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Civil Action2006

YICK MING KIT v. SECURITIES AND FUTURES COMMISSION

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54412-ET-2006-10-03

FORMER DEALING DIRECTOR OF FOREGROUND SECURITIES CO LTD v. SECURITIES AND FUTURES COMMISSION

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HCA861/2006

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO.861 OF 2006

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BETWEEN

(FORMER DEALING DIRECTOR OF FOREGROUND SECURITIES COMPANY LIMITED)Plaintiff
 YICK MING KIT
and
SECURITIES AND FUTURES COMMISSIONDefendant

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Before : Deputy High Court Judge Poon in Chambers

Date of Hearing : 12 September 2006

Date of Decision : 12 September 2006

Date of Handing Down of Reasons for Decision : 3 October 2006

 

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REASONS  FOR  DECISION

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1. On 12 September 2006, I dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal out of time against the order of Registrar Chan striking out his claim and dismissing his action with costs.  These are my reasons.

HCA2966/2004

2. The plaintiff was the principal of Foreground Securities Company Limited (“Foreground”) and was registered as a sole accredited dealer with the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.  In January 1999, the defendant revoked Foreground’s registration as a dealer under the Securities Ordinance (now repealed).  As a result, the plaintiff’s registration as Foreground’s accredited dealer was automatically revoked.  Both Foreground and the plaintiff appealed against the defendant’s decision to the Securities and Futures Appeals Panel.  The appeals were dismissed.

3. In December 2002, the plaintiff commenced HCA2966/2004 in his personal capacity against the defendant, alleging, inter alia, that the defendant had abused its power and breached the Securities Ordinance.  He sought to have his registration restored and claimed damages of HK$2,299,200 per year.

4. Upon the defendant’s application, Deputy Judge To struck out the plaintiff’s claim and dismissed the action on the ground that the plaintiff had no reasonable cause of action.  See the Decision handed down on 22 July 2005.

5. Deputy Judge To also ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant costs of the action.  The costs were subsequently taxed and allowed at HK$158,916.84 (“the Taxed Costs”).  The plaintiff has yet to pay the Taxed Costs.

6. The plaintiff then appeal against the order of Deputy Judge To.  On 18 May 2006, the Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal.  He then applied for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal, which will be heard by the Court of Appeal on 29 September 2006.

The present action

7. On 19 April 2006, the plaintiff commenced the present action.  He claimed for damages equivalent to the amount of the Taxed Costs.  He pleaded that the defendant was not entitled to engage the firm of solicitors under section 9(3) of the Securities and Futures Ordinance, Cap.571 in the application to strike out HCA2966/2004.  That task ought to have been undertaken by the defendant’s own legal department.

8. Upon the defendant’s application, Registrar Chan on 27 June 2006 struck out the plaintiff’s claim and dismissed the action with costs.

Appeal out of time

9. By notice dated 21 July 2006, the plaintiff sought to appeal against the Registrar’s order out of time.

10. It is trite that when hearing an appeal out of time, the court will take into account all relevant factors including the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the prejudice to the other party and the merits of the appeal.

11. Mr Jamison, for the defendant, readily conceded that the delay was insubstantial and perhaps excusable and that the defendant has not suffered any prejudice as a result of the delay.  He opposed the appeal mainly on merits, to which I now turn.

No merits

12. In my view, the plaintiff does not have any cause of action against the defendant at all.

13. The plaintiff seeks, in effect, to claw back the Taxed Costs that he has been ordered to pay.  In his submissions, the plaintiff puts forward two reasons to justify his denial of liability for the Taxed Costs.

14. The plaintiff first argues that his claim should not have been struck out.  He may well be dissatisfied with the order of Deputy Judge To and the Court of Appeal.  He can appeal further, if he so desires.  That, however, does not even begin to ground any cause of action against the defendant for any damages equivalent to the Taxed Costs.

15. The plaintiff next argues that under section 9(3) of SFO, the defendant was not entitled to engage a law firm in HCA2966/2004.  Section 9(3) read :

“The Commission may engage consultants, agents and advisers to assist it in the performance of its functions.”

16. The plaintiff refers to the heading of section 9 which reads : “Staff of Commission” and argues that section 9(3) only applies to internal staff of the defendant.  His argument is plainly misconceived.  For a section heading to any statutory provision shall not have any legislative effect and shall not in any way vary, limit or extend the interpretation of any Ordinance : section 18(3) of the Interpretation and General Clauses, Cap.1.  On a proper reading of section 9(3), the defendant is entitled to engage a law firm to assist it in the performance of its functions.

17. The plaintiff also contends that its legal department could have represented the defendant in HCA2966/2004.  But if the defendant so decides, I see no reason why it is not entitled to engage a law firm in HCA2966/2004. 

18. In my view, the plaintiff’s claim is hopelessly unmeritorious.  It is plainly an abuse of process.  The claim must be struck out and the action, dismissed.  The Registrar was entirely correct in so ordering. 

Conclusion

19. For the above reasons, there is no merit whatsoever in this appeal out of time.  I therefore refused to grant leave to appeal out of time and dismissed the plaintiff’s notice of appeal.

20. Costs must follow the event.  I therefore ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant costs of the appeal, to be taxed if not agreed.  The plaintiff should consider himself lucky.  Had Mr Jamison sought costs on an indemnity basis, I would have no hesitation in allowing it.

(J. Poon)
Deputy High Court Judge

            

The Plaintiff (Appellant), in person

Mr Jamison, of Messrs Clifford Chance, for the Defendant (Respondent)

Plaintiff's applicaiton for an extension of time to appeal to Court of Appeal rejected. Please refer to HCMP190/2007 Date 13 February 2007

53005-EN-2006-06-27

YICK MING KIT v. SECURITIES AND FUTURES COMMISSION

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HCA 861/2006

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 861 OF 2006

____________________

BETWEEN

(FORMER DEALING DIRECTOR OF FOREGROUND SECURITIES COMPANY LIMITED)Plaintiff
YICK MING KIT
and
SECURITIES AND FUTURES COMMISSIONDefendant

____________________

Coram: Before Mr. Registrar C. Chan in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 24 May 2006

Date of Judgment: 27 June 2006

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J U D G M E N T

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It is sad to note that the Plaintiff, Mr. Yick Ming Kit, who erroneously believes that he is right, institutes one action after another and has incurred more and more legal costs that he has to pay.  As Registrar of High Court I have come across a number of such cases conducted by litigants in person.  I feel sorry for them.

2. In 2004, the Plaintiff took legal action HCA 2966 of 2004 against the Defendant.  On 22 July 2005 his claim was dismissed by Deputy Judge To and was ordered to pay costs taxed by Master R. Yu in a sum of $158,916.84.  He appealed from the judgment and his appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 18 May 2006.

3. Before the dismissal of the appeal, the Plaintiff instituted the present action against the Defendant asking the Defendant to pay him the amount of costs that he has to pay under HCA 2966 of 2004 i.e. the first action, on the ground that the Defendant has no right to retain lawyers in the said action and to incur such expenses that he is liable to pay.

4. He relies on Section 9(3) of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Cap. 571) which states:

“(3)   The Commission may engage consultants, agents and advisers to assist it in the performance of its function.”

He refers us to the heading of that section 9 which states “Staff of Commission”.  He argues that the heading qualifies and limits the power of the Defendant: the Defendant could only use its own employees to defend the first action.  Similarly, he argues that Clifford Chance should not be engaged to defend the present proceedings.

5. According to Section 18(3) of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance (Cap. 1), headings do not have any legislative effect and shall not in any way vary or limit the interpretation of any Ordinance.  It is trite to say that headings should not be used for construction of the meaning of any legislation if the contents of which are unambiguous and clear.  The meaning of subsection 9(3) is clear: the Defendant, being a statutory body, has the right to engage consultants, agents and advisers.  I do not find the heading can assist the Plaintiff.

6. In his written submission he also argues that the Defendant being a statutory public body has failed to meet its pledge:

(a)   it has failed to prosecute those who are in breach of the law; and

(b)   it does not deal with the civil proceedings personally by using its own staff to defend the action taken by him.

7. I am not sure what he means when he alleges that the Defendant has failed to prosecute who are in breach of the law as he has given no particular.  In any event, his claim in this action, as I have set out in paragraph 3 above, is related to costs of HCA 2966 of 2004.  I do not consider such argument is relevant in the present proceeding.

8. As to the allegation that the Defendant should not retain outsiders to defend for it, I have made a decision thereon in paragraph 5 hereof and I do not intend to repeat it.

9. I consider that the present action taken by the Plaintiff is to circumscribe the Defendant’s right to enforce the order made by Deputy Judge To to pay the costs of HCA 2966 of 2004 assessed by Master R. Yu in the sum of $158,916.84.  It is an abuse of the court proceedings.

10. He also raises the issue about use of English in conducting the proceeding.  At the hearing, I informed the Plaintiff that since both English and Chinese are official languages in Hong Kong, the court has discretion to use either of the languages.  I find no issue in it.  He has not sought to review or to take any step against the decision by Master R. Yu in the taxation hearing.  I have no power to interfere with his decision.

11. For the above reasons I strike out the Plaintiff’s claims in this action and dismiss the whole action.

12. Pursuant to Order 42 rule 5B(6) I make an order nisi as to costs:

(a)   That the Plaintiff pays the Defendant’s costs of this action (including the costs of this application and also the costs reserved) to be assessed by me, if not agreed.

(b)   For the purpose of the assessment,

(i)    the Defendant shall prepare a statement of costs and serve on the Plaintiff and file with the court at least 21 days before the hearing;

(ii)   The Plaintiff shall within 14 days thereafter serve on the Defendant and file with the court a list of his objection; and

(iii)   The length of hearing of the assessment is estimated to be an hour.

(c)   This order shall become absolute 14 days after the date of this order unless any party applies in writing within the said 14 days for variation of this order.

 (Christopher C. Chan)
Registrar

Plaintiff, appearing in person.

Ms. D. Wacker of Messrs. Clifford Chance for Defendant.