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2005

LI LAI FUN AND ANOTHER v. LEUNG YIU CHEUNG AND OTHERS

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52406-EN-2006-05-12

LI LAI FUN AND ANOTHER v. LEUNG YIU CHEUNG AND OTHERS

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CACV253/2005

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 253 OF 2005

(ON APPEAL FROM HCPI NO. 697 OF 2002)

______________________

BETWEEN

Li Lai Fun and Choi Chi Ming
Administrators of the estate of
CHAI (or CHOI) KAI CHUEN, DECEASED
Plaintiffs
and
LEUNG YIU CHEUNG1st Defendant
LAU SUI YIM2nd Defendant
 LAU SHUI KONG3rd Defendant

______________________

Before: Hon Ma CJHC, Yeung JA & Burrell J in Court

Date of Hearing: 24 March 2006

Date of Handing Down Decision on Costs: 12 May 2006

____________________

DECISION ON COSTS

____________________

 

Hon Ma CJHC :

1. On 16 November 2005, this Court allowed an appeal brought by the Plaintiffs in a fatal accidents case, resulting in a revised award for loss of accumulation of wealth of $132,000.  The background to the appeal is contained in the Reasons for Judgment handed down on 23 November 2005.

2. In the Reasons for Judgment, an order nisi was made in favour of the Plaintiffs.  We said this : -

“On the question of costs the plaintiffs have had to come to court to obtain an increase.  Albeit that the increase was less than contended for, we nonetheless make a costs order nisi in their favour.”

3. The 1st Defendant (who was the Respondent in the appeal) now applies to have that order nisi varied pursuant to RHC O.42, r.5B(6).

4. The main ground relied on by Mr John Hemmings (for the 1st Defendant) relates to a payment into court that had been made prior to the assessment of damages by Master Levy in the court below.  The 1st Defendant made a payment into court of $2,650,000.  The Master awarded damages (inclusive of interest) of $2,607,672, some $42,328 short of the payment in.  As a result, the Plaintiffs did not get the full costs of the action.  The Master ordered that the costs of the action be to the Plaintiffs only up to and including 4 June 2004 (the date they were notified of the 1st Defendant’s last payment into court) and thereafter, the costs were to be to the 1st Defendant.  Our decision on the appeal effectively increased the damages by $32,300.  The resultant figure for damages overall, however, was still less than the amount paid into court by some $10,028.  It therefore followed, so Mr Hemmings submitted, that since the damages had still not bettered the payment in, an award for the costs of this appeal should be made in favour of the 1st Defendant (at least he should not have to pay them).

5. Mr Mohan Bharwaney (for the Plaintiffs) understandably submits the opposite.  He says (as the passage just quoted from the Reasons for Judgment states) that the Plaintiffs had to appeal to the Court of Appeal in order to obtain an increase in damages.  He reminded us that the 1st Defendant had at no stage after the assessment of damages or prior to the appeal, offered (by payment into court or otherwise) to increase the amount awarded by the Master.  The original payment into court could not, as Mr Bharwaney puts it, have been withdrawn by the Plaintiffs after the assessment was made.  In these circumstances, unless the Plaintiffs appealed successfully, there would simply have been no increase in the damages awarded.  Obviously if, as a result of the appeal, the damages had exceeded the amount paid in, then the Plaintiffs would have been entitled to a much more generous order of costs for the proceedings below.  However, this was not so.  Mr Bharwaney accepted that the order for the costs below and of the action should remain intact.  He only sought that the costs for the appeal should be to the Plaintiffs.

6. In my view, the proper order for costs in the present appeal is to make no order : -

(1) While it is entirely correct for Mr Bharwaney to say that his clients had to appeal in order to obtain an increase in the damages awarded in the court below, it is equally accurate to note that overall, the Plaintiffs have still obtained less than the payment in made by the 1st Defendant.  The Plaintiffs also did not succeed entirely in the arguments raised in the appeal.  They had sought more than they eventually obtained (no doubt to secure an overall award beyond the payment in).

(2) Of course, I fully acknowledge the important fact that the payment in was not extended to cover the appeal nor was there any offer made to the Plaintiffs by the 1st Defendant in relation to the appeal.  However, had this been the case, the 1st Defendant would have been entitled to the costs of the appeal if the outcome did not result in any offer being bettered.

(3) Overall, the order that each side should bear their own costs meets the justice of the case.  An order for costs wholly in favour of the Plaintiffs would be the cause of a genuine grievance on the 1st Defendant’s part : after all he had at a very early stage made a payment in, which, if accepted, would have meant the end of the litigation (appeals included).  Equally, an order for costs in favour of the 1st Defendant would also be wrong :  the Plaintiffs had to appeal in order to obtain any increase in damages.  It is worthwhile remembering in this context that the court’s discretion regarding costs is a wide and flexible one to enable the court to do justice between the parties : see Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2006 Vol.1 at paragraphs 62/2/5 and 62/2/6.

7. For the above reasons, the order nisi should be varied to confirm the order for costs below but no order is made on the costs of the appeal.  As for the costs of the present application, I would likewise make no order as to costs.  Neither side has fully succeeded in their submissions.

 

Hon Yeung JA :

8. I agree with the decision of the Chief Judge and have nothing further to add.

 

Hon Burrell J :

9. I would go one step further and award the costs of the appeal and the costs of the application to the defendant.

10. In my judgment, the following matters, on costs only, are highly persuasive when deciding what order meets the overall justice of the case.

11. Firstly, the defendant has, throughout, been the successful party.  At first instance, the successful party was the one who estimated the claim was worth $2.65 million or less, i.e. the defendant.  The litigation process does not come to an end until the appeal process is exhausted.  On appeal, therefore, the defendant’s position that the claim was worth $2.65 million or less remained the same.  They remained the successful party.  Other than conceding the appeal the defendant had no choice but to resist it.  They successfully resisted it to the extent that their assessment of the value of the claim remained good.

12. Secondly, it is important, in this case, to consider the appeal in context.  After the judgment at first instance, the plaintiff was about $42,000 short of the payment in.  The costs of the trial were awarded against them.  On appeal, the plaintiff argued one ground only.  That ground had a maximum value of $100,000.  There were no circumstances in which the award, on appeal, could have been increased by more than $100,000.  Thus an entirely successful appeal would have increased the award by 4% and would have beaten the payment in.

13. Mr Bharwaney, very properly, conceded that an important reason for the appeal was as much to beat the payment in and therefore gets the costs order below reversed as it was to get more money for the plaintiff.  Common sense suggests that the former reason was the more important reason of the two.  In the event, the plaintiff failed to get the costs order below reversed because it failed to beat the payment in.  On its own admission therefore, it failed to achieve an important purpose of the appeal (probably the more important purpose).  Thus, in yet another sense, it was not the successful party.

14. Thirdly, the actual increase in the award on appeal was a mere $32,000 or less than 1.5% of the judgment at first instance which is a small sum in both dollar and percentage terms.  Even if there had been no payment in, it is questionable whether the plaintiff would have been awarded all its costs on appeal.  By failing to accept the (very reasonable) payment in in the first place, the plaintiff took a risk and lost.  By appealing to try and get an extra 2%, it took a risk and lost.  Only the plaintiff could have avoided the costs that have been incurred.  The defendant, on the other hand, made a realistic payment in which was refused and were compelled to resist the appeal which, to all intents and purposes, they did successfully.

15. The plaintiff’s only argument in favour of being awarded the costs of the appeal is that it had to come to court to get an increase and was successful in so doing.  A further $32,000 was awarded due to an erroneous method of calculation by the Master.  (In passing, it should be noted that the basis upon which the appeal court increased the award was not the basis contended for by the plaintiff.  In this sense also the plaintiff’s submissions before the Court of Appeal did not succeed.)

16. As a result of any, or virtually any, increase, the plaintiff submits that costs should follow the event.  In my judgment, in this case, that principle is outweighed by the defendant’s submissions and I would therefore exercise the discretion on costs in their favour.

17. It is a matter of concern that any costs order against a legally aided plaintiff may have the effect of reducing the damages ultimately received by him or her.  In this case that will not happen as my decision is a minority one.

 

Hon Ma CJHC :

18. By a majority, it is ordered that the order nisi on costs be varied to confirm the order for costs below and there be no order as to costs for the appeal and the present application to vary.

 

 

(Geoffrey Ma)
Chief Judge, High Court
(Wally Yeung)
Justice of Appeal
(Michael Burrell)
Judge of the Court of First Instance

Mr Mohan Bharwaney instructed by Messrs B Mak & Co for the Plaintiffs

Mr John Hemmings instructed by Messrs Massie & Clement for the1st Defendant

47071-EN-2005-11-23

LI LAI FUN AND ANOTHER v. LEUNG YIU CHEUNG AND OTHERS

HTML content

CACV253/2005

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO.253 OF 2005

(ON APPEAL FROM HCPI 697 OF 2002)

----------------------

BETWEEN

LI LAI FUN and CHOI CHI MING
Administrators of the estate of
CHAI (or CHOI) KAI CHUEN, DECEASED
Plaintiffs
and
LEUNG YIU CHEUNG 1st Defendant
LAU SUI YIM 2nd Defendant
 LAU SHUI KONG3rd Defendant

--------------------

 

Before : Hon Ma CJHC, Yeung JA and Burrell J in Court

Date of Hearing : 16 November 2005

Date of Judgment : 16 November 2005

Date of Reasons for Judgment : 23 November 2005

 

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REASONS  FOR  JUDGMENT

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Hon Ma CJHC :

1. I agree with the reasons contained in the judgment of Burrell J for allowing the present appeal.

Hon Yeung JA :

2. I also agree.

Hon Burrell J :

3. At the conclusion of this hearing we indicated that we would allow the appeal and make a revised award for loss of accumulation of wealth in the region of $132,000 with written reasons to follow.  This we now do.

4. This is an appeal against an assessment of damages in a fatal accident case.  As is usual the assessment involved a number of heads of damage.  This appeal relates to one head of damage only namely the award for loss of accumulation of wealth.  In a corrected decision handed down on 8 April 2005 Master Levy awarded the plaintiffs $2,485,068.  The Master’s original written assessment, handed down on 20 November 2004 had been for $2,585,068.  That written assessment had been a carefully reasoned and detailed judgment dealing with the different heads of damage.  Under item (4) on page 45 of the judgment she had awarded $200,000 for “Loss of accumulation of wealth”.

5. Before the order was perfected and the judgment sealed it was noticed that she had made an error in her calculations.  That error prompted a summons from the defendant inviting her to correct the error under the slip rule, Order 20 rule 11 of the Rules of the High Court.  There was no dispute between the parties that an error had been made and it was acknowledged by the Master.  The fact that the judgment had not been sealed was neither here nor there.  The slip rule may be invoked at any time.

THE ERROR

6. The error and its significance was as follows.  The fatal accident had occurred in 1999 when the deceased was 42 years old.  He had a family.  The Mandatory Provident Fund (“MPF”) was introduced into Hong Kong legislation in 2000.  One of the Master’s tasks was to assess what the deceased’s fund would have been on retirement had he continued to work.  In making the assessment she, correctly, took into account what the deceased’s own contributions to that fund would have been during the rest of his working life.  The error was that she took into account a figure equal to 10% of what he would have earned.  The correct figure should have been 5%.

7. In her corrected assessment handed down on 8 April 2005 she addressed the task anew using the correct percentage.

8. In her original decision she had assessed the combined contributions of the employer and the employee to the future MPF to be $567,000.  The revised arithmetic (using 5%) produced a figure of $357,200.  A minor 2nd mistake in the method of calculating the true figure was also identified and corrected in the revised decision but it is of no consequence in the present appeal.  No issue is taken by the parties that the “slip rule” was properly utilized for this purpose and that the revised arithmetic resulting in the new figure of $357,200 was correct.

THE CONSEQUENCES

9. The relevance of the figure was in relation to the claim for loss of accumulation of wealth.  In that regard the Master’s next task was to answer two more questions.  Firstly, based on contributions of $357,200 made over 17 years, how much would the fund be actually worth at the time of notional retirement?  Secondly, by how much would that fund be depleted during the remainder of the deceased’s life had he survived until death by natural causes?  Both these questions are hugely speculative but they had to be addressed.  In answering both questions she did two things.  Firstly, she adopted a sensible and reasonable, but non-actuarial, approach and secondly, she adopted the same approach both in her first assessment (based on the erroneous sum resulting from a 10% contribution) and in her revised assessment based on the correct percentage.

(a)     The first assessment

10. The total contribution in her first assessment came to $567,000.  She accepted the figure taken from the plaintiffs’ revised statement of damages that this would have grown to $800,000 by the time of retirement.

11. She then assumed that this fund would have been utilized by the deceased to the extent of $500,000 during the rest of his natural life.  This was based on a broad brush assessment that the average annual call on the fund for his financial needs would be $25,000 for 20 years.  Plainly this was not intended to mean an annual figure of $25,000 from the capital, ignoring the amount by which the fund would grow with interest.  It was an averaging out over 20 years taking interest into account.

12. Two things need to be said about this.  Firstly, it was a calculation which had to be done and it flowed directly and inevitably from the assessment of the starting point of $567,000.  Secondly, it was a calculation in the plaintiffs’ favour.  Her generous assessment of depleting the fund by an average amount of only $25,000 a year meant that $300,000 still remained as a starting point for the “accumulation of wealth” head of damage, even at the notional age of 80.  She then, correctly, depreciated the sum of $300,000 by 30% for early receipt.  (That should have resulted in $210,000, but $200,000 was the figure in the judgment).

(b)     The revised assessment

13. The new, correct, starting point was $357,200.  The consequences of the adjustment had to be met.  The further consequential adjustments still come within the operation of the slip rule.  There is no merit in the argument that the arithmetic calculations should be corrected by the slip rule but the consequences of the new figure should not.

14. However, in the exercise of calculating the effect of the new figure on the final award for loss of accumulation of wealth we think that the Master fell into error in two respects.  The two errors were firstly, her selection of the figure of $650,000 as the notional size to which the fund would have grown by the time of retirement at the age of 60 and secondly, her decision to use the same figure of $25,000 per year as the average amount by which the fund would have been depleted during the remainder of his natural life.

15. The correct approach, in our judgment, would have been to calculate by reference to her original figures the factor by which the original contributions ($567,000) had increased to arrive at the notional retirement fund ($800,000).  The answer is 1.411.  In other words, $567,000 × 1.411 equals (approximately) $800,000.

16. This factor should then be applied to the corrected starting point.

17. The arithmetic approach then becomes as follows :

(1)     $357,200 × 1.411 = $504,009 (say $504,000).

This becomes the proper figure for the size of the fund at age 60.  It is not clear why the Master selected $650,000.  True, it was more generous to the plaintiffs but it does seem somewhat arbitrary.

(2)     The next calculation concerns the figure of $25,000 per year.  Using the same approach it is necessary to calculate by what factor $25,000 is a proportion of $800,000.  The answer is that $25,000 is 3.125% of $800,000.  The new calculation is therefore as follows :

                   $504,000 × 3.125% = $15,750.

Decreasing the figure for the average annual call on the fund from $25,000 to $15,750 also reflects the fact that the smaller the fund the more conservatively it would have been deployed.  This is another direct consequence from the original error.

18. Thus, the new total depletion of the fund is $15,750 × 20 = $315,000.  The amount that would remain is therefore $504,000 - $315,000 = $189,000.

19. The final calculation is to reduce this by the 30% which the Master adopted as a discount for early receipt.  $189,000 × 70% = $132,300.

20. We therefore allow the appeal to the extent that the figure for loss of accumulation of wealth should not, as a consequence of using 10% as the employee’s contribution to the MPF instead of 5%, have been reduced from $200,000 to $100,000 but that it should have been reduced from $200,000 to $132,300.

FURTHER MATTERS

21. There are two further matters which should be mentioned.

22. Firstly, both before the Master during the “revision” hearing on 24 March 2005 and before this court Mr Mohan Bharwaney for the plaintiffs attempted to argue that the Master had fallen into error in another respect as well.  He argued that in calculating the figure of $25,000 per year the Master had not fully, or at all, considered the growth of the fund as a result of interest during the retirement years.  The summons before the Master did not refer to this issue at all.  In any event, if the Master had been in error on this point (which we doubt she was) it would not have qualified as coming within the “slip rule”.  As a result it was necessary for Mr Bharwaney to apply for leave to appeal out of time.  In the course of the hearing we refused leave on the basis that the matter could have been raised at any time hitherto and that it was now far too late.

23. Secondly, it is acknowledged that by its very nature the assessment done by the Master and considered by this court is necessarily speculative and artificial.  Concluding that a man’s MPF fund will be diminishing by an average of $15,750 a year 20 to 40 years after his tragic and early death has to say the least, an air of artificially about it.  The fact is however that a calculation has to be done.  The Master approached the task with diligence and fairness.  The error was simply in failing to apply the arithmetic adjustments consistently to all the figures that emerged as a result of the correction.

COSTS

24. On the question of costs the plaintiffs have had to come to court to obtain an increase.  Albeit that the increase was less than contended for, we nonetheless make a costs order nisi in their favour.

(Geoffrey Ma)
Chief Judge, High Court

(Wally Yeung)
Justice of Appeal

(M.P. Burrell)
Judge of the Court of First Instance

Mr Mohan Bharwaney, instructed by Messrs B. Mak & Co., for the Plaintiffs

Mr John Hemmings, instructed by Messrs Massie & Clement, for the 1st Defenda