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Civil Action2006

CLARE HOLLINGWORTH v. THOMAS EDWARD JUSON

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54963-EN-2006-11-07

CLARE HOLLINGWORTH v. THOMAS EDWARD JUSON

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HCA249/2006

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 249 OF 2006

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BETWEEN

CLARE HOLLINGWORTHPlaintiff
and
THOMAS EDWARD JUSON
also known as TED THOMAS
Defendant

-----------------------

 

Before : Hon Chu J in Chambers

Date of written submissions : 8, 22 & 29 August and 5 September 2006

Date of decision : 7 November 2006

 

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DECISION ON COSTS

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1.  On 12 July 2006, I handed down the Decision on the plaintiff’s application for a summary order for account. I granted the application. I also made an order nisi that the defendant pays the plaintiff the costs of the application to be taxed if not agreed.

2.  The defendant applied by letter dated 18 July 2006 to vary the costs order nisi. Pursuant to directions communicated to the parties by letter dated 25 July 2006, the defendant and the plaintiff lodged their respective submissions on the application to vary on 8 and 22 August 2006.  This was followed by a second round of submissions, which was caused by the defendant’s further submissions lodged on 29 August 2006. 

3.  Before this decision was handed down, the defendant filed a Notice to Act in Person on 8 September 2006.

The defendant’s grounds for variation

4.  In applying to vary the costs order nisi, the defendant asks that there be no order as to the costs of the plaintiff’s application.  In the first submission, the thrust of the defendant’s argument was that the plaintiff should not be allowed her costs because she had failed to comply with Practice Direction 5.4 in the following regards:

(1)     The plaintiff’s skeleton argument and authorities were served late.

(2)     The hearing bundle was served and lodged late and without first consulting the defendant as to its contents. This had caused the court to adjourn the hearing to consider the additional evidence of the defendant, thereby increasing the costs unnecessarily. 

(3)     The plaintiff had failed to prepare a chronology.

5.  In the second submissions, the defendant made the following additional points:

(1)     The plaintiff’s solicitors failed to inform the court at the hearing of the application that they had corresponded with the Director of Legal Aid in connection with the defendant’s legal aid application and had unduly influenced the Director of Legal Aid into making an abrupt decision to refuse his legal aid application.  Both the Director of Legal Aid and the plaintiff’s solicitors refused to disclose their correspondence to the defendant.  In light of this factual matrix and the plaintiff’s conduct, the plaintiff should be deprived of her costs.

(2)     The litigation was brought not by the plaintiff but by Mr Patrick Garrett out of his personal malice towards the defendant. He had also wrongfully interfered with the defendant’s legal aid application.

(3)     Despite Deputy Judge Gill’s remark in his Decision dated 3 May 2006, the plaintiff had refused mediation.  Before issuing the proceedings, the plaintiff did not attempt to seek clarifications of the defendant’s statements and explanations contained in his solicitors’ letter dated 3 February 2006.   

Non-compliance with Practice Direction

6.  Under Practice Direction 5.4, for contested interlocutory applications listed for 30 minutes or more, there should be before the court an agreed chronology of relevant events (paras.2.3 and 3.1).  Further, the applying party should serve and lodge with the court the hearing bundles, chronology of events and skeleton arguments and lists of authorities at least 72 hours before the hearing (para.11).  The responding party should serve and lodge his skeleton argument and list of authorities at least 48 hours before the hearing (para.12). 

7.  Para.20 of the Practice Direction states as follows: 

“Consequences of non-compliance

20.       Those not observing or complying with these directions may be called upon to explain such failure and, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation, may be penalized in costs irrespective of whether or not they are the parties who succeed on the application. Parties are warned that to ensure observance of and compliance with these directions, a party who has breached any of such directions may, despite his success in the application or appeal, still be deprived of all or part of his costs of the application or appeal as a penalty. Further, such costs penalty may be imposed irrespective of whether or not the breach has resulted in any adjournment of the hearing or any other forms of wastage of time or costs.”

8.  There is no dispute that the plaintiff did not serve and lodge the hearing bundles, skeleton argument and lists of authorities within the time prescribed by the Practice Direction.  However, as a result of the defendant’s legal aid application, there was a statutory stay of proceedings until it was lifted on 3 July 2006.  Section 15(4) of the Legal Aid Ordinance, cap. 91 provides that during the period of statutory stay, the “time fixed by or under any law or otherwise for the doing of any act or the taking of any step in the proceedings shall not run”.  I agree with the plaintiff’s submissions that strictly speaking, the time prescribed in Practice Direction 5.4 would not apply.

9.  For the plaintiff, it is further said that there is a good reason for the non-compliance with the Practice Direction.  As noted above, the defendant had made an application for legal aid. The Director of Legal Aid gave notice of the application of legal aid by memorandum dated 30 May 2006.  Consequently, there was a statutory stay of the proceedings for 42 days, which would have lasted until 12 July 2006.  The defendant’s solicitors wrote in early June to seek the court’s indication on whether the hearing on 3 July 2006 would be vacated.  By letter dated 14 June 2006, the parties were informed that the position would be reviewed in the last week of June. 

10.  Then on 30 June 2006, which was the Friday before the hearing, the Director of Legal Aid filed the memorandum of refusal of legal aid.  The plaintiff’s solicitors were notified of the refusal at 5:30pm on 29 June 2006. They immediately instructed counsel and made copies of the hearing bundle, the index of which was already prepared on 28 June 2006.  The hearing bundle and skeleton submissions were served on the defendant before lunchtime on 30 June 2006.  On the same day, the plaintiff issued the summons to lift the stay.

11.  I accept that in these circumstances, there is a good reason for the plaintiff’s non-compliance with the Practice Direction.  It is understandable for the plaintiff to think that the summons would probably be adjourned if by the time of the hearing, the defendant’s legal aid application were still being processed and there was a statutory stay in place.  It is therefore reasonable for the plaintiff to withhold the preparation of the hearing bundle and skeleton submissions for the time being.  They had also proceeded expeditiously to prepare for the hearing once they were informed of the outcome of the legal aid application. 

12.  It is suggested that the defendant was prejudiced by the non-compliance.  I am unable to agree.  Despite the non-compliance, the defendant’s legal advisers had the Friday afternoon and the weekend to consider and prepare the defendant’s case.  Although Mr Bedford who appeared for the defendant indicated that he did not have access to library or research facilities during the weekend, he had compiled a detailed submission and had not sought an adjournment.  As to the contents of the hearing bundle, the defendant’s affidavits that were not included were affidavits filed in relation to other summonses. The defendant did not file any evidence on the plaintiff’s application for account, despite having been given leave to do so.  As a result of Mr Bedford’s indication that the defendant’s affidavits would need to be looked at, I adjourned at about 12:30 pm so that I could read the affidavits during lunchtime and saved counsel’s time in reading out the affidavits in court.  In the end, Mr Bedford did not in his submissions refer to the contents of any of the defendant’s affidavits.  It is therefore incorrect to say that because the hearing bundle was prepared without first consulting the defendant, costs had been unnecessarily increased.

13.        In short, even if the time limits prescribed by Practice Direction 5.4 did apply, the plaintiff had given a satisfactory explanation for the non-compliance and the non-compliance had not occasioned prejudice to the defendant.

The defendant’s legal aid application

14.  The fact that the plaintiff’s solicitors had communicated with the Director of Legal Aid in connection with the defendant’s legal aid application is entirely irrelevant to the issue of costs.  In this regard, Messrs Robertsons appeared to be under a misconception that the costs order nisi in the Decision of 12 July 2006 relates to both the application for account and the application to lift the statutory stay.  As pointed out in the court’s letter dated 1 September 2006, at the hearing on 3 July 2006, Mr Stock and Mr Bedford had already made submissions on the costs of the application to lift the stay and an order had been made granting costs to the plaintiff.  The present application to vary the costs order nisi therefore only concerns the costs of the plaintiff’s application for account.

15.  Further, the defendant had appealed to the Registrar against the refusal of legal aid.  If the defendant felt that the refusal of his legal aid application was due to any wrongful interference of the plaintiff’s solicitors, the proper forum to raise the complaint was at the appeal against the refusal.  The defendant was legally represented before and after the refusal of legal aid.  At the hearing, he appeared by counsel to resist the plaintiff’s application for account and failed.  The refusal of his legal aid application has no bearing on the outcome of the plaintiff’s application. It cannot afford the defendant with a reason to avoid the costs consequences of his failed opposition.

The involvement of Mr Patrick Garrett

16.  Similarly, the suggestion that these proceedings were instituted by Mr Patrick Garrett out of his personal animosity towards the defendant is not a reason exonerating the defendant from paying the costs of the application.  As observed in Mr Stock’s submissions on costs, it is clear from the affidavits of Ms Wright and Mr Flude that they as well as other family members of the plaintiff are supportive of Mr Garrett and these proceedings against the defendant.  In any event, in granting the plaintiff’s application, the court had accepted that the application was properly made, and the defendant is under a duty both in law and on the facts to render an account.

Mediation

17.  Although Deputy Judge Gill had remarked that this might be a case for mediation, it did not oblige the parties to attempt mediation. Still less would the disagreement to mediate afford a reason for depriving the plaintiff of costs that she would otherwise be entitled to.  Additionally, the evidence shows that for a considerable time before these proceedings were commenced, the defendant had been asked to explain and give an account of the withdrawals from the plaintiff’s account.  It cannot be said that the defendant had not been given a reasonable opportunity to explain and clarify himself.

Conclusion

18.  Costs is a matter of court’s discretion.  None of the matters put forward by the defendant to support the application to vary the costs order nisi justifies a departure from the normal rule of costs to follow event.  Additionally, the plaintiff’s solicitors had by letter dated 23 May 2006 invited the defendant to consent to give an account and also warned him of the costs consequences should he resist the application and fail.  In the circumstances, the defendant has no cause to complain if he had the benefit of legal advice, chose to oppose the application and failed.  He has to abide by the costs consequences.

19.  For the above reasons, the defendant’s application to vary the costs order nisi is refused.  The costs order made in the Decision of 12 July 2006 is made absolute forthwith.  

(C Chu)
Judge of Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Alexander Stock instructed by Messrs Barlow Lyde & Gilbert for the plaintiff.

Up to 8 September 2006, Messrs Robertsons for the defendant.  

After  8 September 2006, the defendant is unrepresented.

54567-EN-2006-10-16

CLARE HOLLINGWORTH v.THOMAS EDWARD JUSON

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HCA249/2006

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 249 OF 2006

-----------------------

BETWEEN

 CLARE HOLLINGWORTHPlaintiff
 and 
 THOMAS EDWARD JUSON 
 also known as TED THOMASDefendant

-----------------------

Before : Hon Chu J in Chambers

Date of Hearing : 9 October 2006

Date of Decision : 9 October 2006

Date of Reasons for Decision : 16 October 2006

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REASONS FOR DECISION

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1.  The plaintiff’s applied by summons for an Unless Order to compel the defendant to file and serve an account and a verifying affidavit in compliance with the order dated 12 July 2006.  The defendant opposed the application.  After hearing submissions, I ordered the defendant to file and serve the account and verifying affidavit within 30 days with costs to the plaintiff. My reasons appear below. 

The facts leading to the application

2.  The background and facts surrounding this action had been set out in my Decision handed down on 12 July 2006. I will not repeat them.

3.  On 15 March 2006, the plaintiff applied by summons for a summary order for account under Order 43 Rule 1 of Rules of the High Court.  After a contested hearing on 3 July 2006, I ordered in my Decision of 12 July 2006 that the defendant should within 21 days (or such longer period as the plaintiff may by writing agree): (a) file and serve an account in respect of the sums set out in Schedules 1 and 2 of the Amended Statement of Claim and the defendant’s dealings with them and the profits or interests made as a result of the receipt of the said sums by the defendant with all necessary vouchers and supporting documentation, and (b) verify the account by affidavit.  

4.  On 31 August 2006, the defendant filed his 4th affidavit for the purpose of complying with the Order of 12 July 2006

5.  On 8 September 2006, the defendant filed a Notice to Act in Person.

The plaintiff’s arguments

6.  It is the plaintiff’s case that the 4th affidavit of the defendant fails to comply with the Order of 12 July 2006, both in form and in substance.  The arguments advanced can be summarized as follows:

(1)The defendant’s 4th affidavit is not an account.  Further, it is not comprehensive and contains various cross-references.  The affidavit only confirms the truthfulness and accuracy of the figures in the exhibits, but not the veracity of the documents exhibited and their contents. 
(2)The defendant’s 4th affidavit does not add anything useful to what was provided by the defendant prior to the plaintiff’s Order 43 application and the Order of 12 July 2006.  The underlying supporting vouchers and documents were not provided.  The figures and descriptions in the exhibits are inconsistent and also contradict with what were previously provided. 

The defendant’s arguments

7.  In opposing the application, the defendant made the following points:

(1)He came to be stuck with the plaintiff and became involved with the plaintiff’s funds by default. It was at a time when the plaintiff was abandoned and everyone was taking advantage of her at the Foreign Correspondents Club through free meals and free drinks. When the plaintiff was in hospital, she pleaded with him not to leave her alone.  The money paid by the defendant on her behalf had to be seen against this background. 
(2)The plaintiff has failing eyesight and is very hard of hearing. There was somebody emailing the defendant from Russia claiming to be the great nephew of the plaintiff.  Then the plaintiff made a new will and executed a power of attorney in favour of these people who claimed to be her relatives and their next-of-kin.  The defendant is in the circumstances entitled to know who is behind this litigation. 
(3)A lot of the plaintiff’s money has been spent on this litigation, which will only benefit the people behind the litigation and their lawyers. 
(4)The defendant had already on three occasions provided an account.  He had repeatedly asked what were wrong with the accounts given and what in fact did the plaintiff want.  All the money said to be owed by him had been returned or paid into court. 
(5)The manner in which the plaintiff’s solicitors served the papers of the present application, by scattering them outside his residence, was objectionable. 
(6)The plaintiff’s had secretly corresponded with the Director of Legal Aid and lied about his financial means, causing the defendant’s legal aid application to be refused. 
(7)The plaintiff’s solicitors had belittled his medical problem that caused his absence at the returnable date of the plaintiff’s present summons, when it was a life-threatening matter discovered more than one year ago. 
(8)The Atkin’s Encyclopaedia of Court Forms in Civil Proceedings, second edition (1992 issue), vol. 1, cited by Mr Stock to show the proper form and contents of an account and verifying account, is not applicable to Hong Kong. 

8.  In addition, the defendant requested the court to order the Director of Legal Aid and the plaintiff’s solicitors to disclose to him the correspondence exchanged between them.  He further requested an order be made directing the plaintiff to pay into court the costs that would be involved in this litigation.

Non-compliance with the Order

9.  Though stated to be made in pursuance of the Order of 12 July 2006, the defendant’s 4th affidavit does not amount to compliance with the Order.

10.  In terms of the practice and proper format for account and verifying affidavit, Mr Stock had helpfully referred to Atkin’s Encyclopaedia of Court Forms in Civil Proceedings, second edition (1992 issue), vol. 1 at pp.605-617 and 646-655. At para.14 on p.612 is a reference to the requirement that the items on each side of the account must be numbered.  This is the requirement under Order 43 rule 4(2) of Rules of the High Court. Para.14 goes on to state that in cases where it is impracticable to number the account, for instance where it is a long, complex partnership account, it is customary to lodge summarised account in ordinary accountants’ form.  In such cases, the accounting party may be ordered to allow the other party to have access to all the books, vouchers and other documents in their possession and power relating to the account.  In simpler cases, the accounting party may be directed to exhibit the supporting vouchers and documents to his affidavit.  At pp.647-648 are the precedent forms of an account (Form 30) and a verifying affidavit (Form 31).

11.  I do not agree that the practice and precedent forms relating to account as contained in Atkin’s Forms have no application to Hong Kong.  On the contrary, the practice set out in Atkin’s Forms is the same as that described in Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2006 vol.1 para.43/3/1.             

12.  Schedules 1 and 2 to the Amended Statement of Claim are not long schedules.  They relate to ATM withdrawals made and cheques paid between 11 July 2003 and 11 June 2005, which is not a long period.  In respect of the cheques in Schedule 2, the details of their numbers, dates, payees and endorsements at the back had been set out in the Schedule.  I do not believe it is impracticable or that it will be a complex or cumbersome task for the defendant to give an itemized and numbered account similar to the precedent form in Atkin’s Forms.  I note in this connection that it is the defendant’s case that an accountant, Mr Barry Lau, was engaged to manage and oversee the plaintiff’s finances.  The defendant also indicated at the hearing of the present application that he was relying on Mr Lau and would be enlisting his help to prepare the account.

13.  It appears to me that despite the Order of 12 July 2006, no attempt was made to give a complete and consolidated account, whether in numbered or summarized form, of all the items in Schedules 1 and 2 to the Amended Statement of Claim.  As Mr Stock rightly pointed out, the defendant only filed and served his 4th affidavit, but did not file and serve an account.  Neither did the defendant’s 4th affidavit exhibit or verify any single document called an account.  Purely on this point, there has been no compliance of the Order.

14.  Secondly, an important consideration underlying my Decision and the Order of 12 July 2006 is that the defendant should provide not only a full, but also consolidated account of the withdrawals and payments from the plaintiff’s account as contained in Schedules 1 and 2 of the Amended Statement of Claim and his dealings with the money withdrawn and any profits and interests derived from such dealings.  In my Decision, I had also referred to some of the more prominent problems in the account and explanations previously given by the defendant. 

15.  The defendant’s 4th affidavit is however not a self-contained document.  It made various cross-references to the accounts previously supplied and the letters from the defendant’s former solicitors. This does not serve the purpose of rendering an account, which ought to be comprehensive and self-contained and have all supporting documentation attached.  It also does not meet the ultimate objective of the Decision and the Order of 12 July 2006 of consolidating the defendant’s position on the transactions contained in Schedules 1 and 2 of the Amended Statement of Claim and in turn defining the disputes between the parties on them.  Notwithstanding the service of the defendant’s 4th affidavit, it remains difficult to identify with clarity and precision the defendant’s case on the purposes of and the actual use put to the various withdrawals and payments and what have become of the money involved.  Without a proper consolidated account, the plaintiff will not be able to file a meaningful list of objections.  It is also not possible to define precisely the issues between the parties. 

16.  Thirdly, in the concluding paragraph of the 4th affidavit, the defendant confirmed to the best of his knowledge information and belief that “the figures stated in the exhibits to this affidavit are true and correct”.  These are carefully chosen words.  They do not amount to a proper verification of an account.  The exhibits to the 4th affidavit are primarily analyses of (i) the income and expenditure, (ii) the account of the book “Captain if Captured” and (iii) spending on sums withdrawn from and cheques drawn on the plaintiff’s account.  Other than (ii), no underlying invoices, receipts and vouchers or primary documentation were provided. Plainly, verification of the veracity of the exhibits and their contents is called for. There ought also to be a verification that a full account had already been given and that all the necessary vouchers and supporting documentation had been attached, which is specifically required by the Order.

Problems in the defendant’s 4th affidavit

17.  Turning to the contents and substance of the defendant’s 4th affidavit and the exhibits, they have created more problems than addressing the problems in the accounts and explanations previously supplied by the defendant.  

18.  Firstly, the management accounts in exhibit “TEJ-8” cannot be reconciled with the analyses and schedules in exhibit “TEJ-10”.  Just to state a few examples:

(1)All the monthly management accounts (covering the period from February 2003 to May 2005) recorded a monthly accounting fee of $1,000. In the document called “Analysis of Clare’s expenses for period covering July 2003 to August 2005 (26 months)” (page 2 of exhibit TEJ-10), the total accounting fees was stated to be $28,000. This is more than a monthly fee of $1,000.
(2)In the same Analysis, it was recorded that a total of $123,200 had been withdrawn from the plaintiff’s account either by way of ATM cash withdrawal ($67,200 as per the attached schedule I) or by cheques ($56,000 as per the attached schedule II) to cover the defendant’s management fees (page 3 of exhibit TEJ-10).  The attached schedules I and II indicated that the management fees covered the period from July 2003 to May 2005.  The total amount of the defendant’s management fee for the period of July 2003 to May 2005 as stated in the monthly management accounts, however, was only $96,200. 
(3)Indeed, a comparison of the schedules I and II attached to this Analysis with the monthly management accounts for the months covered by the Analysis reveals very different figures for some of the months, such as August and December 2003. 

19.  Secondly, the items and figures in the management accounts in exhibit TEJ-8 differ from those given in the management accounts previously supplied by the defendant (which only covered November 2004 to March 2005). Again, just to give some examples:

(1)For the management account for November 2004, the total expenses in the previous and latest account are $39,655 and $34,755 respectively. The cash expenditure for miscellaneous items has reduced by $5,000. Not only that, $2,000 previously described as wine is now described as the defendant’s management fee. 
(2)For the management account for December 2004, there is also a $5,000 reduction of the total expenses from $39,046 to $34,646.  The descriptions of the items are also very different while the figures for the same items also differ. 

20.  The important point is not so much that there are revisions or differences between the previous and latest set of management accounts, which may perhaps be understandable if these were the result of a more serious and vigilant approach to the duty to account. What concern me are the seemingly large discrepancies in the figures and descriptions in the monthly accounts together with the lack of explanations.

21.  Thirdly, the underlying primary documents based upon which the management accounts and analyses were compiled have not been attached to these accounts and analyses.  Only in exhibit TEJ-9, were there invoices or receipts attached to the analysis of the account for the book “Captain if Captured”.  However, the relevance of, for instance, the medical bills, attached to the analysis of the account for the book publication has not been explained.

22.  Mr Stock in his submissions pointed out that the defendant has yet to supply the full sets of account-opening documents and statements of accounts of: (a) what has been referred in these proceedings as “the Juson account” (the account maintained in the defendant’s name with Standard Chartered Bank bearing no. 447-0-062240-6), and (b) the margin trading account maintained in the defendant’s name with China Merchants Securities (HK) Co Ltd bearing account no. MB01681.  On the defendant’s case, the plaintiff’s money had been transferred into these accounts. Prima facie, the funds in the two accounts are held on trust for the plaintiff and ought to be specifically accounted for.  The plaintiff should also be allowed access to the documents relating to the two accounts. I am in agreement with this submission.    

23.  In short, the defendant’s 4th affidavit, whether taken on its own or together with the account previously provided, fall short of what is required to make a proper and full account.

The defendant’s objections

24.  Turning to the objections raised by the defendant to the present application, most of them are not relevant.  Firstly, the argument that the defendant was driven by circumstance to become involved with the plaintiff’s funds has no bearing on the duty to properly comply with the Order to render a full account. Secondly, the defendant had issued summons under Order 80 rule 2 to challenge the plaintiff’s capacity to bring these proceedings and also sought the intervention of the Official Solicitors. The hearing is scheduled for November 2006.  The defendant’s queries as to whether there are and if so who are the people behind the litigation will be dealt with on that occasion.

25.  Thirdly, the propriety or otherwise of the conduct of the plaintiff’s solicitors in their communications with the Director of Legal Aid and in their dealings with the defendant is not a matter that would afford the defendant a defence to the present application to compel a compliance with an Order.  There is no proper legal basis for this court to order disclosure of the letters exchanged between the plaintiff’s solicitors and the Director of Legal Aid.  In any event, the defendant is appealing against the refusal of legal aid to the Registrar. 

26.  Fourthly, the amount of legal costs that the plaintiff has incurred and will incur for this litigation may well be substantial.  There is presently no finding that they are improperly incurred.  Even if the summons under Order 80 was determined in the defendant’s favour, it is by itself not a ground for ordering the plaintiff to pay into the court the costs already or will be incurred.

27.  Finally, on the argument that the defendant had on three occasions provided an account, it is clear from the Decision of 12 July 2006 and the above analysis that these attempts are inadequate and do not discharge the defendant from the duty to comply with the Order of 12 July 2006 to make a full and proper account with all necessary supporting documentation and to verify it on oath.  It is not for the plaintiff and her legal advisers to advise the defendant on what he should do to comply with the duty to account and the Order.  It is not to be forgotten that the defendant was until early September 2006 legally represented and his 4th affidavit was prepared before he became unrepresented.         

Should an Unless Order be made?

28.  The plaintiff’s summons asked that the defendant be given 21 days to comply with the 12 July 2006 Order and also for an Unless Order striking out the Defence and for judgment to be entered in the event of non-compliance.

29.  At the hearing, the defendant indicated he would require 20 to 30 days to prepare the full and consolidated account and to put together the supporting documentation.  Mr Stock did not take objection to the period of time requested for.

30.  As to the making of an Unless Order, Mr Stock submitted that it was called for because there had been repeated requests for an account since February 2005 and the defendant had failed to comply notwithstanding the plaintiff’s summons and the supporting affidavits setting out the grounds as well as the Decision and Order of 12 July 2006.  It was also pointed out that the plaintiff is about to turn 95 years old and there should not be any further delay in the matter.

31.  No doubt, the defendant has since early 2005 been requested to account for the withdrawals made from the plaintiff’s account and his dealings with the money withdrawn.  There is also no doubt that it is in the plaintiff’s interest to have an account and the defendant’s explanations about the withdrawals and expenditure expeditiously. I would say that expeditious resolution of the action is also important having regard to the defendant’s pleaded case that the expenditure and his dealings with the money were with the agreement of the plaintiff.  It is in both side’s interest to resolve the dispute during the lifetime of the plaintiff.

32.  That said, however, the court does not make an Unless Order lightly.  Generally speaking, Unless Order is an order of last resort and should not be made unless there is a history of failure to comply.  It is the last chance for the party in default to put his case in order: Hytech Information Systems Ltd v. Coventry City Council [1977] 1WLR 1666 cited with approval in Lessy SARL v. Pacific Star Development Ltd [1997] 3HKC 306 at 311-2.

33.  In the present case, I am not prepared to conclude at this stage that the defendant is deliberately ignoring the Order of 12 July 2006, such that he ought to be visited by an Unless Order.  The matter may be viewed differently if, notwithstanding the opportunity offered by the order to be made, the defendant continues not to fully and properly comply with the Order of 12 July 2006.

Costs

34.  Both the plaintiff and the defendant asked for costs of the application be awarded to them.  The plaintiff further asked for costs to be awarded on a higher scale, namely, either on an indemnity or a common fund basis.

35.   There is no reason for departing from the normal rule of costs follow event. The fact that Deputy Judge Gill had intimated in his Decision that this may be a case fit for mediation is not a ground for awarding costs to the defendant. The plaintiff should have the costs of the application. 

36.  As to the basis of the costs, I take cognizance of the plaintiff’s concerns that the defendant has failed to comply with the Order of 12 July 2006 at a time when he was legally represented.  I also accept that the defendant had the opportunity to receive advice on what a full and proper account should comprise and what he was required to do to  comply with the Order.  However, as noted above, I am not prepared at this stage to conclude that it was a deliberate decision to ignore the Order and its effect, though a different view may be taken if the non-compliance were to continue. I will not therefore exercise the discretion to award the costs on a higher scale on the plaintiff’s present summons.  

Conclusion

37.  For the above reasons, I make the following orders:

(1)The defendant shall within 30 days file and serve an account and a verifying affidavit in compliance with the Order dated 12 July 2006. The documentation in support of the said account shall include, but not limited to full sets of account opening documents and statements of accounts of: (a) the account maintained in the defendant’s name with the Standard Chartered Bank bearing account no. 447-0-062240-6, and (b) the margin trading account maintained in the defendant’s name with China Merchants Securities (HK) Co Ltd bearing account no. MB01681. 
(2)The defendant’s requests that the Director of Legal Aid and the plaintiff be compelled to disclose correspondence exchanged between them, and that the plaintiff be ordered to make payment into court in respect of the costs of these proceedings are refused. 
(3)The defendant pays the plaintiff the costs of this application in any event on a party-and-party basis, to be taxed if not agreed. 

 

 

  (C Chu)
Judge of Court of First InstanceHigh Court

Mr Alexander Stock instructed by Messrs Barlow Lyde & Gilbert for the plaintiff.

The defendant, unrepresented, appeared in person.

53251-EN-2006-07-12

CLARE HOLLINGWORTH v.THOMAS EDWARD JUSON

HTML content

HCA249/2006

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 249 OF 2006

-----------------------

BETWEEN

CLARE HOLLINGWORTHPlaintiff
and
THOMAS EDWARD JUSON
also known as TED THOMAS
Defendant

-----------------------

Before : Hon Chu J in Chambers

Date of Hearing : 3 July 2006

Date of Decision : 12 July 2006

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DECISION

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1.  This is the plaintiff’s application by summons for a summary order for account under Order 43 rule 1 of Rules of the High Court.  The defendant opposes the application, arguing that full account had been rendered before the action was commenced.

The facts

2.  On the pleadings and evidence filed in these proceedings, much of the basic facts are not disputed. They are set out below.

3.  The plaintiff is an elderly lady of 94 years old.  She is almost blind and is hard of hearing.  Since about January 2003, the defendant had assisted the plaintiff with her financial affairs.

4.  During the period in question, namely, between 2003 and 2005, she maintained an account with Standard Chartered bank (“SCB account”). 

5.  On 14 January 2003, the defendant was made a signatory to the SCB account and could independently sign cheques to withdraw money from the account.

6.  Since 8 August 2003, the defendant had held and had the use of an ATM card in respect of the SCB account.

7.  All the plaintiff’s mails from the bank, including the monthly statements, were directed to the defendant’s premises.

8.  On 18 August 2003, the plaintiff had a fall.  She was hospitalized for 10 days. 

9.  Between 18 and 28 August 2003, the defendant withdrew a total of $1,465,000 from the SCB account by means of six cheques.  Among them were two cheques dated 20 and 22 August 2003 in the respective amounts of $600,000 and $700,000.  They were paid to the defendant personally.  Another cheque dated 18 August 2003 for $50,000 was paid to his company.  The remaining three were cash cheques.

10.  Between 2003 and June 2005, the defendant had also signed a number of cheques to withdraw funds from the SCB account and also used the ATM cards to make cash withdrawals.  Many of the cheques were made either to the defendant personally or to his companies or associates.

11.  Up to 31 May 2005, the total withdrawals by cheques came up to $2,062,305.30.  Up to 11 June 2005, the total cash withdrawals by the ATM card was HK$170,600.  In total, HK$2,232,905.30 was removed from the SCB account. 

12.  In about March 2005, the executrix named in the plaintiff’s will, Ms Elizabeth Wright, began to be concerned with the level of the plaintiff’s bank balance in Hong Kong and the sudden closure of her Swiss bank account.  Eventually, Ms Wright and the plaintiff’s great nephew, Mr Patrick Garrett, contacted and corresponded with the defendant in relation to their concerns over the plaintiff’s financial position.

13.  Eventually on 15 June 2005, the plaintiff and Mr Garrett made a visit to Standard Chartered Bank.  The defendant’s signing right was revoked and the ATM card was cancelled.

14.  Subsequently, the plaintiff executed an Enduring Power of Attorney dated 22 July 2005, under which Mr Garrett was appointed as one of her attorneys.

15.  Since August 2005, the plaintiff has requested the defendant to return all monies he owes to the plaintiff.

16.  The following sums had been paid by the defendant to the plaintiff thus far:

Amounts (HK$)

Dates
100,0009 September 2003
200,00016 January 2004
50,0009 June 2004
 391,5932 September 2005
104,18412 September 2005
100,00015 September 2005
50,0003 November 2005
 50,0006 December 2005

 

The action

17.  It is the plaintiff’s case that the balance in the amount of HK$1,187,128.30 has not been returned.  It is also the plaintiff’s case that the defendant has not properly explained or accounted for the withdrawals and payments to himself or his companies or associates.

18.  On  2006, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant claiming inter alia for an account for the money removed from the SCB account and any profits or interest made by the defendant as a result thereof.

19.  The defendant disputes the claim, contending that he is not a trustee nor fiduciary in relation to the plaintiff and her funds and that he had acted honestly and in the plaintiff’s best interest.  With regard to the bank withdrawals, he says they were made with the plaintiff’s full consent and authorization.  As for the claim for an account, he defends on the basis that he had already rendered a full account by letters dated 3 January and 3 February 2006 from his solicitors to the plaintiff’s solicitors.

The application for account

20.  On 15 March 2006, the plaintiff took out the present application for a summary order for account.  The plaintiff seeks an account of the defendant’s dealings with the withdrawals he made from the SCB account, which are particularized in Schedules 1 and 2 of the Amended Statement of Claim, and the profits or interests he made from the receipt thereof, and further asks that the account be verified by affidavit.  In his written submissions, Mr Stock also asks for consequential directions.

21.  Previously, the defendant had issued summonses seeking further and better particulars of the claim, and challenging the plaintiff’s mental capacity to commence these proceedings.  The hearings of the defendant’s summonses had been adjourned as a result of the statutory stay occasioned by the defendant’s legal aid application.  Since then, the Director of Legal Aid had refused his application.  At the commencement of this hearing, I granted the plaintiff’s summons to lift the stay.

The issues

22.  The present application raises three issues.  They are:

(1)    Whether it is appropriate to invoke the summary procedure of Order 43 rule 1 of Rules of the High Court, and whether there are any preliminary disputes that need to be resolved before an account can be properly taken.

(2)    Whether the defendant is under a duty to account.

(3)    Whether the defendant had already rendered a full account such that the plaintiff’s application is otiose.

Order 43 rule 1 of Rules of the High Court

23.  Order 43 rule 1(1) and (3) of Rules of the High Court provide:

“(1)    Where a writ is indorsed with a claim for an account or a claim which necessarily involves taking an account, the plaintiff may, at any time after the defendant has acknowledged service of the writ or after the time limited for acknowledging service, apply for an order under this rule.”

“(3)    On the hearing of the application, the Court may, unless satisfied that there is some preliminary question to be tried, order that an account be taken and may also order that any amount certified on taking the account to be due to either party be paid to him within a time specified in the order.”

24.  Mr Bedford referred to the cases of Ho Lee Man v. Wong Wai Kai [1993] 1HKC 183 and Kids World Limited v. XL Machine Ltd & Others (unreported) HCA No. 125 of 2002, 18 September 2003, Reyes J.  They are illustrations of the operation of Order 43 rule 1(3), viz. if there are some preliminary facts to be tried, then it is inappropriate to make a summary order for account. 

25.  In Ho Lee Man v. Wong Wai Kai, the parties’ disputes over the scope of the partnership business and the duration of the partnership remained unresolved when the inquiry into the account was ordered.  Not surprisingly, the Court of Appeal was of the view that the order was inapt.  Similarly in Kids World Limited v. XL Machine Ltd & Others, Reyes J held that where the parties are engaged in substantial disputes of fact that are fundamental to the manner in which any proposed account is to be taken, the summary procedure under Order 43 rule 1 is not appropriate.

26.  In Mr Bedford’s submissions, Order 43 rule 1 is rarely used.  In my view, this is not material.  What is important is to have regard to the Rules and the cases. In general, if it is established that a party is under a duty to account, the court may order an account unless it is satisfied that there is some preliminary question to be tried.   The question that needs to be answered is whether there are any preliminary questions that required to be tried before an account can be properly taken.

27.  Mr Bedford says the real difficulty in this case is that the plaintiff has thus far not filed any affidavit. He suggests whether the defendant is a fiduciary or trustee rather than a friend and agent acting within the scope of his authority is a trial issue.  For reasons explained below, I am of the view that this is irrelevant to the defendant’s duty to account and in no way render the Order 43 rule 1 procedure inappropriate.

28.  As to the fact that the plaintiff has not made any affidavit in these proceedings, Mr Bedford’s point is that the only person who seems not to be satisfied with the explanations and account given by the defendant is Mr Garrett and it is not known whether the plaintiff herself is satisfied with the account given.  Again, this is immaterial.  For reasons indicated below, until the defendant’s Order 80 rule 2 application is determined in his favour, the court cannot proceed on the assumption that the plaintiff does not or cannot authorize this litigation or the present application.

29.  Mr Bedford further makes the point that the defendant is handicapped by lack of particulars of the plaintiff’s claim that the account he gave is inadequate.  This is one of his requests for further and better particulars, which have yet to be adjudicated upon.   In my view, the plaintiff’s reasons for the dissatisfaction with the account and explanation given by the defendant had been fully set out in the affidavits filed in support of this application, notably that of Mr Garrett.  I do not accept that the defendant would have any real or substantial difficulties in meeting the plaintiff’s case in this regard.     

30.  I am not persuaded that there are any preliminary questions that required to be tried such that it is inappropriate to make a summary order under Order 43 rule 1.

The defendant’s duty to account

31.  It is clear from the pleadings and the evidence before the court that the defendant accepts that he had since January 2003 assisted the plaintiff to manage her financial affairs.  He also does not dispute that he had made the withdrawals from the SCB account as pleaded in the Amended Statement of Claim.  A considerable amount of the payments went to his personal bank account and his companies.  On his own case, he had made investments on the plaintiff’s behalf and appointed accountant to manage the plaintiff’s finances.  In his statement dated 6 January 2006, the defendant stated he had complete control of the plaintiff’s money and had taken over the handling of the plaintiff’s affairs and funds.

32.  On these unchallenged facts, Mr Stock submits that the defendant is a trustee or fiduciary in relation to the plaintiff’s funds in the SCB account.  The defendant does not accept this.  In his solicitors’ letter dated 3 February 2006, it was said that the defendant was merely an agent for the plaintiff and he had acted within his authority.  Mr Bedford makes the same point in his submissions.  He further argues that the defendant was acting in the capacity of a friend and was helping the plaintiff with her finances.

33.  I do not agree that the defendant never stood in the position of a trustee or fiduciary when he had, among other matters, signed cheques and used ATM card to make withdrawals from the SCB account and to transfer large sums into his personal account.  To say the least, he must be a constructive trustee of the plaintiff’s funds in the SCB account that he caused to be paid out and /or were received by him.  Even if he was not a trustee and was only an agent of the plaintiff, as he argues, he is still under a duty to account.  An agent owes a fiduciary duty to his principal and is under an obligation to account for funds of the principal that he was entrusted with: Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency (Seventeenth edition, 2001) paras.6-032 to 6-093.

34.  Indeed, I do not understand Mr Bedford as arguing that the defendant needs not account to the plaintiff for her funds.  What he argues is that because he was acting as a friend when he dealt with the plaintiff’s funds, his duty should not be as onerous as somebody who is a trustee or fiduciary.  I cannot agree.  If the defendant is, as I find him to be, under a duty to account, then he is obliged to give a proper, complete and accurate account of all his dealings and acts in respect of the funds in question, no matter how the duty arises. 

35.  Mr Bedford also argues that the defendant had acted within his authority and that so long as the plaintiff was happy and satisfied with what he did, that would be sufficient.  In my view, the defendant’s legal duty to account is unaffected by whether he was acting within his duty.  Although the defendant had made an application under Order 80 rule 2 of Rules of the High Court, challenging the plaintiff’s mental capacity to maintain this action, until it is determined in the defendant’s favour, the court cannot assume that the action was commenced without the necessary authority.  Still less can the court assume that the plaintiff does not wish to have an account from the defendant as to what has happened to her funds.   

36.  Mr Bedford also makes the submission that when the defendant took up the role of assisting the plaintiff with her finances, neither Ms Wright nor Mr Garrett had made it clear to him that he was acting in some trustee or fiduciary capacity.  This is, in my view, irrelevant to the defendant’s liability to account.  What is of significance is that the defendant had by his own act and conduct, including transferring the plaintiff’s funds to his personal account and making payments to his companies and associates, placed himself in a fiduciary position and come under a duty to account.  It matters not whether he had or had not been told of his duties by Ms Wright or Mr Garrett.

Had the defendant already rendered a proper and full account?

37.  It is the defendant’s case that a full account had been given by his solicitors’ letters dated 3 January and 3 February 2006.  The plaintiff however contends the account and explanations he had given were inadequate and incomplete.  The plaintiff also doubts the accuracy and truthfulness of some aspects of them.

38.  It is important to point out that for the purpose of considering this application, it is not necessary for the court to conclude on the propriety or otherwise of the defendant’s dealings with the plaintiff’s finances, including the withdrawals and applications of the money from the SCB account.  In fact, it would not be appropriate to pass any such conclusion at this stage of the proceedings.  What I need to determine is whether the defendant had by the two letters and the enclosures already given an adequate and full account, such that there is no room for the plaintiff to press further. 

39.  In this regard, I have no doubt that the plaintiff has by affidavits and counsel’s submissions demonstrated that the defendant’s previous account is inadequate, whether assessed on its own or against other materials, and that a full and consolidated account is called for.  

40.  I set out below the more prominent aspects of the inadequacies in the defendant’s previous account and explanations.

(1)    Withdrawals in August 2003

41.  As noted above, some $ 1.4 million was withdrawn from the SCB account in August 2003 when the plaintiff was hospitalized. The money was put into a bank account in the defendant’s name.  The defendant does not dispute this.  What he stated was he considered if the plaintiff had another fall or became seriously ill and helpless, then a great deal of her money would become inaccessible to meet charges such as tax, medical fees, rents and domestic helper’s wages.   He said he discussed this with the plaintiff and transferred a large sum from the SCB account into a newly opened bank account that would be handled by him personally.  

42.  However, it is not disputed that the defendant already had signing rights to the SCB account and had the use of an ATM card in respect of it.  The money in the SCB account was readily accessible to him.  There was no apparent need for the withdrawals and transfers to his personal account. 

43.  Both Ms Wright and Mr Garrett deposed in their affidavits that they were not informed of the withdrawals at the time.  Ms Wright had been in regular contact with the defendant in relation to the plaintiff’s finances.  Further, Mr Garrett was in Hong Kong when the plaintiff was hospitalized. 

44.  At one stage, Mr Barry Lau, an employee of one of the defendant’s companies and the accountant hired by the defendant to oversee the plaintiff’s finances, explained to Mr Garrett that some of money transferred into the defendant’s personal account was used for purchase of stock and investment into the defendant’s company.  As of the date of the hearing, the total amount returned by the defendant is clearly less than the $1.4 million that was removed from the SCB account in August 2003.   

45.  In these circumstances, it is plain that there is much room for a full and sworn account by the defendant on the money removed.

(2)    Investment into Corporate Communications Ltd (CCL)

46.  It is the defendant’s case that $300,000 of the plaintiff’s money was invested in CCL or its projects.  CCL is one of the defendant’s companies.  The defendant had produced a letter dated 16 July 2004 signed by the plaintiff as the plaintiff’s agreement to the investment.  In his Defence, the defendant pleaded that $200,000 had been returned.  Mr Bedford says that the balance of $100,000 and the interests accrued are held by the defendant’s solicitors, ready to be returned to the plaintiff.

47.  In a document entitled “Analysis of Investment to CCL: 30/6/05” given by Mr Lau to Mr Garrett, the investment dates were recorded as 31 August, 1 November and 31 December 2004.  No receipts for them have been produced.

48.  As noted in the preceding section of this Decision, Mr Lau had at one stage indicated that this $300,000 investment came from the money withdrawn from the SCB account in August 2003 and held in the defendant’s account.  However, in an email dated 13 July 2005, the defendant explained that the $300,000 did not come from his account into which money from the SCB account was transferred in August 2003, but came from his other personal account.  On this basis, $300,000 was deducted from the calculation of the money due from him to the plaintiff. 

49.  The position is to say the least confusing. That aside, the defendant has given no details of the nature or contents of the investment and what returns had been achieved. 

50.  Further, while Mr Bedford in answer to my question says that the three sums of $100,000, $50,000 and $50,000 returned to the plaintiff on 15 September, 3 November and 6 December 2005 represent the return of $200,000 of the investment, there is no mention of this at all in the previous account given by the defendant, let alone any documentation in support of this. 

51.  As submitted by Mr Stock, there is a potential conflict of interests in relation to this $300,000 investment.  This together with the problems in the defendant’s explanations as identified above warrant a sworn account from the defendant.

          (3)    The book “Captain if Captured”

52.  It is the defendant’s case that some $145,000 of the plaintiff’s money was lost on the production of a book called “Captain if Captured”, which is a new autobiography of the plaintiff.  It is, as Mr Garrett put it in his affidavit, a vanity-publishing project. 

53.  The defendant said $50,000 was paid as a sweetener to a Mr Simon Taylor to entice the interest of the owner of the UK’s Daily Telegrapher newspaper in the book.  In his statement provided to the plaintiff’s solicitors in January 2006, the defendant said that the idea of the publication was first raised in 2001 or 2002.  He went on to say that the plaintiff introduced Mr Taylor to him, Mr Taylor asked for the sweetener and they “shook hands on the deal”.  Yet the payment out of the SCB account was said to be by a cash cheque dated 19 August 2003, a date well after 2001 or 2002 and when the plaintiff was admitted into hospital.

54.  Similarly, a cash cheque of $20,000 dated 21 August 2003 was said to be a deposit for the printer.  However, the quotation from the printer was dated 7 November 2003.  There is no explanation from the defendant on these obvious time differences.

55.  Additionally, there is thus far no breakdown or account of the costs of the production of the book and the sales and royalties received in respect of it as well as the number of books in stock.  Neither has the defendant provided the documentation relating to the publication, distribution and sale of the book.  A full sworn account is thus called for.

          (4)    Fees paid to Mr Barry Lau

56.  According to the defendant, Mr Lau was engaged to maintain proper accounts for the plaintiff.  Mr Lau at the same time works for one of the defendant’s companies, Abbey International Accountancy Limited.  He was paid a total of $16,000, based on a monthly fee of $1,000.  Thus far, only five monthly statements of account were produced to show the work he had done.  Suffice to say, they are short and simple accounts with no supporting documentation or annexure.  The defendant has not produced any record kept by him as to the inflow and outflow of the plaintiff’s funds at any particular time.  It also appears that receipts on purchases said to be for the plaintiff from supermarkets, wine stores or pharmacies were not kept.  The justification and purpose of the payment to Mr Lau is in doubt.

57.  Additionally, it appears from a comparison of the five monthly statements said to be prepared by Mr Lau and the statements enclosed in the defendant’s solicitors’ letter dated 3 January 2006 reveal large differences in the amounts for domestic helpers’ salaries and the item “cash + wine”.  This had been set out in details in Mr Garrett’s second affidavit at paragraph 91.  These differences show that either Mr Lau’s monthly accounts are wrong or the defendant’s account is incorrect.  In either case, an explanation is called for.   

          (5)    Domestic helpers’ fees

58.  On the defendant’s case, on average $18,000 was paid each month for the services of foreign domestic helpers.  It is common ground that a full time domestic helper was engaged for the plaintiff at the salary of $8,000.  On top of this, the defendant said that part-time services of other foreign domestic helpers were engaged and arranged through his owner domestic helper at the hourly rate of $25.  It is said that the extra services were required because the full-time helper did not work on Sundays, statutory holidays and, according to Mr Bedford, was not expected to work during nighttime.

59.  Quite apart from the legality of engaging the part-time services of foreign domestic helpers, including the defendant’s own helper, there is simply no breakdown or quantification of how the amount spent on a monthly basis was arrived at.  There is also the question of the necessity and reasonableness of the said arrangement. 

          (6)    Other considerations

60.  Mr Garrett had mentioned in his affidavit several other matters that he relied upon to show the inadequacies and the incredible nature of the defendant’s previous account.  They include the fees paid to the defendant, at $400 per hour and totalling no less than $96,000, for what were said to be long interviews with and telephone calls from the plaintiff to discuss current affairs and politics.  There is also the $100,000 investment portfolio which turned out to be a margin trading account in the defendant’s own name and the sponsorship fees paid to another of the defendant’s company.   Mr Stock also places emphasis on the defendant’s erroneous statement to Ms Wright in March 2005 that the plaintiff only had a bank balance of $767,000 when it is evident from the monthly bank statement sent to his address that there was much more in the plaintiff’s bank accounts. 

61.  As said above, it is not necessary for me to conclude on the reasonableness or propriety of these aspects of the defendant’s case or of the credibility of the defendant’s explanations.  It is sufficient to say that the plaintiff’s criticisms of these aspects of the defendant’s case and his previous account cannot be said to be groundless.

62.  In any event, given that the explanations and account previously given came in bits and pieces and are at times self-contradictory, it is justifiable for the plaintiff to seek a consolidated and sworn account of the withdrawals made from the SCB account and the use to which they had been put.   Further, the account will have the clear benefit of identifying the precise issues of dispute between the parties.

Conclusion

63.  For the above reasons, I grant the plaintiff’s application. 

64.  The orders I make are as follows:

(1)    The defendant do within 21 days, or such longer period as the plaintiff may by writing agree,

(a)     file and serve on the plaintiff an account in respect of the sums set out in Schedules 1 and 2 of the Amended Statement of Claim and the defendant’s dealings with them and the profits or interests made as a result of the receipt of the said sums by the defendant with all necessary vouchers and supporting documentation, and

(b)    verify the account by affidavit. 

(2)    The plaintiff may file and serve within 21 days thereafter, or such longer period as may be agreed between the parties, affidavit(s) in answer to the defendant’s account.

(3)    There is liberty to apply to a Judge for further directions on the further conduct of the account or the action on a date not earlier than 60 days from the date of this order.

65. Applying the normal rule of costs follow event, I make an order nisi that the defendant pays the plaintiff the costs of this application, to be taxed if  not agreed.  

(C Chu)
Judge of Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Alexander Stock instructed by Messrs Barlow Lyde & Gilbert for the plaintiff.

Mr Nigel Bedford instructed by Messrs Robertsons for the defendant.

54030-EN-2006-07-03

CLARE HOLLINGWORTH v. THOMAS EDWARD JUSON

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HCA 249/2006

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 249 OF 2006

____________________

BETWEEN

CLARE HOLLINGWORTH Plaintiff
and
THOMAS EDWARD JUSON
also known as TED THOMAS
 Defendant

____________________

 

Before:  Hon Chu J in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 3 July 2006

Date of Decision: 3 July 2006

_______________

DECISION

_______________

1.  On 30 May 2006, the Director of Legal Aid gave notice of the defendant’s application for legal aid by filing a memorandum.   Consequently, there is a statutory stay of the present proceedings for 42 days under section 15 of the Legal Aid Ordinance.  On 30 June 2006, the Director of Legal Aid filed a memorandum of refusal of Legal Aid.  By summons filed on 30 June 2006, the plaintiff applied to lift the stay. 

2.  As stated by Litton JA (as he then was) in the case of Lee Shiu Ming v. Yeo Hiap Seng (Hong Kong) Limited (unreported) CACV 39/1993, “The primary function of the court is to do justice between the parties.  In considering whether to lift the stay, the court should consider what is just and fair to the parties having regard to all the circumstances of the case.”

3.  On the facts of the present case, the following matters are relevant in determining the plaintiff’s application. 

4.  The first is the purpose of the statutory or legal aid stay.  It is to enable the Director of Legal Aid to properly assess and process the legal aid application.  It is correct for Mr Stock to say that section 15 of the Legal Aid Ordinance relates only to legal aid application.  It is trite that an appeal against a refusal of legal aid does not, by itself, give rise automatically to a stay of the proceedings.  A legal aid stay is also unlike a general permanent or interim stay.  It is for a specific purpose.  Whether the underlying purpose has been achieved is, in my view, a most relevant factor in deciding whether to lift the stay. 

5.  In the present case, the defendant’s legal aid application has been refused.  Even if he has already lodged an appeal against the refusal, that does not automatically mean that the stay should not be lifted. 

6.  Normally, where the lifting of a stay will mean that the applicant is deprived of a proper opportunity to get legal representation, the court will be sympathetic and will be inclined to allow the stay to continue.  However, where it is clear that the applicant will not be seeking private representation, there is little point in continuing the stay.  Similarly, as in here, where the litigant has been and continues to be legally represented notwithstanding the refusal of legal aid, the stay cannot be said to be necessary or justified for the purpose of enabling the litigant to obtain legal advice or representation. 

7.  Another important consideration on the circumstances of this case is what prejudice would the lifting of the stay occasioned to the defendant.  The major point in Mr Bedford’s submissions is that the defendant will be prejudiced because his two summonses had been re-fixed as a result of the statutory stay and if the stay is now lifted, the two summonses will be heard after the plaintiff’s Order 43 application when it would be otherwise under the original timetable. 

8.  It is correct to say that the defendant’s two summonses were issued before the plaintiff’s Order 43 application and were originally scheduled to be heard in June of this year. 

9.  The Registrar had by his order of 27 March 2006, directed that the plaintiff’s summons should not be listed nor heard until after the defendant’s summonses are determined.  The plaintiff appealed against that order.  On 3 May this year, Deputy Judge Gill allowed the appeal and substituted the Registrar’s order with an order that the plaintiff’s summons be listed for hearing forthwith.  On the face of it, the Deputy Judge did not accept the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff’s summons should not be heard until after his two summonses had been disposed of.  Gill DJ, in his oral reasons, commented that it is in the plaintiff’s best interests to proceed with her account application quickly and as soon as possible. 

10. It goes without saying that it is not for this court to reopen issues that have already been canvassed and determined by the Deputy Judge. 

11. Mr Bedford argues that Deputy Judge Gill’s order does not have the effect of directing that the plaintiff’s summons be heard forthwith.  It only directs that the hearing of the summons can be listed forthwith.  With respect, I am unable to agree with this contention.  Plainly, the Deputy Judge had allowed the appeal in its entirety.  He had substituted the entire order of the Registrar with his own order.   The important issue is not whether the appeal to the Deputy Judge is a rehearing or not.  What is important is there is no longer any direction that the defendant’s summonses should be heard first and before the plaintiff’s summons.  That would be sufficient to counter the defendant’s complaint that if the stay is lifted, his summonses could not be heard before the plaintiff’s application for an account. 

12. The defendant has no legitimate basis for complaint when the situation was brought about by his late application for legal aid.  He made his legal aid application just two weeks before the hearing of his own Order 80 summons.  He ought to have known, and should have been advised, that the consequential 42 days statutory stay would cause his first summons, if not both summonses, to be derailed.   The plaintiff’s summons being more than a month away, however, would have stood in different light.  It may or may not be adjourned. 

13. In short, the defendant has no legitimate basis for insisting that his two summonses should be heard ahead of the plaintiff’s summons.  It follows that he cannot complain of unfairness or prejudice if the effect of lifting the stay is to have the plaintiff’s application heard before his own two summonses. 

14. It is also submitted by Mr Bedford that the defendant may appeal against the refusal of legal aid and he has yet to receive the reasons for his legal aid refusal.  As I have noted, the legal aid appeal does not automatically give rise to a stay.  Further, given it is just a matter of nine days or so to the end of the stay, there is, realistically, no likelihood of the legal aid appeal being heard and determined before the end of the stay.  The defendant’s position today is therefore no different from what it will be at the end of the stay period.  There is thus no real prejudice to the defendant to lift the stay today instead of waiting for another nine days or so. 

16.  Mr Bedford also criticizes the lateness in the plaintiff’s application to lift the stay.  I accept the argument that it is prudent for the plaintiff to wait for the outcome of the legal aid application.  No doubt, the plaintiff’s application to lift the stay will be on very weak ground if it were made before the decision is known.  The position will be similar to what it was in the case of Lee Shiu Wing and the court is rather unlikely to have lifted the stay when there is a first legal aid application pending. 

17.  However, I would also point out that it is evident from the court’s letter in reply to the defendant’s solicitor’s letter seeking an indication on vacating today’s hearing on account of the legal aid application that the court has not ordered that the hearing be vacated.  Specifically, the letter says that the matter will be reviewed in the week before the hearing.  It is therefore not up to the defendant to expect with any certainty or confidence that the hearing today would be vacated, especially in the light of the Director of Legal Aid’s decision given on Wednesday. 

18.  As to the merits or importance of the defendant’s two summonses, I do not wish to pre-empt the outcome.  I need only say this.  The Deputy Judge had concluded that the two summonses do not amount to good ground for withholding the plaintiff’s application.  There is no appeal against the order and I have said that it is not for this court to rehearse the arguments again and to come to a different conclusion. 

19.  In any event, I respectfully agree with the Deputy Judge’s analysis.  I see no need to withhold the hearing of the plaintiff’s summonses so that it should be heard after the defendant’s two summonses.  I am not persuaded that it is improper to proceed with the plaintiff’s application first or that Mr Bedford has shown that it is unfair or impossible for the defendant to face the plaintiff’s application without his two summonses being heard and dealt with.  I would have thought that, in any event, whether the plaintiff brings these proceedings in her own name or through a next friend or guardian ad litem, if the defendant is under duty to account, then he has to render an account. 

20. In conclusion, I grant the plaintiff’s summons. 

 (C Chu)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Alexander Stock, instructed by Messrs Barlow Lyde & Gilbert, for the Plaintiff

Mr Nigel Bedford, instructed by Messrs Robertsons, for the Defendant