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Matrimonial Causes2006

IISW v. SDS-W

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96441-EN-2014-09-04

IISW v. SDS-W

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FCMC 1399 / 2006

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 1399 OF 2006

----------------------------

BETWEEN

 IISW
(also known as IIW formerly known as IIS)
Petitioner
 

and

 
 SDS-WRespondent

and

 HW & GIntervening Party

----------------------------

Coram: Her Honour Judge Sharon D. Melloy in Chambers (Not open to public)
Date of written submissions: 18 August 2014
Date of Ruling: 4 September 2014

-------------------------------------------------

R U L I N G
(Costs)

-------------------------------------------------

 

Introduction

1. This Ruling arises out of a request by the intervening party for further clarification in relation to my order on costs following a Ruling relating to the Priority of Orders dated the 23 July 2014. In that Ruling I made an order as follows:

22.  Costs shall be to the wife to be taxed if not agreed on a party and party basis.

2. Having read each sides written submissions and without going into all of the detail, it seems that there is now some consensus between the parties – although it would be fair to say that this is only if I do not accept the intervening party’s primary submission that there should be no order as to costs.

3. At paragraph 13 and 14 of the intervening party’s written submission it is stated as follows:-

13.  After considering the circumstances of the case H.H. Judge Melloy found that it would not be appropriate for the Intervening Party to enforce their debt in priority to the wife.  However, the Judge did accept that the Intervening Party is a genuine creditor.  The Intervening Party should not be penalized for pursuing a legitimate claim, particularly since the Property is virtually the Respondent’s only asset.  It is therefore submitted that the Court in its discretion on costs awards pursuant to O.62 r.2(2A) RDC, should, given the circumstances of the case, make no order as to costs.

14.  In the event that the Judge is minded to order costs against the Intervening Party, such costs order should only be limited to the costs in relation to the Petitioner’s Summons dated 27th January 2014 (in proceedings DSSJ 3408/2013) and the Intervening Party’s Summons dated 3rd March 2014.

4. The solicitor’s for the wife similarly said in conclusion that:-

THE COSTS ORDER

15.  The costs of the Petitioner Wife’s applications for Charging Order Absolute on 6 February 2014 and the costs of her applications for Charging Order Nisi of 19 April 2011 and Absolute of 29 January 2014 be paid by the Respondent Husband.

16.  The Costs of the Petitioner’s application on 24 January 2014 for sale of K Mansion [Paragraph 6(a) above] be paid by the Respondent Husband.

17.  The costs of the application in Paragraphs 6(b), (c) and (e) above and the hearings on 4 February 2014, 9 April 2014 and 7 July 2014 be paid by the Intervening Party.

The law

5. Both parties referred me inter alia to O.62 on costs. To summarize it is accepted that the issue of costs lies in the discretion of the court and costs are normally expected to follow the event. This presumption is more easily displaced in family proceedings that in others.  I can also take into account other factors including inter alia the conduct of the parties.

6. I should say at the outset that my order in relation to costs stands. The wife was largely successful in the matters before the court and given that it seems to me that she should have her costs. The only issue really is whether or not those costs should be borne by the intervening party or by the husband or whether or not any of the costs arising out of the hearing should perhaps more properly be reserved.  

Discussion

7. The intervening party’s primary submission is that there should be no order as to costs. As already indicated I do not think that there is any merit in that submission. In the alternative the parties are in agreement that if I make any order for costs against the intervening party (as opposed to the husband) that it should be in relation to:-

a)   The Petitioner’s summons dated the 27 January 2014 transferred from DCCJ 3408 of 2013 by order dated the 9 April 2014 from Deputy District Court Judge Timon Shum to inter alia discharge the intervening party’s charging order.

Given that the wife was successful in that application I agree that she should have her costs of that summons from the intervening party.

b)   Likewise it is agreed that the wife should have her costs of the intervening party’s summons dated the 3 March 2014. I also accept that to be the case.

c)   However it is not agreed that the wife should have her costs, if any, arising out of the intervening party’s charging order nisi dated the 4 November 2013 also transferred to this court by virtue of the order from Deputy Judge Shum on the 9 April 2014. I accept that the intervening party should also pay these costs.

For the avoidance of doubt the costs of these three applications shall include the hearings of the 4 February 2014, 9 April 2014 and the 7 July 2014.

8. The wife shall also have her costs of the application on the 24 January 2014 inter alia for the sale of the K Mansion property. These costs shall be paid by the Respondent husband.

9. In my Ruling of the 23 July 2014 I said as follows:-   

  Other points which are salient to the present application include the fact that the wife obtained a charging order nisi on K Mansions on the 19 April 2011. This was based on her mistaken interpretation of the original court order dated the 15 May 2007. On the 29 January 2014 this was subsequently made a charging order absolute. I accept that this was wrong and that this charging order should be set aside. On the 6 February 2014 the wife obtained a second charging order nisi against K Mansions in relation to the outstanding school fees from September 2009 – July 2014 in the sum of HK$1,607,330. It should be noted that this figure is different from that set out in my Ruling above of HK$1,330,490.

10. Given that I found that the wife was wrong in applying for and obtaining a charging order nisi against the property on the 19 April 2011 and subsequently a charging order absolute on the 29 January 2014 and that I also have some concerns with respect to the second charging order absolute dated the 6 February 2014, it is hard to see on what basis the wife now claims her costs of these applications against the husband. Consequently her application in that respect is denied. Given that the husband has not participated in this latest round of litigation I intend at this stage to make no further orders with respect to those applications. Costs will accordingly be reserved.

11. In so far as the costs of this application are concerned, given the fact that this was in effect an application to seek clarification, and the fact that at the end of the day there was a large measure of agreement between the parties, I will exercise my discretion and make no order as to costs.   

( Sharon D MELLOY )
District Judge

Ms C Por of Stevenson Wong & Co for the Petitioner

Ms E Ho of Hampton, Winter & Glynn for the Intervening Party

The Respondent was not represented and did not appear

96440-EN-2014-07-23

IISW v. SDS-W

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FCMC 1399 / 2006

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 1399 OF 2006

----------------------------

BETWEEN

 IISW
(also known as IIW formerly known as IIS)
Petitioner

and

 SDS-WRespondent

and

 HW & GIntervening Party

----------------------------

Coram: Her Honour Judge Sharon D. Melloy in Chambers (Not open to public)
Date of Hearing: 7 July 2014
Date of Ruling: 23 July 2014

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R U L I N G
(Priority of orders)

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Introduction

1. The central issue that has arisen in this case concerns the priority of two competing order with respect to a property known as K Mansions, a property in Hong Kong which is registered in the name of the Respondent husband.

2. There are also other issues arising out of this as identified by Ms Por in her submission namely:-

a.  The Petitioner’s application on 24 January 2014 for, inter alia, an order of sale of K Mansion with the reserve or minimum price of HK$4,000,000;

b.  The Intervening Party’s Charging Order Nisi dated 4 November 2013, transferred from DCCJ 3408/2013 by order of Deputy District Judge Timon Shum dated 9 April 2014, to be made absolute;

c.  The Petitioner’s application on 27 January 2014, transferred from DCCJ 3408/2013 by order of Deputy District Judge Timon Shum dated 9 April 2014, to, inter alia, discharge the Intervening Party’s Charging Order Nisi dated 4 November 2013.

d.  The Petitioner’s Charging Order Nisi dated 6 February 2014 to be made absolute; and

e.  The Intervening Party’s application dated 3 March 2014 to, inter alia, discharge the Petitioner’s Charging Order Absolute dated 29 January 2014.

Background

3. The full background to this matter can be found in my judgment of the 6 February 2013, which I do not intend to repeat here, but to which reference can be made if necessary. Suffice it to say that there had been issues with respect to the interpretation of the original court order dated the 15 May 2007. The matter then returned to court for further direction on the 5 September 2013 and a Ruling was subsequently handed down on the 18 September 2013. In the context of the present applications before me it should be noted that in that Ruling I made the following observations:-

Directions on the Charging Order

8. Both sides made some representations in relation to the Hong Kong property. I have also been referred to some correspondence on the issue. In a nut shell the husband agrees to sell the property at the price of HK$4 million or above. He also agrees to use the net proceeds of sale in the first instance to pay a lump sum equivalent to the outstanding children’s school fees as set out above. However he wishes to retain any balance left over for his own use in order to pay off his creditors. The wife for her part said that she wishes the property to be transferred to her free from encumbrances so that she is able to use the same for the benefit of the children. However she has not made any application to transfer the property or otherwise and now asks for time in order to file the appropriate summons and affidavit in support. I have some difficulty with each parties approach given that my judgment was handed down some 7 months ago. Had the wife wanted to take out a further summons then she should have done so before now. I also have some difficulty with the order that she apparently intends to seek. How can the court order that the property be transferred to her unencumbered given the current circumstances? I am also loath to allow the parties to attempt to re litigate matters which may inevitably lead to going over old ground with very little purpose or hope of sensible resolution. It should also be noted that I do not accept the husband’s argument that he needs the remaining net proceeds of sale for his own use and that he is able to pay for the children’s school fees out of income. This, even on his own case, seems to me to be an extremely unlikely proposition at present. He is simply not earning enough to do so. 

9. In the alternative Mr Clough for the wife has suggested that the charging order nisi be made absolute and that in the first instance the net proceeds of sale be paid into court. By way of an indication this seems to me to be a much more sensible way to proceed. My preference would be to make an order that the charging order nisi be made absolute and that the net proceeds of sale (being the sale price less all reasonable costs and expenses related to the sale including the redemption of the mortgage and the loan in favour of Prime Credit Limited, legal costs and agency fees) be first applied to pay the lump sum of HK$ HK$1,330,490 referred to above. The remaining net proceeds of sale could then be paid into court so that the wife is able to claim against those funds for payment of the school fees going forward. A word of warning though - the funds paid into court will not be regarded as funds to be held as security in the event that the husband is unable to pay the school fees. Rather the funds shall be paid into court in order that the wife shall then claim against them in order to pay for the children’s school fees (tuition fees and capital levies) going forward. When those fees have run out she will then be at liberty to issue a further summons against the husband for maintenance of the children.

4. I made no order as to costs with respect to the original order and was critical of both sides litigation conduct in relation to the way in which they had approached the hearing and generally.

5. Other points which are salient to the present application include the fact that the wife obtained a charging order nisi on K Mansions on the 19 April 2011. This was based on her mistaken interpretation of the original court order dated the 15 May 2007. On the 29 January 2014 this was subsequently made a charging order absolute. I accept that this was wrong and that this charging order should be set aside. On the 6 February 2014 the wife obtained a second charging order nisi against K Mansions in relation to the outstanding school fees from September 2009 – July 2014 in the sum of HK$1,607,330. It should be noted that this figure is different from that set out in my Ruling above of HK$1,330,490.

Background to the present application

6. The husband represented himself at the hearing before me on the 5 September 2013, but prior to that he had been represented by Hampton Winter & Glynn (HW&G), who are now the intervening party. The husband filed a Notice of Acting in person on the 3 September 2013 – 2 days prior to the court hearing referred to above. On the 4 September HW&G issued a writ to recover their solicitor and own client fees from the Respondent in the sum of HK$510,573.75. These costs had not been taxed. The hearing was undefended. Judgment was entered against the husband on the 16 October 2013. Shortly thereafter on the 4 November 2013 a charging order was obtained against K Mansions. No notice had been given of these proceedings to the wife or her solicitors or indeed to the court. As soon as the wife’s solicitors became aware they sought to intervene in the civil debt action. It was subsequently directed that all matters should return to the Family court for adjudication.

7. Thus the wife’s second charging order nisi of the 6 February 2014 ranks second to the intervening party’s charging order nisi of the 4 November 2013. The intervening party asks that there be an order for sale and that their fees be paid first prior to any claim that the wife may have because they are first in time. The wife for her part asks that the intervening party’s charging order nisi be discharged and that she take the whole of the net proceeds of sale – or that they be paid into court as was originally intended.

8. Ms Por for the wife summarizes the situation thus:-

a.  whether the Intervening Party’s Charging Order Nisi dated 4 November 2013 should be discharged so that the Petitioner takes the whole of the sale proceeds, after Prime Credit Limited’s mortgage, for payment to her of all arrears of the children’s school fees as ordered and for the children’s future school fees; or

b.  whether the Intervening Party’s Charging Order Nisi dated 4 November 2013 should be made absolute (and whether the Petitioner’s Charging Order absolute dated 29 January 2014 be discharged) so that the Intervening Party can be paid their legal fees from the net proceeds of sale in priority to payment of all or part of the arrears of children’s school fees as ordered and the children’s future school fees.

The law

9. The relevant law can be found in section 3 of the Land Registration Ordinance, Cap 128, which states as follows:-

“(1) Subject to this Ordinance, all such deeds, conveyances, and other instruments in writing, and judgments, made, executed, or obtained, and registered in pursuance hereof, shall have priority one over the other according to the priority of their respective dates of registration, which dates shall be determined in accordance with regulations made under this Ordinance.

(2) All such deeds, conveyances, and other instruments in writing, and judgment, as last aforesaid, which are not registered shall, as against any subsequent bona fide purchaser or mortgagee for valuable consideration of the same parcels of ground, tenements, or premises, be absolutely null and void to all intents and purposes:-

Provided that nothing herein contained shall extend to bona fide leases at rack rent for any term not exceeding 3 years.”

10. The relevant date in determining priority of interest is the date of the charging order nisi.

11. Section 52 A of the District Court Ordinance, Cap 336 states that:-

“In deciding whether to make a charging order the Court has to consider all the circumstances of the case and, in particular, any evidence before it as to-

a. the personal circumstances of the debtor; and

b.  whether any other creditor of the debtor would be likely to be unduly prejudiced by the making of the order.”

Case law  

12. The most recent case on matters of this nature is the Court of Appeal decision in England and Wales, Krest v Agrest [2013] EWCA Civ 41. I have as promised read this case in full and although the factual matrix is very different, nevertheless it is at its heart concerned with the competing interests of a creditor and a wife with respect to a property in the UK. I accept therefore that it is of great assistance in the context of this case and I do not accept that it should be distinguished in any way – either because it concerns the matrimonial home or otherwise. Lord Justice Moore – Bick said as follows:-

10.  It is common ground that the judge had a discretion whether to make a charging order absolute in favour of Mr Chesnokov [the creditor] and that in reaching his decision he was obliged to consider all the circumstances of the case.  Section 1(5) of the Charging Orders Act 1979 provides:-

“In deciding whether to make a charging order the court shall consider all the circumstances of the case and, in particular, any evidence before it as to-

(a) the personal circumstances of the debtor, and

(b)  whether any other creditor of the debtor would be likely to be unduly prejudiced by the making of the order.”

11.  In cases where the available assets are insufficient to satisfy both the financial claims of one former spouse (usually the wife) and the debts of the other (usually the husband) a conflict arises between the interests of the claimant and those of the creditors.  The conflict is all the more acute when a creditor has obtained a judgment which, in the ordinary way, he could expect to enforce by means of a charging order.  This question was considered at some length in Harman v Glencross [1986] Fam 81, on which Mr Feehan QC placed a good deal of reliance.  In that case the sole asset available to satisfy the claims of the wife and those of the judgment creditor was the former matrimonial home.  Without a charging order the judgment creditor was unlikely to recover anything, but if a charging order were made in this favour, the remaining assets would be insufficient to provide a home for the wife and children.  The court held that in such cases it was necessary to strike a balance between the normal expectation of a judgment creditor that an order would be made to enforce his judgment and the hardship that such an order would entail to the wife and children.  In a passage at page 97, to which Mr Feehan particularly drew our attention, Balcombe LJ said:-

“… unless the transfer of the husband’s share in the house to the wife is necessary to give her adequate protection so that she may have a home for herself and the children, it is difficult to see why the judgment creditor’s undoubted rights should not take preference to the wife’s claim to a transfer of property order.”

12.  Later, at page 99 he said:-

“When considering the circumstances, the approach of the court should be to recall the statement of Sir Denys Buckley in the Hegerty case [1985] QB 850, 866, that a judgment creditor is justified in expecting that a charging order over the husband’s beneficial interest in the matrimonial home will be made in his favour. The court should first consider whether the value of the equity in the house is sufficient to enable the charging order to be made absolute and realised at once, as in Llewellin v Llewellin (unreported), even though that may result in the wife and children being housed at a lower standard than they might reasonably have expected had only the husband’s interests been taken into account against them. Failing that, the court should make only such order as may be necessary to protect the wife’s right to occupy (with the children where appropriate) the matrimonial home. The normal course should then be to postpone the sale of the house for such period only as may be requisite to protect the right of occupation – a Mesher type of order – again bearing in mind that the court is holding the balance, not between the wife and the husband, but between the wife and the judgment creditor. If the judgment creditor asks, even in the alternative to his claim to an immediate order, for a Mesher type of order, then it seems to me that it would require exceptional circumstances before the court should make an order for the outright transfer of the husband’s share in the house to the wife, thereby leaving nothing on which the judgment creditor’s charging order can bite, even in the future.”

13.  These passages support the conclusion that when striking a balance between the interests of the judgment creditor and those of the wife, the interests of the judgment creditor should be respected, save to the extent that it is necessary to override them in order to make appropriate provision for the wife and any minor children.  In some cases that can be achieved by an order postponing the sale of the property (usually known as a Mesher order – see Mesher v Mesher and Hall [1980] 1 All ER 126), or in a more extreme case by withholding a charging order altogether and transferring the husband’s interest to the wife free of any encumbrance.  However, each case depends on its own facts.  As Waite J observed in Austin-Fell v Austin-Fell [1990] Fam 172, there can never be automatic predominance for any claim; each case depends upon striking a fair balance between the normal expectations of the judgment creditor and the hardship to the wife and children if a charging order is made.  In some cases justice to the creditor will demand that the wife accept a degree of provision that in other circumstances would have been regarded as inadequate.

15.  In weighing up all the circumstances in this case it is important to identify the essential needs of Ms Kremen and her children.  Mr Feehan submitted, as he had to the judge, that the court should be concerned only with the need for reasonable accommodation, and not necessarily accommodation of the standard to which they had previously been accustomed. The argument was based on a passage in the judgment of Balcombe LJ in Harman v Glencross at page 99 where he said:-

“There will, of course, be cases (such as Llewellin v Llewellin (unreported), 30th October 1985, Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Transcript No 640 of 1985, which we heard immediately after this appeal) where the figures are such that even if the charging order is made absolute, and then the charge is realised by a sale of the house, the resultant proceeds of sale (including any balance of the husband’s share after the judgment debt has been paid) will be clearly sufficient to provide adequate alternative accommodation for the wife and children.”

  Mr Feehan submitted that the court should be concerned only with the provision of accommodation and not with wider financial needs. He argued that Ms Kremen did not require the whole of the equity in Sough Lodge in addition to the sum in court in order to obtain adequate accommodation, even if that accommodation was of a standard lower than that to which they had been accustomed.

16.  The judge did not accept that submission and neither do I.  The issue raised by Mr Feehan was not directly before the court in Harman v Glencross.  It was not necessary for Balcombe LJ to deal with it and there is nothing to suggest that he intended to do so.  In any event, once it is accepted, as it was, that the court must have regard to all the circumstances of the case when exercising its discretion, it is difficult to see how it could properly ignore the wider financial needs of the wife and children, or, as the judge put it, the need to pay for their daily bread.  For similar reasons I would reject Mr Feehan’s submission that the wife is entitled to protection only in relation to her occupation of the former matrimonial home and that since Sough Lodge was never the matrimonial home (have been bought by Mr Argest as in investment) the approach adopted in Harman v Glencross had no application in this case.

13. The Judge added at paragraph 21.

I agree with the judge that this is an exceptional case, not because Mr Chesnokov is seeking to assert a claim against what is once again Mr Agrest’s property, but because of the circumstances in which the debt which he seeks to recover was incurred.  The contract to purchase Everclear, and by that means South Lodge, was not binding on Mr Chesnokov until he had obtained mortgage finance and before that had happened he had become aware of Ms Kremen’s claim and of the order prohibiting Everclear or Mr Agrest from disposing of any interest in the property.  Nonetheless, he proceeded with the purchase in circumstances where he must have been aware that there was at least a risk that the transaction would be challenged and might be held to have been ineffective.  He was, therefore, the author of his own misfortune and in my view that undermines to a very significant extent any expectation he might otherwise have had as a judgment creditor that the court would make an order to enable him to recover the losses incurred as a result.  That is all the more so in circumstances where Ms Kremen and her children would be likely to suffer a degree of hardship if a charging were made in his favour.  Given the amount involved, I do not think that it would be appropriate to make a Mesher order in this case. The reality is that the equity in South Lodge is likely to be exhausted within a relatively short time, but in any event, for the reasons I have given, I do not think that the interests of justice would be served by making a charging order absolute over the property on any terms in favour of Mr Chesnokov.

14. Lord Justice Thorpe added:-

31.  Mr Feehan QC submits that the judgments of Balcombe LJ and Fox LJ establish the principal that the just entitlement of the creditor is not to be denied save and in so far as some element of that entitlement has to be allocated to provide a roof for the wife to a minimum standard.

32.  There is no clear statement to that effect within the judgments.  I can see no rational reason to distinguish between the wife’s bare needs whether for housing, lump sum or maintenance; particularly maintenance for children, for in assessing what is fair the court has to have first regard to the welfare of the children.

15. Reference was also made to the Hong Kong judgment Chan Ting Wai William v Lam Sai Pak [1999] 1 HKC 843 which applied the case referred to in Krest namely Harman v Glencross [1986] Fam 81. Although again the factual matrix was somewhat different I accept that this is authority, as stated by Sakhrani J in that judgment for the following:-

… The court, of course, has a discretion whether or not to make a charging order either nisi or absolute and before it does so, it should consider all the circumstances of the case including circumstances of any other creditor … .

Discussion

16. It is therefore clear that this is not simply a case of enforcing the intervening party’s prior claim against K Mansions as claimed by the intervening party. Neither do I accept that the cases cited i.e. Harman v Glencross [1986] Fam 81 and Chan Ting Wai, William v Lam Sai Pak [1999] 1 HKC 843are capable of distinction and should not be applied in this case. The intervening party argues that:-

10.  The cases cited by SWC for the Ex-Wife can be distinguished as follows:-

(i)  In Harman v Glencross [1986] Fam 81, there was a pending divorce proceedings, the charging order was applied by the Husband’s former business partner against the matrimonial home and the matrimonial home was the only valuable asset of the family.

(ii)  K Mansion was never a matrimonial home of the parties herein and the Ex-Wife had already obtained her share of the family assets, the value of which is substantial.

(iii)  The divorce proceedings had already been concluded and K Mansion was not subject to any orders in the Consent Order or under the Judgment dated 06.02.2013.  It is simply an asset owned by the Ex-Husband.  Therefore, there shall not be any special treatment for the Ex-Wife’s claim for arrears of children maintenance.  Ordinary principles of Charging Order shall apply.

(iv)  In Chan Ting Wai, William v Lam Sai Pak [1999] 1 HKC 843, a charging order nisi has been made after the divorce petition but before the application for ancillary relief has been heard.  In this case, the divorce proceedings was concluded long time ago and it is not the situation that the subject matter of ancillary relief proceedings is to be preserved prior to any determination by the Family Court.

17. In so far as Harman is concerned Krest makes it clear that the fact that the concern in Harman was with the matrimonial home does not mean that the general principles should not apply to the other needs of the wife and children, as in this case. Here the issue is with the maintenance for the children and in particular to their education fees. Similarly it does not seem to me that the fact that in Chan Ting Wai, William v Lam Sai Pak [1999] 1 HKC 843 the application was made before the ancillary relief proceedings had been concluded should make any difference. Certainly in Krest the ancillary relief proceedings had been concluded and the requisite orders had been made. The wife was simply trying to enforce her order against the husband’s available assets in the UK post the ancillary relief order being made.

18. Thus it seems to me that the correct approach as set out in Krest, is to try to strike a balance between the normal expectations of the judgment creditor, here the husband’s former solicitors, that an order should be made to enforce their debt as against the hardship that that would entail to the wife and children. In doing so I need to take into account all of the circumstances of the case.

19. In this case it seems to me that it would not be appropriate for the intervening party to enforce their debt in priority to the wife. In coming to that decision I have taken into account the following factors:-

a)  I accept that the wife is in real and genuine need of the entire proceeds of sale (subject of course to the mortgage with Prime Credit Limited and the other costs normally associated with a sale). The husband has not paid anything to the wife for the children since the funds held in court were exhausted save for US$4,700 and US$5,000. This is despite his submissions in court during the hearing on the 5 September 2013 that he would be able to pay the children’s school fees out of income. This has not happened. The K Mansions property is the only asset that the wife can enforce her claims for maintenance for the children and school fees against. There is nothing else. Even in that event the likelihood is that there will only be funds available to cover the school fees for a fairly limited period. I accept that “The impact on the children’s living and education would be particularly draconian” (p. 29 of the Wife’s submission). As far as the wife and the intervening party are aware the husband continues to reside in Vietnam. Enforcement will therefore most probably continue to be an issue.  

b)  Although I accept that the intervening party is a genuine creditor the fact remains that they took on the risk of acting for the husband when they agreed to act for him in May 2011. They were aware that his financial position was somewhat precarious and that he was resident outside of the jurisdiction. There was no guarantee at any point that they would be able to rely on K Mansions as security for their own fees.

c)  I have also taken on board the fact that these are untaxed costs and that the effect of allowing HW&G’s charging order to take precedence over that of the wife would be to undo the order made by the court that there should be no order as to costs with respect to the substantive application. Ms Por confirmed that the wife also owed her firm a sum in excess of HK$1 million in unpaid fees. These likewise will not be paid from the net proceeds of sale of the property.   

d)  I am also concerned about the timing of the debt proceedings – i.e. that the intervening party issued proceedings to recover their fees when they knew that the matter was back before the court and that the sale of the K Mansions property and what should happen to the net proceeds of sale would be in issue. I am also concerned that although they were not strictly speaking required to give notice to the wife at the time, that in the circumstances that would have been the appropriate thing to do.

Order 

20. I will therefore make an order as follows:-

1.  The wife’s charging order absolute dated the 29 January 2014 shall be set aside. For the avoidance of doubt the charging order nisi dated the 19 April 2011 shall be discharged.

2.  The intervening party’s charging order nisi dated the 4 November 2013 shall be discharged

3.  There shall be an order in terms of paragraphs 2 – 9 (3) and 9 (6) – (7) and 10 of the Petitioner’s summons dated the 24 January 2014.

21. For the avoidance of doubt the effect of this order is that the K Mansions property shall be sold and the net proceeds of sale shall be paid into court. I have not made an order in terms of the paragraph 1 and 9 (4) and (5) because the court is not sure of the basis of the calculation bearing in mind the fact that the wife’s charging order absolute dated the 29 January 2014 has been set aside. Given the previous Ruling and judgment it needs to be clear that the sums of money to be paid out to the wife do not include her claim for maintenance for the children which was later found to be incorrect.

22. Costs shall be to the wife to be taxed if not agreed on a party and party basis.

( Sharon D MELLOY )
District Judge

Ms C Por of Stevenson Wong & Co for the Petitioner

Ms E Ho of Hampton, Winter & Glynn for the Intervening Party

The Respondent was not represented and did not appear

89953-EN-2013-09-18

IISW v. SDS-W

HTML content

FCMC 1399 / 2006

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 1399 OF 2006

----------------------------

BETWEEN

 IISW (also known as IIW
formerly known as IIS)
Petitioner
   

and

 SDS-WRespondent

----------------------------

Coram: Her Honour Judge Sharon D. Melloy in Chambers (Not open to public)
Date of Hearing: 5 September 2013
Date of Ruling: 18 September 2013

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R U L I N G
(Form of Order, Directions and Costs)

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Form of Order

1.  This hearing arose out of my judgment dated the 6 February 2013 when I said in conclusion that:

49.  I will therefore discharge the wife from her undertaking contained in the court order dated the 15 May 2007 not to seek to vary the financial provision for the children until April 2010.

50.  The husband shall pay a lump sum to the wife equivalent to the children’s school fees (i.e. tuition fees and capital levies) for the period from September 2009 to date, such figure to be calculated and provided to the court with documentary evidence in support.

51.  The issue of the charging order nisi shall be adjourned for further argument as directed on the 4 November 2011. In the meantime the charging order nisi shall remain in effect.

52.  The father shall be responsible for payment of the children’s school fees going forward. The parties are invited to make submissions with respect to this. I will also invite the parties’ legal representatives to make submissions with respect to the appropriate structure for the court order.

Costs

53. Given my concerns as expressed in this judgment and given that both parties will be coming back to court in any event I will reserve costs for further argument.  

2.  As stated in that judgment I accepted that the wife had had the benefit of receiving payments until 7 September 2009 (paragraph 21). I stated clearly that the new order should take effect from September 2009. I also confirmed that the husband should pay all ongoing school fees after that date. Given that my order was for the lump sum to be calculated “to date” I will expect that to be until the end of the academic year 2013 – i.e. July 2013.

3.  I also accept that the wife may calculate the fees a year in advance – so that she may claim for the school fees for the next academic year upon the production of an invoice in the Autumn. So in other words the wife may produce an invoice now for the academic year 2013/14 and so on and so forth.

4.  Mr Clough for the wife proposes that the wording of the order should be as follows:

A. The Petitioner is released from her undertaking set out in the Order dated 15th May 2007 not to seek to vary the financial provision for the children until April 2010 and the said undertaking is discharged

1. The Respondent is ordered to pay to the Petitioner the sum of HK$1,190,179 being his liability for the maintenance of the said 2 children for school fees from the month of September 2009 to 6th February 2013

AND

B. Upon the undertaking of the Petitioner that upon receipt of the funds from the Respondent paid in accordance with the terms set out below to defray the same to pay the school fees of the said children, namely E and O for the following school year:-

2. The Respondent is ordered to pay the Petitioner to sum of HK$172,241 for the maintenance of the said two children for their school fees between February 2013 and the end of the 2012/2013 school year in July 2013.

3. The Respondent is further ordered to make the following subsequent payments being annual maintenance payments for the school fees of the said two children by payment to the Petitioner for the children’s benefit:

i. With effect from July 2013 the Respondent shall pay the annual sum of (amount) for the maintenance of E and the annual sum of (amount) for the maintenance of O for the school year ending July 2014 and in subsequent school years in the manner set out in paragraphs ii & iii below.

ii. For subsequent school years, the maintenance payable to the Petitioner for E shall be in such sum as represents his annual school fees for that year and likewise the maintenance payable to the Petitioner for O shall be in such sum as represents her annual school fees for that year.

iii. The first payment shall be for the school year commencing September 2013 and shall be paid on or before 1st August 2013.  Subsequent payments shall be made on or before 1st August in each subsequent year.

iv. The order shall continue for so long as the children, or either of them, remain in full time education or reach the age of 18 years (whichever is the later) and in relation to tertiary education references to “school” shall read as if the reference was to “university” or other place of tertiary education.

5.  I accept that save that it seems to me that paragraph A 1 and B 2 should be amalgamated into one paragraph as follows:

The Respondent is ordered to pay to the Petitioner the sum of HK$1,330,490 being his liability for maintenance of the said two children for school fees from the month of September 2009 to July 2013. [1]

6.  In so far as the remainder of the order is concerned – I have no difficulty with it save that paragraphs 3 i) should read with effect from September 2013 and paragraph 3 iii) should be amended to read the 1 October 2013 for this year only.  

7.  Thus the order should read as follows:

A. The Petitioner is released from her undertaking set out in the Order dated 15th May 2007 not to seek to vary the financial provision for the children until April 2010 and the said undertaking is discharged

1. The Respondent is ordered to pay to the Petitioner the sum of HK$1,330,490 being his liability for maintenance of the said two children for school fees from the month of September 2009 to July 2013

AND

B. Upon the undertaking of the Petitioner that upon receipt of the funds from the Respondent paid in accordance with the terms set out below to defray the same to pay the school fees of the said children, namely E and O for the following school year:-

2. The Respondent is further ordered to make the following subsequent payments being annual maintenance payments for the school fees of the said two children by payment to the Petitioner for the children’s benefit:

i) With effect from September 2013 the Respondent shall pay the annual sum of (amount) for the maintenance of E and the annual sum of (amount) for the maintenance of O for the school year ending July 2014 and in subsequent school years in the manner set out in paragraphs ii & iii below.

ii) For subsequent school years, the maintenance payable to the Petitioner for E shall be in such sum as represents his annual school fees for that year and likewise the maintenance payable to the Petitioner for O shall be in such sum as represents her annual school fees for that year.

iii) The first payment shall be for the school year commencing September 2013 and shall be paid on or before 1st October 2013.  Subsequent payments shall be made on or before 1st August in each subsequent year.

iv) The order shall continue for so long as the children, or either of them, remain in full time education or reach the age of 18 years (whichever is the later) and in relation to tertiary education references to “school” shall read as if the reference was to “university” or other place of tertiary education.

Directions on the Charging Order

8.  Both sides made some representations in relation to the Hong Kong property. I have also been referred to some correspondence on the issue. In a nut shell the husband agrees to sell the property at the price of HK$4 million or above. He also agrees to use the net proceeds of sale in the first instance to pay a lump sum equivalent to the outstanding children’s school fees as set out above. However he wishes to retain any balance left over for his own use in order to pay off his creditors. The wife for her part said that she wishes the property to be transferred to her free from encumbrances so that she is able to use the same for the benefit of the children. However she has not made any application to transfer the property or otherwise and now asks for time in order to file the appropriate summons and affidavit in support. I have some difficulty with each parties approach given that my judgment was handed down some 7 months ago. Had the wife wanted to take out a further summons then she should have done so before now. I also have some difficulty with the order that she apparently intends to seek. How can the court order that the property be transferred to her unencumbered given the current circumstances? I am also loath to allow the parties to attempt to re litigate matters which may inevitably lead to going over old ground with very little purpose or hope of sensible resolution. It should also be noted that I do not accept the husband’s argument that he needs the remaining net proceeds of sale for his own use and that he is able to pay for the children’s school fees out of income. This, even on his own case, seems to me to be an extremely unlikely proposition at present. He is simply not earning enough to do so.   

9.  In the alternative Mr Clough for the wife has suggested that the charging order nisi be made absolute and that in the first instance the net proceeds of sale be paid into court. By way of an indication this seems to me to be a much more sensible way to proceed. My preference would be to make an order that the charging order nisi be made absolute and that the net proceeds of sale (being the sale price less all reasonable costs and expenses related to the sale including the redemption of the mortgage and the loan in favour of PrimeCredit Limited, legal costs and agency fees) be first applied to pay the lump sum of HK$ HK$1,330,490 referred to above. The remaining net proceeds of sale could then be paid into court so that the wife is able to claim against those funds for payment of the school fees going forward. A word of warning though - the funds paid into court will not be regarded as funds to be held as security in the event that the husband is unable to pay the school fees. Rather the funds shall be paid into court in order that the wife shall then claim against them in order to pay for the children’s school fees (tuition fees and capital levies) going forward. When those fees have run out she will then be at liberty to issue a further summons against the husband for maintenance of the children.

10.  Given these circumstances I will therefore adjourn the issue of the charging order until the 5 December 2013 at 9:30 a.m. If the wife wishes to issue a further summons then she must do so by this date. In the absence of any further summonses my intention is to make an order as set out above.

Costs       

11.  I have been very critical of both parties in these proceedings. For example at paragraph 17 of the judgment I said as follows:

            17. I have therefore had the benefit of perusing three lever arch files which contain the pleadings and other related documents pertaining to the actions in Singapore. What is interesting to note is that it appears that many of the same points that were raised in Action No MSS 6XXX/2009, have been raised again before me in the present action and that neither party appears to have made much effort to satisfactorily deal with those points in the intervening period. For example the husband complained in the Singaporean proceedings about the wife’s failure to make full and frank disclosure of her assets – especially in relation to the properties held by her in Turkey and the way in which the lump sum of US$900,000 has been utilized. Documentary evidence was sparse then and it was sparse when the matter came back before me. Likewise the wife accuses the husband of material non disclosure with respect to his business dealings. The husband maintained then, just as he maintains now, that he has little documentary evidence in support of what he says because that is the way business is done in Vietnam. And so it goes on. I should say that as a general comment that I did not find either party to be entirely credible. 

I added at paragraphs 19 and 20 as follows:

 19. Thus it seems to me that it was clear that it was never the intention that the husband should continue to pay the sums identified and that the wife should only seek payment from the money held in court, if he didn’t pay. Rather the intention was that the wife should rely on those funds – hopefully for a three year period, but that in the event that that wasn’t the case then it seems to me implicit in the order that she should be able to come back to court and ask to be released from her undertaking and depending on the circumstances seek further maintenance.

 20. Thus I remain of the view that it was quite wrong of the wife to present her case both in Singapore and Hong Kong as she has done. Further the husband’s stance that her undertaking was in some way “absolute” is also incorrect. Given that it seems to me that there can be no arrears of maintenance as such.         

In conclusion I said at paragraph 34 that

 34. At the end of the day I do not find either party particularly credible; very little evidence has been produced by either side to support what at times have been quite outrageous assertions. Each party has put their case at its highest. Neither has been particularly convincing.     

That remains my view.

12.  It is against this background that the wife now seeks her costs of and incidental to the application on an indemnity basis. I can see absolutely no basis for that application. The husband says in turn that he should be awarded costs because he tried to settle throughout. Again, given the judgment, I can see no basis for that stance.

13.  The wife “won” on some but not all of her case. She was certainly successful in terms of quantum in that the order to pay maintenance for the two children of the family as their school fees is far in excess of anything offered by the husband in terms of maintenance payments for the children, at any stage of the proceedings. But she failed in that I did not accept her interpretation of the original order. (See paragraphs 19 and 20 of the original judgment set out above). This was the central and most important aspect of the case. It seems to me that everything else to a certain extent, hinged on this. The parties consequently spent a great deal of money on litigating the point. There can be no doubt that the husband was successful, in that his interpretation was at the end of the day the preferred interpretation. There were also other issues relating to disclosure on both sides. I have been critical of both sides in this respect. Consequently it seems to me that the most appropriate order, in these circumstances is that there should be no order as to costs in relation to the proceedings leading to the judgment of the 6 February 2013 and of this hearing.

( Sharon D MELLOY )
District Judge

Mr Neal Clough instructed by Stevenson Wong & Co for the Petitioner

The Respondent appeared in person


[1] According to p 7 of the correspondence bundle the wife had paid SGD 190,282 for the children’s school fees from September 2009, with the sum of SGD 27,523 being outstanding for the period until the end of the school year. 190,282 + 27,523 = SGD217,805.  According to today’s exchange rate of 1 SGD = 6.10862 HKD, this equates to HK$1,330,487.67 which has been rounded up to HK$1,330,490.

86461-EN-2013-02-06

IISW v. SDS-W

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FCMC 1399 / 2006

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 1399 OF 2006

----------------------------

BETWEEN

 IISW
(also known as IIW formerly known as IIS)
Petitioner
 

and

 
 SDS-WRespondent

----------------------------

Coram: Her Honour Judge Sharon D. Melloy in Chambers (Not open to public)
Dates of Hearing: 6 – 7 and 10 – 11 September 2012
Dates of provision of outstanding information: 18 and 21 September 2012
Dates of the written closing submissions: 19 November 2012
Date of the written replies: 4 January 2013
Date of Judgment: 6 February 2013

-----------------------

J U D G M E N T
(Interpretation of order and variation of children’s maintenance)

-----------------------

Introduction

1.  There are two applications presently before the court that require adjudication namely the petitioner wife’s summons dated the 4 July 2011 and the respondent husband’s summons dated the 20 July 2012. Both centre on the interpretation of a court order dated the 15 May 2007 and matters arising out of that, in so far as it relates to the maintenance for the two children of the family.

2.  The parties have been embroiled in a bitter fight ever since they separated in January 2006. The present dispute centres on the meaning and intent of an order following a successful Financial Dispute Resolution hearing in Hong Kong on the 15 May 2007. In essence the issue is whether or not there was a secured maintenance order for the children with an amount of US$250,000 paid into court as security for their maintenance or alternatively whether the sum of US$250,000 represented a lump sum that was to cover the children’s maintenance for a three year period. The wife argues that the order of the 15 May was a secured maintenance order; the husband says that it was not.

3.  In either event, even on the husband’s case, the issue of the appropriate amount of maintenance to be paid for the children thereafter i.e. after April 2010 also needs to be determined. The husband claims that his present earnings are minimal and his earning capacity much diminished from before. The wife disputes this and claims maintenance for the children based as far as possible on their previous standard of living in Hong Kong. In particular she is asking that the husband contribute towards the children’s school fees at a prestigious international school in Singapore. Originally the wife asked that the husband continue to pay HK$20,000 per month per child plus the children’s school fees. However in her opening she asks that the husband pay for half of all of the children’s expenses. The parties are at loggerheads with respect to nearly every aspect of the litigation. The credibility of each is in issue. The husband presently resides in Vietnam with his second wife and her four children and other family members. The wife resides in Singapore with the two children of the family. The parties previously lived and worked in Hong Kong. The husband does not see the children often and access is also in dispute. It seems that the wife has concerns about the children visiting Vietnam because it is not a signatory to the Hague convention. There has been very limited access in Singapore. The husband appears to be very aggrieved about this although no formal applications have been made with respect to the arrangements for the children.  

The issues

How should the consent order dated the 15 May 2007 be interpreted?

What date should the new order be effective from?

What funds should be made available for the children’s maintenance and what order should be made?

In determining these issues consideration will also be given to the following points: 

Has there been material financial non disclosure by either party and should the court draw adverse inferences accordingly? 

What are the present financial resources of each party?

What is the present earning capacity of each party?

Background to the marriage

4.  The parties met in Taiwan in 1999 where they were both engaged in the finance industry. They married in Hong Kong in January 2001 and relocated to the territory shortly thereafter. The wife is of Turkish descent and the husband is British. The wife was on a dependant’s visa and could not work in Hong Kong initially. In any event the parties had two children shortly after they relocated, namely E, a boy, who was born in May 2002 and O, a girl born in April 2004 and the wife was fully engaged in caring for them during this time. It seems that the marriage floundered and in January 2006 the husband told the wife that their relationship was at an end. This was then a fairly short marriage of approximately 5 years duration that produced two children. It seems that both parties were struggling emotionally at the time of the separation and in particular the husband was said to be experiencing from stress at work. There was then a flurry of litigation; several emergency applications were issued including a summons for injunctive relief, as the wife attempted from her perspective, to secure the financial position for both herself and the children in the short to medium term. The husband relocated to Vietnam in March 2007 in order to start a new life. He joined a new company in Vietnam as their Chief Executive Officer at a much reduced salary from his package in Hong Kong. Following the economic crises in 2009 the husband resigned from this position with effect from April 2009. He said that he had no choice but to do so.  In May 2009 the husband invested in two of his own new start up ventures in Vietnam. The wife meanwhile remained in Hong Kong and began working in a full time capacity with an insurance company. In September 2009 she was asked by that company to relocate to Singapore, which she did. The husband began living with his new partner in early 2008 and they formally married in May 2010 in the United States. In September 2009 the husband’s eldest step son was diagnosed with acute leukaemia and he underwent treatment in Singapore.

Background to the litigation

5.  At the adjourned FDR hearing on the 15 May 2007 the parties eventually agreed terms inter alia as follows:

AND UPON the Petitioner’s undertaking to the Court and the Respondent that in consideration of the provisions therefore made herein, she will not seek to vary the financial provisions for the children until after the month of April 2010.

AND UPON each party agreeing to waive and not enforce any Order for costs made in his or her favour during these proceedings.

AND UPON the Petitioner and the Respondent acknowledging and agreeing that the following terms are in full and final settlement of all claims that either party has against the other and their respective estates whether in these proceedings or otherwise and whether within this jurisdiction or elsewhere.

AND UPON the application dated 15th May 2007 by the Petitioner to make absolute the Decree Nisi pronounced herein on 6th September 2006.

……

4. All properties held by either the Petitioner or the Respondent and whether real property or chattels shall remain in the sole ownership of the party in whose name it is registered or in his/her possession.

5. The Respondent shall pay to the Petitioner within 14 days of decree absolute a lump sum of US$900,000.00, and upon payment all the Petitioner’s claims for ancillary relief for herself shall be dismissed.

6. The Respondent shall pay into Court within 14 days hereof a lump sum for the children of the family of US$250,000.00 which shall be paid out to the Petitioner for the children of the family as follows for so long as the Petitioner and the children of the family reside in Hong Kong:-

(a)   HK$40,000.00 per month as maintenance for the children of the family (i.e. HK$20,000.00 per child per month).

(b)   HK$50,000.00 per month for the children’s share of the continuing rent at [the former matrimonial home] until January 2008 or for so long as the Petitioner and the children continue to reside there whichever shall be earlier.

(c)   The school fees for the children of the family shall be paid out of the said sum for each term in advance upon presentation of the invoice from the school for tuition fees and capital levies by either the Petitioner or the Respondent.

(d)   The said sums at (a) and (b) above shall be paid from the funds held in Court on the 24th day of each calendar month commencing on 24th May 2007.

6.  The wife’s view appears to be that the above order was a secured periodical payments order and that the level of maintenance as stated in paragraphs 6 (a) – (c) above was to continue until further order. Even on a cursory view there are difficulties with this interpretation, given the wife’s undertaking and the fact that it is clearly stated that the amounts to be paid out were contingent on the wife and children remaining in Hong Kong. The husband is clear however that the US$250,000 was an interim lump sum payment designed to cover his maintenance obligations towards the children until April 2010.

7.  Following the FDR hearing the father returned to Vietnam and the mother continued to reside in Hong Kong. Shortly thereafter in August 2007 the wife obtained new employment in Hong Kong on a full time basis in the finance sector. During the FDR hearing the wife had said that she only expected to be able to obtain part time work. She was then asked by her company to relocate to Singapore and on the 21 July 2009 I granted her leave to permanently remove the children to Singapore. At the same time I also made an order that

2. The balance of the sum of US$250,000 previously paid into Court by the Respondent pursuant to paragraph 6 of the Order made by Her Honour Judge S. D’Almada Remedios dated 15th May 2007 be fully paid out to the Petitioner for maintenance for the Children forthwith;

8.  As things turned out, there was very little money left in the kitty by that time. Almost the entire sum of US$250,000 had been spent on the children’s maintenance during the intervening two year period.

9.  It should be noted that the mother did not issue an application at this point in Hong Kong seeking to be released from her undertaking and for further maintenance from the father for the children. Indeed she said in her affidavit in support that she intended to issue an application in Singapore for maintenance – which she did (see Subordinate Court Action No MSS 6XXX/2009). She claimed inter alia in those proceedings that

7. Indeed for some months before my relocation to Singapore with the Children the funds that the Respondent had been ordered by the Hong Kong District Court to deposit as security in the “District Court Suitors Funds” were drawn down and exhausted, and he had made no attempt to deposit more money into the said funds account.  Please refer to page 29, where at the last ledger entry dated 7 December 2009 it is clear that the fund for the maintenance of my children was now in deficit, as it was only able to make one last final disbursement of HK$2,206.00.

            This fund was only a security fund to ensure payment by the Respondent of the interim maintenance amounts.  The security payment was by no means a once-and-for-all maintenance payment for the Children.

(See the 1st affidavit of the wife dated the 20 January 2010 in Action No 6XXX/2009)

10.  The wife sought maintenance from the court in Singapore in the sum of S$11,001.60 per month. She asked that it be backdated to 8 September 2009 – the day after she drew down the final payment from the US$250,000 held in the Hong Kong court.

11.  The husband contested the amount of maintenance claimed and said that it was contrary to the wife’s undertaking in any event. He also disputed forum on the basis that Hong Kong was already seized of the matter and that it was a more appropriate forum to deal with the matter in any event. On the 16 April 2010 the husband offered what some might consider as a derisory amount of only S$130 or HK$806 per month per child.

12.  The case was tried. However the wife had also issued proceedings under reciprocal enforcement legislation (Reciprocal Enforcement Maintenance Order or REMO) for alleged arrears of maintenance. The Singaporean court held that she could not issue two sets of proceedings simultaneously and required her to choose which one to pursue. She decided to pursue the enforcement action and withdrew Action No MSS 6XXX/2009. She was ordered to pay costs in the sum of S$20,000. On the 6 December 2010, the Singaporean court dismissed the wife’s reciprocal enforcement action on the basis that the husband was not resident in Singapore. When the wife failed to pay the costs in relation to Action No MSS 6XXX/2009 the husband issued bankruptcy proceedings against her.  

13.  The matter then returned to Hong Kong. On the 28 February 2011 the wife issued an ex parte summons for a charging order against the husband’s property in Hong Kong on the premise that there were outstanding arrears of maintenance for the children. It should be noted that the wife had issued a similar application previously in relation to an outstanding amount of US$75,000 relating to her lump sum payment. There were several hearings and on the 19 April 2011 a charging order nisi was granted. The husband sought to have this discharged. On the 21 June 2011 it was ordered that the charging order would remain in effect. On the 4 November 2011 a further direction was given that the issue of the charging order would be revisited after the conclusion of these proceedings. It should be noted that the husband also initially disputed forum given that the parties had already litigated the matter in Singapore. The wife did explore the option of further litigating in Singapore but appears to have decided against it as she would have been barred from seeking payment of any alleged arrears. She was also advised that she would need to issue a fresh application and that this would be considered “de novo”.

14.  In the wife’s Hong Kong summons dated the 4 July 2011 she sought the following relief:

1. The Order of DDJ A. Kot [should read DJ Remedios] made on 15th May 2007 be clarified/amended/varied in the manner attached hereto in red to reflect the true intention of the Court and/or the parties; (The wife asked that the order be amended so that it read as a secured maintenance order)

2. Alternatively, the Petitioner be discharged from her Undertaking contained in the Order of DDJ A Kot [DJ Remedios] made on 15th May 2007 that she will not seek to vary the financial provisions for the children until after the month of April 2010;

3. The Respondent do pay maintenance for the children of the family of HK$40,000 per month (HK$20,000 per child) backdated from September 2009 until the youngest child reaches the age of 18 or ceases full time education whichever is the earlier;

4. The Respondent do pay school fees and related expenses for the children of the family back dated to August 2009 until the youngest child reaches the age of 18 or ceases full time education whichever is the earlier;

5. The Respondent do pay a lump sum of HK$1,270,745 for the children’s maintenance from September 2009 to April 2011 and school fees from September 2009 to June 2011;

6. The Charging Order: Notice to Show Cause be made Absolute alternatively;

7. In the event that the Charging Order: Notice to Show Cause is discharged, there be an injunction Order to secure the property for arrears of maintenance/future secured maintenance payments;

8. Time for service of this Summons be abridged; and

9. There be an Order for costs in favour of the Petitioner.

15.  The husband eventually countered with his own summons dated the 20 July 2012 as follows:

1. In the event that the Petitioner succeeds in her application by way of Inter-partes Summons dated 4th July 2011 to the effect that the maintenance payable to the children of the family at the total sum of HK$40,000 and the children’s school fees are to continue to be payable, the maintenance order for the children of the family dated 15th May 2007 be varied downwards/discharged with retrospective effect as from September 2009;

2. In the event that the Respondent’s position that the lump sum payment of US$250,000 is to provide for the children’s maintenance and school fees until April 2010, the maintenance for the children of the family be varied downwards/discharged with retrospective effect as from April 2010; and

3. Costs be provided for.

Discussion

How should the consent order dated the 15 May 2007 be interpreted?

Introduction

16.  In the order dated the 4 November 2011 it was directed that

6. The Affidavits filed in the Singapore proceedings may stand as if the same had been filed in these proceedings;

17.  I have therefore had the benefit of perusing three lever arch files which contain the pleadings and other related documents pertaining to the actions in Singapore. What is interesting to note is that it appears that many of the same points that were raised in Action No MSS 6XXX/2009, have been raised again before me in the present action and that neither party appears to have made much effort to satisfactorily deal with those points in the intervening period. For example the husband complained in the Singaporean proceedings about the wife’s failure to make full and frank disclosure of her assets – especially in relation to the properties held by her in Turkey and the way in which the lump sum of US$900,000 has been utilized. Documentary evidence was sparse then and it was sparse when the matter came back before me. Likewise the wife accuses the husband of material non disclosure with respect to his business dealings. The husband maintained then, just as he maintains now, that he has little documentary evidence in support of what he says because that is the way business is done in Vietnam. And so it goes on. I should say that as a general comment that I did not find either party to be entirely credible.  

18.  In so far as the central point is concerned – namely the interpretation of the order dated the 15 May 2007, I have now had the benefit of reading the transcript of the FDR hearing. From that it is clear that the intention was not that this should be a secured maintenance payment order. It is equally clear that the sum of US$250,000 was not a one off payment for the children’s maintenance. Rather it was agreed that the husband would pay the sum of US$250,000 into court so that the wife could claim against that sum on a monthly basis over the next three year period as prescribed in the order i.e. HK$40,000 per month for the children (HK$20,000 per child per month), HK$50,000 as a contribution towards the rent until January 2008 or for so long as the wife and children resided in Hong Kong – whichever was the earlier and the payment of the school fees (to include tuition and capital levies). The inherent difficulty with this is that US$250,000 was not a sufficiently large sum of money to cover these payments for a three year period. When the Judge asked this very question during the FDR hearing she was told that this would partly depend on interest rates – but that the sum should cover payments until January 2011. When the Judge further queried whether the agreement was that the money would last until 2011 or 2010 she was assured that it should last until April 2010. On that premise the wife’s undertaking was altered to that date. She was told that there was “a sort of mutual undertaking not to vary until the money in court has run out”. The Judge was also told that the payments were premised on the wife remaining in Hong Kong and that it was anticipated that the husband would seek to vary, if for example, the wife moved back to Turkey where the cost of living was cheaper. Counsel for the wife was obviously concerned about the structure of the order. Counsel for the husband also made it clear that the husband’s intention was that there should be a lump sum against which the wife should be able to claim for the children’s maintenance for a period of time, while he was unlikely to be earning very much and when he was in the process of getting himself back on his feet. The husband has since said in his affidavits that he also had concerns about the wife’s “alleged excessive spending” and that from his perspective the payment into court meant that the monies for the children would be secured for the following three year period.

19.  Thus it seems to me that it was clear that it was never the intention that the husband should continue to pay the sums identified and that the wife should only seek payment from the money held in court, if he didn’t pay. Rather the intention was that the wife should rely on those funds – hopefully for a three year period, but that in the event that that wasn’t the case then it seems to me implicit in the order that she should be able to come back to court and ask to be released from her undertaking and depending on the circumstances seek further maintenance.

20.  Thus I remain of the view that it was quite wrong of the wife to present her case both in Singapore and Hong Kong as she has done. Further the husband’s stance that her undertaking was in some way “absolute” is also incorrect. Given that it seems to me that there can be no arrears of maintenance as such.          

What date should the new order be effective from?

21.  I have had the benefit of receiving a copy of an agreed schedule in respect of the Court Ledger showing the payments made out to the wife for the benefit of the children from April 2007 until 7 September 2009. It is clear from that schedule that interest had not accrued on that sum as had been anticipated. Further the wife drew down on the sum of US$250,000 as agreed. There is nothing improper in her approach. It is simply that the agreed sum was not sufficient for the agreed three year period. In any event the order was only designed to cover the children’s expenses whilst they were resident in Hong Kong. Once the wife left Hong Kong the matter should have been revisited. Consequently to seems to me that any new order should take effect from September 2009.           

What funds should be made available for the children’s maintenance and what order should be made?

In determining this issue consideration will also be given to the following points: 

Has there been material financial non disclosure by either party and should the court draw adverse inferences accordingly? 

What are the present financial resources of each party?

What is the present earning capacity of each party?

The law

Orders for children

22.  Under s 5 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap 192 the court can make orders for periodical payments, secured periodical payments and lump sum or sums for the benefit of a child. Further under section 6 it is possible to order that one party transfers to the other a property or properties for the benefit of the child and there can also be a settlement of property – such as a trust set up for the benefit of a child. If a court makes an order under either of these sections it is also possible under section 6A to make an order for sale of a property. Section 7(2) adds that in all child related applications:

… it shall be the duty of the court in deciding whether to exercise its powers under section 5, 6 or 6A in relation to a child of the family and, if so, in what manner, to have regard to all the circumstances of the case including the following matters, that is to say-

(a)  the financial needs of the child;

(b)  the income, earning capacity (if any), property and other financial resources of the child;

(c) any physical or mental disability of the child;

(d)the standard of living enjoyed by the family before the breakdown of the marriage;

(e) the manner in which he was being and in which the parties to the marriage expected him to be educated;

and so to exercise those powers as to place the child, so far as it is practicable and, having regard to the considerations mentioned in relation to the parties to the marriage in paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1), just to do so, in the financial position in which the child would have been if the marriage had not broken down and each of those parties had properly discharged his or her financial obligations and responsibilities towards him.

23.  I should add that whilst it is true that the court always attempts to put children in the same financial position as if their parent’s marriage had not broken down, it is also generally accepted that in a great many cases the standard of living of the parties will inevitably reduce on a divorce. This will in turn affect the standard of living enjoyed by the children. 

Variation of maintenance

24.  In so far as the application to vary is concerned, each parties’ respective application to vary is made pursuant to section 11 (7) of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance Cap. 192, which provides that:

“(7) In exercising the powers conferred by this section the court shall have regard to all the circumstances of the case, including any change in any of the matters to which the court was required to have regard when making the order to which the application relates ……”

25.  It is accepted that in considering a change of circumstances, I may look at the case de novo. In other words the court is not necessarily fettered by the existence of a previous order. I may look at the situation afresh and make an order based on the parties’ existing financial circumstances. (See Ch 3.131 Jackson’s Matrimonial Finance and Taxation, 7th edition)

26.  The parties also have a duty to make full and frank disclosure of their means and a failure in that duty can lead the court to draw an adverse inference. (See Baker v Baker [1995] 2FLR 829). In this case both parties are asking that I draw an adverse inference.

Introduction

27.  The wife now asks that the husband pay half of the children’s expenses. She sets those expenses at a reasonably high level commensurate to the children’s position as international children who are living in an expatriate community in Singapore. The husband says simply that he cannot afford to pay and that if the wife chooses to live at such a high level then she must bear those costs from her own resources. The added difficulty of course is that any order that the court makes will be very difficult if not impossible to enforce in Vietnam. Consequently the wife asks that the order be enforced against the sale of the husband’s property in Hong Kong by way of a charging order absolute or injunction.    

Has there has been material financial non disclosure by either party and should the court should draw adverse inferences accordingly? 

28.  The wife’s submissions are very emotive. Unnecessarily so in my view. She talks of a “cheats charter” or a “non-discloser’s dividend". She is clearly convinced that the husband has assets or other financial resources at his disposal and that he is deliberately hiding them. But at the end of the day what has she been able to show? Counsel says that the husband has failed to disclose his former pension/retirement plan. In reply the husband points out that his former employer has gone into liquidation and that obtaining this information is very difficult. Payment of the pension must also be in doubt. Counsel also says that he has failed to produce his previous passport. Whilst this is true the husband’s explanation is also quite plausible. He says that he surrendered his old passport when it was renewed and does not recall receiving the old one.

29.  The husband has explained how his funds have been utilized since the divorce. The wife questioned this in both these proceedings and the Singaporean proceedings. However I accept that the husband has been affected by the Asian financial crises. I do not believe that he deliberately engineered his fall from grace from the first Vietnamese company that he joined. I also accept that the two start ups have not been successful. The suggestion is that he has used these ventures as a cover and that he has deliberately hidden funds out of the reach of the wife.

30.  Whilst I do not accept all that the wife has said in this respect, I do have concerns about the husband’s true involvement in his wife’s jewellery business. The husband sold a property in Bali in June 2011 for US$340,000 and received the net proceeds of sale in the sum of US$314,500. He says that he lent US$280,000 of this sum to his second wife and has referred to a convertible loan agreement dated the 1 July 2011 to this effect. The loan was for a three year period and one of the terms of the loan was that:

1.4     The loan shall be convertible into the shares of the Company, or its subsidiaries, upon the expiry of the term, and be eligible for dividends from the profits of the Company.  The terms of conversion shall be determined by a fair market valuation of the net assets of the Company.  The price of the conversion shall be set at a 15% discount to this fair market valuation.

31.  However there is no evidence to show that the sum of US$280,000 has been paid directly to the business. Instead the husband refers to a number of transactions in his Standard and Chartered bank account as being part of the loan. However these transactions amount to just over HK$300,000 and include some very small amounts of money e.g. HK$600. This simply begs belief. In short I simply do not believe the husband’s stance on this.

32.  The husband, for his part, also accuses the wife of material non disclosure – especially in relation to the US$900,000 lump sum that she received on the divorce and the properties in Turkey. These were issues in the Singaporean trial and they have been issues in this trial. In the wife’s Form E dated the 27 February 2012 the wife said:

Depletion of savings.  I was not given ongoing maintenance following the divorce and instead received a lump-sum payment.  In the last two years I have more or less depleted this sum on child maintenance, house upgrade in Bodrum Golkoy and legal fees.

33.  The wife has produced a schedule setting out how the US$900,000 was apparently utilized. There is very little documentary evidence in support of her assertions in this respect. For example she says that she spent US$250,000 on the Bodrum renovation. There is no evidence of that. The wife also includes payment of other miscellaneous items in her schedule including her tax bill in 2011. To be frank I find this all a little hard to accept. I have also been provided with very little evidence in relation to the properties in Turkey. For example there are no up to date valuations. I am asked simply to believe the wife and to accept a lot of what she has said at face value.   

34.  At the end of the day I do not find either party particularly credible; very little evidence has been produced by either side to support what at times have been quite outrageous assertions. Each party has put their case at its highest. Neither has been particularly convincing.         

What are the present financial resources of each party?

35.  I accept that both parties have some additional financial resources at their disposal. According to the wife she has assets of approximately HK$13 million. She has invested approximately US$160,000 in two life investment policies. As I have said there is a question mark over the whereabouts of some of the remaining funds from the US$900,000. I also query the actual value of her property portfolio. 

36.  The husband says that he has very little in the way of remaining financial resources. As I have said his involvement in his second wife’s business is also open to speculation. This is a very high end bespoke jewellery design business. The husband is the Chairman. On his own case he has also invested in this business. He says he receives a nominal retainer of US$1,000 per month. However it seems that this business provides for the whole family of four children and other relatives. They appear to have a comfortable life style. All four children attend an international school in Ho Chi Minh City. The husband says his current monthly expenses and those of the family amount to HK$128,201 per month. Putting it at its lowest it seems that the husband is certainly benefiting from this business, in which he has a clearly defined role and in which he also has a financial interest.

37.  There are other anomalies. For example, on the husband’s own evidence, he spent just under HK$1.8 million (SG$283,494) on a wedding gift for his wife in May 2009 to celebrate their first two years together.  He now says that this was not the best decision that he has ever made. He has also invested significant sums in the two start up ventures. He also sold his property in Singapore in addition to the property in Bali referred to above. At no point was there ever any attempt by the husband to make some further financial provision for the children over and above the US$250,000. This was at a time when he must have been aware that on the wife’s case there was nothing left from the US$250,000 and it was clear that he did have other financial resources at his disposal.   

38.  The husband still owns a property in Hong Kong valued in the region of just over HK$4 million. The husband estimates that it has a net equitable value of c HK$2.8 million. According to the husband’s most recent disclosure as at the 8 January 2012 there was an outstanding mortgage on that property of just over HK$1 million. In addition he had an unsecured loan with the mortgagor of just under HK$200,000. 

What is the present earning capacity of each party?

39.  According to the most up to date documentation provided by the wife as at the 1 April 2011 she was earning a base salary of S$197,529 per annum or S$16,460.75 per month. However if one were to average out the salary that she received into her bank account for the last six months of 2011 that figure rises to approximately S$17,400 or HK$107,880 per month. This is probably inclusive of other small allowances such as the annual car and cash allowance. She also receives a bonus of up to 50% of her salary. For the year 2010 she received a bonus of S$95,000 or HK$589,000. Thus in total the wife’s average monthly income appears to be in the region of just under HK$157,000 per month pre tax. She receives other “flexi-benefits” which she says she uses for health insurance and dental expenses.  

40.  The husband claims that he is presently earning very little. He presently receives the equivalent of HK$7,800 from his position as Chairman of his wife’s company. In addition there is a small net income from the rental of the Hong Kong property. He has also been pursuing a number of advisory positions on the boards of companies in Vietnam, one of which he has been lucky enough to recently secure. In total the husband estimates that he presently has an actual income of HK$20,800 per month.

41.  The wife says that this is “litigation window dressing” and that the husband has a significant earning capacity in his own right which he does not seek to exploit because of these proceedings. Whilst I would accept that the husband does have a significant earning capacity – I also accept that this might now be difficult for him to fully realize. I certainly accept that he is unlikely to be able to earn anything like what he was earning previously with the finance house in Hong Kong. He has been out of the market in Hong Kong since 2007 and out of the market completely since 2009. It will be very difficult for him to break back in – especially if he continues to reside in Vietnam and if those in the banking industry continue to be retrenched. I accept though that he should be able to obtain other non executive directorship positions. He also presents as a bright and resourceful man. I am sure that other business opportunities may beckon.    

What funds should be made available for the children’s maintenance and what order should be made?

42.  The wife asks for a 50% contribution towards the children‘s expenses. Generally in children’s maintenance cases I look first to the financial resources of each party and in particular to their relative earnings. In the event that the parties are earning about the same I would normally accept that they should be contributing towards both the children’s direct and indirect expenses equally. Where they are not then the expenses are normally divided on the basis of the parties’ actual earnings or other financial resources.

43.  Consideration is also given to the level of expenses claimed and I would normally make a number of rulings based on submissions made in relation to individual items.

44.  I have given a great deal of thought to the appropriate approach to be taken in this case and the difficulties that are likely to be encountered with enforcement in the event that a normal maintenance order is made. The wife is now earning a good salary – certainly far in excess of that anticipated when the parties were negotiating the order of the 15 May 2007. She also has a number of other assets. She is certainly in a position to provide for the children notwithstanding issues about her own disclosure.

45.  The wife spends a great deal on the children’s extracurricular activities c S$2,954 or c HK$18,300 per month. I accept that this seems excessive in the circumstances. Half of that amount would seem to me to be a more reasonable figure. I will allow S$1,500 or HK$9,300 per month. The wife puts the general expenses for herself and the children at S$10,945 or HK$67,859 and her own expenses, inclusive of tax at S$4,035 or HK$25,017 per month. If one puts the school fees to one side for the moment and I allow S$1,500 for the children’s extracurricular activities then the total for the children’s expenses comes to S$5,628 or HK$34,893 per month. In total then the wife spends approximately S$20,608 or HK$127,769 or say HK$128,000 per month. The wife should be able to pay this sum from her own resources.

School fees and related expenses

46.  The wife’s main concern – quite understandably has been in relation to the children’s school fees. The husband has argued that the children should go to local schools, if the parents do not have the means to pay for international school fees. However it is clear that this is not a solution in this case. I accept that it would be very difficult for these children to be educated in the local Singaporean system.  I have also taken due notice of the fact that the husband’s four step children all attend a good international school in Ho Chi Minh City. Clearly education is a priority for both families. I am sure that it would have been the husband’s intention for the children to receive the best possible education had the parties remained married.

47.  Both children were originally attending the C school in Singapore. The wife has however recently enrolled the eldest child at another very prestigious international school with boarding facilities, without obtaining the husband’s consent. She says that it is not her intention to board E for the time being. The wife was unable originally to provide the court with a comparison of the fees between the new school and the children’s original school and other alternatives. She has now done so. From this it is clear that the fees for day pupils are similar in each school.

48.  In the circumstances then it seems to me that the husband should be responsible for the children’s school fees. Although he says that he is unable to pay for these from his own income at present, he does have another financial resource at his disposal, namely the property in Hong Kong that could be used for this purpose. As stated above I also accept that the husband most probably has other financial resources at his disposal.

Conclusion

49.  I will therefore discharge the wife from her undertaking contained in the court order dated the 15 May 2007 not to seek to vary the financial provision for the children until April 2010.

50.  The husband shall pay a lump sum to the wife equivalent to the children’s school fees (i.e. tuition fees and capital levies) for the period from September 2009 to date, such figure to be calculated and provided to the court with documentary evidence in support.

51.  The issue of the charging order nisi shall be adjourned for further argument as directed on the 4 November 2011. In the meantime the charging order nisi shall remain in effect.

52.  The father shall be responsible for payment of the children’s school fees going forward. The parties are invited to make submissions with respect to this. I will also invite the parties’ legal representatives to make submissions with respect to the appropriate structure for the court order.

Costs           

53.  Given my concerns as expressed in this judgment and given that both parties will be coming back to court in any event I will reserve costs for further argument.

( Sharon D MELLOY )
District Judge

Ms E Ho of Messrs Hampton Winter & Glynn for the Petitioner

Mr Neal Clough instructed by Messrs Stevenson Wong & Co for the Respondent