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Employee's Compensation Case2007

WONG KI v. SHUN TAK ELECTRICAL, MECHANICAL AND AIR CONDITIONING ENGINEERING (HONG KONG) CO LTD AND OTHERS

Related cases with same parties

  • DCEC71/2008WONG KI v. SHUN TAK ELECTRICAL, MECHANICAL AND AIR-CONDITIONING ENGINEERING (HONG KONG) CO LTD AND OTHERS
  • DCEC74/2008WONG KI v. SHUN TAK ELECTRICAL, MECHANICAL AND AIR CONDITIONING ENGINEERING (HONG KONG) CO LTD AND OTHERS

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68188-CH-2009-10-27

WONG KI v. SHUN TAK ELECTRICAL, MECHANICAL AND AIR-CONDITIONING ENGINEERING (HONG KONG) CO LTD AND OTHERS

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DCEC 835/2007
DCEC 71/2008
(consolidated)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION CASES

NOS. 835 OF 2007 & 71 OF 2008

----------------------

IN THE MATTER OF an application between 
 WONG KIApplicant
 and 
     SHUN TAK ELECTRICAL, MECHANICAL AND AIR-CONDITIONING ENGINEERING (HONG KONG) CO. LTD.1st Respondent
(discontinued)
 CHAN LAI KUN, formerly trading as MOON SHING ENGINEERING CO.2nd Respondent
 BANK OF CHINA GROUP INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED3rd Respondent
(discontinued)
 WONG TUNG SING4th Respondent

----------------------

(consolidated pursuant to the Order of H H Judge Chow dated 19 June 2008)

主審法官:區域法院法官梁俊文公開聆訊

聆訊日期:2009年10月27日

判案日期:2009年10月27日

----------------------

補償評估判案書

----------------------

 

1.  申請人黃奇(Wong Ki)就他於2005年8月13日因工受傷,按《僱員補償條例》追討僱員補償。按較早前命令,本合併案之法律責任及補償問題分開審理,前者的審訊已在本年3月舉行。根據陳美蘭法官在4月16日的書面判決,第二答辯人滿誠 (Moon Shing)及第四答辯人黃東升 (Wong Tung Sing),分別被裁定為總承判商及僱主。如是者兩人須負上支付補償的責任。補償金額有待評估。

2.  隨著上述判決,本案中就另外兩名答辯人的申請己被中止。原由律師代表的滿誠和黃東升亦已改為自行答辯,親身應訊。

意外

3.  意外發生時,黃奇32歲。當時他在大埔一座工業大厦單位内協助安裝冷氣機。期間其僱主黄東升應總承判滿誠的要求,在單位内安裝一窗口玻璃。黄東升於是指示黄奇執行有關工作。在切割玻璃時,玻璃了突然碎裂,碎片射進黄奇的左眼,導致受傷。

黄奇的狀況

4.  意外後,黄奇被送往醫院接受治療,並獲病假直至2006年9月27日,即13個半月。根據2006年10月4日的證明書,由於他左眼受傷引致視力受損,僱員補償評估委員會將他的永久喪失賺取收入能力評為45%。2007年2月28日的覆核評估證明書就此評估維持不變。

5.  黄奇曾按條例第18條,就上述評估委員會評估他的喪失賺取收入能力提出上訴。但現在決定放棄上訴,並接受有關評估。

補償金額

意外時平均月入

6.  這是本聆訊中較重要的爭議。黄奇指在意外時日薪港幣400元,平均每週工作6天,即每月工作26天。

7.  满誠呈交的表格2指黄奇在意外前1個月的收入為港幣9,200元,但同時確認了黄奇的日薪如他所指,及每月工作26天,即月入港幣10,400元。如按條例第11條,應採用9,200元及10,400元兩者中對申請人較有利的計算。

8.  滿誠的陳女士在庭上確認,上述表格2乃由她與丈夫填寫及呈交。該表格中資料失實之處,在陳美蘭法官4月16日的判案書中有所解釋。然而,就所指黄奇的日薪和平均每月工作日數,似乎並非當時爭議部份。陳女士現在指政府限制不能在星期六下午進行住宅裝修工程,所以黄奇實不可能每月工作達26天。本席接納代表黄奇的劉大律師所指,而陳女士亦承認,她就黄奇事實上每月工作日數並無個人認知。

9.  黄東升似乎並不爭議黄奇平均每月工作26天,只在庭上重申當中包括了黄奇替其他承判工作的日數。言下之意,黄奇在該些日子與他並非處於僱傭關係。這類似黄東升在就責任問題審訊中所指,法官已拒絕接納。本席同意劉大律師所指,現在必須謹慎考慮如此證供。何況在本席細問下,黄東升指該些工程仍是經他本人安排,甚至經他直接支付工資。另外,黄東升確認2006年10月18日黄東升與公證行的會面紀錄的内容大部份正確,當中亦紀錄了他承認黃奇平均每月工作26天,日薪港幣400元。

10.  黄奇指其實還有加班、津貼、及午膳等福利,但就本聆訊他接受以港幣10,400元為計算標準。本席認為他的證供直接可信,裁定他在意外前的平均月入為港幣10,400元。

暫時喪失工作能力方面的賠償(第10條)

11.  按條例第10條,黄奇可獲補償他病假所失之4/5收入。如上所述,病假為期13個半月,並無實質爭議。所以他應得的這項補償為港幣10,400元 x 13.5 x 4/5 = 港幣112,320元。

永久喪失工作能力方面的賠償(第9條)

12.  黄奇喪失賺取收入能力為45%。以此計算這項補償,再以意外發生時黄奇32歲計,根據條例第7(1)(a)條,此項補償為港幣10,400元 x 96 x 45% = 港幣449,280元。

醫療費用方面的賠償(第10A條)

13.  本席接納黄奇提供的證據,亦無爭議,意外招致的醫療開支為港幣1,660元。

總結

14.  黄奇應得的補償是:

根據第9條 港幣 449,280元
根據第10條   港幣 112,320元
根據第10A條 港幣1,660元 
合共:港幣563,260元

15. 扣除黄奇承認已收黄東升港幣80,500元,餘額為港幣482,760元。

命令

16. 現評估補償金額為港幣482,760元。滿誠及黄東升須支付黄奇此款項連利息。由工傷發生當天(即2005年8月13日) 起至今天之利息,以半判定利率計算;今天起至全數支付為止的利息則以判定利率計算。

17. 較早時兩名答辯人已被命令支付本申請之訟費。現命令兩人須進一步支付黄奇因本補償評估聆訊引起之訟費。

〔就訟費討論〕

18. 由於黄奇放棄就僱員評估委員會所評估他的永久喪失賺取收入能力的上訴,而委員會經覆檢後只是維持原有評估,因此準備及存檔的眼科專家報告變得無實際作用。本席認為因而引起的訟費不應由兩名答辯人負擔。該報告乃黄奇一方及第三答辯人一方指示的專家聯合提供的。所以上述本席命令兩名答辯人須支付的訟費將不包括黄奇一方因該專家報告引致的費用。

19. 另外,若雙方未能協議訟費,則由法庭評定。為免疑問,本席頒發大律師證書。黄奇本身的訟費須按《法律援助規則》評估。

 

 

   區域法院法官梁俊文

 

申請人:由法律援助署委派范家碧律師行轉騁劉偉民大律師代表

第二答辯人:親身應訊,無律師代表

第四答辯人:親身應訊,無律師代表

 

65812-EN-2009-05-08

WONG KI v. CHAN LAI KUN formerly t/a MOON SHING ENGINEERING CO AND OTHERS

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DCEC 835/2007 & 74/2008
(consolidated)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION CASE NO. 835 OF 2007

AND 74 OF 2008

                                     

BETWEEN

 WONG KIApplicant
 and 
 CHAN LAI KUN,
formerly trading as
MOON SHING ENGINEERING CO.
2nd Respondent
 BANK OF CHINA GROUP INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED3rd Respondent
 WONG TUNG SING4th Respondent 

                                     

Before:  Her Honour Judge Mimmie Chan in Chambers (Open to Public)

Date of Hearing:  8 May 2009

Date of Delivery of Decision:  8 May 2009

 

                            

D E C I S I O N

                            

 

1.  The 3rd Respondent, BOC, applies to vary the costs order nisi which I made on 16 April 2009, when I entered judgment in favour of the Applicant against the 4th Respondent, TS, with costs against TS and the 2nd Respondent, Moon Shing.  BOC now seeks an order that its costs of the action are to be paid by either Moon Shing, or TS, or Moon Shing and TS jointly and severally.  The application is opposed by Moon Shing and TS. 

2.  BOC had successfully applied to be joined as a party in these proceedings by a Summons issued on 21 August 2007 under Order 15 of the Rules of the District Court, sections 43 and 44 of the Employees’ Compensation Ordinance, and rule 24(1) of the Employees’ Compensation (Rules of Court) Rules.  The application for joinder was granted by the Court with the consent of Moon Shing, and without objection from the Applicant.

3.    Under Order 15 rule 6, the court may order to be added as a party in the proceedings :

(1)     any person who ought to have be joined as a party or whose presence before the court is necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute in the cause or matter may be effectually and completely determined and adjudicated upon; or

(2)   or any person between whom and any party to the cause or matter there may exist a question or issue arising out of or relating to or connected with any relief or remedy claimed in the cause or matter which, in the opinion of the court, it will be just and convenient to determine as between him and that party as well as between the parties to the cause or matter.

4.  The purpose of Order 15 rule 6 is to prevent multiplicity of actions, to enable the Court to determine disputes between all parties to them in one action, and to prevent the same or substantially the same questions or issue being tried twice with possibly different results (see paragraph 15/6/7 Hong Kong Civil Procedure). 

5.  Sections 43 and 44 of the Employees’ Compensation Ordinance concern the liability of an insurer under a policy of employees’ compensation insurance, and the right of an injured party to proceed against such an insurer.

6.  Rule 24(1) of the Employees’ Compensation (Rules of Court) Rules relates to the Court’s joinder of any person appearing to be interested in the proceedings. 

7.  It is accordingly clear from the parties’ consent to BOC’s application for joinder, and the order made by the Court allowing the joinder, that the parties and the Court were satisfied that there existed between BOC and the parties in the proceedings a common question or issue arising out of or relating to the claim or remedy sought in these proceedings, and that BOC has a direct and legitimate interest in the action and the outcome of the action, such that its presence is necessary to ensure that all matters in dispute between the parties may be completely determined, and to avoid multiplicity of actions and the same issues being tried again. 

8.  It is also clear from the Judgment delivered on 16 April 2009 that the Court did determine the common issue affecting the parties, namely, the Applicant’s employer being TS, the 4th Respondent, and that TS was the sub-contractor of Moon Shing.  This determination affects BOC’s liability under its insurance contract with Moon Shing. 

9.  Having thus determined the relevant issues in favour of the Applicant and BOC, and against TS and Moon Shing,  it follows that BOC as the party which has succeeded on these issues should be entitled to its costs against Moon Shing and TS, the parties contending otherwise. 

10.  As made clear in the case of Ada Limited v Sing Tao Holdings Limited, CACV 131/1990, BOC having been added as the defendant at its own request should not be regarded as some form of indulgence having been granted by the Court, when it has the right to be joined.  Nor should it be deprived of the right to its costs when it has succeeded on the issue. 

11.  For the above reasons, and also taking into consideration the matters highlighted in paragraph 47 of my Judgment, I now order that the costs order nisi be varied to further provide that BOC’s costs of the action, which include the costs of the Summons to vary issued on 24 April 2009, are to be borne by Moon Shing and TS jointly and severally, to be taxed if not agreed, with certificate for counsel. 

12.  The 3rd Respondent’s solicitors should draw up the Order in Chinese for service on the 4th Respondent, and the 4th Respondent, if he wishes to have a copy of the Order and the reasons that I have just given to be translated in Chinese, may so apply.  

 

(Mimmie Chan)
District Judge

 

Mr Leung Chong-Shing, of Messrs Lily Fenn & Partners (assigned by DLA) for the Applicant

Mr A Sin, of Messrs S H Chan & Co., for the 2nd Respondent

Mr Ashok Sakhrani, instructed by Messrs Lau Chan & Ko, for the 3rd Respondent

4th Respondent, in person, present

 

65375-EN-2009-04-16

WONG KI v. SHUN TAK ELECTRICAL, MECHANICAL AND AIR CONDITIONING ENGINEERING (HONG KONG) CO LTD AND OTHERS

HTML content

DCEC 835/2007 & 74/2008

(consolidated)

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION CASE NO. 835 OF 2007 & 74 OF 2008

----------------------

BETWEEN

WONG KIApplicant
and
SHUN TAK ELECTRICAL, MECHANICAL AND AIR CONDITIONING ENGINEERING (HONG KONG) CO. LTD.1st Respondent
(Discontinued)
CHAN LAI KUN, formerly trading as MOON SHING ENGINEERING CO.2nd Respondent
BANK OF CHINA GROUP INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED3rd Respondent
WONG TUNG SING4th Respondent

(Consolidated pursuant to the Order of His Honour Judge Chow
on 19th June 2008)

--------------------

Coram  :  Her Honour Judge Mimmie Chan in Court

Dates of hearing  :  11-13, 16, 26 & 27 March, 2009

Date of handing down Judgment  :  16 April, 2009

 

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J U D G M E N T

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Background

1.  On 13 August 2005, Mr. Wong Ki ("Wong") went with 2 colleagues and his brother-in-law, Mr. Wong Tung Sing ("TS"), to office premises at Unit D, 25th floor, Block 1, Tai Ping Industrial Centre in Tai Po ("Premises") to dismantle an air-conditioning unit and to install a new one in its place.  TS was at that time the sole proprietor of a business known as Shun Tak.  Some time in the morning, Wong was instructed by TS to fill a space or hole in a window with a piece of glass.  As Wong was cutting the piece of glass to the correct size in order to fill the hole, the glass shattered, and a piece of glass flew into Wong's left eye.  The cornea, sclera, iris and lens of Wong's left eye suffered damage and impaired vision as a result.

2.  Wong instituted these proceedings against TS to seek compensation in respect of his injury arising out and in the course of his employment by TS.  Alternatively, Wong claims in the Amended Application that he was at the material time the employee of Moon Shing Engineering Co. ("Moon Shing"), named as 2nd Respondent in these proceedings. Further or alternatively, Wong claims that TS was at the material time Moon Shing's subcontractor.  The 3rd Respondent joined these proceedings as an interested party, being Moon Shing's insurers.

3.   Both TS and Moon Shing deny that Wong was their employee.  TS claims that Wong was never engaged by him as an employee.  TS' evidence is that whenever Wong worked for TS on TS' projects, he was engaged as an independent contractor on a project by project basis.  It is TS' case that when Wong was injured, he was working as an employee of Moon Shing, the contractor which had undertaken the decoration works at the Premises.

4.  According to Moon Shing's evidence, although Madam Chan (the sole proprietor of Moon Shing) ("Chan") and Mr. Lau (Madam Chan's husband who was in charge of the daily management of Moon Shing's business) ("Lau") both genuinely thought and believed, at the time of the accident and when they filed Form 2 with the Labour Department, that Wong was Moon Shing's employee, they claim that Wong was only engaged to do the independent job or project of filling the hole in the window with glass, and they had agreed to pay Wong $400 for the job.  On this basis, Moon Shing claim by way of defence that Wong was at the material time an independent contractor, and not an employee.  Despite the vagueness of paragraph 1 of Moon Shing's Defence, I accept that it can be construed as an averment that Wong was an independent contractor of Moon Shing.

Issues

5.  The trial was confined to the issue of liability only.  On the question of liability, the parties are not in dispute that Wong had sustained injuries in the manner he claimed.

6.  The issues on liability which are in dispute and which arose for determination at trial are: at the time when Wong was cutting glass to fill the hole in the window on the Premises -

(1)   was Wong an employee of TS;

(2)   was Wong an independent contractor carrying on business on his own account; or

(3)   was Wong an employee of Moon Shing ?

Legal principles

7.  The parties in this case, as laymen, have expressed confusion and bewilderment over the question of when a worker is, in law, an employee, and when he is an independent contractor.  They may get some comfort from the fact that often, lawyers are just as confused, and that the question cannot be easily answered by the courts.  I can add very little to and hence respectfully adopt the words of Ribeiro PJ (in Poon Chau Nam v. Yim Siu Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR) when describing the often difficult task of the court in deciding whether or not a person is an employee of another.

"In the great majority of cases, deciding whether or not A is B's employee presents little difficulty.  Most people take up jobs which are regular and stable, doing the work assigned to them, supervised by the boss and receiving regular wages and other benefits in return.  They are obviously employees.  However, in certain instances, the answer to the question whether an employer-employee relationship exists is elusive, as recognized by Lord Griffiths in Lee Ting Sang v. Chung Chi Keung v. Another [1990] 1 HKLR 764, at 766G.

This has proved to be a most elusive question and despite a plethora of authorities the courts have not been able to devise a single test that will conclusively point to the distinction [between an employee and an independent contractor] in all cases."

8.  The modern approach to the question whether a person is an employee, as adopted in the case of Poon Chau Nam (supra) itself, is to examine all the features of their relationship against the background of the indicia of employment with a view to deciding whether, as a matter of overall impression, the relationship was one of employment, bearing in mind the purpose for which the question is asked.  The passage of Mummery J's judgment in Hall v. Lorimer [1992] 1 WLR 939 at 944, cited in the judgment of Ribeiro PJ in Poon Chau Nam, provides the most useful guidance in the task which the court undertakes :

"In order to decide whether a person carries on business on his own account it is necessary to consider many different aspects of that person's work activity.  This is not a mechanical exercise of running through items on a checklist to see whether they are present in, or absent from, a given situation.  The object of the exercise is to paint a picture from the accumulation of detail.  The overall effect can only be appreciated by standing back from the detailed picture which has been painted, by viewing it from a distance and by making an informed, considered, qualitative appreciation of the whole.  It is a matter of evaluation of the overall effect of the detail, which is not necessarily the same as the sum total of the individual details.  Not all details are of equal weight or importance in any given situation.  The details may also vary in importance from one situation to another.”

9.  Many disputes in relation to whether a worker was an employee, or an independent contractor, occur in the context of workers brought in to do different aspects of construction work, or against the backdrop of a construction site.  Part of the difficulties in distinguishing between employees and independent contractors in these cases stems from the fact that construction and decoration work inevitably involve different workers with different skills being engaged to do work on the site, the proliferation of small firms in the industry, the reliance on a large pool of mobile labour, and the informality of the arrangements made amongst workers, foremen and contractors.  

Factual evidence on relationship

10.  4 witnesses, including Wong himself, gave evidence at the trial.   When the evidence was completed, the general impression conveyed to the Court and to Counsel was that none of the witnesses had told the whole truth.  Burrell, J once remarked in a case (Cheong Shing Limited v. Yu Kwan HCA No. 12021/2008) : “sifting the truth from falsehoods has been particularly troublesome.  Moreover, neither do I think that the entire truth could be found within the entire pool of evidence even if it were possible to miraculously separate truth from lies."  The learned judge's remarks are very applicable to the present case.

11.  Wong's evidence is that he came to Hong Kong from the Mainland in March 2005, and had since worked for TS in his air-conditioning business.  His work mainly involved the cleaning, replacement and maintenance of air-conditioners.  Wong was paid a daily wage of $400, and worked an average of 6 days a week.  According to Wong, TS made all arrangements for his work, and supplied all materials and tools required for Wong's work.  He claims that as he was a new-comer to Hong Kong, he had not thought of undertaking any business on his own account, nor had TS ever mentioned to or discussed with him his undertaking work on his own account as an independent contractor.

12.  Wong's case on the accident is simple.  On his evidence, he and 2 other workers were brought by TS to the Premises on the day in question, to dismantle a split type air-conditioning unit, and to install a new one in its place.  He did not know by whom TS had been given the job.  The workers had finished dismantling the indoor unit of the air-conditioner, but were not able to dismantle the outdoor unit as it was raining heavily.  At around 11:30 a.m., Wong was instructed by TS to fill a hole measuring 1 foot x 8 inches with a piece of glass.  The hole was in a window under an exhaust fan.  There were some glass panels on the floor, and Wong's evidence is that TS had pointed to the glass and asked him to use the glass to cover the hole.  Wong was also given a cutter by TS in order to cut the glass to the correct size for covering the hole.  Wong's evidence is that he did as instructed by TS, as part of his job for TS.

13.  According to TS' witness statement filed in these proceedings and which he signed on 26 August 2008, he employed Wong in May 2005 as a temporary worker, at a daily wage of $300.  He claimed that he did this because Wong was his brother-in-law, and had not been able to find work on his arrival in Hong Kong, so TS gave him temporary assistance.  TS' evidence was that he had introduced or referred Wong to other contractors, in the hope of getting Wong a full time job.

14.  In an earlier statement made by TS on 12 December 2007 on behalf of the original 1st Respondent, a limited company of which TS was the sole shareholder and director which was incorporated after the date of the accident, TS had also claimed that since May 2005, Wong had worked for TS from time to time as a casual worker at a daily wage of $400.  TS only claimed that Wong was not a technician in air-conditioning works.  The action against the original 1st Respondent was discontinued.

15.  TS' testimony took a drastic turn in court, when he claimed that he had never employed Wong at all, and that from March 2005 until the day of the accident, Wong had worked for TS as an independent contractor.  According to TS' evidence in court, Wong was not paid on the basis of a daily wage, but at an agreed rate on the basis of TS' estimate of the complexity of the job assigned to Wong, the time required to do the job, and the price at which TS himself had undertaken to do the job.

16.  According to TS' evidence, Moon Shing had subcontracted to him the job of installing air-conditioners in the Premises ("Subcontract").  The job was completed in June 2005.  In August 2005, Lau of Moon Shing telephoned TS and asked him to inspect a split type air-conditioning unit on the Premises which was leaking.  TS explains that this unit was not within the scope of the Subcontract.  After TS had inspected the air-conditioning unit, he recommended to Lau that the unit should be replaced with a new one, as it could not be repaired.  It is not disputed between Moon Shing and TS that a separate contract ("Air-conditioning Contract") was made directly between TS and the client and occupier of the Premises ("Cornwall"), for a new air-conditioning unit to be installed in place of the old air-conditioning unit which was leaking.

17.  TS does not dispute that he had brought Wong to the Premises on the day of the accident, to do work under the Air-conditioning Contract.  With Wong's help, the indoor unit of the air-conditioning unit was dismantled by about 11 a.m., and TS' evidence is that he and another worker were to install the new air-conditioning unit.  It is not disputed between TS and Lau that in the process, Lau telephoned TS, and informed TS that there was water leakage from a window in the Premises, as a hole in the window next to an exhaust fan had not been properly covered.  Lau asked TS to purchase some glass to cover the hole ("Glass Job").  What followed Mr. Lau's request is more contentious.

Wong's status under the Air-conditioning Contract

18.  One fact which cannot be controverted is that Wong was brought onto the site at the Premises to work under the Air-conditioning Contract before Wong started any work on the glass.  I consider it relevant to decide first on the relationship between Wong and TS under the Air-conditioning Contract, before deciding whether there was any change in Wong's capacity when he carried out work under the Glass Job.

19.  I reject TS' evidence that Wong was not his employee under the Air-conditioning Contract.  He had admitted in his witness statements that Wong had been engaged by him as a casual worker since May 2005, at a daily wage of $300, although on a temporary basis until Wong could find full-time employment.  TS' evidence that he had agreed to engage Wong to work for 2 days as an independent contractor on the Air-conditioning Contract is totally unbelievable.  On the one hand, TS was keen to minimize the role Wong played in the dismantling and installation of the air-conditioning units under the Air-conditioning Contract, claiming that he lacked experience and technical knowledge and could only work on cleaning and manual tasks, such that he had nothing to do after the indoor air-conditioning unit had been dismantled in the morning of 13 August 2005.  On the other hand, TS denies that Wong had been employed to work under the Air-conditioning Contract on the basis of a daily wage of $400 per day, and claims instead that Wong was paid according to TS' estimate of the time Wong would be required for the job and his own price of undertaking the job.  On this basis, TS' evidence is that he had agreed to pay Wong $800 to work for 2 days on the Air-conditioning Contract.  Contrasted with TS' evidence that he had only agreed to pay $450 to the more experienced and skilled technician who was to take part in the installation and technical work required for the air-conditioning unit, I consider that TS' evidence concerning Wong being an independent contractor who had been engaged to work under the Air-conditioning Contract is totally contrived, as an excuse for not having purchased employees' compensation.

20.  Despite his claim in Court that Wong had never been his employee but had been engaged as an independent contractor throughout, TS admitted to his own Counsel that upon Wong's arrival in Hong Kong in March 2005, he had employed Wong to do air-conditioning work at a site in Hollywood Road.  It is clear that, as he had admitted in all his statements made before he gave testimony in Court, TS had considered that Wong was his employee.

21.  I bear in mind that the parties' own understanding (which may be erroneous) or their description of their relationship is not conclusive on the question of employment, which is a question of mixed fact and law to be decided by the Court.  However, there is nothing in the evidence concerning Wong's work activity or the working relationship between Wong and TS to even suggest that Wong was working for TS other than as an employee under the Air-conditioning Contract.  He was supplied with the tools and equipment for the Air-conditioning Contract.  He did not contribute to the expenses or capital for the undertaking of the Air-conditioning Contract.  He worked under TS' instructions and supervision, and assisted TS and the other workers in their work.  There is no evidence that he had any share of or right to the profits that can be made under the Air-conditioning Contract.  TS' evidence is that he pocketed the profit of $1500 under the Air-conditioning Contract, after deducting the cost of materials, his own labor costs and other costs from the price of $15,000 he had agreed with Cornwall.

Wong's status under the Glass Job

22.  Having found that Wong was working as an employee of TS in the morning of the accident, I next consider whether there was any change in his status following Lau's telephone conversation with TS, and at the time of the accident.  TS' evidence is that it had changed, and that Wong had become a casual employee of Lau when he worked on the Glass Job.   Lau's evidence is that Wong was either an independent contractor of Moon Shing, or of TS, when he was working on the Glass Job, or that Wong remained an employee of TS.

23.  TS' evidence is that following Lau's request on the telephone that he should fill the hole in the window with glass, he had told Lau on the telephone that the Glass Job was not within the scope of the Subcontract, which had been completed, and that he was not free to do the Glass Job as he was busy working under the Air-conditioning Contract.  TS claims that he suggested to Lau in the course of their telephone conversation that Lau should employ his relative, Wong, at a daily wage of $400 for the Glass Job, as Wong had experience in cutting glass on the Mainland. 

24.  Further, TS' evidence is that whereas Wong had been working for him as an independent contractor, he thought that the Glass Job was too small for Lau to engage Wong as an independent contractor, and recommended instead that Lau should engage Wong as a casual worker, in accordance with what TS claims to be the market practice.  According to TS, Lau agreed to this recommendation.  When asked how much time he expected Wong to spend on the Glass Job, TS' evidence is that it would take one day. 

25.  In my Judgment, TS' distinction does not make sense, and his attempt to distinguish his own relationship with Wong with the working relationship he had proposed to Lau is a fabrication to hide the actual fact of his employment of Wong as a casual worker.

26.  It is TS' case that after speaking to Lau, TS then informed Wong of the proposal he had made to Lau to employ Wong to do the Glass Job for $400, and Wong had accepted the Glass Job without hesitation.  According to TS, he then telephoned Lau to confirm to Lau that Wong had consented to Lau's employment.

27.  Turning to Lau's version of his telephone conversation with TS, his evidence is that on the day of the accident, Ah Yiu of Cornwall had called Lau a number of times in the morning and had complained to Lau about a hole or empty space near an exhaust fan on the Premises which had not been properly covered.  Moon Shing had originally undertaken from Cornwall the interior decoration works at the Premises, and had subcontracted the air-conditioning works to TS.  The Air-conditioning Contract was made directly between Cornwall and TS after the completion of the Subcontract.  On learning that TS was at the Premises installing an air-conditioning unit for Cornwall under the Air-conditioning Contract, Lau telephoned TS and asked him to cover the hole referred to by Ah Yiu. 

28.  Lau has given slightly different accounts of his telephone discussion with TS on the day of the accident.  This, by itself, may be understandable, when one bears in mind the fact that the conversation or conversations had taken place over 3 years ago.  The gist of Lau's evidence is that in answer to his request that TS should cover the hole with glass, TS had said that there was no problem, but he could not attend to everything as he had to install the air-conditioning unit, and that he would ask someone to take care of the Glass Job.  Lau does not dispute that in the course of his discussion with TS, Lau had agreed to pay $400 for the Glass Job.

29.  The differences in Lau's accounts of his discussion with TS turn on his testimony that there were in fact 2 separate telephone calls, the details given in each call, and when the details were given.  Lau's final version in Court appears to be that in the first telephone call, TS had not mentioned that he would ask his relative to do the Glass Job, and that the wages would be $400.  According to Lau, TS only mentioned that he would find someone to take care of the Glass Job.  Lau's evidence is that he in fact placed a second call to TS, to ask “if it could be done (得唔得架)", to which TS responded by explaining that he had asked his relative to do the Glass Job, because he had experience in the Mainland.  Lau then asked how much it would cost, and TS told Lau that it would be $400, which Lau agreed to pay.

30.  On Wong's part, he denies that TS had ever mentioned to him that he would be engaged by Lau, or any one other than TS, to do the Glass Job for $400.  Wong denies knowledge of any telephone conversation between TS and Lau.  On Wong's case, he was simply instructed by TS to use the glass seen on the Premises to cover the hole in the window, and to cut the glass to the right size with the cutter supplied by Lau.

31.  On Wong's evidence, because no one had ever mentioned to him before the accident that he would be employed by Lau or Moon Shing or anyone else other than TS, or that he would be paid $400 for the Glass Job, he refused to sign a document which was later presented to him by Chan and TS after the accident, which contained such an acknowledgment ("Acknowledgment").  The Acknowledgment was prepared by Chan, after consulting Lau and TS on the circumstances of the accident.  It contained statements that TS had recommended Wong to Moon Shing for employment, and that Moon Shing had agreed to engage Wong at a daily wage of $400.

32.  Having heard the evidence from Wong, TS and Lau, I find TS' contention that he had recommended to Lau that Lau should employ Wong as a casual worker to be unbelievable.  In particular, I find it unreal that TS would, as he claims, speak to Wong after his telephone conversation with Lau, to inform Wong that Lau would like to employ Wong to work on the Glass Job, and to inquire from Wong if he would like to work for Lau as a casual employee.  It smacks of a lawyer's account of the events, after a clinical analysis of the essential elements required to achieve the desired legal consequences.

33.  As TS' own evidence goes, he was too busy working on the air-conditioning units to do the Glass Job personally.  Wong had been brought onto the site to work for and to assist TS.  TS had agreed to pay Wong for his work under the Air-conditioning Contract.  It is inconceivable that TS, the curt and brief-speaking boss, would take the time and trouble to explain, to his inexperienced worker and relative, either a transfer of employment, or in essence the distinction between working under casual employment with Lau and continuing to work for TS under the Air-conditioning Contract, and further to seek Wong's consent to such change of arrangement or working relationship.  If I may borrow a phrase from the Judgment of Stone, J in Khan Amar v. Cheung Ying Construction Engineering Ltd. & Ors. CACV 153/2006, 5 June 2007, "construction sites in general are not havens of grace and politesse", and the more realistic and likely probability is that, having agreed with Lau that he would get someone to take care of the Glass Job, TS simply instructed his worker Wong, whom TS emphasized to be inexperienced and unable to assist in the installation and technical work required for the air-conditioning units, to deal with what was considered to be the simple task of filling the hole in the window.  This was to discharge TS' obligation under his promise to Lau to take care of the work involved in the Glass Job.

34.  It is equally improbable if not inconceivable that, having agreed (as he claims) to pay $800 to Wong for the Air-conditioning Contract, TS would agree to release Wong from the Air-conditioning Contract, and to permit Wong to undertake the Glass Job.  When he was cross-examined on this, TS' answer was that there was no further work that Wong could do under the Air-conditioning Contract, and as Wong was his relative, TS would like him to earn more money.  Nevertheless, TS had stressed in his own evidence that the price of $800 which he had agreed to pay to Wong under the Air-conditioning Contract was payable irrespective of the number of days Wong actually worked on the Air-conditioning Contract, as this forms the basis of his assertion that Wong was engaged as an independent contractor.  Moreover, the evidence from both TS and Wong is that the work under the Air-conditioning Contract had not been completed by 11:30 a.m..  The outdoor air-conditioning unit had yet to be dismantled and the installation of both the indoor and outdoor units had not been done.  According to Wong, he was to go back to his work on the air-conditioning units after he had completed the Glass Job.  Against such evidence, it is not believable that TS would have agreed to release Wong from the Air-conditioning Contract, and to agree to Wong working for Lau, either as an independent contractor, or as Lau's casual employee.

35.  Lau's evidence is that he never asked TS for the name of the worker who would be doing the Glass Job.  His evidence is that so long as TS could get someone to do the Glass Job, it would be sufficient.  If the work was done, he would pay $400 to TS for the worker.  If it was not done well, he would not pay.  According to Lau, the Glass Job was a one-off transaction.  He agreed to the sum of $400, because he accepted that it was fair, and he did not care if TS should pay $100, $400, or $500 to the worker who carried out the job.  According to Lau's evidence, the sum of $400 would include the cost of purchasing the glass to cover the hole, and any other equipment required.  In my Judgment, such evidence contradicts a relationship of employment.

36.  According to Lau, in his first telephone conversation with TS, TS had simply informed him that he would get someone to take care of the Glass Job.  Lau's evidence is that he called TS after their first telephone conversation, to ask "if it was alright (得唔得架)".  Lau stated that by this, he meant that he had called to ask if TS had managed to secure someone to take care of the Glass Job, and if that person had agreed to do the Glass Job.  However, Lau also stated in cross-examination that he wanted to make sure that the worker procured by TS to do the Glass Job was capable, as there had been instances in the past when TS had referred jobs to workers who were not capable.  I consider that Lau's evidence in this latter respect has a greater ring of truth.  If he had asked TS whether "it was alright (得唔得架)", it is more probable that he had wanted to inquire whether the worker doing the Glass Job was competent, rather than to inquire if the worker recommended by TS had consented to do the Glass Job.

37.  On the totality of Lau's evidence, I consider that he had intended to engage TS as an independent contractor to either carry out the Glass Job personally for $400, or to procure his worker to carry out the Glass Job on TS' behalf for $400.  This is supported by Lau's evidence that whenever TS worked for Lau on the projects Moon Shing had subcontracted to TS in the past, TS would render accounts to Lau and include the charges of the workers he procured in the accounts.

38.  Even if it can be construed that Lau had intended to instruct TS to procure a competent worker to undertake the Glass Job as an independent contractor for $400, I have rejected TS' evidence that he had informed Wong of any proposal which he may have made to Lau to employ Wong either as a casual employee, or an independent contractor.  Accordingly, there is no tripartite agreement or consensus to the transfer of Wong's employment from TS to Lau, either to work as an employee or an independent contractor.  The judgment in Mohammad Latif v. Wong Chi Construction Engineering Company Ltd. DCEC 656/2001, 7 August 2003 and the cases referred to therein including Bolwell v. Redcliffe Homes Ltd. [1999] IRLR 485 are clear that consent of the employee is required.

39.  I also accept the submissions made by Mr. Sakhrani, Counsel for the 3rd Respondent, the insurers, that for policy reasons, it would require cogent evidence and only in the most unusual case for the Court to recognize and give effect to arrangements made by an employer with third parties to transfer the employer's liabilities and obligations, whether under its employment contract with its employee, or under the provisions of the Employees Compensation Ordinance.

40.  On the facts and evidence in this case, I find that at the time when Wong worked on the Glass Job, he remained an employee of TS.  It is also my finding that at the relevant time, Moon Shing had, as Cornwall's principal contractor in respect of the Glass Job which Lau had agreed to do at Ah Yiu's request (and irrespective of his reservations as to whether it was within the scope of Moon Shing's original contract with Cornwall), subcontracted the Glass Job to TS.

Form 2 and other evidence

41.  The only evidence which points to Wong being an employee of anyone other than TS is Form 2, the Notice of Accident filed on 24 August 2005.  On behalf of Moon Shing, Lau and Chan had completed Form 2, in which it is stated that Wong was Moon Shing's employee engaged to carry out “miscellaneous duties”.  The evidence of Lau and Chan is that at the time of the accident and their completion of Form 2, they believed that Wong had been asked by Moon Shing to do the Glass Job and was accordingly Moon Shing's employee.  They claim that as Wong was injured whilst he was working on the Glass Job, Moon Shing should be responsible.

42.  The authorities are clear that it is for the court and not the parties to evaluate the facts and determine the legal relationship between them, such that the parties' own description of their relationship is not determinative (Chan Kwok Kin v. Kwok Kwan Hing [1991] HKLR 631).

43.  Moreover, it is clear from the evidence in this case that Lau who had completed Form 2 totally disregarded the truth of the facts he had inserted in the document.  It is not credible that he had simply not asked nor obtained from TS or Wong the facts of the accident, but even if his assertion in this respect was true, such that the facts he had stated in Form 2 were not deliberate falsehoods, Lau has admitted in his evidence that many of the statements he had made in Form 2 were pure guesses.  On Lau's evidence, Form 2 is totally unreliable, and I attach no weight to it.

44.  Counsel for the 3rd Respondent had referred to statements made by the parties to the loss adjusters appointed by the insurers.  I consider that the witness statements filed by the parties in these proceedings are sufficient to deal with the issues before me.

45.  Counsel for TS relies on the fact that immediately after the accident, TS had telephoned Lau to inform Lau that Wong had been injured.  It was argued that this establishes TS' genuine belief that Moon Shing was the employer of Wong, and that Lau should be notified of the accident in view of Moon Shing's responsibility for the possible consequences arising out of the accident.  I consider that TS' notification to Lau is equally consistent with Moon Shing being the principal contractor which had contracted the Glass Job to TS, since Moon Shing as principal contractor would also have liabilities and responsibilities as a result of Wong having been injured in the course of his work on the Glass Job.  In the light of all the evidence, including the evidence of the working relationship between Wong, TS and Moon Shing; the telephone discussions between Lau and TS in the morning of 13 August 2005 before the accident; and TS' payments to Wong during the period of his sick leave, I do not regard the "contemporaneous" events of the telephone conversations between Lau and TS on 13 August 2005 after the accident (as Counsel described the telephone calls), to have much weight in the balancing exercise.

Conclusion

46.  In relation to the issues identified in paragraph 6 above, I find that at the time when Wong was cutting glass to fill the hole in the window on the Premises, he was an employee of TS.

47.  I will make an order nisi that Wong is to be paid the costs of the action, to be taxed if not agreed, with certificate for Counsel.  Wong's claim against TS is successful, and there is no reason why TS should not bear Wong's costs.  Moon Shing filed Form 2, and claims to be the employer of Wong until the filing of the Defence.  The cavalier attitude adopted by Lau and Chan in their preparation of Form 2, and the evidence which suggests that the filing of Form 2 and the preparation of the Acknowledgment may have been deliberate attempts made by TS, Lau and Chan to seek compensation from the insurers of Moon Shing, are factors which I take into consideration in making the order of costs against Moon Shing.  Wong's own costs are to be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations.

Postscript

48.  The evidence in this case reveals a shockingly cavalier attitude which was adopted by Lau when he completed Form 2.  Over 50% of the details of the accident were made up by Lau, on his own admission.  It is high time that employers recognize that they have a duty under s.15 of the Employees' Compensation Ordinance not only to give notice of an accident to the Commissioner of Labour within a specified time, but also to give true and accurate information.  It is an offence for any employer to fail to give such notice without reasonable excuse, or to give any false or misleading information.  The Courts will not hesitate in an appropriate case to refer the matter to the Department of Justice to take necessary action for prosecution.

    

 (Mimmie Chan)
District Judge

 

Mr. Raymond Lau instructed by Messrs. Lily Fenn & Partners (assigned by D.L.A.) for the Applicant

Mr. David Hui instructed by Messrs. S.H. Chan & Co. for the 2nd Respondent

Mr. Ashok Sakhrani instructed by Messrs. Lau, Chan & Ko for the 3rd Respondent

Mr. K.C. Chan instructed by Messrs. Gary Lau & Partners for the 4th Respondent

 

61496-EN-2008-04-23

WONG KI v. SHUN TAK ELECTRICAL, MECHANICAL AND AIR-CONDITIONING ENGINEERING (HONG KONG) CO LTD

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DCEC835/2007

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION CASE NO. 835 OF 2007

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BETWEEN  
 WONG KI Applicant
 and 
 SHUN TAK ELECTRICAL,  MECHANICAL AND AIR-CONDITIONING ENGINEERING (HONG KONG) CO. LTD.1st Respondent
   CHAN LAI KUN,  formerly trading as MOON SHING ENGINEERING CO.2nd Respondent
 BANK OF CHINA GROUP INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED3rd Respondent

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Before:    Her Honour Judge H C Wong in Chambers (Open to the public)

Date of Hearing: 23 April 2008

Date of Ruling:  23 April 2008

 

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R U L I N G

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1.  The applicant applies for costs against the 1st respondent at the application to discontinue this action against the 1st respondent.  The basis of the applicant’s application is that the applicant was led on by the 1st respondent’s letters before action and the answer filed to the application because the 1st respondent merely denied it was liable because the applicant was not injured in the course of employment when in fact the strongest defence for the 1st respondent is that the 1st respondent was not in existence as it was only incorporated one month after the applicant’s accident.  This was not pleaded in the answer and the applicant claimed that it was not alerted to it until the 1st respondent filed a list of documents on 20 September 2007 which contained the certificate of incorporation disclosing the date of incorporation. 

2.  The 1st respondent’s counsel, Miss Chao, on the other hand, submitted that there is nothing in this case that should induce the applicant to carry on with the proceeding against the 1st respondent because all along the 1st respondent had denied any liability and claimed it was not the applicant’s employer.  These were disclosed in the correspondences and in the answer filed on 13 September last year.

3.  The applicant claimed that the three cheques to the applicant were issued by the 1st respondent and these were strong, cogent evidence for the applicant to join the respondent as the employer.  Furthermore, the applicant was under pressure from the time limit, the applicant’s solicitor decided the 1st respondent should be joined at that stage with the limited information available to the applicant.

4.  I do not find the applicant has a strong case against the 1st respondent on costs.  The matter on costs on the discontinuance should have been sorted out as soon as the applicant found out the 1st respondent’s date of incorporation was after the accident, to say the least.  My reasons are:

(a)   it is the applicant’s solicitors or the applicant’s legal representative’s duty to ascertain who the applicant should join in the action.  This duty includes running a full company search on the 1st respondent before commencement of the action.

(b)   The applicant claimed that he was misled by the 1st respondent’s failure to inform the solicitor the incorporation date of the 1st respondent.  1st respondent’s solicitor referred to matters such as the 2nd respondent was the true employer, etc., etc. rather than informing the applicant the strongest and most obvious reason that the 1st respondent could not be the employer at the time of the accident.

5.  I cannot find any strong reason that the 1st respondent or its solicitor has a duty to assist the applicant even though it would have saved both parties a lot of time and costs.  If the 1st respondent had done so as soon as the applicant informed the 1st respondent that the applicant intended to join the 1st respondent as a respondent in the claim, then, little costs would have been incurred by the 1st respondent.  Even though the 1st respondent might have failed to alert the applicant at the earliest opportunity, the 1st respondent is not under a duty to advise the applicant’s legal representative and the applicant’s legal representative is bound to make its own investigation even though the writ had already been issued to beat the limitation period.  The duty to represent the interests of the applicant includes continuing the investigation.

6.  In any event, the applicant was alerted the date of the incorporation of the 1st respondent on 20 September 2007 when the 1st respondent filed a list of documents which contained its date of incorporation, yet there is a lapse of three months before the applicant’s solicitors became conscious of this very strong defence against the applicant’s claim against the 1st respondent.  This showed the applicant’s legal representatives failed to act on the applicant’s behalf with due diligence.  It is the applicant’s legal representative’s duty to save costs so far as its own client is concerned, and as the applicant is legally aided, to save taxpayers’ money not to unnecessarily expand a minor disputed portion of the action out of proportion.

7.  For the aforesaid reasons, I find the applicant should pay the 1st respondent’s costs after 20 September 2007 when the 1st respondent filed its list of documents.  I order that costs of this application and hearing should be borne by the applicant.  I would further like to find out why the applicant’s solicitor should not personally bear costs.  The applicant’s solicitor to submit the reasons in writing setting out the reasons why the applicant’s legal representative should not personally bear costs.  I understand there has been a change of solicitors.  There may be good reasons not disclosed at this stage.  So far as the 1st respondent’s costs are concerned, they are to be borne by the applicant with certificate for counsel.  The applicant’s own costs to be taxed in accordance with Legal Aid Regulations.

 

 (H C Wong)
Deputy District Judge

Mr Lau Wai-man, Raymond, instructed by Messrs Lily Fenn & Partners, assigned by Director of Legal Aid for the Applicant

Miss Jolie Chao, instructed by Joseph C T Lee & Co., for the 1st Respondent

Mr Sin Ping-ho, of Messrs S H Chan & Co., for the 2nd Respondent