LEUNG CHI TUNG v. AU YEUNG FAN AND OTHERS

HCCW 504/2005

香港特別行政區

高等法院

原訟法庭

公司清盤案件2005年第504號

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判決書

引言

1. 判定債權人（下稱“呈請人”）在完成訊問後，要求法庭命令將判定債務人（下稱“第一答辯人”）監禁。

背景

2. 2005年，呈請人提出本案，要求包括清盤第三答辯人或第一答辯人/第二答辯人購買呈請人（在第三答辯人中）的股票。

3. 案件其後安排在何沛然暫委法官席前審訊，經9天聆訊後，法庭頒令第一及第二答辯人向呈請人購買公司股票，以2005年5月21日當天價值計算，並由會計師樓負責。

4. 雙方之後未能就股票價值如何計算達成協議，而呈請人亦為保障其利益，向法庭申請並獲得禁制令，防止第一答辯人出售其住所。

5. 2011年9月30日，夏利士法官下令決定公司股票定價為RMB18,888,761.84及呈請人代表律師可將禁制令扣押的金錢（HK$6,301,438.83）給予呈請人。再之後，2012年7月18日，夏法官定出股票交易時間為2012年8月8日，下午3時正，第一答辯人須支付餘款RMB13,769,802.59或HK$16,950,626.99。

6. 不過，第一答辯人未有遵守命令，呈請人於是提出訊問申請。2012年8月16日，何志賢聆案官批准有關申請，但第一答辯人要求上訴，不過，在2013年5月9日，被郭美超暫委法官駁回，兼罰訟費HK$45,383.33。郭法官再頒令指示第一答辯人必須披露過去6年的財務資料等等。

7. 訊問原訂在2013年11月18日進行，但第一答辯人缺席，另他亦無作任何文件披露，歐陽浩榮聆案官於是押後聆訊，再命令他作披露。

8. 2014年3月17日，雖然第一答辯人仍未作完全的文件披露，但為免浪費時間，訊問仍正式展開。之後，在與雙方討論安排後，本席下令：

“ 1. 第一答辯人在2014年4月7日或之前向呈請人代表律師遞交及/或披露以下文件：

(1) 書面同意、容許呈請人代表律師直接向第一答辯人在過去6年（從2013年5月9日起計）所有銀行查詢戶口資料及申領戶口月結單，包括個人、聯名、獨資、與他人合資經營及第一答辯人為戶口授權的簽署人。

(2) 第一答辯人在過去6年（從2013年5月9日起計）以海外公司，包括BVI公司，形式實質或仍然持有的公司（包括九方宏達投資有限公司）的股份。

(3) 偉德利（香港）實業國際有限公司15,000股股份，在2008年8月25日從冠逸國際有限公司轉讓至Citron Inc的一切相關文件。

(4) 冠逸國際有限公司從2011年起至現在的審計財務報表。

(5) 第一答辯人現行香港居所的租約副本。

(6) 第一答辯人擁有的(a)九龍又一居CP3 46號車位及(b)澳門馬交石炮台路13-15-A號金洋花園7樓A座，抵押欠款證明文件及欠款詳情。

2. 有關聆訊押後再作15分鐘提訊。

  3.  ……”

9. 雙方在2014年5月12日返回本席席前作提訊，上述的指示未有（完全）辦妥，本席與雙方討論之後，再排期繼續訊問。

10. 2014年8月4日，債權人仍未取得有關文件，但訊問繼續，再之後，本席下令：

“ 1. 第一答辯人須在2014年9月15日或之前向呈請人代表律師遞交及/或披露以下文件：

(1) 第一答辯人尚未遞交及/或披露由2007年5月9日至2013年5月9日期間的銀行戶口月結單及戶口資料，包括個人、聯名、獨資、與他人合資經營及第一答辯人為戶口授權簽署人，包括但不限於：—

(A) 匯豐銀行戶口號碼458-181195 / 458-181195-888

(B) 恆生銀行戶口號碼266-516702-888

(C) 渣打銀行戶口號碼413-0-069957-1

(D) 中國銀行戶口號碼012-8308456-2

(E) 恆生銀行戶口號碼266-195451-001

(F) 集友銀行戶口號碼039-732-4-001603-6及039-732-4-001606-5；及

(2) 第一答辯人直接或間接在九方宏達投資有限公司及中曜集團有限公司持有股權/股票証明文件；

2. 有關聆訊押後續審，預留3小時；及

3.  ……”

11. 最後，文件仍未（完全）披露，唯呈請人不希望再作押後，2014年11月19日，在完成訊問後，債權人便申請要求法院將債務人監禁。

12. 債權人依賴《高等法院規則》第49B號命令1B(1)條規則：

“(1) 凡在根據第1A條規則…進行的訊問後，法庭信納判定債務人—

(a) 能夠全部或部分履行判決；或

(b) 已對資產作出處置，目的在於逃避全部或部分履行判決，或逃避全部或部分履行屬於判決標的之法律責任；或

(c) 故意不作出根據第1A(2)條規則規定須作出的全面披露，或故意不在根據第48號命令進行的訊問中作出全面披露，或故意不回答根據該條規則或該命令規定須回答的任何問題，

則有酌情決定權，可命令將判定債務人監禁，為期不超逾3個月。”

13. 在聽取雙方陳述後，本席押後判決。

判決及理由

14. 於考慮有關申請時，本席牢記《香港民事程序2015》書第49B/1B/1-3段中提及的原則及案例，當中包括由於涉及監禁，證案標準須如刑事案件一樣，即﹕無合理疑點（beyond reasonable doubt）。

15. 就第一答辯人能夠全部或部分履行判決，張律師在其書面陳述說：

“3. 盡管第一答辯人指稱其個人沒有任何收入及資產，他亦可應付每年160萬元人民幣的支出，此外，從第一答辯人所提供的銀行月結單可見，自2007起，有大量金錢進出涉及第一答辯人的銀行賬戶，就有關金錢的來源，第一答辯人的答案是迴避的及不可信納。”

16. 在細心考慮這方面的投訴後，本席認為它們未能成立。

(a)   每年160萬元人民幣的支出，源自第一答辯人提供的附件8資料：

“…自本人自2008年底至今均處於失業，本人及本人的家庭開支，均為本人向弟弟歐陽大捷借支出。本人每年的支出均為160萬（人民幣）元，具體情況如下：

1、香港住所租賃約30萬/年；

2、兒子學費及生活費約80萬/年；

3、女兒學費及生活費約15萬/年；

4、家庭生活費約25萬/年；

5、母親贍養費約10萬/年。”

(b)  第一答辯人亦在其附件10出解釋；

“1、 包括近6年的家庭生活費、母親的贍養費、投資款等，本人欠本人弟弟約1500萬元人民幣；

2、 欠羅志東400萬元；

3、 欠黎炳均80萬；

4、 欠何儉昉200萬；

 5、 約欠其他債權人300萬。”

(c)   另外，雖然本席同意張律師批評第一答辯人對其賬戶金錢來源有部分迴避之嫌，但最重要的是—債務人必須“現在”能夠全部或部分履行判決（詳見案例Hua Chiao Commercial Bank Ltd v Alpha Plus International Development Ltd, unreported, HCA No 14714 of 1999, 24 February 2001）。因此，2007年-2013年等等的賬目對了解第一答辯人現在的還款能力沒法直接證明；更何況是，從第一答辯人提交附件9中知道，他在國內亦共欠下超過千萬，可謂債務重重。

17. 至於第一答辯人已對資產作出處置，目的在於逃避全部或部分履行判決，張律師書面指出：

“當法院於2007年5月頒令第一答辯人須向呈請人購買其在第三答辯人公司所持有的股份後，第一答辯人對其資產作出以下處置：—

(1) 由第一答辯人及其妻子全資擁有的冠逸所持有於偉德利（香港）有限公司的股份被轉往另一間名為CITRON INC的海外公司；

(2) 於2009年10月份，第一答辯人出售其個人擁有的覺士道物業，作價港幣18,000,000.00；

(3) 於2013年8月份，第一答辯人自行無條件放棄個人在九方及中曜持有的股權”

在口頭陳述時，再補充：

(4) “又一居車位和2008年按揭。”

18. 對這等指控，首先，關於覺士道物業的出售，當然後難成立，因為呈請人已獲法庭頒發禁制令，亦得到賣樓後的餘款；另外，至於賣樓是對資產作出處置，抑或是第一答辯人“經濟”問題，以致“被迫”出售，同樣可能，亦可同時並存，在申請監禁刑事案件的證案準則下，並未達到。

19. 同樣地，股票/權轉移及車位按揭等問題，雖然本席同意張律師的說法，即﹕第一答辯人的回答未能令人滿意亦同樣地未有（完全）披露有關文件，但是本席未能在毫無合理疑點下，確認第一答辯人的目的在於完全或部分履行判決。

20. 最後，第一答辯人是否“故意”不作全面（文件）披露或不回答訊問中的問題？

21. 張律師認為：

“ (1) 第一答辯人未有完全披露其個人之銀行戶口資料（集有銀行039-732-63-03116-2）；

(2) 第一答辯人未有交待其在九方公司持有的股份証明；

(3) 有關偉德利（香港）有限公司的股份轉讓，第一答辯人的解釋為：「當時我都唔清楚係點樣轉。」（請參閱2014年3月17日問訊謄本第36頁第Q至R行。）；

(4) 第一答辯人就其對提出未能提供稅單的問題，其只作出迴避，而最終只以：「我解釋唔到」作出答案；（請參閱2014年8月4日的問訊謄本第5頁第C行至第6頁第L行）；

(5) 第一答辯人亦回避其對大昌行欠款的詳情（請參閱2014年8月4日的問訊謄本第15頁第G至P行）；

(6) 第一答辯人拒絕披露其在港住址（請參閱2014年8月4日的問訊謄本第17頁第N行至18頁第N行）；

(7) 第一答辯人聲稱其須支付每年30萬元的租金支出時，第一答辯人為拒絕透露其個人地址承認其個人無須支付任何租金（請參閱2014年8月4日的問訊謄本第18頁第I至P行）；

(8) 而被問到有關其戶口資料時，特別是為數不少的存款來源時，第一答辯人承認有從國內直接匯款給其妻子（請參閱2014年8月4日的問訊謄本第36頁第B行），但並未能提供任何可信納的解釋，只表示：

(i) 可能是源於其之前給予其妻子的不少於300萬港元現金（請參閱2014年8月4日的問訊謄本第27頁第Q行至第28頁第E行）；

(ii) 「唔知道」（請參閱2014年8月4日的問訊謄本第33頁第R行）；及

(iii) 大部分向其弟弟借取（請參閱2014年8月4日的問訊謄本第36頁第F至G行）。”

22. 對於第一答辯人回答張律師的問題，本席同意部分確是未能令人信服，不過，同時間，本席亦考慮到事情發生的時間、細節，第一答辯人當時面對的各種壓力，姑且接受證案標準未能達到。

23. 但是，文件披露一事，本席認為，第一答辯人在無合理疑點的標準下，確是故意不作全面披露—上文第21段(1)及(5)項。

(a)訊問命令由2012年8月16日開始生效。

(b)第一答辯人對此不滿，提出上訴，在2013年5月9日被駁回，法官隨即頒下披露細節。

(c)在上述期間，第一答辯人均有法律代表，直至2013年9月11日，第一答辯人才開始自辯。

(d)訊問原訂3小時，由於文件未有完全披露，以致押後3次，而在2014年3月17日及2014年8月4日，法庭再口頭解釋，加上再以書面方式指示第一答辯人再遞交文件，但仍不得要領。

(e)其間，張律師亦分別在2014年9月11日、9月22日、9月26日及11月7日去信第一答辯人仍然未有披露文件，亦不果。

(f)最後，本席當然亦明白，有時候，當事人可能沒有能力或金錢去取得文件，所以已特別容許第一答辯人以書面授權方式讓呈請人（付款）跟進文件；可惜，結果是﹕簽名不符，而第一答辯人再沒協助呈請人代表律師了。

監禁及刑期

24. 第一答辯人故意不作全面文件披露的投訴既然成立，法院便有酌情權決定是否監禁他，就這方面，雙方均未有特別著墨，但本席認為監禁是適合的懲罰，以應對第一答辯人的不合作或敷衍態度。

25. 至於刑期，張律師未有提交任何案例，只將之交由法院決定。故意未有完全披露文件自然不當，它浪費法庭時間及呈請人的金錢，亦令人無法知清真實的情況，但第一答辯人已作部分披露，而由於也不是完全漠視法院命令，在這情況下，本席認為14天監禁屬合適的決定，而呈請人須支付有關監禁費用，共$8,400（$600 x 14）。

26. 最後，有關本監禁申請的訟費，本席以暫時訟費命令(costs order nisi)方式處理，將之評估為$12,000 ($4,000 x 3)，如任何一方不同意，可在14天內提出更改申請。

HCCW 504/2005

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES (WINDING-UP) NO 504 OF 2005

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REASONS  FOR  DECISION

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1.  This is an appeal from the Decision of Master A. Ho dated 11 January 2013 dismissing the first respondent’s application to set aside the order made by Master A. Ho dated 16 August 2012 for the examination of the first respondent under Order 49B upon his failure to complete the sale and purchase of the petitioner’s shares in accordance with the order made by Harris J on 18 July 2012. The short point of law that arises in this appeal is whether a buyout order which has not been complied with constitutes a "judgment debt" for the purposes of Order 49B of the Rules of the High Court. At the conclusion of the hearing, the appeal was dismissed with costs. My reasons appear below.

Background facts

2.  The matter arises in this way. The petitioner obtained an order dated 30 May 2007 (and amended on 22 September 2009) after trial in proceedings brought under section 168A and 177 (1) (f) of the Companies Ordinance that the first and second respondents purchase the shares held by him in the company. Pursuant to the buyout order a valuation was made but that process took an inordinate length of time.

3.  On 30 September 2011, Harris J ordered that the value of the Petitioner’s shares as between the petitioner and the first respondent be fixed at RMB 18,888,761.84 and allowed the amount of approximately HK$6.3 million held by the solicitors then acting for the petitioner as stakeholder to be released to the petitioner in part satisfaction of that sum.

4.  On 18 July 2012 Harris J ordered that completion of the sale and purchase of the petitioner's shares with the first respondent take place at the head office of the petitioner's solicitors firm on or before 8 August 2012 ("the completion date"). The order required that at completion the first respondent give a cashier order/solicitors cheque drawn in favour of the petitioner in the sum of RMB 13,769,802.59 and the petitioner to execute and deliver all documents for the purpose of effecting the transfer of the petitioner's shares to the first respondent. The order further provided that should the first respondent fail to complete the sale and purchase on the completion date, the first respondent shall pay interest on the balance of the value of the petitioner's shares at judgment rate from the completion date until full payment.

5.  Completion did not take place on the completion date. That appears from the letter dated the 11 August 2012 from the petitioner’s solicitors to the first respondent's solicitors stating that the first respondent failed and/or refused to complete as required by the order.

6.  Upon the petitioner's ex parte application, Master Ho made an order on 16 August 2012 that the first respondent attend and be orally examined pursuant to RHC Order 49B as to whether any and what debts are due to him and whether the first respondent has any and what other property or means of satisfying the order.

Judgment debt

7.  Mr Bell SC who appeared for the first respondent submitted that the order did not create any judgment debt. Nothing was due and payable on the making of the order. Unlike an ordinary money judgment, it did not create an immediate obligation to pay. At best, it created a future debt, an obligation that could arise in the future i.e. on 8 August 2012. It was contingent on the petitioner being able to comply with his obligations in the future. He submitted that Order 49B does not apply because in the circumstances of this case there was no judgment debt.

8.  Mr Bell further refined his submission and submitted that if a judgment is not a judgment debt at the time it is made because it depends on a contingency, then the subsequent acts of the parties cannot convert it into a judgment debt. Mr Bell is effectively saying that a judgment debt must be such at inception, that is to say, created and brought into existence at the time of judgment was pronounced.

9.  Mr Bell placed considerable reliance on a passage in the judgment of Lindley LJ in Webb v Stenton and others, Garnishees (1883) 11 QBD 518 where the court had to consider whether, on the true construction of Order XlV, r. 2 under the English rules, there was a debt due and owing to the debtor which could be attached. It was in that context that Lindley LJ stated that:

"a debt is a sum of money which is now payable or will become payable in the future by reason of the present obligation, debitum in presenti, solvendum in futuro. An accruing debt, therefore, is a debt not yet actually payable, but a debt which is represented by an existing obligation."

10.  I accept that to be a correct statement of a "debt" but I do not see how it assists Mr Bell.

11.  For Order 49B to apply, there must be "a judgment for the payment of a specified sum of money that is, wholly or partly, unsatisfied ...". So, the question that has to be considered is whether in the present case there is such a judgment.

12.  Mr Keith Lam, counsel for the petitioner, submitted that a buyout order with a fixed purchase price and date of payment satisfies that condition. In essence the buyout order made in the present case involves (1) the purchaser paying the purchase price to the seller on the completion date, and (2) the seller transferring his shares in the company to the purchaser.

13.  Mr Lam referred to Duke of Beaufort v Phillips (1847) 1 De G & Sm 321; 63 E R 1087, where the Vice Chancellor took the view that a purchaser in default under the decree for specific performance is a judgment debtor. In that case, after a decree of specific performance had been made in favour of the plaintiff vendor under a contract for the sale of land and before the conveyance was settled the purchaser died. Sir J L Knight Bruce VC considered that the decree made was:

"substantially an order to pay a definite sum and a final adjudication. It must be placed on the footing of the judgment, and the Plaintiff must rank as a creditor accordingly for what should remain due after the proceeds of the estate were exhausted, for principal and interest".

14.  Mr Bell submitted that the Duke of Beaufort case was unhelpful because it was decided many years ago and the reasoning is 'sparse'. I note, in passing, that it was decided only 40 years earlier than Webb v Stenton. In any event, a buyout order is similar in nature to a decree for specific performance. In substance, there is no discernible difference. In my view, both the Beaufort case and Webb v Stenton provide support that on the facts of the present case there is a judgment debt which satisfies Order 49B.

15.  In my view, the order had the effect of creating binding obligations as from the making of the order on both the petitioner and the first respondent to be performed on the completion date. The obligations came into being when the order was made although performance was not due until 18 August 2012 and was not contingent on the other party performing his obligations. Non‑performance by a party of his obligations would constitute a breach of that party's obligations but would not relieve the other party from having to perform his own obligations. If, for example, the petitioner were to refuse to carry out his obligations, he would be in breach of the terms of the order but it would not relieve the first respondent from having to make the payment ordered by the court. It is for that reason that I consider that the effect of the order was to create a present obligation on the part of the first respondent to make payment on the date specified. That obligation was not contingent on any event and payment had to be made on the completion date.

16.  It should be mentioned that although it was said in Mr Bell's skeleton submissions that there was a complete absence of evidence that the petitioner was ready, willing and able to transfer the shares and to comply with this other obligations on completion, at the outset of the hearing, Mr Bell retracted that submission and accepted that there is evidence that the petitioner was ready, able and willing to comply with its obligations.

17.  In any event, the point about the absence of evidence showing the petitioner's willingness to perform his obligations is misconceived. It is irrelevant to the question whether or not there is a judgment debt for the purposes of Order 49B. Further, the point is bad not only because it was not a matter that was raised in the first respondent's affirmation but also because there is not a shred of evidence to support it.

Discretion

18.  It should be mentioned that in the course of his submissions, Mr Bell raised a new point which is that the first respondent should not have resorted to Order 49B which he noted was described as a "draconian order" in the editorial introduction to that order. Rather, it was suggested that an application should have been made under Order 48 for oral examination.

19.  While there are certain differences between Orders 48 and 49B, they share a common purpose which is to find out whether the debtor has any means of satisfying the liability under the judgment order of the payment, whether wholly or partially: see the Court of Appeal's decision in Poon Ting Chau v Wong Kwok Chi, unreported, CACV 65/2007, February 19, 2009. There is no hierarchy among the orders as to which should be used first. I do not consider that there is any substance in the point sought to be made by Mr Bell.

HCCW504/2005

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES WINDING-UP PROCEEDINGS

NO. 504 OF 2005

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BETWEEN

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J U D G M E N T

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1.  The order that I made on 14 October 2010 for the appointment of Sum, Arthur & Co. specifically refers to that firm being appointed at the joint valuer of the Petitioner and the 1st Respondent.  This was because that was what was asked for in the Petitioner’s summons of 1 September 2010.

2.  The 2nd Respondent had not attended court on 14 October 2010 and it appears that that hearing proceeded on the basis that he was absent, although Mr Chan suggested to me today that his solicitors, which were the same as the 1st Respondent’s solicitors, were still on the record.

3.  What appears to be sought today by the Petitioner is an order which states clearly what the value of the Petitioner’s shares are and also an order that money held by the Petitioner’s solicitors as stakeholders can be released to the Petitioner.

4.  I do not have any difficulty making an order dealing with the valuation of the shares as between the Petitioner and the 1st Respondent, but it seems to me that having quite specifically restricted what was sought on 14 October to the 1st Respondent, it would be inappropriate for me to now produce an order which referred to both Respondents.  The Petitioner will have to consider what, if anything, is appropriate for them to do in respect of the 2nd Respondent.  It does not, however, seem to me that this prevents me from making an order that the Petitioner’s solicitors may release the money they hold as stakeholder to their client.

5.  I will, therefore, make the following order.:

(1)   That the value of the Petitioner’s shares as between the Petitioner and the 1st Respondent determined pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the judgment of Recorder A Ho, SC, dated 30 May 2007, and the order of Harris J dated 14 October 2010 is RMB18,888,761.84.

(2)   The Petitioner’s solicitors may release to the Petitioner the sums held by them as stakeholder pursuant to the order of Deputy Judge To of 9 July 2009.

(3)   The costs of this application be paid by the 1st and 2nd Respondents to the Petitioner, to be taxed if not agreed.

(Submissions by counsel on interest)

(4)   Application adjourned sine die.

(5)   No order as to costs of today.