李森華 訴 譚氏裝飾工程有限公司

HCLA118/2004

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

民事司法管轄權

高院勞資審裁處上訴2004 年第118 號

(原本案件編號：勞資審裁處申索2004年第4557號)

---------------------------

申索人/上訴人	李森華
	對
被告人/答辯人	譚氏裝飾工程有限公司

---------------------------

 

主審法官：高等法院原訟法庭法官任懿君

聆訊日期：2005年6月22日

判案書日期：2005年6月30日

 

判案書

 

1. 申索人以被告人為其僱主而向其追討下列各項，即：

(i)	代通知金；及
(ii)	長期服務金或遣散費(遣散費是作爲交替項目)。

申索人不服審裁官梁榮宗駁回其申索，現提出上訴。

2. 雙方對審裁官的裁斷並無爭議的部份如下:

(i)	申索人是一名木工，自1995 年8 月1 日起為被告人工作。
(ii)	2004 年4 月13 日晚上或2004 年4 月14 日淩晨，完成申索人於太子大廈奧利華(音譯 Oliver’s)超級市場的工作後，被告人Oliver’s的董事譚錦榮先生告訴申索人暫時沒有工作，並著他往其他地方找工作。翌日，即2004 年4 月14 日下午，申索人前往譚先生的辦公室領取薪金支票時，譚先生重申他較早時對申索人說的話。結果，自2004 年4 月14 日起，被告人便沒有工作給申索人做。
(iii)	1995 年8 月1 日至2004 年4 月13 日，申索人的服務年資為8 年零 8 個月。申索人的記錄顯示，除了2003 年10 月外 ，他從1998 年4 月至2004 年4 月幾乎沒有間斷地工作 。
(iv)	申索人日薪800 元，其中770 元是工會建議的工資額，30 元為車馬費。事實上，申索人是管工，每月可獲2000 元管理費。他亦持有譚先生的辦公室和工場的鑰匙。他有權僱用「相熟」的工人為被告人的工程施工，而被告人會直接向工人發薪。至於其他工人，申索人僱用他們前會諮詢譚先生。
(v)	原審審裁官純粹基於上述事實裁定申索人只是一名工人，沒有商業風險。他實際上是根據譚先生的指示和工程的要求來施工的。每月2000 元的管理費是作爲工程監督的紀錄，而這點可支持他是僱員這個結論。
(vi)	因此，原審審裁官裁定申索人是被告人的僱員。

3. 再者，原審審裁官基於當時的一些文件，裁定申索人在所有關鍵時刻是被告人的僱員。這些文件包括 ：申索人由1995 年8 月1 日至1999 年3 月31 的報稅表、被告人所披露的由1998 年7 月2 日至1998 年7 月17 日的薪金記錄、2000 年12 月份、2001 年1 月份、2 月份和3 月份的糧單、及由2000 年12 月1 日至2001 年3 月14 日的強制性公積金供款紀錄。

4. 基於上述理由，原審審裁官裁定：

「純粹看這些事實，李先生很明顯只是一名工人，沒有商業風險。他實際上是根據譚先生的指示和工程的要求來施工的。本席不認爲譚先生所提出的每月2000 元的管理費在這爭論點上有甚麽重要之處。這筆費用是給予工程監督的酬勞，可支持申索人是僱員這個結論。作出是承建商還是僱員的測試後，本席毫無疑問認為李先生是僱員。」

5. 可是，原審審裁官駁回申索人的申索。他在判案書的末尾說：

「可是，雙方均同意一點事實，而李先生傳召的證人亦支持這點事實：譚先生沒有責任為李先生提供工作，而李先生亦沒有責任為譚先生工作。李先生可推卻工作，前往替付較高薪金者工作。因此，2003 年10 月時，李先生前往協助朋友，只為譚先生工作兩天。據譚先生說，他不會問李先生缺勤的事。本席裁定，這點事實與李先生各項申索的基礎，即雙方曾訂立任何僱傭合約並不脗合。在這情況下，李先生的申索必定不能成立。」

上訴針對的法律論點

6. 代表申索人的吳港發大律師陳詞說，原審審裁官在相互責任是僱傭合約不可或缺的要素這前提下駁回申索人的各項申索，這項裁定在法律上是錯誤的，因為考慮相互責任這個問題前，有一點很重要，那便是要弄清以下兩項在散工這種情況下可能出現的問題：

(i)	每次個別僱用是否已在雙方間產生僱傭合約；及
(ii)	一般僱用是否構成一個影響他們整體關係的持續重要安排，而這個僱用本身又是否屬於僱傭合約。

7. 後者性質的合約經常稱爲「總體」或「總括」合約。可是，只有問題 (ii)才必定涉及相互責任，問題 (i)則不一定涉及。吳大律師援引下列的案例，即Wong Man Kwan & Others v. Chun Shing Holdings Ltd [2003] 3 HKLRD 403 及 Poon Siu Kuen & Others v. Pine Corporation Ltd，HCLA71/2001。

8. 當時身為高等法院暫委法官林文瀚在Wong Man Kwan一案中說(第 408 頁)：

「因此，在每次個別僱用中(即工人事實上有工作)，即使沒有總體合約，在法律上仍有可能存在僱傭合約。……」

9. 在本案中，原審審裁官裁斷的事實是在每次個別僱用中(即申索人事實上有工作時)已存在僱傭合約。因此，本席接納吳大律師的陳詞，由於每次個別僱用中並非必定涉及相互責任，原審審裁官的裁斷，即每次個別僱用和總體合約都必定涉及相互責任，在法律上是錯誤的。

10. 據此，申索人就原審審裁官駁回其申索而提出的上訴得直，因而可獲以下所申索的金額，即根據第 31V(1) 條的長期服務金如下：

每天800 元x每月18 天x滿8 年年資=115,200 元。

11. 關於長期服務金，還有兩點被告人顯然是沒有異議的。首先，申索人於2003 年10 月缺勤沒有對連續性造成間斷。原審審裁官的裁斷明顯是那個月的缺勤是雙方的安排。根據香港法例第 57 章《僱傭條例》附表 1，連續性不會因雙方根據該條例第 3(1)(b) 段所作出的安排而間斷。

12. 第二，譚氏裝飾工程公司的業務曾易手被告人。原審審裁官亦裁定，雖然業務易手，但僱傭合約仍然有效。他並認爲根據《僱傭條例》第 31J 條，申索人的受僱日期應始於1995 年8 月1 日。

13. 至於代通知金的申索，代表申索人的吳大律師公正地要求本庭考慮上述Wong Man Kwan一案的判決。林文瀚暫委法官在該案的判案書第 17 段中說：

「	至於代通知金，申索人的理據是遭被告人解僱。若僱主只是沒有再僱用該名工人，而總體合約又不存在的話，解僱這個概念很難應用於散工身上。鄧寧大法官(Lord Denning MR)在Wiltshire County Council v. National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education [1980] ICR 455中說：
	『	…… 若根據一份合約，某人須要做某項任務或進行某一種行動，該項任務或行動完畢時，合約因為已履行而得以解除……「解僱」並不存在。一份為某目的而立的合約，若因為已履行而得以解除，便不構成解僱。』
	Ackner LJ的判案書亦有如此見解，見Brown v. Knowsley Borough Council [1986] IRLR 102；Chan Lok Mei v. Sze Chi Sing (unrep., MECA No. 9 of 1995)，1996 年1 月22 日。與遣散費有關的解僱與固定時期合約的情況不同，見第31D(1)(b) 條例。」

結論

14. 基於上述理由，上訴人只有就長期服務金的申索被駁回而提出的上訴獲判得直。本席裁定，被告人須向申索人支付 115,200 元及訴訟費。若雙方未能就訴訟費金額達成協議，則交由法庭評定。申索人本身的訴訟費須根據《法律援助規例》評定。

 

 

( 任懿君 ) 高等法院原訟法庭法官

 

原告人/上訴人：由杜林律師事務所轉聘吳港發大律師代表。

被告人/答辯人：沒有律師代表，親自出庭。

 

HCLA118/2004

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

LABOUR TRIBUNAL APPEAL NO.118 OF 2004

(ON APPEAL FROM LBTC 4557 OF 2004)

--------------------------

BETWEEN

	LEE SUM WAH	Claimant/
		Appellant
	and
	TAM’S DECORATION CO. LTD	Defendant/
		Respondent

--------------------------

Before : Hon Yam J in Court

Date of Hearing : 22 June 2005

Date of Judgment : 30 June 2005

------------------------

J U D G M E N T

------------------------

1.  This is an appeal by the claimant against the dismissal of his claims by the Presiding Officer Winston Leung, Esq.  The claimant’s claims against the defendant as his employer for the following items, namely :

(a)	wages in lieu of notice; and
(b)	long service payment or alternatively severance pay.

2. The findings of the Presiding Officer, which are not disputed by both parties, are as follows :

(i)	The claimant is a carpenter and he commenced working for the defendant from 1 August 1995.
(ii)	On the night of 13 April 2004 or in the morning of 14 April 2004, after finishing the claimant’s work at Oliver’s Supermarket in Prince’s Building, Mr Tam Kam Wing, director of the defendant, told the claimant that there would not be work for the time being and he should go elsewhere to look for a job.  When the claimant went to Mr Tam’s office the next day to get his pay cheque in the afternoon of 14 April 2004, Mr Tam repeated what he said earlier to the claimant.  Consequently, there was no work for the claimant to do since 14 April 2004.
(iii)	Between 1 August 1995 and 13 April 2004, the length of service was over eight years and eight months.  From the claimant’s records, the claimant worked almost without break from April 1998 to April 2004 except October 2003.
(iv)	The claimant was on daily wages of $800, being $770 recommended by the trade union and $30 for travelling expenses.  The claimant was in fact a supervisor and was entitled to a supervision fee of $2,000 per month.  The claimant also held the keys to Mr Tam’s office and to the workshop.  He had the right to engage the “usual workers” to work on a project for the defendant and the defendant will pay the workers directly.  For other workers, the claimant would have to consult Mr Tam before engaging them.
(v)	The Presiding Officer found on the aforesaid facts alone that the claimant was only a worker who had no commercial risk.  The claimant in effect worked under the instruction of Mr Tam and according to the requirement of the projects.  The supervision fee of $2,000 per month meant to be a record for the project leader and this would support the conclusion of an employment.
(vi)	The Presiding Officer thus found that the claimant was an employee of the defendant.

3. Further, from the contemporaneous documents, the Presiding Officer found that the claimant was at all material times an employee of the defendant.  These documents would include the tax returns of the claimant from 1 August 1995 to 31 March 1999, the salaries records disclosed by the defendant for 2 July 1998 to 17 July 1998, the salary receipts disclosed by the defendant for December 2000, January, February and March 2001, and MPF contribution records disclosed by the defendant for the period of 1 December 2000 to 14 March 2001. 

4. The Presiding Officer, for the aforesaid reasons, found that :

“

On these facts alone, it is clear that Mr. Lee was only a worker who had no commercial risk.  He in effect worked under the instructions of Mr. Tam and according to the requirements of the projects.  I do not find the supervision fee of $2,000 per month significant, as suggested by Mr. Tam, on this issue.  This fee is meant to be a reward for the project leader which could support the conclusion of an employment.  Going through the tests for contractor or employment, I have no doubt that Mr. Lee was an employee.”

5. However, the Presiding Officer dismissed the claimant’s claims and said at the end of the judgment that :

“

However both parties agree on the fact, and this fact is supported by witnesses called by Mr. Lee.  There is no obligation for Mr. Tam to provide Mr. Lee with work and Mr. Lee has no obligation to work for Mr. Tam.  Mr. Lee could decline the work and went to work for other who paid higher price.  Therefore in October 2003, Mr. Lee went to help his friend and only worked 2 days for Mr. Tam.  According to Mr. Tam, no question would be asked about his absence.  I find this fact is inconsistent with the parties having entered into any contract of employment which is the foundation of Mr. Lee’s claims and on this basis Mr. Lee’s claims must fail.”

Point of law on appeal

6. Mr Lawrence Ng, counsel for the claimant, submitted that the Presiding Officer’s dismissal of the claimant’s claims is premised on mutuality of obligation as an essential ingredient of a contract of employment.  This finding is wrong as a matter of law because before one considers the question of mutuality of obligation, it is important to distinguish two issues which might arise in the context of causal workers as follows :

(a)	whether or not each individual engagement has given rise to a contract of employment between the parties; and
(b)	whether or not the general engagement constituted a continuing overriding arrangement governing the whole of their relationship and itself amounted to a contract of employment.

7. A contract of the latter nature is frequently referred to as a “global” or “umbrella” contract.  However, mutuality of obligation is only essential to issue (b) but not issue (a).  Mr Ng relied on the following cases, namely : Wong Man Kwan & Others v. Chun Shing Holdings Ltd [2003] 3 HKLRD 403 and Poon Siu Kuen & Others v. Pine Corporation Ltd, HCLA71/2001.

8. Deputy High Court Judge Lam (as he then was) said in Wong Man Kwan at p.408 :

“	It is, therefore, legally possible that during each individual engagement (viz when the worker was actually working) there was a contract of employment even in the absence of a global contract. …”

9. In this case it is a finding of fact by the Presiding Officer that during each individual engagement (viz. when the claimant was actually working) there was a contract of employment.  Thus I accept Mr Ng’s submission that as mutuality of obligation is not essential to each individual engagement, the Presiding Officer’s finding that mutuality of obligation is essential to both individual engagement and global contract is wrong as a matter of law.

10. Accordingly the claimant’s appeal against the Presiding Officer’s dismissal of his claim is allowed.  The claimant is therefore entitled to the following sum as claimed, namely :

long service payment pursuant to section 31V(1) as follows :

$800 per day x 18 days per month x 8 full years of service

= $115,200.00

11. In respect of the claim for long service payment, there are two further points which apparently were not disputed by the defendant.  In the first place there was no breakage on continuity because of the claimant’s absence from work in October 2003.  It was apparently the finding of the Presiding Officer that there was a mutual agreement as to this absence of work during that month.  Pursuant to the First Schedule of the Employment Ordinance, Cap.57, the continuity would not be broken because of the mutual arrangement between the two parties pursuant to paragraph 3(1)(b).

12. Secondly, there was a change of ownership of the business from Tam’s Decoration Company to the defendant.  The Presiding Officer also found that the contract of employment was kept alive despite change of ownership of the business and he considered that the commencement date of the claimant’s employment should be 1 August 1995 pursuant to section 31J of the Employment Ordinance.

13. In respect of the claim for payment in lieu of notice, Mr Ng for the claimant had fairly drawn the attention of this court to the decision of the aforesaid case of Wong Man Kwan in which Deputy Judge Lam said at paragraph 17 :

“	As regards the claim for wages in lieu of notice, the case of the claimants is based on dismissal by the defendant, a concept difficult to apply to a causal worker without any global contract if the employer simply did not re-engage the worker.  Lord Denning MR said in Wiltshire County Council v National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education [1980] ICR 455 :
		… if there is a contract by which a man is to do a particular task or to carry out a particular purpose, then when that task or purpose comes to an end the contract is discharged by performance … There is no ‘dismissal’.  A contract for a particular purpose, which is discharged by performance and does not amount to a dismissal.
	To the same effect is the judgment of Ackner LJ.  See also Brown v Knowsley Borough Council [1986] IRLR 102; Chan Lok Mei v Sze Chi Sing (unrep., MECA No 9 of 1995), 22 January 1996.  Dismissal in the context of severance payment is different in respect of fixed term contract, see s.31D(1)(b).”

Conclusion

14. By reason of the aforesaid matters, only the claimant’s appeal against the dismissal of his claim for long service payment is allowed, and judgment is entered for the claimant against the defendant for the sum of $115,200, with costs to the claimant, to be taxed if not agreed.  The claimant’s own costs shall be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations.

	(D. Yam)
	Judge of the Court of First Instance
	High Court

Mr Lawrence Ng, instructed by Messrs To, Lam & Co., for the Plaintiff/Appellant

Defendant/Respondent in person