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Miscellaneous Proceedings2007

TSOI CHUNG KAK v. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION ASSISTANCE FUND BOARD

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65398-EN-2009-04-20

TSOI CHUNG KAK v. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION ASSISTANCE FUND BOARD

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DCMP 744/2007

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 744 OF 2007

--------------------

BETWEEN

 TSOI CHUNG KAK (蔡宗格)Plaintiff
 and 
  EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION
ASSISTANCE FUND BOARD
Defendant

----------------------

 

Coram  :  Her Honour Judge H.C. Wong in Chambers (open to public)

Date of Hearing  :  2 April 2009

Date of Handing Down Decision  :  20 April 2009

Decision and Reasons for Decision

1.  The Plaintiff (“Mr. Tsoi”) took out an application by originating summons against the Defendant (“the Fund Board”) under S.25 of the Employees Compensation Assistance Ordinance Cap. 365 (“the Ordinance”) for leave to issue proceedings against the Defendant as if it were the employer.

2.  Section 25 of the Ordinance provides:

“25. Board liable in certain proceedings as if employer

(1)  This section applies to any claim against an employer for compensation where –

(a)  the employer –

(i)  cannot be identified or, if identified, cannot be found;

(ii)  is insolvent;

(iii)  is dead or in the case of a company, has been dissolved, wound up or struck off the register; or

(iv)  for any reason, cannot be served with proceedings; and

(b)  no policy of insurance is known to be in force in relation to the employee.

(2)  Subject to this section, proceedings for any claim against an employer to which this section applies may issue against the Board as if it were the employer.

(3)  Proceedings against the Board under this section shall not issue unless the court is satisfied, on application made on notice to the board, as to the matters specified in subsection (1)(a) and (b).

(4)  Where proceedings are brought against the Board under this section, the rights and liabilities of the employer in respect of the compensation the subject of the proceedings are vested in and transferred to the Board.”

Background of the case

3.  The Plaintiff, Mr. Tsoi, has been working as a casual construction worker since 1998.  In August and September 2004, he worked at a site in Western district and another site in Mongkok district for the same employer whom he called ‘the Boss’ (“the employer”).  During that period, he collected his wages in cash at the employer’s premises at Ground Floor, 14 Western Street, Hong Kong.  It was his understanding from co-workers that ‘the boss’ resided at the rear portion of those premises.

4.  On 9 March 2005, a co-worker ‘Ah Shing’ informed him ‘the boss’ has a job for the two of them at a site in Discovery Bay the next day.  He and Ah Shing met up the next day at the Tung Chung MTR Station; they were joined by ‘Ah Chung’ who took them to a house at 19 Costa Avenue in Discovery Bay.  At the house, they were introduced to a man who ‘Ah Chung’ said was the employer’s brother.  Mr. Tsoi was then instructed to commence work on the interior of the house.  While there, he saw and greeted ‘the boss’ whom he described as a medium built man of 50 with little hair.

5.  In the course of moving a large rock in the house in the afternoon with a co-worker, Mr. Tsoi’s right hand got caught between the rock and the wall, injuring two of his fingers.  He, nevertheless, continued to work until the day’s end.  He sought treatment that evening at the Pamela Youde Nethersole Eastern Hospital.  The doctor gave him 7 days sick leave for his injuries.

6.  Mr. Tsoi called the employer on the telephone number given to him by “Ah Shing” and informed the employer he was put on sick leave by the doctor and inquired about sick leave pay.  He called the employer again after 7 days informing him that the doctor had given him a sick leave extension.  The employer hung up on him.  Subsequently, he was not able to contact the employer further.

7.  Mr. Tsoi tried to find the employer by visiting the premises at 14 Western Street, ground floor, in an attempt to recover the sick leave pay, but he was not unable to find the employer on the 10 visits he paid to the premises.

8.  From enquiries made with former co-worker ‘Ah Kit’, he was told the employer was called 「祥强裝修公司」.  He reported the accident to the Labour Department on 21 March 2005 giving full details of the address and name of「祥强裝修公司」with details of the accident.

9.  An accident report was compiled by the Occupational Safety Officer Mr. Lo Yiu Keung on 2 September 2005.  The report was not disclosed to Mr. Tsoi until enquiries were made to the Labour Department by Mr. Tsoi’s solicitors.  The accident report revealed that officers from the Occupational Safety and Health Division had investigated the accident and visited the house at 19 Costa Avenue in Discovery Bay, but they were not able to locate the contractor/employer of Mr. Tsoi.  On 20 September 2005, the Labour Department informed Mr. Tsoi he should seek assistance from the Legal Aid Department.

10.  Inquiries made with the Labour Department by Mr. Tsoi’s solicitors revealed that there was no notification of construction work for the work at the Discovery Bay house on 10 March 2005, nor were there any record of the employer of the work at the house.

11.  Upon legal aid being extended to Mr. Tsoi, he became legally represented by his present solicitors from 28 February 2006.  His solicitors made further attempts to locate the employer but to no avail.  Subsequently, Mr. Tsoi through his solicitors gave notice to the Labour Department and the Employees Compensation Assistance Fund Board (“the Fund Board”) that he intended to join the Fund Board under S. 25 (2) of the Ordinance as if it were the employer.

12.  On 9 March 2007, Mr. Tsoi’s solicitors took out an originating summons for leave to issue proceedings against the Fund Board under S.25 of the Ordinance.  The summons was adjourned for affirmations to be filed and for a date to be fixed for hearing.

13.  During the adjournment, Mr. Tsoi’s solicitors wrote to the registered owners of the house in Discovery Bay asking for the identity of the contractor of the works on 10 March 2005.  The reply received revealed the contractor was one Tsui Chun Yuen (崔峻源)and his mobile phone number.  It is not disputed that enquiries made by the Fund Board resulted in the same information being supplied.

14.  Investigations made by Mr. Tsoi’s solicitor on the registered owner of the premises at Ground floor, 14 Western Street at the Land Registry revealed the owner of the premises as one Tsui Chi Keung.  Upon enquiries made to Mr. Tsui Chi Keung, he replied in writing that during the months of August and September 2004, the premises were let to one Tsui Chun Yuen.

15.  Checks with mobile telephone service providers upon Court orders granted by the District Court to Mr. Tsoi on 27 February 2008 revealed negative results on the mobile number supplied by the registered owner of the house on Mr. Tsui Chun Yuen.

16.  Hutchison Telephone Company Ltd. (“Hutchison”) confirmed Tsui Chi Keung was the registered subscriber of the mobile phone number 9196 9428 with the register address at Ground Floor, 14 Western Street.  The said number was the number Mr. Tsoi had previously been contacting the employer.  Efforts made by Mr. Tsoi’s solicitors to contact Mr. Tsui Chi Keung at the said address were unsuccessful.

17.  There was confirmation by Hutchison of the full name and mobile number of Ah Chung to be Wong Kam Chung.  Mr. Tsoi’s solicitors contacted Ah Chung who confirmed that he had previously worked for the same employer in August and September 2004 in Western and Mongkok, and the contact address was G/F 14 Western Street.  But he was not able to supply the full name of the employer.

18.  Upon obtaining special permission from the Chief Secretary for Administration, the Registration of Persons Office supplied Mr. Tsoi’s solicitors with a copy of the photograph of Mr. Tsui Chi Keung.  Mr. Tsoi could not positively identify the person in the photograph as the employer though he admitted the employer resembled the person in the photograph. He recalled the person in the photograph also resembled the brother whom he met at the house on 10 March 2005.

19.  As the Registration of Persons Office could not supply any details on Tsui Chun Yuen without his ID card number, Mr. Tsoi’s Counsel, Miss Cheng, informed the Court the search for the employer came to a deadend.  Defence Counsel Miss Loh submitted the employer could be ‘Tsui Chun Yuen’ because he was the registered subscriber of the mobile phone number 9196 9428 which Mr. Tsoi had used to contact the employer, Miss Cheng argued it was not conclusive as the mobile phone number could be used by someone other than the registered subscriber.  Furthermore, it is contrary to the information obtained from the house owner who claimed the contractor was Tsui Chun Yuen.

20.  Miss Loh submitted that Mr. Tsoi should issue the proceedings against Tsui Chi Keung on the basis of the evidence that he was the registered subscriber of the mobile phone number 9196 9428.

Findings

21.  After considering the evidence in support of the search for the employer supplied by the Plaintiff, I cannot agree with Miss Loh that it can be concluded that Mr. Tsui Chi Keung was Mr. Tsoi’s employer.  Albeit, there is evidence that he was the registered owner of the mobile phone number 9196 9428 which Mr. Tsoi had used to contact the employer, and there is the evidence that he was (and still is) the registered owner of the premises at Ground Floor, 14 Western Street in Western where Mr. Tsoi had collected his wages in August and September 2004, 6 months before the accident.  On the other hand, there is evidence from the Discovery Bay house owner that the contractor for the works on 10 March 2005 was one Tsui Chun Yuen and further evidence that Mr. Tsui Chi Keung’s letter to Mr. Tsoi’s solicitor had stated that the premises were let to Tsui Chun Yuen in August and September 2004.  Whatsmore, Mr. Tsoi was unable to positively identify the photograph supplied by the Registration of Persons Office that Tsui Chi Keung was the employer.

22.  There may be circumstantial evidence which leads one to suspect Tsui Chi Keung may be related to Tsui Chun Yuen or may even be the same person as Miss Loh suggested.  It remains, however, a mere suspicion.  In spite of repeated efforts on the part of Mr. Tsoi and his solicitors, the true identity of Mr. Tsoi’s employer could not be confirmed.

23.  Miss Loh submitted that the Fund Board serves as a last resort for obtaining compensation or damages legally awarded to employees.  She argued that it is only after the employee has succeeded in establishing liability against the employer and has taken all reasonable proceedings to recover from the employer could he turn to the fund for payment of the unpaid compensation under S.16(1), (2) and (3) of the Ordinance.  She relied on the cases of Yu Nongxian v. Ng Ka Wing [2007] 4 HKLRD 159 pp 175 and 180; and Fok Por v. Sum Shuk Ching, the administratrix of the estate of Li Sing Keung dec’d DCEC 172 of 1991 (judgment of H.H. Downey D.J. on 25 March 1992).  There are no relevant cases on an application under S.25 of the Ordinance.

24.  In the Yu Nongxian case, the Court of Appeal was asked to decide if the Court should exercise its discretion under S.2(2) of the Employees’ Compensation Ordinance (Cap. 282) to treat the deceased as if he was employed under a valid contract (the deceased was an illegal worker from the mainland).  The passage Miss Loh relied on is para. 105 of Cheung J.A.’s judgment at p.180:

“105.  An employee or his family must exhaust all attempts to recover the award against the employer before he could seek payment from the Employees’ Compensation Assistance Fund Board (the Fund)”

25.  In the District Court case of Fok Por, Judge Downey held in para. 10:

“10.  In my judgment, the general scheme of the Ordinance is that the Board should serve as a last resort for obtaining payment of compensation or damages legally awarded to employees, only after it has been shown that attempts to obtain satisfaction have failed because of the insolvency of the employer or his insurer.  Even then, the amount to be paid from the Fund, and whether any payment should be made, are matters left to the discretion of the Board.  With the exception of cases which fall within section 25, there is no question of any entitlement on the part of employees to a payment from the Fund.  In my view, section 25 is really designed to deal with the situation where an employee has an indefeasible claim against an employer, who is uninsured, and cannot be effectively sued.  The section relieves an employee of the pointless task of proceeding against the employer or his estate, and enables him to obtain an order against the board, which the Board must honour like any other party.  In my view, this is the only exception to the discretionary feature of the Board’s function; and is probably justified by the fact that the Board will have ample opportunity to carry out inquiries of the kind envisaged by section 22 by reason of the fact of being a party to the proceedings.”

in para. 11, he further held:-

“The matter is not free from doubt but I consider that the words: “subject to section 25 in section 21 indicate a legislative intention that sections 21 to 23 only apply to “applications” under sections 16 to 18 and not to “proceedings” brought against the Board under section 25.  In my view, the Board must honour in full any order or award made by virtue of section 25; subject only to the priority provisions of section 26.”

26.  I am in total agreement that the burden is on the employee to exhaust all attempts to recover the award against the employer before he could seek payment from the Fund.  By the same token, the employee should exhaust all reasonable course to identify and locate the employer before issuing proceedings under S.25.

27.  Miss Loh submitted that S.25 is the guard door preventing employees from suing the Board direct indiscriminately or for convenience without suing the employer first.  The Board will upon notice take the initiative to join as an intervenor or party to the proceedings under S.25A where it is shown that the employer is insolvent or for any reason liable under s.16 for payment of unpaid compensation.

28.  I do not agree it is the legislative intent that the Fund Board would only intervene after liability has been proved and upon the insolvency of the employer under S.16(1), (2) and (3) of the Ordinance.  S.25 is clearly included in the Ordinance for the protection of employees who were injured or killed in the course of employment in situations where the employer could not be identified or found; or if identified and found is insolvent or dead or if it was a company had been dissolved or cannot be served for any reason; and there was no insurance coverage for the employee (S.25(1)(a) and (b)).

29.  Miss Loh informed me that this is the first application of this kind under S.25 and a floodgate would be opened if Mr. Tsoi’s application is allowed.

30.  The fact that the legislation had provided for cases which come under the requirements set out in S.25 means that it had intended to cover employees who may not be protected otherwise.

31.  I refer to the dictum of Cheung J.A. in para. 100 of his judgment (p.179) in the Yu Nongxian case:

“100.  Under the Ordinance a worker would only be entitled to make a claim for employees’ compensation when he sustained injuries or death.  The Ordinance is an ordinance which allows an employee to recover compensation on a “no fault” basis so long as the injury or death was the result of an incident that arose out of and in the course of the employment.  The authority obviously recognized the social need for this type of legislation: an employee who met such a misfortune should not be without redress.”

32.  Protection against abuse has been built in under S.25(3) of the Ordinance.  It requires the applicant to make an application to the Court before issuing proceedings against the Fund Board as if it were the employer.

33.  Further, the Court has to be satisfied that the applicant had shown the employer could not be identified or if identified cannot be found; or the employer is dead or is insolvent or if it is a company, had been dissolved; or cannot be served and there is no insurance policy cover the employee.  In the present case, I am satisfied, on a balance of probabilities that Mr. Tsoi and his solicitors had in the last 4 years since the accident made repeated attempts to locate the identity of the employer and his whereabouts.  I am satisfied that they have exhausted all reasonable course in doing so.

34.  I do not agree with Miss Loh’s suggestion that Mr. Tsoi should take out proceedings against Tsui Chi Keung unless and until there are strong evidence proving he was the employer.  To do so without strong and positive evidence would be a waste of public funds for Mr. Tsoi is legally aided.  Mr. Tsoi’s injury was minor as he was assessed by MAB to suffer 1.5% loss of earning capacity.  A great deal of efforts had been made and costs expended on the efforts to identify and locate the employer in the last four years by Mr. Tsoi and his solicitors.  I am satisfied the search has come to a deadend.  Further public funds expended in an attempt to issue proceedings against Tsui Chi Keung, which seemed unlikely to succeed, would be folly.

35.  For the aforesaid reason, I grant leave to the Plaintiff to issue proceedings against the Defendant as if it were the employer.

36.  Costs to be in the cause of the proceedings to be taxed if not agreed.  The Plaintiff’s own costs to be taxed in accordance with legal aid regulations.

 ( H.C. Wong )
District Judge

Parties :

Miss Flora Cheng instructed by Messrs. Liau, Ho & Chan assigned by DLA for the Plaintiff.

Miss Phillis Loh instructed by Messrs. Cheng, Yeung & Co. for the Defendant.

59338-EN-2007-11-30

TSOI CHUNG KAK v. EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION ASSISTANCE FUND BOARD

HTML content

DCMP 744 / 2007

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 744 OF 2007

------------------------------

BETWEEN

 TSOI CHUNG KAK (蔡宗格)Plaintiff
 and 
 EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION ASSISTANCE FUND BOARDDefendant

------------------------------

 

Coram : His Honour Judge Thomas Au in Chambers (open to public) 

Date of Hearing : 21 November 2007

Date of Reasons for Decision : 30 November 2007

 

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REASONS FOR DECISION

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1.  The Plaintiff (“Mr Tsoi”) applies by way of an Originating Summons for leave to issue proceedings against the Employees Compensation Assistance Fund Board under section 25 of the Employees Compensation Assistance Ordinance (Cap 365) (“the Ordinance).   He seeks to claim the Board as if it were the employer for employee’s compensation in relation to an injury he suffered while working at a house in Discovery Bay in March 2005. 

2.  Section 25 of the Ordinance provides as follows:

“(1)This section applies to any claim against an employer for compensation where – 
  (a)the employer – 
   (i)cannot be identified, or if identified, cannot be located; 
    …
   (iv)for any reason, cannot be served with proceedings, and 
  (b)no policy of insurance is known to be in force in relation to the employee.
 (2)Subject to this section, proceedings for any claim against an employee to which this section applies may issue against the Board as if it were the employer.
 (3)Proceedings against the Board under this section, shall not issue unless the court is satisfied, on application made on notice to the Board, as to the matters specified in subsection (1)(a) and (b).
 (4)Where proceedings are brought against the Board under this section, the rights and liabilities of the employer in respect of the compensation the subject of the proceedings are vested and transferred to the Board.”

3.  This is not the substantive hearing of the Originating Summons, but the hearing of the Board’s application to strike out the Originating Summons on the usual basis that (a) he has no reasonable cause of action (for issuing proceedings), (b) his claim (for issuing proceedings) is frivolous and vexatious, and (c) it is an abuse of process to apply to issue proceedings against the Board.

4.  In support of the application, the Board through its Counsel, Ms Lau submits that Mr Tsoi’s application for leave to issue proceedings is simply pre-mature and should be struck out since:

(1)On a proper construction of this provision, it requires the applicant to provide sufficient evidence to satisfy the Court the matters under section 25(1)(a) at the time of the issue of an application for leave. 
(2)In the present case, the evidence filed by Mr Tsoi at the time of the issue of the Originating Summons does not show that he had taken all reasonable steps to identify or locate the employer.  In the premises, he cannot satisfy the Court as required under section 25(3) of the Ordinance that proceedings shall be issued against the Board. His application is thus bound to fail and should be struck out. 
(3)In any event, even by now, the evidence filed by Mr Tsoi still does not show that he had taken all reasonable steps to identify or locate the employer.  As such, his application for leave to issue proceedings should also be struck out. 

5.  On the other hand, Mr Tsoi’s counsel, Ms Cheng, submits that the evidence shows that the requirements are or are arguably met either at the time of the issue of the Originating Summons or by now.

6.  It is however trite and common ground that the Court should only exercise its summary power to strike out an application for relief in a plain and obvious case:  Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2008, paras 18/19/4 – 18/19/10, 18/19/13.

7.  In light of the above contentions, the central questions that I need to determine are:

(1)On a proper construction of section 25(3) of the Ordinance, what is the time of reference it requires the applicant to satisfy the Court that the matters under section 25(1)(a) are met.  
(2)Depending on the answers to (1) above, whether in the present case, the evidence can arguably satisfy the Court at the relevant time that the employer cannot be identified or cannot be located. 

What is the time of reference under section 25(3) of the Ordinance

8.  Section 25(3) provides as follows:

“Proceedings against the Board under this section, shall not issue unless the court is satisfied, on application made on notice to the Board, as to the matters specified in subsection (1)(a) and (b).” 

9.  When construing a statutory provision, if the words are clear and unambiguous, one should construe it in accordance to its plain words and meaning, and should not read any additional words into it, unless the interpretation would lead to clear anomaly:  Craies on Legislation (8th ed), paras 17.1.1-17.1.5, 17.1.8.

10.  In my judgment, the plain meaning of the words “on application made on notice to the Board” in section 25(3) refers to the time of the substantive hearing of the application for leave to issue proceedings against the Board.  This is so because, in my view, these words when read together with the opening words “proceedings under this section shall not issue”, refer to the time of actual determination on whether leave should be granted or not for the issue of the proceedings.  That is, the time of the substantive hearing of the application. 

11.  Not only is this interpretation consistent with the plain and clear meaning of the words, it also makes reasonable and logical sense since it will only be at the time of the substantive hearing that all the evidence before the Court is complete, and thus the Court is in a position to decide whether the evidence establishes the matters under section 25(1)(a). 

12.  In my judgment, it could not have been the intention of the legislature that the time of reference as to whether there is sufficient evidence of proof is at the time when the application is taken out:  First, if the application is opposed, the Board would only be able to provide evidence after the application has been taken out.  Secondly, an applicant is fully entitled to then file further evidence in reply to the Board’s evidence in opposition.  The legislature could not have intended that the Court should disregard all such subsequently filed evidence when determining whether to grant leave for the issue of proceedings against the Board.

13.  For the above reasons, I conclude that the Court should only assess the evidence as at the time of the substantive hearing of the application for leave (but not at the time when the application is taken out) to determine whether the Applicant can satisfy the Court that the employer cannot be identified or located.

14.  In the premises, I reject Ms Lau’s submission that the Originating Summons should be struck out simply because Mr Tsoi did not have sufficient evidence to prove, at the time when the Originating Summons was issued, that the employer cannot be identified or located.   Even if, and I make no finding on this, Mr Tsoi did not have such sufficient evidence at that time as submitted by Ms Lau, that is not a valid ground to strike out the Originating Summons. 

Should the Originating Summons be in any event struck out by now given the state of the evidence

15.  Ms Lau also submits that the evidence as it is now also does not show that Mr Tsoi has taken all reasonable steps to identify or locate the employer, and thus the application should be struck out in any event. 

16.  In order to deal with Ms Lau’s submissions, it is necessary for me to set out below in summary Mr Tsoi’s evidence that is now before me in support of his case that his employer cannot be identified, located or served with the proceedings.

17.  Mr Tsoi had been working as a casual worker in construction sites.  In 2004, he had once worked with a co-worker known as Ah Shing in Mongkok and Western District for a particular boss.   He was introduced to Ah Shing by his friend Ah Chung.  For these occasions, Mr Tsoi collected the wage payment in cash from the boss at his shop at Ground Floor, No. 14, Western Street, Western District, Hong Kong.  He understood that the boss lived at the rear portion of this shop.

18.  On about 9 March 2005, Ah Shing introduced him to work as a causal worker for the same boss at a house in Discovery Bay.  The next day, they met each other at the Tung Chung MTR station before going to the site together.  He was joined by Ah Chung and another worker at the MTR station.

19.  He saw the employer, who was a medium built male of about 50 years old at the house on that day.  It was the same boss he saw previously when he worked at Mongkok and Western District. 

20.  He suffered an injury to his right ring and little fingers while working at the house.  He did not go to attend medical treatment until after work that evening.  He was then granted seven days sick leave.

21.  Ah Shing gave him the mobile numbers of the employer, and he tried to contact the employer through the two mobile telephone numbers.  He managed initially to talk to the boss over the phone to discuss about the payments for the sick leave, but later the numbers were no longer in use and he could not find the boss.

22.  Upon making inquiries, he was told by an ex co-worker called Ah Kit that the employer was “祥強裝修公司”.  He also went to the shop in Western District for about 10 times trying to collect the sick leave pay, but he could find no one there.  In late 2005, the shop became a beauty saloon. 

23.  In late March 2005, he sought assistance from the Labour Department. After some investigations, the Labour Department was also unable to contact the employer.  It was also found out that there was no business registration of a business known as “祥強裝修公司”.  There was also no Notification of Construction Work available in the Labour Department’s file concerning the construction work at the Discovery Bay house, and thus no record of whom the contractor was.

24.  Further, it was recorded in the brief inspection report of the Labour Department a fixed line telephone number, after apparently the labour officer had made certain interviews with some informants. 

25.  Mr Tsoi through his solicitors had later written to various telephone companies in Hong Kong to inquire about the personal information of the subscribers to the fixed line telephone number and the two mobile phone numbers mentioned above.  The telephone companies indicate by reply that they would not disclose any such information unless there is a court order.  Mr Tsoi has since taken out four applications seeking discovery against these telephone companies. These applications are pending.

26.  After being told by the Board’s solicitors that the registered owner of the Discovery Bay house is one Joy Fine International Investment Ltd, Mr Tsoi’s solicitor obtains information from Joy Fine that the contractor it used for the work is a Mr Tsui Chun Yuen but there are no documents concerning the contracting with Mr Tsui Chun Yuen.  Mr Tsoi says he has not heard of this name before.

27.  At the same time, it was found out that the registered owner of the Western District Shop is a Mr Tsui Chi Keung.  Upon inquiries made by Mr Tsoi’s solicitors, Mr Tsui Chi Keung informed them that the shop was rented to one Tsui Chun Yuen between August and September 2004, but there was no written tenancy agreement.    Mr Tsui Chi Keung did not respond to the other inquiries concerning the home address, mobile phone number of Mr Tsui Chun Yuen, and whether he has any kinship with Mr Tsui Chun Yuen.

28.  In light of the above evidence, Ms Lau submits that even by now, Mr Tsoi still cannot show that he has taken all reasonable steps to identify or locate the employer.  This is so because Mr Tsoi ought to have at least asked his colleagues whether they knew the names of the two Mr Tsui’s and whether any one of the two Tsui’s was known to them as the employer.

29.  I disagree with Ms Lau’s submissions for the following reasons:

(1)In my judgment, in using the words “unless the court is satisfied” in the provision, the legislature intended to give the Court a free hand to assess all the evidence presented before it by an applicant to decide whether the evidence is sufficient to prove, on a balance of probabilities, the matters listed under section 25(1).  The provision does not limit or prescribe the Court that it should be so satisfied only if an applicant has taken all reasonable steps to identify or locate the employer as suggested by Ms Lau.  Whether he has taken all reasonable steps in the circumstances of the case is but only one of the factors (and perhaps at times an important factor) that the Court could consider whether the matters under section 25(1)(a) are proved. 
(2)As such and given the circumstances of the present case as set out above, I am of the view that it is at least arguable at this stage that, even without the further inquiry with his colleagues as suggested by Ms Lau, the Court could be satisfied that the employer cannot either be identified, located or properly served with a proceedings. 
(3)Moreover, in light of the four pending third party discovery applications, Mr Tsoi is still in the process of gathering potential evidence for the substantive hearing of the Originating Summons. It therefore cannot be said at this stage that his application is bound to fail at the substantive hearing for lack of sufficient evidence to satisfy the Court that the employer cannot be identified or located. 

30.  I therefore do not accept that it is at this stage clear and obvious that Mr Tsoi must fail at the substantive hearing of the Originating Summons.  I will not strike it out.

31.  Given that this is only the striking out application, the Board is of course still entitled to fully argue at the substantive hearing of the Originating Summons why Mr Tsoi’s evidence cannot prove the matters under section 25(1)(a).

Conclusion

32.  For the reasons set out above, I dismiss the Board’s application to strike out the Originating Summons. 

33.  I further grant an order nisi that costs of this application be to Mr Tsoi to be taxed if not agreed, with certificate for counsel, and that Mr Tsoi’s own costs be taxed in accordance with the legal aid schedule.

 

 

 (Thomas Au)
District Court Judge

 

Ms. Flora Cheng Suk-Yee, instructed by Messrs Liau, Ho & Chan for Plaintiff.

Ms. Julia P.G. Lau, instructed by Messrs Cheng, Yeung & Co. for Defendant.