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Building Management Application2005

王吟珍 訴 冠華園業主立案法團

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52616-EN-2006-05-30

王吟珍 v. 冠華園業主立案法團

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LDBM 285/2005

IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

Building Management Application No. LDBM 285 of 2005

________________

BETWEEN

王吟珍 Applicant
and
冠華園業主立案法團Respondent

________________

Coram: Deputy Judge WONG, Presiding Officer, Lands Tribunal

Date of Hearing:  8 May 2006

Date of Handing Down of Decision:   30 May 2006

_______________

DECISION

________________

1. This is an application made by the Applicant to vary the costs order nisi made on 3 March 2006.  On 3 March 2006, I handed down the written judgment in this case whereby the Applicant’s application was dismissed.  I also granted an order nisi that the Applicant do pay costs to the Respondent with certificate for counsel and to be taxed on District Court scale if not agreed.  The Applicant now applies by way of summons dated 15 March 2006 to vary the costs order nisi to “no order as to costs”.

2. Section 12(1) of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance stipulates that “the Tribunal may award costs to and against any party to any proceedings and may order that those costs be taxed on the basis of any one of the Scales of Costs set out in the Schedules to Order 62 of (a) the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4 sub. Leg. A); or (b) the Rules of the District Court (Cap. 336 sub. Leg. H).”

3. Section 12(2) of the Lands tribunal Ordinance further stipulates that “Order 62 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap. 4 sub. Leg. A) shall apply to the award, taxation and recovery of costs in the Tribunal.”  Thus, it is clear that Order 62 of the Rules of High Court applies in the Lands Tribunal: see Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2006, paragraph 62/2/3.

4. There is no dispute that the Lands Tribunal, like the High Court, has wide discretion in awarding costs, but it is a judicial discretion, and must be exercised on fixed principles, that is according to rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion: see Sharpe v. Wakefield [1891] A.C. 173.

5. The general principle is that costs should follow the event, i.e. the winning party should get costs from the losing party.  Order 62, rule 3(2) of the Rules of the High Court provides that “If the Court in the exercise of its discretion sees fit to make any order as to the costs of or incidental to any proceedings, the Court shall, subject to this Order, order the costs to follow the event, except when it appears to the Court that in the circumstances of the case some other order should be made as to the whole or any part of the costs.”  Thus, the Applicant, as the losing party, should pay costs to the Respondent unless there are other circumstances in the case warranting a different costs order.

6. The Applicant relies on two grounds to submit that the Respondent should not be entitled to costs.  The first ground is that the Respondent cannot be regarded as a “successful party” for costs purpose, and the second ground is that there were misconducts on the part of the Respondent.

7. On the first ground, the Applicant submits that each and every committee member of the Respondent failed to conduct correctly in respect of the missing $900, and I have found in my judgment that it was wrong to use the Respondent’s money to pay for the repair cost of a private unit’s iron gate.  The Applicant further submits that each and every committee member of the Respondent (and for and on behalf of the Respondent) wrongly held that Mr. Hui Siu Fung was qualified to be a committee member of the Respondent, and I have held that it was wrong for the Respondent to think that the Building Management Ordinance (“the BMO”) does not require a member of the management committee to be an owner.

8. As far as the $900 is concerned, the Respondent never alleged that it was right to use the $900 on the repair of private property.  The Respondent’s case was that they were not aware of such use and when it was discovered, they immediately asked the former chairman Mr. Sze to go with their lawyer to report the matter to the police.  The police did not charge anyone after investigation.  The present chairman Mr. Watt also donated $900 to the Respondent to avoid the present litigation.

9. Thus, when I wrote in my judgment that it was wrong to use the Respondent’s money, I did not mean that the Respondent lost on their case.  On the contrary, in my judgment, I expressly found that the Applicant’s evidence could not establish who authorized the use of the $900.  I also found that the Applicant was wrong to claim against the Respondent even if she could prove that Mr. Sze or Mdm. Lee had authorized the use of the $900, because her claim should be directed to Mr. Sze or Mdm. Lee instead of the Respondent.  Moreover, the Applicant’s claim against the Respondent was that the Respondent did not handle the matter properly, but I found that the Respondent had taken proper steps to deal with the matter.  So it is clear that the Applicant had failed in her case against the Respondent.  The Respondent must be a successful party in this regard.

10. As to the qualification of Mr. Hui, it was wrong for the Respondent to contend that there was no requirement under the BMO that a committee member had to be an owner.  However, it does not mean that the Applicant has established her case against the Respondent.  The Applicant’s case was that the Respondent’s management committee could not operate when Mr. Hui was not a proper member, but I found that the management committee could still operate and it could appoint another person to replace Mr. Hui.  Thus, the Applicant has clearly lost her case against the Respondent in this regard as well.

11. The Applicant argues that she is just a layman and could not phrase her claim properly.  I do not accept this argument.  The Applicant, even as a layman, should make sure that her claim was properly stated in the Notice of Application, because the Respondent had to defend such claim as stated in the Notice of Application.  The Applicant’s contention was that the Respondent’s management committee could not operate but my finding is that it could.  So the Respondent was successful in defending such claim.  Even if the Applicant was successful in one of the issues, it does not meant that the Respondent should be deprived of the costs in defending the claim.

12. The Applicant also argues that in bringing the present action, she was acting in good faith for good reasons and justice and for the interests of all the members of the Respondent.  I do not agree that good faith is a factor that I should take into account in considering costs.  Very often, parties bringing actions against others were acting in good faith, but if the claims were wrong they should bear the costs.  The Applicant is no exception.  If such a party could avoid the legal consequence of bearing costs, it means that the other party being sued would suffer loss as a result of a wrongful claim and it would be unfair to the other party.

13. On the second ground of misconduct, the Applicant submits that she had exhausted her ways to request and demand the Respondent to rectify its wrong doing, but the Respondent rejected all her requests and demands.  The Respondent failed to conduct further actions to investigate the missing $900 and to recover the same.  Despite the legal advice given and the advice of the representative from Kowloon City District Office and District Board Members, the Respondent continued its misconduct in allowing Mr. Hui to be a member.  The Respondent also induced the Applicant to bring the case to the Tribunal.

14. The Applicant relies on the decision of Atkin L.J. in Ritter v. Godfrey [1920] 2 K.B. 47 to submit that “In the case of a wholly successful defendant the judge must award him costs unless there is evidence: (1) That the defendant brought about the litigation; or (2) has done something connected with the institution or the conduct of the suit calculated to occasion unnecessary litigation and expense; or (3) has done some wrongful act in the course of the transaction of which the plaintiff complains.” (see also Hong Kong Civil Procedure, paragraph 62/3/3.)

15. The Applicant refers to the minutes of various owners’ meetings and correspondence to try to show that the Respondent had asked the Applicant to bring about the present litigation.  I do not accept the Applicant’s contention in this regard.  The evidence shows that the Respondent had reported the matter about the $900 to the police, but the police did not take any action.  So it is not a case that the Respondent did not do anything.  As to the qualification of Mr. Hui, the Respondent held the view that Mr. Hui could be a member.  This is a legal issue.  Even when the Respondent was wrong on this legal issue, it does not mean that the Respondent had misconducted itself.  There is nothing wrong for the Respondent to suggest to the Applicant to take this legal issue to court as only the court can resolve this legal issue.  So I do not find any misconduct on the part of the Respondent.  

16. By reasons aforesaid, the Applicant fails to establish any ground that could deprive the Respondent of its costs.  The normal costs order should therefore apply.

17.  In the circumstances, I order as follows:-

(1)  The application by way of summons dated 15 March 2006 be dismissed.

(2)  The costs order nisi of 3 March 2006 be made absolute.

(3)  Costs order nisi for the summons dated 15 March 2006: The Applicant do pay costs of the summons dated 15 March 2006 to the Respondent with certificate for counsel, to be taxed on District Court Scale if not agreed.  If there is no application for costs in relation to the said summons within 14 days, this costs order nisi shall become absolute.

Deputy Judge WONG
Presiding Officer
Lands Tribunal

Mr. WONG Tak Hing, of M/S T.H. Wong & Co., for the Applicant.

Mr. Stephen FONG, instructed by M/S Damien Shea & Co., for the Respondent.

52717-CH-2006-03-03

王吟珍 訴 冠華園業主立案法團

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LDBM 285/2005

香港特別行政區

土地審裁處

建築物管理申請編號2005年第285號

 

王吟珍申請人
及
冠華園業主立案法團答辯人

 

主審法官 : 黃一鳴暫委法官

審訊日期 : 2006年2月20日

頒下判案書日期 : 2006年3月3日

 

_______________

判    案    書

_______________

 

背景

1. 申請人為香港九龍窩打老道84號冠華園 (“該大廈”) A座16字樓3室之業主。答辯人為該大廈之業主立案法團。申請人的申請是要向答辯人之管理委員會委員追討900元及要求解散管理委員會。

2. 根據申請人再次修改的申請通知書,申請人指稱答辯人有委員擅自挪用法團公款900元繳付委員李夏紅個人之單位鐵閘修理費。申請人及多位業主曾向答辯人之管理委員會提出不應動用公款支付這項費用,並要求當事人將這筆款項交回答辯人,可惜答辯人的委員一直沒有正確處理這事情。

3. 申請人又指稱答辯人之管理委員會委員人數由始至今未能達至《建築物管理條例》(“該條例”) 的要求,因為當中一名委員許兆豐先生並非該大廈之業主。因此,申請人認為答辯人之管理委員會運作無效,須要解散。

4. 答辯人不同意申請人的申請。答辯人指稱其委員對於有900元用作鐵閘修理的事情毫不知情,原因是上任主席施松章先生將法團帳目扣起。當各委員收到申請人於2005年4月19日有關900元的投訴後,第一時間要求施先生和答辯人的法律顧問一同到警署備案。警方調查後,沒有對任何人作出任何指控。施先生於2005年4月30日辭去主席一職,並交出有關文件。其後,屈富仁先生當選為法團主席,並在沒有承認任何責任的基礎上捐出900元給答辯人作為抵銷申請人的追討和避免這宗訴訟。

5. 至於答辯人的管理委員會是否有效,答辯人則不同意有委員在沒有法律認可的身分成為委員。答辯人認為許兆豐先生雖然並非註冊業主,但其父親許秋偉先生是有關單位之註冊業主,並授權許兆豐先生全權代表他處理有關單位的所有事務。答辯人認為許兆豐先生是可以以業主授權人身分去參選和當選委員。

爭議事項

6. 基於雙方的案情,本席須要就以下的爭議事項作出裁決:-

(1)答辯人是否須要為用於鐵閘修理的900元負責;及

(2)答辯人之管理委員會是否因為許兆豐先生不是業主而無效。

鐵閘修理費

7. 申請人是於2005年3月10日在管理處安排陪同下,查閱大廈收支和單據時,發現有一維修單沒有法團主席蓋章及兩委員簽署。在詢問之下,申請人才知道該維修單是支付秘書李夏紅女士之單位的鐵閘修理費。當時的法團主席施先生否認有批核過該維修單,而其他委員亦否認有見過該維修單。李女士更指稱她連鐵閘是何時被修理也不知道。

8. 無何否認,用法團公款去支付私人單位鐵閘維修費用並不妥當,不過,申請人在本案中所提供的證據並不能確立這筆款項是由誰人批准支付。根據當時的管理公司,港基物業管理有限公司,於2005年4月1日發給當時主席施先生的信件,管理公司指稱是在施先生同意之情況下才安排由大廈帳戶內支付。管理公司亦於2005年4月12日發信給各業主作出同樣的指稱。不過這些都是傳聞證供,未獲施先生確認,申請人亦沒有傳召管理公司的有關人士出庭作證。

9. 不過,有關的單據並沒有主席蓋章或委員簽署,如果管理公司的指控是對的話,管理公司不可能不要求施先生蓋章簽署或以其他方式確認有關批准,因為這並非一般的開支。因此,本席不認為上述的傳聞證供可以證明施先生批准管理公司動用有關的款項。

10. 根據申請人及其證人黃小娟和宋小君的證供,管理公司駐該大廈的主管侯香如女士曾指稱以900元修理鐵閘是李夏紅女士允許才進行,但李女士否認有此事。同樣,侯女士的指稱亦只是傳聞證供,侯女士並沒有出庭作證。李女士雖然是法團秘書,但本席不相信管理公司會單靠李女士的指示,而沒有任何的書面確認去動用公款支付李女士的私人用途。因此,本席亦不認為申請人可以證明李女士有允許動用有關款項。

11.    申請人完全沒有證據顯示其他委員有批准動用有關款項。申請人認為由於有關的900元在答辯人的帳目內出現,答辯人的司庫及管理委員會必定知情及同意有關的開支。本席並不同意申請人的見解。這筆款項的確是從答辯人的帳戶支出,答辯人的帳目不可能不列出這項開支,但這並不等同答辯人或其委員是同意這項開支。再者,根據答辯人的證供,施先生曾扣起所有文件,其他委員未能查閱有關文件。申請人並沒有就這點提出反證。本席接受答辯人這方面的證供。因此,除了施先生之外,其他委員根本不可能在事發時知道或同意有關支出。

12.   申請人現時的申請並非針對施先生、李女士或其他委員個別提出,而是針對整個法團,即答辯人,而提出。申請人必須證明答辯人整體要為有關款項負責。即使申請人能證明施先生、李女士或其他個別人士須要為有關款項負責,這並不等於答辯人亦須為這些人士的行為負責。批准公款作私人用途並不是法團可以批准的事情。如果有個別委員私自批准有關開支,而未經法團同意,這些人士應個別為這些行為負責,因此即使申請人能證明施先生或李女士有批准有關開支,申請人亦只能針對施先生或李女士個人提出申請,而不應向答辯人提出申請。

13. 再者,申請人現時的指控是指答辯人未有正確處理動用900元一事,因答辯人以警方不理為借口不處理事情及要求申請人起訴他們。不過,答辯人已在申請人投訴後,即時報警處理,只不過警方不願作進一步跟進。新主席屈先生亦捐出900元來彌補法團的損失。本席認為答辯人己採用了適當的行動處理有關事件。即使答辯人未有在事後妥善處理這事情,這亦不等於答辯人須要為有關的款項負責。

14.   基於上述理由,本席裁定答辯人不須為有關之900元負上任何責任。

管理委員會是否有效

15. 答辯人對於許兆豐先生不是註冊業主這方面並沒有爭議,但答辯人提出許兆豐其實是原先簽定買賣合約購入有關單位之業主,不過其後提名其父親為註冊擁有人。答辯人又認為管理委員會不一定由業主當管理委員會委員,可以由業主的授權人當委員,因為該條例並沒有規定業主授權人不可以是委員。

16. 本席不接受答辯人這方面的論點。首先該條例第2條將“業主”定義為“(a)土地註冊處紀錄顯示,當其時擁有一幅上有建築物土地的一份不可分割份數的人;及(b)管有該份數的已登記承按人”。很明顯,根據上述的定義,業主必須是在土地註冊處有登記的人士,而許兆豐先生並非業主。

17. 根據該條例附表2第2(1)(a)   段的規定,除了租客代表及公契另有規定外,管理委員會的委員必須是業主之間互選出來的業主。第(2)(1)(a)段的條文如下:

“除第(2)節另有規定外,業主在根據第3、3A、4或40C條召開的會議上 -

(a) 而會議是 –

(i)根據第3條召開的,須以互選方式或按照公契(如有的話)規定,委任管理委員會;或

(ii)在其他情況下召開,須以互選方式委任管理委員會委員;”

18. 再者,該條例附表2第4(2)(e)段亦說明如果有委員是以業主身分獲委任為委員,而當不再是業主時,便必須停任委員。

19. 由上述條文可見,答辯人認為該條例並無規定必須由業主作管理委員會委員的論點並不正確。

20. 再者,除了法人團體可根據該條例附表2第11段委任授權代表出任管理委員會委員外,該條例並沒有容許其他業主委任授權代表出任委員一職。本席認為如果該條例是容許其他業主委任授權代表的話,必定會如附表2第11段一樣淸楚寫明業主可以這樣做。在沒有寫明的情況下,業主必須是業主,而不是業主的授權人。

21. 該大廈公契亦沒有任何條文說明業主可委任授權人出任管理委員會委員。因此,許兆豐先生並不能根據該條例或該大廈公契成為管理委員會委員。

22. 該大廈有多過100個單位,根據該條例附表2第1(a)(iii)段的規定,該大廈必須有不少於9人為管理委員會委員。正如上述一樣,許兆豐不符合資格成為委員,那麼答辯人的管理委員會只得8人,不符合附表2第1(a)(iii)段的規定。申請人亦因此而認為答辯人的管理委員會不能運作,須要解散。

23. 不過,申請人忽略了該條例附表2第6段的規定,其條文如下:-

“6.(1)除第 (1A)及 (1B) 節另有規定外,管理委員會如有委員職位臨時出缺,可由管理委員會委任他人填補。
 (1A)租客代表因任何理由停任管理委員會委員而造成的臨時空缺,可由認可組織 (第15(2)條所指者) 根據第15(1)條委任一名新租客代表填補。(由1993年第27號第39條增補)
 (1B)如管理委員會的主席或副主席 (如有的話) 的職位臨時出缺—
  (a) 法團可藉由管理委員會為有關目的而根據附表3第1(1)(c)段召開的業主大會所通過的決議,委任一名業主填補該空缺,直至法團的下一次業主周年大會為止;或
  (b) 在並無如此召開業主大會的情況下,管理委員會各委員可互選委任一名業主署理主席或副主席 (視屬何情況而定) 職位,直至法團的下一次業主周年大會為止。(由1993年第27號第39條增補)
 (2)管理委員會臨時出現的空缺如屬任何其他職位,管理委員會可委任一名業主或其他人填補該職位,直至下一次業主周年大會為止。”

24. 由上述條文可見,如果管理委員會人數不足的時候,其實是可以由管理委員會委任他人填補空缺。所以,雖然許兆豐先生不能成為委員,答辯人的管理委員會其實是可以委任其他人士來填補許兆豐先生的空缺,管理委員會絕對不會因為有空缺而不能運作,亦不需解散。

25. 基於上述理由,本席裁定答辯人之管理委員會不會因為許兆豐先生不是業主而無效。

總結

26. 由於申請人兩項申請都不能成立,本席裁定申請人的申請敗訴。

27. 本席現頒令如下:-

          (1) 撤銷申請人本案之申請;及

(2)  臨時訟費命令:申請人須支付答辯人本案之訟費,包括大律師證書,如果雙方未能就數額達成協議,則由法庭以區域法院基準釐定,如果雙方不在14天內提出訟費申請,則此項臨時訟費命令作實。

 

 

黃一鳴暫委法官
土地審裁處

 

申請人:親自應訊。

答辯人:由佘英輝律師行轉聘方漢權大律師代表應訊。