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Civil Action2006

SUPPLY CHAIN & LOGISTICS TECHNOLOGY LTD v. NEC HONG KONG LTD

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64117-EN-2009-01-29

SUPPLY CHAIN & LOGISTICS TECHNOLOGY LTD v. NEC HONG KONG LTD

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HCA 1939/2006

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 1939 OF 2006

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BETWEEN

 SUPPLY CHAIN & LOGISTICS TECHNOLOGY LIMITED(供應鏈及物流科技有限公司)Plaintiff
 and 
 NEC HONG KONG LIMITEDDefendant

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Before: Hon Lam J in Chambers

Date of filing of Written Submission: 8 December 2008

Date of Judgment on Costs: 29 January 2009

 

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JUDGMENT  ON  COSTS

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1.  Further to my Ruling on 24 November 2008, the Defendant put in a written submission on 8 December 2008.  The Plaintiff chose not to file anything.

2.  As per Paragraph 14 of my Ruling, I regard that both parties are applying for leave to discontinue their respective claims and counterclaim.  I do not see any reason why things should not be regarded as finalized once and for all.  I therefore grant leave to the Plaintiff to discontinue the claims without further recourse.  In other words, the Plaintiff cannot commence fresh action on the same claims against the Defendant.

3.  In the same vein, and there is no objection to this by the Defendant, I grant leave to the Defendant to discontinue the counterclaim without further recourse.

4.  On the question of costs, in respect of the Plaintiff’s claims, I do not see any reason to depart from the general rule that a plaintiff who discontinues his claim should pay the costs of the defendant.  I therefore order the Plaintiff to pay the Defendant’s costs in respect of the claims herein.

5.  In respect of the Defendant’s counterclaim, solicitors for the Defendant submitted that there should be no order as to costs.  The Defendant said it decided to discontinue with the counterclaim for pragmatic reasons after the Plaintiff filed a Notice of Discontinuance on the claims.  The counterclaim was for damages quantified by the Defendant at $200,000 and proceeding with the counterclaim alone is not justifiable in terms of costs.  Witness who left the employment of the Defendant had to be flown from overseas and counsel had to be engaged if there were to be a trial on the counterclaim.  Thus, although the Defendant did have the evidence to substantiate the counterclaim, it decided to drop the same for economic consideration.

6.  I accept this is not a case where the counterclaim is doomed to fail and the discontinuance of the counterclaim cannot be regarded as an acknowledgment of defeat.  But it has been established in Hong Kong that the general rule does not cease to apply when a party discontinues his claim for reasons other than an acknowledgment of defeat, see Inchroy Credit Corp v Cheung Man Cheung [1991] 2 HKC 619 and Trend Publishing (HK) Ltd v Vivien Chan & Co [1996] 3 HKC 433.  There must be good reason to show it is just to deprive the other party of his costs as a matter of discretion.  The mere fact that a plaintiff discontinues with his claim for economic consideration by itself is not enough.

7.  But the Defendant in the present case does not rely on its discontinuance of the counterclaim for economic consideration alone.  It is said that the Defendant only made a Counterclaim in the light of the claims advanced by the Plaintiff.  And the Plaintiff had chosen to discontinue the claims at the last minute when the action was about to come on for trial.

8.  Further the Defendant asked this court to take into account of the unreasonable delay on the part of the Plaintiff in the conduct of the action at various stages outlined in the solicitor’s letter of 20 October 2008.  There was dilatoriness on the part of the Plaintiff throughout the history of the proceedings.  More significantly, the conduct of the Plaintiff leads this court to take the view that after the filing of the witness statements, the Plaintiff did not have any serious intention of continuing with the litigation.  As a matter of fact, the witness statements of the Plaintiff were only filed after a long delay and the Defendant had to get an unless order before the statements were filed.

9.  The lack of intention to proceed with the claim is reflected by the Plaintiff’s failure to engage trial counsel for the preparation of the checklist hearing and the Master therefore directed the Plaintiff to confirm the length of trial at the pre-trial review by trial counsel.  At the pre-trial review on 19 August 2008, the Plaintiff’s solicitor told this court that the Plaintiff had not yet instructed counsel.  Bearing in mind the direction of the Master and that the trial was to commence on 13 October and in the light of the filing of Notice of Discontinuance by the Plaintiff on 4 October, a few days before the trial, the inescapable inference is that the Plaintiff did not have any serious intention to instruct any counsel for trial even after the case had been set down.

10.  At the pre-trial review, the court gave directions for the trial and adopted the procedures in Parts B and D of Practice Direction 6.3 with modifications.  Pursuant to such directions, the Defendant issued a mediation notice on 23 August 2008.  The Plaintiff failed to file any response and up to now no explanation had been offered for such failure.  As far as this court is aware, the only thing the Plaintiff did after the pre-trial review was to file a Notice of Discontinuance on 4 October 2008.  These are hardly conducts of a litigant who is serious with his claims.

11.  Failure to participate in mediation can be taken into account on the question of costs.  The rationale is that the purpose of civil litigation is to resolve dispute between the parties.  Proper case management requires the court and the parties to consider what is the most cost effective and satisfactory way to resolve a dispute.  In many instances, adversarial litigation is only one of the modes to resolve a dispute and it may not be the best mode.  If there is an alternative by which the dispute may be resolved in a more cost effective, timely and satisfactory manner but a party insists on resorting to litigation despite suggestion from the court to explore that alternative, in effect he is adopting a potentially more expensive and time-consuming mode in dealing with the same subject matter that may cause greater attrition to all parties in terms of financial and personal well-being and human relationship, and as such less satisfactory.  He may or may not have good reasons for taking such a stance.  But before the court suggests the parties to consider mediation, it usually would have examined whether the case is appropriate for mediation.  A party who chooses to ignore such suggestion should not be surprised if the court seeks an explanation from him for not making attempts in mediation when it deals with the question of costs.

12.  This approach is well in line with English authorities, see Dunnett v Railtrack [2002] 1 WLR 2423 and Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust [2004] 1 WLR 3002.  In Hong Kong, the pilot schemes on mediation in the High Court Construction and Arbitration List, Sections 168A and 177(f) Companies Ordinance cases and the Lands Tribunal Building Management Cases adopted the same approach.

13.  In dealing with costs, it is well established that settlement attempts that have a prospect in satisfactory resolution of the dispute and the rejection of such attempts are relevant considerations because such case management conducts have a direct bearing on the reduction or escalation of the costs of the litigation.  As Simon Brown LJ put it in Butcher v Wolfe [1999] 1 FLR 334,

“For the plaintiff to be entitled to recover his costs --- in this or any other litigation --- he must show at least that he has obtained at the hearing something of value which he could not otherwise have expected to get.  Only that justifies his proceeding with the action to trial.”

14.  Mediation is in substance third party neutral assisted negotiation.  It has a better prospect of success than the usual inter partes negotiation because of the involvement of a neutral who has the necessary skill and expertise in helping the parties to explore their respective needs and interests with a view to come to a solution acceptable to all parties.  That is so even in cases where mediation is compared with inter partes negotiation conducted through the parties’ lawyers.  By the very nature of the different role played by a lawyer acting for a party, there are things that a skillful mediator can achieve which such lawyer cannot.  Thus, unreasonable refusal to participate in mediation even after the court suggested the parties to do so is a conduct relating to the litigation that should be taken into account when the court deals with question of costs.

15.  However, in the present case, not much legal cost were incurred after the Plaintiff’s failure in responding to the Defendant’s mediation notice due to the discontinuance of the claims and the counterclaim.  Hence, it is difficult to suggest that the failure on the part of the Plaintiff to participate in mediation has any significant impact on costs.  The position may well be different if the Defendant has issued a mediation notice earlier or if the case has proceeded to trial.

16.  But the failure to response to the Mediation Notice is an event that the court can take into account in considering whether the Plaintiff has been acting properly in the pursuit of its claims or the defence of the counterclaim.  Such failure is a non-compliance with the direction of this court given on 19 August 2008 and the only step taken by the Plaintiff afterwards was the filing of the Notice of Discontinuance on 4 October 2008.

17.  The situation is compounded by the Plaintiff’s complete silence when the court directed submissions on costs were to be made.

18.  In the circumstances, I conclude that after the filing of the written statements the Plaintiff did not pursue this litigation with any serious intent to bring it to trial and to defend against the counterclaim.  As far as I can see, very little has been done on the part of the Plaintiff in the preparation of defence to the counterclaim.  Taking all these into account, it is just that in respect of the counterclaim there should be no order as to costs.

 (M H Lam)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

Messrs Benny Kong & Yeung, for the Plaintiff

Messrs Hasting & Co., for the Defendant

63389-EN-2008-11-24

SUPPLY CHAIN & LOGISTICS TECHNOLOGY LTD v. NEC HONG KOGN LTD

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HCA 1939/2006

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO.  1939 OF 2006

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BETWEEN  
 SUPPLY CHAIN & LOGISTICS TECHNOLOGY LIMITEDPlaintiff
 and 
 NEC HONG KOGN LIMITEDDefendant

----------------------

Before: Hon Lam J in Chambers

Date of Ruling: 24 November 2008

 

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R U L I N G

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1.  The action was scheduled for trial before this court from 13 to 17 October 2008.  There were claims and counterclaims.

2.  On 4 October 2008, the Plaintiff filed a Notice of Discontinuance in respect of the claim.  On 8 October 2008, the Defendant filed a Notice of Discontinuance in respect of the counterclaim.  There was however no application for leave under Order 21 Rule 3.

3.  Parties do not reach any agreement on costs.  The Plaintiff says there should be no order for costs for both the claim and the counterclaim.  On the other hand, the Defendant says the Plaintiff should pay the Defendant’s costs on the claim whilst there should be no order as to costs for the counterclaim.

4.  The claim of the Plaintiff is for damages for breaches of two separate agreements: an agreement in February 2006 to purchase certain equipments from the Plaintiff and engage its consultancy service [“the February Agreement”]; and an agreement made in April 2006 to supply some mounting kits and to provide consultancy services to Defendant [“the April Agreement”].  There is also a claim for procurement of breach of contract in that the Defendant obtained supply of goods from the end-supplier in breach of a distributorship agreement between the Plaintiff and the end-supplier.

5.  The counterclaim of the Defendant is in respect of damages arising from defective goods and services supplied under the April Agreement.  The Defendant denies there was any February Agreement.  It also denies it has any knowledge as regards the terms of the distributorship between the Plaintiff and the end-supplier.

6.  Since the notices of discontinuance were not served within the time prescribed under Order 21 Rule 2, the notices did not operate as discontinuance automatically.  By reason of Order 21 Rule 3, the claim and the counterclaim cannot be discontinued without leave of the court.

7.  For the same reason, Order 62 Rule 10 and Rule 3(7) are not applicable.

8.  However, it does not mean that the notices of discontinuance have no effect whatsoever.  Since the notices were served and filed, they were intimation by the Plaintiff that it had no intention to pursue the claim and intimation by the Defendant that it had no intention to pursue the counterclaim.

9.  The court acted on such intimations to order the trial dates being vacated. 

10.  Applying the principle in Grovit v Doctor [1997] 1 WLR 640, it would now be an abuse of process if parties wish to revive the claim or counterclaim.

11.  However, since the discontinuance are not effective without the leave of the court, the court retains jurisdiction over the question of costs.

12.  In a letter of 9 October 2008, solicitors for the Defendant submitted that leave was granted by implication due to the vacation of the trial dates.  I do not accept that submission.  The trial dates were vacated in view of the intimations by the parties to the court that they had no intention to pursue the claim and the counterclaim respectively.  It was envisaged that question on costs can be dealt with on papers.  There was no application for leave to discontinue the action and such leave cannot be granted by implication.

13.  Notwithstanding lengthy submissions in correspondence from the Defendant’s solicitors (whilst the Plaintiff’s solicitors simply stated the Plaintiff’s position on costs without any submissions), there was no reference to relevant cases on the court’s approach on costs in an application for leave to discontinue.  In particular, the following cases were not discussed in the written submissions: Inchroy Credit Corp Ltd v Cheung Man Cheung [1992] 1 HKLR 120, Trend Publishing (HK) Ltd v Vivien Chan & Co [1996] 2 HKLR 227 Leung Yuet Ching v Leung Yuet Kuen [2001] 4 HKC 562 and Terkildsen v Barber Asia Ltd [2007] 4 HKLRD L3, HCA 1963 of 2003, 6 June 2007.

14.  In the circumstances, unless the parties indicated otherwise in writing within 14 days, this court will treat the correspondence as applications for leave to discontinue the claim and the counterclaim under Order 21 Rule 3.  Further, unless this court otherwise directs, the applications for leave will be dealt with on papers and written submissions (including submissions on the above cases and on all conditions that the court should impose on granting leave) shall be filed within 14 days. 

 (M H Lam)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

Mr Yeung Edmond of Messrs Benny Kong & Yeung, for the Plaintiff

Mr Wong Chao Wai, Brian, instructed by Messrs Hasting & Co.,  for the Defendant