See paragraphs 14A and 14B of the Re-Re-amended Defence and Counterclaim.

Discussion

14.  Mr. Yim, in his written submission, submits that the need for expert evidence arises from paragraph 14B of the Re-Re-Amended Defence and Counterclaim, which said that the proceeds of the disposal of the hotel operation were, according to the mainland’s insolvency law and practice, first used to retire the current liabilities and then shareholders or shareholders’ loans.  The defendant in his affirmation in support of this application said that the expert evidence was required to prove that the money received should be regarded as shareholders’ loan under the relevant PRC law and if it can be so regarded, to show the order of priority for distribution of the Company’s assets upon their eventual disposal.

15.  Mr. Yim submits that these two issues are not issues of fact, but issues of PRC law.

16.  He has called in aid of four cases:

a.  HKSAR v Tam Hung, CACV127/2010, 27 July 2011;

b.  HKSAR v Tam Hung FAMC 43/2011, 1 June 2012;

c.  Lammas Global Corp. v Barclays Bank & others  HCA2411/2009, 13 April 2011;

d.  Shenzhen Development Bank Co. Ltd v New Century International (Holdings) Ltd., HCA2976/2001, 31 July 2002

The first and second on the list dealt with the same issue of the necessity of expert evidence on legality of gambling in Myanmar in order to prove the guilt of the defendant in a criminal case.  This case has its special features in itself. It is a criminal case where the prosecution bears the burden to prove the criminal elements in an offence beyond reasonable doubt in order to establish the defendant’s guilt.  PW2 in that case had given evidence on gambling.  But his evidence was not satisfactory to the Court. The gambling activities were open to the public and the operators had to pay tax for the operation in Myanmar.  This is prima facie doubtful for an illegal activity.  The Court, under those circumstances, must be assisted by an expert on the law of Myanmar on gambling.  The facts of this matter are different.  Mr. Yim relies upon the third case on the proposition that if there is a difference between the parties on the foreign law, the court must resolve the difference if it can.  See para.16.  There is no dispute on this general proposition, which must be right.  However, the dispute between the parties is not on the foreign law, but the purpose on which the payment was made by the plaintiff. This case does not assist Mr. Yim’s argument.  The 4th case illustrates that the court can rely upon expert evidence to consider judgments of the Mainland Court and the proper approach for so doing.  See paragraphs 25 & 26.  But it is not necessary to refer to any judgment of the Mainland Court for this matter.  I find that this case does not assist me for this application.

17.  Here, the parties dispute over the way the money was given to the defendant. The plaintiff alleged that it was given to the defendant for acquisition of the 10% shareholding of the hotel operation. But the defendant had, without consent of the plaintiff, converted the money for his own use and in fact, he did not have the shareholding of the hotel operation.  The defendant said that the money was given to him for the investment in the hotel operation as if it were a joint venture between the plaintiff and the other shareholders.  This is very much a matter of fact to be found by the court after hearing the evidence of the witnesses.  The evidence will probably shed light under what circumstances, in particular, on what terms or understanding was the money paid by the plaintiff to the defendant.  The expert simply has no part to play in the factual issues.

18.  This morning, this court has been assisted by Mr. Yim in relation to the corporate structure of the hotel business, which was a subsidiary of the management company (The Treasure Spot (Changsha) Hotel Management Company Limited).  Mr. Yim submits that the hotel operation was part of the business of the management company.  He submits that it is the defendant’s case that the money was invested in the hotel operation, not in the shareholding of the management company.  This will beg the question why it is necessary for the court to consider the law on liquidation since the plaintiff is claiming against the defendant, whom he relied upon to invest in the shareholding of the hotel operation. The priority of distribution of the assets of the management company, which the defendant says has been in liquidation though this fact has not been clearly pleaded in the pleadings, is only available to the management company, not to the defendant.

19.  The defence of the order of priority of distribution of the company’s asset upon liquidation is only available to the liquidator, who is in charge of liquidation of the company.  The defendant is not a liquidator of the hotel operation or the management company even if it were in liquidation.  As such, the issue of priority of distribution of the asset of a liquidated company in the mainland is not relevant for the trial.

Conclusion

20.  For those reasons above, I consider that the expert evidence as proposed by the defendant is not relevant for the issues for the trial.  This application has failed to pass the test in Wong Hoi Fung’s case and is dismissed.

21.  The costs for this application, including all costs reserved, be to the plaintiff, to be summarily assessed by way a schedule of costs to be filed and served within 3 days from the date hereof and the defendant be at liberty to oppose by way of a list of objections within 7 days thereafter.  The summary assessment shall be either on paper or to be heard on a date to be notified by this court and the time estimate is 30 minutes.

Order

22.  I shall now make an order in terms of the following:

a. The defendant’s summons be dismissed;

b. The costs of this application and costs reserved be assessed as per paragraph 21.

(K.W. Lung)
Registrar, High Court

 

Ms. Y. M. Cheng of Messrs Leung, Tam & Wong, for the Plaintiff

Mr V. Yim,  instructed by Messrs Kenneth Woo & Co,  for the Defendant