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Civil Action2006

YEUNG YEUK SUT v. TSE CHUN YIP AND OTHERS

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70878-EN-2010-05-05

YEUNG YEUK SUT v. TSE CHUN YIP AND OTHERS

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HCA 682/2006

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 682 OF 2006

----------------------

BETWEEN  
 YEUNG YEUK SUTPlaintiff
(Paying Party)
 and 
 TSE CHUN YIP1st Defendant
(Receiving Party)
 WONG CHI KIT2nd Defendant
 FAN SHEUNG MOON3rd Defendant
 GAINFORD INTERNATIONAL LIMITED4th Defendant
(Receiving Party)

----------------------

Coram : Before Madam Registrar Au-Yeung in Chambers

Date of Hearing :   2 & 5 March 2010

Date of Handing Down: 5 May 2010

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DECISION

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1.  This Decision should be read in conjunction with the one dated 2 February 2010 in this case (“the February Decision”).  I adopt the same terminology in the present Decision.

Background

2.   After provisional taxation by me on the papers, the paying party successfully had the taxed profit costs reduced to $791,998 at an oral hearing on 6 October 2009.  I summarily assessed their costs at $10,000 which should be set off against the taxed costs. 

3.   There was clear breach of indemnity principle in that the amount of profit costs claimed in the Taxation Bill ($1,071,074) exceeded the liability ($820,840) of the receiving parties to their solicitors CMKI.

4.   The following issues have been adjourned since the February Decision:

A.   The extent to which the receiving parties have breached the indemnity principle;

B.    Whether or not the sanctioned offer made by the receiving parties on 4th August 2009 had been beaten and, if so, what sanctions should be imposed;

C.   Whether or not the paying party should be exempted from payment of part of the interest on costs;

D.   Costs of the taxation proceedings as a whole.

Issue A: The extent to which the receiving parties have breached theindemnity principle

5.   I have to deal first with issues raised in paragraph 25 of the February Decision, namely, recoverability of costs incurred prior to the deemed commencement date of the retainer. 

(i)  Under Stage 1 of the Taxation Bill, Mr. Tang explained that 2 letters which pre-dated the commencement date of the retainer were produced by the receiving parties to CMKI for perusal and handling after early April 2006.    The period covered by Stage 1 merely represented the “issue dates” of the 2 letters.   He proposed merging the costs incurred in Stage 1 into Stage 2.  Without disrespect, this is not permissible.  The work done was described as “communications” with Plaintiff’s former solicitors and not “perusal” of prior correspondence.  I maintain my view that costs claimed and initially allowed ($667) under Stage 1 of the Taxation Bill are irrecoverable. 

(ii)  Under Stage 2 of the Taxation Bill, although it was said to have started before commencement of the retainer, from the schedule annexed to the Taxation Bill, only one letter involving SI for 5 minutes ($333.33) fell outside the period of the retainer and was irrecoverable.

It will become apparent from the analyses below that whether or not these 2 items were included in the taxed amount would not affect the issue of breach of the indemnity principle.

6.   In the present application, the paying party also challenged the hourly rate of Mr. Tang as having breached the indemnity principle.  He was described as a partner in the retainer letter dated 10 April 2006 but he only became a partner on 1 April 2007.  In a letter dated 23 March 2007, there was evidence that Mr. Tang was charging $2,500 per hour.  The paying party suggested that Mr. Tang’s hourly rate should be capped at $2,500 per hour before he became a partner and $3,500 thereafter.

7.   In opposition, Mr. Tang produced undisputed evidence that the client retained his firm on 10 April 2006.  He agreed that the retainer was only later reduced into a formal agreement signed after April 2007 but backdated to the date of the formal Board Resolution.  I accept such evidence.  The retainer letter has provided for the agreed (and/or ratified) hourly rates of fee earners.  I see no reason for going behind an agreement which was entered into long before the taxation started.

8.   I now come to the item by item comparison.  In my February Decision, I have left open the question of what an “item” was.  Each party’s approach to this question was different.  Both parties took pains to prepare numerous tables for comparison purposes. 

The Paying Party’s Approach

9.   The paying party used the stages in the Office Bill as the bases and reconstructed the Taxation Bill accordingly. By so doing, Mr. Ho went into minute details of breakdowning the figures in the Taxation Bill as claimed, as taxed down and as allowed on taxation.  He produced altogether 4 pages of figures (revised and added from time to time) and came to the conclusion that in some stages the indemnity principle was breached.  He claimed that applying the indemnity principle, the amount recoverable was only in the region of $500,000.

10.   In my view, Mr. Ho’s approach was not acceptable given that the stages as classified in the 2 Bills were completely different. The classification in the Office Bill was not based on progress of the litigation whereas the classification in the Taxation Bill was. The reconstruction exercise imposed on the Taxation Bill a structure that was never intended and was against the requirements of PD 14.3.   It required both parties and the Court to do another examination of the Taxation Bill after the formal taxation was over. 

11.   Mr. Ho’s approach involved a reversion to the old practice under which a receiving party would set out each and every piece of communication and conference with dates and time spent respectively.  That practice had been abandoned when the new format for a bill of costs for taxation was put to use pursuant to PD 14.3 post-CJR.  The receiving parties in this case have properly claimed for correspondence andconference costs as global amounts in the Taxation Bill.  (This was in accordance with paragraph 17(5) and (6) of PD 14.3.)  Those global figures often straddled 2 stages of the Office Bill.  The reconstruction done by Mr. Ho necessarily involved breaking up those global figures.  It took each party long hours to check to see if the amounts claimed and allowed were correct for each stage. Mr. Tang has demonstrated that the paying party’s calculation was erroneous in that the correspondence / conference times globally taxed off have not been reflected in his calculation.  The question is: when a taxing master made a global deduction to correspondence / conferences, how could one know which letter in which Stage of the Taxation Bill has suffered a deduction and which one did not, except in the clearest of cases?

12.   Moreover, some items in the Taxation Bill could not be reconstructed in the way proposed by Mr. Ho.  For example, item 82 in Stage 4 of the Taxation Bill was for 50 hours of consideration of “evidential documents received by client and/or other parties including but not limited to those documents inside the agreed and/or non-agreed documents bundles for trial.”  As submitted by Mr. Tang (which I accept) it could not have been the case that all those 50 hours were only spent in Stage 4.  The work done would have been spread over several stages and put under Stage 4 only for convenience.  (This is a common phenomenon in bills. It appeared that item 86 in Stage 5 of the Taxation Bill, being 4 hours for considering pleadings and statements filed in DCCJ 5949 of 2006; and legal research of 2 hours not classified under any Stage, were of the same effect.) 

13.   Finally, Mr. Ho had “assigned” items of costs to the wrong stage of the Office Bill.  For example item 97 under Stage 5 of the Taxation Bill was for perusal of the typed notes prepared by counsel and transcript concerning the first 6 trial dates which ended part-heard on 28 August 2008.  Mr. Ho “assigned” such time to Stage 5 of the Office Bill which ended on 31 August 2008.  As Mr. Tang submitted, and which I accept, he had rendered such perusal work far beyond 31 August 2008 to prepare for the resumption of the trial.  The Taxation Bill did not disclose any other purpose in relation to this perusal.  Item 97 must have been incurred in the final stage in the Office Bill.

14.   Mr. Ho claimed in his written submission that the receiving parties “agreed to compare the profit costs in respect of the Office Bill and Taxation Bill (after taxed) on item and item basis but counter-propose that the time intervals applied shall be in accordance with those of various stages in the Taxation Bill.  Therefore, unless the Honourable Court directs or otherwise, it is no longer necessary for [the paying party] to deal with the comparison stated in [the receiving parties’] submission as the comparisons are partly item by item and/or (partly) global basis”.  I cannot agree with this view.  Mr. Tang has clearly stated in his written submission that parties ought not to engage in “painstaking” comparison of every single “item” in the Taxation Bill and the Office Bill, in order to save costs and time.  However, he had proposed several alternative approaches in opposition to Mr. Ho’s stance.

The Receiving Parties’ Approach

15.   Mr. Tang produced 5 tables which were subsequently revised and added to become 7.   My analyses are as follows.

16.   Table A1 correctly showed the amount claimed and allowed in the various stages under the Taxation Bill.  It could  immediately be seen that the amount claimed ($1,081,140) was in breach of the indemnity principle.  The amount allowed on taxation ($791,998) did not appear to have breached the indemnity principle at first glance until one went into some detail.

17.   Table A2 purported to “assign” the amount I have allowed for general care and conduct ($12,000) to the 5 stages in the Taxation Bill, pro-rated according to the taxed profit costs of a particular stage over the total taxed profit costs for all 5 stages.  I reject this Table. This formula for assignment was against the general practice in taxation, under which 5 minutes per month of the litigation was allowed for general care and conduct.  The present case started from the month of April 2006 to December 2008 (33 months).  Any excess for general care and conduct could be treated as part of the costs for the 5th stage after the trial was over, as costs were awarded on indemnity basis.  I hasten to add that however the $12,000 were assigned would not have any impact on whether or not the indemnity principle has been breached.

18.   Table A3 showed the amounts claimed for profit costs for various stages in the Office Bill.  I accept the calculation therein.

19.   Table A4 reconstructed the costs claimed under the Taxation Bill by pro-rating them according to the number of months under a particular stage of the Office Bill.  I find pro-rating to be an incorrect approach as the actual amount of work done in each stage/each month varied greatly in this case.  CMKI did not charge on monthly basis.  The pro-rating gave no regard to the real situation.  I place no reliance on Table A4.

20.   Table A5 compared Tables A4 and A2.  It showed breach of the indemnity principle to the extent of $97,054 (i.e. $820,800 - $69,181.40 - $193,564 - $118,157.20 - $342,843.40).  As Table A4 was prepared on a basis that I have rejected, the views proposed in Table A5 could not be accepted.  Moreover, this Table conveniently ignored the 2 broad periods of charging by CMKI as can be seen below.

21.   Table A6 purported to make 4 sets of direct comparison between the Office Bill and the Taxation Bill without any “assignment” of costs.  I reject the first 3 sets as they were not comparing like period with like.  As for the 4th set of comparison, it simply compared the total amount in the Office Bill with the Taxation Bill.  Whilst this had the advantage of simplicity, it ignored the manner of CMKI charging the receiving parties.  It also conveniently avoided the item by item comparison.  I reject it as well.

22.   Table A7 gave 3 sets of alternative comparison.  The 3 sets assumed that both bills should only be divided into 2 broad stages.  It relied on Table 5 which I have rejected.  I reject Table A7 as well.

Comparison of 2 Broad Periods of Charging

23.   The Office Bill disclosed CMKI charging the receiving parties by 5 stages ranging from 2 to 12 calendar months.  They did not seem to bear any relationship to the progress of the litigation.  It appeared that CMKI just billed the receiving parties as and when the former deemed appropriate.  However, the Office Bill could be broadly divided into 2 major periods for comparison as stated in the February Decision:

(i)    From the time the retainer started on 3 April 2006 to 31 August 2008 when the trial was adjourned part-heard (“the 1st Period”); and

(ii)  From 1 September 2008 up to 2 November 2009 being the date of the Office Bill during which the trial and taxation were completed (“the 2nd Period”).

24.   For the 1st Period, all 5 stages in the Office Bill should be treated as one item.  The amount that should fall into the definition of “profit costs” according to taxation law wouldbe $478,300 made up of:

Professional charges   $451,000
Photocopying, postage, travelling & other miscellaneous expenses   6,300
Photocopying, postage, travelling other miscellaneous expenses1,600
Photocopying, postage, travelling & other miscellaneous expenses    2,400
Photocopying, postage, travelling & other miscellaneous expenses   11,000
Photocopying, postage, travelling & other miscellaneous expenses6,000
Total$478,300

25.   One should compare this amount with the taxed costs of the equivalent period, i.e. the first 4 stages of the Taxation Bill and part of the 5th  up to 31 August 2008.  Adjusted taxed costs of the first 4 stages were already $451,162.67[1].  Although the parties have not provided me with the taxed costs for the 5th stage up to 31 August 2008, such costs were easily identifiable and I can say with certainty that they were in the region of $200,000.  Thus, the indemnity principle was breached and so the receiving parties could only recover $478,300 for the 1st Period.

26.   For the 2nd Period, the amount that should fall into the definition of “profit costs” according to taxation law would be $342,500 made up of:

Professional charges    $340,000
Photocopying, postage, travelling & other miscellaneous expenses2,500
 $342,500

27.   Mr. Ho asked for breakdown of this amount.  I declined to order for such.  Mr. Ho should bear in mind that this was not a solicitor-client taxation but a party-and-party taxation (although on indemnity basis).  The Court was not assessing the remuneration of the solicitor but was determining how much should be paid to the receiving parties to reimburse them for the expense which they had properly incurred in carrying on the proceedings: paragraph 62/App/2 Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2010.  Moreover, the breakdown was simply not necessary for the purpose of deciding whether the indemnity principle has been breached.  That said, the enormous amount charged to the client could have been for perfectly valid reasons, e.g. as stated in the course of taxation, some costs in the 2nd Period was of a solicitor-client nature that was not covered by the costs order.

28.   The amount I have allowed on taxation for the 2nd Period was $130,098[2]  according to Mr. Ho.  The indemnity principle was not breached and so the receiving parties couldrecover$130,098.

29.   Therefore, under the indemnity principle, the receiving parties can only recover $608,398 (i.e. $478,300 + $130,098).  There was overall breach of the indemnity principle by $183,600 (i.e. $791,998 - $608,398).

Issue B: Whether or not the sanctioned offer made by the receiving parties on 4th August 2009 had been beaten and, if so, what sanctions should be imposed

30.   On 4 August 2009, the receiving parties made a sanctioned offer to settle all costs (including disbursements) in lieu of taxation at $1,400,000.  The offer was not beaten having regard to my finding in the preceding paragraph.

Issue C: Whether or not the paying party should be exempted from payment of part of the interest on costs

31.   The costs order was made on 10 December 2008.  The Taxation Bill was filed in April 2009.  It took more than a year since filing of the bill to have the taxation disposed of by this Decision. 

32.   Negotiation had only ended up in narrowing down of a small number of items for taxation.  The paying party had not made any sanctioned payment.  They have not paid even the non-disputed taxed costs notwithstanding the allocatur has been sealed.  But for my order for part payment into court, the paying party would not have provided a cent of taxed costs.   

33.   I see no good reason for exempting them from payment of any interest on costs. 

Issue D: Costs of the taxation proceedings as a whole.

34.   The paying party asked for costs of the taxation proceedings on indemnity basis.

35.   I have found for him on this application for variation of the taxed costs and prima facie costs should follow the event.  However, I have taken into account the overall circumstances and the conduct of the parties.

36.   The breach of the indemnity principle by the receiving parties was great but I am not satisfied that CMKI committed the breach intentionally.  It was probably due to a change of the taxation law post-CJR that brought about the breach.  CMKI had demonstrated serious efforts in coming to a settlement with the paying party by open correspondence, making sanctioned offer and without prejudice negotiation but was not successful.  Its request for the paying party to prepare a bundle of documents for hearing was not even acceded to.

37.   On the other hand, the paying party was aggressive.  But for the painstaking way in which Mr. Ho presented the comparison of figures, this application would not have taken the course it did.  The original time assigned for this application was one hour but it turned out to be over 4.  Numerous tables, revised tables and written submissions were churned out.  Most of the comparisons were not accepted. Each party spent over 20 hours on preparation and hearing of this application.  One party involved the LCD. The time and effort spent on this application was more than the total spent on the paper taxation plus oral taxation.  This is a typical piece of satellite litigation done after the substantive litigation was over.  It could have been avoided if the paying party had asked for an oral taxation right from the start and adopted a more realistic approach.

38.   In the premises, I will only award costs to the paying party on party-and-party basis, summarily assessed at $35,000.  This will cover all the proceedings under the February Decision and this Decision.

Conclusion

39.  I answer the 4 issues as follows:

Issue A: The amount claimed ($1,081,140) in the Taxation Bill was in breach of the indemnity principle.  The amount allowed on taxation ($791,998) has also breached the indemnity principle.   The receiving parties can only recover $608,398 as taxed profit costs.  The extent of breach was $183,600.

Issue B: The sanctioned offer was not beaten.

Issue C: The paying party should not be exempted from paying any interest.

Issue D: Costs covering all the proceedings under the February  Decision and this Decision be to the paying party summarily assessed at $35,000.

40.   Allocatur is to be sealed.  An amount has been paid into court pursuant to my order on 21 December 2009.  There should be payment out with interest forthwith to the receiving parties in part settlement of taxed costs due to them.

  

 (Queeny Au-Yeung)
 Registrar, High Court

Mr. A. Ho of Messrs. Alex Ho & Co. for the Plaintiff.

Mr. A. Tang of Messrs. Christine M. Koo & Ip for the 1st and 4th Defendants.


[1]  (Nil for stage1) + ($67,456 - $333.33 for stage 2) + ($258,057 + $633 for stage 3) + ($116,350 for stage 4) + ($9,000 for general care and conduct for 27 months from April 2006 to June 2008)

[2]  It comprised the scale costs of $6,667, items 96 to 100 of the Taxation Bill, part of the conferences and communication covering 1 September to 10 December 2008 and the profit costs for taxation less amounts taxed off.  It appears the calculation was to the benefit of the receiving parties.

69609-EN-2010-02-02

YEUNG YEUK SUT v. TSE CHUN YIP AND OTHERS

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HCA 682/2006

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 682 OF 2006

_________________________

BETWEEN

 yeung yeuk sutPlaintiff
(Paying Party)
 And 
 TSE CHUN YIP1st Defendant
(Receiving Party)
 WONG CHI KIT2nd Defendant
 FAN SHEUNG MOON3rd Defendant
 GAINFORD INTERNATIONAL LIMITED4th Defendant
(Receiving Party)

_________________________

Coram : Before Madam Registrar Au-Yeung in Chambers

Date of Hearing :   21 December 2009

Date of Decision :   2 February 2010

_______________

D E C I S I O N

_______________

 

1. Pending sealing of the allocatur, the Paying Party applies to vary the taxed profit costs on the ground that (1) there were contingency fee arrangements; and (2) breach of the indemnity principle, by the Receiving Parties.  The parties agreed that no affirmation evidence would be filed and were content for me to resolve those 2 issues on a bundle of correspondence and submissions.

Background

2. The Receiving Parties and their solicitors (“CMKI”) entered into an agreement for fees as embodied in a letter dated 10 April 2006 (“the Retainer”).  It was an agreement for fees to be charged on time basis at the rates specified therein.  Those rates have been adhered to in the bill for taxation (“the Taxation Bill”).

3. Below is a short chronology of the relevant events:

28.08.2008Trial adjourned part-heard after 6 days.
09.12.2008Resumed hearing.
10.12.2008Deputy Judge Carlson ordered the Plaintiff’s claim to be struck out on the ground of abuse of process.  He ordered costs of the action be to D1 and 4 on indemnity basis to be taxed if not agreed.
23.04.2009Bill for taxation (“the Taxation Bill”) filed. A total $1,805,925 was claimed, of which $1,071,074was for profit costs. 
24.08.2009Paper taxation done and parties were informed of the outcome.
06.10.2009Oral taxation at the request of the Paying Party. Paying Party requested for and Receiving Parties consented to provide their office bill before the allocatur was sealed.  I gave a direction (“the Direction”) accordingly.
07.10.2009LCD for the Receiving Parties wrote to seek confirmation of the Paying Party as to the amount of costs allowed on taxation: total of $1,373,937, of which $791,998 were profit costs.  The Paying Party faxed back asking for production of the office bills to prove the Receiving Parties’ legal costs.
19.11.20009CMKI wrote to the Paying Party’s solicitors stating that all communications between CMKI and their own clients were legally privileged and strictly confidential.  They were not aware of the Direction unless the Paying Party could produce to them any sealed order as such.
01.12.2009Sealing of an order containing the Direction.
02.12.2009CMKI served a copy of their office bill dated 2 November 2009 (“the Office Bill”) to the Paying Party pursuant to the sealed order.  The client was charged a total of $1,597,845, of which $791,000 were profit costs.
11.12.2009CMKI served a revised office bill also dated 2 November 2009 (“the Revised Bill”).  It showed the same amount of costs and disbursements charged to the client but with additional remarks.  (See below.)
16.12.2009Letter from CMKI to the Receiving Parties to confirm various matters (“the Confirmation Letter”).. 
18.12.2009Receiving Parties signed the Confirmation Letter. (See below.)
21.12.2009Hearing before me to vary the taxed costs.

4. The Office Bill effectively broke up the total costs charged into 2 major periods (collectively “the 2 Periods”):

(i)  The 1st Period was from March 2006 to August 2008 (2 years and 5 months) from commencement of the action up to about the time when it was adjourned part-heard.  A total of 112.75 hours was charged under 5 defined stages, plus disbursements for (presumably the same) 5 stages. 

(ii)     The 2nd Period was from September 2008 to 2 November 2009 (1 year and 2 months) up to conclusion of the oral taxation.  A total of 85 hours were charged, plus disbursements.  The substantive work appeared to be for the 2 days’ resumed hearing and taxation proceedings.

One immediately queries why the relatively lighter work in the 2nd period would cost 75% of the costs under the 1st period.

5. The Revised Bill purported to give an answer.  For the 1st Period, it was asserted that “there [were] works done in excess of the said 112.75 hours, which [were] to be billed subject to the taxation.”  For the 2nd period, it was asserted that “particulars of all works done during March 2006 up to October 2009 were stated and described in the Taxation Bill (prepared by Law Costs Draftsman), which was duly provided to Clients and filed with the Taxing Master for taxation.”  One would immediately ask why and which part of the costs for the 1st Period was included in the 2nd Period. 

6. Shortly before the present hearing to vary the taxed costs, the Receiving Parties signed the  Confirmation Letter prepared by CMKI in the following terms:

“We write to confirm that:

1.    We are instructed by [Clients] to issue informal interim bills on profit costs for works done by our firm (“Interim Billing”) in respect of and/or during the period from March 2006 to August 2008 (“Relevant Period”). [Note: this Relevant Period was the same as the 1st period referred to in paragraph 4 above.]

2.    It is agreed that the Interim Billing is of interim nature, not final and did not reflect and show the whole amount of our firms’ profit costs in respect of and/or during the Relevant Period.

3.    It is agreed that we shall issue and serve a final bill of costs (“Final Bill”) which is to account for both the Interim Billing as well as the outstanding amounts of all costs and disbursements, which have not yet been billed and/or charged in respect of and/or during the Relevant Period and thereafter up to the conclusion of the Action, including the taxation proceedings if any (“Outstanding Amounts”).

4.    It is agreed that the Outstanding Amounts (as stated in the Final Bill) are subject to, according to and/or in line with a bill of costs to be prepared by a law costs draftsman or a Court’s costs assessment on a taxation bill prepared by a law costs draftsman if there is taxation proceedings (whichever lower).

5.    We have issued and served upon Clients the Final Bill on about 2nd November 2009, and that the Outstanding Amount (as stated in the Final Bill) is subject to, according to and/or in line with the Court’s costs assessment on 6th October 2009.”

7. The issues are whether or not there was a contingency fee arrangement and whether there has been a breach of the indemnity principle. 

I.  Was There a Contingency Fee Arrangement?

The Statutory Provisions

8. The relevant provisions under the Legal Practitioners Ordinance, Cap. 159 (“LPO”) are as follows:

“58.   A solicitor may make with his client an agreement in writing as to his remuneration, in respect of any contentious business done or to be done by the solicitor for the client, which provides that the solicitor shall be remunerated either by a gross sum or by salary, or otherwise, and at either a greater or a less rate than that at which he would otherwise have been entitled to be remunerated.”

“62.   Subject to the provisions of sections 59, 60 and 61, the costs of a solicitor in any case where any agreement has been made in pursuance of the provisions of section 58 shall not be subject to taxation, nor to the provisions of section 66 with respect to the signing and delivery of a solicitor’s bill.”

“64.   Nothing in section 58, 59, 60, 61 or 62 shall give validity to –

…

(b)     any agreement by which a solicitor retained or employed to prosecute any action, suit or other contentious proceedings stipulates for payment only in the event of success in that action, suit or proceeding; …”

9. A contingency fee arrangement is any arrangement whereby a solicitor is to be rewarded only in the event of success in litigation by the payment of any sum (whether fixed, or calculated either as a percentage of the proceeds or otherwise).  This is so, even if the agreement further stipulates a minimum fee in any case, win or lose.  See section 4.16 of Guide to Professional Conduct Volume 1 of the Law Society of Hong Kong. 

Application to the Present Case

10. The Retainer did not stipulate for payment only in the event of success of the Action.  The profit costs were not calculated with reference to the proceeds of litigation.  Nor was there a minimum fee prescribed for the client.  Costs charged for the 1st period could not be regarded as a minimum fee as submitted by Mr. Ho for the Paying Party.  In my view, the Retainer was not a contingency fee arrangement but a perfectly lawful arrangement.  The Office Bill, on its face, properly charged the client in accordance with the Retainer for the 2 Periods.

11. Mr. Ho relies on a paragraph in the written submission of Mr. Tang for the Receiving Parties to support his argument that there was a contingency fee arrangement.  That paragraph states,

“In short, the profit costs of $451,000 of the [1st] Period as stated in the Interim Bill are not final and D1 & 4 has (sic) agreed to be liable to further profit costs of the [1st] Period exceeding $451,000 subject to taxation and the Final Bill.”

Mr. Ho submits that the Receiving Parties would not be liable for their Solicitors’ costs if they lost the action as there would be no taxation of a losing party’s costs.  I respectfully differ from Mr. Ho’s view.  If the clients had lost, a final bill could still be delivered and there could be solicitor-client taxation of the costs.

12.  Mr. Ho also refers to sections 58 and 62 of the LPO to show that between solicitor and client, fees could not be taxed.  In my view, section 62 only bars taxation of solicitors’ fees which are in the nature of a gross sum, salary or bears an element of being fixed and certain.  However, I do not have to give a definitive view on this legal issue as this case can be resolved on other bases.

II.  Was There Any Breach of the Indemnity Principle?

The Indemnity Principle

13. Costs as between party and party are given by the law as an indemnity to the person entitled to them; they are not imposed as a punishment on the party who pays them, nor given as a bonus to the party who receives them: Gundry v. Sainsbury [1910] 1 KB 645. 

14. “Where the recovering party has agreed with its solicitors on the amount of costs to be charged, that party is not entitled to recover upon taxation a sum higher than that agreed.  This is the indemnity principle.  However, when drawing up the bill for taxation, the solicitors are not limited by this ceiling.  Thus, the amount of costs stated in the bill may be greater.  The amount allowed on taxation may not exceed the ceiling.  If it is the former case, the ceiling would apply and limit the amount recovered accordingly.”  See paragraph 62/App/3 of the Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2010.  (emphasis added)

15. With a change of culture after the Civil Justice Reform (“CJR”), I have reservations as to whether or not the words in italics in the preceding paragraph still hold true.  This is because under paragraph 17(7) of PD 14.3, a solicitor has to certify on the taxation bill that what he claims (not what he actually seeks to recover after taxation) does not exceed his client’s liability to his firm[1].    This is to encourage frankness on the part of the receiving party so that the paying party can make realistic figures for settlement.   A solicitor who draws up the bill for an amount exceeding his client’s liability to his firm and still signs the certificate without qualifying it, runs the risk of breaching the indemnity principle.  In Bailey v. IBC Vehicles Ltd. [1998] 3 All ER 570, Henry LJsaid,

“Order 62 rule 29(7)(c)(iii) requires the solicitor who brings proceedings for taxation to sign the bill of costs.  In so signing he certifies that the contents of the bill are correct.  That signature is no empty formality.  The bill specifies the hourly rates applied and the care and attention uplift claimed.  If an agreement between the receiving solicitor and his client … restricted (say) the hourly rate payable by the client that hourly rate is the most that can be claimed or recovered on taxation. The signature of the bill of costs under the rules is effectively the certificate of an officer of the Court that the receiving party’s solicitors are not seeking to recover in relation to any item more than they have agreed to charge their client under a contentious business agreement.

The court can (and should unless there is evidence to the contrary) assume that his signature to the bill of costs shows that the indemnity principle has not been offended. …

For the avoidance of doubt, I also agree that the taxing officer may and should seek further information where some feature of the case raises suspicions that the whole truth may not have been told.  And the other side of a presumption of trust afforded to the signature of an officer of the court must be that breach of that trust should be treated as a most serious disciplinary offence.

For the avoidance of doubt I also agree that the [costs] officer may and should seek further information where some feature of the case raises suspicions that the whole truth may not have been told.  On the other side of a presumption of trust afforded to the signature of an officer of the Court must be that breach of the trust should be treated as a most serious disciplinary offence.” 

Comparison – Global Approach or Item by Item Basis?

16. A comparison is to be made between the costs to which the order relates and the amount payable by the receiving party to his solicitor “in respect of those costs”.  The comparison may have to be on an item by item basis.  In General of Berne Insurance Co. v. Jardine Reinsurance [1998] 1 WLR 1230, May LJ said,

“The comparison is not global and may require in appropriate circumstances an item by item comparison.  The exact nature of the comparison will of course depend on the nature of the contentious business agreement.  If the agreement itself is not itemized but for a gross sum and if the costs order relates to the entire action with no items at all disallowed, there would be a single comparison.  This will perhaps rarely be the case, since in most litigation there will be items of work which are properly the subject of a charge to the client but which would be disallowed on taxation.  If the agreement is itemized, there can be an itemized comparison and in my view there should be. “

May LJ left open the question of what constitutes an “item”.

17. “If the receiving parties and their solicitors have made an agreement limiting the maximum hourly rates payable by the receiving parties or limiting the maximum costs of any other item, that agreement provides both a measure and a ceiling for the hourly rate or the other item in question.”  See paragraph 62/App/3 of the Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2010; General of Berne Insurance Co. v. Jardine Reinsurance [1998] 1 WLR 1230, at 1243E.

18. In doing an item by item comparison, taxing master should be wary of the costs implications.  The comparison can cost the Court, as in the present case, more time than the paper taxation plus oral taxation.  It can also end up with costly satellite litigation which CJR aims to curb.  As in the present case, Mr. Ho prepared a 3-page minute, painstaking, comparison of the figures in support of his argument. 

19. I will also bear in mind some general principles:

(i)   Disbursements and profit costs should be compared separately.

(ii)  The respective definition of profit costs and disbursements should be consistent with that in taxation.  For example, the Office Bill treated photocopying costs to be disbursements whereas in taxation, they ought to be treated as profit costs.

(iii)    Costs referable to parts of the litigation for which the receiving party did not have the benefit of an order for costs have to be taken out of account in determining the application of the indemnity principle: General of Berne Insurance Co. v. Jardine Reinsurance [1998] 1 WLR 1230.  For example,costs charged to a client because of the need to pay the opponent under a time summons should be taken out of account.

Which Bill Should Be Used for Comparison Purposes?

20. Should the Office Bill or Revised Bill be used to decide if the indemnity principle has been breached and the “ceiling” amount recoverable?

21. CMKI wanted to use the Revised Bill.  They admitted that they were careless in not stating the genuine position in the Office Bill.  There was no secret dealing with the client and there was no pro bono service. 

22. I accept that there was no pro bono service in this case.  In addition, the Retainer did permit CMKI to issue interim bills (see clause 5) although they were not produced, if they ever existed.   However, the Office Bill could not have been an interim bill within the meaning of clause 5.  The Office Bill was dated 4 weeks after the oral taxation.  It was expressly stated to be served pursuant to the Direction.  It was not marked as an “interim bill”.  Anyway, since the litigation and taxation were over, why would it be necessary to produce an interim bill?  There was no time pressure in preparing a final bill since CMKI appeared to be unaware of the Direction.  It was not stated to be for just part of the proceedings but covered all steps including taxation.  To an objective reader of this Office Bill, what other purpose could it serve but to inform the clients that they were liable for the amount and for the period stated therein?

23. The Revised Bill, on the other hand, was served another 9 days later.  CMKI did not even cut-and-paste the figures from the Taxation Bill and purport to charge the client for them.  The notes added were an after-thought and self-serving.  They were inconsistent with the Retainer which did not state that the costs recoverable from the client were subject to taxation at all.  CMKI simply failed to prove that the “agreement” as to taxation was made before the costs order or before the Taxation Bill was served. 

24. I place no weight on the Revised Bill and find that the Office Bill represented the liability of the clients to CMKI on costs. The Office Bill should be used for comparison purpose to decide if the indemnity principle has been breached.

Comparison

25. The Retainer stated that “[CMKI’s] works concerning the Action are deemed to have commenced on 3 April, 2006.  Why this date was chosen was not clear.

(i)  It becomes immediately apparent that the costs claimed under Stage 1 in the Taxation Bill should be wholly irrecoverable under the indemnity principle.

(ii)  It is also clear that part of the work in Stage 2 of the Taxation Bill in relation to the preparation and filing of the writ on 29 March 2006 until 2 April 2006 was also irrecoverable under the indemnity principle.

26. Mr. Ho has in his submission purported to set out the comparison based on the 5 defined stages in the Office Bill.  However,

(i)  There was an apparent flaw in it.  As rightly pointed out by Mr. Tang for the Receiving Parties, Mr. Ho has left out items like photocopying charges which should form part of the profit costs. 

(ii)  Mr. Ho has adopted the 5 defined stages in the Office Bill for comparison purpose.  The bases for computation was unclear and it was not possible to correlate his figures with those in the Taxation Bill or the taxed amount.

The parties should thus work out the correct figures for my approval based on the principles set out in this Decision.

Conclusion

27. I summarize my findings as follows:

(i)  There was no contingency fee arrangement.  The terms governing costs between solicitor and clients were contained in the Retainer.  CMKI has failed to prove the existence of an agreement with clients for fees to be subject to taxation.

(ii)  There was breach of the indemnity principle in that the Taxation Bill claimed for an amount exceeding the client’s liability to CMKI as reflected in the Office Bill.  The Revised Bill carried no weight.

(iii)  It is appropriate to do an item by item comparison in this case to see if the indemnity principle has been breached and the extent thereof.  The parties should work out the figures along the principles set out in paragraphs 16-19, 24 and 25 above.

Other Matters

28. The written submission of Mr. Ho has referred to Calderbank letters and a sanctioned offer on costs.  It was not appropriate to refer to them when we were still dealing with the question of costs taxed under the Deputy Judge Carlson’s order.  I have therefore completely disregarded those matters in coming to this Decision.  The question of costs of the taxation proceedings itself is not straightforward and I will not even make an order nisi at this stage.  I also reserve the question of interest.  I adjourn this case to a date to be fixed with one hour reserved to deal with all outstanding issues, including approving the figures under paragraph 27(iii).

29. On balance, I am not satisfied that CMKI has deliberately breached the indemnity principle.  It may be due to changes brought about by CJR that led to the breach.  Unless there is other evidence forthcoming,

I do not see any need to investigate professional conduct.

    

 (Queeny Au-Yeung)
Registrar, High Court

Mr. A. Ho of Messrs. Alex Ho & Co. for Plaintiff.

Mr. A. Tang of Messrs. Christine M. Koo & Ip for 1st to 4th Defendants.


[1]  The certificate is in these terms, “I certify that the amount claimed in this bill does not exceed [the Plaintiff’s/Defendant’s liability for costs to my firm in respect of this [summons/hearing/action, etc.]”

63661-EN-2008-12-10

YEUNG YEUK SUT v. TSE CHUN YIP AND OTHERS

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HCA 682/2006

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 682 OF 2006

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BETWEEN

 YEUNG YEUK SUTPlaintiff
 and 
 TSE CHUN YIP1st Defendant
 WONG CHI KIT2nd Defendant
 FAN SHEUNG MOON3rd Defendant
 GAINFORD INTERNATIONAL LIMITED4th Defendant

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Before: Deputy High Court Judge Carlson in Court

Date of Hearing: 20, 21, 25, 26, 27 & 28 August 2008 & 9 and 10 December 2008

Date of Delivery of Judgment: 10 December 2008

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J U D G M E N T

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Introduction

1.  This is the 8th day of this action.  For reasons which I must consider in a little detail, the Defendants have now applied for its dismissal on the ground that to allow it to continue would be an abuse of process.  It resumed yesterday having gone part-heard on the 28th August.  During the interim, the main protagonists in this action, Mr Yeung and Mr Tse continued their legal battles before Deputy High Court Judge Au .  He had before him two actions which had been ordered to be heard one immediately following the other.  These were HCA 730 / 2006 and HCA 1413 / 2005.  On the 1st day of the trial on the 20th October before Judge Au the Plaintiff Mr Yeung, who is also the Plaintiff in this action, applied to the Judge to discontinue the action in HCA 730 / 2006 which the Judge allowed him to do (see Supplemental Bundle 294 – 295).  The relevant part of the order is at paragraph 1 and it is in these terms -

“Leave to the Plaintiff to discontinue the action without any right to commence any fresh action against the Defendant in relation or arising out of the same subject matter in this action”.

2.  The other action HCA 1413 / 2005 then proceeded to trial and was heard over 13 days from the 20th October to the 11th November.  Judgment was handed down on the 3rd December.

3.  In order to understand how this application to strike out the present action comes about it is necessary to understand the nature of each of these three actions and how they are related to one another.

Background

4.  I will call Mr Yeung and Mr Tse by their names and designate them as Plaintiff or Defendant whenever it becomes necessary to do so in explaining their position in each of the actions that I will be referring to in this judgment.

5.  Both of these men have had a long association in business.  In 1987 Mr Yeung went into business with three other persons in a partnership which I will refer to by its initials MHEMC, as I will with all the other partnerships or limited companies that I will be required to refer to.

6.  On the retirement of his 3 partners in 1990, Mr Yeung became the sole owner of MHEMC whose name he changed to MHEC.  On the 13th January 1997, there was a Deed of Trust by which Mr Yeung held 25% of MHEC on trust for Mr Tse and a further 15% for a Mr Cheng.  The balance of 60% belonged to him absolutely.  By a further Deed of Trust of the same date Mr Cheng transferred his 15% to Mr Tse so that he now held 40%, with Mr Yeung owning the remaining 60%.  This date represents the formal start of their association.

7.  In 1991, Mr Tse had started GIL, a limited company which supplied machinery and material that has used in the manufacture of printed circuit boards (“PCB’s”).  From 1994 GIL would also seek out and obtain orders for MHEC which produced PCB’s at its factory in the Mainland.  For this service GIL would be paid 10% to 15% of the value of each order, with MHEC retaining the balance.  Since 1994, MHEC would also make use of GIL’s offices in Hong Kong and make use of GIL’s administrative and clerical support.

8.  In 2000, Mr Yeung and Mr Tse decided to increase their level of corporation and established together a limited company MHAL in which the 60% / 40% shareholding was maintained.  The shares were in fact held by their respective wives; the Yeung’s had 60% and the Tse’s 40%.  After the establishment of MHAL, it expanded its activity and MHEC was gradually wound down.

9.  In early 2002, the two men decided to set up a larger factory in China with the capacity to cope with the increased volume in their business.  There is a dispute about how and why this came about.  But at all events the factory which was established was registered in the name of GIL, Mr Tse’s company and not the joint company MHAL.  Mr Tse says that this is because MHAL, as a “wholly-owned foreign enterprise” had not operated in China for the required 3 years to enable it to register a factory in its own name, in which circumstances, the registration was taken in GIL’s name.  Mr Yeung says that he is advised that this was not true and it was done in this way so that Mr Tse would be better placed to control things and to cheat him.

10.  As before Mr Tse dealt with marketing and sales and Mr Yeung used his expertise in operating the factory and in the manufacture of PCB’s.  There was a joint cash injection of $1.5 million to establish the factory which was paid in the proportion of 60% and 40%.  Mr Tse says that despite the fact that the factory was registered in GIL’s name, the understanding between the two of them was that the beneficial owner was MHAL in the 60 : 40 proportion of their shareholding in MHAL.

11.  The factory orders continued to be placed through GIL who also performed the administrative and the accounting work from Hong Kong and Mr Yeung ran the factory largely basing himself in China.

12.  I can now advance the time-frame to 2005, the parties having had strains in their business relationship from 2003 when Mr Tse had proposed buying a further 10% of MHAL from Mr Yeung’s share, so that they would each own 50% and in that way he could have more of a say in the running of the factory.  That fell through after the two of them could not agree on a price.  Mr Tse proposed $2.8 million and Mr Yeung wanted $4.5 million.

13.  According to Mr Tse, Mr Yeung established another company MHPEL and he says that through MHPEL, Mr Yeung started to secretly solicit business away from MHAL including taking away business from an old customer Viasystem and another company called Topsearch.  Eventually, Mr Tse decided to take firm action in order to establish what was going on at the factory and he put in his own security guards who secured the premises which included stopping lorries departing from the factory that were carrying orders that were to be shipped to customers including Viasystem.  This occurred in April 2005.  I have seen a video- recording of the incident which although not violent, shows a very firm line being taken by Mr Tse’s security guards and representatives which included a lawyer.  This incident marked the final straw and it became clear to both men that there would have to be a parting of the ways.

14.  This was achieved by a Deed of Settlement under which Mr Tse purchased Mr Yeung’s 60% sharholding in MHAL and in that way he purchased the factory.  The purchase price for the 60% was agreed at $16,700,000.  Of this sum, $7,600,000 was paid by the Tse’s on execution of the Deed on the 21st May 2005.  The Deed is to be found in Bundle 1 starting at page 121.  The parties to the Deed were the Tse’s, the Yeung’s and Mr Tsui King Fai, a minority shareholder and long-time associate of Mr Yeung.

15.  The intention was that the Deed would put an end to the dispute between Mr Yeung and Mr Tse.  Mr Yeung had already started a number of High Court actions against Mr Tse and his related parties over losses sustained by the lock-down of the factory in April, which he agreed to discontinue and in respect of any other potential disputes between them arising from their business dealings.  This intention is expressed in two clauses in the Deed which I need to set out here :

“5.  Upon Completion of the sale and purchase of the Sale Shares herein any and all the Vendor’s and / or Yeung Yuet Sut’s and / or Tsui King Fai’s rights (if any and whether jointly and severally) claims, demands and commence actions against the Company, Gainford International Limited, the Factory, the Purchaser and / or Tse Chun Yip and their respecting successors and assigns in relation to all causes of action (if any) shall be fully and absolutely discharged, released, waived and extinguished”.

“10.2  Upon execution of this Deed of Settlement the Vendor undertakes to forthwith file a notice of discontinuance in respect of High Court Actions No. 786, 787 and 788 of 2005.  Copy of such discontinuance shall be delivered to the Purchaser’s at the time of the execution of this Deed of Settlement.  Parties shall agree that no costs order shall be made in respect of the said actions.  Each of the Parties further undertakes that no further legal proceedings, actions or claims or demands shall be taken out or made against the other Party for whatever relief in respect of any of the matters covered herein or in respect of the affairs concerning the Company.  This Deed of Settlement shall, upon Completion, be a full and final settlement between all the Parties hereto;”

16.  On the face of it, this Deed, upon which both sides had the benefit of being represented by solicitors, would appear to put an end to all disputes between Mr Tse and Mr Yeung.

17.  Notwithstanding its terms, Mr Yeung has prosecuted this action before me and the two listed before Deputy High Court Judge Au.  As I have already said, Mr Yeung filed notices of discontinuance in respect of the three actions referred to in Clause 10.2 of the Deed above but that was all that he did.

18.  I now turn to describe the two actions before Deputy High Court Judge Au.  Notwithstanding that he had obtained legal advice before he signed the Deed, Mr Yeung alleged that he signed it under duress and sought to have it set aside.  In HCA 730 / 2006, which he discontinued before Judge Au, he was seeking a full range of remedies against Mr Tse and his wife and Mr and Mrs Tse’s two companies MHAL and GIL.  This action, had it been tried, would have involved the court trawling through most, if not all of their business relationship, to decide what had happened between them and what, if any, remedies Mr Yeung was entitled to.  Aside from an order for costs, he claimed 13 orders and / or remedies.  They were the following -

“(i)  An inquiry as to ascertain what assets belonging to the Plaintiff has been used for the business of D3 at all material times.

(ii)  An account of profits of D3.

(iii)  An inquiry to ascertain what assets belonging to the Plaintiff has been used to establish 東莞佳輝設備有限公司.

(iv)  A declaration that D4 is holding東莞佳輝設備有限公司 and any other assets belonging to P on trust for P.

(v)  An account of profits made by D4 from 東莞佳輝設備有限公司 and payment of profits to P made by the same.

(vi)  An order that the title of東莞佳輝設備有限公司 be transferred back to the Plaintiff.

(vii)  Further or alternatively, an order that D3 and D4 do transfer the ownership of the “Diverted Properties” (Schedule 1 & 2) to P or alternatively, damages

(viii)  A declaration that D3 holds on trust the business of MHEC (“the Properties”) for P absolutely.

(ix)  An order that D3 do transfer the Properties to P.

(x)  A declaration that D2 held the 4000 shares of MHAL (D3) on trust for P.

(xi)  An order that the 400 shares of D3 be transferred to P.

(xii)  Damages.

(xiii)  All such further or other requisite Account, Inquiries, directions and Relief as shall be just”.

19.  It is this comprehensive claim that he discontinued.

20.  HCA 1413 / 2005 differed because he was now relying on the Deed itself and suing on it.  Mr Tse had paid him the first tranche of $7,600,000 on the execution of the Deed, but was withholding the balance because of alleged breaches of warranty by Mr Yeung.  At the trial, Mr Yeung was substantially successful, as appears in Judge Au’s judgment which starts at page 297 of the Supplemental Bundle and obtained a substantial money judgment based on the Deed.

21.  It is these events and their outcome that Mr Chan, who appears for Mr Tse and for in GIL (1st and 4th Defendants) and Miss Yiu, for the 2nd and 3rd Defendants, who are employees of GIL, rely on in now applying to strike out the present action.

The nature of this action

22.  In reading the Statement of Claim one could be forgiven for thinking that this is merely an action for the unauthorized payment by the 2nd and the 3rd Defendants, acting on the instructions of Mr Tse (1st Defendant), of 4 cheques drawn on the personal bank accounts of the Plaintiff (Mr Yeung) into an account of a company called AutoBest Finance Limited, a company owned by Mr Tse.

23.  The reality is that this action, rather like the one discontinued before Judge Au, HCA 730 / 2006, has already required a thorough investigation of these two gentlemen’s business association.  One only needs to attend to their witnesses statements and the documentary evidence, to which they have referred in the course of their oral evidence in the trial, to see that this is so.

24.  Miss Tsang, who appears for Mr Yeung, as she has in the two other actions, says that this claim is quite separate from the subject matter of the other disputes because the claim is a discrete one relating to the operation of Mr Yeung’s private bank account.

25.  To describe it in this way is to completely ignore the circumstances in which the 2nd and 3rd Defendant came to be authorized to sign cheques on Mr Yeung’s private account.  Mr Yeung has confirmed that the money kept in these accounts related to his business with Mr Tse.  These surplus monies were kept there at first as a matter of convenience and invested on behalf of the business in Time Deposits.  As time went on the total amount became substantial and he did not wish to keep so much money in the account under his name in case this came to the attention of the Revenue who might ask questions, the answers to which they would not necessarily be willing to accept.  In the circumstances, this money was paid into the AutoBest Finance account.

26.  At issue is whether the version put forward by Mr Tse and his witnesses is the correct one.  For the purposes of this striking out application, I am not required to answer that question, nor can I, where the evidence is not complete, arrive at a final conclusion as to the truth of this matter.

The issues on striking out

27.  Mr Chan submits that whilst the action was not amenable to a striking out application at the beginning of the trial, it has became so following the discontinuance of HCA 730 / 2006 and the decision by Mr Yeung to press on with HCA 1413 / 2005.  By discontinuing HCA 730 / 2006 and by agreeing not to start any fresh action, in relation to or arising out of the same subject matter in that action and then, deciding to proceed and to approbate and sue on the Deed of Settlement, Mr Yeung cannot be allowed to act inconsistently with Clauses 5 & 10.2 of the Deed above when the effect of those terms is to put an end to any dispute and claims between the two of them arising out of their business relationship.  The purposes of the Deed was to wipe the slate clean between them.

28.  Miss Tsang’s reposte is that the money in these four accounts concerned private monies and are not therefore caught by the terms of the Deed.  In my view that submission is not open to Miss Tsang given that Mr Yeung’s evidence in this trial has been that these were monies accumulated from the profits of the business.  Until he elected to proceed with HCA 1413 / 2005, as a consequence of which he was no longer able to assert that the Deed upon which that action was based was null and void for duress or the other similar defences that he has raised in the present action,  but suing on this Deed, he is taken to have accepted that it governed the parties’ future relationship.  If he accepted that the Deed regulates the parties’ relationship, then the only issue is whether this action, based on these 4 cheques, formed part of their business relationship, in which any action arising from that relationship is, as a result of the Deed, not maintainable

29.  I am in no doubt that the evidence so far has amply demonstrated that this dispute has everything to do with that business relationship – Mr Yeung has said so himself.  In such circumstances, once he has approbated the Deed by successfully suing on it, he cannot be permitted to act inconsistently with it by continuing to pursue this action.  To do so is an abuse of the court’s process and this action must therefore be struck out, which is the order that I propose to make.

30.  Miss Tsang quite rightly accepts if I were to strike out the action against Mr Tse and GIL, who are parties to the Deed, I must also make the same order in relation to the 2nd & 3rd Defendant who are related parties to Mr Tse and GIL.  Accordingly, the action will be struck out and I will now hear the parties on any consequential orders that I may need to make including, of course, costs.

 (Ian Carlson)
Deputy High Court Judge

Manyi Tsang instructed by Messrs Alex Ho & Co for the Plaintiff

Samuel Chan instructed by Messrs Christine M. Koo & Ip for the 1st and 4th Defendants

Elsie Yiu instructed by Messrs Livasiri & Co for the 2nd to 3rd Defendants