NG TZE MING v. HKSAR
HTML content
FAMC No. 88 of 2005
IN THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 88 OF 2005 (CRIMINAL)
(ON APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
FROM HCMA NO. 454 OF 2005 )
_____________________
Between:
| NG TZE MING | Applicant | |
| and | ||
| HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION | Respondent |
_____________________
Appeal Committee: Mr Justice Bokhary PJ, Mr Justice Chan PJ and Mr Justice Ribeiro PJ
Date of Hearing: 13 January 2006
Date of Determination: 13 January 2006
______________________
D E T E R M I N A T I O N
______________________
Mr Justice Bokhary PJ:
1. This applicant was convicted in the Magistrate’s Court on a charge, laid under s.25 of the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance, Cap. 455, of dealing with property knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that such property represented a person’s proceeds of an indictable offence. His conviction was affirmed by the High Court. And he now seeks leave to appeal out of time to the Court of Final Appeal under the “substantial and grave injustice” limb of s.32(2) of the Court’s statute.
2. Shortly stated the complaint of substantial and grave injustice put forward on the applicant’s behalf is that he was convicted on the basis that he suspected that the property represented a person’s proceeds of an indictable offence rather than on the basis that he had reasonable grounds to believe that.
3. Studying what the magistrate said, we find him saying in terms that the applicant had reasonable grounds to believe that the property represented a person’s proceeds of an indictable offence. It is true that he also used the word “suspicion”. And it is said on the applicant’s behalf the various context in which the magistrate used the word “suspicion” were similar to the crucial context in this case. Be that as it may, the magistrate said in terms that the applicant dealt with the property having reasonable grounds to believe that such property represented a person’s proceeds of an indictable offence. Despite the able argument advanced by Mr P.Y. Lo on the applicant’s behalf, we see no reasonable basis for arguing that the magistrate did not really understand and mean what he said.
4. For those reasons, the applicant’s complaint of substantial and grave injustice is not reasonably arguable. And leave to appeal is therefore refused.
| (Kemal Bokhary) Permanent Judge | (Patrick Chan) Permanent Judge | (R.A.V. Ribeiro) Permanent Judge |
Mr P.Y. Lo (instructed by Messrs Or, Ng & Chan and assigned by Legal Aid Department) for the applicant
Mr Robert S.K. Lee (of the Department of Justice) for the respondent