PARON GLOVES INTERNATIONAL LTD v. WU WAI KIT
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HCA 1357/2007
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
HIGH COURT ACTION NO 1357 OF 2007
________________________
BETWEEN
| PARON GLOVES INTERNATIONAL LIMITED | Plaintiff | |
| and | ||
| WU WAI KIT | Defendant |
________________________
| Before: Mr Registrar K.W. Lung in Chambers (Open to the public) |
| Date of Hearing: 25 July 2013 |
| Date of Decision: 25 July 2013 |
_______________________________
DECISION
_______________________________
INTRODUCTION
1. On 10 March 2010, leave was granted to the plaintiff to set the matter down for a 5-day trial. The case was not set down up till now. In May 2012, Madam Leung Yuk Chun applied to join as a defendant in this action. On 6 September 2012, an order was made for her to join in. On appeal, this order was set aside by Madam M. Chan J., who delivered her Decision on 10 January 2013. The plaintiff therefore applies for extension of time to set the matter down for trial. The defendant has also taken out two summonses for altogether six applications. These applications are set out in counsel’s written submissions. For convenience, I shall copy the introduction of these applications from Ms. E. Yang’s written submissions. Ms. Yang and Mr. T. Chow, counsel act for the plaintiff and Mr. K. Chan and Mr. H. Leung, counsel act for the defendant. The applications are:
“(a) Plaintiff’s summons dated 26.3.2013 for extension of time to set this action down for trial pursuant to the Order of Mr Registrar Lung dated 10.3.2010 (“P’s Summons”) [A/47];
(b) Defendant’s summons dated 5.4.2013 to apply for inter alia:-
i. P to provide D photocopy of the documents specified in Annex I thereto [A/53] (“Discovery Application”);
ii. Leave to D to amend the Amended Defence as per the draft Re-Amended Defence (“Old RAD”) annexed thereto [A/54] (“Amendment Application”);
iii. Leave to D to file and serve supplemental witness statement of D, witness statement of Leung Yuk Chun (“LYC”) and witness statement of He Shuqin (“HSQ”) (“Supplemental Witness Statements Application”);
iv. Leave to D to file and serve expert report by Mr. Doman Wong (“Expert Evidence Application”);
(c) D be at liberty to call Doman Wong as expert witness at trial. (altogether “D’s Summons”) [A/50]
(d) D’s summons dated 18.7.2013 to apply for leave to withdraw the Old RAD annexed to D’s Summons and replace the same with a new draft Re-Amended Defence and Counterclaim (“New RADCC”) (“Replacement Application”).”
2. The plaintiff also complains the following acts of the defendant.
a. On 18.7.2013, D filed (without leave) the supplemental witness statement of D, and the witness statements of LYC and HSQ (altogether “the Purported Statements”);
b. On 19.7.2013, D sent a draft expert report to P, a belated one.
3. It is not necessary to deal with the Discovery Application as the parties have made the arrangements themselves.[1] Mr. Chan has also fairly agreed to abandon his Replacement Application.
4. Mr. Chan submits that he would plead section 358 of Companies Ordinance as a defence rather than as a counterclaim. He would therefore delete the counterclaim, leaving the paragraph thereunder as part of the Re-Amended Defence. Ms. Yang has no objection to this proposal. Leave is given to the defendant to make the amendments as proposed and re-submit the rectified one, under the title of Re-Amended Defence for filing and service if leave is granted.
5. As to the plaintiff’s application for extension of time for setting down for trial, the defendant says that in view of the defendant’s outstanding matters, the matter is not yet ready to be set down for trial.
6. As to the defendant’s applications, Ms. Yang submits that, on procedural grounds and on merits, they should be dismissed.
THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND
7. For the factual background of this action, I gratefully adopt the summary of the facts set out in Madam Justice M. Chan’s Decision delivered on 10 January 2013 for Madam Leung’s application for joining as a defendant. The learned judge summarized the facts as follows:
“1. The plaintiff (“Company”) is a limited company incorporated in Hong Kong in July 1986. In these proceedings, it makes claims against the defendant (“WK”), a director of the Company until December 2006, for alleged misappropriation of funds of the Company totaling $44,266,315.31 (“Misappropriated Funds”). The Writ was issued in August 2007, and the claim made against WK is for an account of the Misappropriated Funds, alternatively damages in the sum of $44,266,315.31, alternatively damages to be assessed. … …
6. The pleadings filed in this case are not complex. The Company claims that WK had, during the time when she was a director of the Company and between 1995 and 2004, issued 340 cheques in her own favour and withdrawn the Misappropriated Funds from the Company’s bank accounts. Despite the cheques being marked in the Company’s records to have been for the expenditure of Lifeng Factory and Liqiang Factory (“Factories”), in which the Company had interests as a joint venture partner in Mainland China, the Company claims that in truth, the Misappropriated Funds had been used for WK’s own benefit. The Company thus claims that WK had acted in breach of her fiduciary duty and duty of good faith owed to the Company as its director, and that the Misappropriated Funds are held by WK on constructive trust for the Company.
7. By its prayer in the Re-Amended Statement of Claim, the Company seeks from WK an account of the Misappropriated Funds, and damages, whether represented by the Misappropriated Funds or to be assessed.
8. By way of defence, WK claims that the alleged Misappropriated Funds had been utilized for the payment of the expenses of the Factory (paragragh 22 of the Amended Defence). WK claims that the drawing of the cheques was all done under the direction of and advice by Wu Kwok Kwong (“KK”), the registered holder of 45% of the shares of the Company, who is also her brother and another director of the Company. The balance of the shares are held as to 20% by WK, 15% by Leung and 20% by KK’s wife.
9. On the basis of the matters summarized in paragraph 8 above, WK denies that she had misappropriated any funds of the Company, and further denies that the Misappropriated Funds were held by her on trust, as alleged.”
8. The learned judge had considered the facts of the case, and having heard submissions from counsel of respective parties, she commented in her Decision that it is a relatively simple case as she said:
“17. Having considered the pleadings, I agree that the issue in dispute for determination at trial is simply whether WK had misappropriated funds of the Company, such that she should be liable to the Company.
18. The relief or remedy claimed in this action is an account or payment by WK of the Misappropriated Funds of the Company. The question or issue which arises out of or relates to or is connected with the relief or remedy claimed is whether the Misappropriated Funds were used for the purposes of the Company, namely for the expenses of the Factories as WK claims in the Amended Defence. If, as WK claims, the Misappropriated Funds had been used for the legitimate purposes of the Company, by paying for the expenses of the Factories, then she is not liable to the Company for the relief sought.”
THE APPLICATIONS
9. For convenience, I shall first deal with the defendant’s applications before I deal with the plaintiff’s application for extension of time for setting down for trial.
AMENDMENT APPLICATION
10. Mr. Chan submits that the present Amended Defence is not complete and the defendant should be allowed to amend her defence in view of the further witness statements and that there is no prejudice to the plaintiff.
11. Ms. Yang argues that this is a late application. The defendant had, in the Listing Questionnaire filed on 2 March 2010, said there would be no application for amendment of the Amended Defence and the plaintiff had not changed its case. To allow the defendant to amend the defence would inevitably delay the proceedings further.
12. The legal principles on amendment are trite. The plaintiff relies upon the following authorities, which I consider relevant in opposition to this application:
a. The general principles that amendment should be allowed if it causes no prejudice to the other party: Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2013, Vol 1, 20/8/6;
b. Pure undue delay is not sufficient to bar the application. Application for amendment may be refused if the application could have been made earlier and such application would cause other interlocutory applications before trial. Hesson Development Ltd v Tang Ki Fan Tso (unreported, HCA 5584/1998, 30.9.2003)
13. However, I would like to add another authority to the list above, which bears similarity to this application and in which the learned Judge had set out the proper approach for the consideration of the application. In VSC Building Products Company Limited v. Kono Insurance Limited HCA947/2005, 9 September 2009, (unreported) by Mr. Justice A. Cheung (as he then was), the defendant made an application to amend the Defence in less than 3 months before trial, a milestone date as the CJR had already commenced on 2 April 2009. It sought to raise formally the defence that the plaintiff had, in breach of a condition in the policy, failed to notify the insurer of the accident in time. Knowledge of the plaintiff of the accident therefore became a crucial matter. The learned judge set out the court’s approach to the application. At paragraph 19 of the Decision, he said:
“19. The primary considerations in this type of late application are first, the merit of the proposed amendment, which I have just dealt with, and secondly, and maybe more importantly, the presence or absence of any real prejudice to the other.
22. Absent any real prejudice, the case must be decided upon the general principle that a court of law seeks to adjudicate on the real issues and disputes between the parties and, if possible, technical and procedural rules should not stand in the way of allowing the parties to raise their real claims or defences before the court for adjudication.”
14. In Mr. Chan’s written submissions, he set out the purposes for the proposed amendments. They are added to clarify the various bank accounts in which the defendant had deposited the money allegedly misappropriated by her, update the information as to where and when she had deposited the cheques.[2] Ms. Yang does not dispute this in her written submissions.
15. As mentioned in the factual background, this case is a relatively simple case where the plaintiff has built up a prima facie strong case against the defendant, who had allegedly deposited 340 cheques into her account or otherwise had misappropriated the money. It will be for the defendant to give a full account of explanation for the deposits and use of the money for her defence. Ms. Yang does not argue that the proposed amendments are relevant to her defence. I consider that they are crucial for the defendant’s defence. To deprive her of the opportunity of stating her case clearly in the pleadings would be unfair to the defendant. As Mr. Chan has rightly pointed out, the allegations raised by the plaintiff in this Action carry criminal liability against the defendant. The matter has not been set down for trial. No doubt, there will be some delay in the corresponding procedural steps caused by the proposed amendments. However, Ms. Yang has not shown to me the prejudice that cannot be compensated by costs. She submits that the amendment would cause other interlocutory applications such as further discovery. That may be so. However, Mr. Chan has confirmed today that there will not be any application for further discovery because of the amendments.
16. Accordingly, I allow the defendant’s application for amendment in terms of paragraph 4 supra.
SUPPLEMENTAL WITNESS STATEMENTS APPLICATION
17. The defendant seeks leave to file and serve her supplemental witness statement, witness statement of Leung Yuk Chun (“LYC”) and witness statement of He Shuqin (“HSQ”). I shall deal with each of the proposed supplemental witness statement and the further witness statements separately.
Supplemental witness statement of the defendant
18. The plaintiff opposes this supplemental witness statement on the ground that it is, in fact, not a supplemental witness statement, but a fresh witness statement de novo. In her written submissions, Ms. Yang has also set out the objectionable paragraphs with reasons[3]:
a. Paragraphs 11 to 36 because D merely offers observations, comments and speculations to P’s documents;
b. Paragraph 51 where the last sentence makes submissions on the merits;
c. Paragraph 55 where the last 2 paragraphs are speculations and beliefs of D;
d. Paragraph 65 where the 2nd last sentence is merely an opinion/submission on the merits;
e. Paragraph 81 because it is wholly irrelevant and also contains speculations and adverse comments;
f. Paragraphs 89 to 96 because they are legal submissions, opinions and speculation;
g. Paragraphs 122 to 124 because they are statements of belief;
h. Paragraph 130 because it is speculation and opinion;
i. Paragraph 132 because it offers D’s guess;
j. Paragraph 140 because it is speculation;
k. Paragraph 144 because it refers to another proceedings and is irrelevant;
l. Paragraph 147 because it is irrelevant and speculative;
m. Paragraph 148 because it is comment and irrelevant;
n. Paragraph 156 because it is legal submission;
o. Paragraph 158 to 166 because it is wholly irrelevant;
p. Paragraph 169 because it is irrelevant and seeks to introduce irrelevant document;
q. Paragraph 170 is speculation.
19. Mr. Chan submits that the supplemental witness statement of the defendant is not given de novo. It will serve the purpose of giving more particulars to the defendant’s defences. The comments made by Ms. Yang are unwarranted because the comments or opinions of the defendant are supported by the facts stated in her statement or they are necessary conclusions because of the facts stated in her statement. Some of them may be technically objectionable. But to dwell on such technical details will not assist the proceedings. I agree. If such technical transgressions of the witness statement are not prejudicial to the other party, it will not be necessary to waste time and costs to deal with them.
20. I note that the witnesses who have given their witness statements are not allowed to change their witness statements inconsistent with their previous statements. See §10 of Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft (Hong Kong) v Peregrine Fixed Income (in Liquidation)CACV296/2002 (unreported) 10 September 2002. Today, Ms. Yang has admitted that the supplemental witness statement of the defendant is not outside the scope of her original witness statement. If her supplemental witness statement were served as the original witness statement, the plaintiff would have no objection to it. The reasons for the plaintiff’s objection is that it is late and the plaintiff was given insufficient time to consider it.
21. I shall give leave to the defendant to serve her supplemental witness statement.
Witness statement of LYC
22. The plaintiff’s objection to this witness statement is based on the reasons that her witness statement will only cover the background facts and she had no direct or only had limited knowledge of how the cheques had been used. Her witness statement would only expand the issues and prolong the proceedings.
23. The legal principles relating to witness statements are set out in my Decision in Talent Weaving Dyeing & Printing Limited v Able Billion Textiles Limited [2013] 2 HKLRD 479, the relevant parts of which are as follows:
a. evidence that bears no relevance to the pleaded issues in dispute is scandalous and is inadmissible and liable to be struck out;
b. evidence that is beyond the ambit of the pleaded issues is scandalous and should be struck out: John Simpson Warham v Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd (unreported) HCMP4400/2001, 10 December 2008 by Reyes J.
24. Ms. Yang relies upon Parsad v Great Wealthy Eng. Co Ltd, [2012] 3 HKLRD 705, Bharwaney J, in which the learned Judge referred to Chung Hiu Bun, the administrator of the estate of Chung Chun Kong, deceased v. Yeung Yiu Sing and anor., HCPI 123/2012, 28 July 2011, which said that the Court might refuse application for introduction of new evidence at a late stage of the proceedings and “the probative value of such new evidence is low and of marginal relevance”.
25. As I have already allowed the proposed amendments to the Amended Defence, I will take into consideration those proposed amendments. Having considered the amended pleadings, it is quite obvious that in the amended paragraph 18A of the Re-Amended Defence, the defendant pleaded that for cheques No. 86 and 87, Madam Leung was the drawee and in paragraph 28(b), the defendant pleaded that the practice of depositing the cheques of the company into the Joint Name Account and the HK Account was made under the directions of Wu Kwok Kwong, a director and shareholder of the plaintiff and this practice was made known to Madam Leung.
26. The plaintiff may prefer to have a simple factual scenario that the defendant had misappropriated the cheques for her own use and it is for the defendant to account for the use of those cheques and the money. The defendant has already admitted that she had drawn the 340 cheques except for Nos. 86, 87, 309 and 310 as defined in Annex 1 to the Re-Amended Statement of Claim.[4] The burden is clearly upon the defendant to account for the money of those cheques. Otherwise, she will be liable to account the money to the plaintiff. However, the defendant has pleaded her case in such a way that there had been agreement between Mr. Wu Kwok Kwong and herself that the cheques could be deposited in the Joint Name Account and the HK Account. I consider that to deny the defendant the opportunity of adducing Madam Leung’s evidence in support of her defence at this stage would be unfair to her.
27. I have no idea how the plaintiff would plead to the proposed amendments by way of a reply. For interlocutory application, the Court will not go into the details of the evidence, which is matter for the trial. On the materials before me, I consider that Madam Leung’s supplemental witness statement is relevant to the amended pleadings and it should be allowed into evidence. So I do.
Witness statement of HSQ
28. The plaintiff’s objection to this witness’s statement is based on the reason that no explanation has been given as to why HSQ was not engaged earlier and the following paragraphs in her witness statement are objectionable.
a. Paragraph 28.2 because it merely deposes HSQ’s belief;
b. Paragraph 29.1 because it is opinion and submissions;
c. Paragraph 29.2 because it is opinion and submissions;
d. Paragraph 29.3 because it is opinion and submissions; and
e. Paragraph 30 because it is opinion.
29. Mr. Chan makes the similar observations to those comments as he has done to the defendant’s supplemental witness statement.
30. This witness is certainly important for the defendant to advance her defences. Her evidence is relevant to the issues in dispute. I grant leave for the defendant to serve this witness’s statement.
EXPERT EVIDENCE APPLICATION
31. The defendant intends to adduce expert evidence of Mr. Doman Wong, Director of Risk Advisory Department of Baker Tilly Hong Kong Risk Assurance Limited. The defendant applies for expert directions of:-
a. Filing of expert report authored by Mr. Doman Wong;
b. Calling Mr. Doman Wong as an expert witness at trial.
32. The plaintiff opposes this application on procedural grounds and on merits.
33. On procedural grounds, the plaintiff says that the defendant’s application is late and she has not complied with paragraph 20 of Practice Direction 5.2; that she has taken away the Court’s power of appointing a single joint expert.
34. On the merits, the plaintiff says that the matching and tracing exercise of the cheques into various bank accounts do not require any specialized knowledge and do not call for expert testimony.
35. In Wong Hoi Fung v. American International Assurance Company (Bermuda) Limited & Another [2002] 3 HKLRD 507, the court set out the two-stage test for determining admissibility of expert evidence:
“12. In deciding whether certain proposed expert evidence should be received, the relevant test has been stated to be a two‑stage one. Firstly, the evidence has to be admissible as “expert evidence” for the purpose of section 58 of the Evidence Ordinance, Cap.8. Secondly, the evidence must be relevant, in the sense that it is helpful to the court in arriving at its decision on one or more of the issues to be resolved : Barings plc (in Liquidation) & Anor v. Coopers and Lybrand & Ors, Lexis Transcript, 9 February 2001, Evans‑Lombe J at paras.44‑45”
36. Since the plaintiff argues that the matching and tracing exercise done by Mr. Doman Wong does not require specialized knowledge and hence, does not call for expert testimony, it will be helpful to make reference to the case of Barings plc (in liquidation) and another v Coopers & Lybrand (a firm) and others Barings Futures (Singapore) Pte Lye (inliquidation) v Mattar and others [2001] All ER (D) 110 by Evans-Lombe J., where the court directed the parties to adduce expert evidence on banking management and there was an extensive discussion on the issue of what was the proper subject matter of expert opinion. The ground of objection to the defendants’ expert report was that the subject matter was not properly the subject of expert evidence, being directed to generalised management failings by Barings where criticism was not based on any objective standards but only upon Mr Giannotti's own experience. The head-notes of the law report summarize the learned judge’s decisions as follows:
“It was established that expert evidence was admissible under s 3 of the Civil Evidence Act 1972 (the same provisions under s.58(3) of the Evidence Ordinance, Cap. 8) added by me, in any case where the court accepted that there existed a recognised expertise governed by recognised standards and rules of conduct capable of influencing the court's decision on any of the issues which it had to decide and the witness to be called satisfied the court that he had a sufficient familiarity with and knowledge of the expertise in question to render his opinion potentially of value in resolving any of those issues. However, evidence meeting that test could still be excluded if the court took the view that calling it would not be helpful to the court in resolving any issue in the case justly. Such evidence would not be helpful where the issue to be decided was one of law or was otherwise one on which the court was able to come to a fully informed decision without hearing such evidence.”
37. Mr. Wong has submitted his draft report for the Court’s consideration. In his report, Mr. Wong has set out his professional qualifications and the factual basis on which he made the matching and tracing of the cheques as alleged in the pleadings. By looking at this report briefly, one can see immediately that the exercise takes a professional accountant to make the matching and tracing in order to make a finding on the way cheques were treated through the various accounts.
38. It will be enlightening to find the following results during the relevant period in question between 1 May 1995 and 31 December 2004 after Mr. Wong’s matching and tracing exercise:
a. $5,150,432.93 were transferred to the plaintiff’s bank account from the joint name account (page 11)
b. $2,764,202.62 were remitted to Lifeng and Liqiang from the defendant’s account (page 14)
c. Overall, $12,793,499.10 were withdrawn from the joint name accounts of the defendant and Wu Kwok Kwong and the single name savings and current account of the defendant in connection with the purposes of payment to third parties, transfer to the plaintiff’s account, payment to Wu Kwok Kwong and overseas remittances to Lifeng and Ligiang. (page 16).
39. Ms. Yang has fairly admits that the above information would be relevant to the issues at the trial. She only argues that these matters do not require an expert to handle. She submits the trial judge will be able to look at the accounts and entries to obtain the information in the draft expert report. With respect to her, I have to admit that if I were the trial judge myself, I might have difficulty in understanding the various accounting entries, tracing the flow of money and doing the matching myself.
40. Furthermore, as the burden is on the defendant to account for the cheques, which she had admitted to have drawn, it is at least reasonable to allow her to obtain the assistance of an accountant to present comprehensive and logical accounts to defend herself at the trial. Such expert report, in my view, will certainly assist the trial judge to understand the evidence of the defendant. It will save time and costs for the trial than otherwise having the accountants to explain the matching and tracing of the accounts in court.
41. I am satisfied that the defendant has passed the two-stage test and Mr. Doman Wong’s expert report should be given leave to be adduced as evidence at trial.
42. Once I have come to this conclusion, the plaintiff’s argument on the procedural grounds will fall away. Practice Direction 5.2 is not applicable as the defendant has already obtained a draft expert report. This draft expert report was prepared before the court has granted leave to the defendant to adduce it as evidence. The defendant therefore prepared this expert report at her own risk that if the court refuses to grant her leave, she has to bear the cost for the expert report herself. It will be for the plaintiff to consider whether it will call an expert to respond to the defendant’s expert opinions.
43. As to the court’s power of appointing a single joint expert, this power cannot be taken away. However, it is quite apparent that a single joint expert, though convenient and costs-saving, would not be practicable for this matter. If the plaintiff is minded to have a single joint expert, it may consider agreeing to adopt Mr. Wong’s report, in which event, it will save time and costs for the trial. But this is entirely a matter for the plaintiff’s legal advisors.
44. I will therefore grant leave to the defendant to call Mr. Doman Wong as the expert for the defence and leave is granted to the defendant to adduce the expert report within 28 days from the date hereof. The plaintiff is at liberty to serve its own expert report in response to Mr. Wong’s expert report within 56 days from the date of service of the defendant’s expert report. The defendant is at liberty to serve an expert report in reply within 21 days thereafter. The costs of the expert reports should be in the cause of the Action.
THE PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION
45. As I have granted leave to the defendant to amend the Amended Defence, to serve the witness statement and the supplemental witness statements and to serve the expert report, there must be time for the plaintiff to take the corresponding steps in response to these changes. I agree with Mr. Chan that in those circumstances, the plaintiff’s application should not be considered until all outstanding interlocutory matters have been cleared.
46. I shall therefore adjourn the plaintiff’s summons, returnable on 12:00 noon on 11 December 2013 for the next Case Management Conference before myself.
COSTS
47. As to the costs of the defendant’s applications, the plaintiff submits that it agrees that the costs for the summons and the costs of and occasioned by the application for amendment be to the plaintiff and the costs for today’s hearing on amendment be to the defendant, who has succeeded. Mr. Chan has no objection to this proposal. I shall make an order as proposed. As to the costs for the witness statements and the expert report, the same basis will apply, that the costs of the application be to the plaintiff but the costs for today’s argument will be dealt with separately. What follow is the costs for today’s hearing. The plaintiff asks for costs on the basis that the defendant has only served the witness statements and draft expert report on the plaintiff late, causing this hearing inevitable. The defendant argues that if the plaintiff considers that it cannot have sufficient time to consider the defendant’s witness statement and expert report, the plaintiff should apply for an adjournment and the costs for the adjournment will be dealt with accordingly. However, since the plaintiff has elected to argue the case before the court today and it has failed, the costs for the argument should follow the event and must be given to the defendant. I agree. Costs is a matter at the discretion of the court. In considering the costs, the court has to take into consideration the factors under Order 62 rule 5, one of which is the parties’ conduct. Having taken into consideration of the circumstances, I consider that the costs for the defendant’s application relating to the witness statements and the expert report should be given to the defendant. But because of the conduct of the defendant in serving the materials late, the defendant’s costs for the witness statements and expert report applications be reduced by 20%. Since the defendant has not prepared the schedule of costs and the plaintiff’s schedule of costs may have to be amended because of the order here, I shall direct the parties to submit their schedules of costs (in revised form by the plaintiff) within 14 days from the date hereof. I shall then consider whether the summary assessment be made on paper or by way of oral hearing on a date to be fixed. On the question of two counsel as proposed by Mr. Chan, I consider that although there are a number of items in dispute, the legal arguments involved do not warrant the service of two counsel, with no disrespect to counsel for both parties, for whose assistance I am grateful.
ORDER
48. I shall make an order in terms as follows:
a. As per paragraphs 16, 21, 27, 30 and 44 supra.;
b. Costs as per paragraph 47.
| (K.W. Lung) | |
| Registrar, High Court |
Ms. Elizabeth Yang and Mr. Tony Chow, instructed by C.L. Chow & Macksion Chan, for the plaintiff
Mr. Kenneth Chan and Mr. Herbert Leung, instructed by Cheung, Fung & Hui, for the defendant