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Civil Action2005

CROWNING SUCCESS LTD v. BRIGHTLAND CORPORATION LTD AND ANOTHER

Related cases with same parties

  • CACV110/2009CROWNING SUCCESS LTD v. BRIGHTLAND CORPORATION LTD AND ANOTHER
  • HCA1540/2005CROWNING SUCCESS LTD v. BRIGHTLAND CORPORATION LTD AND ANOTHER
  • HCA2655/2004BANHART CO LTD v. BANK OF CHINA (HONG KONG) LTD

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65194-EN-2009-04-03

CROWNING SUCCESS LTD v. BRIGHTLAND CORPORATION LTD AND ANOTHER

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HCA1445/2005
& HCA1540/2005

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NOS. 1445 AND 1540 OF 2550

  -----------------------------

BETWEEN

 CROWNING SUCCESS LIMITEDPlaintiff
 and 
 brightland corporation limited1st Defendant
 banhart company limited2nd Defendant

-----------------------------

(Actions consolidated by Order of Master Lung dated 9 June 2006)

Before : Hon Burrell J in Court

Dates of Hearing : 12, 13, 16, 17, 19 and 20 March 2009

Date of Judgment : 3 April 2009

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j u d g m e n t

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1. These proceedings concern a confirmor sale of commercial premises known as “Unit C” on the 45th floor of Convention Plaza, 1 Harbour Road, which failed to complete on the due completion date of 22 July 2005.  

2. The 2nd defendant (Banhart) was the head vendor who, on 30 December 2004, had agreed to sell the property to the 1st defendant (Brightland) for $14.8 million.  The agreed completion date was to be 22 July 2005.  

3. On 18 January 2005, Brightland agreed to sell to the plaintiff (Crowning Success) under a sub-sale agreement for $17,800,000.  The completion date was the same, 22 July 2005.  As can be seen from the figures involved, the property market at the material time was rising.  The agreed valuation at the time of completion was $19.54 million.  

4. In December 2004, Unit C was an open space forming part of the 45th floor.  There was no partitioning in place.  However, by a “rider” to the agreement, signed by both parties, a floor plan showing the location of the unit, its dimensions and shape was annexed to the Head agreement.  The plan also confirmed, as part of the “rider”, that the saleable area of the unit was not less than 144.402 sq. metres.  This was certified by a professional architect.  For ease of reference, a copy of the plan is included in this judgment as appendix “A”. 

5. The on-sale to Crowning Success was intended to be a back-to-back arrangement.  Put simply, Crowning Success agreed to buy from Brightland the same as Brightland had agreed to buy from Banhart. 

6. However, when Crowning Success came to the premises to inspect prior to completion on 22 July differences between the unit on site and the unit on plan were detected.  Concerned that it was not getting what it had agreed to purchase, measurements were taken and a further plan drawn up.  The plaintiff’s case is that Appendix “B” is what was being offered on the date of completion.  The key differences were :

(a)      the length of the unit was 12.95 metres not 14.806 metres as shown on appendix plan “A”;

(b)     the saleable area was calculated to be 128.2 sq. metres, not 144.402 as shown on appendix plan “A”;

(c)     the shortened length resulted in a strip (referred to on appendix plan “B” as the “indigo strip”) being excluded from the original unit.  The south-easterly end of the indigo strip was the curtain wall of the building comprising two windows.  These two windows were thus within the indigo strip and thus were being excluded from the unit being sold to Crowning Success.  The view through these windows was due east and afforded a view across the whole width of the harbour in an easterly direction.  Without those windows the view of the harbour was more limited.  When standing in front of the windows in the “pink” area on appendix plan “B”, the view to the east (i.e. to the left) was a partial view of the harbour over the Causeway Bay typhoon shelter.  The court, the parties and their legal representatives went on a “view” of the premises prior to trial.  Amongst other things, the view through the various windows was noted. 

7. For these reasons (and for one additional reason which I deal with later under the heading “Requisition”) Crowning Success did not complete with Brightland and Brightland were correspondingly unable to complete with Banhart. 

8. Banhart’s position is that the area of Unit C on 22 July was 144.402 sq. metres and that there was no agreement as to exactly where the 144 sq. metres would be located on the 45th floor.  In particular, there was no agreement that Brightland was entitled to the habour view from the windows within the “indigo strip” area. 

9. On 27 July 2005, a plan was prepared on behalf of Banhart by a Mr Li Man Ying.  That plan is appendix plan “C” to this judgment.  It is Banhart’s case that plan C represents accurately what was offered at the proposed time of completion on 22 July.  It is Banhart’s case that their contractual obligation was to provide a unit of not less than 144.402 sq. metres which was approximately, but not exactly, located within the area shown on plan “A”.  Banhart submits that there was no obligation to include the two windows in the “indigo strip” neither was there any obligation to provide the space called the “indigo strip”.  The remaining significant difference between plan “A” and plan “C” is that the partition walls on plan C are double partition walls with an 800 mm cavity between the two partitions.  It is Banhart’s case that these partition walls were in place at the time of completion on 22 July.  

10. For the reasons which follow, my findings on the evidence are that on 22 July :

(i)      the saleable area of Unit C being offered by Banhart was only 128.2 sq. metres;

(ii)      the partition walls were not double cavity walls;

(iii)     the dimensions of the unit within the partitions were as measured by Alan Chu, a witness for Crowning Success, namely 12.95 metres by 9.9 metres;

(iv)     the shape of Unit C, being offered by Banhart, was a rectangle and was not the shape as shown on plan “A” which was a specific irregular geometric shape;

(v)     the north-eastern partition commenced a few inches to the south of the corner of the building thus blocking the view from the two windows within the “indigo strip”.  The two windows within the “indigo strip” formed part of the unit which Brightland had contracted to buy and they were therefore entitled to whatever view those windows provided; and

(vi)     the south-western partition wall had been positioned in line with the north-eastern wall of the lift lobby, as shown on plans A and B but not as shown on plan C.  

Reasons

11. (a)      Mr Li Man Ying’s plan was prepared on 27 July, five days after the completion date.  His plan records his findings on that day.  More importantly he was not called as a witness.  Banhart’s only witness as to fact was Ms Lillian Oung, the owner of the property (she was also the owner of the entire 45th floor).  She was able to provide no good reason why Mr Li was not called as a witness.  Given the crucial factual issues at the heart of this case little weight can be attached to his written evidence.  Banhart’s expert witness was Mr Wong Man Hong.  He was only instructed in late 2008.  It is therefore difficult to understand on what basis he was able to state that he was in “full agreement” with Mr Li’s report. 

(b)     Given also that the existence of a serious dispute became glaringly apparent from 22 July onwards and that writs were filed within days, it is a serious weakness of Banhart’s case that no plan was prepared by them on 22 July, no photographs were taken, Mr Li did not give evidence and neither was any witness called from the company (“Marriots”) who built the partition walls, said by Banhart to be double walls with an 800 mm cavity.  It was further Banhart’s case that the cavity walls remained in position for a further six months before they were demolished.  It is even more perplexing that not a single photograph or independent plan exists in support of their existence.  Writs had been issued, battle lines drawn and litigation looming but no one took a photograph to support Banhart’s contentions. 

(c)      In order to achieve an area of 144.402 sq. metres plan “C” shows the south-westerly outer partition wall to be in line with the middle of the lift lobby, not the north-east wall of the lift lobby.  One photograph taken by Crowning Success on 22 July shows this patently not to be the case.  Mr King Wong, counsel for Banhart, attempted to argue that the angle from where the photograph was taken in the lift lobby might have produced a deceptive or misleading result.  I considered this submission to be valiantly made but utterly hopeless.  There was no doubt at all that, on 22 July, the south-westerly partition wall was where Crowning Success and Brightland said it was and not where Banhart claimed it was.  

(d)     When Mr Alan Chu was taking measurements on 22 July he said he saw no signs of double cavity partitioning.  I accept his evidence.  He was an impressive and reliable witness.  On the other hand, however, I find myself unable to rely on the evidence given by Ms Oung where it conflicts with the evidence of Crowning Success and Brightland.  She seemed unable to give short succinct answers to straightforward questions.  Her answers were often prolix and evasive.  On the key issue of the existence of cavity walls on 22 July, I was unable to accept her evidence.  Unfortunately there are no photographs from which it can be positively gleaned that only single partition walls were built but on the other hand such photographs that were taken both of the south-west wall and the north-east wall are consistent with (albeit not absolute proof of) the plaintiff’s case. 

(e)        Banhart’s explanation for building double cavity partitioning was unconvincing.  I accepted and rely upon the expert evidence adduced on behalf of Crowning Success and Brightland, which, taken as a whole, supports the following :

(i)      that 800 mm double cavity partition walls in commercial premises would be “unnecessary and non-sensical” (per Mr Wilson Ho, an acoustics expert);

(ii)      sufficient sound proofing could be achieved and usually is achieved with single partition walls of 105-134 mm thick.  It is normally only necessary to exceed this thickness for premises such as theatres or sound recording studios;

(iii)     double cavity walls were not necessary for fire resistance; and

(iv)     it would be most unusual for so much floor space to be wasted by the installation of such walls given the very high price of commercial property in the centre of Hong Kong. 

(f)      No evidence was adduced by Banhart of any written instructions to a contractor to build the walls as claimed. 

(g)      Even if the double cavity walls were built on 22 July (a contention which I specifically reject) the saleable area is still significantly short of 144 sq. metres.  The internal length of Unit C as measured by Alan Chu on 22 July was (wall to wall on site) 12.95 metres.  If one adds 400 mm x 2 (half the thickness of each cavity) the length of the unit becomes 13.75 metres.  The saleable area would therefore be 13.75 metres x 9.9 metres = 136.125 sq. metres. 

(h)      Banhart’s contention (made in evidence by Lillian Oung) that the location of Unit C as shown on the certified plan was only intended to be “approximate” is untenable for the following reasons :

(i)      the plan shows the unit to have a specific and unique geometric shape.  It is not a simple rectangle.  It fits into the angle of the building where there is a 135o corner.  That shape can only fit into one location; and

(ii)      the head agreement is unequivocal as to the size, shape and location.  If the location was only approximate there would be no need for a “certified” plan.  The reason for having a plan was to avoid approximations not to permit them.  Banhart signed the rider which specifically deals with size, shape and location.  No attempt has been made to write anything on the plan or the rider to suggest there might be modifications or amendments or that it was only an approximation. 

12. As can be seen from the above findings and reasons, the key issues are entirely factual and, I so find, entirely in Crowning Success and Brightland’s favour. 

13. It follows that Banhart repudiated the head agreement, Brightland lawfully accepted the repudiation, Brightland were unable to deliver to Crowning Success who lawfully accepted Brightland resulting repudiation of the sub-sale agreement. 

Requisitions

14. This is a discrete issue.  My judgment is that even if none of the above issues had ever arisen, Crowning Success would have still been able to terminate the sub-sale agreement with Brightland because of their failure to provide good title having failed adequately to answer a requisition. 

15. In an assignment between Banhart and a company called Polytown Company Limited dated 19 September 1990, clause 2(2) provided that :

“the Purchaser shall not partition or sub-divide any individual floor of the Property into two or more separate smaller units for the purpose of sale assignment charge mortgage or other disposal thereof without the prior written approval of the Vendor.”

16. On 19 July 2005, the plaintiff’s solicitors wrote to Brightland’s solicitors requesting a certified copy of Polytown’s consent. 

17. Brightland’s solicitors immediately made the same request of Banhart’s solicitors.  Neither requisition was properly answered.  Moreover, no objection was raised as to the timing of the requisition being three days prior to completion.  Brightland therefore failed to show good title to Crowning Success. 

18. This is merely a second string to Crowning Success’s bow.  Given the strength of their case on the main issue it is somewhat academic. 

Crowning Success’s entitlement to a lien

19. Crowning Success seeks a declaration that it is entitled to a lien over the whole of the 45th floor of the building limited to the amount of the lien that Brightland could claim against Banhart for breach of the head agreement.  Crowning Success seeks the lien directly against Banhart even though there is no contractual relationship between them. 

20. Its argument is that whatever interest Brightland acquired from Banhart was assigned (because it was a back-to-back confirmor sale) to Crowning Success in equity. 

21. There is authority for the argument that an equitable lien would be created, in such circumstances.  However, in the absence of a contractual connection, I decline to make the declaration in this case for two reasons.  Firstly, Crowning Success seeks the declaration in relation to the whole of the 45th floor.  I am not minded to declare a lien over property which was not the subject of the transaction between any of the parties to the litigation.  Secondly, declaring a lien over “Unit C” would be unworkable.  “Unit C” was never defined in terms of undivided shares and a lien would be therefore unregisterable.  “Unit C” is also no longer a definable area or space and, moreover, is no longer owned by Banhart (the parties having earlier come to terms about the lifting of the lis pendens registered by Crowning Success).  It is because of these difficulties that Crowning Success seek a lien over the whole of the 45th floor.  In my judgment such difficulties cannot be solved by a blanket lien over different property. 

Inducing a breach of contract

22. Crowning Success also claims directly against Banhart in tort for inducing a breach of contract.  There is no doubt that Banhart’s breach of the head agreement led inevitably to the breach of the sub-sale agreement.  I am satisfied also that Banhart knew of the sub-sale at the time of completion.  Lillian Oung claimed that she did not know, however correspondence between solicitors suggests otherwise.  However my evaluation of the whole of the evidence does not enable me to conclude that the motive for the breach by Banhart was in order to gain an economic benefit for itself.  I am not persuaded that Banhart’s breach was deliberately done for its own advantage.  Accordingly, the relief in this case must be confined to the return of deposits and damages for breach of contract. 

Relief

23. As to the measure of damages I consider it to be a straightforward arithmetic exercise.  The only three relevant figures are (i) Brightland’s purchase price, (ii) Crowning Success’s purchase price and (iii) the agreed valuation on 22 July 2005. 

24. Based on the agreement at trial that the property was worth $19.54 million on 22 July 2005, final judgment in the consolidated action shall be as follows :

1.       A declaration that the 2nd defendant repudiated the head agreement.  

2.       A declaration that the 1st defendant repudiated the sub-sale agreement.  

3.       An order that the 2nd defendant returns the outstanding deposit of $857,750 to the 1st defendant with interest at prime plus 1% from 22 July 2005.  

4.       The 2nd defendant shall pay damages to the 1st defendant in the sum of $4.74 million with interest at prime plus 1% from 22 July 2005 (the difference between the valuation on 22 July and the purchase price in the Head agreement).  

5.       An order that the 1st defendant returns to the plaintiff the deposits of $2,670,000 with interest at prime plus 1% from 22 July 2005.  

6.       The 1st defendant shall pay damages to the plaintiff in the sum of $1.74 million together with interest at prime plus 1% from 22 July 2005 ($19.54 million less $17.8 million).  

7.       The plaintiff’s and 1st defendant’s costs both of the consolidated action and costs incurred prior to consolidation shall be borne by the 2nd defendant.  

25. Orders as to costs and interest shall be on a nisi basis. 

   (M.P. Burrell)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Jin Pao, instructed by  Messrs Kao, Lee & Yip, for the Plaintiff

Mr Eugene Fung, instructed by Messrs Vincent T.K. Cheung, Yap & Co., for the 1st Defendant

Mr King Wong, instructed by Messrs Amelia Cheung & Co., for the 2nd Defendant

Appendix Plan A

Appendix Plan B

Appendix Plan C

 

Appeal by the 2nd Defendant to Court of Appeal dismissed. Please refer to CACV110/2009 dated 1 April 2010
60990-EN-2008-04-22

CROWNING SUCCESS LTD v. BRIGHTLAND CORPORATION LTD AND ANOTHER

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    HCA 1540/2005 and HCA 1445/2005 (consolidated)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NOS. 1445 OF 2005 AND 1540 OF 2005

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BETWEEN  
 CROWNING SUCCESS LIMITEDPlaintiff
 and 
 BRIGHTLAND CORPORATION LIMITED
(暉隆有限公司)
1st Defendant
 BANHART COMPANY LIMTED2nd Defendant

----------------------

(Consolidated by order of Master Lung dated the 9th day of June 2006)

 

Before : Hon Sakhrani J in Chambers

Date of Hearing : 22 April 2008

Date of Judgment :22 April 2008

 

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JUDGMENT

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1. Briefly, by way of background, the 2nd defendant at all material times was the owner of the 45th Floor of the Office Tower of Convention Plaza. 

2. By a preliminary sale and purchase agreement dated 30 December 2004 the 2nd defendant agreed to sell a portion of the 45th floor namely, Unit C in accordance with the plan attached to the agreement.  By a preliminary sale and purchase agreement dated 18 January 2005 the 1st defendant agreed to sell Unit C as per the plan attached to the agreement.  Completion under both agreements was to take place on 22 July 2005. 

3. There was no completion of the agreements.

4. The plaintiff’s case is that Unit C as tendered was substantially different from what was provided in the agreement. 

5. The main complaint of the plaintiff is that the property which was tendered for completion on 22 July 2005 had a saleable area significantly less than 144.402 sq. m. as contracted for and had a different location as indicated on the plans.  The area excluded was approximately 200 sq. ft.  As a result of the exclusion of the area, the property tendered did not have the sea view which it would otherwise have had.  Obviously, this would affect the value of the property. 

6. There are disputes between the parties as to the actual saleable area of the property tendered on 22 July 2005 and as to the existence or extent of any sea view. 

7. The plaintiff claims damages against both defendants in respect of the failed transaction.  The claim against the 1st defendant is in contract.   The claim against the 2nd defendant is for damages for wrongfully procuring a breach of contract.

8. The matter before me is an appeal by the plaintiff against Master de Souza’s order of 22 February 2008.  The main complaint is paragraph 1 of the order where the master ordered that the plaintiff and the defendants in the consolidated action do mutually disclose property valuation reports dealing with the market value of Unit C as at two specific dates namely, 22 July 2005 and 22 January 2006.

9. The plaintiff had sought a direction for expert reports dealing with the market value of the property without specifying any specific valuation date.  It has prepared an expert report with a valuation given every three months from 22 July 2005 up to 22 January 2008.

10. It is common ground that the starting point for damages for breach of a contract for the sale of land is the date of breach.  However, in appropriate cases this may be departed from where this causes injustice.

11. There is a duty on the plaintiff to mitigate damages and a reasonable time is given to the innocent party to a breach of contract to mitigate damages. 

12. The date given by the master, 22 January 2006, is six months after the date of the alleged breach by which time, on the 2nd defendant’s case, the plaintiff would have been expected to have mitigated its loss by entering into a substitute contract.

13. Mr Pao, however, has submitted that Unit C was a unique property and that it was not reasonable to mitigate by finding a substitute property in the six months’ period.  However, on the pleadings and the evidence placed before me, that is not a point that the plaintiff can run without specifically pleading the matter.  I think Mr Man is right.  There must be a basis put forward by the plaintiff for departing from the normal rule for the assessment of damages.  At present, there is no such basis pleaded nor is there any evidence provided to me.  That being so, I see nothing wrong in the order made by the master and I would dismiss the appeal.

 

 

 (Arjan H. Sakhrani)
Judge of the Court of First Instance, High Court

 

Mr Jin Pao, instructed by M/s Kao, Lee & Yip, for the Plaintiff

Mr Bernard Man, instructed by M/s Wilkinson & Grist, for the 2ndDefendant

 

60743-EN-2008-04-10

BRIGHTLAND CORPORATION LTD v. BANHART CO LTD

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HCA 1445/2005

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 1445 OF 2005

_________________________

BETWEEN

 BRIGHTLAND CORPORATION LIMITEDPlaintiff
 And 
 BANHART COMPANY LIMITEDDefendant

_________________________

HCA 1540/2005

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 1540 OF 2005

_________________________

BETWEEN

 CROWNING SUCCESS LIMITEDPlaintiff
 And 
 BRIGHTLAND CORPORATION LIMITED1st Defendant
 BANHART COMPANY LIMITED2nd Defendant
   

_________________________

(Consolidated pursuant to order of Master Lung dated 9 June 2006)

Coram : Before Master J. Wong in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 18 March 2008

Date of Decison: 10 April 2008

_______________

D E C I S I O N

_______________

 

Application

1. This is an application by the 2nd Defendant to vacate registration of 5 instruments from the Lands Registry against the whole of 45/F, Office Tower, Convention Plaza, No. 1 Harbour Road (“the Property”), upon payment into court of securities to the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant.

Background

2. By a Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 30 December 2004, the 2nd Defendant agreed to sub-divide and sell Unit C of the Property (“Unit C”) to the 1st Defendant at $14.84 m. By a Further Sale and Purchase Agreement dated 18 January 2005, the 1st Defendant sub-sold Unit C to the Plaintiff at $17.8 m.  Unfortunately, the 2 conveyance transactions became fallen through and they triggered the present 2 proceedings.

3. These proceedings have been consolidated.  Briefly, both the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant complained, inter alia, that the 2nd Defendant wrongfully retained $200 square feet area from Unit C.  Such area further enjoyed a harbour view.  They therefore sued for repayment of the deposits paid, damages, interest and costs.

4. So far, the parties have been working on interlocutory matters, trying to get ready the case for trial.  In the meantime, in light of the current raising property market, the 2nd Defendant intended to sell the Property.  It then issued the present application to vacate the registration of all instruments relating to the said 2 conveyance transactions and present proceedings.  Both the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant opposed to the same.

5. On 18 March 2008, the parties appeared before me for the substantive argument.  Mr. Bernard Man and Mr. Jin Pao, both of Counsel acted for the 2nd Defendant and the Plaintiff respectively.  Mr. Lawrence Lam of Vincent T.K. Cheung, Yap & Co. represented the 1st Defendant.  Having heard from the parties, I reserved my decision to be delivered.  I now do so by this written decision.

Ruling

6. Upon consideration of all the evidence authorities and submission before me, I have decided to allow the 2nd Defendant’s application upon payment into court in the total sum of $12 m.  My reasons appear in below.

Jurisdiction?

7. Mr. Pao argued that this Court had no jurisdiction under section 19 (“section 19”)of the Land Registration Ordinance (Cap. 128) to make the order sought against his client because it only sought to register the Writ and Amended Writ in HCA 1540/2005 against the Property, but these instruments had not been registered.  Instead, the Land Registry put them under the heading of “Deeds Pending Registration”.  Hence, there was no registered instrument to be vacated.

8. Upon thoughts, I disagree with Mr. Pao.

(a)   Both Counsel confirmed with me that there was no direct authority on the jurisdictional point.  Hence, we have to look at and examine carefully the said section 19.

“The court or judge before whom any property sought to be bound is in litigation, may on the determination of the lis pendens, or during the pendency thereof, where the said court or judge is satisfied that the litigation is not prosecuted bona fide, or for other good cause shown, make an order for the vacating of the registration (emphasis added) in the Land Registry of such lis pendens without the consent of the party who registered it, and may direct the party on whose behalf the registration was made to pay all the costs and expenses occasioned by the registration or the vacating thereof, including the costs of the application to vacate, or may make such other order as to such costs or any of them as to the said court or judge may seem just.”

(b)   In my view, the word “registration” in the above context includes both instruments having been registered and “pending registration” with the Land Registry.

(c)   The Land Registrar allows registrable instruments affecting land to be registered in the Land Registry.  The registration gives public notice of the registered documents.  It affects priority of interest.  However, in Hong Kong, if the Land Registrar has doubts over, inter alia, the registrability of the instruments, he will put them under “Deeds Pending Registration” as an interim measure before the doubts will be resolved.

(d)   The implication of an instrument being put under such heading is that:

“34.  … By attempting to register the Writ against the title Mr Kong [the person causing the registration] was in his effect making a statement to the public at large, and in particular to anyone who chose to search the titles, that he was asserting a right over the Properties.  It is correct that that assertion of a right had not yet been crystallised, but so long as the documents were not withdrawn from registration and remained noted on the title as “pending registration”, that assertion remained.”

(Tai Yip Dyeing Factory Ltd v Kong Hoi Sang,
Saunders J. [2007] 1 HKLRD 608)

Hence, as far as the registered owner of the property and any third party are concerned, registered instruments or deeds pending registration made no practical difference.  Any subsequent purchaser has been given notice of it and will be bound by the same.

(e)   Section 19 gives this Court a wide discretion to do justice in the particular circumstances of each case.

“… The terms of section 19 are very wide; and I think that its width is the product of the wisdom of those who framed it…

The formula “other good cause shown” in s. 19 is unrestricted by any words of the statute.”

(Ho Yau-kong v Ho Cheng Kwai-ying & Others
[1991] 1 HKLR at page 652)

(f)   I agree with Mr. Man that his client should not be put in a worse situation by an “attempted registration” than a “completed registration”.  This can never be the legislative intention of section 19.

(g)   Even assuming that I was wrong in the above interpretation, this Court still has an inherent jurisdiction to vacate the deeds pending registration.

“The court has both statutory and inherent jurisdiction to order vacation on ‘other good cause’, and the inherent jurisdiction of the court is co-extensive with that of the High Court of Justice in England: see Thian’s Plastics Industrial Co v Tin’s Chemical Co [1970] HKLR 498 at 522 per Blair-Kerr J; Heywood v BDC Properties Ltd (No 2) (1964) 1 WLR 971; Taylor v Taylor (1968) 1 WLR 378 followed …”

(The Annotated Ordinances of Hong Kong
– Land Registration Ordinance, at page 41)

Discretion?

9. I now move to see if the registration should be vacated by section 19.

10. Section 19 allows this Court to vacate the registration on 2 grounds:

(a)       litigation not prosecuted bone fide, or

(b)       for other good cause shown.

There is no suggestion by the 2nd Defendant that the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant has any malice in prosecuting the proceedings.  In relation to the 2nd limb, useful guidance can be located in the said case of Ho Yau-kong to show how the Court should approach to exercise his discretion.

“It seems to me that the courts may, and should, approach it by reference to what they normally do when dealing with interlocutory injunctive relief, subject to this.  The position of somebody with a lis penden which he or she can register is stronger than that of someone seeking or seeking to maintain such relief.  First of all, the registration may be made without reference to a court and without the burden of having first to make out a case.  Secondly, I think it is right to be even more reluctant to vacate a registration than to refuse or discharge an injunction which would have similar effect.  That is my approach here.”

11. With this approach in mind, I take the view that discretion should be exercised in favour of the 2nd Defendant in the circumstances.

(a)       The registration of the 5 instruments as a whole affect the Property, i.e. the whole of 45/F when the subject disputes only concern Unit C only.

(b)       Both the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant are not asking for specific performance.  They seek, among others, damages only.  The 2nd Defendant is willing to put security to protect the claims.  Provided sufficient security will be provided, I see no reason to stop the 2nd Defendant to dispose the Property.

(c)       The property market fluctuates.  There is evidence before this Court that the current market value of the Property has risen to $170 m and the 2nd Defendant is intending to sell the same.

Quantum?

12. Before moving to see how much payment-in should be made, I should point out that the amount of security should be awarded in the discretion of this Court having regard to all the circumstances of the case.  The security should be sufficient but not necessarily a complete one.

13. By the summons, the 2nd Defendant suggested $1,893,082 and $2,481,447 for the 1st Defendant and the Plaintiff respectively.  At the hearing before me, Mr. Man increased the offer for the 1st Defendant to $5,778,326.56.  However, he refused to pay anything to the Plaintiff because it was said that it would amount to double security.  In short, he argued that the Plaintiff’s lien was premised on that of the 1st Defendant.  Once the lien of the 1st Defendant was protected, the 2nd Defendant should not be required to pay more ( Aberaman Ironworks v Wickens (1868-1869) 4 LR Ch App 101, 110).

14. On the argument of lien, I agree with Mr. Man only as a matter of principle.  However, when we come to security, it is entirely different matter.  The chasing of lien on law is only one factor to be taken into account by the Court.  In our present case, there are other considerations.

(a)       Parties are not arguing merits of their respective cases before me.  Chances of success and failure therefore remain neutral for the time being.  The crux of the parties’ dispute turns primarily on the correctness or wrongfulness on the part of the 2nd Defendant in retaining the said 200 square feet area enjoying a sea view.  If this Court found the 2nd Defendant at fault in the end, it would be required to return deposits paid, and pay damages, interests, costs and so forth to both the 1st Defendant and the Plaintiff.  In short, the 1st Defendant might shoulder all the compensation.  Hence, I see no reason why the Plaintiff’s position should not be protected as distinct from that of the 1st Defendant.

(b)       The 2nd Defendant initiated the application by offering to pay something to both the 1st Defendant and the Plaintiff.  It appears to me that it is rather unfair if the 2nd Defendant suddenly changed its position fundamentally towards the Plaintiff.

Security for the 1st Defendant

15. Mr. Man and Mr. Lam had a narrow dispute on quantum only.  In short, they disputed on their estimate of costs for the proceedings up to trial.  Mr. Man said 1 m and Mr. Lam, 2.5 m.  To resolve the dispute, I will adopt a lump-sum assessment or board brush approach usually employed by this Court.

  $$
(a)Conveyance costs 30,000
    
(b)HCA 1445/2005 (26/7/05 – 8/6/06)  
 (i)   Pleadings ($4,000 x 10hrs)40,000 
 (ii)  Discovery: list of documents        ($4,000 x 10hrs)40,000 
 (iii) Miscellaneous20,000100,000
(c)Consolidated proceedings (9/6/06 – trial)  
 (i)   New pleadings, including subsequent amendments and further & better particulars    ($4,000 x 20hrs)80,000 
 (ii)  New discovery, including new list, witness statements ($4,000 x 50hrs)200,000 
 (iii) Counsel fee so far200,000480,000
 (iv)  Further preparation before trial        ($4,000 x 20hrs)80,000 
 (v)   Coming trial for 8 days
- Counsel ($100,000 + $30,000 x 7)
- Solicitor ($4,000 x 5hrs x 8)

310,000
160,000
 
 (vi)  Miscellaneous50,000600,000
   1,210,000

16. Hence, I have the following assessment for the 1st Defendant on the security.

  $
(a)Loss of profit2,960,000
(b)Return of deposit857,750
(c)Interest (2,960,000 + 857,750) x 8.125% x 3930,576
(d)Costs1,210,000
  5,958,326
 Say 6 m

Security for the Plaintiff

17. As to quantum for the Plaintiff, both Counsel also differed in their opinion, especially the loss of profit.  Mr. Man said $958,229 and Mr. Pao, $13,400,000.  The big difference is caused by the adoption of different timing for the further sale of Unit C by the Plaintiff.  The 2nd Defendant said that the value of Unit C on 22 January 2006 should be adopted, i.e. 6 months after the alleged breach by the 2nd Defendant.  It was said that, by such time, the Plaintiff should have mitigated its loss.  On the other hand, the Plaintiff elected the date of 22 January 2008.  On such date, Unit C was estimated to be $32,000,000.

18. To these arguments, I have the following observations.

(a)   It is indisputable that the Plaintiff owed a duty to mitigate.

(b)   On the evidence before me, I do not see what the Plaintiff has been done to mitigate its loss.  With respect, I have doubt if this Court will accept the adoption of the value at 22 January 2008.  The Plaintiff cannot simply sit there and allow the loss to be accumulated without doing anything.

(c)   I therefore prefer the opinion of Mr. Man.

19. In relation to the costs, I say the followings.

  $$
(a)Conveyancing costs 30,000
    
(b)HCA 1540/2005 (5/8/05 – 8/6/06)  
 (i)   Pleadings ($4,000 x 10hrs)40,000 
 (ii)  Discovery: list of documents        ($4,000 x 10hrs)40,000 
 (iii) Miscellaneous20,000100,000
(c)Consolidated proceedings (9/6/06 – trial)  
 (i)   New pleadings, including subsequent amendments and further & better particulars    ($4,000 x 20hrs)80,000 
 (ii)  New discovery, including new list, witness statements and expert reports ($4,000 x 60hrs)240,000 
 (iii) Interlocutory application(s) ($4,000 x 20hrs)80,000 
 (iv)  Counsel fee so far, including assistance in interlocutory application300,000700,000
 (v)   Further preparation before trial ($4,000 x 20hrs)80,000 
 (vi)  Coming trial for 8 days
    - Counsel ($100,000 + $30,000 x 7)
    - Solicitor ($4,000 x 5hrs x 8)

310,000
160,000
 
 (vii)       Miscellaneous50,000600,000
   1,430,000

20. The security for the Plaintiff therefore is:

  $
(a)Loss of profit958,229
(b)Return of deposit2,670,000
(c)Interest (958,229 + 2,670,000) x 8.125% x 3884,380
(d)Costs1,430,000
  5,942,609
Say also 6 m

 

Order

21. In conclusion, I order that

(1)       Upon the payment into court a sum of $6 m as security for the claim by the 1st Defendant in HCA 1445/2005 and further upon the payment into court another sum of $6 m as security for the claim made by the Plaintiff in HCA 1540/2005, the registration of the following instruments in the Land Registry be vacated forthwith:

           (a)   Writ of Summons in HCA 1445/2005 by Memorial No.05072700970010;

           (b)   Preliminary sale and purchase agreement by Memorial No.UB9450060;

          (c)   Provisional Agreement for sale and purchase by Memorial No.UB9477266;

          (d)   Writ of Summons in HCA 1540/2005 by Memorial No.05080901710014; and

           (e)   Amended Writ of Summons in HCA 1540/2005 by Memorial No.06063001980010.

(2)       Liberty to apply for further directions, if necessary.

22. As to costs, I have not been benefited from parties’ submissions.  However, it appears to me that each of them have succeeded in some issues but also lost in some others.  To balance them against one another, I believe that costs of the application, including costs reserved and certificates for counsel on 18 March 2008, if applicable, should be costs in the cause.  Such order nisi will become absolute 14 days from today.

23. Finally, since the decision herein has touched on a rough estimate of the assessment of compensation to the 1st Defendant and the Plaintiff, I further direct that this Decision shall not to be seen by the trial judge, unless otherwise directed the Court.

 (Jack Wong)
Master of the High Court

Mr. Jin Pao instructed by Messrs. Kao, Lee & Yip for Plaintiff.

Mr. Lawrence Lam of Messrs. Vincent T.K. Cheung, Yap & Co. for 1st Defendant.

Mr. Bernard Man instructed by Messrs. Wilkinson & Grist for 2nd Defendant.