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Civil Action2007

PAK KO BATTERIES FACTORY LTD AND OTHERS v. NEW LEADER BATTERY INDUSTRY LTD

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91170-EN-2014-01-14

PAK KO BATTERIES FACTORY LIMITED AND OTHERS v. NEW LEADER BATTERY INDUSTRY LTD

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HCA 1139/2007

 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

HIGH COURT ACTION NO 1139 OF 2007

_________________________

BETWEEN

 PAK KO BATTERIES FACTORY LIMITED
(栢高電池廠有限公司)
1st Plaintiff
 FANASIA ELECTRONICS (BOLOU, YEUNG CHOW, CHINA) LTD
(博羅圓州泛亞電子有限公司)
2nd Plaintiff
 DONGGUAN GAIN CHARM TOYS CO LIMITED
(東莞佳暢玩具有限公司)
3rd Plaintiff
 and
 NEW LEADER BATTERY INDUSTRY LIMITED
(新利達電池實業有限公司)
Defendant
_________________________
Before: Mr Registrar K.W. Lung in Chambers (Open to the public)
Date of Hearing: 14 January 2014
Date of Decision: 14 January 2014

_____________

D E C I S I O N

_____________

THE APPLICATION

1.  By summons dated 31 July 2013, the plaintiffs apply for leave under Order 38 rules 7 & 36 to adduce expert evidence as set out in the summons, the main points of which are summarized as follows:

a. The decision/judgments of the PRC courts/state offices relating to the issues of validity and/or infringement of the “patent” in question (“the final decisions/judgments”) as evidence of finding of foreign law;

b. The legal effect of the decisions/judgments and in particular, in view of the Decision of the Highest People’s Court of the PRC dated 20 December 2012 (the 2012 Decision), the “patent” in question is deemed to be invalid from the beginning and thereby never existed, or it remains valid and subsisting notwithstanding the final decision/judgment; and if that is the position, what is the overriding effect on the validity of the “patent” in question?

c. An accountant’s report on the quantum of loss suffered by the plaintiff.[1]

2.  The defendant’s positions in relation to the above applications are these:

a. As to the issue of foreign law, it takes the view that Order 38 RHC refers to section 59 (4) of the Evidence Ordinance, Cap. 8, which refers to decisions of the supreme courts in UK or the Court of Final Appeal only.  It does not refer to the PRC court.  However, the defendant submits that it is unnecessary for the plaintiffs to take out the application as both parties’ experts have to rely upon the PRC decisions or judgments.  The plaintiffs agree that this application is not necessary.  As such, this application is dismissed.

b. It agrees that expert evidence should be adduced at trial.  It disagrees to the issues as framed by the plaintiff.  It proposes the issues for expert evidence as set out in pages 152-156.  It can be seen that the defendant agrees that expert evidence should be given, but since the defendant has to plead justification in its defence, it has to rely upon expert evidence on the interim periods where the patent was obtained and set aside by the Court and subsequently restored by the administrative office of the PRC, in particular, during the periods when the alleged defamatory statements were made.

c. It disagrees that leave should be given to the plaintiffs to adduce the accountant’s report on its loss because loss, in its view, is a matter of fact to be adduced by factual witnesses.[2]

3.  Mr. Lam, solicitor acts for the plaintiffs and Ms F. Lok, counsel acts for the defendant.

THE FACT

4.  This is a case of defamation against the defendant, who was the owner of the patent in relation to certain battery products, a business rival to the 1st plaintiff.  The 1st plaintiff claims that the defendant issued a letter dated 24 September 2004 to its customers containing defamatory words that the 1st plaintiff had supplied battery products which infringed the defendant’s patent on those products.  The 1st plaintiff also alleged that the defendant had, on a date unknown to it, published an article (“the article”) on its website containing the similar defamatory words.  The 1st plaintiff did not dispute that the defendant had once been the owner of the patent.  But it said that the said patent had been declared invalid at the material times by the Patent Re-examination Board (“the Board”) of the State Intellectual Property Office of the PRC.  Hence, the statement and the article were defamatory.

5.  The 2nd and 3rd plaintiffs said that the article on the defendant’s website was defamatory because it meant that they were selling product supplied by the 1st plaintiff, which were an infringement of the defendant’s patent.  For the same reason that the defendant’s patent had, at the material times, been declared invalid, they claimed against the defendant for libel.

6.  The defendant pleads justification and qualified privilege as its defence.[3]  The defendant further says that the material dispute between the parties is the validity of the defendant’s patent at the material times, namely the publication of the letter and the article.[4]

7.  Thus analyzed, the dispute between the parties in relation to the expert evidence on the liability will focus on the width and depth of the issues on which expert evidence should be adduced at the trial.

THE APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

8.  The following legal principles should apply:

a. The court is concerned with proper directions for expert evidence in order not to cause delay and waste of expenses.  Faith Bright Development Limited v Ng Kwok Kuen & Ors [2010] 5 HKLRD 425 at 430-431;

b. The parties and their legal representatives have a duty to assist the court in formulating the appropriate expert directions.  Chok Yick Interior Design & Engineering Co Ltd v Lai Chi Lun t/a Chi Hung Construction Eng Co HCA 1480/2008 by Lam J (as he then was) on 5 May 2010 at §8;

c. Expert evidence must be confined to the live issues of dispute between the parties, which must be sought from the pleadings.  China Gold Finance Limited v.CIL Holdings Limited & Ors HCA2900/2001, (unreported, Registrar Lung, 25 September 2012) at para.17-18.

9.  For the purpose of defining the live issues for liability, it is common that the parties must refer to the legal effects of the final decisions/judgments and the interim periods of the decision of the Board and the decisions of the courts.

FACTORS TO DETERMINE SCOPE OF EXPERT EVIDENCE

10.  In determining the scope of expert evidence, it may be helpful to bear in mind the following factors:

a. The real issues of dispute;

b. The burden of proof;

c. Is it fair to adopt a narrow scope or a wider scope (as the dispute is usually on the scope of expert evidence)? and

d. Proportionality – will the proposed scope save costs and time?

11.  In China Gold Finance Limited v.CIL Holdings Limited & Ors (HCA2900/2001), the parties were also arguing on the scope of the expert evidence.  I ruled out the plaintiff’s proposed direction on an issue which was not pleaded and, even if pleaded, had no chance of success.  It was therefore not a real issue of dispute.  The scope as proposed by the 1st defendant was more extensive than that proposed by the plaintiff.  The real issue of dispute was whether, as alleged by the 1st defendant, the plaintiff had assigned the loan to another company and therefore the 1st defendant was not liable.  The burden of proof lied upon the 1st defendant.  If the court were to adopt the plaintiff’s narrow scope of expert evidence, it would be unfair to the 1st defendant, who would be, in any event, entitled to raise it at trial.  The adoption of the 1st defendant’s wider scope of expert evidence would not incur more costs and time.  I therefore adopted the 1st defendant’s proposed scope of expert evidence.  See paragraphs 28-30.

12.  In Amcor Packaging (Asia) Pty Ltd v Li Wei Bo HCA 1351/2009 (unreported, Registrar Lung 9 January 2014), the plaintiff claimed against the defendant for the guaranteed amount because the audited accounts of the companies, which the defendant guaranteed showed a deficiency in the guaranteed profit.  The defendant disputed that the audited accounts were not compiled in accordance with the terms of the undertaking; in particular, they were not in compliance with the accounting and audit standard in Hong Kong.  The real issue was whether the audited consolidated accounts of the group of companies were compiled in accordance with the terms of the undertaking.  Since the plaintiff had produced the audited accounts, the burden would be on the defendant to show that they were not in accordance with the terms of the undertaking.  In fact, the defendant had produced an expert report commenting on the way the audited accounts were prepared.  Therefore, though the plaintiff objected to the defendant’s application, leave was given to the defendant to adduce the expert evidence to discharge his burden.  However, the defendant’s proposed issues for expert evidence on the way the audited accounts should be prepared were irrelevant as there should be more than one way of preparing the audited accounts acceptable to the accounting and audit standard in Hong Kong.  Those issues were rejected because they were not the real issues; and if allowed, would muddle the issues and would waste costs and time.  The Court therefore reframed the issues for the parties.

13.  In West Coast International Trading Ltd trading as Dandelion Fine Arts v Chelsea Art Company Ltd HCA1636/2010 (unreported, Registrar Lung 10 January 2014), the plaintiff claimed against the defendant for conversion of the paintings stolen from it.  The defendant had bought one of the paintings and intended to return it to the plaintiff.  The plaintiff declined to accept it, saying that it was a counterfeit.  The plaintiff supported its allegation by the opinion of another painter, an expert on painting in question. The defendant argued that there should be expert evidence on the identity of the 2ndpainting and put the plaintiff to strict proof whereas the court, after considering the materials before it, decided that the real issue should be the authenticity of the painting which the defendant sought to return to the plaintiff, not the identity of it.  The scope of the expert evidence was therefore determined accordingly.

DISCUSSION

The scope of expert evidence on liability

14.  I shall now apply the above factors to the proposals as put forth by the plaintiffs and those by the defendant.

15.  The real issue of dispute has been decided.  Since the defendant pleads justification, the burden will be on the defendant to prove those contents were, at the material times, true or they were justified for qualified privilege.  The defendant should be given the liberty to adduce the evidence that it considers appropriate to support its case, provided that the evidence is relevant and reasonable, not wasting time and costs.

16.  It is true that the plaintiffs’ proposed scope of expert evidence is brief and succinct.  This is because the plaintiffs can simply rely upon the 2012 Decision, which, the plaintiffs say, renders the patent invalid ab initio.  The plaintiffs comment that the defendant’s proposed scope of expert evidence is diverse and that it appears to adopt the stance the administrative actions or appeals by the defendant to the PRC courts at the material times had the effect of preserving the validity of its patent or keeping it alive.  The plaintiffs have raised three grounds of objection on the defendant’s stance.[5]

17.  The first ground relates to the dates of the article published and the date of the appeal.  This seems to be irrelevant to the stance.  At best, the plaintiffs may say that the article was published before the lodging of the appeal, which is a matter of fact.

18.  The second ground says that there is no evidence that the administrative actions or appeal might have the effects as the defendant intends.  This is what expert evidence should be given.  It should be noted that the court’s decisions on the validity of the patent appeared to be not final as the courts’ decisions were, from time to time, reviewed by the Board, which will require the expert in Chinese law to explain to the court.

19.  The third ground is that the stance is not pleaded in the Defence.  This is already covered in the pleadings because the pleading is on justification.

20.  The defendant has pleaded that until the resolution of the proceedings commenced on 3 July 2007 to set aside the administrative office’s decision, the patent is still valid.[6]  In the determination of relevance in the pleadings, the Court should adopt a broad sense, rather than going to the particulars.  It should also be noted that the pleadings of respective parties have not touched on the Decision of the Highest People’s Court of the PRC dated 20 December 2012.  The plaintiffs and the defendant have indicated that they will amend their pleadings. This will be covered by the directions in the Case Management Conference below.

21.  Even if the Court is to adopt the plaintiffs’ proposed scope of expert evidence, it will not be difficult to envisage that the defendant will, at the trial, raise all those questions as appeared in its scope of expert evidence for the expert witnesses. The Court will be reluctant to restrict the defendant’s questions to the expert witnesses.

22.  I consider it will be unfair to restrict the defendant’s right to adduce its expert evidence as it has to discharge its burden of proof for justification.  As they are bound to be the issues to be discussed, it will not be unfair or wasting costs to allow the defendant’s proposed scope of expert evidence.  The plaintiffs’ expert may answer those issues as raised by the defendant in the expert report, saving time at the trial.

23.  I agree with the plaintiffs that the defendant’s proposed directions are diverse.  The real issues will be whether or not the patent remained at the material times, viz. the time when the letter was issued to the plaintiffs’ customers and the time when the article was published on the defendant’s website.  However, since the plaintiff has pleaded that the article was published on the defendant’s website on a date unknown to them, the scope of the material times has to be extended to the whole period from the obtaining of the patent until the 2012 Decision.

24.  I decide to adopt the defendant’s proposed scope of expert evidence.

On quantum

25.  As to the issue of expert evidence on quantum, the defendant argues that it is a matter of fact.  Therefore factual evidence from the plaintiffs or their representatives will be sufficient.[7]

26.  The plaintiffs argue that if the plaintiffs are successful, they are entitled to actual loss and loss of customers as a result of damage to goodwill.  An accountant will be required to make the assessment.

27.  The real issues of dispute must be found from the pleadings.  In paragraph 17 of the Statement of Claim, the plaintiffs claim damages for cancellation of the orders because of the defendant’s libel.  The amount of damages is $330,000.  The particulars given in paragraph 18 are the reasons for the claim rather than the way the amount was calculated.  In the Defence, the defendant denied the plaintiffs’ claim and said that the plaintiffs were not entitled to any damages, whether exemplary or otherwise.  See paragraph 19 of Defence.

28.  Mr. Lam tells me that the purpose of getting an accountant as an expert is to prove damages.  However, from the Defence, the defendant has not pleaded that it will challenge the way the amount of damages were calculated.

29.  Therefore, I do not agree that leave should be given to the plaintiffs to adduce expert evidence on the quantum.

Costs

30.  On the question of costs for this application, Mr. Lam submits that the costs should be in the cause because the question for today is the scope of the expert evidence, which is a matter for case management.  Ms Lok submits that the parties had been advised by the Court to agree on the expert evidence way back to June last year.  They were unable to do so and the plaintiffs insist upon their stance.  As the matter has been argued, the costs should follow the event.  I agree.  The fact that the defendant has not maintained the same proposed expert evidence is not a factor that will affect the costs liability arisen from the argument today.  Costs should be given to the defendant (with a counsel’s certificate), which is to be assessed summarily under Order 62 rule 9A RHC. The defendant’s schedule of costs amounts to $284,328.  Mr. Lam submits that it is excessive because there was senior counsel’s involvement, which is not necessary.  He also comments that there was excessive time claimed by the solicitor for the preparation of the matter.  Ms Lok explained that senior counsel was once involved, but upon re-consideration, the defendant decides to instruct the junior counsel only.  The solicitor had to explain the documents in English to client, which has caused more time for the preparation.  On a broad-brush basis, the Court considers that the time for this hearing, as agreed by the parties, is only two hours.  I have made reference to the plaintiff’s schedule of costs, which are $39,250.  The costs as proposed for a 2-hour hearing are no doubt, high.  I assess the costs for this application, including the costs reserved and the hearing today, be $80,000 to be paid by the plaintiffs to the defendant within 14 days from the date hereof.

Order

31.  I shall make an order in terms as follows:

a. The plaintiffs’ application for leave to adduce foreign law be dismissed;

b. Leave to the plaintiffs and the defendant to adduce expert evidence as per the directions set out in page 152-156 of the bundle;

c. The plaintiffs’ application for expert evidence on quantum be dismissed;

d. The costs be as per paragraph 30 herein.

32.  I shall now deal with the Case Management Conference matters as follows:

a. After the preparation of the joint expert statement as provided under the proposed directions for expert evidence as per page 156 of the bundle, the parties shall, within 28 days, obtain Counsel's advice;

b. All interlocutory applications as may be advised shall be taken out within 21 days thereafter. Such applications, if contested, shall be fixed before the Registrar for argument;

c. The parties shall exchange the witness statements within 42 days thereafter or after close of the amended pleadings, if any;

d. Any party being unable to comply with any of the directions herein shall take out an application for time extension within 7 days after the due date for compliance.

e. The 2nd Case Management Conference shall be held at 9:30 on 29 October 2014;

f. Costs of this Case Management Conference hearing (30 minutes) be in the cause.

 

 (K.W. Lung)
 Registrar, High Court

Mr. Lam Chun Sing, of Hastings & Co., for the plaintiffs

Ms. Frances Lok,instructed by Lam & Co., for the defendant



[1] Page 15 of bundle

[2] §3 of written submissions

[3] §20 ibid

[4] §21 ibid

[5] §19 of written submissions

[6] §8 of the Defence

[7] §§37-40 of written submissions

83503-EN-2012-08-29

PAK KO BATTERIES FACTORY LTD AND OTHERS v. NEW LEADER BATTERY INDUSTRY LTD

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HCA 1139/2007

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1139 OF 2007

____________

BETWEEN

 PAK KO BATTERIES FACTORY LIMITED1st Plaintiff
 FANASIA ELECTRONICS (BOLOU,
YEUNG CHOW, CHINA) LTD
2nd Plaintiff
 DONGGUAN GAIN CHARM TOYS3rd Plaintiff
 CO LTD 

and

 NEW LEADER BATTERY INDUSTRY LIMITEDDefendant
____________

 

Before: Hon Mimmie Chan J in Chambers (Open to public)

Date of Hearing: 29 August 2012

Date of Decision: 29 August 2012

 

___________________

D E C I S I O N

___________________

 

1.  The principles of striking-out are clear. It is only in plain and obvious cases that the court should exercise its summary powers to strike out the endorsement on any writ or any pleading under Order 18 rule 19. Disputed facts are to be taken in favour of the party sought to be struck out. The court should not decide difficult points of law in striking-out proceedings. The claim must be obviously unsustainable, the pleading unarguably bad, and it must be impossible, not just improbable, for the claim to succeed before the court will strike it out. It is for the party seeking to strike out to demonstrate that the case is a plain and obvious one in which the other party’s claim is bound to fail.

2.  As the Chief Justice made it clear in the case of Wing Fai Construction Company Limited [2012] 1 HKLRD 589, one of the main objectives of the CJR is to enable parties to proceedings to have their disputes resolved as expeditiously, effectively and efficiently as reasonably practicable. The primary responsibility of the court, as made clear by Order 1A, rule 2(2), is to secure the just resolution of disputes in accordance with the substantive rights of the parties.  The role of the court is therefore not, of course, to prevent actions being litigated; quite the opposite.  As such, striking-out should only be used in plain and obvious cases.

3.  On the question of whether the plaintiffs’ claims should be struck out as being scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or otherwise an abuse under Order 18 rules 19(1)(b) and (d), the basis of the defendant’s application is that the plaintiffs’ claims in this action are unsustainable.  The defendant claims that its patent was at all material times valid, that its statements that the plaintiffs were involved in proceedings relating to infringement of its patent can be justified, and hence the plaintiffs’ claims of defamation cannot possibly succeed. 

4.  According to the plaintiffs, the defendant’s patent was declared by the Patent Re-examination Board (“PRB”) on 31 May 2004 to be invalid.  The defamatory letter and the article, alleging that the plaintiffs had infringed the patent, were nevertheless published in September 2004.  The parties do not dispute that there have been related proceedings in Mainland China on the patent.

5.  The defendant’s case is that the PRB’s decision and declaration of the patent’s invalidity dated 31 May 2004 was in fact dismissed by the Chinese court in February 2005.  There was a further decision of the PRB dated 23 April 2007, again declaring the patent to be invalid, but this decision, although upheld by Beijing’s Intermediate Court, was again dismissed by the Beijing Higher Court in August 2008.  The PRB issued a third decision in June 2009, again declaring the patent to be invalid upon its reconsideration, but such declaration of invalidity was yet again dismissed by the Intermediate Court in December 2010, which dismissal was upheld by the Higher Court in October 2011.

6.  Expert evidence on Chinese law has been filed by each of the parties. The experts apparently differ as to whether the patent may yet be declared invalid by the PRB.  The defendant’s expert considered that this is unlikely, whereas the plaintiffs’ expert considered that it is possible.  There is also dispute as to whether the patent can be said to be invalid during the period when its validity was being challenged, or when it was declared invalid. 

7.  Issues of foreign law are regarded as issues of fact.  There is hence a dispute of fact of foreign law as to whether, at the time of the publication of the allegedly defamatory statements, the patent was valid or rendered invalid as a result of the PRB decision, as the plaintiffs claim. 

8.  As counsel for the plaintiffs has emphasised, disputes of facts should be taken in favour of the party sought to be struck out.  On that basis, the patent is to be taken as invalid for the purposes of this striking-out.  If the patent is invalid, I am not satisfied that it is plain and obvious that the statements complained of are incapable of bearing a defamatory meaning as the plaintiffs contend, or that the plaintiffs’ claims are obviously unsustainable, unarguably bad or impossible to succeed.

9.  As for the claim that the action should be struck out for inordinate delay and/or for being an abuse of process, it is clear from the Court of Final Appeal’s decision in Wing Fai Construction that mere delay is not sufficient to justify an order to strike out.  A party’s mere commencement of proceedings, followed by delay, would not necessarily amount to warehousing, or an abuse so as to justify an order to strike out. 

10.  On the facts of this case, although there is inordinate delay, the defendant has not adduced evidence of any prejudice it has sustained as a result of the delay.  The defendant complains that the plaintiffs failed to take any step after the filing of the Defence in July 2007.  However, the defendant also failed to take any step in the action until 2011.  It was happy before then to let sleeping dogs lie, an attitude which the Court of Final Appeal made clear, in Wing Fai Construction, would no longer be tolerated after the Civil Justice Reform. 

11.  I cannot say, from the evidence, that the plaintiffs’ conduct shows a wholesale disregard of the court rules or orders.  Nor can I say, in view of the PRC proceedings, and the development of events there, that the plaintiffs have simply no intention to bring these proceedings to a conclusion. 

12.  In all the circumstances of this case, I am not satisfied that there is any real risk that a fair trial of this action is not possible as a result of any inordinate delay on the part of the plaintiffs.  The issues for determination at trial would be whether the patent was valid at the time of the publication of the defamatory statements, and infringed by the plaintiffs, such that the defendant has a defence of justification and/or qualified privilege. This should not depend on the memory of witnesses, but would rather depend on questions of PRC law on the validity and effect of the patent, amongst other things.

13.  I am not satisfied that this is an appropriate case for striking-out and will, accordingly, dismiss the defendant’s summons.

14.  Since both sides are culpable of delay in bringing this action to trial, instead of ordering costs to follow the event of the unsuccessful application for striking-out, I consider that a fair order would be for each party to bear its own costs, unless I hear submissions from the parties that some other costs order should be made. 

Submissions on costs

15.  I will maintain my order that each party should bear its own costs. 

16.  I hope the parties can now put their house in order and proceed diligently with trial.  If the plaintiffs indeed, as a result of developments in China, consider not to pursue this action further, then it should take appropriate steps to discontinue these proceedings.  In the event of further delay, on the next occasion when the parties come back to court, I cannot say that the court will not make an unless order or such other appropriate order.

 

 

 (Mimmie Chan)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Alan Yung, instructed by Hastings & Co, for the 1st to 3rd plaintiffs

Mr Jonathan Wong, instructed by Lam & Co, for the defendant