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Miscellaneous References Application2005

TSAN LUK YUK YIN v. THE SECRETARY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, TRANSPORT AND WORKS

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92942-EN-2014-09-04

TSAN LUK YUK YIN v. THE SECRETARY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, TRANSPORT AND WORKS

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LDMR 3/2005

IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MISCELLANEOUS REFERENCE APPLICATION NO. 3 OF 2005

_________________

BETWEEN
TSAN Luk Yuk Yin (as the trustee for TSANG Hing Kwong Thomas (2/4 shares), TSAN Hing Him Lana (1/4 share) and TSAN Hing Tat Heidi (1/4 share) being tenants in common as the beneficiaries) Applicant
and
The Secretary for the Environment, Transport and Works Respondent

_________________

Before:Deputy Judge KOT, Presiding Officer, Lands Tribunal and
 Mr. Lawrence PANG, Member of the Lands Tribunal
Dates of Filing of Written Submissions by Applicant: 7 & 22 July 2014
Dates of Filing of Written Submissions by Respondent: 8 & 22 July 2014
Further Reply of the Parties: 29 August 2014 & 1 September 2014
Date of Decision: 4 September 2014

_________________

D E C I S I O N

_________________

 

Background

1.  The application by the applicant for determination of compensation pursuant to sections 13, 27 and 29 of the Roads (Works, Use and Compensation) Ordinance (“Cap. 370”) was heard by this Tribunal with judgment handed down on 9 May 2014 (“the Judgment”).  The background of this case can be found in the Judgment and we are not going to repeat here.

2.  In the Judgment, it is ordered that :

(a) the respondent do pay the applicant compensation for the Lots in the sum of $20,600,000 (“the Compensation”); and

(b) the matters of professional fees, interest and costs shall be adjourned to a date to be fixed, with liberty to apply for any other ancillary and consequential matters (§81 of the Judgment).

3.  By way of a consent order, parties agreed for the issue of professional fees, interest and costs (“Outstanding Issues”) to be dealt with by way of paper application. This is our ruling on the Outstanding Issues.

4.  It is not in dispute that the Compensation fails to beat the offer of $26,107,347 made by the respondent to the applicant by way of letter dated 12 April 2007 (“the Offer”).

5.  And it is also not in dispute that, after deducting the provisional payment previously made by the respondent (“Provisional Payment”), the balance of the Compensation payable is $4,226,300 which had already been paid on 14 July 2014.

Interest

6.  It is agreed between the parties that interest for the Compensation should be differentiated into 4 periods, namely :

(a) From 24 June 1997 to 2 July 2000 (“the 1st Period”);

(b) From 3 July 2000 to 2 October 2000 (“the 2nd Period”);

(c) From 3 October 2000 to 11 April 2001 (“the 3rd Period”); and

(d) From 12 April 2001 onwards (“the 4th Period”).

7.  The disagreement falls on the interest rate to be adopted for the 1st, 3rd and 4th Period.

8.  It is the respondent’s contention that for the 2nd Period, the interest rate should be fixed in accordance with Section 13(2)(b) of the Interest Rates (Miscellaneous Amendments) Ordinance, i.e. “at the lowest interest paid by members of The Hong Kong Association of Banks on time deposits on 2 July 2000”. The applicant has no argument on this and accepted this should be the interest rate adopted for the 2nd Period.

9.  For the 1st, 3rd and 4th Period, the respondent submitted that the lowest rate, i.e. a 24 hours’ call deposit rate (“the Lowest Deposit Rate”) should be adopted in the calculation of interest for these periods.

10.  The applicant disagrees and contended that the interest rate for the 1st Period should be the Lowest Deposit Rate + 1% whilst Prime + 1% should be adopted for the 3rd and 4th Period.

1st Period

11.  Section 17(3A) of the then Lands Resumption Ordinance (“s.17(3A)”) stated that :

“The rate of interest for the purposes of subsection (3) shall be such rate as the Lands Tribunal may fix having regard to the lowest rate payable from time to time by members of The Hong Kong Association of Banks on time deposits.”

12.  Parties agreed that s.17(3A) is applicable in the consideration of interest rate as far as the 1st Period is concerned.  It is also not in dispute that in Director of Buildings and Lands v Shun Fung Ironworks Ltd [1995] 2 AC 111, it was held that :

“… in requiring the tribunal to have regard to the lowest time deposit rate, the legislative purpose must be that this should be the rate fixed by the tribunal unless in the particular case there is good reason for departing from it.”

13.  Mr. Mok for the respondent relied upon the judgment of Shun Fung (supra) and Li Po Chun Estate Ltd v Director of Lands (No. 1) [1997] CPR 330 and submitted that the interest rate for the 1st period should be the lowest time deposit interest rate, i.e. a 24 hours’ call deposit rate.

14.  Mr. Khaw for the applicant contended that there is no reason why the applicant should suffer an extremely low interest rate for this period which has been caused by the Government’s inordinate delay in making the offer for Provisional Payment in March 2001[1]. This should provide a good reason for an increase of 1 % on the interest rate in respect of the 1st Period as what the Tribunal in Li Po Chun had found.

15.  In Shun Fung, the Privy Council had said the followings about good reason :

“The rate specified is a low one, but the legislature must be taken to have intended that ordinarily this should be adequate recompense to a claimant for being kept out of his money. This would not cover a case where one of the parties has behaved unreasonably, and by his conduct protracted the time taken in determining the claim. In a suitable case that could furnish good reason for the tribunal fixing a higher or lower rate, depending on who was at fault.”

16.  Delay is apparently a factor to be considered in deciding whether good reason is established.  It is a fact that the Provisional Payment was only agreed and paid on 22 March 2001, i.e. 4 years after the resumption.  But we found the delay in the present case can be distinguished from the scenario in Li Po Chun in which the Government had delayed in the payment of the agreed compensation, a delay found to be “unreasonable and unjustified”.

17.  The only evidence before this Tribunal concerning the course of event leading to the Provisional Payment comes from the witness statement of Mr. Tsang dated 28 June 2006[2].  The chronology is summarised as follows :


24 April 1997

Date of resumption

24 February 1998

District Land Office (“DLO”) invited the applicant to submit a written claim

23 June 1998

A claim of compensation registered with the DLO without valuation report

19 August 1998

Valuation report submitted together with a claim for compensation

11 November 1998

Applicant revised the amount of claim

10 February 1999

Further clarification raised by DLO

10 March 1999

Applicant requested the Government to issue a compensation offer

20 January 2000

DLO requested the applicant to prove its good title

9 February 2000

Solicitor for applicant submitted title documents of the Lots to DLO

22 March 2001

Agreement and payment of Provisional Payment

18.  It is apparent from the chronology above that during the 4 years period, the applicant had only finalised its amount of claim by late 1998 and upon being satisfied with the applicant’s title in early 2000, the Provisional Payment was agreed and settled in March 2001.  We found the delay is not solely caused by the respondent and even if it were, it’s far from “unreasonable and unjustified”. 

19.  We found the applicant had failed to show a good reason to justify a departure from the Lowest Deposit Rate which should be adopted as the interest rate for the 1st Period.

3rd & 4th Period

20.  It is not in dispute that the current Section 13(4) of the Interest Rates (Miscellaneous Amendments) Ordinance 2001 (“s.13(4)”) and Section 17(3B) of the current Lands Resumption Ordinance (“s.17(3B)”) are applicable in the consideration of interest for the 3rd and 4th Period respectively (these legal provisions are collectively called the “Legal Provisions”).  Terms of the Legal Provisions are more or less identical which stipulate that the rate of interest fixed should be :

(a)     in respect of a working day must not be lower than the lowest of the interest rates paid on deposits at 24 hours’ call by note-issuing banks at the close of business on that day; and

(b)    in respect of a non-working day must not be lower than the lowest of the interest rates paid on deposits at 24 hours’ call by note-issuing banks at the close of business on the last working day before that day.

21.  It is also agreed that in Happy Dragon Restaurant Ltd v Director of Lands CACV 115/2012, unreported, 31 January 2013, it was held that:

“provision for interest was amended 6 years after the Shun Fung judgment by the Interest Rates (Miscellaneous Amendments) Ordinance 2001 … the Tribunal is no longer enjoined to ‘have regard to’ the stated rate, and the stated rate is now a minimum rate” (at §25) and

“the Tribunal is to have an unfettered discretion to fix the interest rate for compensation, and the claimant is entitled to a minimum rate” (at §37).

The stated rate refers to the rates stipulated in s.17(3B) quoted at §20 above. 

22.  So the principle of Shun Fung (quoted at §12 above) is no longer applicable to the Legal Provisions and the wordings of the Legal Provisions only sets the minimum rate of interest for the compensation and should not be considered as a starting point.

23.  Mr. Mok submitted that the rate at the lowest of interest rates paid on deposits at 24 hours’ call should be adopted for these periods since the applicant has behaved unreasonably in the present case in protracting the time taken in determining her claim.  The unreasonable behaviour of the applicant[3] includes :

(a) The applicant’s claim is grossly exaggerated and is wholly unreasonable and unjustifiable as found by the Tribunal;

(b) Pre-action conduct was equally unprofessional and unreasonable, with the effect of protracting and wasting the time and effort required under the regime of out-of-court settlement by a shifting claim amount and only taken out this case on 10 November 2005, more than 8 years after the date of resumption;

(c) The applicant’s first claim based on the 2003 Scheme was conducted with equal lack of professionalism in disregard of the significance of the existence of the Right of Way; and

(d) The applicant had unreasonably declined the Offer and unreasonably persisted in her claim based on the 2009 Scheme.

24.  Mr. Khaw submitted that the fair and appropriate interest rate for the 3rd and 4th Periods should be Prime + 1% which is a long established practice of the courts in Hong Kong and the UK in a commercial setting and beyond as found by the Tribunal in Happy Dragon (LDLR17/2006, unreported, 20 January 2014) after the case was remitted from the Court of Appeal for reconsideration of the issue of interest.  As for the unreasonable behaviour alleged, it is contended that :

(a) The applicant is entitled to put forward a claim on the maximum basis and exaggeration is not a sufficient consideration for the question of reasonableness of an applicant’s conduct (as per Potter LJ in Purfleet Farms Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport [2003] 1 P&CR 20 at 36);

(b) The issues are not straightforward and it cannot be said that the applicant’s valuation has shown any unreasonable conduct which would justify applicant being deprived of any interest and the proceedings have no doubt been delayed by the Building Authority’s unreasonable conduct in failing to determine the feasibility of the 2009 Scheme and the respondent’s objections to adduce further experts reports by the applicant;

(c) The respondent never expressly challenged the 2003 Scheme on the basis of the issue of footpath before the hearing resulting in the issue being raised and argued at the hearing on 8 October 2007 as a preliminary issue; and

(d) The decline by the applicant in accepting the Offer is relevant to the question of costs and should not affect the determination of the interest rate.  In any event, the respondent had failed to make further payment in order to fully protect its position on interest.

25.  By relying on the Tribunal’s decision in Happy Dragon as suggested by Mr. Khaw, one must not lose sight of the findings of the Tribunal that :

“the long established practice, which remains a practice, not law that we must follow… However, the ‘broad brush’ approach in awarding interest rate at Prine +1% in the absence of any other evidence may still be relevant for our consideration, as it may well represent an amount that could compensate the applicant fairly and fully for being kept out of the money in accordance with the principle of equivalence” (at §42) (emphasis added).

26.  The Tribunal, in Happy Dragon, has also found that :

“As held in The Hong Kong Electric Co Ltd v Commissioner of Rating and Valuation, supra, the practice of awarding interest at Prime +1% amounts to no more than a presumption which can be displaced if its application would be ‘substantially unfair either to one party or the other’. The burden of displacing this presumption lies on the party seeking to displace it” (at§57).

27.  We agree with the observation of the Tribunal in Happy Dragon.  In our consideration of the interest rate, we should consider whether the respondent’s contention of the unreasonable behaviour of the applicant tends to displace the presumption of awarding interest at Prime +1% and the minimum rate stated in the Legal Provisions should be adopted instead.

28.  Whilst what is stipulated in the Legal Provisions is just a minimum rate and the long established practice of Prime +1% may well be a consideration of this Tribunal, we find the rationale of Lord Nicholls in Shun Fung quoted at §15 above should still be applicable in the consideration as to whether a higher or lower interest rate was justified. 

29.  Having considered the submissions of both parties, we agree with Mr. Mok that the applicant had behaved unreasonably in the manner particularised by Mr. Mok in his written submission.  Such conduct of the applicant had prolonged these proceedings and the applicant should not take advantage of her own fault in getting a higher interest rate.  To accept the applicant’s contention in awarding a higher interest rate than the minimum stated rate could not be in line with the principle of equivalence.

30.  Exaggeration on its own may not be a sufficient consideration, but this should be one of the factors to be considered.  The exaggeration of the applicant’s claimed amount is based on an argument which is not supported by the market demand and the only comparable is not a suitable one[4]. Allowing the applicant to run an exaggerated case in a full blown trial and declining any reasonable offer from the respondent and yet granting the applicant a higher interest rate, this is against the principle of equivalence in the sense that the applicant is getting more than she should be entitled by putting up an unjustified case and prolonging the period for interest to accrue.

31.  We found the minimum rate stipulated in the Legal Provisions should be adopted as the interest rate for the 3rd and 4th Period.

Costs and Professional Fees

32.  It is agreed between the parties that the respondent shall pay the applicant’s costs including professional fees incurred before the Offer.  The outstanding issue falls on the costs and professional fees after the Offer as well as whether certificate for 2 counsels is justified in this case.

33.  Section 30 (3) of Cap. 370 (“s. 30(3)”) provided that :

“Where the Secretary has made any offer … which is not accepted by the claimant and the compensation assessed by the Lands Tribunal does not exceed the amount of compensation comprised in the offer, the Lands Tribunal shall, unless for special reason it thinks it proper not to do so, order the claimant to bear his own costs and to pay the costs of the Secretary in so far as the costs are incurred after the making of the offer.” (emphasis added)

34.  The principles set forth in Re Elgindata (No. 2) [1992] 1 WLR 1207 concerning the question of costs are :

“(i) Costs are in the discretion of the court.

(ii) They should follow the event, except when it appears to the court that in the circumstances of the case some other order should be made.

(iii) The general rule does not cease to apply simply because the successful party raises issues or makes allegations on which he fails, but where that has caused a significant increase in the length or cost of the proceedings he may be deprived of the whole or a part of his costs.

(iv) Where the successful party raises issues or makes allegations improperly or unreasonably, the court may not only deprive him of his costs but may order him to pay the whole or a part of the unsuccessful party’s costs” (at 1214A-D).”

35.  There is no argument on the legal provisions and principles cited above.

36.  Mr. Khaw for the applicant submitted that since the respondent had raised issues improperly and unreasonably in the conduct of these proceedings, special reasons anticipated by s.30(3) are established.  Mr. Khaw is referring to the unreasonable and irrational decision of the Building Authority (“BA”) in refusing to make a determination on the 2009 Scheme and the respondent’s acting on this and failure to act fairly and properly in not admitting the 2009 Scheme was a feasible one. The BA never took issue on whether it was within its power or authority to consider the 2009 Scheme, a revised proposal till 24 December 2008[5].  This has resulted in experts, namely Professor Chung for the applicant and Mr. SK Chan for the respondent to be engaged on the feasibility of the 2009 Scheme which is an agreed issue in dispute between the parties.  And the respondent had failed, at trial, in seeking leave to adduce further documents which consisted of copies of land grant of 14 properties in Cheung Sha and 4 properties in other parts of Lantau Island.  This has caused a substantial increase in the length and costs of the proceedings.  The total time spent is about 1/3 of the hearing.

37.  The proposed costs order suggested by the applicant is :

(A) If the Tribunal takes the view that the respondent has raised the above issues improperly and unreasonably :

(1) Subject to any previous costs orders made herein :-

(a) The respondent shall pay the applicant’s costs incurred up to and including 26 April 2007 to be taxed on High Court scale, if not agreed, with certificate for 1 counsel;

(b) the respondent shall pay the applicant’s professional remuneration incurred up to and including 26 April 2007 to be assessed by the Lands Tribunal, if not agreed;

(2) Subject to any previous costs orders made herein :-

(a) the applicant shall pay 1/3 of the respondent’s costs incurred after 26 April 2007 to be taxed if not agreed with certificate for 1 counsel; or alternatively there be no order as to costs;

(b) the applicant shall pay the professional remuneration incurred by Mr. Faulkner after 26 April 2007, to be assessed if not agreed;

(c) the respondent shall pay the professional remuneration incurred by Professor Chung after 26 April 2007, to be assessed if not agreed; and

(d) there be no order as to the professional remuneration incurred by Mr. SK Chan.

(B) If the Tribunal takes the view that the respondent has not raised the above issues improperly and unreasonably but that the raising of such issues did cause a substantial increase in the length and costs of the proceedings:-

(1) Subject to any previous costs orders made herein:-

(a) The respondent shall pay the applicant’s costs incurred up to and including 26 April 2007 to be taxed on High Court scale if not agreed, with certificate for 1 counsel;

(b) The respondent shall pay the applicant’s professional remuneration incurred up to and including 26 April 2007 to be assessed if not agreed;

(2) Subject to any previous costs orders made herein;

(a) The applicant shall pay 2/3 of the respondent’s costs incurred after 26 April 2007 to be taxed, if not agreed with certificate for 1 counsel;

(b) The applicant shall pay the professional remuneration incurred by Mr. Faulkner after 26 April 2007, to be assessed if not agreed;

(c) There be no order as to the professional remuneration of Professor Chung and Mr. SK Chan.

38.  As for certificate for counsel, it is the contention of the applicant that in all previous substantive hearings before the Lands Tribunal in these proceedings, the Tribunal only allowed certificate for 1 counsel, this should be the order adopted at this stage as well.

39.  Mr. Mok submitted that the respondent, being the successful party, should be entitled to have its costs after the Offer.  Irrespective of whether the BA had acted unreasonably or whether the respondent had failed to concede that the 2009 Scheme is feasible, the findings of the Tribunal is that it could not be satisfied that the 2009 Scheme “is the optimal development for the Lots since the applicant had failed to show that there is the demand for it.”[6]  It is apparent that the Tribunal had ruled in favour of the respondent and accepted the respondent’s case.  The feasibility of the 2009 Scheme does not qualify as an event under Seepersad v Persad, but rather it only forms part of the relevant event.  And even though the respondent had sought to adduce further documents at trial, this does not affect the basis and substance of the respondent’s case and the final result of this case.  In any event, not much time had been spent on these 2 issues and had not prolonged the trial. 

40.  Mr. Mok also asked for certificate for 2 counsels in this case contending that the complexity and technicalities of the issues do justify the engagement of 2 counsels.

41.  The wordings of s.30(3) is clear without ambiguity.  Applying s.30(3) to this case, since the Compensation fails to beat the Offer, we should make an order for the applicant to bear its own costs and to pay the costs of the respondent after the deadline to accept the Offer, i.e. 26 April 2007 unless the applicant can demonstrate special reason to justify a departure. 

42.  Having considered the submission of the parties, we find the issue on whether the BA or the respondent had acted unreasonably concerning their stance in the approval of the 2009 Scheme is not “something so distinct and separate in itself that the decision of it constitutes as ‘event’”[7]. The crux of the matter at trial before this Tribunal, i.e. the event, is whether the 2009 Scheme is an optimal development and the uncertainty of the approval of the same is just part and parcel of this main issue.  It cannot be considered as an isolated issue unnecessarily pursued as having no bearing on the real question in the case. 

43.  The complaint by the applicant of the BA’s unreasonable refusal to make a determination on the 2009 Scheme is not justified.  There is nothing to show that the BA is obliged to entertain such a request.  Both Professor Chung and Mr. SK Chan accepted that the request is only considered as an informal inquiry made to the BA.  And there is nothing to challenge the evidence of Mr. SK Chan that the practice of not answering enquiries for hypothetical development had in fact been in place since 18 December 2003 and due to oversight of some staff, the applicant’s enquiry had been wrongly entertained between 18 December 2003 and 24 December 2008. 

44.  Given our findings that the feasibility of the 2009 Scheme is not unreasonably pursued, the calling of Professor Chung and Mr. SK Chan is required and necessary.  And the time and costs incurred is also insignificant (1 report each from Professor Chung and Mr. SK Chan and testimony of them takes up less than half a day).

45.  As for the failure by the respondent to adduce the further document on the second day of the trial, we have handed down the reason for our decision on 3 April 2014 (“the Decision”).  Even though we found it to be a separate and distinct application to adduce further evidence, the time and costs incurred in disposing of the same is relatively insignificant (only a 1 hour argument on 25 March 2014). 

46.  We found the 2 special reasons raised by the applicant are not substantiated to justify a departure from the requirement under s.30(3) and the professional fees concerning the feasibility of the 2009 Scheme are reasonably incurred. 

47.  As for the certificate for counsel, the fact that certificate for 1 counsel is being granted in previous hearings is not the basis to determine this dispute.  Given the complexity of this case, we are not convinced that the assistance of leading counsel is necessary at trial.  There is no difficult legal argument involved in this case and the mere fact that the size of the claim is substantial is neither here nor there since this does not add anything onto the complexity of the case.

Order

48.  Accordingly, we order that :

(a) The interest of the Compensation from 24 June 1997 to 2 July 2000 should be paid by the respondent to the applicant at the rate of the lowest 24 hours’ call deposit rate paid by members of the Hong Kong Association of Banks;

(b) The interest of the Compensation from 3 July 2000 to 2 October 2000 should be paid by the respondent to the applicant at the rate of the lowest time deposit interest rate paid by members of the Hong Kong Association of Banks on 2 July 2000;

(c) The interest of the Compensation from 3 October 2000 to 11 April 2001 should be paid by the respondent to the applicant at the lowest 24 hours’ call deposit interest rate paid by those members of the Hong Kong Association of Banks that provide the Government with the relevant interest rate at the close of business on that day if it’s a working day and on the last working day before that day if it’s a non-working day;

(d) The interest of the Compensation after 12 April 2001 should be paid by the respondent to the applicant at the lowest 24 hours’ call deposit interest rate paid by those members of the Hong Kong Association of Banks that provide the Government with the relevant interest rate at the close of business on that day if it’s a working day and on the last working day before that day if it’s a non working day;

(e) The respondent do pay the costs incurred by the applicant up to and including 26 April 2007, to be taxed on High Court Scale if not agreed, with certificate for 1 counsel;

(f) The applicant do pay the costs of the respondent incurred after 26 April 2007, to be taxed on High Court scale if not agreed, with certificate for 1 counsel;

(g) The respondent do pay the professional fees incurred by the applicant up to and including 26 April 2007, to be assessed by the Tribunal if not agreed;

(h) The applicant do pay the professional fees incurred by the respondent after 26 April 2007, to be assessed by the Tribunal if not agreed;

(i) Costs of this argument on interest, costs and professional fees be to the respondent, to be taxed if not agreed at High Court scale, with certificate for 1 counsel.  This is a costs order nisi.  Unless any of the parties apply by summons to vary it, the costs order nisi shall be made absolute upon expiry of 14 days.

Deputy Judge KOTMr. Lawrence PANG
Presiding OfficerMember
Lands TribunalLands Tribunal

Mr Richard Khaw, instructed by Keith Lam Lau & Chan, for the applicant

Mr Y C Mok and Ms Teresa Wu, instructed by the Department of Justice, for the respondent


[1] Bundle B/306-312

[2] Bundle A/104-106

[3] §21 of respondent’s Submission on Interest, Costs and Professional Fees

[4] §37-44 of the Judgment

[5] Bundle D/164

[6] §56 of the Judgment

[7] As per Lord Carswell in Seepersad v Persad as quoted by Lam J. in Hong Kong Kam Lan Koon Ltd v Realray Investment Ltd. (No. 4) [2005] 4 HKC 162

92919-EN-2014-05-09

TSAN LUK YUK YIN v. THE SECRETARY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, TRANSPORT AND WORKS

HTML content

LDMR 3/2005

IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MISCELLANEOUS REFERENCE APPLICATION NO. 3 OF 2005

_________________

BETWEEN
TSAN Luk Yuk Yin (as the trustee for TSANG Hing Kwong Thomas (2/4 shares), TSAN Hing Him Lana (1/4 share) and TSAN Hing Tat Heidi (1/4 share) being tenants in common as the beneficiaries)Applicant
and
The Secretary for the Environment, Transport and WorksRespondent

_________________

Before:Deputy Judge KOT, Presiding Officer, Lands Tribunal and Mr. Lawrence PANG, Member of the Lands Tribunal
Dates of Hearing: 24, 25, 26 & 27 March 2014
Dates of Filing of Submission by Applicant: 10 & 24 April 2014
Dates of Filing of Submission by Respondent: 9 & 24 April 2014
Date of Judgment: 9 May 2014

_________________

J U D G M E N T

 _________________

 

Background

1. This is an application by the applicant for determination of compensation pursuant to sections 13, 27 and 29 of the Roads (Works, Use and Compensation) Ordinance, Cap. 370.  The applicant is the former registered owner of Lot Nos. 288, 289 and 293 in D.D. 313, Tai O, Lantau Island, New Territories, Hong Kong (“the Lots”).

2. Tai O is a traditional fishing village and village settlement area.  Apart from Lung Tin Estate, a public housing estate of nine 12-storey blocks, and Lung Hin Court, a Home Ownership Scheme housing comprising four 6-storey residential blocks, developments in the neighbourhood comprise mainly village type developments of two to three storeys.  It is also a popular tourist spot for both foreigners and residents of other parts of Hong Kong.  Public transport facilities between Tai O and Mui Wo such as franchised buses and taxis are available along Tai O Road, which is within 5 minutes walking distance from the Lots.  As at the date of resumption on 24 June 1997, apart from the highway access via Tung Chung, ferry service was provided between Mui Wo and Central.  The North Lantau Highway and the Tsing Ma Bridge which provide road connection to the Lantau Island from other parts of Hong Kong were only open in May 1997.  The MTR Tung Chung Line also came into operation in June 1998.  Though from Tung Chung to Tai O, it still takes more than 40 minutes to an hour by public transport.

3. The Lots, comprising building land and agricultural land, were held under a Block Government Lease in D.D. 313 for a term of 75 years commencing on 1 July 1898 renewable for a further term of 24 years less the last 3 days.  The lease was further extended to 30 June 2047 under the New Territories Leases (Extension) Ordinance, Cap 150.  By a Notice of Resumption dated 24 April 1997 registered in the Land Registry with memorial no. 244069, the Government resumed the Lots.  The Lots reverted to the Government, two months later, on 24 June 1997.

4. The Lots are located at a slightly inclined area close to the waterfront to the North East of Lung Tin Estate, Phase II.  Whilst the first phase of this public housing estate was completed in 1980, its second phase was completed in 1995 comprising, for instance, Tin Lee House (Block 8) and Tin Ning House (Block 9A & 9B) and four other blocks of low-rise buildings on the opposite side of Lung Tin Estate, Phase I which were converted to become part of Phase 20B of the Home Ownership Scheme which was put up for sale in 1999[1].  Incidentally, 85 flats at the 12-storey Tin Lee House, which was closest to the Lots and about 100 metres to their west, will also be converted into Home Ownership Scheme for sale as Tin Lee Court in June 2014[2].

5. On 20 November 2007, the Tribunal (differently constituted) handed down its judgment that a footpath straddling the Lots leading from Tai Ping Street in an area known as Yim Tin to another part of Tai O (“the Footpath”) was a public right of way which in effect traversed the middle of the Lots into two further longitudinal pieces, one facing a creek to the northeast and the other on the inward side of the shore overlooked by Tin Lee House.

6. The registered area of the Lots is summarized below:

D.D. No.Lot No.Registered AreaResumed Area in equivalent*
3132880.30 ac (building land)1,214.1 sq.m.
3132890.05 ac (building land)
0.05 ac (agricultural land)
202.3 sq.m.
202.3 sq.m.
3132930.04 ac (building land)
0.06 ac (agricultural land)
161.8 sq.m.
242.8 sq.m.
  Total:2,023.3 sq.m.

* 1 acre ≈ 4,046.85 sq.m.

7. As can be seen from the aerial photo attached to this Judgment as Annex A[3], there were a series of structures scattering around the Lots and the vicinity, according to the valuation report previously produced by the former expert on behalf of the applicant dated 19 August 1998, there were temporary structures, small timber houses and squatters on the Lots as at the date of resumption.  The respondent also produced a series of photographs[4] of these structures taken on 24 April 1997.  According to a letter to the applicant’s former solicitors dated 13 March 1996, the structures there had been erected years ago and were the home for about 30 families[5].  The latter is not denied by the applicant.

The Law for Determining Compensation

8. According to section 27 of the Roads (Works, Use and Compensation) Ordinance and Part II of the Schedule thereto, the applicant's right to compensation in respect of the resumption of land is the right to recover from the Government a sum to be assessed on the basis “as if the claim were made under the Lands Resumption Ordinance (Cap. 124) for land resumed under that Ordinance”.  Section 10 of the Lands Resumption Ordinance provides for the rules for determination by the Lands Tribunal of compensation payable by the Government.

9. Further section 12 of the Lands Resumption Ordinance provides additional rules for determining compensation:

“In the determination of the compensation to be paid under this Ordinance-

(a) no allowance shall be made on account of the resumption being compulsory;

(aa) no account shall be taken of the fact that the land lies within or is affected by any area, zone or district reserved or set apart for the purposes specified in section 4(1)(a), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h) or (i) of the Town Planning Ordinance (Cap 131);

(b) no compensation shall be given in respect of any use of the land which is not in accordance with the terms of the Government lease under which the land is held;

(c) no compensation shall be given in respect of any expectancy or probability of the grant or renewal or continuance, by the Government or by any person, of any licence, permission, lease or permit whatsoever:

Provided that this paragraph shall not apply to any case in which the grant or renewal or continuance of any licence, permission, lease or permit could have been enforced as of right if the land in question had not been resumed; and

(d)  subject to the provisions of section 11 and to the provisions of paragraphs (aa), (b) and (c) of this section, the value of the land resumed shall be taken to be the amount which the land if sold by a willing seller in the open market might be expected to realize.”

10. Thus by reference to the above, compensation based on the market value of the land reflecting its development potential is payable if the potential development is permitted by the existing user covenants of the Government lease or other title document involved.

The 2003 Scheme

11. As at the date of resumption, the then Regulation 19(2) of the Building (Planning) Regulations Cap. 123F (“Reg. 19(2)”) provided that :

“Where a site abuts on a street less than 4.5 m wide or does not abut on a street, the height of any building or buildings to be erected thereon and the maximum site coverage and plot ratio to be permitted in respect of such building or buildings shall be determined by the Building Authority.”

12. As the Lots were not abutting a street, pursuant to Reg. 19(2), the height of any building(s) to be erected thereon and the maximum site coverage and plot ratio in respect of such building(s) shall be determined by the Building Authority.  For the purpose of substantiating the open market value of the Lots, the applicant’s Authorized Person made an enquiry submission to the Building Authority on 31 July 2003[6] for a decision on the permissible plot ratio of the Lots.  In particular, the Building Authority was requested to confirm that “the development intensity of this hypothetical scheme would have been approvable as at the Date of Resumption”.  Eventually, on 5 December 2003[7], the Building Authority wrote to the Authorized Person, confirming that there was no objection to a scheme comprising, as later clarified on 3 August 2005[8], three 3-storey single family houses and three 3-storey apartment buildings with plot ratio of 1.256 and a site coverage of 42.024% along both sides of the Footpath (“The 2003 Scheme”).

The 2009 Scheme

13. Since the Lands Tribunal determined that the Footpath was a public right of way by prescription in its ruling dated 20 November 2007, the applicant instructed another Authorized Person to submit to the Building Authority a revised hypothetical building scheme for consideration on 13 February 2008[9]. The revised scheme would “retain all existing natural features and landscape” while “all previous design parameters and essential provisions such as plot ratio, site coverage, density and access for rescue ladder/ appliances were by and large maintained”.  

14. However, by a letter dated 24 December 2008[10] (“the 2008 letter”), the Building Authority replied inter alia, that “[p]re-submission enquiries solely related to compensation claims, hypothetical schemes and academic exercise would not normally be entertained by Buildings Department.”

15. The Authorized Person further amended the revised hypothetical building proposal based on various technical issues raised by the Building Authority prior to the 2008 Letter and came up with a scheme comprising six 3-storey single family houses each with private swimming pool on top and one 3-storey apartment building also with swimming pool on top yielding a plot ratio of 1.264 and a site coverage of 42.143% (“the 2009 Scheme”).

16. In view of the stance taken by the Building Authority as stated in the 2008 letter, the applicant engaged Professor Barnabas Chung (“Professor Chung”), former Chief Building Surveyor of the Buildings Department, to give his opinion on the feasibility of the 2009 Scheme.  Also, for the purpose of determining the feasibility in assessing compensation as a result of the resumption, Professor Chung and Mr Chan Shu-kwong (“Mr SK Chan”) a senior building surveyor with the Buildings Department and the expert on behalf of the respondent, produced a joint statement dated 13 December 2013[11] confirming, inter alia, that:

(a)  The 2009 Scheme involved no significant change in the road serving the Lots and no increase in the total number of residential units as compared with the 2003 Scheme;

(b)  Both the site coverage and plot ratio of the 2009 Scheme were only very marginally in excess of those of the 2003 Scheme noting that the differences for the site coverage and plot ratio were 0.119% and 0.008 respectively, which could be deemed infinitesimal;

(c)  The 2009 Scheme was not formally submitted to the Building Authority.  However, upon receipt of an enquiry from the Lands Department in July 2012, the Building Authority advised the Lands Department in September 2012 that the maximum plot ratio and site coverage of the 2009 Scheme should not be more than that as determined for the 2003 Scheme.  Otherwise, the 2009 Scheme would have been acceptable under the then Building (Planning) Regulation 19(2) as at the date of resumption of the Lots.

17. Facts stated above are either not in dispute or undisputable between the parties. 

18. The applicants contends that the compensation should be assessed based on the 2009 Scheme, a villa type development on the Lots which commands a market value of $78,606,000 at the date of the resumption.  The respondent, on the other hand argued that villa type development is not feasible on the Lots and instead an ordinary New Territories Exempted Houses (“NTEH”) form of development should be the optimal development for the purpose of assessing the value of the resumed Lots, hence the amount of compensation should be in the amount of $20,600,000.

Agreed Issues

19. The following are the agreed issues for determination in the present application:

(a)  Whether (i) a villa type development or (ii) an ordinary New Territories Exempted Houses (“NTEH”) form of development, is the optimal development for the purpose of assessing the value of the Lots as at the date of resumption?

(b)  If a villa type development is the optimum form of development for the purpose of assessing the value of the Lots as at the date of resumption, whether the 2009 Scheme is, in principle, to be considered a feasible scheme of development for such purpose as at the date of resumption?

(c)  Whether, in assessing the value of the Lots as at the date of resumption, one should apply (i) the direct comparison method, or (ii) the residual valuation method, having regard to the relevant information and materials which are available for carrying out the assessment?

(d)  What is the open market value of the Lots as at the date of resumption?

20. Mr Anderson Chow (“Mr Chow”), Senior Counsel for the applicant, had confirmed that should the Tribunal found NTEH to be the optimal form of development for the Lots, the valuation of $20,600,000 provided by Mr David Nicholas Faulkner (“Mr Faulkner”) is not being challenged and is accepted by the applicant.

The Evidence

21. For the purpose of the present application, the applicant and the respondent have produced the following expert reports on building surveying issue in relation to the development potential of the Lots:

(a)  Expert report dated 5 November 2009 by Professor Chung[12];

(b)  Expert report dated 31 October 2012 by Mr SK Chan[13];

(c)  Supplementary expert report dated 28 December 2012 by Professor Chung[14].

22. In addition, Professor Chung and Mr SK Chan have prepared a joint statement dated 13 December 2013 setting out the areas of agreement and disagreement[15].

23. The applicant and the respondent have also produced the following expert reports on valuation:

Prepared in relation to the 2003 Scheme

(1)  expert report dated 16 November 2005 by Mr Alnwick Chan (“Mr A Chan) for the applicant[16];

(2)  expert report dated 21 July 2006 by Mr Faulkner for the respondent[17];

(3)  supplementary expert report dated 19 September 2006 by Mr A Chan[18];

(4)  supplementary expert report dated 31 August 2006 by Mr Faulkner[19];

Prepared in relation to the 2009 Scheme

(5)  supplementary expert report dated 28 December 2009 by Mr A Chan[20];

(6)  supplementary expert report dated 1 November 2012 by Mr Faulkner[21];

(7)  rebuttal report dated 28 December 2012 by Mr A Chan[22].

24. Mr A Chan and Mr Faulkner have also prepared a joint statement dated 3 December 2013 setting out the areas of agreement and disagreement[23].

25. All the above experts were called at trial to give evidence.  The applicant also called Mr Thomas Hing Kwong Tsang (“Mr Tsang”) to testify for and on behalf of the applicant as a factual witness.

Villa Type Development

26. Mr Chow submits that the Lots were basically building lands and prior to the resumption, the applicant had the legal right to build houses thereon.  Mr Chow also submits that compensation should be assessed by reference to the optimal form of development, ie a development which would produce the highest land value.  Citing the Lands Tribunal decision in Million-Add Development Limited v. Secretary for Transport [1997] CPR 316, at 321F-G, Mr Chow submits that in the present case, the potentiality of further development is clearly evidenced by the Building Authority’s approval of the 2003 Scheme.

27. Whereas the Lands Tribunal held in Million-Add Development Limited (supra) that the owner’s plans were relevant but not decisive to the objective determination of the development value, the applicant considers the differences between the 2009 Scheme and the 2003 Scheme were only marginal in terms of site coverage and plot ratio, or indeed “infinitesimal” by reference to the joint statement by Professor Chung and Mr SK Chan dated 13 December 2013; hence the 2009 Scheme should be the optimal form of development.

28. Mr Y C Mok (“Mr Mok”) for the respondent submitted that the applicant failed to prove that there is a demand for this villa type development in Tai O and there is also uncertainty as to whether the 2009 Scheme would be approved by the Building Authority as well as the uncertainty created by the existence of numerous trespassers on the date of resumption.  

 Demand

29. In Halpern & Others v. Greater London Authority [2014] UKUT 0116 (LC) (ACQ/274/2010, unreported judgment dated 18 March 2014)where the Lands Chamber of the Upper Tribunal was dealing with a claim for compensation under compulsory purchase, it had the following remark at§42 of its judgment:

“… there is an important distinction between what is claimable in principle and what can be proved on the evidence in any particular case. In every case the claimant has to prove on the balance of probabilities that he has suffered the losses in respect of which he is claiming. The Tribunal can only reach a conclusion in his favour on the basis of credible and admissible evidence.”

30. Thus in determining the optimal development of the Lots, other factors are relevant.  As stated in the judgment of Million-AddDevelopment Limited case, supra “that an owner's plans are relevant but not decisive to the objective determination of development value.  The intentions of experienced developers and the opinions of their experts will often include evidence, relevant to potentialities.” (at page 322)

31. In Leung Lai-sheung & another v Director of Lands & Survey [1977] HKLTLR 131 at 132:

“The claimants sought compensation upon the basis of the redevelopment potential of the sites. Mr Simon Kwan… who was the expert called by the claimants, suggested that the redevelopment potential was for a wholly commercial six storey building upon each site. Mr Kwan failed to convince the Tribunal that a wholly commercial building would be a viable commercial proposition in this area of Hollywood Road. He was unable to point to any such development in the immediate area and, having considered all of the evidence, the Tribunal is satisfied that the real potential for development lay in a commercial/residential building… It is no doubt true that a wholly commercial building if it could be readily sold or let would produce a greater financial return to the owner than would a commercial/residential development; however it has not been shown that it could be sold or let and, indeed, the view of the Tribunal is that this location would not support such a building.” (underline added)

32. Mr Mok also cited an Australian case Constantino and Maric v. Roads and Traffic Agnecy [2006] NSWLEC 248 (30165 of 2003, unreported judgment dated 30 May 2006) in which the planning experts had provided conflicting advices in relation to the lands compulsorily acquired. Pain J cited, inter alia, at para. 23, the following passage from Bautocivh v The Minister administering the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act [2004]  NSWLEC 389 on the role of the court in such situations:

“… the Court’s role is not to determine what would have been approved, but rather to decide how the hypothetical purchaser acting prudently after obtaining the advice of relevant experts familiar with the experience in developments of residential subdivisions, would have assessed the potential for the development of the subject land.”

Then at para. 70 of the judgment, Pain J rejected two of the development models on the basis that he did not consider a prudent hypothetical purchaser would consider the demand for those two development models could be assumed.

33. From the authorities cited above, demand of the development model suggested is apparently a factor which is relevant to the consideration of potentialities.  In Nam Chun Investment Co Ltd v Director of Lands [2005] 1 HKC 390 at 406E-H, the Court of Appeal had the following remark:

“the legal burden rests with the claimant to make good what he claims, and if he produces comparables for the use of the tribunal, he has the legal burden to prove on the balance of probabilities that the comparables are …reliable and appropriate for use by the tribunal…”

34. It is the applicant’s case that as at the date of resumption on 24 June 1997 it was the heyday of the property market in Hong Kong.  Mr A Chan argued that since the bidding of the Cheung Sha site was enthusiastic, developers would equally be interested in the Lots.  Nevertheless, Mr A Chan admitted that there are differences between the Lots and the Cheung Sha site in terms of location, environment and accessibility.  However, more differences between the Lots and the Cheung Sha site can be discerned from the table at para. 10.3 of Mr A Chan’s Supplemental expert report dated 28 December 2009[24]:

The Cheung Sha  siteThe Lots
(based on the 2009 Scheme)
Location:Cheung Sha, Lantau IslandTai O, Lantau Island
Site Area:2,240 sq m2,023 sq m
User:Private ResidentialPrivate Residential
Maximum GFA:896 sq m2,558.034 sq m
Maximum Site Coverage:20%42.143%
Maximum Plot Ratio:0.41.264
Maximum no. of Units:129 (as proposed)
Height:7.6 metres above mean formation level and not exceeding 2 storeysApproximately 10.2 metres and 3 storeys
Parking Spaces:Not more than one space for every two residential unitsNot available on site

35. In respect of the feasibility of the 2009 Scheme, Mr Faulkner has, inter alia, the following comments in his Supplementary Report dated 1 November 2012[25]:

(a)  “(The 2009 Scheme) is not compatible with the location characteristics of Tai O and the physical attributes of the Subject Property ….

And in “Valuation of Development in Hong Kong (pp.4) (Second Edition) written by Philip J. Roberts & Johnny C.P. Siu, it mentioned that:-

“The value of development land depends upon a combination of many factors, the most important of which are the type of building that may lawfully be erected on the site, the demand that exists for accommodation in that building in its particular location, the permissible gross floor area of that building in its particular location, the permissible gross floor area of that building, its quality and hence the cost of its erection, and the supply of competing accommodation in the neighbourhood. For example, in urban areas the plot ratio of a commercial building would be much larger than that of a residential building. If the site is in an area, however, where little demand exists for offices or other commercial uses, a smaller residential building would be more profitable, and hence, that is the type of development which would be likely to take place.

… it is clear that the demand and marketability of the proposed development are always the primary concerns in determining what to build on site.”

(b)  “Tai O used to be an old fishing village ….As at the date of resumption, the village was mostly occupied by dilapidated stilt houses with squatter licenses and village-type houses. Other than these two types of dwelling house, there were only two residential development, namely Lung Tin Estate ... and Lung Hin Court. In view of the decaying built environment of Tai O where the neighboring properties were deteriorated squatter and village-type houses as at the date resumption, the Revised Scheme proposed by Mr Chan would be unsuitable for this location.”

(c)  “…. There had been no villa-type development in Tai O as at the date of resumption. This remains the case now even after a lapse of 15 years from the resumption date despite a series of infrastructure improvements and new town developments on Lantau Island during the past decade. According to the government records, no occupation permits (OP) have been issued by the Buildings Department for villa-type development or non-NTEH-type house in Tai O from the 1980s up to now and no land grant for such kind of development has been granted by the Lands Department since the 1980s.”

(d)  “The accessibility of Tai O was limited and restricted as at the date of resumption. It could only be reached by limited bus and ferry services from only a few places. I am of the view that the geographical location of Tai O, with deficient transportation and infrastructural support and back-up, would discourage the establishment of high-end villa type development in the locality.”

(e)  “(The Lots were) fragmented and irregular-shaped site covered by shabby structures and (were) occupied by trespassers. It would further be required to be dissected into four fairly odd-shaped sections given the Lands Tribunal’s decision dated 20 November 2007… It is undeniable that the public right of way running through (the Lots) would detrimentally impact on the degree of spaciousness, privacy and exclusivity of the proposed development on site and would render it not commensurate with the criteria of a high-quality development.”

(f)  “… the provision of direct vehicular access and car-parking facilities is indispensible to a luxury-type residential development. However, there is no vehicular access in (the 2009 Scheme) and only a public car park (for 16 spaces) is available at a distance (about 700 metres).”

36. Mr A Chan, in his Rebuttal Report dated 28 December 2012, stated his responses which include, inter alia, the following[26]:

(a)  “…the hypothetical Revised Scheme will not come into the market until completion in say end 1999 when all the transportation infrastructures serving Lantau Island would have been completed.  Developers/purchasers do consider the future site potentials especially when these added site advantages brought about by the infrastructure projects are confirmed as at 24 June 1997.”

(b)  “The Property, if not the only one, is one of the scarce supply of building land of such a scale that can accommodate a comparatively comprehensive development within Tai O. Accounting for its advantageous large site area, compatible lease restrictions and no planning control, the Property in fact commands high development flexibility. There is no reason that NTEH which has a restricted floor plate, restricted ceiling height, restricted roof over area and inferior image is the only solution.”

(c)  “Mr Faulkner pointed out the lack of new villa type developments at Tai O. I reckon the Lack of villa type development is not due to limited demand but due to limited or no supply….. Building lots within Tai O are generally of fragmented lots of small site areas that cannot accommodate villa type development.” He then quoted Tung Chung as an example where “Tung Chung was a new town with very little attractions” when Government sold a lot of land for the development of the new town. “This has demonstrated that developers look at not only the current local demand, but also the future potential of the apartments/houses when they are completed.”

(d)  “With improved accessibility to Lantau Island, the attraction to people wishing to set up their home on the island was substantially enhanced. The Chek Lap Kok International Airport was not far from completion in mid 1997. The island also became a convenient home location for airline staff and airport related personnel.”

(e)  “The Revised Scheme is comprised of 6 dwelling houses and 1 apartment block. Out of the six houses, five of them are purposely planned to face the creek with the aim of minimizing the potential disturbance arising from the right of way (“the ROW”). The gardens area will be planted with shrubs and trees and fence walls to maintain the privacy. There is no reason why the owners cannot fence their own garden so long the fence walls do not conflict with the ROW.”

(f)  “Carparking in rural area in the New Territories should not give rise to any serious problem and therefore Mr. Faulkner’s argument on lack of public carpark in Tai O is not agreed. Parking of vehicle in the vicinity of the proposed estate cannot be ruled out. It is actually the village custom respected by the authority.”

37. We are however not convinced that the responses of Mr A Chan have sufficiently disposed of the queries raised by Mr Faulkner stated above. Firstly, we agree with Mr Faulkner that if there be sufficient demand, supply will somehow come into place.  As rightly pointed out by Mr Mok for the respondent, not only the Government is in the position to supply land to cater for the demand, if there be any, private landowners/developers, in response to a ready market, would try to amalgamate land and apply for a surrender and re-grant, if needed, from Government.  This was not disputed by Mr A Chan during cross-examination.  Indeed in Director of Lands v. Yin Shuen Enterprises Limited & another [2003] 2 HKLRD 399, it was said at §26 that:

“Urban development is nowadays usually left to private developers, who seek any necessary modification of the terms of their lease, rather than undertaken by the Government after resumption. ”

38. The problem that building lots in Tai O are generally fragmented lots of small site areas should not be a hurdle for villa type development in time.  The fact is there is no villa-type development in Tai O even after a lapse of 16 years from the resumption date.  During cross-examination, Mr Faulkner admitted that there is no NTEH development in Tai O for past years as well but as he said in response, his proposal of NTEH development conforms with the surrounding environment that a prudent purchaser or developer is more ready to assume. On the other hand, the fact that there is no NTEH development in Tai O for past years also supports Mr Faulkner’s argument that the built environment of Tai O was decaying.  This would further discourage any developer in putting forward a high quality villa-type development like the 2003 Scheme or the 2009 Scheme.

39. At trial, we also pointed out to Mr A Chan that his theory may not stand because the history of Lung Tin Estate tells that the district of Tai O is not even favoured by people of lesser income means as vacancy had stayed at some 40% leading to the recent conversion of one block, Tin Lee House, into part of a Home Ownership Scheme for sale. The remaining 15 flats at Lung Hin Court were sold in mid 2010[27].  Of course, Mr Chow for the applicant submitted that this should be regarded as a different market. Be that as it may, but even after a lapse of 16 years from the resumption date, Tai O has not become “a convenient home location for airline staff and airport related personnel”.  This is a fact one cannot ignore which is relevant in our consideration.

40. On the other hand, the development of Tung Chung as referred to by Mr A Chan is all the more a different market because as at the date of resumption, the Government’s intention to develop Tung Chung into a new town with sophisticated infrastructure is manifested[28] whereas Tai O and more particularly the Lots were not covered by any planning, not to mention any modern infrastructure.  We agree that developers would look at not only the current local demand, but also the future development potential of the land in question.  Nonetheless, we find the future development potential of the Lots as at the date of resumption was clouded with many uncertainties.

41. Also, by reference to the aerial photo at Annex A, the right of way pierced through right into the heart of the Lots. Despite what Mr A Chan said in §36(e) above, its advantageous large site area and development flexibility would have been lost.

42. We agree that the demand for any particular type of development on the Lots can only be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. Bearing in the mind also the characteristic and environs of the Lots as at the date of resumption with temporary structures, small timber houses and squatters around, we consider, on a balance of probabilities, that it is more likely than not demand was not in place at the Lots for the luxury villa-type development like the 2009 Scheme as at the date of resumption.

43. In Siu Sau kuen v. The Director of Lands, CACV 180/2012 (unreported,  dated 31 July 2013), the Court of Appeal had tried to restate the test in identifying the development potential of the land resumed for the purpose of determining compensation. As §34 the test was put as:

“Whether, on a balance of probabilities, the evidence discloses that, as at the date of resumption, redevelopment of the property resumed was likely. Such likelihood may be demonstrated by:

(i) …., or

(ii) evidence of redevelopment in the vicinity of the resumed property (whether accompanied by evidence of redevelopment plans for the resumed property or not), so long as such evidence of redevelopment in the vicinity supports a finding that redevelopment on its own or merger of the resumed property with other properties giving rise to a viable redevelopment scheme was likely within a reasonably foreseeable time scale.”

The applicant fails in discharging his burden of proof that a villa-type development like the 2003 Scheme or the 2009 Scheme was an optimal development as at the date of resumption.

44. Further, by applying the Bwllfa principle which derives its name from the House of Lords judgment in Bwllfa and Merthyr Dare Stream Collieries (1891) Ltd v. Pontypridd Waterworks Co [1903] AC 426, our view above is strengthened by the fact that there is no villa-type development in Tai O even after a lapse of 16 years from the resumption date. In this House of Lords case, a compensation claim required an estimate to be made of future profit. By the time the dispute reached arbitration, profits had soared and actual figures and not mere estimates were available. The House of Lords held that the actual figures were admissible. Lord MacNaghten declared at p 431:

“In order to enable (the arbitrator) to come to a just and true conclusion it is his duty, I think, to avail himself of all information at hand at the time of making his award which may be laid before him. Why should he listen to conjecture on a matter which has become an accomplished fact? Why should he guess when he can calculate? With the light before him, why should he shut his eyes and grope in the dark?”

Uncertainty as to Reg. 19(2)

45. It is not in dispute that the building density of any villa type development on the Lots which do not abut on a street, required the prior determination by the Building Authority.  It is the contention of the respondent that the 2009 Scheme has never been submitted to the Building Authority for the determination under Reg. 19(2), hence the building density remained an unknown fact.  No professional adviser would be able to tell whether the 2009 Scheme or any villa type development of any building density would be permitted on the Lots.  This uncertainty should have discouraged any hypothetical purchasers from purchasing the Lot at the level of the 2009 Scheme or for a villa type development.  It is not for the Tribunal to determine what would have been the Building Authority’s determination but rather to decide how the hypothetical purchaser would have assessed the development potential of the Lots on the date of resumption.

46. The applicant, on the other hand, submitted that the Tribunal is entitled to consider if, on the balance of probabilities, the 2009 Scheme would have been approvable as at the date of resumption.  Since the 2003 Scheme has been approved by the Building Authority, there is simply no reason why the 2009 Scheme would not have been approvable in view of the following agreed evidence :

(a)  The Building Authority would consider all material factors holistically;

(b)  The 2009 Scheme has satisfied all the fundamental issues which should have been considered under Reg. 19(2); and

(c)  The site coverage and plot ratio of the 2009 Scheme were only very marginally in excess of those of the 2003 Scheme which both Professor Chung and Mr SK Chan considered to be “infinitesimal”.

47. Having heard the evidence of Professor Chung and Mr SK Chan, we find, particularly from their joint statement dated 13 December 2013 as stated in §16 above, that the 2009 Scheme would have been acceptable under Reg. 19(2) as at the date of resumption of the Lots.  The 2003 Scheme has been approved by the Building Authority and the differences for site coverage and plot ratio between the 2003 Scheme and the 2009 Scheme are deemed infinitesimal, there is no reason to suspect that the Building Authority is unlikely to approve the 2009 Scheme.  We take the evidence that the restriction on development intensity was only given by the Buildings Department in a meeting with the Lands Department in July 2012 in anticipation of the hearing for the purpose of determining the compensation payable. The objection by the Building Authority against the marginal increase in intensity is not supported on any ground lest the captioned resumption which however should not be taken into account under the Pointe Gourde principle[29]. We consider a villa type development in the form of the 2009 Scheme was an approvable development at the date of resumption.

48. Having said so, we agree with Mr Faulkner that because of the requirement under Reg. 19(2) and the approval of the Building Authority is required, there stands some uncertainty as to the development potential of the Lots[30].  This can be demonstrated by the different position taken by the surveyors for the applicant.  For instance, in the initial claim for compensation by Mr A Chan’s predecessor submitted on 25 November 2002, the development potential relied on was mere 1,026 sq m (or a plot ratio of 0.507)[31] which indicated a substantial difference from the 2003 Scheme and 2009 Scheme .  

49. The House of Lords in the judgment of Transport for London v. Spirerose Limited [2009] 1 WLR 1797 referred, for instance, to a valuation principle as contained in Johnson, Davies and Shapiro, Modern Methods of Valuation of Land, Houses and Building, 9th ed (2000):

“… As the hope (for getting permission) crystallises into reasonable certainty of a permission at some stage, a valuation can be attempted based on the potential development value deferred for the anticipated period until permission will be forthcoming, but with some end deduction to reflect the lack of certainty. Indeed, since most developers will buy only when permission is certain …. any sale in the period of uncertainty will probably require a significant discount on what might otherwise appear to be the full (development) value.”[32]

50. Mr A Chan admitted he had not applied such a discount, significant or otherwise in his valuation to reflect (i) the time required for the Reg. 19(2) determination, and (ii) the uncertainty on the extent of the development intensity to be determined by the Building Authority.  We found these uncertainties should be factored in the assessment even though the 2009 Scheme is considered an approvable development at the date of the resumption.

Uncertainty as to Trespassers

51. It is also not in dispute that there were trespassers present on the Lots at the date of resumption.  It was stated in the report dated 19 August 1998 prepared by C Y Leung & Company Limited who then acted for the applicant that “There were temporary structures, small timber houses and squatters at the date of reversion. As informed by our client, the subject lots had not been leased to anyone ever since our client acquired the property on 1 September 1981 and the occupiers are considered as trespassers.”[33]

52. It is submitted by the respondent that there is the uncertainty as to the time for the removal of the trespassers as well as uncertainty as to whether they could be removed at all.  Mr Tsang gave evidence that the Lots had been kept within his family for a long time at least from 1969, ie more than 20 years prior to the date of resumption and the family was unable to tell when the trespassing had first begun.  The respondent contends that this posed a real risk to the hypothetical potential purchaser which Mr A Chan also accepts that he would be unable to quantify such risk of uncertainty in terms of value.

53. The applicant rebutted that despite the allegation of some 30 families staying there as alerted by the Island District Office in the letter dated 13 March 1996, Mr Tsang gave evidence that no further claim was received from any alleged trespassers after his then solicitors met the trespassers once or twice.

54. We accept the evidence of Mr Tsang which is not shaken that there was no claim ever received from any alleged trespassers.  We would not speculate as to the reason for the nil claims from these trespassers, be it due to subsequent clearance by the Government according to its prevailing clearance policy or not.  However, having regard to the 30 demand letters put forward by the respondent[34] and to Annex A which tends to show the significance of trespassing, we agree with the respondent that not an insignificant discount had to be allowed in the valuation for the costs and time of clearance.

55. Again Mr A Chan failed to do so in his valuation.

Conclusion on Villa Type Development

56. Having considered the above argument, we are not satisfied that the villa-type development proposed by the applicant is the optimal development for the Lots since the applicant had failed to show that there is the demand for it.  And even if we are wrong on this, should the villa type development be the optimal development, substantial discount should be considered in view of the uncertainty as to the development potential as well as in evicting all trespassers.

Village-type Development

57. On the other hand, Mr Faulkner in his reports dated 21 July 2006 and 31 August 2006 considered that the Lots can be at best developed into a comprehensive NTEH residential development with a total Gross Floor Area of about 3,935.49 square metres (ie a plot ratio about 1.9451) which comprises 15 3-storey NTEHs on Lot No. 288, 4 3-storey NTEHs on Lot No. 289 and 3 3-storey NTEHs on Lot No. 293[35] (ie a total of 22 NTEHs on the Lots).  During cross-examination, Mr Faulkner confirmed once again this would be the development yielding the highest and best use of the Lots taking into account the surrounding environment and characteristics.

58. The applicant contends that the NTEH development is not the optimal development for the Lots. But as we have formed the view that the villa type development like the 2009 Scheme had not been proved by the applicant to be the optimal development, we agree with the respondent that the NTEH proposed by Mr Faulkner would be acceptable in light of the established village surroundings.

59. As stated above, the applicant concedes that if a NTEH development is held to be optimal for the Lots, he would not challenge the residual valuation of HK$20,600,000 provided by Mr Faulkner. Whilst our ruling on the optimal development above might have disposed of the matter, we proceed to deal with the valuation of the Lots on the basis of the 2009 Scheme proposed by Mr A Chan.

Cheung Sha Comparable

60. On the basis of the 2009 Scheme which he termed “a very unique low density high quality development” in his supplemental report dated 28 December 2009[36], Mr A Chan has provided his opinion of the market value of the Lots as at the date of resumption.  He adopts the direct comparative method of valuation by reference to a public auction of a site in Cheung Sha, being Lot 244 in DD 331 (“the Cheung Sha site”) on 3 June 1997 sold for $40 million or an accommodation value (“AV”) of $44,643 per sq metre.

61. In order to quantify the difference in land value between the Lots and the Cheung Sha site due to the differences in location, environment and accessibility, Mr A Chan has compared the data derived from the sale and purchase transactions of the village type developments in Tai O and Cheung Sha which difference he found to be 17%. Furthermore, as the difference in the sale price of the NTEH village type properties in Tai O and Cheung Sha does not equate to the difference in the AV, the residual valuation method has been adopted for the purpose of deducing the difference in the AV between the Lots and the Cheung Sha site[37]:

  Tai O Cheung Sha% Diff
Unit Sale Price (/sq m gross) $15,600 $18,800-17%
PV@ 10.75% for 1.5 yearsx)0.858x)0.858 
(A)$13,385(A)$16,130
      
Unit Construction Cost (/sq m gross)$6,500$6,500
Profit @20% on costsx)1.20x)1.20 
 $7,800 $7,800 
 x)0.9263x)0.9263 
(B)$7,225(B)$7,225 
      
(A)– (B) $6,160 $8,905 
Less Profit@ 20%÷1.20÷1.20
 
AV(/sq m) $5,133 $7,421-30%

62. With this difference of 30%, Mr A Chan proceeded to assess the market value for the purpose of compensation as follows[38]:

 VillaFlat
AV of the Cheung Sha site (per sq m)$44,643
 
Overall adjustment for the locational (including environmental and accessibility) factor-30%-40%
AV applicable to the Lots (per sq m)$31,250$26,785
Potential GFA of the Lots (sq m)2,259.609298.425
Open Market Value of the Lots$70,612,781$7,993,313
 Total:$78,606,094
 Say$78,606,000
Overall AV(per sq m): $30,729

63. Following Mr A Chan’s approach, Mr Faulkner had attempted to assign adjustments to the different factors between the Lots and the Cheung Sha site as follows[39]:

Adjustment FactorAdjustment Rate
Location/accessibility-30%
View-20%
Site Condition (ie occupation by trespassers)-10%
Development Density-5%
Site Layout & Shape-3%
Public right of way cutting through-5%
Quality/ Type of the Proposed Development-15%
Total:-88%

64. It is the contention of the respondent that the Cheung Sha comparable is not an appropriate comparable and the way Mr A Chan derived the AV of the Lots is fundamentally wrong.

65. Cheung Sha is a popular residential and resort housing area on the southern side of the Lantau Island, relatively close to a beach and ferry pier and offers seaview whereas Tai O is a tourist village located on the northwestern side of the Lantau Island with no non-village development save for Lung Tin Estate and Lung Hin Court.  Mr A Chan also acknowledges that there are differences between the Lots and the Cheung Sha site in terms of location, environment and accessibility.

66. Indeed, by reference to the table of differences between the Lots and the Cheung Sha site as stated at §34 above, one can easily discern that the Cheung Sha site is not a comparable to the Lots at all particularly in terms of its development density (when a plot ratio of 0.4 is compared with that of 1.264 before accounting for the space taken up by the public right of way).  As Mr A Chan acknowledged in his Supplemental Report dated 28 December 2009 at paragraph 12.1: “Cheung Sha is a residential and resort housing area, relatively close to a beach and ferry pier and offers sea view, whereas Tai O is a tourist village (where there is no non-village development except some subsidized housing developments) and the living environment is generally inferior.”[40]  Using the same term propounded by Mr Chow in explaining away the demand for the 2009 Scheme from that of the Lung Tin Estate, the Lots and the Cheung Sha site cater for different markets.  There is no evidence at all that Tai O or more particularly the Lots would share the same market sentiment in the Cheung Sha site as at the date of resumption. In this regard, we also bear in mind that the general market sentiment in Hong Kong has already passed not only the enthusiasm demonstrated in 1997 but also the recent years.

67. While we appreciate that the various adjustment rates adopted by Mr Faulkner are subject to dispute, we agree that the various factors require not insignificant adjustments.  That is, Mr A Chan failed to consider other important factors of adjustments apart from location, environment and accessibility and his adjustments for the latter factors by conducting a residual analysis in §61 above are inadequate.

68. Mr A Chan had stated in his Rebuttal Report dated 28 December 2012[41] that he “acknowledge there are locational difference between Cheung Sha and Tai O but there is no evidence to suggest Tai O cannot accommodate a villa type development if the sale price offered is commensurate with the characteristics of the product, including quality and location.”  Yet in §61 above, in order to quantify the difference in land value between the Lots and the Cheung Sha site due to the differences in location, environment and accessibility, Mr A Chan has compared the data derived from the sale and purchase transactions of the village type developments in Tai O and Cheung Sha which difference he found to be 17%.  He then proceeded with a residual valuation for the purpose of deducing the difference in the AV between the Lots and the Cheung Sha site.

69. At best, by doing this exercise, Mr A Chan was able to find the difference in AV of land for NTEH development but not the AV of land for villa-type development unless, as pointed out by this Tribunal at trial, Mr A Chan had made a very important assumption that the price differential between villa-type development and NTEHs in Tai O and Cheung Sha would be the same.  Such assumption cannot be supported if the sale price of a villa type development in Tai O has to “commensurate with the characteristics of the product, including quality and location.”

70. Taking into account the shabby environment in Tai O, for example, if the price differentials between the two types of developments in Tai O are smaller than those in Cheung Sha, the AV adjustments will be larger than 30%.  During cross-examination, Mr A Chan tried to argue that his selection of the NTEH comparables in the two areas had already reflected the differences in other attributes including view, privacy and intensity. We are however not persuaded this is the case by reference to the table of differences between the Lots and the Cheung Sha site as stated at §34 above.

71. We also pointed out that Mr A Chan has not taken into account the lack of carparking on the Lots. During re-examination, he explained that the amount of adjustment should not be significant because carparking at the Cheung Sha site is restricted to “not more than one space for every two residential units”, ie half of the residential units do not have carparking on site as well.  However, Mr A Chan conceded that some $50,000-$100,000 had to be allowed presumably for each space.  We are however not interested in the actual quantum of allowance; what we are concerned is the character and development intensity of the Lot vis-à-vis the Cheung Sha site is completely different.

72. We find in any event that the Lots and the Cheung Sha site are too different to be considered for any comparable value; otherwise we are not comparing like with like.  We found the Cheung Sha site is not a suitable comparable to be adopted in this case for the Lots and the assessment by Mr A Chan is also fundamentally flawed.

The Lamma Site

73. Mr A Chan then cross-checked his valuation with the result of another Government auction in respect of Lot 866 in DD 1, Ngau Kau Wan on Lamma Island (“the Lamma site”) held on 27 August 1997, ie two months after the date of resumption.  Again the particulars of the Lamma site as compared with the Lots are summarized below:

The Lamma siteThe Lots
(based on the 2009 Scheme)
Site Area:3,920 sq m2,023 sq m
User:Private ResidentialPrivate Residential
Maximum GFA:2,352 sq m2,558.034 sq m
Maximum Site Coverage:30%42.143%
Maximum Plot Ratio:0.61.264
Maximum no. of Units:349 (as proposed)
Height:Not exceeding 17m above HKPD and 3 storeysApproximately 10.2 metres and 3 storeys
Parking Spaces:Not available on Lamma IslandNot available on site

74. Mr A Chan considered the AV for the Lamma site, ie $27,211, which is about 11.4% less than the assessed overall AV for the Lots supported his valuation.  Likewise, save for the issue on the provision of parking spaces, we find most of the criticisms against adopting the Cheung Sha site as comparable similarly apply here.  Apart from the significant difference in development intensity and in location, Mr A Chan failed to apply adjustment to the different factors raised by Mr Faulkner as well as allowed discount for uncertainty in development potential and for the trespassers.  We found the Lamma comparable is also not a suitable comparable to be adopted in this case.

Valuation Method

75. Certainly, based on his assumption of the 2009 Scheme, Mr A Chan assessed the market value of the Lots by the Direct Comparison Method, criticizing on the other hand “the deficiency of residual valuation and the improper use of this method by Mr Faulkner”.  On the other hand, Mr Faulkner opined that since “the Cheung Sha site is the sole comparable which may not truly affect the market perception and the substantial adjustment is large in magnitude”, he maintained that the residual valuation method is the most appropriate method in assessing the market value of the Lots.

76. That the residual method of valuation suffers a series of subjective assumptions is well known in the valuation sector.  The Lands Tribunal has repeatedly stressed its reluctance to use this valuation method.  Its continued enforced use on many other occasions does not mean that its faults are any the less; it remains a valuation method of last resort which is inherently very sensitive to even small changes in the input variables[42].  

77. While we agree that the direct comparison method is usually the best method in valuation, we agree with Mr Faulkner that it is generally not a good approach to carry out any valuation by direct comparison method using a single comparable[43].  This is particularly the case as we found above that this single comparable, ie the Cheung Sha site should not be regarded as comparable at all. And the criticism by Mr A Chan against Mr Faulkner’s approach is also applicable to Mr A Chan’s adoption of a residual valuation for the purpose of deducing the difference in the AV between the Lots and the Cheung Sha site.

78. In Tin Kung Investment Limited v. Secretary for Transport, LDRW 16 of 2001 (unreported, dated 29 June 2004), the Tribunal raised concern about the many variables and quantum of adjustments required in the comparison exercise:

“Putting before anyone these statistics, there must be the concern whether the Comparables selected for valuation are indeed suitable for comparison. Making adjustment to compensate for the difference between two properties is not a perfect and effective valuation tool. What the experts have built in the valuation formula are largely subjective views (and such formula may be manipulated to arrive at an intended result). The subjective views tend to cause error, the risk of which goes in proportion to the quantum of adjustment made. Its application therefore is with limitation. It is suitable for use only if the two properties are in great similar but in minor place different. In the case where a large number of factors and amount of adjustment as the above are applied in the valuation, the risk of getting the valuation wrong is high. If this fundamental principle of application is not observed, the price of a commercial property in a central business area can be absurdly taken to find out the value of a piece of farmland in the green belt zone through adjustments. The great total number of factors/amount of adjustment adopted is a sheer indication of the unsuitability of a property for use for comparison to the other. In this regard, the Respondent's counsel has rightly quoted HH Judge Cruden's view in his book entitled "Land Compensation and Valuation Law in Hong Kong.”

79. While similar criticism may be directed towards using the auction result of the Lamma site, we consider the most appropriate valuation method in determining the market value of the Lots is the residual method.  We agree that where adequate comparables exist, the Direct Comparison Method is to be preferred but this is not the case here.  In Hofei Estates Limited v. Secretary for City and New Territories Administration [1980-82] CPR 486, although the valuation surveyors from both sides valued the development land resumed solely by the comparative method, the Lands Tribunal observed that the substantial number of adjustments necessary under direct comparison method reduced the quality of the valuations.  It remarked at §15 of the judgment that:

“In these circumstances a better approach would have been to have used the residual method. The adoption of the residual method would have enabled the valuers to have tested the value of the subject property in terms of optimum development in relation to cost and reasonable profit margins.”

Conclusion

80. Since we have already ruled out the 2009 Scheme to be the optimal development of the Lots, we agree with Mr Faulkner that the highest and best use of the Lots as at the date of resumption should be based on NTEH development.  In this regard, we note the proposed development layout and scale of development in terms of GFA, number of storeys, building height, etc are agreed by Mr A Chan as well in their joint statement dated 3 December 2013. Mr Chow for the applicant also concedes that if the Tribunal adopts the NTEH development as the optimal development for the purpose of assessing the value of the Lots as at the date of resumption, the valuation by Mr Faulkner in the sum of $20,600,000 is agreeable as the market value of the Lots.

Orders

81. Accordingly, we order that the respondent do pay the applicant compensation for the Lots in the sum of $20,600,000.  The matters of professional fees, interest and costs shall be adjourned to a date to be fixed, with liberty to apply for any other ancillary and consequential matters.

82. It remains for us to thank Counsel for their invaluable assistance.

Deputy Judge KOTMr. Lawrence PANG
Presiding Officer
Lands Tribunal
Member
Lands Tribunal

Mr Anderson Chow SC and Mr Richard Khaw, instructed by Keith Lam Lau & Chan, for the applicant

Mr Y C Mok and Ms Teresa Wu, instructed by the Department of Justice, for the respondent


Annex A

LDMR3.05.JPG

[1]  See http://www.housingauthority.gov.hk/en/about-us/news-centre/press-releases/index.html?key=1581

[2] See http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201403/24/P201403240406.htm

[3] See Bundle D/242

[4] See Bundle E/93-99

[5] See Bundle B/197

[6] See Bundle D/91-109

[7] See Bundle D/113

[8] See Bundle D/209

[9] See Bundle D/210-211

[10] See Bundle D/231

[11] See Bundle A/111-113

[12] See Bundle C/52-61

[13] See Bundle C/80-89

[14] See Bundle C/144-147

[15] See Bundle A/111-113

[16] See Bundle C/1-20

[17] See Bundle C/21-35

[18] See Bundle C/36-43

[19] See Bundle C/44-51

[20] See Bundle C/62-79

[21] See Bundle C/90-124

[22] See Bundle C/125-143

[23] See Bundle A/110

[24] See Bundle C/73

[25] See Bundle C/97-109

[26] See Bundle C/129-132

[27] See pp 7 & 11 of Exhibit A1

[28] See Bundle C/131

[29] This principle, whose derives its nomenclature from the Privy Council decision in Pointe Gourde Quarrying and Transport Co Ltd v. Sub-Intendent of Crown Lands [1947] AC 565 (which was referred to in Waters & Ors v. Welsh Development Agency [2004] 1 WLR 1304 cited to this Tribunal by Mr Chow), is any increase (or in the present case decrease) in value wholly due to resumption is to be disregarded.

[30] See Bundle C/116

[31] See Bundle B/128

[32] See, for example, §72 of the judgment.

[33] See Bundle B/029

[34] See Bundle E/6-91

[35] See Bundle C/27 & C/47

[36] See Bundle C/67

[37] See Bundle C/77

[38] See Bundle C/78

[39] See Bundle C/34 & C/117

[40] See Bundle C/75

[41] See Bundle C/132

[42] See for instance Director of Lands and Survey v. Fung Ping Chung [1977] HKLTLR 37

[43] See for instance John James Toohey v. Hero Plaza Limited, LDNT 60/1999 (unreported, dated 8 July 2000) and Forsyth v Banbury Investments Ltd. [2000] 3 HKLRD 834

92379-EN-2014-04-03

TSAN LUK YUK YIN AND OTHERS v. THE SECRETARY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, TRANSPORT AND WORKS

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LDMR 3/2005

 

IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MISCELLANEOUS REFERENCE APPLICATION NO. 3 OF 2005

_________________

 

BETWEEN
TSAN Luk Yuk Yin
(as the trustee for TSANG Hing Kwong Thomas (2/4 shares),
TSAN Hing Him Lana (1/4 share) and
TSAN Hing Tat Heidi (1/4 share) being tenants in common as the beneficiaries)
Applicant
and
The Secretary for the Environment, Transport and WorksRespondent

_________________

Before:Deputy Judge KOT, Presiding Officer, Lands Tribunal and
 Mr. Lawrence PANG, Member of the Lands Tribunal
Date of Hearing: 25 March 2014
Date of Decision: 25 March 2014
Date of Reasons for Decision: 3 April 2014

_________________

REASONS  FOR  DECISION

_________________

1.  This is an application by the respondent to adduce a bundle of document consisting of copies of land grant of 14 properties in Cheung Sha and 4 properties in other parts of Lantau Island (“the Bundle”) on the second day of a 5-day trial.

2.  The purpose of adducing the Bundle, according to Mr. Mok for the respondent, is to rebut the theory suggested by Mr. Alnwick Chan, the applicant’s expert (“Mr. A Chan”), on his conclusion that there has been no villa type development in Tai O of Lantau, not because of lack of demand but due to the fact that there has been a lack of supply of land (as particularized in Mr. A Chan’s last report dated 28 December 2012).

3.  With the Bundle in evidence, Mr. Mok is trying to show that the question of lack of supply of land can be cured by a process of surrender of land in exchange for a new grant and/or by way of merged site development which is the situation as shown in certain land grants in the Bundle.

4.  Mr. Mok also explained the reason for the late production of the Bundle is because of the fact that this point is only discovered by him last week when he is preparing for this trial.  It is the submission of Mr. Mok that he is entitled to cross-examine Mr. A Chan on the possibility of a land exchange or merged site development even without such point being raised by the respondent’s expert in advance so any complaint of the late production of the Bundle is not justified.  In fact, it is only for fairness that the respondent sought to adduce the Bundle.

5.  Mr. Chow for the applicant opposed to the production of the Bundle at such late stage.  It is submitted that the Bundle raised new issues about land assembly process and the applicant had been deprived of the chance to check the background of the transactions involved and also for an analysis of the government policy as to land exchange at the material time.  The details as to how the land was being held at the first place, how much time spent in the acquisition and how premium were assessed in these land exchange transactions are relevant in deciding whether the respondent is justified to rely upon the 18 transactions to rebut Mr. A Chan’s evidence.

6.  Having considered the argument, we declined to allow the production of the Bundle as sought by the respondent with reasons to be handed down.  This is the reason for our decision.

7.  It is most unfortunate that such a point was only discovered by Mr. Mok last week but this does not mean that the Bundle should be admitted.  We do not find this to be a valid reason to justify the lateness of the introduction of the Bundle.

8.  We agreed with Mr. Chow that the Bundle is being introduced at such a late stage that leave should be refused.  There had been orders for the exchange of expert reports as well as meeting of experts with statement of agreement and disagreement to be prepared.  The purpose of such a move is to prevent parties from being taken by surprise as to the true nature of the dispute and thereby being obliged to seek for an adjournment.  The Bundle sought to be produced is to show that amalgamation of lots have been happening in Cheung Sha and this can also be done in Tai O in order to solve the problem of lack of supply.  Hence, the background of the land exchange must be relevant because there may be special features of these transactions in Cheung Sha to make it distinguishable from the situation in Tai O, where the subject lot located.

9.  It would be unfair for the applicant to deal with the Bundle without the opportunity to at least study and analyse the same.  To allow the Bundle to be admitted, we can foresee that it is inevitable for an adjournment to be sought by the applicant, which may lead to the lengthening of the trial process, the unnecessary increase of costs and a waste of the resources of the court.  This is not in furtherance of the underlying objectives of the Civil Justice Reform and most undesirable, in particular for the fact that the trial is already underway.  The trial was a milestone event, and it would be undesirable to interrupt Mr. A Chan’s evidence. 

10.  Having said so, this Tribunal had also borne in the mind Order 1A rule 2 of the Rules of the High Court which provides that in giving effect to the underlying objectives of these rules, the court shall always recognise the primary aim in exercising the powers of the court is to secure the just resolution of disputes in accordance with the substantive rights of the parties.  Since Mr. Mok also indicated that he is entitled to cross-examine Mr. A Chan on the issue of land exchange even without the production of the Bundle (which is not in dispute by the applicant), we found no injustice is being caused to the respondent in not allowing the Bundle to be admitted.

11.  If the respondent is minded to adduce the Bundle, the applicant should be alerted well in advance so that the applicant can have the chance to analyse the land exchange transactions in question in order to properly deal with the new evidence.  Given the lateness of this application without any justification, the application must be refused.

 Deputy Judge KOT
 Mr. Lawrence PANG
Presiding Officer Member
Lands Tribunal
 

Mr Anderson Chow SC and Mr Richard Khaw, instructed by Keith Lam Lau & Chan, for the applicant

Mr Y C Mok and Ms Teresa Wu, instructed by the Department of Justice, for the respondent

80898-EN-2012-03-16

TSAN LUK YUK YIN v. THE SECRETARY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, TRANSPORT AND WORKS<br>

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LDMR 3/2005

IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

Miscellaneous Reference Application No. 3 of 2005

________________

BETWEEN

 TSAN Luk Yuk Yin
(as the trustee for TSANG Hing Kwong Thomas (2/4 shares), TSAN Hing Him Lana (1/4 share) and TSAN Hing Tat Heidi (1/4 share) being tenants in common as the beneficiaries)
Applicant
 and
 The Secretary for the Environment, Transport and Works Respondent

________________

Before: HH Judge M Wong, Presiding Officer of the Lands Tribunal
Date of Hearing: 13 February 2012
Date of Decision: 16 March 2012

_______________

DECISION

_______________

 

Background

1.  This is an application made by the applicant by way of summons dated 3 September 2010 to seek leave to file and serve the Expert Report of Professor Barnabas Chung dated 5 November 2009 and the Supplemental Expert Report of Mr Alnwick Chan dated 28 December 2009 (“the new reports”).

2.  The respondent objects to this application on the ground that the applicant is attempting to put forth a new or amended claim for $78,606,000 as set out in the new reports basing on a completely different development model (“the 2009 model”) and the applicant is barred from making a new or amended claim by the operation of sections 27 to 29, particularly the time limit imposed in section 28(5), of the Roads (Works, Use and Compensation) Ordinance, Cap 370 (“the Ordinance”).

3.  The applicant was the registered owner of Lot Nos. 288, 289 and 293 in DD 313, Tai O, Lantau Island, New Territories, Hong Kong (“the Lots”) which have been resumed by the Government since 24 June 1997 pursuant to section 13 of the Ordinance.  By Notice of Application dated 10 November 2005, the applicant applies to the Lands Tribunal in these proceedings for determination of the applicant’s claim for compensation under Item 1 of Part II of the Schedule to the Ordinance.

4.  It was mentioned in the letter dated 23 June 1998 attached to the Notice of Application that the amount of claim was $200 million and valuation report would be submitted in due course.  Then the applicant filed the Expert Report and the Supplemental Expert Report of Mr Alnwick Chan dated 16 November 2005 and 19 September 2006 respectively (“the 2005 & 2006 reports”) setting out the applicant’s claim for $79,430,000 basing on a development model prepared in 2003 (“the 2003 model”), which proposed development to be built over a footpath running through the Lots.

5.  At the hearing of the applicant’s claim on 8 October 2007 and upon the application of the applicant, the Tribunal ordered that a preliminary issue, namely “Was the footpath lying on the subject Lots as at the date of resumption a public right of way by prescription?”, be determined first. At the completion of the oral submissions of counsel for the parties on 9 October 2007, the Tribunal ordered that the hearing of the applicant’s application for compensation be adjourned to a date to be fixed by the parties after the determination of the preliminary issue.

6.  The Tribunal gave its decision on the preliminary issue on 20 November 2007 and held that the footpath was a public right of way by prescription.  There was subsequently a proposed appeal by the applicant against the Tribunal’s decision to the Court of Appeal, but the proposed appeal was eventually not proceeded with.

7.  In view of the Tribunal’s decision on the preliminary issue, the applicant instructed an authorized person to submit to the Building Authority a revised hypothetical building proposal (“the revised proposal”) taking into account the public right of way and containing no building over the footpath.  In April 2008, comments were provided by various government departments on the revised proposal.  Thereafter, the applicant’s authorized person took steps to resolve the technical issues raised by the government departments.  However, by letter dated 24 December 2008, the Building Authority stated that it was not within its ambit to determine the revised proposal on the ground that “Pre-submission enquiries solely related to compensation claims, hypothetical schemes and academic exercises would not normally be entertained by Buildings Department”.

8.  The new reports have been prepared in support of the applicant’s claim for compensation based on the revised proposal.  Professor Chung’s report also addresses various comments raised by the government departments in respect of the revised proposal.  The applicant contends that the new reports are simply further expert evidence for the Tribunal’s determination and they do not amount to a new or amended claim.  Thus, the time limit for service of the claim or any amended claim on the respondent as set out in the Ordinance is irrelevant, and the respondent’s reading and construction of the statutory provisions are plainly wrong.

9.  The applicant further contends that it is unfair for the respondent to raise this contention at this stage when:-

(1)  she has all along been clearly aware of the applicant’s interest in the Lots and also the nature of her present claim, since the claim was first submitted to the District Land Office in July 1998;

(2)  even after the determination of the preliminary issue had been made, the government still proceeded to consider the applicant’s revised proposal and provided its comments on the same; and

(3)  the basis of the revised proposal (ie for development of low-density residential complex) is the same as the previous proposal (accepted by the Building Authority) submitted to the Tribunal before the determination of the preliminary issue.

10.  Even assuming what the applicant is seeking to put forward is an amended claim, the applicant contends that the respondent can no longer allege that the amended claim is time-barred by reasons of waiver, estoppel and acquiescence arising out of the following matters:-

(1)  In the present case, during the period between 1998 and 2004, the applicant and the respondent were involved in a long negotiation on the amount of compensation.

(2)  The proceedings were commenced in the Lands Tribunal in November 2005 after the negotiation had broken down.

(3)  If the respondent’s argument were right, the applicant would have been barred from putting forward any valuation which is different from the original amount of the claim when the proceedings were commenced in the Lands Tribunal in 2005.

(4)  However, both parties in these proceedings have put forward further valuation reports by way of expert evidence.  The respondent has never raised any issue of time bar before October 2010.  The respondent has all along been clearly aware of the applicant’s interest in the Lots and the nature of this claim (since the claim was first served on the District Land Office in July 1998 ie within the one-year period stipulated).  In the present case, the nature of the claim has never changed.

(5)  The applicant has revised the assessment of her claim on various occasions in the past and such revisions were all made beyond the one-year statutory period. However, the respondent never saw fit to raise any issue of time bar until recently.

(6)  The subject-matter of the applicant’s claim has always been the same, ie for compensation in respect of the Lots resumed.

(7)  The respondent has all along been fully aware of the nature of the applicant’s interest and the nature of her claim.

(8)  It is clear to the respondent that the determination of the preliminary issue on the public right of way would have a material impact on the assessment of compensation and would therefore result in revisions of the applicant’s claim.

(9)  The basis of the applicant’s revised proposal (ie for development of low-density residential complex) is the same as the previous proposal submitted to the Lands Tribunal before the determination of the preliminary issue.

(10)   In view of the decision on the public right of way, the applicant’s authorized person, in the revised proposal, has modified the configuration of the blocks intended to be constructed, resulting in a reduction of the number of units from 18 to 9.  However, only minor alterations were made in the revised proposal in terms of site coverage and plot ratio.

(11)   Even after the determination of the preliminary issue has been made, the government still considered the applicant’s revised proposal and provided its comments on the same.

11.  In view of the parties’ contentions, the main issues for me to decide in this application are whether the applicant is putting forward a new or amended claim by adducing the new reports, and if so, whether such a new or amended claim is time-barred and whether the respondent is entitled to raise the time-barred issue now.  I shall deal with these issues below.

Right to compensation

12.  Section 26 of the Ordinance prescribes the rights to compensation as follows:-

“No person shall have any right against the Crown or any other person to recover any money –

(a) in respect of any use authorized under this Ordinance; or

(b)   in respect of any works or anything else authorized under this Ordinance except to the extent of the rights to compensation provided for in section 27.”

13.  Section 27(1) of the Ordinance stipulates that:-

“The compensation referred to in section 26 is the right to recover from the Crown for the matters set out in the first column of Part II of the Schedule a sum assessed on the basis specified opposite thereto in the second column thereof and with regard to the provisions of Part I of the Schedule, subject to-

(a)  the claim being served on the Secretary within the appropriate period specified in the fourth column of Part II of the Schedule.”

(underlines added)

14.  In other words, the right to compensation is qualified and conditional upon the claim being (1) first served on the respondent and (2) served within time.  The claimant cannot directly go to the Tribunal for compensation. The first condition is set out in section 29 of the Ordinance in more details and the second condition in section 28.

Claims procedure

15.  Section 29(1) of the Ordinance provides that any person who claims to be entitled to compensation “shall” serve upon the respondent a written claim setting out such of the following particulars as are applicable to his claim:-

“(a) the name of the claimant, and his address for service of notices;

(b) a full description of the land to which the claim relates including any covenants, easements, rights or restrictions affecting the same;

(c) the nature of the claimant’s interest in the land including in the case of a sub-lessee or sub-tenant his landlord’s name and address and details of the sub-lease or tenancy;

(d) details of any mortgage, including the principal still owing and name and address of the mortgagee;

(e) if the claimant has let the land or any part thereof, the name and address of each tenant and details of his lease or tenancy;

(f) particulars of the claim showing –

(i) the amount of the claim;

(ii) under which item of Part II of the Schedule the claim is made; and

(iii) how the amount claimed under each item is calculated.”

 (underlines added)

16.  The respondent submits that a claim is required by the Ordinance to include not just the demand for a monetary amount but is required to be a claim with sufficient particulars showing how the amount claimed under each item is calculated.  In practice, surveyors acting for claimants always provide an assessment of compensation based on a development model as part and partial of the claim to set out how each item of the claim is calculated.

17.  Under section 29(2) of the Ordinance, the respondent shall in writing acknowledge receipt and the date of receipt of every claim served on him.  Under section 29(3), if a claimant amends his claim before proceedings are commenced in the Lands Tribunal and the respondent considers the amendment to be substantial, the respondent may, within 28 days of the receipt of the amended claim, notify the claimant that he elects to treat the claim as if it were a new claim and the statutory procedure under section 29 shall apply accordingly.

18.  Under section 29(4) of the Ordinance, the respondent may by notice in writing request the claimant to furnish further particulars of and in support of his claim or any item thereof and if any such particulars are not furnished as requested, the claim or the item thereof shall be deemed to be rejected.

19.  Section 29(5) of the Ordinance provides that:-

“The Secretary shall within 6 months of the service of a claim on him or, if he has requested further particulars under subsection (4) within 6 months of the day on which they are furnished in accordance with that subsection, notify the claimant in writing that he –

(a) admits the entire claim; or

(b) rejects the entire claim; or

(c) admits a specified part or parts and rejects the remainder, and in every case shall briefly state his reasons for rejection so that the claimant is adequately informed of those reasons:

Provided that the Secretary may at any time state further reasons for rejection of claim.”

20.  The respondent submits that the statutory claims procedure leading to the admission or rejection of a claim under sections 29(4) and (5) of the Ordinance is always tied to the requirement of a particularized claim under sections 29(1)(f) and (4).

21.  Pursuant to section 29(6) of the Ordinance, where the respondent has rejected a claim or any part thereof under section 29(5), the respondent may by notice in writing offer to the claimant such sum, including costs as agreed or taxed, as the government is willing to pay in full and final settlement of the claim or any part thereof, or commence proceedings in the Lands Tribunal to have the claim determined.

22.  Section 29(7) provides that if a claim has not been settled after 7 months, either the claimant or the respondent may commence proceedings in the Lands Tribunal under the Ordinance.

23.  The respondent submits that under section 29 the right to commence proceedings in the Lands Tribunal to determine a claim is not unconditional.  The right is subject to the claim having first been served on the respondent and having been rejected or not having been settled.  In the case of the applicant’s particularized claim based on a specific development model, it is that claim, which, after the respondent’s rejection, gains the right to be placed before the Tribunal.

Extension of time for service of new or amended claims

24.  Under section 28(1) of the Ordinance, if a claim or an amendment is not served on the respondent before the expiration of the period specified in the fourth column of Part II of the Schedule in respect of that matter, the right to claim compensation therefor shall be barred, but it is subject to the Lands Tribunal’s power to extent time as provided in section 28(4).

25.  As stipulated in the fourth column of Part II of the Schedule, the period within which the claim for compensation in respect of the resumption of land under section 13 of the Ordinance must be served on the respondent is before the expiration of one year from the date of resumption.

26.  According to section 28(2), the period referred to in section 28(1) of the Ordinance may, upon application made to the Lands Tribunal either before or after the expiry of that period, be extended in accordance with section 28.

27.  Section 28(4) of the Ordinance states that:-

“The Lands Tribunal may extend the period within which a claim must be served upon the Secretary if it considers that the delay in serving the claim was occasioned by mistake of fact or mistake of any matter of law (other than the relevant provision in the fourth column of Part II of the Schedule) or by any other reasonable cause or that the Crown is not materially prejudiced in the conduct of its case or otherwise by the delay.”

(underlines added)

28.  Thus, sections 28(2) and (4) of the Ordinance enable the Tribunal to grant extension of time for service of an amended claim after the expiry of the period referred to in section 28(1) (see also Ease Gold Development Limited v Secretary for Transport,CACV 3422 of 2001 and Busy Firm Investment Limited v Secretary for Transport, LDRW 6 of 2001).

29.  However, section 28(5) of the Ordinance limits the length of extension allowed under section 28(4) to six years as follows:-

“An extension may be granted by the Lands Tribunal under subsection (4), with or without conditions for such period as it thinks fit but not in any case exceeding 6 years from the time when the right to compensation first arose.”

 (underlines added)

30.  Accordingly, any new or amended claim which surfaces after the 6-year period is barred.

The applicant’s case

31.  The applicant contends that her claim by letter dated 23 June 1998 was served on the respondent within time.  Section 28 of the Ordinance (read in conjunction with section 29) deals only with the time limit for service of a claim (or any amendment to the claim) on the respondent so as to allow the respondent to consider it within a reasonable time after the date of resumption or any other relevant date.  Hence, such time limit is confined to situations regarding claims made to the respondent and the determination of the claims by the respondent before proceedings are commenced in the Lands Tribunal.  There is no time limit imposed on submission of a revised or amended claim after the respondent has made a decision or after proceedings have been commenced in the Lands Tribunal.

32.  The respondent had already considered the claim. However, the parties failed to reach any agreement on the amount of compensation.  On 10 November 2005, the Applicant commenced the present proceedings in the Lands Tribunal.  The claim is now being considered by the Lands Tribunal which has the power to consider what evidence (including expert evidence) may be adduced by the parties.  In the present application, the applicant simply intends to adduce further expert evidence for the determination by the Lands Tribunal (as opposed to the respondent) in view of the Lands Tribunal’s determination of the preliminary issue.  Hence, the time limit set out in section 28 for service of the claim (or an amended claim) for consideration by the respondent (before proceedings are commenced in the Lands Tribunal) is irrelevant.

33.  There is nothing in the Ordinance which prevents a claimant from revising or amending his claim after the respondent has made a decision (or after proceedings have been commenced in the Lands Tribunal).  In Berwell Trading Ltd v Secretary for Transport [2003] 3 HKC 631, the Lands Tribunal considered, amongst others, an application for extension of time to submit a revised claim for loss of rental and/or disturbance under the Ordinance, and it was held by Judge Lam, Presiding Officer (as he then was) that:-

“The original claim has alerted the respondent as to the applicant’s interest and claim and it was clearly stated to be an interim one. A revised claim after completion of the works must have been expected by the respondent. I am not sure whether an extension is required. An applicant can amend his claim (see s 29(3) of the Ordinance) and there is no suggestion in the Ordinance that a claim cannot be amended after the time bar for filing an original claim.”

34.  The applicant submits that it does not make sense if all revisions to the original claim would have to be made within one year from the date of resumption.  It is common that a claimant, after his original claim is rejected by the government, will adduce further expert report in the proceedings before the Lands Tribunal and such report may contain revisions made to the original claim.  It is plainly wrong for the respondent to suggest that such expert report shall be served on the respondent within one year from the date of resumption.  Such a contention, if accepted, would usurp the powers and functions of the Lands Tribunal which should be entitled to consider all relevant evidence in determining the claim.

35.  It is also wrong for the respondent to allege that the applicant and her professional advisers had deliberately disregarded the issue of the public right of way for the following reasons:-

(1)  By letter dated 10 March 1999 to the District Land Officer, the applicant’s then representatives, Messrs C Y Leung & Co Ltd, stated their view that the footpath did not give rise to a public right of way by prescription.

(2)  Thereafter, the respondent had never indicated that it would take issue on this point until it was raised in the hearing before the Lands Tribunal on 8 October 2007.

(3)  At the hearing on 8 October 2007, it was the applicant who took the initiative of applying for the determination of a preliminary issue as it was contemplated that such a ruling would affect the assessment of compensation.

The respondent’s case

36.  The respondent objects to the applicant’s application for leave to adduce further evidence because the applicant is barred from making a new or amended claim based on the 2009 model.  The respondent contends that the applicant’s intended claim for $78,606,000 as set out in the new reports basing on the 2009 model is a new or amended claim.  Section 28(1) of the Ordinance requires the applicant to serve any new or amended claim upon the respondent within 1 year of the date of resumption subject to the Tribunal’s power of extension under section 28.  However, as the Tribunal’s power of extension is limited by section 28(5) to within six years from the date of resumption, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to extend time for the applicant when the new or amended claim based on the 2009 model was not made by 24 June 2003.  It follows that the applicant is barred from making the intended new or amended claim based on the 2009 model and the new reports would serve no useful purpose, and accordingly leave to file the new reports should be refused.

37.  The respondent further submits that it is wrong to draw a distinction between two situations: (a) the serving of a claim or amended claim on the respondent before the respondent has made a decision on it (which is to be subject to the time limits under section 28) and (b) the claimant having commenced proceedings in the Lands Tribunal after the respondent has rejected a claim (which is not to be subject to the time limits under section 28).  Such an argument should be rejected for at least the following reasons:-

(1)   The Ordinance imposes the mandatory requirements of having all claims and amended claims to be first served on the respondent (section 27(1)(a)) and to go through the claims procedure of s. 29 which stipulates that only a rejected or unsettled claim should go to the Tribunal for adjudication.

(2)   The Ordinance also imposes the mandatory requirement that all claims and amended claims have to be served with the respondent within the appropriate period (sections 27(1)(a) and 28(1) impose the initial time limit of one year but subject to the Tribunal’s power to extend time (section 28(2)) up to the limit of 6 years imposed by section 28(5).

(3)   These are clear provisions set out in sections 28 and 29.  There can be no doubt of the legislative intent of the statutory regime.

(4)   If there were such a distinction as mentioned above, it would render (a) the time limits imposed by section 28, particularly section 28(5), on the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to extend time of service of a claim or amended claim on the respondent and (b) the requirement of starting the claim process with the service of the claim or amended claim on the respondent rather meaningless.

(5)   The applicant’s intended claim based on the 2009 model is clearly a new or amended claim within the meaning of section 28 and it should be governed by the same regime established under the provisions of that section, whether the applicant has commenced action before the Tribunal or not.

(6)   In East Gold and Busy Firm, the Court of Appeal and the Tribunal respectively considered section 28(1) applied to the applications for amendments to the claims made to the Tribunal after the commencement of compensation proceedings there and granted extensions of time to the amended claims under section 28(4).

(7)   In Busy Firm it was specifically argued by the claimant that the amendment to the claim was not governed by the equivalent of section 28 but by section 10 of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance, Cap 17 and the Tribunal rejected the argument.

(8)   Judge Lam’s ruling in Berwell Trading Ltd does not give much help to the applicant in this regard, as Judge Lam in that case did exercise the Tribunal’s power of extension of time under s. 28(4) and the passage cited was clearly obiter.  The passage was made apparently without benefit of any argument.  Further this case predated both East Gold and Busy Firm and the ratio of these two decisions are very clear: section 28 applies to an amendment made to the claim after the commencement of compensation proceedings in the Tribunal.

38.  The respondent further contends that in compliance of sections 27 and 29, each of the 4 previous new or amended claims submitted on behalf of the applicant was constituted by a compensation valuation assessment based on a development model and each particularized claim was served on the respondent and had gone through the claims procedure resulting in a rejection.  The matters relied on by the respondent are as follows:-

(1)   On 24 February 1998, the respondent invited the applicant to serve written claim pursuant to s. 27 and s. 29 of the Ordinance.

(2)   On 23 June 1998, C Y Leung & Co Ltd submitted for the applicant claim for $200,000,000 with the express statement that a valuation report would be submitted later.  The respondent asked for further particulars and on 19 August 1998, C Y Leung & Co Ltd submitted a valuation report showing a revised claim of $141,504,622 basing on a development model with a plot ratio of 3.9 and total saleable area of 6,155.21m2.

(3)   After the respondent requested for further clarifications, on 11 November 1998, C Y Leung & Co Ltd provided a further valuation report revising the claim to $122,416,134.

(4)   On 16 December 1999, the respondent rejected the claim for $122,416,134 and counter-offered $26,107.254.  On 11 January 2000, the applicant only accepted provisional payment but not the counter-offer.  This signified the end of the process concerning the first claim based on the first development model.

(5)   The applicant’s claim by letter of 23 June 1998, after it was particularized, relied on the first development model.  It was not the claim and the development model which the applicant chose to take to the Tribunal.  It was the claim based on the 2003 model that was presented to the Tribunal for adjudication.

(6)   The first development model also ignored and built over the footpath and hence would have been rendered not feasible by the Tribunal’s ruling on the preliminary issue.

(7)   On 29 November 2000, DTZ Debenham Tie Leung submitted for the applicant another valuation report making a new or amended claim for $57,372,634 basing on a village-type houses development model of total gross floor area of 4,338.78 m2 (obtained from  the net building site area of 1,446.26 m2 after deducting the footpath). The respondent requested for particulars, which the applicant provided.

(8)   On 11 July 2001, the respondent rejected the claim for $57,372,634 and counter-offered $26,107,254.  On 3 August 2001, the applicant rejected the counter-offer.  This signified the end of the second claim based on the second development model.

(9)   On 25 November 2002, Chesterton Petty submitted for the applicant another valuation report making a new or amended claim for $39,414,254 being the higher of the two assessments based on (a) NTEH development model of total gross floor area of 4,338.6m2 (obtained from net building area of 1,446.2m2 after deducting the footpath); and (b) Non-NTEH development model of gross floor area of 1,026m2, the existing bulk of the structures found in the Lots at the date of resumption.

(10)     After seeking particulars and not getting them, on 26 June 2003, the respondent rejected the claim for $39,414,254 and counter-offered $26,107,347.  The applicant did not accept the counter-offer.  This signified the end of the third claim based on the third development models.

(11)     On 27 October 2003, the applicant made the building enquiry submission on plot ratio and the Building Authority approved it on 5 December 2003.

(12)     On 15 January 2004, Chesterton Petty submitted for the applicant another assessment making a new or amended claim for $62,500,000 basing on the 2003 model (according to the plans approved by the Building Authority on 5 December 2003).

(13)     On 14 July 2004, the respondent rejected the claim for $62,500,000 and counter-offered $26,107,347.  On 12 October 2004, the applicant rejected the counter-offer.

(14)     The applicant issued the Notice of Application for compensation on 10 November 2005 still relying on the 2003 model but revising the claim to $79,430,000 in the 2005 & 2006 reports submitted for the purpose of the trial.

39.  The respondent submits that the parties have acted pursuant to the claims procedure under section 29 of the Ordinance and in particular:-

(1)   Each of the applicant’s new or amended claims is not just a monetary amount but is always particularized and constituted by a compensation assessment based on a definite development model;

(2)   In respect of each of the applicant’s new or amended claim, the respondent would follow the statutory procedure ending with the issuance of a rejection together with a counter-offer; and

(3)   After the non-acceptance of the counter-offer, the applicant would submit another compensation assessment making a new or amended claim based on a different development model (except for the last one based on the 2003 model in respect of which the application started the action herein).

40.  After the determination of the preliminary issue, the applicant attempts to make the intended claim for $78,606,000 in the new reports based on the 2009 model and hence the present application for leave to file the new reports. The 2009 model is different from the 2003 model in all fundamental respects in terms of the locations, orientations, numbers, types, designs, layout and dimensions of the buildings and the open space in at least the following ways:-

2003 model2009 model 
  Type of Building No. of Unit Gross Floor Area Type of Building No. of unit Gross Floor Area
Proposed
Development
1.    One 3-storey detached apartment block 3 78.2m2 x 3 = 234.6m2 1.  Six 3-storey detached houses with individual swimming pool on roof of each houses  
House 1 1 110.220m2 x 3 = 330.660m2
House 2 1 139.255m2 x 3 = 417.765m2
House 3 1 111.787m2 x 3 = 335.361m2
House 4 1 117.500m2 x 3 = 352.500m2
House 5 1 110.046m2 x 3 = 330.138m2
House 6 1 164.395m2 x 3 = 493.185m2
  2.    One 3-storey
    4-block in-row apartment block
12 574.302m2 x 3 = 1,722.906m2 2.  One 3-storey detached apartment block with a swimming pool 3 99.475m2 x 3 = 298.425m2
  3.    Two 3-storey detached house (with light-well on 1st & 2nd Floors) 2 107.928m2 + 103.428m2 x = 314.784m2   
  4.    One 3-storey semi-detached house 1 89.837m2 x 3 = 269.511m2   
  Total 18 2,541.801m2 Total 9 2,558.034m2
Layout ·   Apartment blocks situated on Lot No. 288
·   Houses situated on Lot Nos. 289 & 293
·   Apartment block situated at southern portion of Lot No. 288
·   Houses situated on the northern & southern portion of Lot No. 288 and Lot Nos. 289 & 293
Max.
Building Height
·   Apartment blocks with 8.55m
·   Houses with 9.11m
Not Available
Plot
Ratio
1.256 1.264
Site Coverage 42.024% 42.143%
Open Space 635.705m2 644.691m2

41.  Thus, the respondent contends that the applicant’s intended claim for $78,606,000 based on the 2009 model is a new or amended claim within the meaning of section 28, and as the Tribunal cannot extend the period beyond 6 years such a claim is now time-barred.

42.  The respondent further contends that it is the applicant’s own choice to take risk on the footpath in the 2003 model.  A salient feature of the 2009 model is that it has (unlike the 2003 model) taken into account the right of way in the footpath and designed new buildings (which are fundamentally different from the buildings in the 2003 model) which do not build on the footpath.  The applicant (and her advisers) knew from the very beginning of the claims procedure that the respondent queried development models building over the footpath but took the deliberate decision to proceed in the Tribunal with claim based on the 2003 model (as opposed to some other models which would respect the right of way in the footpath such as the 2009 model), and by so doing the applicant must live with the consequences of the inherent risks flowing from that deliberate decision.  The respondent relies on the following matters to support the above contention:-

(1)   By way of letter dated 10 February 1999, the District Lands Office requested C Y Leung & Co Ltd to clarify the right of way in respect of the first development model as follows:-

“There was a footpath crossing the sites as shown on the resumption plan. The footpath which had long been established appeared to be by prescription a public right-of-way. Should there exist, the sites were fragmented. The development site area which in turn the development potential of the captioned sites would be affected”

 (underlines added)

(2)   On 10 March 1999, C Y Leung & Co Ltd admitted the existence of the right of way as follows:-

“We noted that there is a footpath shown on the resumption plan. The footpath is under the ownership of our client. At the date of reversion, there was a no claim for any interest on this path. Therefore, no allowance has been made for any public right-of-way.”

(underlines added)

(3)   However, DTZ Debenham Tie Leung (which is the successor of C Y Leung & Co Ltd) took into account and respected the right of way when submitting the claim for $57,372,634 based on the second development model on 29 November 2000 as follows:-

“Site Area 1,578.26
(Including the area of existing footpath): sq.m.”
“Net Site Area 1,446.26
(After deducting area of existing footpath): sq.m.”
(underlines added) 

(4)   Chesterton Petty equally took into account and respected the right of way by adopting 1,446.26m2 as the site area (net the right of way) for the NTEH development model with the higher assessed value when submitting the claim for $39,414,254 based on the third development model on 25 November 2002.

43.  From the above, the respondent submits that the applicant had made the deliberate decision of choosing to proceed to trial in her compensation proceedings on her last claim based on the 2003 model which deliberately built over the footpath.  There is nothing unfair for her to take the consequences flowing from the decision of having taken that risk.  One of the consequences is that any intended new or amended claim from her to be served after the preliminary issue ruling would be time-barred.  The applicant simply has no cogent reason to delay coming up with the 2009 model before the deadline as provided by section 28(5).

Discussion

44.  There is no dispute between the parties that section 28(1) of the Ordinance stipulates a limitation period for service of a claim or an amended claim on the respondent (as opposed to the Lands Tribunal).   The applicant, however, has made it clear that she is not seeking any extension of time in the present application, still less an extension of time to serve any claim or amended claim on the respondent.  What the applicant is seeking is the Tribunal’s leave to file and serve the new reports in support of her claim for compensation which was filed with the Lands Tribunal in 2005.

45.  Thus, section 28(1) of the Ordinance is not directly engaged in the present application unless I rule in favour of the respondent that the applicant is actually introducing a new or amended claim.  As submitted by the respondent, I need to make determination on this issue at this stage, and if not, it would also be brought up at the resumed hearing.

46.  Having considered carefully the submissions from both parties, I come to the view that the applicant is not making a new or amended claim as alleged by the respondent.  The applicant’s claim is for compensation under Item 1 of Part II of the Schedule to the Ordinance (ie resumption of land), and the amount of the claim put forward in the Notice of Application is for $200 million, which is based on C Y Leung & Co Ltd’s letter dated 23 June 1998 to the District Lands Officer.  The Notice of Application and the attachment thereto did not refer to any particular form of development.  Thus, it can include the revised proposal or the 2009 model.

47.  Prior to the filing of the Notice of Application on 10 November 2005, the amount of the claim had been revised on a number of occasions: (i) originally on 23 June 1998, $200m¸ (ii) on 19 August 1998, $142m, (iii) on 11 November 1998, $114m + $7.9m (ex-gratia allowance), (iv) on 29 November 2000, $57.4m, (v) on 25 November 2002, $39.4m, and (vi) lastly on 15 January 2004, after a building enquiry submission had been approved, $62.5m.  In each instance other than (i), the amount put forward was supported by a report or assessment by a valuer.

48.  After the commencement of the proceedings herein, the parties adduced their respective expert evidence in support of and against the applicant’s claim.  In particular, the applicant’s expert, Mr Alnwick Chan, put forward a claim for $79.43m in his report dated 16 November 2005.

49.  I agree with the applicant that the various valuation reports or assessments are merely evidence put forward by the applicant in support of her claim for compensation for resumption of the Lots.  The new reports will also serve the same purpose as part of the evidence in support of the claim first served on the respondent on 23 June 1998.  The new reports have been prepared consequent upon and in view of the Tribunal’s ruling regarding the public right of way.  Even though the evidence put forward may not fully support the amount of the claim (ie $200 million), that is a different matter altogether.  It is not unusual that the evidence put forward on behalf of a claimant may not fully match the amount of the pleaded claim.

50.  On the other hand, it is rather odd to say that in every such case, each valuation put forward by the claimant should be treated as an amended claim and the claimant is required to serve an amended claim on the respondent first when the basis and nature of the claim are still the same.  If the respondent’s arguments were right, it means that all the previous revisions on the amount of claim would have to be made within one year from the date of resumption.  This is plainly wrong. 

51.  The respondent has placed considerable emphasis on the so called different “development models”.  However, these development models are all hypothetical, and are merely models used by the valuers to derive or arrive at the true value of the lands resumed by the government.  These different development models do not amount to different “claims”, even though the quantification of the claim has changed having regard to the different hypothetical development models.

52.  Although the cases of East Gold and Busy Firm ruled that section 28(1) applies to new claims or amended claims sought to be made after the proceedings are commenced in the Lands Tribunal, they are clearly distinguishable from the present case.

53.  East Gold relates to a claim under the Ordinance where the applicant sought to change the whole basis of the claim for compensation.  The original claim was based on the use of the relevant land as a fish pond and the amount of compensation claimed was $101,300, whereas the amended claim was based on the best use of the land (ie open storage) and the amount of compensation claimed was $14.3 million.  Busy Firm relates to a claim under the Railways Ordinance, Cap 519, where the applicant sought to add a new component to the claim for compensation, namely, diminution in value of certain contiguous lots (not resumed by the government) due to severance.

54.  In both cases, it was accepted that there was an “amended claim” within the meaning of section 28(1).  The parties did not raise any question relating to the meaning of an “amended” claim or “amendment” of a claim, and there was obviously a substantial difference in terms of the nature of the “claim”.  In the present case, however, the subject matter (or components) of the applicant’s claim always remain the same.

55.  I accept that if the basis or the nature of the “new” claim is different from the original claim, then a claimant will have to serve the “new” claim on the respondent again.  In this regard, I agree with the respondent’s interpretation that there should not be a distinction between the situation where the proceedings in the Lands Tribunal have already commenced and the situation where they have not.  The Ordinance clearly does not draw such a difference.  It would also make no sense if a claimant is allowed to make a completely different claim without going through the statutory process laid down in section 29 of the Ordinance once the proceedings in the Lands Tribunal has commenced.  It would also make no sense to have the time limit imposed in section 28 of the Ordinance, if a claimant can make a completely different claim at any time after the proceedings in the Lands Tribunal have commenced.

56.  However, the above does not apply to the present situation, as there is no different claim here.  The applicant is still claiming compensation in relation to the Lots, not some other lots.  The basis and the nature of the claim are still pursuant to Item 1 of Part II of the Schedule to the Ordinance, and not some other provisions.  The mere fact that there is a different hypothetical development model used by the applicant to help the Tribunal to determine the right amount of compensation payable under Item 1 of Part II of the Schedule to the Ordinance will not change the basis or the nature of the applicant’s claim.  The respondent’s contention that the claim first submitted to the respondent is different from what the applicant is claiming now simply has no merit at all.

57.  It is also wrong for the respondent to rely on section 29(1)(f) of the Ordinance to suggest that whenever the particulars given are different from the original particulars of the claim, it will constitute a new or amended claim.  Take for example, if a claimant made a genuine arithmetical error or typing mistake in the calculation of the amount of the claim and hence set out the wrong particulars in the claim, would he be barred from making the right claim after the time limit has expired?  I would not say so in such circumstances, as the basis and nature of the claim are still the same.  Thus, it would be wrong to place such great emphasis on the particulars given. Ultimately, the question should just be whether there is a change of the basis and nature of the claim.  As discussed above, I do not consider that assessments of compensation based on different development models would amount to making different claims.

58.  In the circumstances, I find that by adducing the new reports, the applicant is not making a new or amended claim and the issue of time-barred is irrelevant in the present context.

Unfairness, waiver, estoppel and acquiescence

59.  In view of my finding above, it is not necessary for me to deal with all these contentions concerning the unfairness, waiver, estoppels and acquiescence for the respondent to raise the time-barred issue.

60.  In any event, I would agree with the respondent that the Tribunal’s power to extend time for service of a new or amended claim comes from and is defined by the Ordinance.  The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to extend time other than in accordance with s. 28(5) of the Ordinance for the service of the claim.  The respondent cannot act to confer jurisdiction by estoppel, waiver, acquiescence or even express consent (see Chiu Ming Kiang v. William Lee Shung, Civil Appeal No. 85 of 1990).  It is also a fundamental principle that a party cannot be stopped from subsequently maintaining that a court or tribunal has acted without jurisdiction (see Essex County Council v Essex Incorporated Congregational Church Union [1963] AC 808).

61.  Thus, if the applicant has made a new or amended claim as alleged by the respondent, which I do not agree, then there is still no use for the applicant to rely on all these contentions concerning the unfairness, waiver, estoppels and acquiescence for the respondent to raise the time-barred issue, as they would not confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal once the claim is time-barred.

Relevance of the new expert reports

62.  Apart from the issue of time bar, the respondent has not disputed the relevance of the new expert reports.  On the question of relevance and admissibility, the applicable test can be found in Wong Hoi Fung v American International Assurance Co (Bermuda) Ltd & Anor HCA 4576 of 2001, where Chu J (as she then was) said the following:-

“Modern judicial authorities recongnize that the court has inherent power to rule on the admissibility of expert evidence at a pre-trial stage: Woodford and Ackroyd v. Burgess [2000] CP report 79, Ko Chi Keung v. Lee Ping Yan Andrew [2001] 2 HKC 63 and Annabell Kin Yee Lee & Others v. Lee Wing Kim (May Lee) & Anor (unreported), HCA9522/1997. Where the proposed expert evidence is plainly inadmissible or irrelevant, the court ought to exercise its discretion to refuse the admission of such evidence. But where the court cannot form a clear view on the relevance of the proposed expert evidence or where it considers that the proposed evidence is clearly relevant, then it should grant leave for the evidence to be adduced at the trial: Ko Chi Keung v. Lee Ping Yan Andrew (supra), at p.67 and Annabell Kin Yee Lee & Others v. Lee Wing Kim (May Lee) & Anor (supra), at p.15.”

63.  I agree with the applicant that the new reports are clearly relevant.  The evidence of Professor Chung, an experienced building surveyor who had formerly worked for many years in the Buildings Department, is directly relevant to the feasibility or viability of the revised proposal from the point of view of compliance with the relevant statutory building requirements.  The evidence of Mr Alnwick Chan in his supplemental report provides a detailed analysis of the assessment of the open market value of the Lots on the basis of the revised proposal.  Such evidence will clearly assist the Tribunal in the determination of the compensation payable to the applicant.  Thus, I see no reason to exclude the new reports at all.

Conclusion

64.  By reasons aforesaid, I allow the applicant’s application and order as follows:-

(1)  The applicant do have leave to file and serve the Expert Report of Professor Barnabas Chung dated 5 November 2009 and the Supplemental Expert Report of Mr Alnwick Chan dated 28 December 2009 within 14 days from the date of this order.

(2)  Costs order nisi: The respondent do pay the applicant costs of the summons dated 3 September 2010 with certificate for one counsel to be taxed on High Court scale if not agreed.  If there is no further application for costs within the next 14 days, the costs order nisi shall become absolute.

 

 

 (Michael Wong)
 Presiding Officer
Lands Tribunal

 

Mr Anderson CHOW SC and Mr Richard KHAW, instructed by Messrs Keith Lam Lau & Chan, for the applicant

Mr Y.C. MOK and Ms Teresa WU, instructed by the Department of Justice, for the respondent

59222-EN-2007-11-20

TSAN LUK YUK YIN v. THE SECRETARY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, TRANSPORT AND WORKS

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LDMR 3/2005

IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

Miscellaneous Reference Application No. 3 of 2005

______________________

BETWEEN

  TSAN Luk Yuk Yin (as the trustee for TSANG Hing Kwong Thomas (2/4 shares),TSAN Hing Him Lana (1/4 share) andTSAN Hing Tat Heidi (1/4 share) beingtenants in common as the beneficiaries)Applicant
 and 
 The Secretary for the Environment, Transport and WorksRespondent

______________________

 

Coram : H.H. Judge WONG, Presiding Officer of the Lands Tribunal and Mr. W.K. LO, Member of the Lands Tribunal

Dates of Hearing : 8 & 9 October 2007

Date of Submission of Last Written Submission : 23 October 2007

Date of Decision : 20 November 2007

 

______________________

DECISION

______________________

 

1. This is an application by the Applicant for determination of compensation pursuant to sections 13, 27 and 29 of the Roads (Works, Use and Compensation) Ordinance, Cap. 370.  The Applicant is the former registered owner of Lot Nos. 288, 289 and 293 in D.D. 313, Tai O, Lantau Island, New Territories, Hong Kong (“the Lots”).

2. The Lots comprising building land and agricultural land were held under a Block Government Lease in D.D. 313 for a term of 75 years commencing on 1 July 1898 renewable for a further term of 24 years less the last 3 days.  The lease was further extended to 30 June 2047 under the New Territories Leases (Extension) Ordinance, Cap 150.  By a Notice of Resumption dated 24 April 1997 registered in the Land Registry with memorial no. 244069, the Government resumed the Lots.

3. The Lots are located at a slightly inclined area close to the waterfront to the North East of Lung Tin Estate, Phase II, which is a public housing estate completed in 1980.  They straddle a footpath (“the Footpath”) leading from Tai Ping Street in an area known as Yim Tin to another part of Tai O.

4. At the commencement of the trial of this application on 8 October 2007, the Respondent raised an issue on whether the Footpath is a public right of way by prescription.  As this issue will affect the Applicant’s proposed developments at the Lots and the assessment of compensation, the Applicant requested the Tribunal to determine this issue first as a preliminary issue.  We acceded to this request and ordered that the preliminary issue be determined first.

5. The preliminary issue is framed by the Applicant in the following term:-

“Was the footpath lying on the subject Lots as at the date of resumption a public right of way by prescription?” 

6. The parties did not call any oral evidence in relation to the preliminary issue, but just relied on the documents produced to make their submissions.  After hearing submissions from both parties on 8 & 9 October 2007, we reserved our decision on the preliminary issue.  The parties then sent in further written submissions on 11, 17 and 23 October 2007 and agreed that the Tribunal can read and consider these further submissions.  Having considered all the submissions, we now deliver our decision on this preliminary issue.

7. The Respondent’s case is that there is an easement by prescription in relation to the Footpath.  The Respondent relies on the judgment of Saunders J in China Field Limited v. Appeal Tribunal (Buildings), HCAL 2/2007 and Sun Honest Development Limited v. Appeal Tribunal (Buildings), HCAL 3/2007 (Heard together) (“the China Field case”) to say that a right of way by prescription can exist in Hong Kong and the Tribunal can simply look at plans and photographs without any oral evidence to determine whether an easement by prescription exists at the Footpath.

8. The Applicant, however, argues that the China Field case is not an authority for any general proposition that a right of way by prescription can always be proved by plans and photographs alone, and that the Respondent has simply produced insufficient evidence to establish an easement by prescription at the Footpath.  In particular, the Applicant contends that the Respondent has failed to identify the dominant tenements in question and has adduced no evidence of actual use by the owners of such dominant tenements.  The Applicant also contends that the Respondent has failed to prove any of the following elements, not to mention the state of mind of the users:-

(1)Who were using the Footpath at the material times?
(2)When did those people start using the Footpath?
(3)How long had they been using the Footpath?
(4)Did the owner of the Lots have any knowledge of the alleged use?
(5)What acts or conduct of the owner of the Lots are relied upon to prove “acquiescence”?

9. First of all, we agree with the judgment of Saunders J in the China Field case that a right of way by prescription can exist in Hong Kong, even though the presumption of a lost modern grant could only be claimed by an owner of fee simple and all the land in Hong Kong (except St. John’s Cathedral) is leasehold (see Foo Kam Shing & Ors v. Local Printing Press Ltd (1953) 37 HKLR 201 and Tam Tim Fat & Anor v. Chan Fok Kei & Ors [1992] 2 HKLR 373).  We do not find it necessary to repeat everything said by Saunders J in his judgment, save that we agree with his observation and the ruling in this regard.

10. As to whether the Respondent has established easement by prescription with sufficient evidence, we are of the view that the photographs and the plans produced are already clear evidence of such an easement.  Although the China Field case is not an authority for any general proposition, in Regina (Beresford) v. Sunderland City Council [2004] 1 AC 889, the House of Lords gave the following judgments:-

“It is clear law … that for prescription purposes under the Prescription Act 1832 … “as of right” means nec vi, nec clam, nec precario, that is, “not by force, nor stealth, nor the licence of the owner …” (per Lord Bingham) 
“Lord Hoffmann in the Sunningwell case [2000] 1 AC 335 made clear that the section 22(1) requirement of 20 years’ use as of right did not require the users of the land to give evidence of their personal belief in their right of use.  He said, at p 356: 
 “A person who believes he has a right to use a footpath will use it in the way in which a person having such a right would use it.  But user which is apparently as of right cannot be discounted merely because, as will often be the case, many of the users over a long period were subjectively indifferent as to whether a right existed, or even had private knowledge that it did not.” 
 It is sufficient, therefore, if the use is “apparently as of right”.  But, of course, if the users do have a personal belief in their right to use the land, so much the better.” (per Lord Scott)

11. Thus, from the Beresford case, it is clear that it is not necessary to require the users of the land to give evidence of their personal belief in their right of use, and it is sufficient if the use is apparently as of right. 

12. The Applicant, on the other hand, refers to some other authorities such as Dalton v. Angus (1881) 6 App. Cas. 740, Megarry & Wade: The Law of Real Property, 6th ed., para. 18-123 and Gale: Easements, 17th ed., para. 4-89 to 4-90 to contend that “the claimant must prove not only his own user but also circumstances which show that the servient owner acquiesced in it as in an established right” and there must still be proof of the fact of user.  The Applicant argues that the Respondent has failed to produce any evidence of the use of the Footpath by the owners of the unidentified “dominant tenements” or acquiescence of such use (if any) on the part of the owner of the Lots.

13. Nevertheless, we agree with the Respondent that the authorities cited by the Applicant are all before the Beresford case.  They do not contradict the propositions laid down in that case.  As held in paragraph 45 of the judgment of the Beresford case, members of the public simply using the way following the examples of others who were using the way will constitute a use which is “apparently as of right”.

14. The photographs and the plans produced clearly show that the Footpath has been a way leading from one side of Tai O (downstream) to another (upstream), and the Footpath has been in existence for a very long time, which can be traced back to 1905.  There are no gates or other barriers to prevent the public or the neighbours to use the Footpath.  Even though there may be alternative routes going from one side of Tai O to another without passing through the Footpath, the Footpath is the most direct way.  It is not difficult at all for us to conclude that the public or the neighbours must have used the Footpath to gain access to the Lots and the neighbouring lots (Lot Nos. 290-292), or to pass through them all these years.  This is the most logical and reasonable presumption one can take from the evidence of the plans and the photographs, even though no oral evidence is given by anyone to that effect.

15. Moreover, Chesterton Petty Ltd., in preparing the building plans for the Applicant, retains a notional path at the Lots, which suggests that the Applicant acknowledges the rights of others to use the Footpath.  If there were no such understanding, there would be absolutely no reason to include the notional path.  The parties have argued whether the servient owner has the right to alter the route of a right of way.  It is clear to us that there was no such right to alter the route (see Greenwich NHS Trust v. London and Quadrant Housing Trust [1998] 1 WLR 1749).  In any event, it has no bearing on the preliminary issue we are dealing with at the moment.

16. Our conclusion that there is no need to have oral evidence is also supported by the case of Stafford v. Lee (1992) 65 P&CR 172, where an implied easement by common intention was found to be established without any oral evidence and with a 1955 deed alone as evidence.  The English Court of Appeal in that case rejected the submission that there was a lack of evidence of the intention of the parties to the deed on the intended use and concluded that “on the balance of probabilities, the parties can only have intended that it should be used for the construction of another dwelling to be used thereafter for residential purposes” and no other intention could reasonably be imputed to them.  Likewise, from the plans and photographs available and on the balance of probabilities, we find that the public and the neighbours of the Lots must have used the Footpath for many years and the easement by prescription must have established.  There could be no other reasonable interpretation that can be drawn from the documentary evidence.

17. To answer the specific questions raised by the Applicant, we are of the view that the answers are apparent from the plans and photographs.  The dominant tenements must be the neighbouring lots, such as Lot Nos. 290 to 292 in D.D. 313.  There are buildings on some of these lots.  It would not be reasonable to assume that no one would use these lots.  The presumption, on the balance of probabilities, should be that there are people using these lots.  So the fact of users is established.  The owners or occupiers of these neighbouring lots, as well as the other villagers of Tai O and the public, would be using the Footpath at the material times.  As the Footpath can be traced back to 1905, these people would have used the Footpath since about 1905.  So they had been using the Footpath for about a century.  The use of the Footpath would have been done openly and the owner of the Lots must have knowledge, actual or constructive, of such open use.  The retention of the notional path as aforesaid also establishes the knowledge of the owner.  The fact that there were no gates or other barriers to prevent people from using the Footpath and the absence of any other overt act show that there was acquiescence on the part of the owner of the Lots.

18. In the circumstances, we rule that the preliminary issue must be answered in the affirmative, i.e. the footpath lying on the subject Lots as at the date of resumption was a public right of way by prescription.

19. We also grant a costs order nisi that the Applicant do pay the Respondent costs of and incidental to the determination of the preliminary issue, with certificate for one counsel to be taxed on the High Court Scale if not agreed.  If there is no application for costs within the next 14 days, the costs order nisi shall become absolute.

 

 

H.H. Judge WONG
Presiding Officer
Lands Tribunal
Mr. W.K. LO
Member
Lands Tribunal

 

Mr. Anderson CHOW, S.C. and Mr. Richard KHAW, instructed by M/S Johnson, Stokes & Masters, for the Applicant

Mr. Y.C. MOK and Ms. Teresa WU, instructed by the Department of Justice, for the Respondent