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Civil Action2007

MOULIN GLOBAL EYECARE HOLDINGS LTD (in liquidation) AND OTHERS v. KPMG (a firm)

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73325-EN-2010-09-29

MOULIN GLOBAL EYECARE HOLDINGS LTD (IN LIQUIDATION) FORMERLY KNOWN AS MOULIN INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LTD AND OTHERS v. KPMG (a firm)

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HCA118/2007

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 118 OF 2007

__________________

BETWEEN

 MOULIN GLOBAL EYECARE HOLDINGS LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) FORMERLY KNOWN AS MOULIN INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LIMITED1st Plaintiff
 MOULIN HOLDINGS (HK) COMPANY LIMITED
(IN LIQUIDATION)
2nd Plaintiff
 MOULIN GLOBAL EYECARE TRADING LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION) FORMERLY KNOWN AS MOULIN OPTICAL MANUFACTORY LIMITED3rd Plaintiff
 LEADKEEN INDUSTRIAL LIMITED
(IN LIQUIDATION)
4th Plaintiff
and
 KPMG (a firm)Defendant

__________________

Coram: Hon Barma J in Chambers (Open to public)

Date of Hearing: 29 September 2010

Date of Decision: 29 September 2010

________________

D E C I S I O N

________________

1.  This was an application for leave for the plaintiffs to file a further expert’s report by Mr Kenneth Morrison dealing with questions of local business practice and local accounting practice. As to this, the dispute between the parties can be put on two levels.

2.  The first is as to whether or not the plaintiffs should be restricted to relying only upon Mr Swinton, their liability expert, given that Mr Swinton is unable, or may feel unable, to deal with matters of local practice and some matters of local practice have been adverted to and raised in the expert’s report of Mr Wong filed on behalf of the defendant. 

3.  On this point, it was argued that the plaintiffs should have picked up or made more of certain paragraphs in the defendant’s pleading, in which matters of local business practice and local auditing practice were mentioned, in particular paragraph 115, 147.1, 263.5 and 263.6 or 263 generally and 254.6 and 255.6(d), which broadly raise the following areas.

4.  The first relates to the practice of Hong Kong companies of holding their manufacturing facilities in China through local Mainland Chinese nominees. 

5.  The second relates to the making of advances to third parties who are known to be associated with or related to the controlling shareholders of a small to medium sized family company. 

6.  The third relates to a specific point as to audit practice in Hong Kong relating to the date on which an audit opinion is given, in particular as to whether that is the date of actual completion of audit work or whether it might be given at a slightly earlier stage when audit work has been substantially completed, when there are still a few outstanding matters to be dealt with. 

7.  Having considered the pleading, it does not seem to me that the paragraphs in question make it as clear as it is suggested by Mr Lam, that specific matters of Hong Kong business practice or Hong Kong audit practice would be relied upon. 

8.  It is fair to say that a point of Hong Kong audit practice is raised in paragraph 263.5 in relation to the date upon which the audit opinion is given and that Hong Kong business practice is referred to in relation to the other two matters in paragraphs 115 and 254.6 respectively.  But as Mr Jat, I think rightly, points out, the impact of these matters is they relate to an auditor’s duties is not as clearly spelt out.

9.  In those circumstances, I do not think that it was altogether unreasonable for the plaintiffs not to have picked up on these particular points as matters that would require to be carefully addressed in their expert evidence.  But even if I am wrong as to this, it does seem to me that ultimately, as Mr Lam pointed out, the test that one should apply in deciding whether or not a particular step should be permitted in the proceedings is to bear in mind the overriding requirement of our procedural rules, which is that fairness must be afforded to both parties with a view to achieving justice in the actual dispute before the court.

10.  In the present case, given the significance which the defendant has placed on these matters of local practice in its expert’s opinion, it does seem to me that unless some fundamental unfairness would be caused to the defendant by allowing the plaintiffs to have the opportunity, even at this somewhat belated stage, to address those matters, the injustice that would be caused to the plaintiffs in requiring them to go into trial without an opportunity to respond to these matters which have assumed some importance in the defendant’s expert report, would be greater than the injustice that might be caused to the defendant by allowing the plaintiffs to have an opportunity to address these matters. 

11.  I therefore am of the view that it would be appropriate to allow the plaintiffs to file a limited amount of further evidence to deal with the matters of business practice and audit practice that have been raised by Mr Wong in his report.

12.  This leads on to the second aspect of the application, and as to this, it does seem to me that it is important that the scope of Mr Morrison’s report should be clearly defined.  With this in mind, I would propose to restrict it to dealing with the matters raised in the specific paragraphs that have been identified by the plaintiffs in Mr Jat’s skeleton.  Those seem to be the paragraphs that deal substantially with the matters that are in issue. 

13.  I would also wish to make it clear that it does seem to me that Mr Morrison’s role should be limited to commenting on the existence or otherwise of the business practice in question, and on the existence or otherwise of the audit practice in question.  Whether or not, in the light of the existence or otherwise of the business practice or the audit practice in question, the defendant in this particular case should be regarded as having fallen short of the standard of care to be expected of it, or should be regarded as having met that standard of care, should be left to the primary liability expert, Mr Swinton, to deal with. 

14.  In other words Mr Swinton will have to consider the matter on the basis a) that Mr Wong is right; and b) that Mr Wong is incorrect, as to  his appreciation of local business practice in relation to the advances to third parties, in relation to the holding of assets through nominees in Mainland China and also in relation to any questions of local audit practice that may arise.  Thus, to the extent that Mr Morrison may wish to comment on whether or not it is in accordance with local audit practice or business practice to do things in a particular way, he may do so.  The court will then have to decide whether or not that audit or business practice is made out and whether or not, in the light of that practice, if it is established, the defendant can be said to have been negligent in that particular, and this is a matter that can and should be addressed by Mr Swinton. 

15.  In relation to the other points that have been raised by Mr Lam,  Mr Lam suggested that it would be fundamentally unfair for the defendant to have one expert when the plaintiffs were given the opportunity of having two.  It seems to me that provided that the scope of the evidence to be dealt with by each expert is limited in the way that I have indicated, there should, at the end of the day, be no such unfairness. 

16.  It might be that if the plaintiffs had better appreciated the role that local practice and local audit practice would have to play in these proceedings that they would have asked for leave to file expert reports from two experts dealing with different aspects of the matter.  That this was not appreciated earlier may be regrettable but it seems to me that the court should, at this stage, look forward to the trial rather than look back and try to allocate blame to one side or the other for having failed to pick up on this point which, it may or may not be the case, should have been appreciated.

17.  So far as the impact on the trial is concerned, it seems to me that given that the trial is, at this stage, still some five months off, it is unlikely that there will be any significant impact on the trial.  There certainly is no suggestion that there should be any impact on the commencement date of the trial.  The only practical impact would appear to be on the holding of a meeting of the experts.  That, I understand, is currently scheduled for 29 October 2010 and it is currently the proposal of the plaintiffs that Mr Morrison’s report should be filed by 12 November.  It would seem to me that the sensible course, if it can be arranged, would be for the meeting of experts to be put back to a date after 12 November or such earlier date as the plaintiffs may feel that they are able to deliver Mr Morrison’s report. 

18.  If that proves not to be possible, then it would seem to me that perhaps the sensible course might be for Mr Wong and Mr Swinton to meet to deal with all matters, other than those which are to be covered by Mr Morrison in his report, on 29 October with a supplemental or follow-up meeting to be held as soon as practicable after the delivery of Mr Morrison’s report.  But that, I think, is really a matter of administration which would be best left to the parties to try to resolve in the generally cooperative way in which they have hitherto been able to deal with most matters relating to the procedural aspects of this litigation.

19.  I will therefore give leave to the plaintiffs to file a further expert’s report by Mr Morrison, limited in the respects that I have indicated.

(Discussion re report and costs)

16. Costs of today will be in the cause.

(Aarif Barma)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr Jat Sew-Tong, SC, instructed by Messrs Clifford Chance, for the Plaintiffs

Mr Godfrey Lam, SC, instructed by Messrs Barlow Lyde & Gilbert, for the Defendant

71432-EN-2010-06-08

MOULIN GLOBAL EYECARE HOLDINGS LTD (in liquidation) AND OTHERS v. KPMG (a firm)

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HCA 118/2007

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 118 OF 2007

____________

BETWEEN

 MOULIN GLOBAL EYECARE HOLDINGS LIMITED
(in liquidation)
(formerly known as MOULIN INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LIMITED)
1st Plaintiff
 MOULIN HOLDINGS (HK) COMPANY LIMITED
(in liquidation)
2nd Plaintiff
 MOULIN GLOBAL EYECARE TRADING LIMITED
(in liquidation)
(formerly known as MOULIN OPTICAL MANUFACTORY LIMITED)
3rd Plaintiff
 LEADKEEN INDUSTRIAL LIMITED
(in liquidation)
4th Plaintiff
 PEACE CITY INVESTMENT LIMITED
(in liquidation)
5th Plaintiff

and

 KPMG (a firm)Defendants

____________

Before: Hon Barma J in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 25 February 2010

Date of Ruling: 8 June 2010

________________________

RULING ON COSTS

________________________

 

1. On 10 February 2010, I gave judgment in relation to applications by the Defendants in these proceedings by which they sought further and better particulars and discovery from the Plaintiffs.

2. The outcome in relation to the matters argued at the hearing was that so far as the requests for further and better particulars were concerned, the Defendants were broadly successful, in that I decided that the requests pursued by them went to matters that were properly matters of particularisation of the Plaintiffs’ case, and that the Plaintiffs should provide certain particulars as indicated in my judgment.  So far as the discovery application was concerned, however, the Plaintiffs were, in my view, the substantially successful party, in that in relation to the two main categories of documents of which discovery was sought, discovery was refused, while in relation to a third item, which was dealt with quite briefly, I required the Plaintiffs to confirm whether or not the document in question was in their possession, custody or control by virtue of being in the custody of the Plaintiffs’ liquidators in their capacity as such.

3. However, a substantial portion of the Defendants’ application for discovery was not proceeded with, in the light of information supplied by the Plaintiffs or indications that further discovery might be provided.  Moreover, much of the evidence filed in relation to the applications dealt with both applications, as did a part of the submissions at the hearing on 21 December 2009, as Mr Lam S.C., appearing for the Defendants, helpfully took me through the pleadings with a view to assisting in an appreciation of the Plaintiffs’ case, a matter which was of relevance to both applications.  I therefore directed that the question of costs should be dealt with by oral submissions at the hearing on 25 February 2010, when a further application for discovery, this time by the Plaintiffs, was before me for argument.

4. Mr Jat. S.C., for the Plaintiffs, suggested that so far as the discovery application was concerned, the Plaintiffs had been largely successful in relation to the matters that were actually argued.  He recognised, however, that a substantial number of the items originally pursued were not argued as a result of their having been dealt with voluntarily by the Plaintiffs.  He suggested that a fair order might be for the costs of the hearing in relation to discovery to be awarded to his clients, while the balance of the costs of the application should be in the cause.  As for the application for particulars, Mr Jat suggested that although orders had been made against his clients, the Plaintiffs had in fact agreed to produce the bulk of the information sought (albeit by way of evidence rather than particulars), and the Defendants had been truly successful only in relation to one out of four broad categories of particulars requested.  In these circumstances, he suggested that an appropriate order might be costs in the cause, or perhaps the Defendants’ costs in the cause.

5. However, recognising (as did Mr Lam) that it would be a difficult task on taxation to try to separate out the costs attributable to the separate applications, given the way in which the evidence and the submissions (to a large extent) dealt with both applications, Mr Jat indicated that a possibly more convenient approach would be to deal with the matter globally, in which case he suggested that his clients should be awarded about half the costs of the hearing, with the remainder of the costs being in the cause.

6. Mr Lam also accepted that there might be advantages in dealing with the matter globally, but differed from Mr Jat as to who was the substantially successful party, and as to the costs order that should be made.  Mr Lam said that the Defendants had been substantially successful in relation to the particulars application, as orders had been made in relation to all the particulars sought (although in one or two respects not quite as extensive as the requests), and should therefore have the costs of that application.  So far as discovery was concerned, he suggested that in the light of the fact that the Plaintiffs had voluntarily agreed to provide some further discovery or information, rendering it unnecessary to pursue a large part of the application, the fact that the Defendants had failed in respect of the two main requests that were argued should not be held against them, and that the appropriate order as to costs for the discovery application would be no order as to costs.  Overall, if the matter were approached globally, Mr Lam suggested that an order like that proposed by Mr Jat, but going the other way, so that his clients, the Defendants, should recover half the costs of the hearing, with the balance of the costs of the applications being in the cause would be appropriate.

7. Having regard to the overlap in the evidence and submissions, it seems to me that it would be more convenient to make a single order in relation to the applications, notwithstanding that there were two separate applications.  This will avoid leaving the taxing master with what is likely to be the extremely difficult task of having to separate out the costs properly attributable to the two applications.

8. Adopting that approach, it remains necessary to consider which party was successful in relation to each application, and what overall costs order would best reflect the outcome.  In my view, the Defendants were clearly substantially the more successful in relation to the application for particulars.  The particulars sought were resisted by the Plaintiffs as a matter of principle, contending that they were matters of evidence and not particularisation, and in this they were unsuccessful.  So far as the discovery application is concerned, however, the Plaintiffs were clearly the more successful in relation to the items argued at the hearing, although it is fair to note that most of the items sought did not need to be argued as a result of the Plaintiff volunteering to take steps to deal with the Defendants’ concerns as to discovery.

9. Looked at overall, I am of the view that the outcome of the matters argued at the hearing was that the parties were approximately equally successful. I therefore think that there should be no order as to the costs of the hearing, and that the balance of the costs of the applications should be in the cause.

 (Aarif Bama)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

Mr. Jat Sew-Tong, SC instructed by Messrs Clifford chance for the Plaintiff

Mr. Grodfrey Lam, SC instructed by Messrs Barlow Lyde & Gilbert for the Defendants

71431-EN-2010-06-08

MOULIN GLOBAL EYECARE HOLDINGS LTD (in liquidation) AND OTHERS v. KPMG (a firm)

HTML content

HCA 118/2007

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 118 OF 2007

____________

BETWEEN

 MOULIN GLOBAL EYECARE HOLDINGS LIMITED
(in liquidation)
(formerly known as MOULIN INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LIMITED)
1st Plaintiff
 MOULIN HOLDINGS (HK) COMPANY LIMITED
 (in liquidation)
2nd Plaintiff
 MOULIN GLOBAL EYECARE TRADING LIMITED
(in liquidation)
(formerly known as MOULIN OPTICAL MANUFACTORY LIMITED)
3rd Plaintiff
 LEADKEEN INDUSTRIAL LIMITED
 (in liquidation)
4th Plaintiff
 PEACE CITY INVESTMENT LIMITED
 (in liquidation)
5th Plaintiff

and

 KPMG (a firm)Defendants

____________

Before: Hon Barma J in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 25 February 2010

Date of Judgment: 8 June 2010

______________

J U D G M E N T

______________

 

1. This was an application by the Plaintiffs in these proceedings seeking further discovery from the Defendants, pursuant to RHC Order 24 rules 3, 7 and 11. The proceedings concern claims by the Plaintiffs, all of whom are companies in liquidation, for damages from the Defendants, KPMG, their former auditors, in respect of losses the Plaintiffs claim to have suffered as a result of the Defendants’ negligence. A broad outline of the Plaintiff’s case, as appears from their Amended Statement of Claim is set out in my earlier judgment of 10 February 2010, dealing with applications by the Defendants for further and better particulars and for discovery.

2. The Plaintiffs’ application for discovery was made by summons dated 21 December 2009.  By their summons, the Plaintiffs sought discovery of eight categories of documents, to be provided by the preparation of a further list of documents and verified on affidavit.  The documents sought were:-

(1)

All audit working papers, whether stored in hard copy or electronic form, including all drafts, in respect of the consolidated Moulin Group audit and/or the audits of any of the Plaintiffs for the years ended 31 March 1998 to 31 March 2002;

(2)

All qualified opinions, including draft qualified opinions, whether prepared for internal dissemination or to be shown to the Moulin Group, in relation to any of the audits conducted by [the Defendants] of the Moulin Group or any of the Plaintiffs between 1991 and 2002;

(3)

All documents stored in the section of [the Defendant]’s server dedicated to the preservation of electronic data relating to the Moulin Group, including documents described in the “working client folder” and documents stored in the process of upgrading laptops;

(4)

Internal correspondence (including electronic documents) relating to the audits of any of the Plaintiffs or the Moulin Group, or to [the Defendant]’s position as auditor or to [their] resignation;

(5)

External correspondence (including electronic documents) between the Defendants and their staff and employees of the Moulin Group in respect of the conduct of the Moulin Group’s audit or after their resignation;

(6)

External correspondence (including electronic documents) between the Defendants and their staff and Ernst & Young (their successors as auditors of the Moulin Group) in respect of the proposed change of auditors of the Moulin Group and Ernst & Young’s request for assistance;

(7)

Documents (whether for internal or external use) prepared in advance of audit meetings held in the course of the audit of the Moulin Group, including draft agendas and briefing notes; and

(8)

Diaries (including electronic diaries) of the Defendants’ personnel involved with the conduct of the Moulin Group audit.

3. The application was adjourned in order to enable the parties to attempt to resolve (or at least to narrow) their differences in respect of the Defendants’ discovery.  They have had some success in doing so, in that of the eight categories of documents of which further discovery is sought, it has proven necessary to seek a ruling in respect of the first three only.  So far as the other categories of documents are concerned it was agreed that the application in relation to categories 4, 5 and 8 should be adjourned sine die, with liberty to restore if it became necessary for them to be argued, and that no order should be made in relation to categories 6 and 7.

4. The Plaintiffs’ evidence consists of two affidavits of Mr Roderick Sutton, one of the liquidators of each of the Plaintiffs.  The Defendants’ evidence is contained in affidavits made by Mr William Crowe, a partner in the Defendants’ Risk Management Group, who has been closely involved in the defence of these proceedings, and Mr Grant Jamieson, the partner in charge of the Defendants’ forensic practice.

5. Mr Sutton complains that the Defendants have taken a limited approach to discovery, in that while the discovery provided by them appears to be extensive (in terms of the quantity of documentation disclosed), closer examination of what has been disclosed reveals inadequacies in the disclosure they have made.  He suggests that when looked at more closely, the Defendants’ discovery consists largely of their formal working files (which have been provided in full, in hard copy) and some electronic copies of audit working papers, and that there is little disclosed documentation in the nature of correspondence (whether internal or external), draft documentation (whether of working papers or audit opinions), or documentation relating to the Defendants’ resignation as the Moulin Group’s auditors in 2002.  Mr Sutton draws particular attention to what he says is the small number of e-mails disclosed, and to the fact that a draft qualified audit opinion for the 1998 audit, which makes reference to concerns about the availability of suitable audit evidence in relation to substantial payments apparently received close to the year end from the entities which are referred to in the pleadings as the North American Debtors (in respect of transactions that the Plaintiff alleges were entirely fictitious) was not disclosed in either hard copy or electronic form, and was not referred to as a document which had previously been in the Defendants’ possession.

6. In response, Mr Crowe has described the process by which the Defendants preserved their documents (both hard copy and electronic) relating to their involvement with the Moulin Group, and the approach that the Defendants and their legal advisers adopted in dealing with discovery for the purposes of these proceedings.  He also explained the manner in which the Defendants kept records of work done in the course of audits carried out by them.

7. So far as record keeping generally is concerned, Mr Crowe said that the procedures by which the audit opinion was reached in any particular case would be evidenced by the documents retained in the audit working paper files and correspondence files in respect of the engagement in question.  The documents retained on such files were intended to record the planning, performance, supervision and review of the audit, and to record the audit evidence obtained as a result of carrying out audit procedures on which the audit opinion was based.  Although such working papers would be created in either hard copy or electronic form, the practice of the Defendants was to generate and retain hard copies of all documents that were considered necessary to record the matters mentioned above.  Other documents created during the course of the audit, which did not need to be retained for the purposes of such a record would not be placed on the working paper file or kept in the correspondence file, although some such documents might have been retained, either in hard copy or electronic form, elsewhere.

8. Mr Crowe went on to explain the way in which the Defendants’ electronically stored information was handled.  Documents were generally initially created by audit staff, mostly electronically, on the computers assigned to them.  Where they were created in the Defendants’ offices, the documents would be saved to a specific sub-folder on the Defendants’ server for the client in question, known as the “working client folder”.  Staff working in the field would upload documents created by them while away from the office to the same sub-folder on their return to the office.  However, working drafts of documents would not be retained.

9. On 4 July 2005, Mr Sutton wrote to the Defendants to inform them that he and Mr Desmond Chiong had been appointed as provisional liquidators of the 1st Plaintiff.  The letter, which was received the next day, stated that the provisional liquidators had, prior to their appointment, investigated the affairs of the 1st Plaintiff and the Moulin Group, and that there were a significant number of transactions that called for further investigation.  The Defendants were asked to preserve any books and records of the 1st Plaintiff that were in their possession, and also to preserve their own documents relating to services provided to the 1st Plaintiff.  Mr Crowe says that it was clear from this that litigation was in contemplation, although no indication of the particular areas of complaint had yet been provided.  As a result, on 6 July 2005, the Defendants retained their solicitors (Messrs. Barlow Lyde and Gilbert) and sought their advice as to their position generally.  On 22 July 2005, the provisional liquidators wrote further, asking for copies of a number of documents relating to the Defendants’ audit of the Moulin Group.

10. Mr Crowe says that the Defendants immediately took steps to secure documentation relating to the Moulin Group.  This was done in accordance with advice received from their solicitors.  All partners who had advised on Moulin Group related matters were contacted and requested to ensure that all existing staff who had worked on such matters preserved all documents that they had which related to the Moulin Group, whether these were old or recently created, in hard copy or electronic form, including all correspondence, e-mails and drafts.  Steps were also taken to secure all electronically stored information that might be available. The original intention was to set up a secure area on the Defendants’ server (which has been referred to as the “ring fenced area”), to which all electronic information could be copied.  Once documents and other information were copied to the “ring fenced area”, it would not be possible to delete or amend them.  However, as a result of technical difficulties (there were concerns that there might be alterations or apparent alterations to documents copied to the “ring fenced area” as a result of their being copied to that location), it took about a year before the “ring fenced area” was available.  In the meantime, in February 2006, Ms Jacqueline Wong of the Defendants’ Risk Management Group made a copy of the working client folder on the server for the Defendants’ audit group which had handled the Moulin Group audit, and stored it on the Risk Management Group’s own server.  In August 2006, Mr Crowe decided that, notwithstanding that not all the technical issues had been resolved, copies of electronically stored information relating to the Defendants’ dealings with the Moulin Group should be copied to the “ring fenced area” in any event.  Thus, in August 2006, all employees who had been involved with assignments relating to the Moulin Group were instructed to copy all electronically stored information in their computers to the “ring fenced area” on the server – they did so by copying such information to one of two folders in the “ring fenced area” under their names: one folder for e-mails, and the other for all electronically stored documents or information.  All current partners and employees who were identified as having worked on Moulin Group related matters were also asked to confirm that they had done this.  Former partners or employees were not, it seems, asked to do this, as they would have given up their assigned computers on leaving the firm, and such computers would have had their memory erased before being reissued to other members of the Defendants’ staff.  According to Mr Crowe, a comparison between the documents in the working client folder on the Risk Management Group’s server with those in the “ring fenced area” shows that all documents in the former folder are in fact in the “ring fenced area” as well.

11. Mr Crowe has also stated that a number of documents which should not have been copied to the “ring fenced area” were copied to that location in error.  Some such documents were privileged documents, and others were documents that concerned other clients of the Defendants.  However, having been copied there, they cannot now be modified or removed.

12. So far as the discovery process is concerned, Mr Crowe said that audit working paper files were disclosed in their entirety for the financial years ending on 31 March 1998 to 31 March 2001.  Disclosure was also made of the complete hard copy audit correspondence files for those periods.  For prior periods, a review was made, with the assistance of the Defendants’ solicitors, of the hard copy documents in the audit working paper and correspondence files, and documents that were regarded as being relevant to the issues raised in the pleadings were disclosed.  For electronically stored documents, such documents were also reviewed, and any such documents from any source that contained material relevant to the issues raised in the pleadings were also disclosed.

13. The Plaintiffs, however, are not satisfied with the discovery that has been provided.  They suggest that the documents that have been disclosed consist largely of what was on the audit working paper files, and a limited number of electronic documents.  They say that the amount of electronically stored information that has been disclosed is surprisingly small, that draft or earlier versions of documentation that may exist appear not to have been disclosed, that at least one draft qualified opinion (in relation to the 1998 audit) was not disclosed or otherwise referred to, and that they consider that the Defendants have taken a limited approach to discovery by working with close reference to the pleadings, rather than approaching the issues in what the Plaintiffs suggest is a more appropriate, broader, sense.  The Plaintiffs have also expressed concerns as to whether the steps taken by the Defendants to ensure that relevant documentation was secured were sufficient and were effective.

14. In the course of the argument at the hearing, it became clear that perhaps the major issue that divided the parties was the question of what the appropriate test of relevance for purposes of discovery should be.  Mr Jat, for the Plaintiffs, suggested that all documentation relating to the Moulin Group, or at least to audits of the Moulin Group should be regarded as relevant.  He contended that it would be wrong to regard the Plaintiffs’ claims as being limited to particular aspects of the Defendants’ audit of the Moulin Group.  He said that the Plaintiffs’ case, as explained by Mr Sutton in his affidavits, went to the whole of the audit process, at every stage, and that therefore, for all practical intents and purposes, every document created by the Defendants in the course of their audits was potentially relevant, and should be disclosed as part of their discovery.  On the other hand, Mr Lam, for the Defendants, maintained that it was necessary to ascertain the issues from the pleadings, even if in broad terms, and to confine discovery to documents which were relevant to those issues.  He disagreed with the suggestion that virtually every aspect of the audit was in issue for the purposes of these proceedings.  He said, moreover, that discovery should only be ordered if there was a fair probability of the discovery sought producing material that would be of reasonable evidential significance.

15. Both parties accepted the approach of Colman J in O Company v M Company [1996] 2 Lloyds LR 347 as the correct approach to adopt.  In that case, which concerned a cargo claim for losses arising as a result of an explosion and fire (the cause of which was not known) on board a ship which caused damage to cargo on board the vessel. In that case, Colman J said (at page 350):

“Whether a class of documents as a whole is relevant for discovery purposes must depend upon what information it is reasonable to suppose the documents of the class contain and whether such information may enable the plaintiffs to advance their own case or damage that of the shipowners.  The “case” of the plaintiffs or the defendants respectively can be defined only by looking at the pleadings.  It must be defined by reference to the plaintiffs’ pleaded claim in its general sense, as distinct from its detailed exposition and by the defendants’ pleaded defence in the sense of its general refutation of the plaintiffs’ claim.  What matters for discovery purposes is the claim and the defence to it in the broadest sense and not to the detailed particulars of either claim or defence.  A document in a defendant’s possession, custody or power which provides information as to a ground not hitherto pleaded in a cargo claim upon which it can be said that they failed to exercise due care of the cargo is just as relevant for discovery purposes as one which contains information as to a ground of want of due care which has already been pleaded.”

16. Colman J went on to consider the level of likelihood that a document would provide such information that should be required as the threshold for requiring further discovery to be provided, concluding (at page 351) that:

“… the document of class of documents must be shown by the applicant to offer a real probability of evidential materiality in the sense that it must be a document or class of documents which in the ordinary way can be expected to yield information of substantial evidential materiality to the pleaded claim and the defence to it in the broad sense which I have explained. If the document or class cannot be demonstrated to be clearly connected to issues which have already been raised on the pleadings or which would in the ordinary way be expected to be raised in the course of the proceedings, if sufficient information were available, the application should be dismissed.” (the emphasis is Colman J’s)

17. In my view, to suggest, as the Plaintiffs do, that just about every document generated by the Defendants in the course of their audits of the Moulin Group is potentially relevant to these proceedings, is to cast the net of discovery too wide.  The shape of the Plaintiffs’ case is quite apparent from the Amended Statement of Claim – it is based on the existence of a scheme on the part of the Plaintiffs’ former management to inflate the Moulin Group’s turnover and sales and thus its revenue and profits, resulting in it suffering the losses (mainly dividend and interest payments that should or would not otherwise have been made) that are alleged.  The nature of the scheme is set out in paragraphs 53 to 79 of the Amended Statement of Claim (which I have summarised in paragraphs 11 to 27 of my earlier judgment).  It is apparent from those sections of the Amended Statement of Claim that the thrust of the allegations relates to the alleged overstatement of revenue and profits by the recording of fictitious sales to the North American debtors, and the use of a variety of devices (the circular trade finance transactions, supposed advances to third parties, and the supposed assets of Leadkeen held through Ma Wu Bei) to disguise the fact that such supposed sales were fictitious.

18. Thus, following the approach laid down in O Company v M Company, clearly all documents which relate to the North American debtors, the circular trade finance transactions, the advances to third parties and the Leadkeen/Ma Wu Bei payments, and the Defendants examination of these matters in the course of their audits, will be of potentially significant evidential materiality.  Beyond this, if there should be documents that suggest that there were other ways, not as yet pleaded, in which the fictitious sales were disguised, these too would be of sufficient evidential materiality to justify the making of an order for discovery.  But beyond this, where documents generated by the Defendants in the course of their audits do not touch on such matters, it is not immediately apparent why they are relevant, or would be of sufficient potential materiality to call for their disclosure.  While it is correct to say that the Plaintiffs’ complaints against the Defendants extend to each stage of the auditing process – from planning, to the obtaining of adequate audit evidence, to the failure to detect what are alleged to have been material irregularities in the Plaintiffs account, and the failure to report or to qualify the Plaintiffs’ accounts appropriately, it is equally important to note that the complaints at each of these stages relate to alleged shortcomings that had to do with the broad scheme that has been identified – thus, for example, the section on failure to obtain sufficient audit evidence sets out a case that highlights the respects in which insufficient evidence is said to have been obtained in relation to the North American debtors, the circular trade finance facilities, the advances to third parties and the Leadkeen/Ma Wu Bei payments.

19. In O Company v M Company the cause of the explosion and fire on board the vessel that caused the loss of and damage to the cargo which was the subject matter of the claim was unknown.  Nonetheless, Colman J approached the question of discovery by considering whether or not the documents sought were likely to produce something of evidential significance, focussing on documents that might throw light on conditions in areas of the vessel that were in proximity to, or in some way connected with, the location in which the explosion and fire occurred.  Similarly, it would be appropriate here to focus on documents that are reasonably closely related to the central areas of complaint, as it would be such documents that might be expected to yield material that may be of significance for the claim.

20. The Defendants have said in their evidence, and Mr Lam has reiterated, that their approach has been to look at the question of relevance by reference to the pleaded issues, without seeking to confine relevance by too close reference to the details of the pleading.  I do not see that this approach is mistaken, and I am therefore of the view that the approach advocated by Mr Lam is to be preferred to that put forward on behalf of the Plaintiffs.

21. With this in mind, I turn to consider the specific categories of documents that remain in issue on this application.

22.Category 1: This request calls for the production of all audit working papers, whether hard copy or electronic, including all drafts in respect of the audits of the Plaintiffs and the consolidated Moulin Group audit for the years from 1998 to 2002.

23. Hard copies of the audit working paper files and audit correspondence files have already been disclosed.  According to the Defendants, all other documents in their possession have been reviewed for relevance, and appropriate disclosure made.  A small number of additional files, which the Defendants say are of peripheral relevance have been identified and will be disclosed.  The Defendants have indicated that they will conduct a further review of the documentation in their possession by reference to the broad pleaded issues, particularly in the light of the amendments introduced in the Amended Statement of Claim, and disclose any further documents that may be relevant.  They have also agreed (without conceding relevance) to disclose all drafts of working papers.

24. So far as disclosure of documents not on the audit working paper and audit correspondence files are concerned, it seems to me that the offer made by the Defendants to conduct a further review of the documents in their possession is sufficient.  There is no reason to suppose that they have misconceived the appropriate test of relevance – on the contrary, for the reasons which I have explained above, it seems to be that they have understood it correctly.  Insofar as there are audit working papers or correspondence which do not relate to the Plaintiffs’ pleaded case, understood in the broad sense explained by Colman J in O Company v M Company these are not documents which would be likely to be of sufficient evidential materiality to be regarded as relevant for discovery purposes.

25. So far as draft documents are concerned, it seems to me that draft documents which relate to areas falling outside the broad framework of the Plaintiffs’ case need not, strictly speaking, be disclosed, notwithstanding that the entire audit working paper and correspondence files have been disclosed, and that the final version of some such documents may have been disclosed.  The reason for the disclosure of the entirety of these files has been explained by the Defendants as being in order to ensure the integrity of the files, and not as a concession as to the possible relevance of everything in them.  In these circumstances, not all drafts of documents that are to be found in such files will necessarily be relevant to these proceedings.  Even in relation to documents that have the necessary relevance, drafts of those documents which contain no material differences from the final versions would not appear, strictly speaking, to require disclosure.  However, the mere fact that a document is a draft of a disclosed final version does not, ipso facto, mean that the draft need not be disclosed.  If the draft differed in some material respect from the final version, or threw light on the approach adopted by the Defendants as to the matter dealt with by it, it would be likely to be of sufficient materiality as to call for disclosure.  However, as the Defendants have agreed to disclose all drafts of documents the final versions of which have been disclosed, it is not necessary to make any further order in respect of draft documentation.

26.Category 2:This concerns all qualified opinions, including drafts of qualified opinions in relation to any audits conducted by the Defendants from 1991 to 2002.  This request is based on the fact that the liquidators found among the Plaintiffs’ documents a copy of a draft qualified opinion in respect of the 1998 audit.  The reason for the qualification proposed in the draft audit opinion related to payments of some HK$210 million received from the North American debtors shortly before the March 1998 year end.

27. The Defendants do not dispute that this document is relevant.  However, they say that despite searches, they have not located it (or a copy of it) in either their hard copy or electronic documents.  They accept that it should be disclosed in the appropriate part of their list as a document which was once in their possession, but is no longer in their possession, together with such explanation as they can give for it no longer being with them.  They say, however, that this is the only case of such a document being missing in their papers, and that it does not provide a basis for supposing that there might be other such documents which have not been disclosed.  The Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that the non-disclosure of this document is supportive of their view that the Defendants have not properly carried out their discovery obligations.

28. Having regard to the fact that Mr Crowe has explained on affidavit that the reason for the non-disclosure of this document earlier is because it was simply not in the possession of the Defendants, in that no copy of the document can be found in either the hard copy documentation or electronically stored information which has been preserved, and his frank acceptance that it is a relevant document which should (and would) have been disclosed had the Defendants had a copy of it, I am not inclined to conclude that the existence of a single document of this nature, important though it may prove to be to the Plaintiffs, is a sufficient basis for thinking that there has been any extensive failure in the Defendants’ attempts to preserve documents relating to their dealings with the Moulin Group, having regard to the steps that were taken to ensure that documents were secured as soon as the Defendants were put on notice of a possible claim against them.

29. In the circumstances, although the 1998 draft qualified opinion will have to be dealt with in a supplemental list of documents in due course, I do not consider it necessary to make any order in respect of this category of documents either.

30.Category 3: This request calls for the disclosure of all documents stored in the “ring fenced area”, including the working client folder, along with any documents stored as part of the process in relation to the upgrading of laptops.

31. Mr Jat suggested first that all documents that were stored in the “ring fenced area” were likely to be of some relevance, in the sense that he had contended for when putting forward his arguments as to the appropriate approach to relevance for purposes of discovery.  However, in the light of the evidence of Mr Crowe, it seems that that is not the case.  Mr Crowe has explained that there are some documents that were mistakenly copied to the “ring fenced area” that should not have been, either because they were privileged or because they in fact related to other clients of the Defendants.  However, having been copied to the “ring fenced area” it is not possible for the documents to be deleted or modified.  Mr Jat accepts that such documents should not be disclosed.  It seems that there are also documents which relate to non-audit engagements for the Moulin Group which have also been copied to the “ring fenced area” – such documents would also seem to me not to be discoverable, since they would not appear to relate to the audit engagements which form the basis of the Plaintiffs’ claim.

32. This apart, I am not satisfied that it would be right to adopt the approach suggested by the Plaintiffs.  In my view, it would be tantamount to requiring the Defendants to turn over the contents of their filing cabinets (in this context, electronic ones) for the Plaintiffs to rummage through.  I do not think that this is an appropriate means of given discovery of documents relating to the matters in question in these proceedings.  Just as there are likely to be hard copy documents preserved which are not discoverable by reason of their lack of relevance, so it is likely that there will be, in the “ring fenced area”, electronically stored information which is likewise not discoverable, as it does not relate to the issues arising in these proceedings, viewed in a broad sense.

33. It is relevant to note that at the time when information was copied to the ring fenced area, all that was known was that there was likely to be a claim against the Defendants for alleged negligence, and that such a claim was likely to relate to the Defendants’ role as auditors of the Plaintiffs.  It was not until the Statement of Claim was served that the shape of the Plaintiffs’ case would have been known to the Defendants.  That being so, when electronic documents were copied for the purpose of preservation, this would have been done for all documents still available in electronic form, not all of which will be of relevance to the claims that have now been advanced (a good example is the case of documentation relating to the Defendants’ audit of another company in the Moulin Group known as Peace City Investment Limited, which was formerly the 5th Plaintiff in these proceedings – although allegations of negligence were made in respect of the audit of this company, it was eventually concluded by the Plaintiffs that no loss had been suffered as a result thereof, and the claim has not, therefore, been pursued, and it is difficult to see any reason why documents relating to it should be relevant to the matters now in issue between the parties).  There is therefore likely to be information in relation to the audits of the Plaintiffs which is not relevant to the claims that have been put forward, as I have explained in the context of the documents sought under category 1.

34. Although the Plaintiffs have also suggested that there may be doubts as to whether or not all documents were in fact properly copied, saying that it is not clear that there was verification that instructions to preserve such information were properly followed, I do not think that the steps taken by the Defendants should be regarded as insufficient.

35. In my view, it would not, as a matter of principle, be appropriate to make an order of the nature sought by the Plaintiffs where (as here) this is likely to result in disclosure of documents which do not relate to matters in question in the proceedings.  Such documents are not discoverable under our rules relating to discovery, and there would appear to be no basis for requiring a party to disclose irrelevant documents along with relevant ones simply because it might prove more convenient to do so.

36. Further, I am not satisfied that this would in fact be a more convenient or cost effective course to adopt.  Leaving aside the fact that the Defendants would in any event have to go through the information stored in the “ring fenced area” to weed out documents that were placed there by mistake, if everything else were simply handed over to the Plaintiffs, it would be necessary for the Plaintiffs themselves to sort through the material to identify what is relevant and what is not.  The task is one that has to be performed, whether by the Defendants or the Plaintiffs.  In either case, it will involve the expenditure of time and cost.  If the Plaintiffs were to do the exercise, they would (as Mr Jat accepted) seek to recover the costs of doing so at the end of the day, assuming that they are successful.  It is therefore unlikely that there would be any appreciable saving in costs or time spent – the only question would be which party should incur the costs in the first place, and which party should bear them at the end of the day.

37. For these reasons, I do not think that it would be right to make the order sought in respect of this category of documents either.

38. Thus, I do not propose to make any order in respect of the documents under categories 1 to 3 of the Schedule to the Plaintiffs summons.  As already indicated, the Plaintiffs did not seek any order in respect of categories 6 and 7, and I shall make no order as to them either.  So far as categories 4, 5 and 8 are concerned, the summons will be adjourned sine die with liberty to restore.

39. So far as costs are concerned, I think that the appropriate order would be for the costs of the hearing itself to be paid by the Plaintiffs to the Defendants in any event, as the Defendants have been successful in relation to all three of the categories that have been argued.  However, so far as the balance of the costs of the application are concerned, having regard to the fact that the Defendants have agreed to take certain further steps in relation to discovery (without conceding an obligation to do so), and the Plaintiffs have as a result not pursued a number of matters, I shall order that the costs should be in the cause.  Both of these orders are orders nisi, and either party may apply to very them in the usual way if they wish to do so.

 (Aarif Barma)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
 High Court

Mr Jat Sew-Tong, SC, instructed by Messrs Clifford Chance, for the Plaintiffs

Mr Godfrey Lam, SC, instructed by Messrs Barlow Lyde & Gilbert, for the Defendants

69731-EN-2010-02-10

MOULIN GLOBAL EYECARE HOLDINGS LTD AND OTHERS v. KPMG (a firm)

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HCA 118/2007

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 118 OF 2007

____________

BETWEEN

 MOULIN GLOBAL EYECARE HOLDINGS
LIMITED (in liquidation)(formerly known as
MOULIN INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LIMITED)
1st Plaintiff
 MOULIN HOLDINGS (HK) COMPANY
LIMITED (in liquidation)
2nd Plaintiff
 MOULIN GLOBAL EYECARE TRADING
LIMITED (in liquidation)(formerly known as
MOULIN OPTICAL MANUFACTORY LIMITED)
3rd Plaintiff
 LEADKEEN INDUSTRIAL LIMITED
(in liquidation)
4th Plaintiff
 PEACE CITY INVESTMENT LIMITED
(in liquidation)
5th Plaintiff
 and 
 KPMG (a firm)Defendants

____________

Before: Hon Barma J in Chambers

Dates of Hearing:  21 December 2009

Date of Judgment:  10 February 2010

______________

J U D G M E N T

______________

Introduction

1.  By these proceedings, the Plaintiffs, all of whom are companies forming part of the now defunct Moulin Group of companies, seek damages from their former auditors, Messrs KPMG, in respect of losses said to have been caused by alleged negligence on the part of KPMG (“the Defendants”) in their audit of the Plaintiffs’ accounts for the financial years ending on 31 March 1999, 2000 and 2001 respectively.

2.  The applications before me relate to requests by the Defendants for particulars of the Statement of Claim (which has now been amended – references below will be to the Amended Statement of Claim), and for discovery.

3.  The Plaintiffs are:-

(1)  Moulin Global Eyecare Holdings Limited (formerly named Moulin International Holdings Limited) (“MIHL”), which was listed on The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, and was the ultimate holding company of the Moulin Group.

(2)  Moulin Holdings (HK) Limited (“Moulin HK”), which was an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of MIHL, and was the immediate holding company of the principal operating subsidiaries within the Group.

(3)  Moulin Global Eyecare Trading Limited (formerly named Moulin Optical Manufactory Limited) (“MOML”), a wholly owned subsidiary of Moulin HK, which was the largest operating subsidiary within the Group.

(4)  Leadkeen Industrial Limited (“Leadkeen”), another wholly owned subsidiary of Moulin HK, and also a significant operating subsidiary within the Group.

4.  Peace City Investment Limited, a further wholly owned subsidiary of Moulin HK whose function was to hold property, was formerly the Fifth Plaintiff in these proceedings until its removal as a party on the Statement of Claim being amended.

5.  At the relevant times, the Moulin Group carried on a business involving the design, manufacture, distribution and retail sale of eyewear products. The main operating companies within the Group were MOML and Leadkeen. MOML’s function focussed on the marketing and distribution of eyewear products designed and manufactured by the Group. Leadkeen’s function focussed on the manufacture of such products, through arrangements it had with factories in the People’s Republic of China (“the PRC”). The majority of the executive directors of MIHL during the relevant period were members of the Ma family (Ma Bo Kee, his brothers Ma Bo Fung and Ma Bo Lung, and his sons Ma Lit Kin Cary and Ma Hon Kin Dennis), who were also its main shareholders, holding some 40% of its issued shares through a family trust.

6.  The Plaintiffs’ claim is substantial – the alleged damages run to some HK$381 million. The pleadings run to well over 100 pages on each side, with extensive particulars having been sought, and (for the most part) provided. Discovery runs to many thousands of documents. The trial of the action, which is to commence at the end of February 2011, is expected to last between two and three months.

These applications

7.  The parties have sought to deal constructively with most interlocutory matters that have arisen, and have, to a very large extent, been able to do so. There remain, however, some matters on which they have been unable to agree. This resulted in summonses being issued by the Defendants seeking further and better particulars of the claim, and for further discovery, shortly before the first case management conference was held in September 2009. Both summonses were adjourned to this hearing.

8.  So far as the Defendants’ request for particulars was concerned, there were sixteen outstanding requests, falling into four broad groups, which required a ruling. As for the discovery application, which related to 17 categories of documents, in the light of further discovery and information provided (or which, it is expected, will be provided) by the Plaintiffs, the Defendants only sought orders in relation to two categories (although a third also figured briefly in the argument), and asked for the balance of their discovery application to be adjourned sine die with liberty to restore.

The Plaintiffs’ case

9.  Before dealing with the applications, it will be convenient first to outline the Plaintiffs’ case, as it appears from the Amended Statement of Claim. In doing so, I shall focus in more detail on those parts of the Amended Statement of Claim that are of particular relevance to the applications now before me.

The parties, the relevant framework and guidelines and the audit engagements

10.  Paragraphs 1 to 7 identify the parties, and paragraphs 8 to 16 provide further information in relation to the Plaintiffs, setting out the nature of their business and operations, and identifying their directors and major shareholders. Paragraphs 17 to 22 set out the various roles in which the Defendants acted on behalf of the Plaintiffs between about 1991 and 2002. Paragraphs 23 to 26 identify the statutory and regulatory framework which are said to give rise to certain duties on the part of the Defendants as the auditors of the Plaintiffs and the group of companies of which they were part. Paragraphs 27 to 33 then identify the professional guidelines and standards that the Plaintiffs contend are relevant in the circumstances of this case. Paragraphs 34 to 40 identify the relevant terms (express and implied) on which the Defendants were engaged as the Plaintiffs’ auditors. Paragraphs 41 to 52 set out information relating to the financial statements of the Plaintiffs in respect of the financial years ending on 31 March 1999, 2000 and 2001 respectively, and identify the relevant statements made and opinions expressed by the Defendants in their audit reports relating to those financial years, in particular their opinion that the accounts of the Plaintiffs gave a true and fair view of their respective state of affairs, and that such accounts had been properly prepared in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted in Hong Kong and the requirements for disclosure under the Companies Ordinance (Cap. 32).

The alleged misstatements in the audited accounts

11.  Paragraphs 53 to 79 set out the respects in which it is alleged that, contrary to the audit opinions expressed by the Defendants, the audited accounts of the Plaintiffs and the Moulin Group were deficient in that they did not give a true and fair view of their financial affairs, had not been properly audited, had not been prepared in accordance with the applicable professional guidance and did not comply with the relevant disclosure requirements under the Hong Kong Stock Exchange’s Listing Rules.

12.  Paragraph 53A of the Amended Statement of Claim summarises the allegations. It is said that the revenues and accounts receivable of the Moulin Group and the Plaintiffs were substantially overstated by the creation of fictitious sales in order to inflate the actual sales and profitability of the Group. These (it is said) were covered up by the use of funds sourced from trade finance and other loan facilities obtained for fictitious transactions, which (insofar as they were recorded) were not properly recorded, and were falsely accounted for with a view to disguising the true position.

13.  Paragraphs 54 to 79 set out a more detailed description of the various respects in which it is said that the accounts were false. They are divided into four main sections, respectively dealing with the North American debtors (paragraphs 54 to 61), the circular trade finance transactions (paragraphs 61A to 61L and 68), the cash advances to third parties (paragraphs 62 to 68) and Leadkeen/Ma Wu Bei (paragraphs 69 to 79). These paragraphs, and in particular the allegations at the end of each section, are (together with certain other paragraphs in the Amended Statement of Claim) the subject of the first aspect of the outstanding requests for particulars.

The North American debtors

14.  The North American debtors consist of five entities which were recorded as substantial customers of MOML in its accounts for the financial years ending on 31 March 1999, 2000 and 2001. The trade debts and bills receivable attributed to them at each year end represented a substantial proportion of the total trade debts and bills receivable recorded in the consolidated accounts of the Moulin Group as a whole (some 58.61% in 1999, 41.98% in 2000 and 61.05% in 2001), and the revenues said to have been generated from dealings with them represented significant proportions of the Moulin Group’s turnover in those years (some 26.70% in 1999, 27.29% in 2000 and 33.41% in 2001).

15.  The Plaintiffs allege that the North American debtors were wholly fictitious, did not exist, and that the Moulin Group never conducted any business with them. Accordingly, it is alleged that the revenues supposedly derived from them was fictitious, as were the debts supposedly owing by them at the relevant year ends. Paragraph 61 of the Amended Statement of Claim alleges that by recognising the supposed revenues and debts said to have arisen through dealings with them, the accounts of MOML and the consolidated accounts of the Moulin Group were overstated as to current assets by the amount of the receivables recorded as owing by the North American debtors, and as to revenue by the amount of the revenue recorded as having been received from them. This is one of the allegations of which particulars are now sought.

The circular trade finance transactions

16.  As to the circular trade finance transactions, the Plaintiffs allege that if the fictitious transactions involving the North American debtors were (as they should have been) removed from MOML and the Moulin Group’s respective financial statements, MOML and the Moulin Group were not generating sufficient income to meet their operating costs, resulting in a funding deficit that was met by increased syndicated debt and increased borrowing through the use of trade finance facilities. Funds derived from such trade finance facilities were treated as purported receipts from the North American debtors and to meet operating expenses of the Moulin Group. It is said that from 1998 onwards, MOML would apply for trade finance loans in favour of a number of suppliers, called “Friendly Suppliers”, which are said to have been controlled by Ma Lit Kin Cary and/or Ma Bo Kee. With a few exceptions, it is alleged that the Friendly Suppliers did not in fact do business with the Moulin Group, but were used only as a conduit for funds to be channelled to MOML and the Moulin Group in the following way – MOML would purport to place an order for raw materials with a Friendly Supplier and would be supplied with an invoice for the materials supposedly ordered; the invoice would be used to support an application for a trade finance loan in the invoice amount, which would be remitted by the lending bank (net of charges) to the Friendly Supplier, who would then forward the proceeds to MOML; MOML would eventually repay the loan, charges and accrued interest to the lender, having meanwhile obtained further similar advances from the lender or other lenders. The supposed underlying transactions with the Friendly Suppliers for the purchase of raw materials are, on the Plaintiffs’ case, fictitious.

17.  Some such transactions are said not to have been recorded in the accounts of MOML and the Moulin Group at all (these have been referred to as “off balance sheet” trade finance facilities). Those that were recorded were, according to the Plaintiffs, misrecorded in MOML’s Temporary Payments and Temporary Receipts ledgers, with incoming funds being described (falsely) as payments received from the North American debtors for the fictitious sales described above, and outgoing funds being described (again, falsely) as payments made to Leadkeen/Ma Wu Bei, or as loans made by MOML to third parties, as described below.

18.  The effect of the alleged false accounting was to overstate MOML’s and the Moulin Group’s accounts receivable and revenue. It is also alleged that there was an understatement of its liabilities as a result of some of the trade finance facilities remaining off balance sheet and unrecorded (see paragraph 61L). Although there is no outstanding request in respect of these allegations (which were introduced into the Statement of Claim by the amendment for which leave was given at this hearing), the allegations are of the same nature as those for which requests are outstanding, and if an order is made for the provision of the particulars sought, in the manner suggested by the Defendant, such particulars as may be needed of these allegations will, I think, be provided as well.

The third party advances

19.  The next section of the Statement of Claim makes allegations in relation to the third party advances. It is alleged that in the accounts of MOML and consolidated accounts of the Moulin Group, there was recorded, for each of the years ended 31 March 1999, 2000 and 2001, an item described as “Other Debtors, Deposits and Prepayments”, which included purported loans made by MOML to third parties in the total amounts of about HK$112 million, HK$90 million and HK$165 million in each of those years respectively. The borrowers in question are alleged all to have been persons or entities related to the Ma family, and thus with MOML and the Moulin Group. Certain common characteristics of these advances are then identified, and it is alleged that the amount of such advances was, in each year, material for audit purposes.

20.  It is then alleged that the advances in question, although recorded in MOML’s books, were not in fact loans to the borrowers in question, but were no more than fictitious assets created to disguise the true reason for part of the payments by MOML that had been recorded in its Temporary Payments ledger.

21.  Further allegations are made in relation to purported loans to a Mr Ulrich Fisher and a company called Filos SpA in relation to the audited accounts for the year ending March 2001. It is alleged that loans recorded in such accounts as having been made to them were never in fact made, and that the accounts misstated the position in this regard.

22.  The effect of this false accounting is said to have been to overstate the assets of MOML and the Moulin Group in each of the three relevant years by the amount of the purported loans in question, and to overstate the revenue of MOML and the Moulin Group in relation to the interest income supposedly generated by such purported loans. It is also said that MOML and the Moulin Group’s liabilities and expenses were understated by failing to record and recognise that part of the trade finance facilities which were kept off balance sheet, and by failing to record and properly charge against their true revenues the costs associated with such unrecorded facilities. There are outstanding requests for particulars in respect of these allegations also.

Leadkeen and Ma Wu Bei

23.  The final part of the allegations of false account relates to Leadkeen and Ma Wu Bei. As I have noted, Leadkeen was the company in the Moulin Group which was primarily responsible for the manufacturing operations of the Group on the Mainland. In the audit years in question, Leadkeen’s and the Moulin Group’s audited accounts recorded as assets of Leadkeen and the Group amounts purportedly held by Ma Wu Bei (a nephew of Ma Bo Kee who had responsibility for the management of Leadkeen’s PRC factories and business) on behalf of Leadkeen (and hence the Moulin Group). The total amount purportedly so held was some HK$150 million in 1999, HK$217 million in 2000 and HK$257 million in 2001. These amounts were subdivided into what were described as prepaid production expenses, investment in a China joint venture, investment in a factory known as the South Sea factory, and advances or repayments from PRC distributors.

24.  It is also alleged that no allowances were made in respect of potential PRC tax liabilities of Leadkeen in Leadkeen’s accounts, or those of the Moulin Group, on the basis that Ma Wu Bei had provided indemnities in respect of any such liabilities that might arise.

25.  The amounts supposedly held by Ma Wu Bei on behalf of Leadkeen are alleged to have represented significant proportions of Leadkeen’s current assets (between 45% and 55%), total assets (between 21% and 26%) and total equity (between 47% and 53%) in each of the years in question, and smaller, but nonetheless significant, proportions of such items in the Moulin Group’s consolidated accounts.

26.  According to the Plaintiffs, all of the amounts purportedly held by Ma Wu Bei on behalf of Leadkeen were fictitious, and were (like the loans to third parties) simply false accounting entries to disguise the balance of the payments recorded in MOML’s Temporary Payments ledger.

27.  As a result, it is said that the audited accounts of Leadkeen and the consolidated audited accounts of the Moulin Group materially overstated their respective receivables by the amounts of the Ma Wu Bei payments in each of the years ended March 1999, 2000 and 2001. Again, this allegation is the subject of an outstanding request for particulars.

The steps taken by the Defendants and allegations of breach of duty

28.  There follows from paragraphs 79A to 122A a series of allegations concerning the audit process in respect of the 1999, 2000 and 2001 financial years, the interim accounts for each of those three years, and steps taken in respect of the audit for the 2002 financial year prior to the Defendants’ resignation as auditors prior to the completion of that audit. The allegations set out the areas of concern identified by the Defendants in the course of such audits, the steps taken to address them, and communications between the companies and Group on the one hand, and the Defendants on the other, in connection with the audits under consideration.

29.  Paragraphs 123 to 178 set out the Plaintiffs’ allegations of breach of duty and/or negligence, pleading alleged shortcomings and identifying steps that it is said that should have been taken in relation to the Defendants’ approach to audit planning and assessment of audit risk, and its failures to obtain adequate or reliable audit evidence in relation to the North American debtors, the third party advances and the Leadkeen/Ma Wu Bei payments, again identifying the shortcomings, and the steps that it is said should have been taken in relation to each of these areas in all the years in question, supplemented by specific allegations applicable to specific years. It is further alleged that the Defendants failed to detect or act upon material irregularities in the Plaintiffs’ accounts in respect of alleged overstatements of cash at the end of accounting periods – an allegation which is also the subject of an outstanding request for particulars. The matters upon which it is said the Defendants should have reported (but did not) are set out in paragraphs 175 to 178.

30.  Paragraph 178 is the subject of the second aspect of the outstanding request for particulars. It alleges that, had the Defendants complied with their duties, they should, and would, have detected fraud by the executive management of the Moulin Group, and should have taken various further steps and made various further reports (which they did not do).

31.  There follows an allegation that the Defendants were in breach of duty in failing to report unresolved audit issues upon their resignation (paragraphs 179 to 183).

Causation, loss and damage

32.  Finally, paragraphs 184 to 193 set out the Plaintiffs’ case on causation, loss and damage. In summary, it is alleged that had the Defendants acted properly, the Plaintiffs’ accounts would have disclosed that they had suffered losses (rather than the profits which it purported to have earned), and were in fact insolvent, could not have paid the dividends which they did, and would not have had to pay the profits tax which they in fact paid, in any of the years 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002. It is further alleged that had the Defendants acted properly, the true financial position of the Plaintiffs would have been revealed, resulting in their becoming unable to obtain further loans, so that they would not have incurred the interest and bank charges associated with the circular trade finance arrangements used to disguise the non-existence of the North American debtors. There are also requests for particulars outstanding arising out of allegations in these paragraphs.

The outstanding requests for particulars

33.  Turning to the outstanding requests for particulars, these fall into four main areas.

Request for restated financial statements, details of off balance sheet liabilities and overstated cash balances

34.  The first area is that covered by requests 7(2) and 8(2) under paragraph 61 of the Amended Statement of Claim, requests 22(2) and 23(5) under paragraph 68(a) of the Amended Statement of Claim, requests 25(2) and 27(2) under paragraph 68(b) of the Amended Statement of Claim, request 88 under paragraph 184 of the Amended Statement of Claim, request 97 under paragraph 188(a) of the Amended Statement of Claim and request 99 under paragraph 189 of the Amended Statement of Claim. These requests call for the identification of the changes which are required to be made to the financial statements in order to reflect the removal of the allegedly fictitious revenues and assets and the recognition of the trade finance liabilities identified by the Plaintiffs in the Amended Statement of Claim.

35.  The second area is that covered by request 24(2), which seeks details of the off balance sheet trade finance liabilities which it is said should have been included in the financial statements.

36.  The third area is that covered by requests 69, 70 and 73, all of which seek the identification of the extent of the overstatement of cash balances which is alleged to have taken place at the end of each accounting period.

37.  At the hearing, these three areas were dealt with together by both Mr Jat (appearing for the Plaintiffs) and Mr Lam (appearing for the Defendants), on the basis that they had the common feature that the provision of restated financial statements in respect of the Plaintiffs for each of the accounting years in question would in all likelihood address each of the requests. While the first group of requests identified above specifically request such restated financial statements, the second and third groups in effect seek them as well. As far as the alleged off balance sheet trade finance liabilities are concerned, the complaint is that they should have been, but were not, included as liabilities of MOML, and included on its balance sheet and the consolidated balance sheet of the Moulin Group. Thus, once such liabilities are identified, they would have to be included on restated balance sheets of MOML and the Moulin Group. As for the alleged inflated cash balances, this is also a matter that feeds through to the balance sheets of the companies concerned, as the inflated balances would result in larger than appropriate amounts of cash being recorded on such balance sheets.

38.  In his affidavit filed in opposition to these applications, Mr Sutton, one of the liquidators of each of the Plaintiffs, indicated that although the Plaintiffs did not regard these requests as legitimate requests for particulars, they would provide the restated financial statements and information relating to the off balance sheet trade finance facilities sought by the Defendants (but not, so far as appeared from his affidavit, in relation to the allegedly overstated cash balances) in advance of the main part of their expert evidence.

39.  At the hearing, Mr Jat maintained that what was sought did not form the subject of a legitimate request for particulars, so that no order should be made in respect of them, although he reiterated that the Plaintiffs would supply restated financial statements (which would now extend to the alleged overstatements of cash balances) and full details of the off balance sheet trade finance liabilities (some of which had already been provided prior to the making of Mr Sutton’s affidavit) prior to the deadline for the exchange of expert evidence. He indicated that it was hoped that this could be done by the end of January 2010 (so that they may have been provided by now).

40.  He submitted, however, that no order should be made in respect of these requests, as they were in fact requests for evidence, and that, even if he was wrong as to this, particulars should not be ordered because this was necessary neither for the saving of costs nor for the fair disposal of the proceedings, as is now required by Order 18 rule 12(3B) of the Rules of the High Court.

41.  In his affidavit filed in support of the applications, Mr Collins of the Defendants provided a number of reasons why such information was considered to be necessary.

42.  Mr Collins suggested that there was information that was missing from the Plaintiffs’ case, saying that it was necessarily the Plaintiffs’ case that the cumulative amount of the allegedly fictitious sales to the North American Debtors should, at any given date) be equal to the sum of the balances of the alleged fictitious assets (i.e. the receivables from such debtors, together with the balance allegedly held on the Ma Wu Bei account and the cash advances to third parties) and any unrecorded liabilities. This suggestion does not appear to have been dissented from by Mr Sutton.

43.  Mr Collins then pointed out that the cumulative sales to the North American debtors up to 31 March 2001 amounted to some HK$1,184 million, whereas the total of the allegedly fictitious assets as at that date amounted to only HK$707 million, resulting in a shortfall of HK$477 million. He went on to suggest that the difference must be accounted for either by unrecorded liabilities or cumulative cash settlements, or a combination of both. To the extent that there were cash settlements, this would reduce the amount of the overstatement of revenues (since the settlements would constitute real revenues), and would have an impact on the claims for loss arising out of allegedly improper dividend payments, and allegedly overpaid profits tax, since the revenue and profits of the Plaintiffs would fall to be reduced not by the full amount of HK$1,184 million, but some lesser (but as yet unspecified) amount.

44.  Mr Collins also suggested that even if the North American debtors were fictitious, this did not rule out the possibility that there were genuine sales with other entities whose identities had been disguised. Similarly, he suggested that on the basis of documents seen by the Defendants, it was possible that the Ma Wu Bei payments (or at least part of them) had some underlying basis – for example, prepaid production expenses might in fact have been applied at some later dates – and that the advances to third parties might have been recovered, in whole or in part, at some later time.

45.  He went on to suggest that insufficient information (whether in the form of particulars or documents disclosed on discovery) had been provided to enable the Defendants to ascertain whether some or all of the allegedly fictitious assets were in fact recovered in subsequent accounting periods, or could properly have been regarded at the relevant time as being recoverable – in either case, it was suggested, the alleged overstatement of profit would be reduced (either because that was the factual position, or because it would have been appropriate to regard the assets as having some value at the relevant date, and hence something that was properly recognised and included the financial statements as at that date.

46.  Mr Sutton responds to this line of argument by pointing out that the Plaintiffs’ case does not depend on niceties such as those which Mr Collins seeks to introduce. As Mr Jat put it in his submissions at the hearing – fictitious means fictitious: the Plaintiffs’ case is that the revenues supposedly deriving from the North American debtors was wholly fictitious, or not real, in that they were completely made up. There was no underlying reality to them, and it was not a case of misrecording of real sales. Similarly with the loans to third parties, and the supposed Ma Wu Bei payments – they were not real, in the sense that there never had been any loans to the third parties capable of generating interest income, or being recovered at the end of the day, and the position in relation to the Ma Wu Bei payments was the same: they were imaginary and did not exist, otherwise than as an entry in the Plaintiffs’ accounting records.

47.  In this, I think that Mr Sutton is right. It is clear from the Amended Statement of Claim that the Plaintiffs’ case is that the sales to the North American debtors never occurred, and the revenues and receivables supposedly deriving from them should have been disregarded entirely, and that the assets created to disguise the hole in the Plaintiffs’ accounts that would otherwise have existed, consisting of the loans to the third parties and the payments to Ma Wu Bei, were likewise non-existent and had no basis in reality. I do not think, therefore, that Mr Collins’ suggestion that there might be some underlying reality to some part of these supposed assets, a suggestion which runs flatly counter to the Plaintiffs’ case, provides a basis for requiring the Plaintiffs to provide the particulars sought.

48.  However, this is not the end of the matter. As Mr Collins also pointed out, although the Plaintiffs have identified the revenues and assets which they say should be removed from their financial statements, they have not yet identified the full extent of the accounting adjustments that are required to be made in order to effect such removal. This is because, when an item is removed from the revenues recorded in a profit and loss account, the effect of doing so goes beyond the consequent reduction in the profits recorded therein – it feeds through to the balance sheet, so as to affect the level of accumulated profits (by reducing them) or losses (by increasing them). Further, any adjustment on one side of the balance sheet would necessarily imply that consequential changes will have to be made on the other side of the balance sheet, so that it remains balanced. The Defendant says that these consequential adjustments have not been identified.

49.  Mr Sutton recognises that such consequential adjustments do have to be made, and that this will have to be done in the context of establishing that the Plaintiffs would have incurred trading losses as the result of the exclusion of the fictitious revenues and assets, so as to establish the Plaintiffs’ case that they would not have paid, or been in a position to pay, the dividends and tax which they say constitute a substantial part of the losses which they suffered.

50.  Mr Sutton suggests, however, that any dispute over this is essentially an exercise in accounting, and that it is a matter for (expert) evidence rather than particularisation of the Plaintiffs’ case. He says that there can be no doubt as to the Plaintiffs’ pleaded case – whether as to the nature of the misstatements in the Plaintiffs’ audited accounts, or as to the Defendant’s negligence in failing to identify them or pick them up, or as to the consequences in terms of loss which the Plaintiffs claim to have suffered as a result. Or, as Mr Jat put it in his submissions, the precise form that the restatements to the Plaintiffs’ financial statements should have taken does not form a necessary part of the Plaintiffs’ pleaded case.

51.  With respect, I do not think that this is right. As I have noted, it is common ground that the financial statements concerned will, if the Plaintiffs are right in respect of their allegations concerning the North American debtors, the unrecorded trade finance facilities, the advances to third parties and the Leadkeen/Ma Wu Bei payments, require restatement. The question is whether such restatement is a necessary part of the Plaintiffs’ case. It seems to me that it is. In my view, the restatements are required in order to establish an essential element in the Plaintiffs’ case as to loss and damage. In order to establish that certain dividends would not have been paid, the Plaintiffs will have to demonstrate that the state of their finances, in particular in respect of their distributable reserves, was such that they would not have made the dividend payments complained of (although there may be some room for argument as to how far they will have to go in this regard – whether it will be necessary for them to show that they could not have made the distributions (because, e.g., there would have been no distributable reserves out of which to make them), or that they would not have made them (because, perhaps, it would have been imprudent to do so in the light of the available distributable reserves)) But on either basis, it would seem necessary for the Plaintiffs to make a case as to the level of distributable reserves that would have been available to them had their accounts been properly audited, and restated so as to reveal their true financial position.

52.  It seems to me that this is a necessary step in the Plaintiffs’ case, which is required in order to take them from the allegations of breach of duty by the Defendant, to the conclusion that they have thereby suffered loss and damage. As such, I think that they must be regarded as material facts, which the Plaintiffs will need to establish in order to succeed in their claims, and not merely as matters of evidence.

53.  That being so, can it be said that the provision of such information is neither necessary for the fair disposal of the proceedings, nor for the saving of costs?

54.  So far as the fair disposal of the proceedings is concerned, I think that the nature and extent of the adjustments that the Plaintiffs’ will say should have been made to their audited financial statements to properly reflect their true financial situation are matters of sufficient importance as to be necessary for the fair disposal of the proceedings. This is clearly information which needs to be provided – a matter that appears to be recognised by the Plaintiffs. It seems to me that it would be much fairer for such information to be provided to the Defendants in sufficient time for the Defendants to consider it and address it, as necessary, in their evidence, whether of fact or of expert opinion (it is more likely to be the latter).

55.  As for savings in costs, I would think that the provision of the information in advance of the exchange of evidence, and particularly the exchange of expert evidence, is likely to result in such savings. If the information were not provided at this stage, the Defendants would have to prepare their evidence on the basis of their best assessment of the adjustments to the financial statements that would be needed – in the event that this assessment proves incorrect, there would almost certainly be a need for them to go back on this part of their evidence and reconsider it in the light of what is revealed in the Plaintiffs’ expert evidence in respect of the appearance of the restated accounts. This would simply add to costs, in a way that would seem avoidable if the information is supplied in advance. On the other hand, from the Plaintiffs’ point of view, the information is something that will have to be provided at some stage – the only question being when. It does not seem to me that the provision of the information at a slightly earlier time than it otherwise would have been is likely to result in any significant costs wastage from the Plaintiffs’ point of view, as such work would have to be done in preparing their expert evidence in any case.

56.  I have therefore come to the view that the provision of restated financial statements is a matter for proper particularisation of the Plaintiffs’ claim, and that these requests for particulars are justified. Given that the Plaintiffs have indicated that they will provide such information (and may already have done so), the main effect of my decision will probably be reflected in the incidence of costs in respect of the application. However, in case the information has not yet been provided, I would direct that it should be provided within two weeks from the date of this judgment, by close of business on 24 February 2010.

Requests for details of fraud

57.  This leaves two requests for particulars outstanding. Both relate to paragraph 178 of the Amended Statement of Claim, and in particular the allegation that the Defendants “should, and had it exercised reasonable care would, have detected or suspected fraud and financial mismanagement by certain members of the executive management of the Moulin Group”.

58.  The relevant requests are requests 82 and 83. Request 82 asks for identification of the members of the Group’s executive management in respect of whom the Defendants should have detected or suspected fraud and financial mismanagement. Request 83 seeks a statement of the nature of the alleged fraud and financial mismanagement.

59.  The Plaintiffs have provided a response to each of these requests. In respect of request 82, they have stated that the members of the executive management in question included five named persons (the five members of the Ma family mentioned in paragraph 5 above. In respect of request 83, they have indicated that the alleged fraud and financial mismanagement “includes false accounting and the intentional misstatement in accounting records and/or financial statements, the intentional falsification of documents, misrepresentations to financial institutions and other stakeholders, destruction of records and general laundering of funds”.

60.  In pursuing these requests, the Defendants seek details of the identities of any other members of the Moulin Group’s executive management whom the Plaintiffs say were party to the alleged fraud, and whether there are any other as yet unspecified forms of fraud alleged, together with the particular respects of what is intended to be included in the general allegations of fraud mentioned in the answer that has been given so far.

61.  Dealing first with request 82, Mr Jat contended that identification of the persons responsible for the fraud was not a necessary part of the Plaintiffs’ case. At one stage, he suggested, I think, that the allegation of fraud was not itself a necessary part of that case. While that may be right in the sense that it may not strictly be necessary for the Plaintiffs to contend that the misstatements in their financial statements were brought about by fraud, or by fraud of a particular kind perpetrated by particular persons, it remains the case that the Plaintiffs have, in paragraph 178 alleged in effect that the misstatements were due to fraud on the part of members of their executive management. Moreover, on being asked for particulars of the identities of such persons, their response was not that the identification of such persons did not form part of their case, but was to identify five named persons as being persons who were included in those responsible for the fraud.

62.  It seems to me that having regard to the fact that the Plaintiffs have chosen to identify, in an apparently non-exhaustive way, certain persons as party to the fraud said to have been perpetrated on them, it is proper for the Defendants to seek to establish whether or not the Plaintiffs say that any other persons were party to the fraud. This information may be relevant in a number of respects identified by the Defendants – for example, it may have some impact on questions of contributory fault and causation which the Defendants have raised in their defence; or it may impinge on questions of what acts or knowledge on the part of members of its executive management are to be attributed to the Plaintiffs, another matter raised by the Defendants’ defence; or it may have some impact on issues of whether or not the Defendants could or should have relied on information or representations allegedly provided to them by particular members of the Plaintiffs’ executive management.

63.  In the course of his submissions, Mr Jat made reference to the indictment which has been laid in criminal proceedings for false accounting and conspiracy to defraud in which the five members of the Ma family identified by the Plaintiffs, along with a number of other senior employees of the Moulin Group, have been charged as providing some indication of the persons involved. However, as Mr Lam pointed out, those charges relate to a different time frame to the matters in question in this litigation, and in any event, it does not seem to me that this excuses the Plaintiffs from having to identify those persons whom they wish to allege were part of the executive management of the Plaintiffs who were involved in the alleged fraud.

64.  Insofar as the Plaintiffs seek to allege that any persons, other than the five already named, were persons whom the Defendants should have suspected of fraud, or concluded were involved in a fraud on the Plaintiffs, they must, I think, inform the Defendants of this. I would therefore order that the particulars sought should be given, within the same time frame as has been ordered in respect of the other requests, namely by close of business on 24 February 2010.

65.  As for request 83, it seems to me that the position is similar. Although it may not have been strictly necessary for the Plaintiffs to have alleged that the misstatements were due to a fraud, they have chosen, no doubt for good reasons, to do so. Further, they have provided an apparently non-exhaustive description of the nature of the fraud. In these circumstances, it seems to me that it is open to the Defendants to seek to pin the Plaintiffs down as to whether or not there are any other relevant aspects of the fraud.

66.  That said, I do not think that it would be either appropriate or necessary to require the Plaintiffs to descend to the level of detail suggested in, for example, paragraph 70 of Mr Collins’ affidavit, in which he argues that the Defendants should be given what he describes as “full particulars” of the allegedly fraudulent scheme by identifying the particular documents said to have been falsified, those said to have been concealed from the Defendants and those said to have been destroyed. Although the Plaintiffs have chosen to allege that a fraud on them underlay the misstatements in their financial statements, I do not think that the precise details as to how that fraud was carried out forms (or needs to be) part of the Plaintiffs’ case. It is not suggested that the Defendants should have discovered that particular documents (other than the relevant ledgers) were falsified, let alone concealed or destroyed. What the Plaintiffs allege is that their financial statements were misstated in the various respects pleaded in paragraphs 53 to 79 of the Amended Statement of Claim. In the course of argument, Mr Jat indicated that that was the extent of their allegations of fraud.

67.  In these circumstances, I think that although the Defendants are entitled to know whether there are any other forms of fraudulent conduct beyond those mentioned in the Plaintiffs’ answer to this request on which the Plaintiffs will rely, I do not think that, beyond this, further particularisation of the answer given is necessary. I shall therefore order only that the Plaintiffs should specify any further forms of fraudulent activity beyond those identified in the Amended Statement of Claim and the answer to request 83 upon which they seek to rely in these proceedings, such particulars also to be provided by close of business on 24 February 2010.

Discovery

68.  Turning to the discovery application, I shall deal below with items 9 and 15, which were the subject of the main part of the argument at the hearing, and then deal with item 11, which was also discussed. So far as the other items are concerned, the summons will be adjourned sine die, with liberty to restore if necessary.

Item 9 – Ernst & Young working papers

69.  This part of the application for discovery seeks disclosure of “all documents concerning the balances and transactions with the North American debtors, cash advances to third parties and amounts held by Ma Wu Bei on behalf of Leadkeen and the Moulin Group … which the Liquidators would have obtained from their order under section 221 of the Companies Ordinance requiring Ernst & Young to produce documents relating to its audit of the Plaintiffs”. The documents sought are then further detailed as follows:-

(1)  Those relating to sales to and settlements received from each of the North American debtors for the financial years after that ending on 31 March 2001;

(2)  Those relating to manufacturing operations in the PRC (such as production and expense records and inventory records) for each of the audit years 1999, 2000 and 2001 and thereafter;

(3)  Those relating to the amount of cash advances made to third parties, repayments thereof and interest charged thereon for each of the audit years 1999, 2000 and 2001 and thereafter;

(4)  Those relating to year end balances of cash advances to third parties for each of the audit years 1999, 2000 and 2001 and thereafter;

(5)  Those relating to year end balances, and movements during the year, of amounts held by Ma Wu Bei on behalf of Leadkeen and the Moulin Group, showing the balances of individual components thereof, for each of the audit years 1999, 2000 and 2001 and thereafter;

(6)  Those relating to the balances of each of the North American debtors at the year end of each financial year after that ending on 31 March 2001; and

(7)  Those relating to the balances of the circular trade finance transactions at the end of each of the audit years 1999, 2000 and 2001 and thereafter, including a detailed listing by banks, and classifying the balances as on or off balance sheet.

70.  Mr Lam submitted that these documents are clearly relevant to the issues in question in these proceedings. In relation to the audit years that are the subject of these proceedings, I would accept that this would be likely to be the case. I do not think that Mr Jat disagreed with this.

71.  However, Mr Jat submitted that there was no need for such discovery to be ordered, whether for the fair disposal of the action, or for the saving of costs. He pointed out that substantial discovery had already been made in respect of documentation relating to the audit years in question, and submitted that there was therefore no significant benefit to be obtained from requiring the Plaintiffs to search through the considerable volume of material obtained from Messrs Ernst & Young, who were the Plaintiffs’ auditors after the Defendants’ resignation, to locate documents containing the information sought, an exercise which would be time consuming and costly.

72.  Mr Lam submitted that insofar as these audit years are concerned, Ernst & Young’s working papers would be likely to conveniently summarise information relating to these matters, which would save the parties the expense of having to trawl through the underlying documents for the information.

73.  At the end of the day, I do not think that the benefit (such as it may be) of having these documents produced is such as would justify the additional expenditure of time and cost involved in requiring the Plaintiffs’ to give discovery of them. The underlying documentation having already been disclosed, it seems to me that such original material, which would presumably have been seen by, or at least available to, the Defendants, would be the best source of information rather than the work product of another firm of auditors, which would, after all, record their own summaries and understandings of the material which they had seen. Such summaries may or may not be of particular value in the context of these proceedings, but they are, I think unlikely to be much more useful than the original material which has, as I understand it, been disclosed.

74.  Turning to the audit years subsequent to those for which the Defendant was the Plaintiffs’ auditor, Mr Lam submitted that the material that might be expected to be contained in them was relevant for the reasons given by Mr Collins in his affidavit, where he dealt with the alleged relevance of events after the involvement of the Defendant – this relates to the alleged relevance of potential settlements of indebtedness by the North American debtors or the third party borrowers and the possible use of funds held by Ma Wu Bei for production in the PRC, after March 2001.

75.  However, as I have explained above, in the context of the request for particulars in the form of restated financial statements, the suggestion that there might have been relevant economic benefits received at a later time flowing from the allegedly fictitious transactions (quite apart from being a notion which is disputed by the Plaintiffs) is not something that appears to flow from their case, which is simply that the transactions in question had no foundation in reality. As Mr Jat put it, the transactions never happened, and were purely imaginary, so that there could be no question of benefits of any sort flowing from them in later accounting periods.

76.  In these circumstances, I see no justification for requiring the Plaintiffs to give the discovery sought under this category of documents in relation to audit years after that ending on 31 March 2001 either.

77.  I therefore do not propose to make any order in respect of item 9 in the Schedule to the Defendant’s summons for discovery.

Item 15 – documents relating to loans made to members of the Ma Family and/or private companies owned by them

78.  This aspect of the discovery application seeks disclosure of all pleadings and other documents (including affidavits) in relation to the Plaintiffs’ claim against Cary Ma Lit Kin and Anthony P Dichiara in HCA 1037 of 2006, and similar documents in relation to the claim made by Active Base Limited against the Liquidators in HCCW 470A of 2005 and CACV 279 of 2008.

79.  The former proceedings sought to set aside certain agreements and recover payments made to Dichiara as part of a remuneration package – there was reference in the Statement of Claim in those proceedings to Cary Ma and other members of the Ma Family (or their private companies) having borrowed substantial amounts from unlicensed moneylenders for the purposes of the Moulin Group.

80.  Mr Sutton has pointed out that these proceedings related to transactions and loans in 2004 and 2005, some considerable time after the resignation of the Defendants as the Plaintiffs’ auditors. In these circumstances, the Plaintiffs contend that such documentation is not relevant to the issues arising in the proceedings.

81.  Mr Lam submitted that documents in these proceedings would cast light on the modus operandi of the Ma family in relation to the use of borrowed funds to influence (or inflate) cash balances – with respect, it seems to me that given that the transactions covered by these proceedings do not fall within the period during which the Defendants were the Plaintiffs’ auditors, the relevance if any of documents relating to them is tenuous, at best, and I do not think that discovery of them is necessary either for the fair conduct of this action, or for the saving of costs.

82.  The position in relation to the other proceedings (the Active Base claim) is similar. The claim related to loans said to have been made by Active Base, a moneylender, to MIHL. In the course of the proceedings, there was reference to three very short term loans made by Active Base close to and straddling the year end of the Group at the end of the 31 March 1998 and 2002 and 31 December 2003 financial years – in each case the loans were made just before the year end, with repayment scheduled shortly after the start of the next financial period. The loans were apparently made to Ma Bo Kee or Ma family private companies, with the proceeds (at least in respect of the two later loans) being channelled to companies in the Moulin Group.

83.  Again, the suggestion is that documents relating to these proceedings would cast light on the modus operandi in relation to the inflated cash balances.

84.  For the reasons I have given in relation to the Cary Ma/Anthony Dichiara proceedings, I do not think that it would be appropriate to require discovery in relation to the loans that fall outside the financial periods with which these proceedings are concerned. So far as the remaining loan, which fell to be repaid early in the financial year ending 31 March 1999, is concerned, Mr Sutton has stated (and Mr Jat confirmed) that the Plaintiffs have provided disclosure of documentation relating to this loan to the Defendants. In these circumstances, it does not seem to me to be appropriate to make an order requiring discovery of these documents either.

85.  In the result, I decline to order the discovery sought under this heading also.

Item 11 – report produced by Ferrier Hodgson for creditor banks of the Group

86.  This relates to a report apparently produced by Messrs Ferrier Hodgson (the firm of which the liquidators are partners) for certain creditor banks of the Moulin Group in 2005, as to the financial position of the Group.

87.  The Defendants suggest that this document is likely to be relevant, and that it is likely to be in the possession, custody or control of the liquidators, in their capacity as such, having regard to the fact that it was produced by their firm on the instructions of the Group’s creditor banks, who form the majority of its creditors.

88.  Mr Jat submitted that the mere fact that such a report may have been produced by the liquidators’ firm for the banking creditors of the Group does not mean that it is ipso facto in the Liquidators’ possession – he submitted that one had to have regard to the capacity in which the liquidators’ firm held the documents in question.

89.  I think that that is correct, insofar as it goes. Merely because the document may be in the possession of the liquidators’ firm (as the producers of it) does not mean that it is in the liquidator’s possession. In order for the document to be discoverable, I agree that it should be in the liquidators’ possession in their capacity as liquidators.

90.  That said, however, as I understood Mr Lam’s submission, it was that the court should conclude that there was (at least) a prima facie case for possession, as it was inherently likely that the document would have been released by the creditor banks to the liquidators in their capacity as such, given that it would throw light on the condition of the Moulin Group prior to its liquidation, and might well throw light on the false accounting that is said to have taken place. To this, Mr Jat responded that Mr Sutton had made it clear that it was not in the possession of the liquidators in their capacity as such. But with respect, that is not clear from Mr Sutton’s affidavit. All that Mr Sutton said on this point was that “documents produced for creditor banks are not documents in the possession, custody or control of the Plaintiffs”. While I would accept that the document would not necessarily, or inevitably, be in the possession of the Plaintiffs, or be in their possession simply because the liquidators’ firm had produced the document in some other capacity, it seems to me that there is nonetheless a prima facie case for suggesting that it is in their possesion, having regard to the circumstances referred to at the beginning of this paragraph. It seems to me that there is a reasonable likelihood of the document having been made available to the liquidators in their capacity as liquidators, and in my view, Mr Suttons’ statement does not deal expressly with that situation.

91.  I therefore think, on balance, that the Plaintiffs should state whether or not this document is in their possession, custody or control, by being in the possession of the liquidators of the Plaintiffs in their capacity as liquidators, so that it is a document in the possession, custody or control of the Plaintiffs. To confirm this one way or another is not likely to be an onerous task, and I shall therefore order that this should also be done within 14 days from the date of this judgment, by close of business on 24 February 2010.

Costs

92.  So far as costs are concerned, having regard to the fact that a substantial portion of the discovery application was not proceeded with, and the fact that the evidence filed in relation to the applications dealt with both applications, I shall direct that the question of the costs of these applications should be dealt with by oral submissions on 25 February 2010, when the Plaintiffs’ application for discovery from the Defendant is due to be heard.

 (Aarif Bama)
 Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr. Jat Sew-Tong, SC instructed by Messrs Clifford chance for the Plaintiffs

Mr. Godfrey Lam, SC instructed by Messrs Barlow Lyde & Gilbert for the Defendants