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Civil Action2006

NGAN IN LENG AND OTHERS v. CHU YUET WAH

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[2022] HKCFI 558-EN-2022-03-03

NGAN IN LENG AND OTHERS v. CHU YUET WAH

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HCA 388/2006

[2022] HKCFI 558

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 388 OF 2006

____________________

BETWEEN  
 NGAN IN LENG1st Plaintiff
 CHAN WAI IAN2nd Plaintiff
 NGAN IEK3rd Plaintiff
 NGAN IEK CHAN4th Plaintiff
 NGAN IEK PENG5th Plaintiff
 AND 
 CHU YUET WAHDefendant

____________________

Before: Hon Anthony Chan J in Court
Date of Hearing: 10-14, 17-18 and 21 January 2022
Date of Judgment: 3 March 2022

________________

JUDGMENT

________________

1.  This is an action by the Plaintiffs against the Defendant (“Mrs Chu”) for her alleged breach of an oral share purchase agreement made in January 2005 (“SPA”). The principle issue here is a factual one, namely, whether the SPA was made in the course of certain discussions which took place during the late evening of 5 January 2005 and the early hours of 6 January 2005.

Background

2.  The following background facts are not in dispute save indicated otherwise[1]. The Plaintiffs’ claim arose out of the sale of Hotel Casa Real in Macau (“Hotel”), along with its facilities which included a casino then operated by Sociedade de Jogos de Macau, S.A. (“SJM”).

3.  At the material time, the Hotel was beneficially owned by the Plaintiffs, via corporate vehicles. Following discussions in late 2004 and early 2005, the Plaintiffs sold their interests in the Hotel to Next Champion Ltd (“Next”), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Golden Resorts Group Ltd (“Golden Resorts”)[2], a company listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The consideration was HKD1.25 billion which was to be paid partly in cash (HKD750 million) and partly by the issue of 1.1 billion new shares in Golden Resorts (“Consideration Shares”). Those shares were valued, for purpose of the transaction, at HKD500 million (HKD 0.4545 per share).

4.  The Plaintiffs are members of the Ngan family. The 1st Plaintiff (“Mr Ngan”) is the patriarch of the family. The 2nd Plaintiff is his wife. The 3rd Plaintiff (“Franky”) is their son. The 4th (“Jane”) and 5th Plaintiffs are their daughters.

5.  Prior to the sale, the Plaintiffs held their interests in the Hotel via the following structure. They each held one issued and fully paid-up share of Hang Huo Holdings Ltd (“Holdings”), a BVI company. Those five shares represented Holdings’ entire issued share capital. In turn, Holdings held 99% of the issued share capital of a Macanese company, Hang Huo Hotel Co Ltd (“Hotel Co”), with the remaining 1% held by Jane. The Hotel was owned and operated by Hotel Co.

6.  Holdings and Jane also each held one of the only two issued shares in a Hong Kong company, Hang Huo Hotel Co Ltd (“HK Co”), which provided reception and promotional services for the Hotel.

7.  The three companies, Holdings, Hotel Co and HK Co were thus the vehicles through which the Plaintiffs’ interests in the Hotel and its associated businesses were held (“Family Shares”).

8.  Mrs Chu is an experienced, wealthy and well-connected businesswoman. She moved to the US in about 1977 and returned to Hong Kong in 1992. During the stay in the US, she obtained a bachelor degree in science of management. She is the daughter of Mr Lee Wai Man (“Lee”), a well-known casino operator of VIP casino rooms in Macau known as “Golden Hall”. Mrs Chu was and is familiar with casino operations.

9.  The Plaintiffs say that Mrs Chu is the controlling beneficial shareholder of both Kingston Securities Ltd (“Kingston Securities”) and Kingston Capital Ltd (“Kingston Capital”), companies which carry on securities brokerage and related businesses in Hong Kong. Mrs Chu’s evidence was that she set up these companies in respectively 1993 and 1998 or 1999. In respect of Kingston Securities, she held 51% of its shares (until it became part of Golden Resorts in about April 2011) with the other 49% held by her mother. She conducted her securities brokerage business through this company. She held 499,999 out of 500,000 shares in Kingston Capital.

Plaintiffs’ case

10.  The Plaintiffs say that at all material times during 2005 and 2006, Mrs Chu, together with Lee, were the beneficial controlling shareholders of Golden Resorts and held herself out to the Plaintiffs as such.

11.  In about the beginning of January 2005, Mrs Chu expressed an interest in purchasing the Hotel and its associated business, which were available for sale. From around 4 to 6 January 2005, Mrs Chu engaged in negotiations with the Plaintiffs (conducted via Franky and Mr Ngan) with a view to purchase their interests in the Hotel and its associated businesses by Golden Resorts (through Next).

12.  In the course of those negotiations, Mrs Chu informed the Plaintiffs that: (a) she was an experienced, wealthy and well-connected businesswoman; (b) she was the controlling shareholder of Kingston Securities and Kingston Capital, which she described as amongst the top Chinese companies in the securities industry in Hong Kong; (c) she was the controlling shareholder and “the boss” of the Golden Resorts group; (d) she was the daughter of Lee; (e) she was familiar with casino operations; and (f) parts of Lee’s casino VIP rooms business would be injected into her Golden Resorts group in due course.

13.  The Plaintiffs and Mrs Chu agreed in principle that they would sell the Family Shares for HKD1.25 billion. Originally, the Plaintiffs required the entire consideration to be paid in cash, but Mrs Chu proposed that the consideration be paid by a combination of cash of HKD750 million plus Golden Resorts shares valued at HKD500 million.

14.  Late in the evening of 5 January 2005, the parties met at the presidential suite of the Hotel to continue their negotiations (“Meeting”). Mr Ngan expressed concern that the market price of shares in Golden Resorts might fall below HKD 0.4545 per share (the nominal value of each of the Consideration Shares). In order to induce the Plaintiffs to accept the Consideration Shares as part of the consideration for the sale of the Hotel, Mrs Chu represented to the Plaintiffs, inter alia, that :

(1)  The Golden Resorts group was in the process of making hotel and casino businesses in Macau its core business focus. For which purpose, it was acquiring the Grandview Hotel in Macau (“Grandview Acquisition”), the Hotel (“Casa Real Acquisition”) as well as Lee’s VIP casino rooms business (“Lee Acquisition”);

(2)  Since Mrs Chu was the controlling shareholder of Golden Resorts, shareholder approval of the Casa Real Acquisition was assured. After its announcement, Golden Resort’s share price would rise and after the Lee Acquisition the share price would rise further;

(3)  The market price of shares in Golden Resorts would not fall below HKD 0.4545 per share;

(4)  If Next was unable to complete the Casa Real Acquisition, Mrs Chu would take over the transaction (personally or through a nominee).

15.  Despite Mrs Chu’s assurances, the Plaintiffs remained concerned about the risk of downturn in the value of the Consideration Shares. In order to induce the Plaintiffs to accept the Consideration Shares as part of the consideration for the Casa Real Acquisition, Mrs Chu made them an offer, namely, that if at any time after the completion of the Acquisition, the price of Golden Resorts shares fell below HKD 0.4545 (“Trigger Price”), she would purchase (personally or through nominees) the Consideration Shares from the Plaintiffs at the Trigger Price (“Share Purchase Offer”).

16.  The Plaintiffs requested Mrs Chu to record the Share Purchase Offer in writing but she refused, stating that to do so might cause difficulties for Golden Resorts by reason of the SEHK Listing Rules.

17.  Induced by and in reliance on the Share Purchase Offer, the Plaintiffs entered into the SPA with Mrs Chu and accepted the Consideration Shares as part consideration for the Casa Real Acquisition. In the early morning of 6 January 2005, the Plaintiffs entered into a written preliminary sale and purchase agreement (“PSPA”) with Next to sell the Family Shares for HKD750 million in cash and HKD500 million in the Consideration Shares.

18.  Between 6 January 2005 and 19 February 2005, the Plaintiffs and Next engaged in negotiations and preparation for the formal sale and purchase agreement (“FSPA”) for the Casa Real Acquisition. The Plaintiffs repeatedly expressed to Mrs Chu their concerns about the falling market price of Golden Resorts’ shares, but they were repeatedly assured by her that the price would recover and were encouraged to retain the Consideration Shares.

19.  On 19 February 2005, the Plaintiffs and Next entered into the FSPA. The FSPA provided, inter alia, that Next would acquire the Family Shares for HKD1.25 billion (comprising HKD750 million in cash and HKD500 million in Consideration Shares) and that, on completion, the Plaintiffs should provide to Next a letter from SJM stating that it agreed to the change of proprietor and representative of the Hotel (clause 5.02(a)(iii)).

20.  On or around 21 March 2005, the Plaintiffs (through Mr Ngan) and Mrs Chu (through Mr Lee) orally agreed (“SJM Side Agreement”) that they would arrange for 120 million shares in Golden Resorts to be transferred to SJM to secure its approval to change the proprietor and representative of the Hotel and that the transfer shares would be provided by the Plaintiffs and Mrs Chu (or Mr Lee) in equal proportion (60 million shares from each side).

21.  On 31 May 2005, (a) the Plaintiffs and Next entered into a deed of undertaking (“Deed”) and agreed to proceed to completion of the FSPA (“Completion”) notwithstanding that certain conditions under the agreement had not been met; and (b) Completion took place, whereupon the Plaintiffs became shareholders of Golden Resorts.

22.  On 7 June 2005, there was a 10 for 1 consolidation (“Consolidation”) of the issued shares of Golden Resorts. Consequently, the 1.1 billion Consideration Shares were converted into 110 million shares in Golden Resorts and the Trigger Price was adjusted to HKD4.545 per share.

23.  On or around 12 September 2005, Franky transferred 6 million shares[3] in Golden Resorts to an account nominated by Mrs Chu for the benefit of SJM pursuant to the SJM Side Agreement.

24.  At all material times since the Completion and during 2006, the price of one Golden Resorts share was below the Trigger Price. The Plaintiffs expressed their concern about the share price to Mrs Chu, who reassured them that the price would recover following a Golden Resorts “road show” in July 2005 and the Lee Acquisition. On 30 December 2005, the closing price of one Golden Resorts share was HKD1.93.

25.  By a letter dated 25 January 2006, the Plaintiffs’ solicitors (“RB”) demanded that Mrs Chu honour the SPA and purchase the Plaintiffs’ remaining 104 million Golden Resorts shares (110m – 6m) at HKD4.545 per share. Mrs Chu has refused to do so. The undisputed evidence is that Golden Resorts’ share price had fallen below the Trigger Price since the 24 January 2005 and had not recovered by 25 January 2006.

26.  On 25 July 2006, Kingston Securities, acting on behalf of companies owned by Mrs Chu and Mr Lee, made a mandatory conditional general offer to all other shareholders of Golden Resorts to purchase their shares at HKD1.94 each. In order to mitigate their loss, the Plaintiffs accepted the offer and sold their shares in early September 2006.

27.  Consequently, the Plaintiffs claim loss and damage of HKD270.92 million, being 104 million shares multiplied by HKD2.605 per share (HKD4.545 – HKD1.94 = HKD2.605).

Mrs Chu’s case

28.  Mrs Chu denies that in 2005 and 2006 she was the beneficial controlling shareholder of Golden Resorts. Instead, from April 2004 until July 2006, Jenkin Cheung Yu Shum (“Jenkin”), through Perfect View Development Ltd (“Perfect View”), was the controlling shareholder of Golden Resorts, holding 67.36% of its issued share capital.

29.  Mrs Chu says that, in late December 2004, she became aware that the Hotel was being marketed for sale and she informed Jenkin of the same. Jenkin subsequently authorised her to proceed with negotiations regarding the purchase of the Hotel. It was Jenkin who decided that the price range of the Hotel should be HKD1 billion to HKD1.3 billion and the number of consideration shares to be issued would not exceed 10% of Golden Resorts’ issued shares.

30.  At meetings held on 4 January 2005 attended by Franky, Wong Hin Shek (“Hans”) and Mrs Chu[4], Franky understood that Mrs Chu was acting as the representative of Golden Resorts. Mrs Chu indicated that the purchase price could be HKD1.25 billion, which Franky indicated was acceptable. Franky suggested that the consideration be paid by cash and shares in equal parts. Mrs Chu declined and stated that the maximum amount of consideration shares would be HKD500 million only.

31.  In the evening on 5 January 2005, Mrs Chu (as the Golden Resorts group’s representative) travelled to Macau with Jenkin, her husband (“Mr Chu”) and Hans for a final round of negotiations with the Plaintiffs. Shortly after midnight, the Plaintiffs and Next signed the PSPA. Mrs Chu did not say that she was the controlling shareholder or the “boss” of the Golden Resorts group, or that Lee’s VIP casino rooms business would be injected into the group.

32.  Mrs Chu denies making the Share Purchase Offer or entering into the SPA. Further, a number other contentions have been advanced by her :

(1)  In entering into the FSPA, the Plaintiffs expressly acknowledged and confirmed that they did not rely on the alleged or any Share Purchase Offer or the SPA;

(2)  The SPA was not binding or enforceable because:

(a)  Mrs Ngan, Jane and Fiona were not privy to the SPA, and Mr Ngan and Franky had no authority to enter into the same on their behalf;

(b)  of lack of certainty; and

(c)  lack of consideration in that there was no mutuality of promises.

(3)  The Plaintiffs had unequivocally represented to Mrs Chu that they would not exercise their rights under the SPA and therefore had waived such rights by:

(a)  electing to enter into the FSPA without reference to or reliance on the SPA;

(b)  electing to complete the FSPA without any reference to or reliance on the SPA; and

(c)  deciding not to exercise such rights until 25 January 2006.

33.  On the SJM Side Agreement, Mrs Chu admitted that on or around 21 March 2005, a meeting took place in Hong Kong between Mr Ngan, Mr Lee and representatives of SJM, but denies the SJM Side Agreement. Mrs Chu contends that Mr Lee personally agreed with SJM to transfer 60 million shares in Golden Resorts to it, but it was an agreement between Mr Lee and SJM which did not concern the Plaintiffs or her.

34.  On the Plaintiffs’ case of loss, Mrs Chu’s case is that, if the Plaintiffs suffered loss, it was caused by their decision in not holding onto the Consideration Shares and/or their failure to mitigate by failing to sell the Consideration Shares at a price higher than HKD1.94 per share.

Issues

35.  There is an Agreed List of Issues filed pursuant to the directions of this court. I agree with Mr Barlow SC, who appeared with Mr Chen for the Plaintiffs, that the principal issue for determination in this trial is the factual question whether an oral SPA was made between the Plaintiffs and Mrs Chu. That issue had been elaborated into three questions by Mr Barlow (although he submitted that they were part of a single issue) as follows :

(1)  In January 2005, did Mrs Chu offer to purchase the Plaintiffs’ Consideration Shares at HKD 0.4545 per share should the market price of Golden Resorts shares fall below that Trigger Price (ie, the Share Purchase Offer)?

(2)  Were the Plaintiffs induced by the Share Purchase Offer to accept the Consideration Shares as part of the consideration for the sale of the Hotel?

(3)  Did the Plaintiffs and Mrs Chu conclude an oral contract in terms of the Share Purchase Offer, ie, the SPA?

36.  There is no serious argument between the parties that the resolution of this principal factual issue may render the various legal arguments advanced on behalf of Mrs Chu (see paras 32 and 34 above) superfluous.

Applicable legal principles

37.  Mr Whitehead SC, who appeared with Mr Chen and Mr Yau for Mrs Chu, referred the court to, firstly, Leung Chin Sing, Rabo & Anr v Ko Chun Hay, Kelvin[2021] HKCFI 2242 at §§41-44 where DHCJ Jin Pao SC summarised the principles relevant to the determination of dispute over the existence of an oral agreement :

“41. Since this case concerns the existence of an alleged oral agreement, and turns on my assessment of the credibility of witnesses, the legal principles on evaluating the truthfulness of an account given by a witness are relevant. …

(1) contemporaneous written documents and documents which came into existence before the problems in question emerged are of the greatest importance in assessing credibility;

(2) in deciding whether to accept a witness’ account, importance should also be attached to the inherent likelihood or unlikelihood of an event having happened, or the apparent logic of events;

(3) regard should be had to the consistency of the witness’ evidence with undisputed or indisputable evidence, and the internal consistency of the witness’ evidence;

(4) care should be taken in drawing conclusions about truthfulness and reliability solely or mainly from the appearance of a witness or from the assessment of a witness’ character;

(5) witnesses’ credibility should be tested by reference to the objective facts proved independently of their testimony, and regard should be had to their motives and to the overall probabilities.

42. It is rare in modern commercial litigation to encounter a claim based on an agreement which is not only said to have been purely by word of mouth but of which there is no contemporaneous documentary record of any kind. The prevalence of e-mails, text messages and other forms of electronic communication is such that most agreements or discussions which are of legal significance, even if not embodied in writing, leave some form of electronic imprint … Because the value of a written record is understood by anyone with business experience, its absence may, depending on the circumstances, tend to suggest that no contract was concluded …”

43. In Gestmin SGPS SA v Credit Suisse (UK) Limited [2013] EWHC 3560 (Comm) at [16-20], Leggatt J (as he then was) set out a detailed analysis on the unreliability of human memory and the impact on the civil litigation process on recalling past events. In view of these considerations, at [22], it was held that the best approach for a judge to adopt in the trial of a commercial case is to place little if any reliance on witnesses’ recollection of what was said in meetings and conversations, and to base factual findings on inferences drawn from the documentary evidence and known or probable facts. …

44. I also bear in mind that the burden of proof rests on the Plaintiffs to prove and establish the oral agreement, including the manner in which it was concluded and on the terms as pleaded, on a balance of probabilities. There is no burden on the Defendant to persuade the Court that his alternative version of events should be accepted … ”

38.  Secondly, in Esquire (Electronics) Ltd v Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp Ltd [2007] 3 HKLRD 439 at §135, Stock JA (as he then was) held as follows :

“135. In this case, the witnesses testified in February 2004. The events about which they testified took place in 1985, 1986 and 1987. That is a gap of 17 years and more. It is that delay, the delay between events and trial, a delay that does not lie at the trial judge’s door, that seems to me to be of particular significance in this case. It is an unusually long gap, for which reason the accuracy of the memory of witnesses was to be approached with especial caution. Comparison with contemporaneous documentation is always an aid to reliability of oral testimony, unless there is reason to believe that the documentation is contrived or materially incomplete; but where the passage of time between events and trial is as long as it was in the present case, and where there is such a host of contemporaneous documentation, as there was in this case, the documentation must, I would have thought, assume a special importance … I do not say that an assessment of the character of a witness plays no part in the fact-finding process, but it is a task that may sometimes be elusive even to the best trained eye and ear, and I would venture to suggest that the truth, in so far as one is able to reach it or, as is sometimes the case, to reach a version of it that is more likely to be correct than not, can best be tested by reference to contemporaneous documentation where it exists, or to its absence where one would expect it to have been created, as well as to inherent probabilities (though bearing in mind that there may be occasions where the truth may run against that particular grain) having regard to all the facts that are known. This is particularly so in a case such as the present, where events have taken place so long before trial and where there exists a mountain of contemporaneous documentation that can be used to point the way … That documentation, as well as conflicts within the evidence, inherent probabilities, and a study of how matters were originally pleaded and asserted in witness statements – these are the factors which in a trial such as this, so long removed from the time of the events in question, were likely to be of particular use in assessing the facts …”

39.  Mr Barlow did not quarrel with these principles but emphasised that they should not be applied rigidly. For evaluation of a witness’s evidence, he referred the court to Northampton Borough Council v Cardoza [2020] 2 BCLC 249 at [37] where Judge Simon Barker QC referred to factors relevant to the evaluation of a witness’s evidence :

“evasive and argumentative answers, tangential speeches avoiding the question, blaming legal advisers for pleading, disclosure and evidence shortcomings, self-contradiction, internal inconsistency, shifting case, new evidence, and selective disclosure”.

40.  Relying on Mercantile International Group plc v Chuan Soon Huat Industrial Group plc [2001] 2 All ER (Comm) 632 per Andrew Smith, J at [11] and [14]; Applause Store Productions Ltd v Raphael [2008] EWHC 178 per DHCJ Richard Parkes QC at [41]-[43]; and Otuka v Alozie [2006] EWHC 3493 per DHCJ David Donaldson QC at [26]-[29], Mr Barlow submitted that witnesses who signed witness statements which merely replicated the version of events of a party to the litigation or of a primary witness should be treated with special caution by the court. Such replicated evidence should not be regarded as the witness’s own evidence. He simply sang in unison from the same song sheet and had jettisoned the opportunity to provide his own evidence on the subject. In such circumstances, unless corroborated by contemporaneous documents, the “contributions” of the minor singers in the choir carry no evidential weight.

Witnesses

41.  For the Plaintiffs, Mr Ngan, Mr Chris Siew (“Chris”) and Mr Keith Lam (“Keith”) gave evidence as witnesses.

42.  Mrs Chu also gave evidence and called both Jenkin and Hans as her witnesses.

An overview of the evidence

43.  The SPA was not in any way evidenced in writing. The first written record of an allegation made against Mrs Chu that she had given a guarantee on the share price was in a letter from RB dated 3 November 2005 (“RB Letter”), nearly 10 months after the SPA was allegedly made. I shall come back to this letter below.

44.  The trial took place a full 17 years after the events. Plainly, the court has to be very careful with oral evidence which was unsupported by any document. Further, for the reasons stated below, I did not find the evidence of any of the witnesses reliable. Hence, the court has to rely heavily upon inherent probabilities in resolving the key factual dispute.

45.  I shall next set out what was described by Mr Barlow as the context of the Meeting, followed by assessment of the reliability of the witnesses’ evidence and the inherent probabilities.

Context of the Meeting

46.  Firstly, the witnesses were in agreement that in late 2004 and early 2005, the Macau gambling industry was much favoured by investors by reason of the opening up of the market by the government. That climate had generated considerable interest in the acquisition of gambling business. Before the acquisition of the Hotel, Golden Resorts was in the course of acquiring another hotel which operated a casino as part of its business, the Grandview Acquisition. Dr Stanley Ho was the ultimate beneficial owner of that hotel.

(A) Person(s) in control of Golden Resorts

47.  Secondly, it is necessary to look at the person(s) in control of Golden Resorts. It is controversial but I agree with the Plaintiffs that if Mrs Chu was the controlling beneficial owner of the company, there was an incentive for her to give a guarantee over the share price and it may explain why certain things were done.

48.  Fortunately, there were contemporaneous documents which would assist the court in deciding this issue, namely, public documents of Golden Resorts.

49.  Prior to Jenkin’s (via Perfect View) acquisition of a majority stake in Golden Resorts, it was at best a struggling company (described as a “distressed company” by Jenkin) – loss-making and had a very small asset base. Golden Resorts’ principal businesses were “manufacturing and trading of watches and watch components, the provision of electroplating services, investment holdings and property holding”. In the 2003 financial year, the company made HKD140,000 in profits. As of 31 December 2003, it had net assets (or shareholders’ equity) of HKD14.48 million. For the 6 months ended 30 June 2004, it incurred a loss before taxation of HKD3.19 million. For the 2004 financial year, its loss before taxation exceeded HKD11.08 million. Mrs Chu’s brother-in-law was on the board of Golden Resorts as en executive director.

50.  According to Jenkin, he was asked in late 2003 by the staff of Kingston Securities whether he was “interested in acquiring another listed company, ie by way of investment in further distressed assets to which [he] responded positively”.

51.  On 24 December 2003, Golden Resorts and Perfect View entered into a subscription agreement, whereby the latter agreed to subscribe for 5 billion new shares in the former for HKD50 million. Jenkin described this transaction as a “white knight rescue”. At the same time, in order to maintain its public float (following the subscription), Golden Resorts entered into a placing agreement with Kingston Securities to place 543.7 million shares to independent third parties.

52.  Following the completion of the subscription agreement and the placement in April 2004, Perfect View became the largest single registered shareholder of Golden Resorts, holding 67.36% of its issued share capital. The general public held 25% and the shareholding of the previous largest shareholder was reduced from 27.78% to 6.78%.

53.  It should be noted that, firstly, Perfect View’s acquisition of its shareholding in Golden Resorts was entirely funded by Kingston Securities and secured by the shares.

54.  Secondly, in a joint public announcement of Golden Resorts and Perfect View dated 9 January 2004 regarding the latter’s subscription, it was stated that Perfect View “intends that the Group will continue the existing watch business” and that the Golden Resorts’ Board believed that “the personal network of [Jenkin] in the PRC can assist the Company to procure more business”. It appears that Golden Resorts soon changed its direction radically.

55.  Grandview was marketed for sale in around November 2004. According to Jenkin, he was so informed by Mrs Chu. Mrs Chu had existing connections with Grandview in that, out of the 3 syndicates which provided gaming-related services at the hotel casino, she had interests in one of the syndicates and her father had interests in all three.

56.  Golden Resorts’ 11 November 2004 public announcement concerning a placement of shares and a top-up subscription stated :

“The net proceeds from the Top-Up Subscription of approximately HKD91.8 million will be used for possible acquisition of properties, traveling and entertainment related businesses or assets. The Company has commenced a preliminary discussion with a party, who is not a connected person (as defined in the Listing Rules), in relation to the Possible Acquisition.”

57.  Golden Resorts’ 18 November 2004 public announcement concerning a further placement of shares and an additional top-up subscription further explained :

“The net proceeds from the Top-Up Subscription of approximately HKD56 million, together with the net proceeds from the top-up subscription pursuant to the Previous Placing of approximately HKD91.8 million, that is in aggregate of approximately HKD147.8 million, may be used for possible acquisition of an equity interests in a hotel in Macau. The Company has commenced a preliminary discussion with a party … in relation to the Possible Acquisition. … There has not been any progress in the discussion since 11 November 2004.”

58.  It is reasonably clear that the acquisition target was Grandview. The provisional sale and purchase agreement for Grandview at HKD500 million was signed on 24 November 2004 between its owner and Futuremind Holdings Ltd (a wholly-owned subsidiary of Golden Resorts). On the same day, Golden Resorts and Mrs Chu entered into an agreement by which if Futuremind was unable to proceed with the purchase, Mrs Chu would complete the transaction by taking over Futuremind (“Grandview Side Agreement”). It was a very substantial obligation and one which an experienced businessperson would not lightly assume.

59.  Although there was dispute over the precise reason why the Grandview Side Agreement was made, it is reasonably clear that it was a requirement of Dr Ho to ensure the completion of the sale. It says something that Dr Ho chose to trust Mrs Chu rather than the majority shareholder of a listed company, Jenkin.

60.  From January to December 2004, Golden Resorts had 5 major finding raising activities (including Jenkin’s HKD50 million acquisition). They were all conducted with Kingston Securities as the placing agent. In total HKD746.60 million was raised (the vast majority was raised on 3 occasions between 11 November and 17 December 2004), which was a staggering achievement for a company in distress only shortly before those activities. The handsome fundraising was aided by the significant increase of share price from HKD0.01 per share to HKD0.34 per share.

61.  The Plaintiffs accused Mrs Chu of ramping up the share price of Golden Resorts, implying something sinister in the exercise. Jenkin’s evidence was that he had little involvement in the fundraising exercises which were handled by Kingston Group. I have little doubt that Mrs Chu had a pivotal role in the fundraisings but I do not see that being successful in promoting the shares of Golden Resorts in the exercises was inappropriate. It was her job and the evidence showed that some of the placement shares had gone to a well-known institutional investor.

62.  It appears that the optimism over Golden Resorts was fuelled, at least in part, by its anticipated entrance into the Macau gambling business. Jenkin’s evidence was that before the 2 placement exercises in November 2004, he was told by Mrs Chu about the availability of Grandview. On 17 November 2004, the media had already reported the “possible injection of casinos under the Golden Club in Hotel Lisboa or Hyatt Regency Macau [Mr Lee’s business] into [Golden Resorts]”. It is unlikely for such market sentiment to have anything to do with Jenkin, who admitted to having no standing in the Macau hotel and casino industries. More likely than not, it arose from Mrs Chu’s involvement with Golden Resorts and the fact that her father was a serious player in the Macau gambling business.

63.  On 14 December 2004, Golden Resorts made a composite announcement, namely, the Grandview Acquisition, Pefect View’s “gift” of shares to Mrs Chu and Mr Lee (“Share Gifts”), the grant of 8 million warrants by the company to Mrs Chu at the subscription price of HKD0.25 and the change of the company’s name from Medtech to Golden Resorts. Its share price increased by 32.6% from HKD0.26 per share to HKD0.345 per share on that day.

64.  The details of the Share Gifts were as follows. Jenkin’s evidence was that he gifted around one-third of his shares in Golden Resorts to Mrs Chu and Mr Lee (via their corporate vehicles) “as remuneration for their services” in the Grandview Acquisition.

65.  The shares gifted to Mrs Chu and Mr Lee, 1.2 billion shares and 400 million shares respectively, comprised 15.93% of Golden Resorts’ issued share capital following the completion of the Grandview Acquisition. Based on the closing price of Golden Resorts shares on 14 December 2004 of HKD0.26 per share, the Share Gifts were worth around HKD416 million. Based on the closing price on 15 December 2004 of HKD0.345 per share, the Gifts were worth HKD552 million.

66.  On any account, these were exceptionally generous gifts. Apart from the monetary size, by gifting one-third of his own shareholding in Golden Resorts Jenkin had reduced his holding to 26.21%, whilst those of Mrs Chu and her father had increased to 22.51% (including the exercise of warrants by Mrs Chu).

67.  Jenkin’s evidence (supplemental witness statement) was that the Gifts were to reward Mrs Chu and Mr Lee for their services relating to the Grandview Acquisition. However, under cross-examination, Jenkin said that he had problems with the word “services” because it “cause[d] confusion”. He explained that the “most important element” for the Gifts was the Grandview Side Agreement. Such explanation did not appear in Golden Resorts’ announcement (see below) for which, as Chairman, he was responsible. Nor did it feature in Mrs Chu’s witness statements.

68.  The Grandview Acquisition was a deal worth HKD500 million. The value of the Gifts nearly matched that deal, and had exceeded it with the 15 December 2004 share price.

69.  Golden Resorts’ 14 December 2004 public announcement stated that the Share Gifts were gratuitous rewards for Mrs Chu and Mr Lee agreeing “to be consultants of the Company in relation to the management of Grandview Hotel with gaming entertainment in view of their extensive experience in the Macau market”.

70.  Quite rightly, Mr Barlow pointed out that the explanation in the public announcement is difficult to understand. According to which, the 1.6 billion shares were gifts to Mrs Chu and Mr Lee, not consideration under an enforceable contract engaging them as consultants. Thus, Mrs Chu and Mr Lee could resign as consultants and yet still retain the shares.

71.  The Share Gifts may be contrasted with the reward derived by Jenkin as the Chairman and an executive director of Golden Resorts. He received only HKD200,000 in the 2005 financial year in salaries, allowances and benefits. It is noteworthy that Mrs Chu had received HKD2.87 million for the same reasons over the same period.

72.  The evidence does not admit a sound commercial reason for the Share Gifts.

73.  The change of name to Golden Resorts announced in December 2004 was important. Mrs Chu agreed in cross-examination that she chose that name because she wanted a name associated with “Golden” Hall. She agreed to having a plan to inject Golden Hall into Golden Resorts but there was no plan to do so in December 2004.

74.  Such evidence should be considered in the context that, at the time, Mrs Chu was only a 0.67% registered shareholder of Golden Resorts. Even taking into account the Share Gifts and warrants, she and Mr Lee would hold 22.51% of Golden Resorts’ issued share capital, less than Perfect View’s 26.21% shareholding.

75.  The probabilities were that the Company would not have changed its name to Golden Resorts unless there was a reasonable prospect that it would be able to acquire the Golden Hall businesses. That raises the question as to why Golden Resorts would have that expectation unless Mrs Chu and/or her father owned or controlled that Company.

76.  Turning to the SJM Side Agreement, there is no dispute that Mr Ngan and Mr Lee met with Dr Ho on 21 March 2005. Each of Mr Ngan and Mr Lee agreed to transfer 60 million shares in Golden Resorts to Dr Ho to secure his consent to the change of beneficial ownership and representative of the Hotel.

77.  Firstly, why would Mr Lee agree to transfer 60 million shares (worth HKD18.3 million at HKD0.305 per share) of his own shares to Dr Ho? Jenkin was not involved in the SJM Side Agreement at all. One would have expected Mr Lee to ask Jenkin to make the transfer to ensure the smooth completion of the Casa Real Acquisition.

78.  Mrs Chu’s evidence (cross-examination) was that Mr Lee transferred the shares to Dr Ho only on Mr Ngan’s request for “help”. This was contradicted by both her pleaded case and the question put by her leading counsel to Mr Ngan, both of which suggested that the transfer was made pursuant to an agreement. In any case, it did not explain why it Mr Lee should provide the assistance and not Jenkin or even herself who had received a much larger part of the Share Gifts.

79.  In cross-examination, Mrs Chu said that the 60 million shares came from Mr Lee’s own shareholding. On the other hand, according to Golden Resorts’ 2005 Annual Report, Mr Lee’s shareholding had not reduced during the relevant period.

80.  The evidence on the SJM Side Agreement is quite unsatisfactory. It is unlikely that the court had been given a true or complete picture.

81.  On 5 April 2005, Mrs Chu became the Managing Director of Golden Resorts. It was on that day that an Undertaking given by her to the SFC for 24 months lapsed. Although the Undertaking was given in relation to her involvement in Kingston Securities, it is difficult to accept Mrs Chu’s claim in cross-examination that the timing was mere “coincidence”. More likely than not, she was acting with abundance of caution not to attract any attention from SFC over her involvement with Golden Resorts during the period of the Undertaking.

82.  Finally, by 4 transactions which took place from 16 August 2005 to 10 February 2006, Jenkin sold all his shares in Golden Resorts about two years after he became its largest shareholder. According to Mr Barlow’s analysis[5], to which there is no demur from the Defendant, Jenkin had made over HKD500 million from this venture (assuming that he pocketed them all), one which had cost him no capital outlay.

83.  Jenkin was cross-examined on why this business opportunity was introduced to him. It was an opportunity introduced to him when Mrs Chu, according to Jenkin, did not know him. Jenkin was unable to provide a sensible answer to the question which was asked a number of times. His suggestion that it was him who introduced the gambling concept to Mrs Chu and her Kingston Group cannot be taken seriously.

84.  On 6 April 2006, Mrs Chu was appointed the CEO of Golden Resorts.

85.  After Jenkin’s (and Perfect View’s) exist from the Golden Resorts, by July 2006, Mrs Chu and Mr Lee together held 44.06% of Golden Resorts’ issued share capital and she then made the Mandatory Conditional General Offer.

86.  The above evidence established convincingly that Mrs Chu (via Kingston Securities) funded the acquisition of a struggling listed vehicle. She then promoted Golden Resorts with a plan to enter into the Macau gambling business and obtained very handsome funding. She was instrumental in acquiring both Grandview and the Hotel, and had a plan to inject Golden Hall into the Company. Her plan to gain a foothold in the Macau gambling business was achieved with the exit of her nominee (Jenkin) and formally taking control of the Company.

87.  It might well have been the case that Jenkin had a stake in the Company as his reward in the venture. The true picture was not revealed to the court. In any case, there can be little doubt that it was Mrs Chu who was pulling all the strings. See also the findings on the witnesses below.

88.  In the premises, I accept the Plaintiffs’ case that Mrs Chu was, at the time of negotiation over the purchase of the Hotel, the controlling beneficial owner of Golden Resorts.

(B) Negotiations over the terms of the PSPA

89.  There were drafts of the PSPA which evidenced the course of negotiations by the parties. It can be seen from the exchanges in respect of the first two drafts that the negotiations were based on the purchase price of HKD750 million in cash and HKD500 million in shares with the shares valued at HKD0.49 each.

90.  In the Ngans’ reply to the 3rd draft, they proposed that the consideration be changed to cash of HKD800 million and HKD450 million in shares valued at HKD0.45 each. The 4th draft, which was prepared by Hans, did not accept those changes. It was the draft taken along by Hans, in the company of Mrs Chu and others, to the Meeting for final negotiation.

(C) Things said by Mrs Chu at the Meeting

91.  Mrs Chu agreed in evidence that she flew over to Macau to attend the Meeting with the expectation of reaching an agreement for the Casa Real Acquisition. She said that most of the terms had been agreed at that time. This is largely supported by the drafts of the PSPA, although I would not agree with Mrs Chu that 95% of the Agreement had been agreed.

92.  At the Meeting, Mrs Chu was accompanied by her husband, Jenkin and Hans. On the other side, there were Mr Ngan, Franky and their senior employees, Chris Siew (“Chris”), Keith Lam (“Keith”), Eric Lo and Rex Chiu.

93.  Mrs Chu agreed that at the early stage of the Meeting, she introduced herself and her father, and explaining her father’s background and experience in the management of VIP gambling rooms in Macau. She also mentioned the Grandview Acquisition. She told Mr Ngan that after the Grandview Acquisition the share price of Golden Resorts was very good.

94.  In answer to question whether she also mentioned that the share price would go up more after the announcement of the Case Real Acquisition, she said that: “I mentioned that the share price goes up very good after the [Grandview Acquisition], but after the [Casa Real Acquisition] whether the price would go up would depend on the market. I did not say that the price of [Golden Resorts] would necessarily be as good as that after Grandview was acquired because it depends on the market.” From that answer, it is reasonably clear (and it was the most natural topic of discussion at the Meeting) that there were discussions between Mrs Chu and Mr Ngan about the anticipated share price movement of Golden Resorts after the Casa Real Acquisition.

95.  Despite her earlier denial about the intention of injecting Golden Hall into Golden Resorts because, inter alia, there was no such plan at the time, Mrs Chu was pressed further: “But that didn’t stop you talking about it, did it, Madam Chu?” She answered: “Maybe I would -- I would tell -- [Mr Ngan] that my father was running the Golden Hall very well. But there was still no plan at the time.” The ambiguous answer suggests that, more likely than not, Mrs Chu at least hinted to Mr Ngan that there was a prospect of injecting Golden Hall into Golden Resorts. This is, again, a natural subject of discussion at the Meeting. It is consistent with her discussion over her father’s business, as well as the fact that Mr Lee was 72 years old at the time and was likely to have considered passing his business to his daughter. I am not persuaded by Mrs Chu’s denial that her father had any plan to retire at the time.

Mr Ngan’s evidence

96.  Mr Ngan was 73 years old when he gave evidence. He was not in the best of health. The court was previously informed[6] that he was suffering form, inter alia, Parkinson deceased. It was apparent that he had some difficulty with the clarity of his speech and that his concentration span was shorter than one might have expected of a normal 73 year old person. However, I did not notice any serious difficulty with his power of comprehension, nor that he was inclined to answer any question in cross-examination without understanding it.

97.  Mr Ngan was clearly an experienced businessman of considerable wealth. Despite his reluctance to admit so, he was investing, directly or indirectly, in a wide range of businesses, including real estate, food processing and telecommunication. As an indication of his wealth, the documents before the court showed that in August 2002 he purchased about HKD200 million worth of shares in a Hong Kong listed company via a corporate vehicle. He was asked about the transaction in cross-examination, but he was unable to recall the amount of money involved because the transaction was handled by a staff. The evidence suggests that HKD200 million was not an unforgettable sum to Mr Ngan.

98.  I do not understand why Mr Ngan was not more forthcoming on his business experience. His reticence cannot, I believe, be explained by modesty.

99.  Mr Ngan was challenged in cross-examination on his credibility. For instance, he was asked why, in his application to give evidence via VCF, his solicitor had filed evidence on his behalf stating that due to his health condition he was staying in Macau and had not travelled outside it. After the evidence was contradicted by Mrs Chu, Mr Ngan filed another affirmation to correct the false picture given to the court. Mr Ngan sought to explain in cross-examination that the variation between the evidence of his solicitor and himself was due to misunderstanding. I am unable to accept the explanation because the solicitor must have been given some instructions before affirming that Mr Ngan had been staying at home since the outbreak of COVID-19. It is inconceivable for her to have given the evidence she did if she had any idea of the information contained in Mr Ngan’s subsequent affirmation. More likely than not, the information given to the solicitor was simply wrong.

100.  I bear in mind that at the time of the transaction Mr Ngan was in his mid-fifties and in good health. Not only was he a businessman of considerable experience, he had the experience of litigation in Hong Kong. His case went all the way to the CFA. Therefore, he was familiar with consulting lawyers and must have known the importance of protecting his business interest with legal advice. It will be seen below that when the inherent probabilities are analysed many of Mr Ngan’s actions were simply not consistent with someone with his background and available resources.

101.  It is convenient to deal with the absence of Franky as a witness for the Plaintiffs. Mr Whitehead submitted that (a) Franky was a critical witness who allegedly was given the oral guarantee on share price by Mrs Chu in the course of negotiations prior to the Meeting; and (b) an adverse inference should be drawn by reason of his absence. I am not inclined to agree. Firstly, there is sufficient evidence to allow the court to come to a factual finding on the central issue in this case. Secondly, there is evidence before the court that Franky was subject to an order of the Mainland court, which arose out of a civil action, which prevented his departure from the Mainland to attend this trial.

Chris’ evidence

102.  Chris was a highly qualified professional. He was a chartered accountant (as well as having a Master degree in accounting and finance) and had worked for one of the top international firm of accountants in both Australia and his home country, Malaysia, as a tax consultant and possibly also on compliance before coming to Hong Kong many years ago. He was Jane’s husband and the CFO of the Hang Huo Group (“Group”) of companies which belonged to the Ngan family.

103.  Chris was an important witness. His involvement with the sale of the Hotel started from the afternoon of the 5th January 2005 when he, together with Franky, Keith, Mr Eric Lo (“Eric”) and Mr Rex Chiu (“Rex”) discussed the terms contained in a draft PSPA received from Hans. Chris confirmed that the five of them were the senior staff of the Group, and that as the CFO he had special responsibility to look after the financial interests of the Group in the sale. Against that backdrop, I regret to say that the inexplicable features in Chris’ evidence can only be magnified many times over compared with those found in Mr Ngan’s evidence.

104.  Chris accepted that the offer of a guarantee by Mrs Chu, which he was told by Franky, was extremely important. He was taxed in cross-examination about how the guarantee was going to work, eg, its duration, and the following answers were given after he explained that the guarantee was an undertaking that when the value of the Consideration Shares fell below HKD500 million, Mrs Chu would buy them back :

“Q. When would she do that?

A. Whenever.

Q. I’m sorry. Whenever -- no, my question is when would she to that?

A. When we wanted her to do that.

Q. So 10 years’ time, buy back the shares in 10 years’ time? That was the agreement?

A. I think realistically that was not what we were all thinking.

Q. Five years?

A. Probably not.

Q. No idea? You’ve got no idea when; is that right?

A. I wouldn’t say “no idea”.

Q. Would the shares -- would the obligation to buy the shares be automatically triggered as soon as the shares fell below the trigger price?

A. It could.

Q. It could?

A. Yes.

Q. So that’s a possibility, is it?

A. Yes.

Q. If Madam Chu was asked to buy back the shares, how much time did she have to raise the money to do this?

A. It wasn’t stated, or it wasn’t mentioned.

Q. Wasn’t stated. Rather important, isn’t it?

A. Sorry?

Q. It’s a rather important matter, isn’t it?

A. Yes.

Q. Yes. Was there any discussion on this occasion, on 5 January, about any lock-up period?

A. No.

Q. No. Why not?

A. I’m not sure.”

105.  Bluntly, I find it incredible that a highly qualified CFO of the Group (not to mention his wife’s interests in the transaction) would not have raised these matters very shortly, if not immediately, after learning of the offer of guarantee. Such a person would have ensured that his team of senior staff, especially Franky who was one of the negotiators representing the Group, recognised and discussed the issues which required clarification with Mrs Chu before accepting the extremely important offer. There was no evidence that Chris, or anyone of the other senior staff, had taken any such action.

106.  According to Chis’ evidence, he hardly raised any question or took any action about the guarantee offered by Mrs Chu, such as asking for her financial background to be checked to ensure that she would be good for guarantee.

107.  Chris’ evidence was that the decision makers of the Group, Mr Ngan and Franky, went to the meeting in the evening of 5 January 2005 with their advisors, namely, himself, Eric, Keith and Rex[7], and they all believed in what Mrs Chu said to them without any discussion amongst the team. Such evidence is very hard to believe.

Keith’s evidence

108.  He was the VP of the Group since 2005. He was qualified in accounting and worked under Chris. Like Chris, part of Keith’s job was to protect the interests of the Ngan family. Although Keith insisted that his recollection about some of the events of 2005 was very fresh, his evidence suffered from the same fragility as that of Chris. His action or non-action was at odds with his qualification, position held in the Group and common sense.

109.  Keith said that when the senior staff first learned about Mrs Chu’s undertaking on the share price from Franky, they did not believe it. The clear implication is that it was a little too good to be true. Keith regarded the undertaking as a deal-breaker because he had no faith in the shares of a 3rd or 4th tier listed company. Inexplicably, none of the senior staff nor Franky discussed about having the undertaking secured in written form (eg, a separate letter) or to check the financial background of Mrs Chu.

Mrs Chu’s evidence

110.  Mrs Chu was educated and lived in the US for over 10 years. Shortly after returning to Hong Kong, she set up and ran Kingston Securities. Three further related Kingston financial companies followed. Kingston Securities had become a successful and well-known securities company in Hong Kong. There is no doubt that Mrs Chu was a sophisticated and able person, as well as a highly successful businessperson.

111.  Mrs Chu was not a forthcoming witness at all. She gave the clear impression of having difficulty in recalling relevant events even with the contemporaneous documents in front of her, eg, the matters concerning the various share placements of Golden Resorts. I do not believe that it can be explained by the passage of time when there was an allegation against her that she was the controlling shareholder of Golden Resorts and had said so at the Meeting. One would expect that a person like Mrs Chu to have availed herself of the relevant information to refresh her mind on those matters before the trial. However, Mrs Chu displayed much hesitation when answering question designed to elicit the identity of the controlling shareholder of Golden Resorts.

112.  I believe that, based on the undisputed documents, a picture had emerged that, contrary to her denial, Mrs Chu was in control of Golden Resorts. The evidence in this regard has been set out above.

Jenkin’s evidence

113.  In the analysis above on Person(s) in control of Golden Resorts, some of the unsatisfactory aspects of Jenkin’s evidence concerning his professed controlling interest in Golden Resorts have been covered. In short, I do not find his evidence credible in light of the contemporaneous documents, and many of his answers in cross-examination were inconsistent with common sense.

114.  There is another inexplicable feature in Jenkin’s evidence. He basically took no part in the negotiations with the Ngans during the Meeting. Instead, the negotiations were conducted by Mrs Chu on behalf of Golden Resorts. Given that the Golden Resorts party went to the Meeting with the expectation of concluding the deal, and it was anticipated that the Ngans would become major shareholders of the company, one would have expected Jenkin to assert himself to them as the person-in-charge. The fact that he did nothing of the sort speaks volumes.

115.  Jenkin had a tendency to give long and irrelevant answers, which suggested that he was evading the questions. There is force in Mr Barlow’s criticism that both Jenkin and Hans were singing from the same songsheet as that provided by Mrs Chu. Their witness statements on what transpired during the Meeting were almost identical with that of Mrs Chu. I do not believe that the issue can simply be explained by the suggestion that the statements were drafted by the same person. Such evidence does not inspire confidence in its reliability.

Hans’ evidence

116.  Like Jenkin, Hans was a well-educated and sophisticated man. His evidence is less important. His role, according to him, was mainly to assist in the drafting of the PSPA. However, his evidence about the Meeting was almost identical with that of Mrs Chu. I do not believe that Hans’ evidence should prevail over the inherent probabilities.

Inherent probabilities

117.  I have set the scene of the Meeting in the discussions on Context above. Mr Barlow forcefully submitted that the Ngans wanted an all cash deal for the Casa Real Acquisition. I am unable to find sufficient evidential support for the proposition. It might have been the initial intention of the Ngans but the draft PSPA demonstrated that they were receptive to receiving shares in Golden Resorts.

118.  I do not believe that being a 3rd or 4th tier listed company, as described by the Plaintiffs’ witnesses, was a real deterrence to accepting Golden Resorts shares. The Ngans, with their team of well-qualified advisors, must have considered the recent changes of Golden Resorts’ share price (the contrary suggestion of Keith is rejected as improbable). They would have known that it rose significantly after the announcement of the Grandview Acquisition. They must have been well aware of the attraction of the Macau gambling business to investors at the time. There is no reason to believe that the Ngans would have agreed to sell the Hotel at anything less than the market value. The manner of payment was one of the constituents of the market value.

119.  The Grandview Acquisition provided a reference to gauge the composition of shares in the acquisition consideration. Although it was a smaller hotel, it was owned by Dr Ho who was plainly in a strong bargaining position[8]. Dr Ho was happy to accept Golden Resorts shares as part of the consideration.

120.  The probabilities are that, like Dr Ho, the Ngans were attracted by the prospects of having a stake in Golden Resorts to which (via a subsidiary) they were selling the Hotel. They knew about the significant hike in share price after the announcement of the Grandview Acquisition. Under the favourable environment for investing in Macau gambling business, they probably saw the opportunity as a positive one which may result in enhancement of the return on the Hotel. In any case, the Consideration Shares could be sold if they changed their mind. The above analysis is supported by the fact that the Ngans had subsequently purchased more Golden Resorts (worth HKD6.5 million) with their own money.

121.  The discount over the share price is an important factor which can assist the court in assessing the inherent probabilities of the factual dispute here. It is uncontroversial that the closing price of Golden Resorts shares on 5 January 2005 was HKD0.54. Thus, valuing the Consideration Shares at HKD 0.4545 each represented a discount of about 16%. That was potentially a handsome bonus if the share price remained unchanged. In the case of the Grandview Acquisition, the share price discount was about 23%.

122.  Mrs Chu’s evidence that at the Meeting Mr Ngan only wanted a steeper discount for the share price is supported by the final agreement to value the shares at HKD 0.4545 each (against the Ngans’ counter-proposal at HKD 0.45 (see para 90 above)). I have little doubt that in the course of the negotiations over the final price Mrs Chu was promoting the prospects of Golden Resorts with its plan to Mr Ngan, a task which she was good at judging by her success with Kingston Securities.

123.  In the premises, there is no objective indication of necessity for Mrs Chu to have made a personal guarantee on the share price. The terms of the SPA were almost too good to be true (Keith said that they (the senior staff) suspected that Patrick had lied about it when they heard about the guarantee from him). There was only upside for the Ngans. With the guaranteed share price, they could only stand to gain from any upward price movement, whilst downward movement would cause no loss to them.

124.  I am not convinced by the submission that Mrs Chu was prepared to do anything to conclusion the PSPA on 5/6 January 2005. Whilst she was no doubt keen to conclude that deal, she was unquestionably a shrewd businessperson and would not have exposed herself to very substantial liability without compelling reason. I can find no objective indication of such reason.

125.  The vagueness of the terms of the SPA (see para 104 above) militates against the parties, all sophisticated businesspersons, having reached such an agreement. For instance, why would Mrs Chu agree to an agreement when it was not clear how long her guarantee would last? Chris’ acceptance that such matter would have to be discussed between the parties, and the undisputed fact that there was no such discussion, put paid to the inherent likelihood of the SPA having been made.

126.  The lack of any written record of the SPA is another Achilles’ heel in the Plaintiffs’ case. Assuming that the Plaintiffs were right that at the Meeting Hans said that it was inappropriate to have the SPA recorded in writing because of potential conflict with the Listing Rules, I see no reason for the Ngans to have accepted the suggestion without checking with their own legal advisors. Both Mr Ngan and Chris accepted in cross-examination that their lawyers could have advised them on the legality of the SPA and how to protect their interests thereunder. Given the acceptance by the Plaintiffs that (a) Mrs Chu was a stranger to them; and (b) no financial check was carried out to find out if she was good for the guarantee, the Plaintiffs’ case that they simply accepted what was said is difficult to believe.

127.  I also find it incredible that, given its importance, there was no footprint of the SPA in Mr Ngan’s personal diary, nor in any internal emails passed between Franky and the senior staff. Whatever reason was given as to why the SPA should not be recorded in writing, there was nothing to stop them from discussing it (especially before the Meeting) and thereby leaving some written trail.

128.  I am not convinced by Mr Ngan’s evidence that in Macau an oral agreement was as good as a written one, certainly not one with a stranger involving HKD500 million. Mr Ngan’s own case is that he asked for the SPA to be recorded in writing.

129.  Even if the Ngans were happy to accept the suggestion that the SPA ought not be recorded in writing, there was no evidence of any discussion that it should at least be witnessed by a mutually agreed person. The introducer of Mrs Chu to the Ngans, Mr Lee Chi Keung, might be a suitable person. The Ngans were of equal bargaining power in the Casa Real Acquisition, their complete failure to take any action to safeguard (or try to do so) their interests under the SPA does not sit with common sense.

130.  The RB Letter (see para 43 above) was only written as a response to Next’s threat of legal action against the Plaintiffs for breach of the Deed, which was made as part of the Casa Real Acquisition. The timing and circumstances of the letter are certainly unhelpful to the Plaintiffs’ case. Mr Whitehead also relies on the fact that in the RB Letter it was alleged that the SPA was made between the Plaintiffs and Golden Resorts/Next. I do not find that the inconsistency is necessarily an important one because the identity of the parties to the oral agreement was something which required careful consideration after reviewing the details of the transaction, and the solicitors might not have had sufficient opportunity to do so prior to the issuance of the Letter.

131.  However, the RB Letter may provide an answer to Mr Barlow’s submission that the Plaintiffs lack any motive to advance a false case. They were probably unhappy about the alleged breach of the Deed (which involved a sauna business of the Hotel that was operated by an independent contractor), as well as the fact that Mrs Chu’s projection about the prospects of Golden Resorts’ share price had failed to materialise in a bad way. I can see that once the Plaintiffs had taken a position, they had the means to see it through in litigation.

132.  For these reasons, I am of the view that the inherent probabilities are against the Plaintiffs’ case, and it is rejected. Had I not rejected the Plaintiffs’ factual case, I would uphold their case on having been induced by the Share Purchase Offer to accept the Consideration Shares as part of the consideration for the Hotel (see para 35(2) above). The Offer was so good that any vendor in the Plaintiffs’ position would have been induced by it.

133.  By reason of the rejection of the Plaintiffs’ factual case, there is no need to consider the various legal arguments raised by Mrs Chu.

Disposition

134.  This action is dismissed with costs to Mrs Chu, with a certificate for 2 counsel.

135.  Lastly, I am grateful for the assistance rendered by counsel.

( Anthony Chan )
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

  

Mr Barrie Barlow SC and Mr David Chen, instructed by MinterEllison LLP, for the 1st – 5th Plaintiffs

Mr Robert Whitehead SC, Mr Vincent Chen and Mr Jeff Yau, instructed by Lam & Co, for the Defendant



[1] There is a Statement of Agreed Facts filed on 29 September 2021 pursuant to the directions of this court.

[2] On 5 January 2005, it was called Medtech Group Co Ltd. In the course of the material events, its name was changed to Golden Resorts. It is currently known as Kingston Finance Group Ltd. For convenience, the company is referred to herein as Golden Resorts.

[3] Post Consolidation.

[4] She only participated in part of the meetings.

[5] Annex E of the Plaintiffs’ Closing Submissions.

[6] In the evidence filed in support of Mr Ngan’s application to given evidence via VCF.

[7] There was also Mr Lin, a VP of the Group, but there was no evidence about his involvement.

[8] He was described by Mr Barlow as the ultimate insider of the Macau gambling business.

[2021] HKCFI 3916-EN-2021-12-30

NGAN IN LENG AND OTHERS v. CHU YUET WAH

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HCA 388/2006

[2021] HKCFI 3916

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 388 OF 2006

____________________

BETWEEN  
 NGAN IN LENG1st Plaintiff
 CHAN WAI IAN2nd Plaintiff
 NGAN IEK3rd Plaintiff
 NGAN IEK CHAN4th Plaintiff
 NGAN IEK PENG5th Plaintiff
 AND 
 CHU YUET WAHDefendant

____________________

Before: Hon Anthony Chan J in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 30 December 2021
Date of Decision: 30 December 2021

________________

DECISION

________________

1.  There is no merit in this eleventh hour application for the Plaintiffs’ witness, Mr Eric Lo, to give evidence via VCF at the trial of this action, which is to begin on 10 January 2021. It must be underlined that the lateness of this application has resulted in a 15 minute hearing this morning which is contested and attended by counsel on both sides. Bluntly, this is jumping the queue at the cost of other court users as well as imposing an unwarranted burden on the court.

2.  As long ago as 4 September 2019, an order was made against any further interlocutory application without the leave of the court. The only purported explanation advanced for the lateness of this application is the suggestion that Mr Lo only indicated in early December this year his reluctance to attend the trial due to the need of quarantine upon his return to Macau.

3.  I am unable to accept the purported explanation :

(1)  On the evidence, the need to quarantine must be known since March 2021;

(2)  An application was made in September 2021 by the Plaintiffs to have the evidence of the 1st Plaintiff given via VCF. It was granted on 3 November 2021.  Hence, there was proper opportunity for this application to be made;

(3)  Mr Lo has agreed to be a witness in this case. There is no reason to believe he is not aware of the attendant obligations, the most elementary of which is to give evidence at the trial; (See Wang Rongan v Silver International Investment Ltd[2021] HKCFI 3198, §19);

(4)  There is no evidence that Mr Lo is liable to suffer undue hardship from the quarantine.

4.  In the premises, on lateness alone, I decline to entertain this application.

5.  For completeness and briefly, I am unable to accept the Plaintiffs’ submission that Mr Lo is not an important factual witness whose credibility is not going to be hotly contested. He was present at important negotiations which led to the Share Purchase Agreement. That Agreement is central to the dispute in this action. It is accepted by Mr Chen, who appears for the Plaintiffs, that Mr Lo will be put forward as a detached witness.

6.  Neither can I accept that there is no prejudice to the Defendant if this application is granted. Justice must be seen to be done. The Defendant is entitled to think that the Plaintiffs’ application will deprive her of the opportunity to test the evidence of an important witness under the solemn atmosphere of the court.

7.  Further, I agree with the observations of the court in Wah Lun International Development Ltd v Lau Chiu Shing[2020] HKCFI 2572, §18, that the court can only deal with an application as it stands notwithstanding the fluid state of the COVID-19 pandemic.

8.  Finally, I remind myself of the principles set out in Re Nobility School Ltd[2020] HKCFI 891, §9. I do not believe that this application is grounded on sound reason.

9.  I shall hear the parties on costs.

( Anthony Chan )
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

  

Mr David Chen, instructed by MinterEllison LLP, for the 1st – 5th Plaintiffs

Mr Robert Whitehead SC and Mr Vincent Chen, instructed by Lam & Co, for the Defendant

85199-EN-2013-01-10

NGAN IN LENG AND OTHERS v. CHU YUET WAH

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HCA 388/2006

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 388 OF 2006

____________

BETWEEN

 NGAN IN LENG1st Plaintiff
 CHAN WAI IAN2nd Plaintiff
 NGAN IEK3rd Plaintiff
 NGAN IEK CHAN4th Plaintiff
 NGAN IEK PENG5th Plaintiff

and

 CHU YUET WAHDefendant

____________

Before: Hon Au-Yeung J in Chambers
Date of Hearing: 10 January 2013
Date of Decision: 10 January 2013

_____________

D E C I S I O N

_____________

1.  By an order dated 7 December 2012, Kingston Financial Group Ltd (“Kingston”) was ordered to make discovery of certain documents. The plaintiff was to provide an express undertaking of confidentiality in terms agreed with Kingston or, failing agreement, as settled by the court.

2.  There is no dispute on the precise contents of the confidential obligations.  The bone of contention between the plaintiff and Kingston is whether or not the plaintiff should be required to provide an express undertaking (“the further undertaking”) in these terms:

“We acknowledge that any breach of the said undertaking or obligation by us or any of us will entitle you to seek appropriate relief (including, but not limited to, injunctions and/or damages) from the Court of HKSAR or from any other appropriate court(s).”

The legal principles

3.  There is no dispute on the applicable principles:

(1)  The court has jurisdiction to exact an express undertaking as to confidentiality from the party seeking disclosure such terms which go further than the automatic obligations under the implied undertaking.

(2)  Where an express undertaking going further than the automatic obligation is sought, it must be justified by the circumstances of each case: Matthews and Malek on Disclosure, 4th ed, at 15.29.

(3)  The duty under the undertaking is owed to the court: Home Office v Harman [1983] 1 AC 280, 307F.  The remedy for breach of an implied undertaking as to confidentiality (and hence, an express undertaking which does not include the further undertaking) is civil contempt which may be restrained by injunction: Matthews and Malek on Disclosure, at para 19.45.  It does not give rise to a private cause of action, in particular an action founded in breach of contract: Independiente Ltd and ors v Music Trading On-Line (HK) Ltd [2007] 4 All ER 736.

(4)  There is no wider private duty of confidentiality owed to the party giving discovery: Matthews and Malek on Disclosure, at para 19.07.

(5)  There is no established principle that a third party ordered to provide discovery will invariably be entitled to a remedy beyond the automatic remedy.

Application of the legal principles

4.  Kingston’s bases of application are two-fold: (i) on the basis of paragraph 84 of my decision dated 7 December 2012; and (ii) special circumstances of this case.

5.  With regard to the first basis, Mr Wong for Kingston submits that on a proper analysis of the decision, it appears to be the view of this court that the implied undertaking was insufficient.  In order to overcome the confidentiality obligation the plaintiffs offered to give an express undertaking.  Hence on a proper analysis, the express undertaking was effectively a price which the plaintiffs offered to pay for the discovery in addition to the implied undertaking. 

6.  With respect to Mr Wong, I do not think that is the correct reading of paragraph 84 of the decision.  The discovery was ordered against the opposition of Kingston.  The plaintiffs have not offered anything beyond what was the same implied undertaking in Mr Barber’s 7th affirmation in the discovery proceedings.  The intention of paragraph 84 was only to make express what was implied.  The need to pay a “price” for the discovery was not advanced at the hearing.  The first basis for this application fails.

7.  With regard to the 2nd basis, there is no bar to Kingston raising the need for the further undertaking provided there is sufficient justification.  I shall not repeat each party’s written submission.  Kingston is a non-party having no interest in the outcome of this case. The documents to be discovered may be confidential or commercially sensitive even though the transactions were completed many years ago.  Upon misuse of the documents, it is of no practical use to Kingston to commit the plaintiffs, who reside out of this jurisdiction and have no known assets in Hong Kong, for contempt of court.  Kingston may have to suffer the prejudice of having to go through what might be a cumbersome process of service outside jurisdiction and costs for the committal proceedings which might not be covered by the indemnity costs order given in this case.  This violates the spirit that discovery against non‑parties is the exception rather than the norm and that non‑parties should be adequately protected against prejudice when making discovery.  These matters, taken together, are weighty in persuading me that the further undertaking should be given.

Conclusion

8.  I order the imposition of the further undertaking as proposed by Kingston and grant the extension of time sought by the plaintiffs.  I order that the plaintiffs do bear the costs of Kingston on the same indemnity basis as ordered.  Such costs shall be assessed on the papers on 17 January 2013.  Kingston should provide the costs statement by close of play on 14 January 2013 and the plaintiffs should provide grounds of objection by 16 January 2013.

9.  I thank Mr Wong and Mr Barber for their assistance.

(Queeny Au-Yeung)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court
 

Mr William Barber, of Reed Smith Richards Butler, for the plaintiffs

Mr Anson Wong, instructed by K C Ho & Fong, for the Kingston Financial Group Ltd

84749-EN-2012-12-07

NGAN IN LENG AND OTHERS v. CHU YUET WAH

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HCA 388/2006

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 388 OF 2006

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BETWEEN

 NGAN IN LEUNG1st Plaintiff
 CHAN WAI IAN2nd Plaintiff
 NGAN IEK3rd Plaintiff
 NGAN IEK CHAN4th Plaintiff
 NGAN IEK PENG5th Plaintiff

and

 CHU YUET WAHDefendant
____________

Before: Deputy High Court Judge Au-Yeung in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 14 August 2012

Date of Decision: 7 December 2012

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D E C I S I O N

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THE APPLICATIONS

1.  By 2 separate summonses, the plaintiffs seek specific discovery against the defendant (“the Chu Summons”) and a third party company called Kingston Financial Group Ltd (“Kingston”) (“the GR Summons”) respectively.

BACKGROUND

2.  Kingston, a listed company, was formerly known as Golden Resorts Group Limited (“Golden Resorts”) and, before that, Medtech Group Co Ltd.  In 2005, Golden Resorts acquired the plaintiffs’ interests in companies which owned the Casa Real Hotel with a casino in Macau.  The price was HK$1.25 billion, payable partly in cash of HK$750 million and partly by allotment of newly issued ordinary shares of Golden Resorts (“the Shares”) at a value of HK$0.4545 each (equivalent to about HK$500 million).  The negotiation for the acquisition was conducted by the defendant (“Chu”) and her father (“Mr Lee”) on behalf of Golden Resorts.

3.  It is the plaintiffs’ case that in the course of negotiation, Chu represented, amongst others, that she was the controlling shareholder and the boss of Golden Resorts (“the representation”).  She orally agreed to buy back the Shares at $0.4545 each should the value per share in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange fall below that price.  It was allegedly in reliance on her offer that the plaintiffs agreed to accept the Shares as part of the consideration (“the share purchase agreement”).

4.  The sale of the shares of companies holding the hotel and casino was completed on 31 May 2005 and the Shares were issued to the plaintiffs.  At all times since the making of the agreement for the acquisition, the share price has been below $0.4545 per share.

5.  It is the plaintiffs’ case that Chu assured them that the share price would recover as a result of a restructuring of Golden Resorts involving, amongst others,:

(i)   acquisition of the Casa Real Hotel and associated business (“the Casa Real Acquisition”); and

(ii)  completing an agreement to acquire the Grandview Hotel and share of the profits generated by the casino carried out in the Grandview Hotel (“the Grandview Acquisition”).

6.  Chu also allegedly represented to the plaintiffs that if for any reason the buyer was unable to complete the Casa Real Acquisition, she or her nominee would take over the deal.

7.  The plaintiffs were given 1.1 billion shares.  After a 10:1 consolidation (“the consolidation”), they held 110 million shares.  They transferred away 6 million shares to the casino operator and still hold 104,000,000 shares.

8.  Before consolidation, the value was HK$0.196 per share (ie HK$1.96 after consolidation).  The plaintiffs claim that there was an implied term that after consolidation, the buy-back price would become HK$4.545 per share.  Accordingly, the Shares in the plaintiffs’ hands were worth only HK$20,384,000, representing a loss of HK$268,840,000.

9.  The plaintiffs seek specific performance of the share purchase agreement, alternatively damages for its breach.

10.  Chu is now a director, CEO and controlling shareholder of Kingston, but during the course of negotiations with the plaintiffs, she was still a minority shareholder in Golden Resorts. She denies having made the representation or entered into the share purchase agreement.  Her case is that she negotiated the deal on behalf of Golden Resorts, on the instructions of its then Chairman, Mr Jenkin Cheung.  The plaintiffs contended that the reverse was true, ie it was Mr Cheung who acted in accordance with the instructions of Chu and Mr Lee.

A.  THE CHU SUMMONS

11.  The plaintiffs seek specific discovery of 13 classes of documents relating to 3 key transactions as follows:

  Date of preliminary agreement Date of completion
The Subscription 24.12.2003 13.4.2004
The Casa Real Acquisition 6.1.2005 31.5.2005
The Grandview Acquisition 24.11.2004 March 2005

The Subscription documents (classes 1-3)

12.  By the Subscription, one Perfect View subscribed for 5 billion shares in Golden Resorts.  The acquisition was financed by a loan of $50 million from Kingston Securities Ltd (whose controlling shareholder was Chu) to Perfect View. On 13 April 2004, the day of completion of the Subscription, Mr Cheung was appointed as executive director and chairman of Golden Resorts.

13.  The plaintiffs seek discovery of the transaction documents in relation to the Subscription, correspondence and notes of meeting between Mr Cheung and/or Perfect View, Chu and/or Kingston relating thereto, the loan documentation and documents relating to repayment of the loan. 

The Casa Real Acquisition documents (classes 4-5)

14.  The share purchase agreement was allegedly entered into during the course of negotiation for the Casa Real Acquisition.  There is no dispute that Chu had an active role in the negotiation and Mr Lee was also involved.  Whether Chu acted on the instructions of Mr Cheung, or the latter acted on the instructions of Chu and Mr Lee, is in dispute. 

15.  No correspondence between Chu/Mr Lee and Mr Cheung/ Golden Resorts has been disclosed in the course of discovery.  The plaintiffs seek discovery of :

(i)   all correspondence and all notes of meetings between (a) Chu and Mr Lee and (b) Mr Cheung and/or Golden Resorts, concerning the Casa Real negotiation;

(ii)  all correspondence and all notes of meetings between Chu, and Mr Cheung and/or Golden Resorts, in relation to Chu’s reward and/or remuneration (if any) for acting on behalf of Golden Resorts in the Casa Real negotiation.

The Grandview Acquisition documents (classes 6-13)

16.  The Casa Real Acquisition and Grandview Acquisition were close in time and bore strikingly similar features:

(i)   The consideration for both was partly in cash and partly by issuance of new shares in Golden Resorts.

(ii)  Though not an officer of Golden Resorts and being a minority shareholder, Chu was extensively involved in the Grandview Acquisition to the extent of entering into the Chu Guarantee Agreement dated 24 November 2004, effectively to personally guarantee the completion of the Grandview Acquisition in order to protect Golden Resorts from losses. 

17.  On 6 April 2005, following completion of the Grandview Acquisition, (a) Chu was appointed the managing director of Golden Resorts and Mr Lee was appointed non-executive director; (b) Chu and Mr Lee, through their respective corporate vehicles, was bestowed by Perfect View with 1.6 billion shares (over 20% of the issued shares) in Golden Resorts.

18.  The Grandview Acquisition and Casa Real Acquisition both formed part of Golden Resorts’ strategic business diversification into the Macau hotel and casino business at the material time: see circular of Golden Resorts dated 18 April 2005 on the Casa Real Acquisition.

19.  The plaintiffs seek discovery of: 

(i) all correspondence and all notes of meetings between (a) Chu and (b) Mr Cheung and/or Golden Resorts, concerning the Grandview negotiation (similar to those re the Casa Real Acquisition);

(ii) the Grandview provisional agreement;

(iii) documents created during the course of negotiations for the Grandview Acquisition relating to the nature and amount of consideration to be paid by Futuremind, being all drafts of the Grandview provisional agreement, all correspondence accompanying the same exchanged with the parties to the transaction and all notes of meetings relating to the same;

(iv) all correspondence and all notes of meetings between Chu, and Mr Cheung and/or Golden Resorts, in relation to Chu’s reward and/or remuneration (if any) for acting on behalf of Golden Resorts in the Grandview Acquisition (similar to those re the Casa Real Acquisition);

(v) the Chu guarantee agreement;

(vi) all correspondence and all notes of meetings between (a) Chu and (b) Mr Cheung and/or Golden Resorts, relating to or culminating in the Chu guarantee agreement;

(vii) the agreement for 1.2 billion ordinary shares of Golden Resorts to be conferred on Sure Expert in return for Chu agreeing to be a consultant of Golden Resorts in managing the Grandview Hotel (“the Chu consultancy agreement”);

(viii) all correspondence and all notes of meetings between (a) Chu and (b) Mr Cheung and/or Golden Resorts, relating to or culminating in the Chu consultancy agreement.

Bases of the application

20.  The bases for the application have been summarized in a specific discovery table Exhibit WJGB-3.  In a nutshell, it is said that the documents sought will shed light on whether Chu was the controlling/ de facto beneficial shareholder of Golden Resorts at the material time, with Mr Cheung as the front man.  The documents will assist in explaining why she made the share purchase offer and support the existence of the share purchase agreement. 

The applicable principles

21.  To invoke the jurisdiction of the court under Order 24, rule 7 of the Rules of the High Court to order discovery, the 3 prerequisites are relevance, existence and possession of the documents.  Once a prima facie case is made out, the court has a discretion whether or not to order disclosure: Paul’s Model Art GMBH & Co KG v UT Ltd [2006] 1 HKC 238.  It is up to the party objecting to discovery to show that it is not necessary for disposing fairly of the cause or for saving costs: Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2012, Vol 1, para 24/8/1, at page 559.

22.  Chu opposes the application on the ground that the classes of documents for which specific discovery is sought are:

(1)  Not relevant;

(2)  Not shown to be in her possession, custody or power;

(3)  Not necessary for the fair disposal of the cause or matter; and

(4)  Not necessary for the purpose of saving costs.

Relevance

23.  The parties’ cases are diametrically opposite on the core issue of the existence of the share purchase agreement. Closely related to this issue is whether or not Chu made the representation, although there is no separate cause of action in misrepresentation.  The credibility of witnesses will be of crucial importance at the trial. 

24.  Counsel are not in dispute over the principle that in assessing the credibility of a party’s case, the Court will have regard to (a) whether the testimony is inherently plausible or implausible (“the plausibility issue”); and (b) whether the testimony is supported or contradicted by other undisputed or indisputable evidence (such as contemporaneous documents): Lee Fu Wing v Yan Po Ting Paul [2009] 5 HKLRD 513, 524.

25.  Counsel are also not in dispute over the principle that discovery which solely relates to credit is not allowed: Man Won Co Ltd & anor v Tay Vi Bing & ors,HCA 2553/1989, 6 October 1991,Bokhary J (as he then was); EG Music v SF (Film) Distributors Ltd [1978] FSR 121at 125.

26.  Fishing expedition with a view to hunting around the documents in the hope that they will reveal some improprieties on the defendants’ part or will provide information for them to pursue more enquiries is not permitted: Re Estate of Ng Chan Wah, HCAP 5/2003, 5 March 2003,Chu J (as she then was), at para 16.  However, this must be distinguished from onerous discovery causing inconvenience to a party: Man Won Co Ltd & anor v Tay Vi Bing & ors.

27.  In resisting this application, Mr Chan SC, counsel for Chu, relies on Allington Investments Corp & ors v First Pacific Bancshares Holdings Ltd [1995] 2 HKC 139, the facts of which appear to be similar to the present case.  In that case, the plaintiffs who were minority shareholders in the 1st defendant, sued the defendants for $10 million under an oral agreement.  They claimed that the defendants had entered into it to secure the plaintiffs’ votes in favour of a proposal at a special general meeting to cancel the minority shareholdings for a cash payment.  The defendants pleaded that the $10 million settlement was suggested by the plaintiffs in relation to three other outstanding matters between them and was unconnected to securing minority votes.  They expressly denied any agreement was reached.  The defendants sought discovery of documents relating to the three outstanding matters between the parties.  The Court of Appeal considered that raising an issue in the pleadings was not determinative as to whether it related to a matter in question. Discovery was not required of documents which related to irrelevant allegations in pleadings which, even if substantiated, could not affect the result of the action.  The application was held by the Court of Appeal to be without merit both as a matter of entitlement and as a matter of the discretion of the court (at 142E-F).

28.  Allington is clearly distinguishable from the present action on the facts.  There, establishing the three outstanding matters went nowhere near to showing that the oral agreement existed or that the plaintiffs’ case was more plausible.  The discovery sought in the present action is relevant to the plausibility issue.  A revelation that Chu was the controlling shareholder of Golden Resorts at the material times would enhance the inherent plausibility that she had made the representation, that she would be willing to commit to a repurchase of the Shares from the plaintiffs at a fixed price, an act that would potentially incur a great loss in return for retaining control in Golden Resorts.  The discovery is not solely on credibility[1].

29.  Chu in her affirmation stated that (i) while it might be argued that it was improbable that an individual would make the share purchase offer if he/she was not a shareholder of and did not have any beneficial interest in Golden Resorts, (ii) it did not follow that it became probable that an individual would make the share purchase offer if he/she was a shareholder of Golden Resorts. There was also no basis to say that as between a minority shareholder and a controlling shareholder of Golden Resorts, it was more probable that the latter would make the share purchase offer bearing in mind there were always other shareholders including members of the public.

30.  In my view, part (i) of Chu’s argument is actually a concession of relevance to the plausibility issue. Part (ii) of her argument, however, is an inference to be drawn by the trial judge and does not affect the test of relevance in the present application.

31.  In fact, Chu had conceded the relevance of documents relating to the Grandview Acquisition. Pursuant to the plaintiffs’ original request by letter dated 23 October 2007, Chu gave discovery by her further supplemental list of documents dated 25 January 2008 of Golden Resorts’ announcement dated 14 December 2004 and circular dated 22 February 2005 on the Grandview Acquisition.

32.  Given the proximity in time and striking similarity between the Casa Real Acquisition and Grandview Acquisition, documents in respect thereto may be pieced together to advance a case on controlling/de facto beneficial ownership.  Their relevance, subject to what I shall say as to the width of the discovery, is established. 

33.  In respect of the Subscription, however, Chu has never been a shareholder or director of Perfect View.  The Subscription was completed in April 2004, well in advance of the share purchase agreement.  On the evidence, it is not even alleged that Chu was a negotiator in the Subscription.  Her role (through Kingston Securities) was limited to lending money to Perfect View and could not have any bearing on Chu’s role as controlling/de facto beneficial owner in Golden Resorts. Even if, to borrow Mr Barlow SC’s example, Chu had waived the loan, that would not go to show her control in Golden Resorts.  Relevance of the Subscription documents is not established.

Width of the discovery

34.  Though relevance is established, the order must identify with precision the document or documents or categories of document which are required to be disclosed, for otherwise the person making the list may find himself in serious trouble for swearing to a false affidavit, even though doing his best to give an honest disclosure: Re Estate of Ng Chan Wah; Berkeley Administration Inc v McClelland [1990] FSR 381.

35.  Where a claim to see a class is made, the class must not be defined or described so widely as to include documents which are not relevant to the issue. The prerequisites mentioned above must be established in respect of the class described as a class, not as regards some in the class only: Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2012, Vol 1,paragraph 24/7/1.

36.  An excessively wide class remains a valid class, and even a valid relevant class, notwithstanding that irrelevant material is brought within its ambit. The fact that the party will be compelled to discover much irrelevant material in addition to relevant material, is something which goes to the issue of whether a discovery order is necessary “either for disposing fairly of the cause or matter or for saving costs”: Toeca National Resources BV v Baron Capital Ltd & anor, HCA 1913/2009, 31 May 2011, McWalters J, at para 38.

37.  I have considered the table prepared by Mr Tommy Lo for Chu and Lai’s affirmation containing complaints as to width of the classes of documents but shall not reproduce the details here.  Requiring discovery of eg correspondence and communication “in relation to” a key transaction was not too wide or too vague.  The classes are defined by reference to the nature of the documents but not to an issue: Deak & Co (Far East) Ltd v NM Rothschild & Sons Ltd & ors [1981] HKC 78, at 82F; Toeca National Resources BV v Baron Capital Ltd & anor, at paras 27-28.

38.  Classes 1-3 should be excluded for reasons given in para 33.

39.  Documents relating to the Casa Real Acquisition are directly related to the subject matter of this action.  It is the internal and unpublicized documents that may reveal the true position of Chu as a controlling/beneficial shareholder.  Class 4 is relevant. However, whether or not Chu has been given a reward or remuneration for acting on behalf of Golden Resorts in the negotiations for the Casa Real Acquisition is speculative and has no bearing at all even on the plausibility issue; discovery sought is a fishing exercise.  Class 5 should be excluded.

40.  For documents relating to the Grandview Acquisition, Classes 7, 10 and 11 are relevant for the same reason as for Class 4.  Class 6 is relevant to give the proper context for considering class 7.  The provisional and formal agreements would have set out the terms of the Grandview Acquisition and I do not see the need for discovery of the drafts, hence class 8 should be excluded.  Class 9 should be excluded for the same reason as for Class 5.  Classes 12 and 13 fall into the fishing category.  Exercising control as a consultant is not relevant to exercising control as de facto beneficial shareholder.

41.  The plaintiffs have made out a case of relevance for classes 4, 6, 7, 10 and 11 (collectively “the relevant classes”).  

Existence

42.  A prima facie case on existence may be established on merely showing the probability arising from the surrounding circumstances or on specific facts deposed to: Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2012, Vol 1, para 24/7/1, at pg 554.  For example, a prima facie case on existence may be established simply by assessing whether it is business practice for a certain type of document to exist: Union Bank of India v General Nice Resources (Hong Kong) Ltd, HCA 299/2007, 10 May 2010, Bharwaney J atpara 10.

43.  Documents under classes 7 and 10 had been referred to in the publicannouncements concerning the Casa Real Acquisition and Grandview Acquisition.  By business practice one can safely conclude that the listed companies would have generated correspondence and communication in the course of the negotiations.  Chu does not seriously dispute the existence of these documents.  I am satisfied that the plaintiffs have satisfied the test of existence.

Possession, custody and power over the documents

44.  Where documents are in the possession of a company of whom the respondent to an application is a director, the applicable principles are as follows:

“(1) …

(2) The documents of a company are in the legal possession of the company. If they are or have been in the actual physical possession of a director who is a party to litigation they must be disclosed by that director, if relevant to the litigation, even though he holds them as servant or agent of the company in his capacity as an officer of the company.

(3) Whether or not documents of a company are in the power of a director who is a party to the litigation is a question of fact in each case. “Power” in this context means “the enforceable right to inspect or obtain possession or control of the document”. If the company is the alter ego of such a director so that he has unfettered control of the company’s affairs, he must disclose and produce all relevant documents in the possession of the company.

(4) Where relevant documents in the possession of a company are disclosed by a director as being in his custody or power, the court has a discretion whether or not to order production of them.

(5)  The discretion is a judicial discretion, and in exercising it the court will have regard to all the circumstances. The court will balance the relevance and importance of the documents and the hardship likely to be caused to the [applicant] by non-production against any prejudice to the [respondent] and third parties likely to be caused by production. It has not hitherto been the practice of the court to order production of company documents to which the board of directors objects on affidavit, provided that the court is satisfied that the objection is not contrived for the purpose of frustrating the powers of the court. The court will not in exercise of its discretion order parties to do that which they have no power to do. The court will not order production unless it is satisfied that production is necessary either for disposing fairly of the issues between the parties or for saving costs.”

B v B (Matrimonial Proceedings: Discovery) [1978] 1 Fam 181page 193D-194A

45.  The relevant classes cover documents of Casa Real, Grandview, Mr Cheung, Mr Lee, Golden Resorts and Kingston Securities.  As Chu is sued in her personal capacity, Mr Barlow SC makes clear that the plaintiffs are only seeking discovery of those documents in her possession, custody or power.

46.  Chu denies having possession, custody or power of the documents or that the relevant companies were her alter ego.  At the time when she gave discovery she had not considered specifically whether she was or was not authorized to give discovery of those documents. 

47.  By a board resolution dated 23 September 2011 (“the board resolution”), Kingston has forbidden Chu from accessing or producing documents belonging to or held by Kingston, Kingston Securities or any other subsidiary of Kingston for the purpose of this action.

48.  I view Chu’s denial of possession with caution.  Firstly, she had affirmed to the fact that documents of Golden Resorts are not and “have never been” in her possession, custody or power.  However, Mr Chan SC has conceded in his submission that this statement was wrong. 

49.  Secondly, in her 3 lists of documents, virtually all but 3% in her 2nd list of documents were Golden Resorts' documents. 

50.  Thirdly, Lai, who was purportedly authorized by the board of Kingston (in which Chu and her husband abstained from voting) stated that he had no idea how Chu came into possession of some of the documents belonging to Golden Resorts and its subsidiaries and had no knowledge of her making discovery of the same.  There was apparently no investigation done by Lai or anyone to ascertain why Chu was able to do that. Lai’s version is simply not capable of belief.

51.  Fourthly, Chu’s has, in the words of Mr Barlow SC, calculated to mislead the court on her shareholding.  She affirmed to having 18.84% shareholding in Golden Resorts as of December 2004, became a controlling shareholder (in the sense of holding over 50% of the issued share capital) of Golden Resorts in April 2011, and has a present shareholding of 56.19%.  In fact, she has been a controlling shareholder (as defined in the Listing Rules, holding over 30% shares) as at July 2006; her shareholding as of October 2011 was about 56.23%.  This application for specific discovery was made at a time when Chu has become majority shareholder of Golden Resorts. 

52.  Fifthly, Chu has previously been held by the court to be an incredible witness, who had contrived a plot whereby employees of Golden Resorts and Kingston Securities, friends and relatives of such employees and clients of Kingston Securities bought shares and then signed proxy forms in favour of a scheme of arrangement.  The purchase was subject to a buy-back offer from Chu regardless of the market price. It was done with a view to boosting the head count in favour of the scheme at the court meeting.  Despite her denial, the court found Chu not to be credible and that Chu had devised a scheme as described.  See Re PCCW Ltd, HCMP 2382/2008, 6 April 2009, Kwan J (as she then was), para 70, 72(4), 111 and 116.  Such findings were upheld by the Court of Appeal in Re PCCW Ltd [2009] 3 HKC 292, 313 F-H.

53.  The inference to be drawn is that Chu has chosen to make disclosure only when it suited her. 

54.  Despite what was said in paragraphs 48-53, I do not think the rights of Golden Resorts can be taken away.  Golden Resorts is not a one-person company.  There are shareholders from the public and other independent directors.  I am unable to find, on the balance of probabilities, that Golden Resorts was the alter ego of Chu or that the directors were parties to some form of contrivance with Chu in the passing of the board resolution.  I am not satisfied that Chu is or was in possession, custody or power of the documents belonging to Golden Resorts, except in relation to classes 10 and 11 which are documents that Chu would have.

Necessity for disposal of the cause or matter and saving costs

55.  The court has to balance the interests of the plaintiffs, those of the defendant and the interest of the judge,

“33. … The judge accommodates all these interests by a balancing exercise in which he firstly takes into account the likely value of the materials to the person seeking discovery. This is expressed as assessing what information it is reasonable to suppose the documents contain and determining whether such information may, not will, enable the party seeking them to advance its own case or damage that of its opponent. After making this assessment he then places into the balance the interests of the opposing parties and his own interests as ultimate arbiter of the rights and liabilities of the parties and his case management responsibilities.” Toeca National Resources BV v Baron Capital Ltd & anor

56.  Even if relevant, if the probative value of the documents would be so slight as not to justify the inconvenience of giving discovery, discovery may be refused: Chan Hung v Yung Kwong Chung, HCA 216 & 217/2004, 15 January 2009, Deputy Judge Horace Wong SC, at para 32.

57.  I do not consider the probative value to be so slight as not to justify the inconvenience of giving discovery.  The relevant classes may include irrelevant materials (like letters on settling terms of an agreement).  That does not matter because it is really the way the correspondence or communication was handled internally and whether it was controlled by Chu that the discovery is aiming at.

58.  Mr Edward Chan SC also submits that since Chu has stated on affirmation that she does not have the documents, it would not assist in disposing fairly with the cause or matter by making an order of discovery against her.  Rather than saving costs, an order to that effect would increase costs.

59.  Given the hurdle of the board resolution, I agree it would not be costs saving to order Chu to personally produce the relevant classes, except for classes 10 and 11.

Discretion

60.  Mr Edward Chan SC has drawn to my attention that the Chu Summons was taken out very late – 7 years after the event, over 1 year after the witness statement was filed by Chu and 4 months after the latest list of documents was filed.  I do not consider this delay, in itself, is sufficient to deny the plaintiffs access to the documents.  I order discovery of classes 10 and 11 under the Chu Summons.

B.  THE GR SUMMONS

The applicable principles

61.  The court may order discovery against a non-party under section 42(1) of the High Court Ordinance, Cap 4:

“42 (1) On the application, in accordance with rules of court, of a party to any proceedings in which a claim is made, the Court of First Instance shall, in such circumstances as may be specified in the rules, have power to order a person who is not a party to the proceedings and who appears to the Court of First Instance to be likely to have or to have had in his possession, custody or power any documents which are relevant to an issue arising out of that claim―

(a) to disclose whether those documents are in his possession, custody or power; and

(b) to produce such of those documents as are in his possession, custody or power to the applicant or, on such conditions as may be specified in the order―

(i) to the applicant’s legal advisers

    …”

To that end, Order 24, rules 7A and 8(2) are applicable.

62.  The governing principles have been set out in the case of Tullett Prebon (HK) Ltd v Chan Yeung Fong Nick & ors, HCA 2197/2009, 9 June 2011, paras 64(1) and 76:

(i)   It must be shown that the non-party is likely to have the documents in his possession, custody or power any documents which are relevant to an issue rising out of the claim.

(ii)  The test of relevance is the same Peruvian Guano test as for inter-parte discovery, as are the other related principles governing exercise of the court’s discretion: Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2012, Vol 1, para 24/7A/4-8.

(iii)    It must be shown that the order must be necessary either for disposing fairly of the matter or for saving costs.

(iv)    The order sought must identify with precision the document, documents or categories of documents which are required to be disclosed: Berkeley AdministrationIncv McClelland.

(v)  Even if satisfied with the above, the court still has discretion to exercise.  It should be borne in mind that disclosure orders against third parties are exceptional.  It should not be used as a fishing exercise for documents nor speculative.  It should not be oppressive to the witness, eg by the terms being too wide.  It must identify the documents by means of a particular description and not a general description.

(vi)    It will be oppressive if the order required the third party to make fine judgments regarding the relevance of the documents; or if it requires him to undertake a search of an excessively large amount of documents; or if it does not specify the documents with reasonable particularity.  See ACCC v Shell (1999) 161 ALR 686.

(vii)   The court may also in its discretion refuse to order the disclosure of documents which are confidential: Re Global Info Ltd [1999] 1 BCLC 74 at 79a.

Documents sought

63.  Specific discovery is sought for the same classes of documents as those in the Chu Summons, plus one class of documents (“the financing documents”)[2] in respect of the Casa Real Acquisition, ie:

(a)  Loan applications and agreements, security documentation in respect of loans made by Golden Resorts; and

(b)  Correspondence between Golden Resorts and banks or companies providing those loans.

I need only concentrate on the relevant classes.

64.  Kingston has no interest in the outcome of this action.  It objects to the application on the grounds of (i) failure to prove possession; (ii) lack of relevance; (iii) lack of necessity for fair disposal of the matter; (iv) lack of adequate identification of the classes of documents; and (v) oppression.

Failure to prove that Kingston has possession, custody or power

65.  The plaintiffs’ solicitors have deposed to his belief that Kingston should have kept written records.  It is not sufficient to make a general affidavit based on a priori reasoning that certain classes of documents must be in his opponent’s possession or power: White v Spafford & Co [1901] 2 KB 241 (CA) at 246.

66.  Mr Lai has affirmed to the practice of Kingston:

(i)   of not keeping formal attendance notes for internal meetings or communications, and that even if attending officers took their own notes, they as a matter of practice would not be kept; and

(ii)  of destroying documents kept beyond the required 7 years under revenue law; since documents sought related to commercial transactions completed for more than 7 years, it is likely that those documents have been destroyed in accordance with usual practice.

67.  Mr Wong, counsel for Kingston, submits that the plaintiffs have failed to show that Kingston is “likely” to have or have had internal notes and correspondence in its possession, custody or control.  As for other documents, the plaintiffs fail to show that they are “likely to be in Kingston’s possession, custody or control. In this regard, section 42(1)(a) and (b) of the High Court Ordinance are worded to the clear effect that the court is only given the power to order a non-party to disclose documents which “are” in his possession, custody or power.  There is only jurisdiction for the Court to make a discovery order if it can be shown that the documents are (as opposed to “have been”) in the non-party’s possession, power or custody.

68.  Lai’s evidence must be viewed with caution for the reasons given in paragraphs 50 and 52.  He only came into employment of Kingston in 2008, years after the key transactions.  All that he could depose to was the practice of the company.  He only said that “for most of the time”, internal communications were conducted orally and not reduced into writing. He did not go so far as to assert that the documents sought (principally for the 2004/2005 period) had been destroyed.

69.  There is contrary evidence from the plaintiffs that Golden Resorts’ representatives did take meeting notes during the Casa Real negotiation.  It would have been likely for a listed company to keep such notes and have correspondence as part of its business practice.  The GR Summons taken out in November 2011 was just before expiry of the 7 year period for 2004 documents.  One would not expect Golden Resorts to have destroyed them pending resolution of the GR Summons.

70.  The plaintiffs have made out a prima facie case that the documents exist and are likely to be in the possession of Kingston.

Relevance

71.  The analyses on relevance under the Chu Summons apply.  As for the financing documents, it appears from Golden Resorts’ circular dated 18 April 2005 that part of the cash consideration for the Casa Real Acquisition of $750 million would be funded by bank financing. The plaintiffs say that this class of documents would likely reveal the true extent of the Chu’s involvement in the Casa Real Acquisition, including the question whether she was the beneficial controlling shareholder of Golden Resorts at that time.  Since it would be Golden Resorts taking out the loans, it is almost certain that Kingston would have possession, custody or power of the financing documents.  In my view, it is far-fetched to say that financing documents can reveal Chu’s controlling role.  I decline to order discovery of the financing documents.

NECESSITY EITHER FOR DISPOSING FAIRLY OF THE MATTER OR FOR SAVING COSTS

72.  The analyses under paragraphs 55-57 equally apply.

Lack of precise identification of document or categories of documents to be disclosed

73.  For the reasons given in paragraph 37 above, the complaint is unjustified.

OPPRESSION

74.   It will be oppressive if the order requires the third party to make fine judgments regarding the relevance of the documents; or if it requires him to undertake a search of an excessively large amount of documents; or if it does not specify the documents with reasonable particularity.  See ACCC v Shell.

75.  In reducing the categories of documents to be disclosed under the Chu Summons, I have already taken into account the need to bar the plaintiffs from fishing for evidence and acting on speculation.

76.  The relevant classes are well defined.  No fine judgment regarding relevance of documents need to be made by Kingston’s employees to decide whether a document falls within a class.

77.  As for the necessity to undertake asearch, Kingston says that an order for specific discovery will require it to undertake a search of an excessively large amount of documents of over 2,000 cartons.  It will require 2 out of 5 administrative staff costing $10,000 to undertake a full-time search for the documents for not less than 2 weeks.

78.  Oppression is not confined to the situation of asking a third party to undertake an extensive search.  Engaging a high percentage of his workforce in the search may also be oppressive in the sense of affecting the normal running of the business.

79.  Is “oppression” real in the circumstances of this case?  Each subsidiary keeps its own documents.  The 2,000 cartons are for all subsidiaries of Golden Resorts.  The relevant classes concern only a few subsidiaries, 2 key transactions and a period of about a year from negotiation to completion.

80.  If documents are kept for tax purposes and if there is a system of each department of the Group regularly destroying documents after 7 years, it is inconceivable that the contents of 2,000 cartons have not been labelled or indexed by reference to date, content or subsidiary for easy retrieval.

81.  In my view, the assertion of oppression is exaggerated and I reject the same.

OTHER FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN EXERCISE OF DISCRETION

82.  The court may in its discretion refuse to order the disclosure of documents which are confidential: Re Global Info Ltd at 79a.

83.  There is no serious dispute that the documents sought contain confidential and/or sensitive commercial information privy to Kingston and its counter-parties.  However, all the transactions have been completed years ago.

84.  There is an implied undertaking as to confidentiality in discovery.  If that is not sufficient, the plaintiffs are prepared to give an express undertaking and I do require that undertaking as a condition for discovery.  The issue of confidentiality carries little weight.

85.  The plaintiffs have made their first port of call to the defendant before taking out the GR Summons.  Having considered all the circumstances, I consider it fair and appropriate to make an order for discovery of the relevant classes against Kingston.

SECURITY

86.  The court has power under Order 27, rule 7A(5) to make such order “conditional upon the applicant giving security for the costs of the person against whom it is made”.

87.  It is established that the usual costs order for non-party discovery is for the non-party to have the costs of the application and of the production of the document from the applicant: Tullett Prebon, at para 105.  There is no reason why the usual indemnity basis of costs applicable to a Norwich Pharmacal order should not be similarly applied to an application for non-party discovery: A Co v B Co [2002] 3 HKLRD 111, para 31.  On taxation or assessment of costs on indemnity basis, all costs are allowed except those unreasonably incurred and the receiving party will be given the benefit of the doubt: Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2012, Vol 1, para 62/App/11. 

88.  The plaintiffs are indisputably based in Macau.  Despite the issue of security being raised, they have not shown the existence of assets within the jurisdiction of Hong Kong. Indeed the plaintiffs do not dispute the need to provide security.  The dispute is on quantum of security.

89.  Kingston asks for security in the sum of $378,200.  I will not reduce the hourly rates or number of fee earners.  However, apart from perusal of documents, the substantive work done leading up to the hearing was the drafting of one affirmation of Chu and one of Mr Lai in opposition.  I appreciate, of course, that there may be further legal work required for Kingston to make discovery on affirmation. Even so, the costs claimed are excessive. I order security for costs in favour of Kingston, assessed on indemnity basis, at $100,000.  This will cover costs on discovery to be incurred after the hearing.  Additionally, I order the plaintiffs to bear the costs of Kingston in the first instance for the GR Summons. Such costs shall remain in the discretion of the trial judge who, by the time of trial, will be in a position to see what comes out of the discovery and its overall impact on the trial.

CONCLUSION

90.  On the Chu Summons, I make an order in terms of paragraphs 1-3, limiting discovery to classes 10 and 11.  The plaintiffs are partly successful but for the board resolution passed after the taking out of the Chu Summons. There is however an element of fishing involved. I make an order nisi that the plaintiffs’ costs be in the cause.

91.  On the GR Summons, I order as follows:

(1)  Upon fulfilment of the following conditions:

(i)  Within 14 days, provision of an express undertaking of confidentiality by the plaintiffs in terms agreed with Kingston (or, failing agreement, settled by the court);

(ii)  Within 14 days of the summary assessment referred to in sub-paragraph (3) below, payment of the costs of Kingston;

(iii)  Within 21 days, provision of security of costs of Kingston for the discovery by payment of $100,000 into court;

there be an order in terms of paragraphs 1-2 of the GR Summons, save that the documents to be disclosed shall be confined to classes 4, 7, 8, 11 and 12[3].

(2)  Costs of the summons including all costs reserved and this hearing shall be on an indemnity basis and be borne by the plaintiffs in the first instance in favour of Kingston.  Such costs as between the plaintiffs and the defendant shall remain in the discretion of the trial judge.

(3)  Costs of Kingston are to be summarily assessed on 27 December 2012 at 4:30 pm on the papers without attendance.  Kingston shall file and serve its statement of costs by 14 December 2012.  The plaintiffs shall file and serve their grounds in opposition by 21 December 2012.

92.  I thank counsel for their assistance.

 

 

 (Queeny Au-Yeung)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Barrie Barlow SC and Mr Benny Lo, instructed by Reed Smith Richards Butler, for the plaintiffs

Mr Edward Chan SC and Mr Tommy Lo, instructed by Cheung, Tong & Rosa, for the defendant

Mr Anson Wong, instructed by K C Ho & Fong, for Kingston Financial Group Limited


[1] Compare to the situation of eg adducing evidence in the Re PCCW Ltd, HCMP 2382/2008, 6 April 2009,to discredit Chu: see para 52 below.

[2] Item 6 in the GR summons.

[3] These numbers follow those in the GR Summons and are the same as classes 4, 6, 7, 10 and 11 of the Chu Summons.