HK CourtDB
HomeDirectoryMCP
Hong Kong CourtDB
Back to directory
Magistracy Appeal2004

HKSAR v. BUTT AZIZ AKBAR

Related cases with same parties

  • CAAR11/1997HKSAR v. YIP CHI TUNG
  • CAAR1/1998HKSAR v. LING VERONICA
  • CAAR12/1996HKSAR v. WONG KWONG YICK
  • CAAR6/1998HKSAR v. LAU SHIU KONG AND ANOTHER
  • CAAR6/2012HKSAR v. LEUNG KWOK CHI
  • CAAR9/2001HKSAR v. WONG TO LEUNG
  • CACC100/1997HKSAR v. YU HON CHUN
  • CACC100/1999HKSAR v. LAM CHI KIN
  • CACC100/2000HKSAR v. SHING KUEN KIN
  • CACC100/2001HKSAR v. OU YANG MING CHYUAN
  • CACC100/2002HKSAR v. CHAN LAI SING AND ANOTHER
  • CACC100/2003HKSAR v. CHENG CHONG SHING
  • CACC100/2022HKSAR v. LIMBU PRASHANT
  • CACC101/1997HKSAR v. YIU KENNETH LIK KIN
  • CACC101/2001HKSAR v. LEUNG KWAI PING
  • CACC101/2021HKSAR v. WONG CHI FUNG AND ANOTHER
  • CACC10/1997HKSAR v. MAN KAM SHING
  • CACC10/1998HKSAR v. CHAN CHUN TAK
  • CACC10/2001HKSAR v. TAM KWAI KEUNG AND ANOTHER
  • CACC10/2002HKSAR v. WONG WAN SHAN

Files (2)

45373-EN-2005-06-03

HKSAR v. BUTT AZIZ AKBAR

HTML content

HCMA 1017/2004

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO. 1017 OF 2004

(ON APPEAL FROM NKS 3483/2004)

____________

  IN THE MATTER of an application for Leave to appeal pursuant to section 32 of the Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap.484

and

IN THE MATTER of the decision of the Court of First Instance in the Magistracy Appeal dated 13.4.2005

_____________

BETWEEN

HKSARRespondent
and
BUTT AZIZ AKBARAppellant

____________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Barnes in Court

Date of Hearing: 3.6.2005

Date of Judgment: 3.6.2005

Date of Handing down Reasons of Judgment: 6.6.2005

 

_______________

J U D G M E N T

_______________

 

Background

1. The Appellant applies, pursuant to section 32 of the Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap. 484, for a certificate that a point of law of great and general importance is involved in a decision of mine, to enable him to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal. I refused his application after hearing submissions. I gave a brief oral judgment at the time and I now give the fuller reasons in writing.

The relevant section

2. Section 32 of Cap. 484 provides:

“(1)No appeal shall be admitted unless leave to appeal has been granted by the Court.
   
 (2)Leave to appeal shall not be granted unless it is certified by the Court of Appeal or the Court of First Instance, as the case may be, that a point of law of great and general importance is involved in thedecision or it is shown that substantial and grave injustice has been done.
   
 (3)Where the Court of Appeal or the Court of First Instance declines to certify as mentioned in subsection (2), the Court may so certify and grant leave to appeal.
   
 (4)………………”          (emphasis applied)

Appellant’s submission

3. The Appellant, after referring to my earlier decision in refusing to treat his Notice of Abandonment of Appeal as a nullity and to reinstate the appeal, submitted that he signed the Notice of Abandonment under ‘special circumstances’ so he should be granted leave to appeal against both my decision and the conviction by the learned magistrate.

Respondent’s submission

4. Ms. Polly Wan, Senior Government Counsel in response referred to the decision HKSAR v Lai Siu Cheung  [2004] 3 HKLRD 1 (an authority I referred to in my earlier decision) and cited another passage therein (at page 12G of the judgment):

“The rational for the distinction between, on the one hand, mistakes or erroneous advice as to the nature and effect of the notice of abandonment and, on the other, the prospect of success, as a ground suggesting that the abandonment is a nullity, is succinctly explained in R v Bridge [1998] 104 A Crim LR 322, at pp.329-330:

The rationale for a mistake as to the prospects of success on appeal (irrespective of the cause of the mistake) not giving rise to a null notice of abandonment is that a notice of abandonment signed or served for that reason remains the true act of the applicant. Wrong advice of this kind does not result in a decision that is not properly informed for the purposes of the nullity test.”

5. Ms. Wan submitted that even with the ‘special circumstances’ alleged by the Appellant, the Appellant was under no misconception concerning the effect and/or consequences of abandoning the appeal. The Appellant failed in the nullity test and the court had no inherent jurisdiction to permit the appeal to be re-opened. Ms. Wan submitted that no point of law of great and general importance was involved in the decision.

Judgment

6. Having considered the submissions I am not convinced that a point of law of great and general importance is involved in the decision and I therefore refused the Appellant’s application. The Appellant is advised he can apply directly to the Court of Final Appeal for leave to appeal.

(Judianna Barnes)
Deputy High Court Judge

Ms. Polly WAN, Senior Government Counsel of the Department of Justice for the Respondent

Appellant in person

44985-EN-2005-04-13

HKSAR v. BUTT AZIZ AKBAR

HTML content

HCMA 1017/2004

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO. 1017 OF 2004

(ON APPEAL FROM NKS 3483/2004)

____________

BETWEEN

HKSARRespondent
and
BUTT AZIZ AKBARAppellant

____________

 

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Barnes in Court

Date of Hearing: 13.4.2005

Date of Judgment: 13.4.2005

Date of Handing down Reasons of Judgment: 14.4.2005

 

_______________

J U D G M E N T

_______________

 

Background

1. The Appellant was convicted of Careless Driving on 22.9.2004. He filed a Notice of Appeal against Conviction on 5.10.2004. Before the appeal was heard, the Appellant’s solicitors filed on his behalf a Notice of Abandonment of Appeal (“the Notice”) on 5.11.2004. Upon receipt of the Notice the appeal was dismissed.

2. By an affirmation dated 14.3.2005, the Appellant applied for the Notice to be treated as a nullity and to reinstate the appeal.

Grounds submitted by the Appellant

3. In his affirmation the Appellant stated that an application for the transcript was refused by the High Court. His legal representatives strongly advised him that without the transcript the chance of winning the appeal was slim, he was also advised of the costs implication should he lose the appeal. The Appellant found that he was left with no choice but to instruct his lawyer to file the Notice.

4. The Appellant claimed that his legal representatives failed to inform him that he could have applied for the transcript from the Magistracy and that they failed to inform him that he could apply to the Court of Final Appeal even if he has lost his appeal in the High Court. The Appellant claimed that his mind did not go with any act of abandonment.

The Law

5. The Court of Appeal in the case of HKSAR v LAI Siu Cheung CACC 487/2002 set out the applicable principles. It is well established that the restoration of an appeal after abandonment is only permissible where it can be demonstrated that the abandonment was a nullity. There is no inherent jurisdiction to hear an appeal which has been dismissed.

6. As to what amounts to the “nullity test”, the Court of Appeal referred to the judgment in  R. v Medway  [1976] 1 62 Cr. App R 85 as follows (at page 13 of the judgment):

“ In our judgment the kernel of what has been described as the ‘nullity test’ is that the Court is satisfied that the abandonment was not the result of a deliberate and informed decision, in other words that the mind of the applicant did not go with his act of abandonment. In the nature of things it is impossible to foresee when and how such a state of affairs may come about, therefore it would be quite wrong to make a list, under the headings as mistake, fraud, wrong advice, misapprehension and such like, which purports to be exhaustive of the types of case where this jurisdiction can be exercised. Such headings can only be regarded as guidelines, the presence of which may justify its exercise”.

Judgment

7. Having considered the relevant legal principles and the circumstances of the Appellant, I do not accept the Appellant’s assertion that “his mind did not go with his act of abandonment”. It is clear to me that he knew exactly what he was doing. He received advice relating to the prospects of success on appeal and the costs implication. He made a deliberate and informed decision when he decided to abandon the appeal. There is nothing here to show that the Notice was a nullity. The Appellant’s application to treat the Notice as nullity and to reinstate the appeal is therefore refused.

(Judianna Barnes)
Deputy High Court Judge

Ms. WAN Shuk Fong, Polly, SGC, of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent

Appellant in person